DEADLINE: FRIDAY 6AM

NIKKI
Cariaga vs. LTB
DOCTRINE: In order to recover under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff must allege the and prove the circumstance which the injury
caused arose from along with the invocation of Art. 1903 for the subsidiary liability of the employer. (not so sure bout this doctrine)
FACTS: At about 1pm on June 18, 1952, Bus No. 144 of Laguna Tayabas Bus & Co. (LTB) driven by Alfredo Moncada, left its station at
Azcarraga St., Manila for Laguna with Edgardo Cariaga, a 4th year med student from UST, as one of its passengers. At about 3pm, as the bus
reached that part of Poblacion Bay, Laguna, where the national highway cross a railroad track, it bumped against the engine of the train
then passing by with force that the first six wheels of the train were derailed, the engine and front part of the body of the bus was wrecked.
The driver of the bus died instantly, while many of the passengers including Edgardo, were severely injured.
Edgardo was first confined at the San Pablo City Hospital and was later taken to De los Santos Clinic, Quezon City. He got
transferred to UST hospital then back to De los Santos Clinic. Dr. Gustilo removed the removed the fractured bones which lacerated the
right frontal lobe of his brain and at the UST Hospital, Dr. Gustilo performed another operation to cover a big hole on the right frontal part
of the head with a tantalum plate. LTB paid for the hospital, medical and miscellaneous expenses incurred by Edgardo. He stayed in a
private house in QC and was given a daily allowance of P10.00.
He filed an action against LTB and MRR Co. and asked for P312,000.00 as actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages.
His parents also asked for damages in the amount of P18,000.00.
LOWER COURT: LTB liable. bus driver was negligent and that caused the accident. Cariagas appealed because the amount awarded was only
P10,490.00. The claim for damages of the parents was dismissed. LTB also appealed. Here, the lower court found the bus driver to be
negligent because when the train was 300 meters away from the bus, it blew its whistle four times - two long and two short blows. Another
LTB bus driver, driving another LTB bus, who witnessed the accident, testified that when he heard the whistle of the train, he stopped but
the LTB bus in this case did not stop and proceeded and tried to cross the railroad tracks thus causing the collision.
ISSUE: WON in action for breach of contract under a contract of carriage, the injured party may be awarded:
1.
moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code
2.
compensatory damages
3.
attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
HELD/RATIO:
1.
No, LTB cannot be held liable because it did not act fraudulently or in bad faith in connection therewith. LTB has exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees like the drivers of its buses in connection with the discharge of their
duties and so it must be considered an obligor in good faith.
Of course enumerated in the just quoted Article 2219 only the first two may have any bearing on the case at bar. We find,
however, with regard to the first that the defendant herein has not committed in connection with this case any "criminal offense resulting in
physical injuries". The one that committed the offense against the plaintiff is Gregorio Mira, and that is why he has been already prosecuted
and punished therefor. Altho (a) owners and managers of an establishment and enterprise are responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions; (b) employers are likewise
liable for damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned task (Article 218 of the Civil
Code); and (c) employers and corporations engaged in any kind of industry are subsidiary civilly liable for felonies committed by their
employees in the discharge of their duties (Art. 103, Revised Penal Code), plaintiff herein does not maintain this action under the provisions
of any of the articles of the codes just mentioned and against all the persons who might be liable for the damages caused, but as a result of
an admitted breach of contract of carriage and against the defendant employer alone. We, therefore, hold that the case at bar does not
come within the exception of paragraph 1, Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to
respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to
exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially in the legal viewpoint from the
presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by Article 1903 of the Civil Code (Art. 2180 of the new), which can be

rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection of supervision. Article 1903 is not applicable to obligations arising EX
CONTRACTU, but only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to CULPA
AQUILIANA'
2.
Yes, considering that the damage to the brain reduced Edgardos intelligence by 50%, the court increased the amount to
P25,000.0 taking into consideration the income he would have made when he could have been a doctor.
3.
Edgardo is not entitled to recover attorneys fees because this case does not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Article
2208 of the Civil Code.
JEROME

Pangasinan Transportation vs Legaspi

DOCTRINE: Article 2206 of the Civil Code states: The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. ...
Article 2206 applies in case of death caused by the breach of contract by the common carrier (Art. 1764). It fixes the minimum indemnity
for death at P3,000, which the courts may increase according to the circumstances. It is in fixing a greater amount of indemnity that
courts may consider the financial capacity of the common carrier, along with such other factors as (1) the life expectancy of the deceased
or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, (2) pecuniary loss to the plaintiff or beneficiary, (3) loss of support, (4) loss of service, (5) loss
of society, (6) mental suffering of beneficiaries, and (7) medical and funeral expenses
FACTS:
Civil Case No. A-247 and Civil Case No. A-248 were filed against the Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. (Pantranco) in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, for the recovery of damages for the death of Aurora Breguera and Welly Pua, wife and one-year old child,
respectively, of respondent Pua Pian, and for the death of Memia Chua, 18-year old daughter of respondents Chua Teck and Crispina
Breguera.
Plaintiffs alleged that Aurora Breguera, Welly Pua and Memia Chua boarded at Dasol, Pangasinan, Pantranco Bus No. 334, bound for the
town of Alaminos of the same province. They averred that before reaching Alaminos and just after rounding a blind curve, the bus driver,
Arsenio Osorio, "by reason of his gross negligence, serious imprudence and wanton recklessness, collided with another oncoming
passenger truck bus No. 306, likewise owned and operated by defendant (Pantranco)," causing Bus No. 334 to turn turtle several times
and that as a result of the accident, Aurora Breguera and the child Welly Pua suffered injuries from which they died shortly after the
accident, while Memia Chua died instantaneously.
Respondents prayed for various amounts of damages and alleged in their complaints "that defendant (Pantranco) is financially wellestablished having enormous assets and a huge income."
Answering the complaint, Pantranco contended that the accident was purely a force majeure beyond its control. It also alleged that "it is
an established concern."
During the trial, respondents asked the court to order the office manager of Pantranco to produce in court on December 5, 6 and 7, 1962,
between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., the company's general ledgers and financial statements for the years 1959, 1960 and 1961, for respondents
to inspect, examine or photograph. The motion was opposed by Pantranco on the ground that its financial capacity is not in issue.
TRIAL COURT RULING:
The court has no quarrel with counsel for the defendant that, under the above-quoted section 1, Rule 21 (now Rule 27) of the Rules of
Court, and decided cases, only documents, papers, books, letters, photographs, objects of tangible things "not privileged which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action" and which are in the possession of the party concerned

