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1. INSULAR GOVERNMENT v.

ALDECOA
FACTS: In 1907, the government demanded from Aldecoa and Co., the possession of a
piece of land which had been formed by the action of the sea. Aldecoa and company
claimed ownership on the ground that the adjacent land was theirs, and that their
erection of a wall was responsible for the forming of the new parcel of land.
ISSUE: Whether the land in dispute was acquired illegally by the appellant that such
should be returned to the government.
HELD: The land produced by the action of the sea is of public ownership and cannot
therefore be acquired by any private person or entity inasmuch as same belongs to the
state.
Furthermore, the company did not ask government permission to set up the wall.

2. THE HEIRS OF PROCESO BAUTISTA v. SPOUSES BARZA


FACTS: Proceso Bautista applied for a fishpond permit which was then acknowledged by
the then Division of Fisheries. Said application, however was rejected after two years by
the same division because the said area applied for is needed for firewood production.
Subsequently, Barza applied for the same which was apparently approved. The Director
of Fisheries ordered Bautista to vacate the area however Barza should pay for the
improvements made by Bautista. Conversely, the latter refused alleging that such
amount is not proper. The dispute was transferred to the trial court which reversed the
action of the Director of Fisheries in favor of Bautista. The trial court averred that
decision of the Director f Fisheries became had all became stale because of the noncompliance of Barza corresponding to prescription.
ISSUE: Whether such action of the trial court reversing the decision of the Director of
Fisheries if valid.
HELD: Wherefore, the decision of trial court was reversed, affirming he decision of the
court of appeals. It should be stressed that the function of administering and disposing
of lands of the public domain in the manner prescribed by law is not entrusted to the
courts but to executive officials. 30 Matters involved in the grant, cancellation,
reinstatement and revision of fishpond licenses and permits are vested under the
executive supervision of the appropriate department head who in this case is the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

3. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CABANGIS


FACTS: a large parcel of land belonging to the predecessor of the herein claimants and
appellees. From the year 1896 said land began to wear away, due to the action of the
waves of Manila Bay, until the year 1901 when the said lots became completely
submerged in water in ordinary tides, and remained in such a state until 1912 when the
Government undertook the dredging
ISSUE: Whether the lots in questioned having disappeared on the account of the gradual
erosion due to the ebb and flow of the tide.
HELD: The Government dredged said estuary in order to facilitate navigation. Neither
the herein claimants-appellees nor their predecessors did anything to prevent their
destruction. In conclusion, then, we hold that the lots in question having disappeared on
account of the gradual erosion due to the ebb and flow of the tide, and having remained
in such a state until they were reclaimed from the sea by the filling in done by the
Government, they are public land.

4. REPUBLIC v. AMANDA VAT VDA.


FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the
government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation
proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the government
argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not
when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not
taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the
essential elements of the taking of property under the power of eminent domain,
namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more
than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has
entered and occupied the property as lessee.

HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings
commenced in 1959.

The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property,
(2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4)
devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it
in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and
occupied the property under a contract of lease.

5. SANTOS V. MORENO
FACTS: The Zobel family of Spain formerly owned vast track of marshland in the
municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga province. Ayala y Cia., sold a portion of Hacienda
San Esteban to Roman Santos who also transformed the swamp land into a fishpond. In
so doing, he closed and built dikes across Sapang Malauling Maragul, Quiorang Silab,
Pepangebunan, Bulacus, Nigui and Nasi. The closing of the man-made canals in
Hacienda San Esteban drew complaints from residents of the surrounding communities.
ISSUE: Whether the streams in question are public or private.
HELD: The channels of the streams in question which may be classified creeks belong to
the owners of Hacienda San Esteban. The said streams, considered as canals, of which
they originally were, are of private ownership. The case at bar should be differentiated
from those cases where it held illegal the closing and/or appropriation of rivers or
streams by owners of estates through which they flow for purposes of converting them
into fishponds or other works.23 In those cases, the watercourses which were
dammed were natural navigable streams and used habitually by the public for a long
time as a means of navigation. Consequently, they belong to the public domain