may, upon motion of any party, be ordered produced, inspected, copied or photographed. The Court, however, is of the opinion that
while the financial capacity of the defendant in these cases may not be necessary in the determination of the bare fact of whether or not
it is liable for the death of three victims, but that such financial capacity becomes relevant and necessary in determining a reasonable
equitable amount of compensation or damages that may be awarded to the heirs of the victims should the court be convinced that the
defendant company is liable thereof.
Hence this certiorari.
ISSUE: The issue is whether, in an action for damages for breach of contract of carriage, proof of the financial standing of the defendant is
necessary so as to justify a request for the production of the financial statements relating to the business of the defendant under Rule 27
of the Revised Rules of Court.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed and the writ of preliminary injunction is dissolved without pronouncement as
to costs.
RATIO:
Petitioner contends: the documents, consisting of general ledgers and financial statements of the company, are immaterial and irrelevant
to the issue of negligence and that to allow their production would be to sanction inquisition or "fishing expedition" into the financial
records of the company.
COURT: rule 27 permits fishing for evidence
MAIN ISSUE: the materiality of the evidence of defendant's financial standing in an action for breach of contract of carriage.

mishap that occasioned the death of passenger Aurora Breguera and the serious injuries of passenger Welly Pua. The circumstances thus
averred, if duly proved, would justify the award of damages "by way of example or correction, for the public good, in addition to the
moral ... or compensatory damages" (Art. 2229 in connection with Art. 2232). Since such additional corrective damages are at the
discretion of the Court (Art. 2233), the latter may properly inquire in this case into the pecuniary ability of the defendant in order to
determine what amount should be added to the normal indemnity, to serve as effective deterrent to induce defendant to exert more
diligence and care in the future.
But I must dissent in so far as the decision implies that inquiries into the resources of a defendant would be permissible whenever
damages, pecuniary or moral, are sought
To recapitulate: compensatory and moral damages can only be awarded to indemnify the victim or his relatives for the prejudice
suffered, and the financial standing of the person responsible is irrelevant to their evaluation. The omission in the Civil Code of any
reference to the defendant's pecuniary ability, as was heretofore done by Commonwealth Act No. 284, confirms this thesis. The ruling in
Alcantara vs. Surro, 93 Phil. 472, is predicated precisely on that Commonwealth Act, and not on the Civil Code now in force, and is
inapplicable. In so far as the award exceeds indemnification, it trenches on the sphere of corrective damages that are justified by other
special circumstances set out by the Civil Code.
I am constrained to insist on these principles, because the cases brought to this Court show a lamentable disregard of the carefully
structured system of damages of our Civil Code. A prime illustration is the complaint that initiated this case in the court below, where
nominal and compensatory damages are both prayed for; yet a modicum of common sense ought to show that damages cannot be both
nominal and actual at the same time (Civil Code, Article 2221).

COURT: Article 2206 of the Civil Code states: The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. ...
GAB
Article 2206 applies in case of death caused by the breach of contract by the common carrier (Art. 1764). It fixes the minimum indemnity
for death at P3,000, which the courts may increase according to the circumstances. It is in fixing a greater amount of indemnity that
courts may consider the financial capacity of the common carrier, along with such other factors as (1) the life expectancy of the deceased
or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, (2) pecuniary loss to the plaintiff or beneficiary, (3) loss of support, (4) loss of service, (5) loss
of society, (6) mental suffering of beneficiaries, and (7) medical and funeral expenses
Also under CA 284, - the civil liability or the death of a person shall be fixed by the competent court at a reasonable sum upon
consideration of the pecuniary situation of the party liable and other circumstances, X X X but not less than 2000 pesos.
From the foregoing, Of course, independently of its financial capacity, the common carrier, if liable, must be made to pay the minimum
amount. But if its financial ability is such that it can pay a greater amount of indemnity as demanded by the circumstances of the case,
then certainly it should be made to pay more than P3,000. Its financial standing in such a case is material.
Because of the abovementioned provisions, That is why in the prayer of their complaints, they asked the court, not for the minimum
indemnity of P3,000, but for such indemnity for the death of Aurora Breguera, Welly Pua and Memia Chua, as the Court may find proper
and reasonable." Their request therefore was for a good cause and the respondent Judge committed no abuse of discretion in granting it.
Separate Opinions
REYES J.B.L., J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the denial of the writ but solely on the basis that the original complaint for damages (Answer, Annex "I") expressly pleaded
(paragraph V) "gross negligence, serious imprudence and wanton recklessness" of the driver of the petitioner company as cause of the

Villa Rey Transit vs CA

Villa Rey Transit vs CA

Doctrine:
only net earnings, not gross earning, are to be considered5 that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of
such earnings or income6 and less living and other incidental expenses.7
Facts:
At about 1:30 in the morning of March 17, 1960, an Izuzu First Class passenger bus owned and operated by the VILLA REY, bearing Plate
No. TPU-14871-Bulacan and driven by Laureano Casim, left Lingayen, Pangasinan, for Manila. Among its paying passengers was the
deceased, Policronio Quintos, Jr. who sat on the first seat, second row, right side of the bus. At about 4:55 o'clock a.m. when the vehicle
was nearing the northern approach of the Sadsaran Bridge on the national highway in barrio Sto. Domingo, municipality of Minalin,
Pampanga, it frontally hit the rear side of a bullcart filled with hay. As a result the end of a bamboo pole placed on top of the hayload and
tied to the cart to hold it in place, hit the right side of the windshield of the bus. The protruding end of the bamboo pole, about 8 feet
long from the rear of the bullcart, penetrated through the glass windshield and landed on the face of Policronio Quintos, Jr. who, because
of the impact, fell from his seat and was sprawled on the floor. The pole landed on his left eye and the bone of the left side of his face
was fractured. He suffered other multiple wounds and was rendered unconscious due, among other causes to severe cerebral
concussion. Patrolman Bacani placed Policronio Quintos, Jr. and three other injured men who rode on the bullcart aboard the La Mallorca
bus to the hospital. Quintos died due to traumatic shock due to cerebral injuries
[GU3] Private respondents ,the sisters of the deceased, filed a case vs Vila Rey transit for breach of contract of carriage to recover 63k as
damages
Villa Rey argued that it was due to a fortuitous event but the CA and RTC found that it was due to the negligence of the driver.
TC and CA held that Petitioner Villa Rey is liable to plaintiff the amount of P63,750.00 as damages for breach of contract of carriage

Petitioner only contested the amount recoverable

Issue:How much is the amount of damages recoverable by private respondents herein. The determination of such amount depends,
mainly upon two (2) factors, namely: (1) the number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed and (2) the rate(net
earnings) at which the losses sustained by said respondents should be fixed.
The first factor was based by the TC and CA upon the life expectancy of Policronio Quintos, Jr., which was placed at 33-1/3 years he
being over 29 years of age (or around 30 years for purposes of computation) at the time of his demise by applying the formula (2/3 x
[80-30(his age) = life expectancy) adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the actuarial of Combined Experience Table
of Mortality. Upon the other hand, petitioner maintains that the lower courts had erred in adopting said formula and in not acting in
accordance with Alcantara v. Surro in which the damages were computed on a four (4) year basis
In responsnse to petitioners argument, the SC said the Alcantara case had not thereby laid down any rule on the length of time to be
used in the computation of damages. The SC held in that case
"(t)here can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life and the measure of
damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the
particular facts and circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary,
whichever is shorter, is an important factor.' (25 C.J.S. 1241.) Other factors that are usually considered are: (1)
pecuniary loss to plaintiff or beneficiary (25 C.J.S. 1243-1250) ; (2) loss of support (25 C.J.S., 1250-1251); (3) loss of
service (25 C.J.S. 1251-1254); (4) loss of society (25 C.J.S. 1254-1255); (5) mental suffering of beneficiaries (25 C.J.S.,
1258-1259) ; and (6) medical and funeral expenses (26 C.J.S., 1254-1260)."
Thus, life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also, an important element in fixing the amount recoverable by private respondents
herein. Although it is not the sole element determinative of said amount, no cogent reason has been given to warrant its disregard and
the adoption, in the case at bar, of a purely arbitrary standard, such as a four-year rule .
Petitioners Villa Rey argue that damages awarded will be paid now but the injury will be incurred later on
SC held that the force of the said argument of petitioner herein is offset by the fact that, although payment of the award in the case at
bar will have to take place upon the finality of the decision therein, the liability of petitioner herein had been fixed at the rate only of
P2,184.00 a year, which is the annual salary of Policronio Quintos, Jr. at the time of his death, as a young "training assistant" in the
Bacnotan Cement Industries, Inc. In other words, unlike the Alcantara case, on which petitioner relies, the lower courts did not consider,
in the present case, Policronio's potentiality and capacity to increase his future income.
At this juncture, it should be noted, also, that We are mainly concerned with the determination of the losses or damages sustained by
the private respondents, as dependents and intestate heirs of the deceased, and that said damages consist, not of the full amount of his
earnings, but of the support, they received or would have received from him had he not died in consequence of the negligence of
petitioner's agent.
In fixing the amount of that support, We must reckon with the "necessary expenses of his own living", which should be deducted from
his earnings. Thus, it has been consistently held that earning capacity, as an element of damages to one's estate for his death by wrongful
act is necessarily his net earning capacity or his capacity to acquire money, "less the necessary expense for his own living.3 Stated
otherwise, the amount recoverable is not loss of the entire earning, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the
beneficiary would have received.4 In other words, only net earnings, not gross earning, are to be considered5 that is, the total of the
earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income6 and less living and other incidental expenses.
All things considered, We are of the opinion that it is fair and reasonable to fix the deductible living and other expenses of the deceased
at the sum of P1,184.00 a year, or about P100.00 a month, and that, consequently, the loss sustained by his sisters may be roughly
estimated at P1,000.00 a year or P33,333.33 for the 33-1/3 years of his life expectancy. To this sum of P33,333.33, the following should
be added: (a) P12,000.00, pursuant to Arts. 104 and 107 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 2206 of our Civil Code, as
construed and applied by this Court;8 (b) P1,727.95, actually spent by private respondents for medical and burial expenses; and (c)
attorney's fee, which was fixed by the trial court, at P500.00, but which, in view of the appeal taken by petitioner herein, first to the
Court of Appeals and later to this Supreme Court, should be increased to P2,500.00. In other words, the amount adjudged in the decision
appealed from should be reduced to the aggregate sum of P49,561.28,

EM
Davila vs PAL
DOCTRINE: According to Article 2206, paragraph (1), of the Civil Code, "the defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of
the deceased and indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter." This Article, while referring to "damages for death caused by crime or
quasidelict," is expressly made applicable by Article 1764 "to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common
carrier."
FACTS:
There was a plane crash that involved PALs planes, the route of which was from Iloilo-Romblon-Manila. It crashed at Mt. Baco, Mindoro,
one hour and fifteen minutes after take-off. All passengers and crew of the said plane died.
The plane in this case was a DC-3 type of aircraft, manufactured in 1942 and acquired by the defendant in 1948. It had flown almost 18,000
hours at the time of its ill-fated flight. Despite its age, however, it had been certified as airworthy by the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
The petitioners of this case are the parents of Pedro Avila Jr. who was one of the passengers of this flight. At the time of his death, he was
single and 30 years of age. His life expectancy was 25 years.
The route prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Administration for the flight of the plane in the afternoon of November 23, 1960 was IloiloRomblon-Manila, the latter stage, denominated as airway "Amber I," being a straight lane from Romblon to Manila. The prescribed
elevation of the flight was 6,000 ft. The plane reported its position after take-off and again when it was abeam the Roxas homer. However, it
did not intercept airway "Amber I" over Romblon as it was supposed to do, and the pilot did not give his position then although Romblon
was a compulsory checking point. The fact was that the plane had deviated from the prescribed route by 32 miles to the west when it
crashed at Mt. Baco. The reading of the altimeter of the plane when its wreckage was found was 6,800 ft.
It was suggested that in the course of the flight between Romblon and Mindoro the aircraft was drifted westward by the cross-winds then
blowing in the region. The defendant, however, has not given a definite explanation as to why, if such was the case, the pilot failed to make
the necessary correction in his flight to compensate for the drift. According to the defendant's witness, Maj. Mijares, Chief of the Aviation
Safety Division of the Civil Aeronautics Administration and Chairman of the CAA Investigating Committee, there was a navigational error, to
which several factors contributed: "the weather observation at that time from the Weather Bureau was not so good between Mt. Baco and
Romblon and the wind aloft was quite strong, which would be also one of the causes for the drifting of the aircraft; and the other strong
probability, I would say, would be the malfunction of the aircraft's navigational instrument." He further explained that "a cross-wind can
drift the plane if the pilot will not make the necessary correction, if his navigational instrument is malfunctioning and the visual reference
outside the aircraft could not make the necessary corrections."
There is nothing in the testimony of Maj. Mijares to show just how strong the cross-winds were in the region at the time, although in the
investigation of the accident by the Senate Committee on transportation there was testimony that the cross-winds had a velocity of either
20 to 25 knots or 25 to 35 knots an hour. Considering the relatively short distance from Romblon to Mt. Baco and the brief span of time it
would take to fly that distance, cross-winds with the velocity stated could not have possibly deviated the plane by as much as 32 miles.
What is undisputed therefore is that the pilot did not follow the route prescribed for his flight, at least between Romblon and Manila. Since
up to that point over Romblon, where he was supposed to intersect airway "Amber I" the weather was clear, the most reasonable
conclusion is that his failure to do so was intentional, and that he probably wanted to fly on a straight line to Manila. It was a violation of aircraft traffic rules to which, under the circumstances, the accident may be directly attributable.
So, the Davila spouses filed an action for damages against PAL for the death of their son, and the CFI Iloilo awarded the spouses the
following sums:
(1) For the death of Pedro T. Davila, Jr. the amount of P6,000.00;
(2) For the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased at the rate of P12,000.00 per annum for five (5) years in the amount of Sixty
Thousand Pesos. (P60,000.00);
(3) For moral damages in favor of the plaintiffs Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00);
(4) For exemplary damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00);
(5) For actual damages the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) broken down to as follows: A rolex watch valued at P600.00; a pistol
worth P300.00; burial expenses P600.00; for the lot and the mausoleum P3,500.00;
(6) For Attorney's fees the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) or a total amount of One Hundred and One Thousand Pesos
(P101,000.00)

To pay the costs of this proceedings.

The Davila spouses appealed this ruling directly to the Supreme Court asking for an increase in the indemnity awarded for the death of their
son, while PAL asked for exoneration, if not mitigation, of such liability.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the pilot of PAL was Neglugent
(2) How much should be awarded to the Davila spouses?
HELD:
(1) PAL was negligent as its pilot failed to follow the established flight plan along the airway Amber I The pilot wanted to fly a straight
line to Manila and this deviation was a violation of air traffic rules.
(2) According to Article 2206, paragraph (1), of the Civil Code, "the defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased and indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter." This Article, while referring to "damages for death caused by crime or quasidelict," is expressly made applicable by Article 1764 "to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier."
The deceased, Pedro Davila, Jr., was single and 30 years of age when he died. At that age one's normal life expectancy is 33-1/3 years,
according to the formula (2/3 x [80-30]) adopted by this Court in the case of Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals on the basis of the
American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality. However, although the deceased was in
relatively good health, his medical history shows that he had complained of and been treated for such ailments as backaches, chest pains
and occasional feelings of tiredness. It is reasonable to make an allowance for these circumstances and consider, for purposes of this case, a
reduction of his life expectancy to 25 years.
In the same case of Villa Revenue Transit this Court stated:
"... earning capacity, as an element of damages to one's estate for his death by wrongful act is necessarily his net earning capacity or his
capacity to acquire money, less the necessary expense for his own living. Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is not loss of the entire
earnings, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have received. In other words, only net earnings,
not gross earnings, are to be considered, that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income
and less living and other incidental expenses."
Considering the fact that the deceased was getting his income from three (3) different sources, namely from managing a radio station, from
law practice and from farming, the expenses incidental to the generation of such income were necessarily more than if he had only one
source. Together with his living expenses, a deduction of P600.00 a month, or P7,200.00 a year, seems to Us reasonable, leaving a net yearly
income of P7,800.00. This amount, multiplied by 25 years, or P195,000.00 is the amount which should be awarded to the plaintiffs in this
particular respect.
Actual losses sustained consist of the following, as found by the trial court: "Rolex Watch P600.00; pistol P300.00; Burial Expenses
P600.00; and cost of cemetery lot and mausoleum - P3,500.00."
Under Article 2206, in relation to Article 1764, of the Civil Code, the parents of the deceased are entitled to moral damages for their mental
anguish. The trial court awarded P10,000.00 in this concept, and We find no justification to change the award, considering the long period of
uncertainty and suffering the plaintiffs underwent from November 23, when the plane crash occurred, to December 19, when they received
a letter from the defendant's president confirming the death of their son, and again to the following December 29, when his body was
finally recovered and taken back to them.
With respect to the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, it is Our opinion that the same should be eliminated. According to Article
2232 of the Civil Code, in contracts and quasi-contracts the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. The failure of the defendant here to exercise extraordinary diligence, as required by
law, does not amount to anyone of the circumstances contemplated in the said provision.
The trial court has awarded attorney's fees of P10,000.00. We do not find this award groundless or the amount thereof unreasonable.
The total of the different items above enumerated is P232,000.00. The judgment of the court a quo is therefore modified accordingly and
the defendant is ordered to pay the said amount to the plaintiffs, with legal interest thereon from the finality of this judgment. With costs
against the defendant.

EUNICE
FACTS:

PAL vs CA

On November 23, 1960, at 5:30 P.M., Starlight Flight No. 26 of the Philippine Air Lines (hereafter PAL) took off from the Manduriao Airport
in Iloilo, on its way to Manila, with 33 persons on board, including the plane's complement. The plane did not reach its destination but
crashed on Mt. Baco, Mindoro, one hour and fifteen minutes after takeoff .The plane was Identified as PI-C133, a DC-3 type aircraft
manufactured in 1942 and acquired by PAL in 1948. It had flown almost 18,000 hours at the time of its illfated flight. It had been certified as
airworthy by the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
Among the fatalities was Nicanor Padilla who was a passenger on the star crossed flight. He was 29 years old, single. His mother, Natividad
A. Vda. de Padilla, was his only legal heir.
As a result of her son's death, Mrs. Padilla filed a complaint (which was amended twice) against PAL, demanding payment of P600,000 as
actual and compensatory damages, plus exemplary damages and P60,000 as attorney's fees.
In its answer, PAL denied that the accident was caused by its negligence or that of any of the plane's flight crew, and that, moreover, the
damages sought were excessive and speculative.
**CASE ENUMERATED FOUR PARTIAL STIPULATIONS OF FACT (WILL INCLUDE ONLY THOSE WHICH ARE CONSIDERED RELEVANT FOR RECIT
AND CRAZY QUESTION PURPOSES)
Nicanor A. Padilla finished the elementary grades in 1943, high school in 1947, graduated the Reserve Officer's Course (Infantry Basic
Course) Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1949, and graduated with the degree of Bachelor of Literature in 1951 and the degree of
Bachelor of Laws in 1954, all in Ateneo de Manila.
He was admitted by the Supreme Court of the Philippines to practice law on January 28, 1955, and from January 1958, to the time of his
death on November 23, 1960, he was associated with the law offices of Senator Ambrosio Padilla, brother of his father, Alberto R. Padilla.
At the time of his death, he was the President and General Manager of the Padilla Shipping Co., Inc. He was also Vice-President and
Treasurer of the Allied Overseas Trading Co., Inc.
He was a member of the Board of Directors of the Junior Chamber of Commerce (Jaycees) International and Chairman of its Committee on
Governmental Affairs for the term 1960-1961. This Committee on Governmental Affairs published a pamphlet entitled "Good Government is
our Business," for which the deceased was named "Jaycee of the Month of January 1960."
The parties submitted different books regarding the life expectancy of Filipinos such as:
1.
the book written by Salvador B. Salvosa, M.S. University of Michigan and member of the Actuarial Society of the Philippine,
entitled; "Filipino Experience Mortality Table," the complete life expectancy of Filipinos
2.
Salvador B. Salvosa's "Filipino Experience Mortality Table," including the table of life expectancy are used by the Philippine
International life Insurance Co., the Sterling Life Insurance Co., the Cardinal Life Insurance Co., and Star life Insurance Co., and that the same
has been approved by the Insurance Commissioner for the use of life insurance companies doing business in the Philippines
3.
That the book of Nelson and Warren, Consulting Actuaries of St. Luis and Kansas cities, Missouri, entitled: "Principal Mortality
Tables", contains a table of comparison of complete life expectancy based on principal mortality tables used by life insurance companies
In addition to the stipulation of facts, private respondent (mother) testified that her son, Nicanor Padilla, prior to his death, was 29 years
old, single, in good health, President and General Manager of Padilla Shipping Company at Iloilo City, and a legal assistant of the Padilla Law
Office; that upon learning of the death of her son in the plane crash, she suffered shock and mental anguish, because her son who was still
single was living with her; and that Nicanor had a life insurance of P20,000, the proceeds of which were paid to his sister.

Eduardo Mate, manager of the Allied Overseas Trading Company, testified that the deceased, Nicanor Padilla, was one of the incorporators
of the company and also its vice-president and treasurer, receiving a monthly salary of P455.
Isaac M. Reyes, auditor of the Padilla Shipping Company, declared that the deceased was the President and General of the firm and received
a salary of P1,500 monthly.
TRIAL COURT: ordered PAL to pay PR(mother) the sum of Php 477,000.00for expected income of deceased, Php 10,000 as moral damages,
Php 10,000 as attorneys fees and to pay the costs.
CA: affirmed decision of RTC in toto.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent court erred in computing the awarded indemnity on the basis of the life expectancy of the late Nicanor Padilla
than on the life expectancy of PR? NO.

Following the procedure used by the Supreme Court in the case of Davila vs. PAL, 49 SCRA 497, the trial court determined the victims gross
annual income to be P23,100 based on his yearly salaries of P18,000 from the Padilla Shipping Company and P5,100 from the Allied
Overseas Trading Corporation. Considering that he was single, the court deducted P9,200 as yearly living expenses, resulting in a net income
of P13,900 (not P15,900 as erroneously stated in the decision). Since Nicanor Padilla was only 29 years old and in good health, the trial court
allowed him a life expectancy of 30 years. Multiplying his annual net income of P13,900 by his life expectancy of 30 years, the product is
P417,000 (not P477,000) which is the amount of death indemnity due his mother and only forced heir
The SC also took note of the fact that there has been a seriously long delay in the decision of the case, the PR is entitled to a legal interest
rate of 6% from the moment that the judgment of the TC was issued.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed with modification. The petitioner is ordered to pay the private respondent or her heirs death
indemnity in the sum of P417,000 (not P477,000), with legal rate of interest of 6% per annum from the date of the judgment on August 31,
1973, until it is fully paid. Costs against the petitioner.

HELD:
Petitioner relies on "the principle of law generally recognized and applied by the courts in the United States" that "the controlling element in
determining loss of earnings arising from death is, as established by authorities, the life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary,
whichever is shorter
However, resort to foreign jurisprudence would be proper only if no law or jurisprudence is available locally to settle a controversy. Even in
the absence of local statute and case law, foreign jurisprudence is only persuasive.

VANESSA

De Caliston vs CA

**RESOLUTION**
FACTS:

For the settlement of the issue at hand, there are enough applicable local laws and jurisprudence. Under Article 1764 and Article 2206(1) of
the Civil Code, the award of damages for death is computed on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased, not of his beneficiary. The
articles provide:
Art. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages.
Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.

Private respondent Geronimo Dalmacio, bus driver, ran over Juana Sonza Vda. de Darrocha (a USVA pensioner) who died instantly,
survived by her only child, Gloria Darrocha de Caliston (petitioner). Dalmacio was convicted by the CFI of Negros Occidental for
HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE. He was ordered to pay 15k for the death of the victim, 5k moral damages, 5k burial expenses
and 10k loss of pension. CA modified this by absolving Dalmacio from the payment of 10k for the loss of pension and credited him for the
5k he previously paid.

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi- delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there
may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

ISSUE: Whether the deletion of the 10k award for loss of pension is unjustified? YES. 10k award reinstated!

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the
latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death; . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

RULING:

Petitioners contention that Art. 2206 of the NCC must be proven by clear and satisfactory evidence is correct, but its perception that such
evidence was not presented in this case is WRONG!!

The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have
been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

The witnesses Mate and Reyes, who were respectively the manager and auditor of Allied Overseas Trading Company and Padilla Shipping
Company, were competent to testify on matters within their personal knowledge because of their positions, such as the income and salary
of the deceased, Nicanor A. Padilla. As observed by the Court of Appeals, since they were cross-examined by petitioner's counsel, any
objections to their competence and the admissibility of their testimonies, were deemed waived. The payrolls of the companies and the
decedent's income tax returns could, it is true, have constituted the best evidence of his salaries, but there is no rule disqualifying
competent officers of the corporation from testifying on the compensation of the deceased as an officer of the same corporation, and in any
event, no timely objection was made to their testimonies.

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shag be paid to the heirs of the
latter. . .

COMPUTATION PART: (just in case! This is a direct quote from the decision of the court)

Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code

The pension of the decedent being a sure income that was cut short by her death for which Dalmacio was responsible, the surviving heir
of the former is entitled to the award of 10k which is just equivalent to the pension the decedent would have received for one year if she
did not die.

On the other hand, the 5k paid to the petitioner by the insurer of the passenger bus which figured in the accident may be deemed to
have come from the bus owner who procured the insurance. Since the civil liability (ex-delicto) of the latter for the death caused by his
driver is subsidiary and, at bottom, arises from the same culpa, the insurance proceeds should be credited in favor of the errant driver.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted partially in that the P10,000.00 award for loss of pension deleted in
the appealed Court of Appeals decision is hereby reinstated.

KIKOY

De Lima vs LTB

G.R. No. L-35697-99 April 15, 1988

ELADlA DE LIMA, POTENCIANO REQUIJO, NEMESIO FLORES, REYNALDO REQUIJO, DOMINADOR REQUIJO and MARIO REQUIJO,
petitioners,
vs.
LAGUNA TAYABAS CO., CLARO SAMONTE, SANTIAGO SYJUCO, INC., (SEVEN-UP BOTTLING CO., OF THE PHILIPPINES) and PORVENIR
ABAJAR BARRETO, respondents.
Doctrine: Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract.
Facts:
This present action arose from a collision between a passenger bus of the Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. (LTB) and a delivery truck of the Seven-up
Bottling Co. of the Philippines which took place on June 3, 1958 resulting in the death of Petra de la Cruz and serious physical injuries of
Eladia de Lima and Nemesio Flores, all passengers of the LTB bus. Three civil suits were filed against herein respondents which were
consolidated for trial before the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
CFI- Ruled in favor of the petitioners awarding damages.
De Lima and Requijos filed an MR seeking an award of legal interest on the amounts adjudged in their favor from the date of the said
decision but their motion was not acted upon by the court a quo.
All of the plaintiffs voluntarily desisted from appealing the decision by reason of financial necessity and in the hope that the defendants LTB
Co. and its driver Claro Samonte will be persuaded to make immediate payment to them as adjudged by the court a quo. Only the said
defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
Defendants appealed, CA awarded legal interest but said interest will start from the date of the decision of the Court of Appeals to the time
of actual payment.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this decision seeking its modification so that the legal interest awarded by the Appellate, Court
will start to run from the date of the decision of the trial court on December 27, 1963 instead of January 31, 1972, the date of the decision
of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner potenciano Requijo as heir of the deceased Petra de la Cruz further sought an increase in the civil
indemnity of P3,000.00 to P 12,000.00.
CA- denied the motion for reconsideration holding that since the plaintiffs did not appeal from the failure of the court a quo to award
interest on the damages and that the court on its own discretion awarded such interest in view of Art. 2210 of the Civil Code, the effectivity
of the interest should not be rolled back to the time the decision of the court a quo was rendered.
Issue/s:
Did the CA err in granting legal interest on damages to start only from the date of its decision instead of from the date of the trial court's
decision? - Yes
Did the CA err in not increasing the indemnity for the death of Petra de La Cruz (in Civil Case No. SP-240) from P3,000 to P12,000.00.
Held:

- It is true that the rule is well-settled that a party cannot impugn the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him, and while he
may make counter assignment of errors, he can do so only to sustain the judgment on other grounds but not to seek modification or
reversal thereof, 6 for in such case he must appeal. 7 A party who does not appeal from the decision may not obtain any affirmative relief
from the appellate court other than what he has obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal. 8
However, respondents failed to note that the legal interest was awarded by the Appellate Court in its discretion based on equitable grounds
which is duly sanctioned by Art. 2210 of the Civil Code which provides
Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract.
We take note of the fact that petitioners are litigating as paupers. Although they may not have appealed, they had filed their motion for
reconsideration with the court a quo which unfortunately did not act on it. By reason of their indigence, they failed to appeal but petitioners
De Lima and Requijo had filed their manifestation making reference to the law and jurisprudence upon which they base their prayer for
relief while petitioner Flores filed his brief.
Pleadings as well as remedial laws should be construed liberally in order that the litigants may have ample opportunity to pursue their
respective claims and that a possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities may be avoided.
- Civil indemnity for the death of Petra de la Cruz was properly awarded by virtue of Art. 1764 in relation to Art. 2206 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines which allows a minimum indemnity of P3,000.00 for the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common
carrier. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence the indemnity of P3,000.00 should be increased to P30,000.00 and not P12,000.00 as
prayed for by petitioner.
If the transportation company had only accepted the judgment of the trial court and paid its just awards instead of appealing the same to
the Court of Appeals, no further delay would have been occasioned on the simple issue of interest and indemnity. To mitigate the impact of
such a great delay in this case the Court finds ample justification in the aforesaid award for interest and indemnity. We hope this relief is not
too late.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, the subject decision is modified in that the legal interest on the damages
awarded to petitioners commences from the date of the decision of the court a quo until actual payment while the civil indemnity for the
death of Petra de la Cruz is increased to P 30,000.00. This judgment is immediately executory and no motion for extension of time to file
motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.

JEROME
Sulpicio vs CA
DOCTRINE: It is true that under Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, only deaths caused by a crime as quasi delict are entitled
to actual and compensatory damages without the need of proof of the said damages. Said Article provides:
a.
The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi delict shall be at least Three Thousand Pesos, even though there may
have been mitigating circumstances. . . .
however, Article 1764 thereof, expressly makes Article 2206 applicable "to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by
a common carrier." Accordingly, a common carrier is liable for actual or compensatory damages under Article 2206 in relation to Article
1764 of the Civil Code for deaths of its passengers caused by the breach of the contract of transportation.
FACTS:
1.
CA found:
2.
October 23, 1988: plaintiff Tito Duran Tabuquilde ("Tito") and his three-year old daughter Jennifer Anne boarded the M/V Dona
Marilyn at North Harbor, Manila, bringing with them several pieces of luggage.
3.
MORNING OF OCTOBER 24, 1988: the M/V Dona Marilyn, while in transit, encountered inclement weather which caused huge
waves due to Typhoon Unsang.
4.
Notwithstanding the fact that Storm Signal No. 2 had been raised by the PAG-ASA authorities over Leyte as early as 5:30 P.M. of
October 23, 1988 and which signal was raised to Signal No. 3 by 10 P.M. of the same day, the ship captain ordered the vessel to proceed
to Tacloban when prudence dictated that he should have taken it to the nearest port for shelter, thus violating his duty to exercise
extraordinary diligence in the carrying of passengers safely to their destination.

5.
At about the same time, plaintiff-appellee Angelina Tabuquilde ("Angelina") mother of Jennifer Anne, contacted the Sulpicio Office
to verify radio reports that the vessel M/V Dona Marilyn was missing.
a.
Employees of said Sulpicio Lines assured her that the ship was merely "hiding" thereby assuaging her anxiety.
6.
AROUND 2:00 P.M. of October 24, 1988: vessel capsized, throwing plaintiff-appellee Tito and Jennifer Anne, along with hundreds
of passengers, into the tumultuous sea.
7.
TITO LOST JENNIFER: Tito tried to keep himself and his daughter afloat but to no avail as the waves got stronger and he was
subsequently separated from his daughter despite his efforts.
8.
He found himself on Almagro Island in Samar the next day at round 11:00 A.M. and immediately searched for his daughter among
the survivors in the island, but the search proved fruitless.
9.
IN THE MEANTIME: Angelina tried to seek the assistance of the Sulpicio Lines in Manila did not work.
a.
Angelina spent sleepless nights worrying about her husband Tito and daughter Jennifer Anne in view of the refusal of Sulpicio Lines
to release a verification of the sinking of the ship.
10. October 26, 1988: Tito and other survivors in the Almagro Island were fetched and were brought to Tacloban Medical Center for
treatment.
11. October 31, 1988: Tito reported the loss of his daughter, was informed that the corpse of a child with his daughter's description had
been found.
a.
Tito wrote a letter to his wife, saying that Jennifer Anne was dead. Angelina suffered from shock and severe grief.
12. The coffin bearing the corpse of Jennifer Anne was buried in Tanauan, Leyte in November.
13. Afterwards, a claim for damages was filed by Tito with the defendant Sulpicio Lines in connection with the death of the plaintiffappellee's daughter and the loss of Tito's belongings worth P27,580.00.
RTC: decision in favor of the plaintiffs. CA: affirmed. MR: denied.
the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. Q-89-3048 in favor of the plaintiffs Tito Duran Tabuquilde and Angelina de Paz
Tabuquilde (private respondents herein) and against defendant Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (petitioner herein) ordering defendant to pay
P27,580.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00 for the death of Jennifer Tabuquilde, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs.
ISSUE: THE PROPRIETY OF THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT
HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of P27,580.00 as actual
damages for the loss of the contents of the pieces of baggage is deleted and that the award of P30,000.00 under Article 2206 in relation
Article 1764 is increased to P50,000.00.
RATIO:
1.
In the case at bench, the trial court merely mentioned the fact of the loss and the value of the contents of the pieces of baggage
without stating the evidence on which it based its findings.
2.
There is no showing that the value of the contents of the lost pieces of baggage was based on the bill of lading or was previously
declared by respondent Tito D. Tabuquilde before he boarded the ship. Hence, there can be no basis to award actual damages in the
amount of P27,850.00.
3.
The CA was correct in confirming the award of damages for the death of the daughter of private respondents, a passenger on
board the stricken vessel of petitioner.
4.
It is true that under Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, only deaths caused by a crime as quasi delict are entitled to
actual and compensatory damages without the need of proof of the said damages. Said Article provides:
a.
The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi delict shall be at least Three Thousand Pesos, even though there may
have been mitigating circumstances. . . .
5.
Deducing alone from said provision, one can conclude that damages arising from culpa contractual are not compensable without
proof of special damages sustained by the heirs of the victim.
6.
However, the Civil Code, in Article 1764 thereof, expressly makes Article 2206 applicable "to the death of a passenger caused by
the breach of contract by a common carrier." Accordingly, a common carrier is liable for actual or compensatory damages under Article
2206 in relation to Article 1764 of the Civil Code for deaths of its passengers caused by the breach of the contract of transportation.

7.
The trial court awarded an indemnity of P30,000.00 for the death of the daughter of private respondents. The award of damages
under Article 2206 has been increased to P50,000.00.
With respect to the award of moral damages, the general rule is that said damages are not recoverable in culpa contractual except when
the presence of bad faith was proven. However, in breach of contract of carriage, moral damages may be recovered when it results in the
death of a passenger
With respect to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2232 of the Civil Code of the Philippines gives the Court the discretion to grant
said damages in breach of contract when the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent and reckless manner
8.
A common carrier is obliged to transport its passengers to their destinations with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person.
The trial court found that petitioner failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of a common carrier, which resulted in the
sinking of the M/V Dona Marilyn.
9.
The crew of the vessel M/V Dona Marilyn took a calculated risk when it proceeded despite the typhoon brewing somewhere in the
general direction to which the vessel was going. The crew assumed a greater risk when, instead of dropping anchor in or at the periphery
of the Port of Calapan, or returning to the port of Manila which is nearer, proceeded on its voyage on the assumption that it will be able
to beat and race with the typhoon and reach its destination before it (Unsang) passes.
GAB

Cervantes vs CA

Cervantes vs CA and PAL

On March 27, 1989, the private respondent, Philippines Air Lines, Inc. (PAL), issued to the herein petitioner, Nicholas Cervantes (Cervantes),
a round trip plane ticket for Manila-Honolulu-Los Angeles-Honolulu-Manila, which ticket expressly provided an expiry of date of one year
from issuance, i.e., until March 27, 1990. The issuance of the said plane ticket was in compliance with a Compromise Agreement in two
previous [GU1] suits
[GU1] 4days before the expiration date of the ticket, petitioner used it. Upon arrival at LA,he booked his La-Manila flight adnd it was
confirmed at april 2 1990.
[GU1] Petitione made arrangements with PAL for him to board the flight in san Francisco instead of LA,
On April 2, 1990, when the petitioner checked in at the PAL counter in San Francisco, he was not allowed to board. The PAL personnel
concerned marked the following notation on his ticket: "TICKET NOT ACCEPTED DUE EXPIRATION OF VALIDITY."[GU2]
[GU2] petitionr filed a case for breach of Contract of Carriage with the RTC of surigao but was dismissed and CA affirmed
1.MAIN ISSUE: w/n there was a breach of contract of carriage- NO
2.ISSUE RELATED: Whether or not the denial of the award for damages was proper.[GU3] -IT WAS PROPER
RATIO:
1. The plane ticket itself provides that it is not valid after March 27, 1990[GU4]
Since the PAL agents are not privy to the said Agreement and petitioner knew that a written request to the legal counsel of PAL was
necessary, he cannot use what the PAL agents did to his advantage. The said agents, according to the Court of Appeals, 10 acted without
authority when they confirmed the flights of the petitioner.[GU5]
Under Article 1989 11 of the New Civil Code, the acts an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal[GU6]
2. an award of damages is improper because petitioner failed to show that PAL acted in bad faith in refusing to allow him to board its plane
in San Francisco[GU7] .
In awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage, the breach must be wanton and deliberately injurious or the one responsible
acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. 14 Petitioner knew there was a strong possibility that he could not use the subject ticket, so

much so that he bought a back-up ticket to ensure his departure. Should there be a finding of bad faith, we are of the opinion that it should
be on the petitioner. What the employees of PAL did was one of simple negligence. No injury resulted on the part of petitioner because he
had a back-up ticket should PAL refuse to accommodate him with the use of subject ticket[GU8] .(so this means simple negligence isnt a
basis for moral damages but gross negligence amounts to bad faith)
Neither can the claim for exemplary damages be upheld. Such kind of damages is imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good, and the existence of bad faith is established. The wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be
allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner. 15 Here, there is no showing that PAL acted in
such a manner. An award for attorney's fees is also improper.[GU9]