6. HILARIO V. CITY OF MANILA


FACTS: Jose Hilario was the original owner of the herein disputed property. Upon his
death, his son Hilario inherited the land, which is attached to a river. Thereupon, Hiliario
constructed bamboo dikes to prevent the waters of the river in entering the property.
However, a great inundation arisen which destroyed the dikes therein. Hilarion begun
operating sand and gravel plant within the premises which he succeeded from the US
Army. Representatives of the City of Manila prayed that Hilario shall be restrained from

the excavation in the said property. The latter alleged that the excavation was made
from the riverbed.
ISSUE: Whether the excavation and extraction made in the riverbanks by Hilario is
unauthorized because it is part of the public domain.
HELD: The excavation and extraction made by Hilario was legitimate because such
property belongs to him as the lawful owner/private owner. However, it is also declared
that such excavations made by the City of Manila is legitimate because excavation was
made within the premises of the riverbed, which is a part of the public domain.
7. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING
THE VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 386 OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO, BAGUIO
CITIZENS ACTION INC., and JUNIOR CHAMBER OF BAGUIO CITY, INC. v. THE CITY
COUNCIL AND CITY MAYOR OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO, respondents-appellees.
FACTS: Petitioners moved to nullify the Ordinance No. 386 declaring the squatters in
the City of Baguio as legitimate owners of the lot where they erected their residential
houses.
ISSUE: Whether the City Council has the power to legalize the illegal occupation of
public land
HELD: Certainly, there is more reason then to void the actions taken by the City of
Baguio through the questioned ordinance.
Being unquestionably a public land, no disposition thereof could be made by the City of
Baguio without prior legislative authority. It is the fundamental principle that the state
possesses plenary power in law to determine who shall be favored recipients of public
domain.
8. JACINTO VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
FACTS: This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Director of Lands to
execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the petitioner. The property was acquired
through public auction. Metropolitan Water District instituted proceedings in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal for the condemnation of certain parcels of land situated in the
municipality of Caloocan for the construction of an earth am and a first-class highway.
Nicanor Jacinto, was made a party defendant in the proceedings. He admitted the
existence of the right of condemnation and the necessity for the expropriation, but
demanded the sum of P64,839.33 as indemnity for the expropriation. As the actual

purchase price to be paid by the purchaser from the Government only amounts
P13,725, including interest, the Metropolitan Water District considered the petitioner's
demand excessive and declined to pay. In the month of July, 1926, the applicant
tendered payment to the Director of Lands, the petitioner insisting that, under Act No.
1120 as amended, he is entitled to a conveyance of the land upon payment of the
purchase price to the Government.
ISSUE: Whether the Director of lands has the power to execute deeds of conveyances
subject to expropriation.
HELD: The land in question is private or patrimonial property of the Philippine
Government and we can find no law specially enjoining upon the Director of Lands the
duty to execute deeds of conveyance to purchasers of such lands; Duty to execute
deeds of conveyance devolved upon the Governor-General.

9. CITY OF MANILA V. GARCIA


FACTS: Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land. Shortly after liberation from
1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge
and consent. There they lived thru the years to the present.
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the
property. Came the need for this school's expansion; it became pressing. On September
14, 1961, plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters'
houses on city property, gave each of defendants thirty (30) days to vacate and remove
his construction or improvement on the premises. This was followed by the City
Treasurer's demand on each defendant, made in February and March, 1962, for the
payment of the amount due by reason of the occupancy and to vacate in fifteen (15)
days. Defendants refused. Hence, this suit to recover possession.2 Defendants insist that
they have acquired the legal status of tenants.
ISSUE: Whether the intrusion of the defendant herein is lawful as they were able to
acquire permits from the city of manila.
HELD: Their homes were erected without city permits. These constructions are illegal.
Official approval of squatting should not, therefore, be permitted to obtain in this
country where there is an orderly form of government.
We, accordingly, rule that the Manila mayors did not have authority to give permits,
written or oral, to defendants, and that the permits herein granted are null and void.

That entry was not legalized by the permits. Their possession continued to remain illegal
from incipiency. Hence, no action for recovery of property shall ensue.

10. MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT V. COURT OF APPEALS


FACTS: