40344775

Originality
Author(s): Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein

Source: Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, No. 6 (Oct., 2009), pp. 1505-1550
Published by: Virginia Law Review
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ORIGINALITY
and Alex Stein**
GideonParchomovsky*
law thatcalibrates
a modelof copyright
thisArticlewe introduce
and liabilities
totheleveloforiginality
in theirworks.
authors'rights
We advocatethismodelas a substitute
fortheextantregimethatunthe
toall workssatisfying
equalprotection
grants
justlyandinefficiently
yy
standard.
Under
our
"modicumof creativity
model,highlyoriginal
and theirauthorswillalso be
workswillreceiveenhancedprotection
works.Conversely,
ausheltered
fromsuitsby ownersofpreexisting
incur
and
thorsoflessoriginalworkswillreceivediminished
protection
thisproposal
Weoperationalize
liability.
exposureto copyright
greater
forworksexhibitoriginalworks,
separaterulesforhighly
bydesigning
are
works
that
and
minimally
originalor
ingaverageoriginality, for
our
rules9
illustrate
We
applicationby showinghow they
unoriginal.
casesina socially
in
classic
decisions
couldhavealteredcourt
copyright
way.
beneficial
turnstile
revolve,the"authorshould
"[T]o makethecopyright
the
box
havetodepositmorethana pennyin
BenjaminKaplan1
Introduction
A workmust
is the sine qua non of copyrightability.
Originality
it
is
a
be originalto receivecopyright
Yet,
veryminimal
protection.
to show that
needs
author
an
To prove originality,
requirement.2
*
Professor,Universityof PennsylvaniaLaw School; Bar-Ilan UniversityFacultyof

Law, Israel.
George W. CrawfordVisitingProfessorof Law, Yale Law School. Professorot
Law, Cardozo Law School. We thankBarton Beebe, Abraham Bell, Ben Depoorter,
discusBob Ellickson,JimGibson, Bobbi Kwall, and Peter Siegelman forinsightful
sions and comments,and Taly Dvorkis and Lital Helman forsuperb researchassistance.
1An
UnhurriedView of Copyright46 (1967).
2
See Bleisteinv. Donaldson LithographingCo., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) ("Personand a verymodestgrade of art
even in handwriting,
expressesits singularity
ality
That somethinghe may
alone.
man's
is
one
which
in
it
has
somethingirreducible,
copyright ") (Holmes, J.).
1505

1506
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
the expressionforwhichprotectionis soughtoriginatedwithher

and was notcopiedfromsomeoneelse. Once thisshowingis made,
an authoronlyneedsto demonstrate
thatherexpressioncontainsa
modicumof creativity3
and thatit was fixedin a tangiblemedium
of expression4
in orderto enjoythefullpanoplyof exclusiverights
and benefitsundercopyright
law. Protectionis grantedindiscrimito
all
nately
expressiveworks,whetherhighlyor onlyminimally
original.5
law failsto take the nextstep and calibratethescope
Copyright
of the copyright
protectionto the degreeof thework'soriginality.
under
the extantregimeis a mere thresholdrequireOriginality
The problem
ment,and,moreover,one thatcan be easilysatisfied.6
withthe existingdesignis that by rewardingminimallyoriginal
worksand highlyoriginalworksalike,thelaw incentivizes
authors
to produceworkscontaining
to
receive
just enoughoriginality
pro- but not more. This resultis neitherefficientnor just.
tection
Whetherone subscribesto utilitarian
law or
theoriesof copyright
to desert-based
it
that
identical
treatment
of
justifications,appears
all works,regardlessof thelevel of originality,
is a misguidedidea.
From an efficiency
perspective,the currentapproachincentivizes
productionof too manyworksat the low end of the originality
Froma
spectrumand a suboptimalnumberoftrulyoriginalworks.7
3
See Feist Publ'ns,Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) ("Original,
as the termis used in copyright,
means onlythatthe workwas independentlycreated
bythe author. . . and thatitpossesses at least some minimaldegreeof creativity.").
See 17 U.S.C. 102(a) (2006) (makingeligibleforcopyrightprotectionany original work of authorship"fixedin any tangiblemediumof expression,now knownor
laterdeveloped,fromwhichtheycan be perceived,reproduced,or otherwisecommueitherdirectlyor withthe aid of a machineor device").
nicated,
5
We believe thatownersof unoriginalworkswould sufferlesserdamage fromcopyThe prospectof lesser damage could potentiallyincrease an inrightinfringements.
fringer'schances to defeat the owner's suit by the "fairuse" defense.Cf. Harper &
Row, Publishers,Inc. v. Nation Enters.,471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (observingthat"'the
effectof the use upon the potentialmarketforor value of the copyrighted
work' ... is
undoubtedlythe singlemost importantelementof fairuse"). While thisfactorcould
mitigatethe overbreadthof copyright
protection,it does so haphazardlyand in a very
limitedway.
6
Cf. Douglas Lichtman,Copyrightas a Rule of Evidence,52 Duke L.J. 683, 704-16
(2003) (rationalizingthe minimalistoriginalityrequirementas a cost-savingevidentiarydevice thatallows courtsto denyprotectionto worksnot exhibitingdistinctiveness thatmakes it easv to establishcopying).
7
For discussion,see infraPartII.

2009]
Originality
1507
thedistortion
fairnessperspective,
maybe even greateras thejust
rewardof authorswho made a significant
to societyis
contribution
to
be
much
than
for
those
who
made
a relatively
greater
supposed
contribution.8
insignificant
In thisArticlewe set out to designa workablecopyright
system
thatcalibratesauthors'protectionand liabilityto the originality
level of theirworks.9We do not propose to revampthe current
We acceptthetwoconstituent
oforiginality.
definition
elementsof
- independentcreationby the authorand creativthatdefinition
ratherthanthresholds,
and then
ity- buttreatthemas continuums,
of
in
rules
and
accordance
the
copyright
protection
liability
vary
ofworks.Underour proposeddesign,
withthedegreeof creativity
authorsof highlyoriginalworkswillnot onlyreceivegreaterprotection,but will also be shelteredfromliabilityif sued for inworks.Conversely,
creatorsof
fringement
byownersofpreexisting
will
little
receive
protectionand incur
minimallyoriginalworks
ifsued byothers.
greaterexposureto liability
To operationalizeourvisionofcopyright
law,we introducethree
standardswithevidenthat
combine
substantive
mechanisms
legal
tiaryrules.Althougheach of our mechanismsis designeddifferently,theyall sharethecommongoal ofinducingcreationof original expression,either by rewardingauthorsof highlycreative
worksor bypenalizingauthorsof minimally
originalor completely
ones.
unoriginal
Our firstmechanismis called "thedoctrineofinequivalents"and
is designedto affordthe maximumdegreeof protectionto excepuniquely
tionallyoriginalworks.Authorsofworksthatincorporate
will not onlyreceivethe maximum
and creativity
highoriginality
8For
discussionof thisidea, see infraPartII.
9
For a more restrictiveapproach that importsthe patent law nonobviousnessrequirementinto copyrightlaw, see JosephScott Miller,HoistingOriginality,32 Cardozo L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
For discussionsof thisproposal,see JustinHughes,
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1361040.
Should Copyright'sOriginalityStandard be Sort-ofNon-obviousness?2 (Apr. 5,
2009) (unpublished manuscript,available at http://blog.richmond.edu/ipi/articleRoberta Rosenthal Kwall, Hoisting Originality:A Response 1
1/commentators/);
available at http://blog.richmond.edu/ipi/article(Apr. 2009) (unpublishedmanuscript,
see also Roberta RosenthalKwall, Originalityin Context,44 Hous.
1/commentators/);
L. Rev. 871, 874 (2007) (analyzingthe relationshipbetweenthe minimalistoriginality
law and moralrights).
standardof copyright

1508
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
butwillalso be shelteredfromliabilpossiblecopyright
protection,
for
the
of
others.
works
ity infringing
Our secondmechanism,
"the added value doctrine,"willgovern
actions
infringement
involvingworksof standardor averageorigiof
nality.It will requirecourtsto comparethe relativeoriginality
the plaintiff's
workwiththatof the defendant.If a courtdeterminesthattheoriginalcontribution
of thedefendantis equal to or
willbe deniedinjuncthan
that
of
the
the
greater
plaintiff, plaintiff
tive reliefand be awarded marketvalue compensationinstead.
This remedialshiftfrominjunctionsto damages10
is designedto
balance thecompetingdemandsof worksof averageoriginality
by
ensuringthatoriginalworksare notsuppressedfromthemarket.
Our thirdand finalmechanism,"the samenessrule,"willregulate copyrightconflictsthat involve minimallyoriginalor nonoriginalworks.The rule will create a rebuttablepresumptionof
work containingminimal
copyingwhen an allegedlyinfringing
is substantively
similarto the plaintiffswork.The preoriginality
will
if the defendantsuccessfully
be
removed
showsinsumption
creation
or
the
a
existence
of
common
source
dependent
prior
fromwhichbothworksare borrowed.
As we will demonstrate,
of our proposedmeimplementation
chanismswillincreasethebenefitsand reducethecostsassociated
withcopyright
protection.
By puttinga positiveand a negativepremiumon originality,
our framework
willencouragecreatorsto focus on the originalcontentof theirworksand therebyenhance
theircontributions
to society.At the same time,our proposalwill
also scale back theprotection
currently
grantedto multipleexisting
worksand by so doingwillclear the pathforfuturecreativity.
Indeed, we will show how our mechanismscould have alteredthe
cases in a waythatmighthave benefitanalysisof classiccopyright
ted society.
It shouldbe emphasizedthatin designingour mechanisms,
we
were mindfulof the constraintsfaced by adjudicatorsand were
10
The classic taxonomyof Calabresi and Melamed would categorizethisshiftas a
substitution
of the property-rule
protectionfora liabilityrule. See Guido Calabresi &
A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, LiabilityRules, and Inalienability:One View
of the Cathedral,85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1092-93, 1105-07 (1972). For a detailed discussion of the possibilityand desirabilityof such substitutions,
see Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky,
PliabilityRules, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 59-64 (2002).

2009]
Originality
1509
therefore
carefulto craftthemin a waythatwillenable theiruse in
the adoptionof our framework
will not require
Hence,
practice.
to
make
determinations
do
not
make already,
adjudicators
they
nor willit requirethemto opine on the inherentvalue of art and
expressionmorethantheydo so now.
theArticleunfoldsin threeparts.In PartI, we will
Structurally,
discussthe overbreadthproblemof the extantcopyright
regime
and its adverseeffecton futurecreativity.
We willshowthatover
timetheprotectionaccordedto existingauthorshas becomeexcesto undermine
siveto thepointthatitthreatens
law's very
copyright
a
rich
In
domain.
Part
of
II, we will
goal underwriting
expressive
make the theoreticalcase for a copyright
systemthat correlates
We positthatbothefprotectionand liabilityto works'originality.
fairness-based
and
justifications
supportthis vision.We
ficiency
to
this
visionof copyright
law
willalso identify
possibleobjections
thattheseobjectionsare not compelling.We will
and demonstrate
in
thenspecifythedesignprinciplesthatshouldguidepolicymakers
in
law.
Part
we
an
III,
copyright Finally,
creating originality-based
forreforming
willintroduceourspecificmechanisms
law,
copyright
in practice,and demonstrate
explainhowtheycan be implemented
theirsuperiorityover the existinglegal rules and adjudicatory
tools.
I. Copyright's Overbreadth
of a propertyregime,it is
In assessingthe breadth,or strength,
to pay heed to fourdistinctaspectsoftheproblem.First,
important
one mustlook at therulesgoverningacquisitionof rights.Second,
one mustanalyzethe scope of rights(or dominion)of the owner.
Third,one mustexaminethe ease withwhichthe ownermaysucassertherrightsagainstothers.Finally,one mustconsider
cessfully
the remediesthe law grantsto an ownerwhose rightshave been
law fromthisperspectivereveals
violated.Looking at copyright
thatright-holders
enjoyverybroad protectionon each dimension
and evenmoreso in theaggregate.
maywell be the
Begin withthe rulesof acquisition.Copyrights
law
sets
twomainpreto
easiestproperty
rights acquire.Copyright
in
which
rightsare
requisitesfor acquisitionof rights:the work

1510
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
soughtmustbe originaland mustbe fixedin a tangiblemediumof

forobtainBothrequirements
seta verylow threshold
expression.11
in
even
combination.
The
ing protection,
originality
requirement
demandsthatthe personseekingcopyright
protectionoriginated
thework.Restatedin the negative,originality
requiresthata person wishingto obtainrightsin a workof expressiondid not copy
theworkfromsomeoneelse. In thelandmarkdecisionFeistv. RutheSupremeCourtraisedtheoriginality
bar somewhatbyinral,12
the requirement
to incorporatea demandfor"a moditerpreting
cum of creativity."13
Therefore,to satisfythe requirementafter
Feist,an authorneeds to show thatshe composedher workand
thatitcontainsa minimalamountofcreativity.
The fixationrequirementis even easier to meet. Under the
Act,fixationdoes notrequirea specificform:anyphysiCopyright
cal embodimentsatisfiesthe requirement.Furthermore,
the law
does not requirea permanentor even long-lasting
fixation.Quite
the contrary,
even temporary
or transientfixationthatlastsfora
verybriefperiod of time will suffice.For example,in MAI v.
Peak14theNinthCircuitruledthata temporary
copyofa program,
a
as
generatedby turning computeron, qualifies fixationunderthe
Act, even thoughthe copyvanishesonce the computer
Copyright
is turnedoff.15
It shouldbe noted thatoriginality
and fixation,the "gatekeepers" of copyright
fall
shortof the "gatekeepers"employedby
law,
to be useful,novel,and
patentlaw. Patentlaw requiresinventions
nonobviousto "a personhavingordinary
skillin theart."16
The usefulnessrequirement
ensuresthattheclaimedinventionsucceedsin
11
17 U.S.C. 102(a) (2006).
12
See Feist Publ'ns,Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
13
Id. at 346.
14
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer,Inc.,991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 518 ("[B]y showingthatPeak loads the softwareinto the RAM and is then
able to view the systemerrorlog and diagnose the problemwiththe computer,MAI
has adequately shown that the representationcreated in the RAM is 'sufficiently
permanentor stable to permitit to be perceived,reproduced,or otherwisecommunicated fora period of morethantransitory
duration.'").
16
35 U.S.C. 103(a) (2006); see also RobertP. Merges & RichardR. Nelson,On the
Complex Economics of PatentScope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, 844 (1990) ("To be patentable an inventionmustmeet all the statutoryrequirementsforpatentability:
novelty,utilityand non-obviousness.").

2009]
Originality
1511
The
attainingthe goal or functiondescribedin the application.17
invention
in
that
an
must
be
new
prescribes
noveltyrequirement
the
nonobviousness
orderto qualifyforpatentprotection.18
Finally,
requirementobliges an inventorto prove that her innovation
overthepriorart.19
Unlikecopymarksa non-trivial
improvement
inventions
to
examination
to
law
law,
undergo
right patent requires
ensure compliancewiththe statutoryprerequisitespriorto the
an examinalaw neverincorporated
Copyright
grantofprotection.
is notrequired
tionprocessand,strictly
speaking,even registration
are
It shouldbe notedhere thatcopyrights
to secureprotection.20
the
Their
rest
of
world.
the
that
avail
in
rem
recogniagainst
rights
As rightsin rem,copyrights
tionis notcostfree.21
imposea dutyon
all membersof our societyto complywiththerightsof theholder.
This effectis ofparticularnote in a democraticsocietysincecopy17
See 35 U.S.C. 101 (2006); see also In re Fisher,421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2005). Additionally,the inventionmustbe workable,since inoperativeor nonsensical
inventionswill not be considereduseful.See CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int'l Corp., 349
F.3d 1333,1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
18
See 35 U.S.C. 102 (2006); see also RichardA. Mann et al., StartingfromScratch:
A Lawyer's Guide to Representinga Start-UpCompany,56 Ark. L. Rev. 773, 785
(2004) ("The noveltyrequirementmeans thatthe inventionmustbe new and not previouslypatented,described,or otherwiseanticipated.");David W. Opderbeck,Patent
Damages Reformand the Shape of PatentLaw, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 127, 168 (2009) (explainingthatan invention"is non-obviousonly if,giventhe state of all the relevant
priorart at the timeof the invention,a person of ordinaryskillin the art would consider the inventionnon-obvious"and that "the patent examineror the court is required to put itselfintothe shoes of a personof ordinaryskillin the art at the timeof
... of the claimed invention's
the inventionin order to make the ... determination
over the priorart").
contribution'
'specific
19
See 35 U.S.C. 103 (2006); Graham v. JohnDeere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966)
("Under 103, the scope and contentof the prior art are to be determined;differences betweenthepriorartand the claimsat issue are to be ascertained;and the level
of ordinaryskillin the pertinentart resolved.Againstthisbackground,the obviousness or nonobviousnessof the subject matteris determined.Such secondaryconsiderationsas commercialsuccess,long feltbut unsolved needs, failureof others,etc.,
mightbe utilizedto give lightto the circumstancessurroundingthe originof the subject mattersoughtto be patented.");see also KSR Int'l Co. v. TeleflexInc., 550 U.S.
398, 415-26 (2007) (applyingGraham's criteriaand invalidatingpatent on obviousness grounds).
20
See 17 U.S.C. 408(a) (2006). Registrationof copyrightsstill provides owners
withpracticaladvantages.See infranote 50.
21
Cf. JamesWilson,Could therebe a Rightto Own IntellectualProperty?,28 L. &
thatthe moral case forrecognizingintellectualpropPhil. 393 (2009) (demonstrating
ertyownershipis also farfromobvious).

1512
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
since
rightsconstrainothers'freedomof expression.Furthermore,
law
the
owners
exclusive
it
raises
specterof
copyright grants
rights
who
value
worksat
As
a
certain
users
result,
monopolistic
pricing.
more thantheircompetitiveprice,but are unwillingor unable to
pay the right-holder's
extortionary
premium,will not acquire the
works.Finally,copyrights
costs.Some
also generateenforcement
of thesecosts are borneby the copyright
but
holdersthemselves,
othersare shoulderedby society.The state puts its law enforce- courts,agencies,and thepolice- at the disposal
mentmachinery
of copyright
holdersin orderto help themvindicatetheirrights
and generatedeterrenceagainstputativeinfringers.
As far as the aspect of dominionis concerned,copyright
law
grantsto authorssix exclusiverightsin theirworks.Section106 of
the Copyright
Act confersupon authorstherightof reproduction,
adaptation,distribution,
public performance,
public display,and
These exdigitalperformance
(in the case of sound recordings).22
clusiverightsdo not exhaustall possibleuses of expressiveworks:
forexample,one can freelyperform
a workprivately
or consumea
workby readingor listeningto it. Yet, theydo put a verywide
range of activitiesunder the exclusivecontrolof the copyright
owner.23
To be sure,theAct also setscertainlimitations
on thedominion
of theowner.But thelimitations
are eitherverynarrowand specior veryvague and complex.25
fic24
As ProfessorJamesGibson re2217U.S.C. 106
(2006).
23Id.
Suchnarrowexceptions
worksin the
include,interalia, theuse of copyrighted
framework
ofnonprofit,
face-to-face
informative
events,nonprofit
teaching
religious
or
broadcasts
fortheblind.See 17U.S.C. 108,110(2006).
services,
25For public17 U.S.C. 107 definesa
example,
generalexceptionforthe "fairuse" of
whichrequirescourtsto employa balancing
testthatincludesfour
works,
copyrighted
The scope and limitsof thefairuse standardhave been subjectto
specificfactors.
variousdebatesand criticism
lackofclarity.
See, e.g.,
owingmainlyto thedoctrine's
BartonBeebe,An EmpiricalStudyofU.S. Copyright
FairUse Opinions,1978-2005,
156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549,549-50(2008) (describing
thefairuse doctrine
as enigmatic
anddeveloping
an empirical
accountofitsapplications
bycourts);see also Lawrence
meanstheright
to hire
Lessig,FreeCulture187(2004)("[F]airuseinAmericasimply
a lawyer "); GideonParchomovsky
& KevinA. Goldman,FairUse Harbors,93
Va. L. Rev. 1483,1484-91(2007) (attesting
thatapplications
ofthefairuse doctrine
are unpredictable
and proposing
ofnonexclusive
establishment
rulesthat
bright-line
willdefineperse fairuses); cf.17 U.S.C. 115 (2006) (statingthecomplexmechanismsforcompulsory
licenses).

2009]
Originality
1513
ofrightsand limitations
in theCopycentlynoted,thearchitecture
in
Act
combination
with
the
ease
of
and the
right
suinginfringers
remediesprovidedby theAct,whichwe discussbelow- generates
an unceasingdynamicof expansionof the copyright
holders'dominionat theexpenseofusers.26
Gibsondemonstrated
Specifically,
thatthe vaguenessof the variouslimitationsand defensesgenerated a highdegreeof uncertainty
thescope
amongusersregarding
whichin turnpromptedthemto pay
and contentoftheirprivileges,
ownersa licensefeeratherthanrisklitigation.27
copyright
are also limitedin time.28
But the currentprotection
Copyrights
- lifeof the authorplus 70 years- givescopyright
term
ownersat
least99.8% ofthevalue theycouldextractiftheprotection
wereto
as life expectancyincreases,so
last in perpetuity.29
Furthermore,
willthetermof theprotection.
Finally,thereis alwaysa possibility
thatCongresswilldecideto extendthetermas it has severaltimes
in thepast.30
Hence,thefinitedurationprovisois no longera meanlimitation
on the dominionof copyright
owners,and in the
ingful
- ifit has not become so
irrelevant
futureit maybecome virtually
already.
Let us turnto the thirdaspect: the ease withwhichcopyright
ownerscan vindicatetheirrightsagainstputativeinfringers.
Here,
in
To
succeed
an
favors
law
too, copyright
infringement
plaintiffs.
needs to showcopyingand improperappropriation
suit,a plaintiff
The terminology,
however,is misleading.Imporbythedefendant.
to proveactualcopying.Innot
do
courts
requireplaintiffs
tantly,
as proxiesforcopying.Acand
access
courts
use
stead,
similarity
in orderto prevailin an infringement
suit,the plaintiff
cordingly,
needs to showthatthe defendanthad access to herworkand that
betweenthe two works.Access in copyright
thereare similarities
evidence.
is
actions
typically
provedbycircumstantial
infringement
was
If the plaintiffsworkachievedcommercialsuccess,or
widely
26
See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and RightsAccretionin IntellectualProperty
116 Yale L.J.882,884 (2007).
Law,
27
Id. at 887-906.
28
17 U.S.C. 302
29 Eldred v. (2006). 537 U.S.
See
186,255-56 (2003) (Breyer,J.,dissenting).
Ashcroft,
Congressextendedthe durationof copyrightsin several instances,principallyin
1831,1909,1976,and 1998. See Eldred,537 U.S. at 192,222 (2003) (dismissingconstitutionalchallengesto the CopyrightTerm ExtensionAct of 1998).

1514
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
liaccess will be inferred.31

Furthermore,
disseminated,
copyright
the
Innoof
defendant.
does
not
on
the
mental
state
ability
depend
centcopyingand even subconsciouscopyingsufficeto giveriseto
law thuseffectively
establishesa strictliability
liability.32
Copyright
regime.33
This reThe plaintiff
also mustprove improperappropriation.
borrowed
the
show
the
defendant
to
that
quires
plaintiff
protected
elementsfromherwork.This showingis necessaryto ensurethat
thesimilarity
betweenthetwoworksis not due to thepresenceof
the same unprotected
elementsin bothworks.On its face,the unlawfulappropriation
check
inquirymayappear to be an important
on the power of copyrightowners to bringinfringement
suits
however,
againstothers.The unlawfulappropriation
requirement,
does not raise a significant
bar forplaintiffs.
As one commentator
observed,"new creativeworksalmostinvariablyborrowfromold
on the
creativeworks,whichraisesthe possibility
of infringement
partoftheborrower."34
As forthe fourthand finalaspect,remedies,copyright
law furnishesan impressivearrayof remediesto successfulplaintiffs,
inand
Courts
also
cludinginjunctions supra-compensatory
damages.35
have broaddiscretionto issuepreliminary
Whilepreinjunctions.36
are
difficult
to
secure
in
other
courts
contexts,
injunctions
liminary
tendto grantthemas a matterof coursein copyright
infringement
cases withoutrequiringa showingof irreparableharm,so long as
theplaintiff
can demonstrate
a likelihoodofsuccesson themerits.37
The ease withwhichpreliminary
are issuedin copyright
injunctions
cases
is
since
mostcases do not go
infringement
highlysignificant
31Three
BoysMusicCorp.v. Bolton,212F.3d477,482-83(9thCir.2000).
32Id. at 482-85
of liability
forsubconscious
(affirming
imposition
copying);Bright
TunesMusicCorp.v. Harrisongs
Music,420 F. Supp. 177,180-81(S.D.N.Y. 1976)
the copyright
in the
(holdingGeorgeHarrisonliableforsubconsciously
infringing
see Olufunmilayo
B. Arewa,The Freedomto Copy:
plaintiffs
song).For criticism,
CreationandContext,
41 U.C. DavisL. Rev.477,531-39(2007).
Copyright,
3
inthePublicDomain,50 B.C. L. Rev.139,152
See,e.g.,DavidFagundes,
Crystals
remainsa strictliability
and evena
(2009) ("Directcopyright
offense,
infringement
minorunauthorized
use can resultin majorliability
iftheownerhas regisrelatively
teredtheworkandchoosesto claimstatutory
damages.").
34
Gibson,supranote26,at 887.
35See
17U.S.C. 502-505(2006).
36
Id.
37 502.
Gibson,supranote 26, at 890.

2009]
Originality
1515
mostdebeyondthisstage.Faced witha preliminary

injunction,
fendantselectnotto proceedwiththetrialand choose to settlethe
case instead.38
In addition,theCopyright
Act allowssuccessfulplaintiffs
to collectboththe compensationforthe losses theysufferedas a result
as well as the defendants'profits.40
In the alof the infringement,39
the
Act
entitles
to
seek
ternative,
plaintiffs
statutorydamages
withoutproofof harm.The Act prescribesthatstatutory
damages
whileleaving
mustrangefrom$750to $150,000perworkinfringed,
to set theactualamountbased on thecircumcourtsthediscretion
stancesof thecase.41Finally,theAct authorizescourtsto orderthe
and destruction
ofinfringing
articles.42
impounding
In lightofthisanalysis,it is not at all surprising
thatmanycopybelieve
that
scholars
copyright
protectiongoes overboard.43
right
virtual
consensus
is
there
Indeed,
amongtheoriststhatcopyright
law offersexcessiveprotectionto existingauthorsand does so at
the expenseof futurecreators.ProfessorYochai Benkler,forexlaw,
ample, has decriedthe "enclosuremovement"in copyright
works
that
were
considuses
of
out
that
many
expressive
pointing
ered legitimatein the past can no longerbe carriedout without
to thesame dynamic,
Referring
permissionfromtheright-holder.44
ProfessorPamela Samuelsoncolorfullytermedit the "copyright
Moreover,ProfessorLawrenceLessigcautionedthatifthe
grab."45
38Id. at 944-45.Gibsonnotesthat
to
takeadvantageofcourts'willingness
plaintiffs
in orderto "keep[]cases fromreachinga substantive
issuepreliminary
injunctions
thatmight
ruling
clarify
feedback-fueling
grayareas."Id.
3917U.S.C.
504(b)
(2006).
40Id.
41Id.
amounta
the maximum
is not willful,
504(c)(l)-(2). If the infringement
award
forgoodminimum
The
Id.
is
can
collect
$30,000.
504(c)(l).
damage
plaintiff
is $200.Id. 504(c)(2).
faithinfringements
42Id. 503.
43
Paradox54-80(2008) (discussing
Netanel,Copyright's
See, e.g.,Neil Weinstock
WhiteGoo, 31 Colum.
Jessica
Litman,
Billowing
ungainly
expansion");
"copyright's
lawunderwent
thatrights
J.L.& Arts587,587 (2008)(attesting
bycopyright
granted
Naoverthepastfifty
Infringement
years);JohnTehranian,
expansion
extraordinary
Reformand the Law/Norm
tion:Copyright
Gap, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 537, 543^8
are
forcopyright
andliability
thatcopyright
infringement
protection
(2007)(attesting
excessive).
Constraints
Free as theAirto CommonUse: FirstAmendment
YochaiBenkler,
on EnclosureofthePublicDomain,74 N.Y.U. L. Rev.354,354-60(1999).
45Pamela
The Copyright
Grab,Wired,Jan.1996,at 134.
Samuelson,

1516
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
trendof expansionin copyright

law is not arrested,it willput futurecreativity
at risk.46
Siva
Finally,
Vaidhyanathanbest captured
the essence of the problemwhen he concludedthat"[copyright]
law has lostsightof itsoriginalcharge:to encouragecreativity,
science, and democracy [it] rewardsworksalreadycreatedand
limitsworksyetto be created."47
In thenextPart,we developa proposalto redesigncopyright
law
in a way thatfixesthisdefect.Specifically,
we make a case fora
copyright
regimethatcorrelatesauthors'protectionand potential
and creativity
in theirworks.We
liabilityto thelevel of originality
demonstrate
thatourproposalhas thepotentialnotonlyto remedy
the overbreadth
law,but
problemthatcurrently
plaguescopyright
also to enhancethe originality
and creativity
of expressiveworks
and thusenrichthedomainsofart,culture,and technology.
II. Originality-Based Copyrights
In thisPart,we layout a normative
case forcorrelating
copyright
of worksof authorship.
protectionand liabilitywiththe originality
We submitthat originality-based
copyrightlaw can curtailthe
overbreadth
we
discussed
in
PartI, as well as improvethe
problem
and
fairness
of
the
current
utility
regime.
Our definition
of originality
is qualitatively
similarto thatused
subsistsin independently
createdexpresby thecourts.Originality
siveelementsand embodiesa demandfora certainlevelofcreativwe conceiveoforiginality
ity.Ratherthana threshold
requirement,
as a continuum
and set out to redesigncopyright
law in accordance
withthisvision.We arguethata highleveloforiginality
shouldentitlethe authorto a higherdegreeof protectionagainstunauthorized uses,as well as shelterher,to varyingdegrees,againstliability
for borrowingfromothers.Conversely,a low originalitylevel
shouldqualifyauthorsto minimalprotectionunderthe Copyright
Act and expose themto enhancedliabilityif theyborrowedfrom
works.48
preexisting
46Lawrence
Lessig,The FutureofIdeas:The Fate oftheCommonsin a Connected
World(2001).
47Siva
and Copywrongs:
The Rise ofIntellectual
Vaidhyanathan,
Copyrights
PropandHowitThreatens
4
erty
Creativity
(2001).
4 Cf.Gideon
& AlexStein,TortsandInnovation,
107Mich.L. Rev.
Parchomovsky
tortliability
rulesas taxesandsubsidiesforinno285,288-90(2008)(conceptualizing

2009]
Originality
1517
criterion
fora numberof reasons.The
We adopt the originality
firstreason is benefitto society.United States copyrightlaw is
grounded in utilitarianphilosophy.The IntellectualProperty
Clause in the Constitution
grantsCongressthe power "[t]o promotethe Progressof Science and usefulArts,by securingforlimited Times to Authorsand Inventorsthe exclusiveRightto their
and Discoveries."49
On thisview,copyright
prorespectiveWritings
an
Its
raison
d'etreis to enrichthe domeans
to
end.
tectionis a
mainof expressionand therebyimprovethe well-beingof society.
Naturally,onlyoriginalworkspromotesocial welfare.Societyhas
no interestin protecting
unoriginalworksthateffectno advancementsin art,literature,
science,education,or otherusefulendeavors.
The analysisshould not stop here,however.Under the extant
is a merethreshold
and,moreover,
requirement,
regime,originality
as well.The problemwith
one thatminimally
originalworkssatisfy
levelsof
betweendifferent
thisdesignis thatit failsto differentiate
works
and
highlyorigiminimally
original
By rewarding
originality.
nal worksalike, the existinglaw incentivizesauthorsto produce
but
to receiveprotection,
workscontaining
just enoughoriginality
notmore.Froma societalviewpoint,
however,thedegreeof origithe
more
matters.
originalworksgeneratea
Presumably,
nality
is not embeddedin the
fact
this
for
benefit
society.Yet,
greater
currentregime.If societywishesto encourageauthorsto produce
highlyoriginalworksand not settleforthe bare minimumnecesit mustreflectthispreferencein the desaryto secureprotection,
it
That
law.
the
of
is, oughtto increasethe amountof protecsign
tion and decrease the potentialliabilityof authorswhose works
it oughtto dea highdegreeoforiginality.
Conversely,
incorporate
creasetheamountofprotectionand increasethepotentialliability
of authorswho produceminimally
originalworks.These measures
the
willpromptauthorsto focuson
factor,and thereby
originality
withthebroadersocialinterest.
aligntheirprivateinterests
forour proposalhas to do withcost.
An additionaljustification
protectiongeneratesfourtypesof cost.The firsttypeis
Copyright
on
andusersofconventional
knowledge,
vators,on theone hand,andforreplicators
theotherhand,andcallingfortheremovalofrulesthatchillinnovation).
49U.S. Const,art.
I, 8,cl.8.

1518
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
thecostof establishing
a systemof copyright
and maintaining
protection.To enable the systemto operate,it was necessaryto pass
elaboratelegislationthatdefinesthe relevantrights,powers,and
privilegesof authors.Then,it became necessaryto set up a special
theregadministrative
Office,to administer
agency,theCopyright
the
istrationof rights.50
Like otheradministrative
agencies,
CopyrightOfficeis fundedby society.Societyalso bears the cost of
criminalenforcement
and of the resoviolators51
againstcopyright
lutionof privatecopyright
disputesthatfindtheirwayto thecourt
system.
The secondtypeof costis monopolistic
pricing.At leastin some
its
of
bestowsupon
cases,copyright
law,through grant exclusivity,
right-holders
enoughmarketpowerto chargemonopolisticsupraAs a result,somebuyerswhowouldhave purprices.52
competitive
50
Althoughregistrationis no longermandatory,it offersthreedistinctbenefitsto
copyrightowners.First,it establishesprimafacie evidenceof the validityof the copyrightand of the facts stated in the certificatein judicial proceedings. 17 U.S.C.
410(c) (2006). Second, subject to certainexceptions,it serves as a prerequisitefor
suit.Id. 411(a). Third,it servesas a precondicommencinga copyrightinfringement
tionforawardingstatutorydamages and attorney'sfees in judicial proceedings,while
of actual damages and profitsis available in the absence of registration.
onlyan award
Id. 412. '
See, e.g., Id. 506, 1204(a). Congressrecentlyshowed an inclinationto expand
criminalliabilityfor copyrightviolations. See Eric Goldman, Warez Trading and
CriminalCopyrightInfringement,
51 J. CopyrightSoc'y USA 395, 396 (2004). This
The recentPro-IP Act,
developmentwill increasethe costs of criminalenforcement.
called the Prioritizing
Resources and OrganizationforIntellectualProperty
officially
Act of 2008, exacerbates those costs by stiffening
the penalties for all intellectual
propertyviolationsand by appointinga special "IP Czar" to oversee the enforcement
of those penalties.Pub. L. No. 110-403,122 Stat. 4256 (codifiedas amended in scatteredsectionsof 15 U.S.C. and 17 U.S.C. (2006)).
52
See, e.g., SJ. Liebowitz,CopyrightLaw, Photocopying,and Price Discrimination,
8 Res. L. & Econ. 181, 184 (1986) (associatingcopyrightownershipwithpricingmonopoly); ChristopherSprigman,Reform(aliz)ingCopyright,57 Stan. L. Rev. 485, 524
(2004) (explainingthat copyright"creates deadweightlosses in marketsfor expression" because "exclusive rights. . . enable the creatorto charge a supracompetitive
price" and "[consequently,access to the workwillbe denied to those who value it in
excess of the competitiveprice,but less than the supracompetitive
price thatthe monopolist is able to command"); see also Michael Abramowicz,A Theory of Copyright'sDerivativeRightand Related Doctrines,90 Minn. L. Rev. 317, 325-32 (2005)
effectsof copyright'sderivativerightsand whetherthe
(analyzinganti-competitive
rights'benefitsoffsetthose effects);ChristopherS. Yoo, Copyrightand ProductDifferentiation,79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 212, 220-24 (2004) (arguing for a "differentiated
as a basis formonopolisticcompetition).
products"model forcopyrights

2009]
Originality
1519
worksat theircompetitiveprice mustforego

chased copyrighted
and do withouttheworks.
thetransaction
Thiscostis relatedto,yet
The thirdcostis politicalrent-seeking.
a
of
the
distinct
from, problem monopoly.By providing
analytically
thatallowsforsupra-competitive
profits,
copyright
legal structure
law creates rents over which various interestgroups compete.
It divertsreRent-seekingis an inherentlywastefulactivity.53
as
sourcesto non-productive
uses,such politicallobbying,thatoften yieldsociallysuboptimallegislationor regulation.54
Indeed, as
ProfessorJessicaLitmanhas pointedout, interest-group
politics
play a key role in shapingour copyrightlaw,55and manyother
scholarsbelieve thatthe CopyrightTerm ExtensionAct of 1998
was poweredthrough
byDisney.56
on
The fourthand finalcost is the adverseimpactof copyright
The magnitudeof thiscostis a directfunctionof
futurecreativity.
the breadthof copyright
protectionaccordedto existingauthors.
thecostlieritbecomesfor
The broaderthescope oftheprotection,
In
a worldwithextremely
their
works.
to
authors
produce
aspiring
have to createcomwill
either
authors
broad protection,
aspiring
pletelyoriginalworksor securepermissionfrompriorauthors.As
53
See RobertD. Tollison,Rent Seeking:A Survey,35 Kyklos575, 576 (1982).
Fred McChesneysuccinctlydescribedit as moneytor nothing, bee rred b. McChesney,Money forNothing:Politicians,Rent Extraction,and PoliticalExtortion3
(1997).
See JessicaD. Litman,Copyright,Compromise,and LegislativeHistory,72 Cornell L. Rev. 857, 903 (1987) (claimingthat in consideringthe 1976 CopyrightAct,
Congress relied heavilyon industryspecialists);Jessica Litman,Revising Copyright
Law forthe InformationAge, 75 Or. L. Rev. 19, 22-23 (1996) (demonstrating
copyplayers).
rightlaws' bias in favorof industry
ProfessorLessig termedthe legislationthe "Mickey Mouse ProtectionAct. See
Lawrence Lessig,Copyright'sFirstAmendment,48 UCLA L. Rev. 1057,1065 (2001);
see also JessicaLitman,Digital Copyright23 (2001) (describingDisney's lobbyingeffortat protectingMickey Mouse for an additional twentyyears); Lawrence Lessig,
How I Lost the Big One, Legal Affairs,Mar.-Apr.2004, at 57, 58; ChristopherSprigman,The Mouse thatAte the Public Domain: Disney,The CopyrightTerm Extension
Act, and Eldred v. Ashcroft, FindLaw's Writ, Mar. 5, 2002, http://
("Rather than allow
writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020305_sprigman.html
Mickey and friendsto enterthe public domain, Disney and its friends a group of
- told Concontent
owners
PACs
and
music
labels,
studios,
representing
Hollywood
bill
passed. Promptedperhaps by the Disney
gress that they wanted an extension
- more than $6.3 millionin 1997-98, accash
of
donations
lavish
campaign
group's
cordingto the nonprofitCenter forResponsive Politics- Congresspassed and PresidentClintonsignedthe SonnyBono CopyrightTerm ExtensionAct.").

1520
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
is thecase withanyproperty
regime,theneed to securepermission
conmaygiverise to the spectreof holdups.But in the copyright
text,a greaterproblemlurks:thevastnessof theuniverseof copytherelevant
rightedworksmakesit virtually
impossibleto identify
and negotiatewiththem.Worseyet,thesamereason
rights-holders
makesit impracticable
forfutureauthorsto engagein comprehensive preemptionsearches,withoutwhichtheycan neverbe sure
thattheirworksare completely
original.
Our proposaldoes notconcernthefirstthreecosts;it targetsthe
fourth.Given the highinformation
costs thatexistin the fieldof
the
workable
law,57 only
copyright
wayto affordelbowroomforfuture creatorsis by narrowingcopyright
protectionbased on the
criterion.Varyingprotectionbased on originality
will
originality
reducethe abilityof authorsof minimally
works
to
bring
original
suits againstsubsequentcreators.This should help
infringement
clearthepathforfutureauthorsby loweringthecostofproducing
new works.In property
parlance,it maybe said thatour proposal
seeks to minimizethe blockingeffectof priorexpressiveassetsby
theirsize.58Our proposal can also be justifiedon
reconfiguring
fairnessgrounds.Economic justifications
focus almostinvariably
on individuals'ex ante incentivesforaction.59
Fairness-basedjustiin contrast,
take
an
ex
A
fications,
predominantly
post approach.60
fairness-driven
that
is
often
invoked
to
theory
justify
copyright
protectionfocuseson desert.Underthistheory,authorsdeserveto be
rewardedfortheirlabor and the contribution
theymade to soci-
57See Clarisa
Costsin PatentandCopyright,
90 Va. L. Rev.465,
Long,Information
500-18(2004) (explaining
thatcopyright
law imposeshighinformation
costson potentialinfringers,
butalso reducesthosecostsbyallowingindependent-creation
and
otherdefenses
todefeatowners'suits).
See generally
AbrahamBell & GideonParchomovsky,
in
Reconfiguring
Property
ThreeDimensions,
75 U. Chi.L. Rev. 1015,1051-53(2008)Gustifying
and
regulation
othermeasuresagainstowner-initiated
ofassetsthatimposeexternalconfigurations
itieson others).
59See MarkA.
forIntellectual
Lemley,Ex AnteVersusEx PostJustifications
Prop71 U. Chi.L. Rev. 129,129-30(2004);see also Mazerv. Stein,347U.S. 201,219
erty,
behindtheclauseempowering
(1954) ("The economicphilosophy
Congressto grant
is theconviction
thatencouragement
of individual
effort
patentsand copyrights
by
is thebestwayto advancepublicwelfare ").
personal
gain
60See FrankH.
Foreword:The Courtand theEconomicSystem,
98
Easterbrook,
Harv.L. Rev.4, 11 (1984).

2009]
Originality
1521
Fromthisperspective,
too, an author'srewardsshouldcorreety.61
or hercontribution
late witheitherhereffort
to society.Awarding
the same protectionto worksthatare highlyoriginaland works
thatexhibitscantoriginality
(or no originality
whatsoever)is unfair.Allowingauthorsof minimallyoriginalworksto block the
creationof novel works,more originalthantheirs,is also unjust.
This unfairnessis farfrombeing an unavoidableconsequenceof
ownership.The existenceand scope of copyright
copyright
protectionare bothmattersofsocial choice,and societyshouldmakethis
choice wisely.It can and shouldconditionthatprotectionon the
size ofthebenefitthattheprotectedworkbringsto society.
A workable originality-based
systemof copyrightprotection
and commitment.
The system'srulesmust
mustcombineflexibility
be flexibleenoughto allowcourtsto adjusttheprotectionof copyRigidruleswouldimpair
rightedworksto theirlevel of originality.
to
make
these
the adjudicators'ability
case-specificadjustments.
Courts' decisionson copyrightliabilityand remediescannot be
though.The systemneedsto giveauthors
discretionary,
completely
on theground
a credibleassurancethatitsprotectionof copyright
Failwork's
to
the
willactuallycorrespond
originality.
underlying
ure to providethisassurancewouldnot allow the systemto elimithatexistunderextantlaw.
natetheperverseincentives
and commitment
Our systemattainsthetwingoals of flexibility
stanthe
substantive
between
It createsa synergy
to originality.
rulesthatimpledardsof copyright
protectionand the evidentiary
The substantivestandardswe recommend
mentthosestandards.62
are flexible.They will allow courtsto make case-by-caseassessments of works' originality.Evidentiaryrules that accompany
influencecourts'decisionsin fathosestandardswillsystematically
vor of originalcreatorsand againstauthorswhose worksexhibit
61See Justin
77 Geo. LJ. 287,297ofIntellectual
Property,
Hughes,The Philosophy
accountoflabor-based
andcomprehensive
an insightful
310 (1988)(providing
justifiArtistic
Creasee also CherylSwack,Safeguarding
cationsof intellectual
property);
of DroitMoralBetweenFranceand
tionand theCulturalHeritage:A Comparison
the UnitedStates,22 Colum.J.L. & Arts361, 361-62 (1998) (discussingartists'
intheirartwork).
"moralrights"
62This
& AlexStein,OverenfromRichardA. Bierschbach
originates
methodology
of Evi93 Geo. LJ. 1743,1746(2005);see also Alex Stein,Foundations
forcement,
rulesto opthecapacityofevidentiary
denceLaw 17-25,133-53(2005) (explicating
theriskoferrorinadjudicative
timizelaw-enforcement
fact-finding).
byallocating

1522
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
scant or no originality.
This skewingwill crediblysignalthe system'scommitment
to originality.
Developersof originalworkswill
be
able
to
count
on
and benefitfromthatcommitconsequently
ment.
Beforewe introduceour specificmechanisms
forimproving
coplaw,we wishto addresstwopossibleobjections.The firstobyright
jectionis predicatedon the concernthatour proposalmaylead to
excessiveoriginality.
This objectionquestionsthe utilityof legal
rules designedto induce authorsto produce originalworks.Arwhichwill
guably,those rulesmayforceout excessiveoriginality,
be wastefulor otherwisedetrimental
to society.
We do not disputethatoriginality
has an optimalamount.But
thisamountis difficult
to ascertain,and our proposedsystemdoes
noteven beginto addressit.We doubtthatanyonecan everidenin artsand literature.
tifythe optimalamountof originality
Adoptionofthisunrealistically
ifnotUtopian,criterion
for
perfectionist,
law would forestallany attemptat improving
reforming
copyright
the law. We take a modestpositionon the quantumof originality
issue. We believethatsocietyshouldreflectitsinterestin original
worksin the designof copyright
law. Our goal is to reducetheobvious distortionsthat preventcopyrightlaw fromachievingits
statedgoals.
The secondobjectiongoes to thepracticality
of our proposal.In
an oft-cited
paragraph,JusticeHolmes cautionedthat"[i]t would
be a dangerousundertaking
forpersonstrainedonlyto thelaw to
constitute
themselvesfinaljudges of theworthofpictorialillustrations,outsideof thenarrowestand mostobviouslimits."63
Echoing
JusticeHolmes,one may wonderwhetherjudges are qualifiedto
our proposal.We believethatthisconcernis misplaced
implement
fora numberofreasons.To beginwith,we do notrequirejudgesto
make determinations
about theintrinsic
value of art,or even what
constitutesart. JusticeHolmes wrotehis famoussentencein response to JusticeHarlan's opinion statingthat advertisements
shouldbe deniedcopyright
protectionbecause theydo not constituteart.64
Our proposaldoes nottouchon thatissue.Indeed,we do
not addressthisquestionat all. We clearlydo not seek to bar pro63
Bleisteinv. Donaldson Lithographing
Co., 188 U.S. 239,251 (1903).
64
Id. at 253 (Harlan, J.,dissenting).

2009]
Originality
1523
tectionto anyexpressiveor artform.Quite theopposite;we accept

JusticeHolmes' view thatthe public oughtto have the power to
decidewhatartis.
We merelyassigncourtsthe task of determining
an expressive
Courtsare notonlycapable ofperformwork'slevel of originality.
but
suitrethis
task,
theyalreadydo so. Everyinfringement
ing
to
the
elements
in
incourt
the
works
the
identify original
quires
volved and decide whetherthe defendantappropriatedoriginal
work.65
whenevera deFurthermore,
expressionfromtheplaintiff's
fendantraisesa fairuse defense,thecourtmustassess thelevel of
in herworkas partof theanalysis.In doingso,
transformativeness
and creativity
in the allegedly
judges assess the level of originality
In appropriatecases,judges can seek assistance
work.66
infringing
as they
fromexpertwitnessesin makingoriginality
determinations,
This means that courtsare quite adept at making
do already.67
and thatour proposal will not present
determinations
originality
themwitha newchallenge.
III. The Mechanics of Originality-Based Copyrights
In thisPart,we introducea set of rulesdesignedto calibratethe
Our rules
scope of a work'sprotectionto its level of originality.
the
have twogoals.First,theyaim to strengthen protection
granted
to authorsof highlyoriginalworksby increasingthe level of pro65
unlawfulapproThe subtractiveapproach (an importantmethodfordetermining
from
theirconsidcourts
to
remove
in
suits)
requires
infringement
copyright
priation
erationthe unoriginaland otherunprotectedelementsof the plaintiffsworkin order
betweenthe defendant'sworkand
to determinewhetherthereis sufficient
similarity
theprotectableelementsof theplaintiffswork.See David Nimmeret al., A Structured
Approach to Analyzingthe SubstantialSimilarityof ComputerSoftwarein Copyright
Cases, 20 Ariz. St. L.J.625, 635 (1988); see also Alexanderv. Haley, 460
Infringement
betweenthe protectF. Supp. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (findingno substantialsimilarity
elementsof the plaintiffsnovel and the defenable, as opposed to non-protectable,
test for software-related
dant's book). The "Abstract-Filtration-Comparison"
copyrightsuits also entails assessmentof works' originality.See ComputerAssocs. Int'l,
Inc. v. Altai,Inc.,982 F.2d 693,706-12 (2d Cir. 1992).
66
See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard,103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105,
is criticalto whethera use "fulthattransformativeness
1111 (1990) (demonstrating
law to stimulatecreativity"and arguingthatcreative
filled] the objectiveof copyright
owner'sobjection).
use mightbe justifieddespitea copyright
67
For one such example, see BrightTunes Music Corp. v. HarrisongsMusic, 420
F. Supp. 177, 178 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see also infranote 68.

1524
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
tectionto whichtheywillbe entitled.Second,theyreduce- and,in

- those authors'exposure
appropriatecases, completelyeliminate
to liabilityforinfringement.
Our ruleswillbringabouttheopposite
resultforauthorsof worksexhibiting
scant originality
by scaling
down theirworks'protectioncorrespondingly
withthe low originalitylevel. The decrease we propose will not stop at a zeroprotection:authorsof completelyunoriginalworkswill receive
"negativeprotection"in theformofan increasedprospectofcopyrightliability.
To achieve these effects,we reformulate
the substantivestandardsofcopyright
law and adjusttheevidentiary
doctrinesthatacwe dividethedomainof excompanythosestandards.Specifically,
pressiveworksintothreecategories.The firstcategoryconsistsof
exceptionally
originalworks.The secondis comprisedofa widevaof
works
thatexhibitregularor averageoriginality.
The third
riety
accommodatesworksthatare almostor completely
unoriginal.
Under our proposed system,exceptionallyoriginalworkswill
entitletheirauthorsto a swordand a shield.Authorsofsuchworks
willbothreceiveverybroad protectionagainstinfringements
and
be shelteredfromcopyright
Worksin thesecondcategory
liability.
willnotenjoytheprivilegedstatusofworksthatbelongto thefirst
category.The protectionand liabilityof thoseworks'authorswill
of each work.In resolvingcondepend on the relativeoriginality
flictsbetweenthoseworks,courtswillcomparethe level of originalityof the plaintiffsworkwiththatof the defendant'swork.If
theplaintiff's
workis moreoriginalthanthedefendant's,
theplaintiffwill prevail. Upon winningthis originalitycompetition,the
will be able to collectdamagesbut not injunctiverelief.
plaintiff
Finally,authorsof the scantlyoriginalor altogetherunoriginal
worksthatfallintothethirdcategorywillreceiveno protectionat
all. Those authorswill also assumeliabilityforimitating
worksof
others.
To operationalizeour scheme,we introducethreelegal mechanisms:"thedoctrineofinequivalents,"
"theadded-valuedoctrine,"
and "thesamenessrule."Each of thesemechanismsis designedto
the
applyin one of our originality
categories.Our firstmechanism,
inequivalentsdoctrine,will applyto the categoryof exceptionally
originalworks.The second,the added-valuedoctrine,willgovern
disputesbetweenworksof averageoriginality.
Finally,the same-

2009]
Originality
1525
ness rulewillregulateconflicts
involvingminimally
originalor unIn
of
this
we
the
remainder
works.
Part,
explainin detail
original
We also comhow courtsshouldapplyour proposedmechanisms.
emlaw currently
pare our mechanismsto therulesthatcopyright
extantcopyploys,and show thatthese mechanismsoutperform
of
and
fairness.
chosen
criterion
rules
efficiency
byany
right
A TheDoctrineofInequivalents
The doctrineof inequivalentswill exemptthe defendantfrom
liabilitywhen her work is exceptionally
copyrightinfringement
originaland creative.The work's exceptionalcreativitymay be
it withoutrecourseto expert
so thata courtcan verify
self-evident,
couldbe
work's
the
exceptionalcreativity
Alternatively,
testimony.
of expertsfromthereleestablishedbyrelianceon thetestimonies
The expertswill relyon the same knowledgethey
vantindustry.
about works'
trialswhentheytestify
invokein copyright
presently
the
market.68
on
success
and
similarity
who borrowedfroma copyIn eithercase, an allegedinfringer
will
ofinequivalents
doctrine
on
the
to
seeks
and
work
rely
righted
- or inequivahave to establishher work'sexceptionalcreativity
lence- by clear and convincingevidence. This evidentiaryrequirementwillminimizethe numberof courtdecisionsthaterroAs a result,only
neouslygrantworksan inequivalencestatus.69
harborof "exthe
safe
will
earn
works
creative
and
highlyoriginal
those
of
Authors
trulyexceptionalworkswill
ceptionalcreativity."
suitsby prioraube immunizedagainstinfringement
consequently
thorsfromwhoseworkstheyborrowed.
68
StudiosInc. v. Grokster,Ltd.,545 U.S. 913, 952See, e.g.,Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
54 (2005) (Breyer,J.,concurring)(relyingon experttestimonyto finda marketfor
uses of peer-to-peersoftwareand to quantifythe volume of infringenon-infringing
Three
Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating
ment);
oftenrequiresanalyticaldisthat"[t]he extrinsictest[ofworks'substantialsimilarity]
section of a work and experttestimony."(citingApple Computer,Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994))); Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 887 (2d
Cir. 1997) (relyingon expert testimonyin determining"harmonicsimilarities"between musical works); Sid & Marty KrofftTelevision Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (describingthe use of experttestimonyfor
the extrinsicteston substantialsimilarity);see also Sturdzav. U.A.E., 281 F.3d 1287,
1300 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (observingthatcourtsadjudicatingcopyrightcases increasingly
relyon experts).
See Stein,supranote 62, at 152-53.

1526
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
if Anna, a filmproducer,incorporatedexpressive
Accordingly,
elementsfroma shortstoryby Bill in a path-breaking
movieshe
our
doctrine
of
will
shelter
her
from
liabilproduced,
inequivalents
The
level
of
in
Anna's
work
and
ity.
high
originality creativity
should granther privilegedstatusunder our proposed scheme,
eventhoughshe used protectedelementsfroma preexisting
work.
The inequivalentsdoctrinemaybe justifiedon groundsof both
and fairness.Worksdemonstrating
efficiency
exceptionalcreativity
enrichsociety'sliterary,
and aestheticexperiartistic,
significantly
ences.70
Authorsof exceptionally
creativeworkstherefore
oughtto
be both encouragedto producethemand rewardedfordoingso.
Theircreativeefforts
shouldnot be stalledby the threatof copyrightliabilityfornon-imitative
copyingofotherworks.
Thisjustification
encounter
an objectionfromgeneralpropmay
an
ertytheory.Arguably, expressiveworkthatexhibitsa scintilla
of creativity71
shouldbelongto its authorin the same categorical
way in whichtangibleassets belong to theirowners.An asset
ownershouldbe able to fendoffunauthorizedusersby means of
self-helpand by recourseto the legal system.She shouldalso be
able to set a priceforallowingotherpeople to acquireor use her
asset. This regimeis fairin thatit protectsthe fruitsof people's
and free-riding.72
This reproductivelabor againstencroachments
is
also
efficient
in
that
it
a
selfish
reason
fordegime
givespeople
and
assets
that
veloping
protecting
improvesociety'swell-being.73
of ownershipextendto
Arguably,these well-known
justifications
all assetsthatcan be owned,ratherthanto tangibleproperty
alone.
70
See JulieE. Cohen, Creativityand Culturein CopyrightTheory,40 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 1151, 1151 (2007) ("Creativityis universallyagreed to be a good thatcopyright
law shouldseek to promote.").
See, e.g., Luck's Music Library,Inc. v. Ashcroft,321 F. Supp. 2d 107, 118 (D.D.C.
2004), affd sub nom. Luck's Music Library,Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir.
as requiringindependentcreationand "just a scintillaof
2005) (describingoriginality
creativitv").
72
See Mark A. Lemley,Property,IntellectualProperty,and Free Riding,83 Tex. L.
Rev. 1031, 1031-33 (2005) (discussingpreventionof free-riding
in intellectualpropertv).
7
See, e.g., Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman,The Economic Rationale of
Copyright,56 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 421, 425 (1966) (explicatingthe predictionthat"[t]he generalwelfarewill... be enhancedby enactingcopyrightlegislation which encourages the creation and publicationof manuscriptsthat otherwise
would not have come intoexistence").

2009]
Originality
1527
Expressiveworks,regardlessof how originaltheyare, are among

If so, authorsofthoseworksshouldbe able to enjoin
thoseassets.74
othersfromunauthorizedcopying;at the veryleast, those who
fee or
copy an owned workshouldpay its authora market-price
otherequitableamount.75
We believethatthisobjectionis overstated.An authorwhoborcreativework
rowsfromanother'sworkto createan exceptionally
ofherowndoes notappropriatethecopiedworkin thetraditional
or reproducingthiswork,the
propertysense. Far fromimitating
authorcreatesa noveland highlycreativeexpressiveworkthatinher originalideas. The closest property
tegratespredominantly
is accessionof assets,76
of
the
author's
action,therefore,
analogue
The accesof another'sproperty.
as opposed to misappropriation
sion in our contextis specialin thatit does not destroythecopied
work,as in the case of accessionof tangibleinputs.Nor does exopporpressiveaccessionnecessarilydilutethe income-generating
tunitiesof the copied work'sowner.The ownercan stillsell his
workor allow othersto use it fora fee in exactlythe same wayin
the linkwhichhe could do so beforethe accession.Furthermore,
thecopincreases
new
creation
work
and
the
age betweenthefirst
and promotesitssales.
ied work'svisibility
are likelyto enhancethevalue ofthepreworks
creative
Highly
our
which
from
works
theyborrow.This factdistinguishes
existing
asowner's
uses
the
user
case fromcases in whichan unauthorized
set to create a new asset. When tangibleassets are used in the
process of creatingnew ones, the originalassets are oftendeand,in anyevent,theownerstandsto lose
stroyedor transformed,
use.
fromthe unauthorized
Hence, the law seeks to reinstatethe
74See
Hughes, supra note 61, at 291. For a recent philosophicaldefense of this
claim,see JonathanPeterson,Lockean Propertyand LiteraryWorks,14 Legal Theory257 (2008).
See Gideon Parchomovsky& Peter Siegelman,Towards an IntegratedTheoryof
IntellectualProperty,88 Va. L. Rev. 1455, 1467 (2002) ("By creatingand enforcing
... not onlystifleunauthorizedcopyexclusiverightsin intellectualgoods, copyrights
but also enable authorsand inventorsto chargeforthe use of theirworks.")ing,
76 Thomas W. Merrill&
See
HenryE. Smith,Property:Principlesand Policies 16575 (2007) (statingand explainingthe principleof accession in propertylaw); Thomas
W. Merrill,Accession and OriginalOwnership(May 2009) (unpublishedmanuscript,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1400902)
(providinga
comprehensiveanalysisof accession principlesand theireconomic and moraljustifications).

1528
'
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
Thisis notthecase in thecontextofinaggrievedowner'swealth.77

When
the
tangiblegoods.
subsequentworkfallsintothe category
of inequivalence,the originalauthorsuffers
no real harm,and his
for
remediation
is
unfounded.78
plea
It is noteworthy
thatpatentlaw has long recognizedan exception similarto the one we seek to introduceinto copyright
law.79
Patentlaw's doctrineof reverseequivalentslimitsthe protection
ingrantedto first-in-time
patenteesagainstgenuinetechnological
novatorswhoseinventions
accomplishthesame resultdescribedin
a priorpatent,but in a whollydifferent
As the Supreme
way.80
Courtexplained:
froma patented
[W]herea deviceis so farchangedin principle
articlethatit performs
in a subthesame or a similarfunction
different
fallswithinthe literal
stantially
way,but nevertheless
wordsof theclaim,thedoctrineof equivalentsmaybe used [in
theclaimand defeatthepatentee'sactionfor
reverse]to restrict
infringement.81
This doctrineof reverseequivalentsin patentlaw is a conceptual
twinof our inequivalencedoctrine.Althoughthereare important
differences
in thedesignand substanceof thetwodoctrines,82
both
serveto bar liabilityin certaincases ofliteralinfringement.
77
Merrill& Smith,supra note 76, at 171; see also HenryE. Smith,IntellectualPropertyas Property:Delineating Entitlementsin Information,116 Yale L.J. 1742, 1766
(2007) ("The law of accession deals withsituationsin whichone personmixesher labor or otherinputswithsomeone else's property.Generally,innocentimproverscan
purchasethe owner's interestin the improvedproperty. . . , but if the owner'spropthe improvercan demand paymentfor
ertyis more valuable than the improvement,
theadded value but cannotkeen theimprovedorooertv."!
78
ProfessorHenrySmith,supra note 77, at 1766-73,was firstto analogize the acquisitionof intellectualpropertyrightsto the rules of accession. Under his theory,intellectual propertyrightsremunerateinnovatorswho produce value by mixingtheirintellectuallabor and otherinputswiththeinformation
situatedin thepublicdomain.
79
RobertL. Harmon,Patentsand theFederal Circuit417 (8thed. 2007).
See,
e.g.,
80
For discussionsof the doctrineof reverseequivalentsin modernpatentlaw, see
5B Donald S. Chisum,Chisumon Patents 18.04[4],at 18-827to -51 (2007); Charles
F. Pigott,Jr.,Equivalentsin Reverse,48 J.Pat. Off.Soc'y 291 (1966).
GraverTank & Mfg.Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co.. 339 U.S. 605. 608-09 (19501
82
See Jeanne C. Fromer,Claiming IntellectualProperty,76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 719,
731-49 (2009) (distinguishing
between the peripheralprotectionof patentsand the
exemplar-focused
protectionof copyright).

2009]
Originality
1529
Bank v. HoughtonMifflinCo83vividlyillustrateshow
Suntrust
our inequivalentsdoctrinecan be operationalized.This cause celebrefeaturedAlice Randall,a youngAfricanAmericannovelist,
whosebook The WindDone Gone84retoldthe storyof Gone with
fromthevantagepointoftheblackcharacters.
theWind85
Randall's
a
was
to
offer
different
of
the
South
thanthat
very
portrayal
goal
offeredin MargaretMitchell'sclassic.To achievethisgoal,Randall
had to drawto some extenton Mitchell'sbook. And she did.86It
to Gone withtheWindin the
was undisputedthatRandall referred
forewordof her book;87she mentionedkey charactersfrom
and she also borrowed
Mitchell'sbook,albeitby different
names;88
and
It was also alleged
scenes.89
fromtheircentralrelationships
This
thatRandallcopiedsomedialoguefromGone withtheWind.90
Randall.
was
allegation disputedby
The trusteeof Mitchell'sestate fileda copyright
infringement
suit againstRandall and her publisher,seekinginjunctiverelief
motionfora
courtgrantedtheplaintiff's
againstboth.The district
Randall
and
her
and
publisher
enjoined
injunction
preliminary
The
or even displayingthe new book.91
fromdistributing,
offering,
and
EleventhCircuitvacatedthejudgmentof the DistrictCourt92
remandedfora findingon whetherRandall's book shouldbe considereda parodyof "Gone withtheWind."93
Despite Randall'sexthat
classic
from
Mitchell's
tensivecopying
normallyamountsto an
the courtacknowledgedthata fairuse
of copyright,
infringement
defensewas available,and that,givenitslikelihoodof success,the
shouldbe vacated.94
injunction
We agreewiththe outcomeof thecase, but notwiththecourt's
matter,thecase should
reasoning.We contendthat,as a normative
The court'scategohave come underour doctrineofinequivalents.
83268F.3d1257
Cir.2001).
84AliceRandall,(11th
The WindDone Gone (2001).
85
GoneWiththeWind(Macmillan1936).
Mitchell,
86Margaret
268F.3dat 1259.
Suntrust
Bank,
87id.
88Id.
wId.
90Id.
91Id. at 1259.
92Id. at 1277.
93Id.
"Id.

1530
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
rizationof Randall'sbook as a "parody"was deeplyproblematic.95

senseofthe
Thisbook is certainly
nota parodyin theconventional
of
Randall used Mitchell'sromanticized
term.96
portrayal thewhite
accountof
antebellumSouth as a backgroundforher antithetical
theblackslaves' experience.97
thecourt'scategorization
Therefore,
of The WindDone Gone as a parodymay have done injusticeto
Randall'sliterary
and hurtitssales. Yet, underextant
achievement
the
Eleventh
Circuit
did
nothavemuchofa choice.
doctrine,
We positthatour inequivalentsdoctrineprovidesa muchmore
promisingvenue fordealingwithsuch worksas The WindDone
Gone. Underour framework,
Randall'sbook wouldnothave been
at
hence
there
and
would be no need fora strained
infringing all,
fairuse analysisto salvagethework.Even thoughRandallinvariablyhad to borrowcertainelementsfromMitchell'sbook,herbook
is brimmingwith originality.
Indeed, Randall's book possessed
sucha highlevel of originality
as to immunizeit froman infringementsuitfromMitchell'sestate.Randall'screativeeffort
produced
a book qualitativelydifferent
fromGone withthe Wind.Randall
did not attemptto imitatethe classic. Instead,she attempted
- to break new literaryground.The plaintiff'sporsuccessfully
trayalof Randall's book as an unauthorizedsequel of Gone with
the Windthereforeseems specious.The two books are inequiva95The courtbelow
examinedRandall'snoveland concludedthatits
thoroughly
overallpurposewasnotto parodyGoneWiththeWind,butrather"tocreatea sequel
to theolderworkand provideMs. Randall'ssocialcommentary
on theantebellum
South [that]retellstheearlierstoryin a condensedversionfroma different
per" Suntrust
Bank v. HoughtonMifflin
Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357,1378
spective
(N.D. Ga. 2001).
Webster'sCollegiateDictionary
902 (11thed. 2003) (defining
See, e.g.,Merriamor musicalworkin whichthestyleof an authoror workis
"parody"as "a literary
forcomiceffector in ridicule");The OxfordReferenceDictionary
closelyimitated
611 (JoyceM. Hawkinsed., 1986) (defining
"parody"as "a humorous
exaggerated
imitation
ofan author,
a travwork,style,etc."andas "a grotesque
imitation,
literary
esty").
See Siva Vaidhyanathan,
The Anarchist
in theLibrary:
How theClashBetween
Freedomand Controlis HackingtheReal Worldand Crashing
theSystem84 (2004)
that"The WindDone Goneis nota parodyofGonewiththeWind,It is a
(explaining
a retelling
oftheclassicfroma critical
stanceina vernacular
voice.It'salso a
revision,
anotherperspective
in the parallaxviewof race and history
thatthe
supplement,
UnitedStatesdesperately
needs" and concludingthat"[ijnsteadof cheatingby
thedefinition
of parody... theappealscourtshouldhaveconsidered
the
stretching
Does Americancopyright
lawprotect
works... intoo manyways,and
bigquestions:
withtoomanyancillary
powersforthegeneralgood?").

Originality
2009]
1531
lents.There is no reasonable way to perceive them differently.

Randall's book as a non-infringing
inequivalentwould
Classifying
of beinglabeled an infringer
have sparedher the embarrassment
thatescaped liabilitybyprovinga defense.Likewise,it wouldhave
saved Randall's publisherthe need to markether highlycreative
novelas a parody.
Anothercase thatfitsunderour inequivalentsdoctrineinvolves
the "epic" legal battle between Superman and "The Greatest
in Superman,the
AmericanHero."98The ownersof the copyright
famousfictionalhero of filmsand books, broughtcopyrightinfringement
allegationsagainstthedevelopersand broadcastersofa
televisionseriesfeaturing
Ralph Hinkleyas The GreatestAmerican Hero." Both charactershad superhumanpowers,whichthey
used to defendtheworldagainstevilforces.100
Theyalso closelyresembled each otherin theirappearance,actions,and phrases.101
Hinkley'spersonalityand mentalmakeup,however,profoundly
differedfromSuperman's.102
Supermanwas a fearlessand proud
his
who
hero,
"performs superhumanfeatswithskill,verve,and
dash . . . [as] themasterof his own destiny."103
Hinkley,in contrast,
acted"like a timid,reluctanthero,who acceptshismissionsgrudgingly[,]prefersto get on withhis normallife,... is perplexedby
the superhumanpowershis costumeconfersand uses themin a
comicalfashion."104
bumbling,
Based on these facts,the Second Circuitagreed withthe trial
similar
thatthetwocharactersare not substantially
court'sfinding
suit.106
the dismissalof the plaintiffs'
and affirmed
to each other105
branch
of
the
mentioned
also
The courtof appeals
"[t]he'parody'
thecreativ'fairuse' doctrine"thatservesas "a meansoffostering
107
the
"balances
and
law"
the
publicincopyright
ityprotectedby
holder'sinterest
terestin the freeflowof ideas withthe copyright
98
WarnerBros.,Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983).
99
Id. at 238.
1W
Id. at 236-37.
101
Id. at 237.
102
Id. at 243.
105
Id.
llMId.
105
Id. at 245.
1W
Id. at 235.
107
Id. at 242.

1532
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
in the exclusiveuse of his work."108

This reference,however,was
sincethecourtultimately
decidedto alignits
merelyparenthetical,
decisionwiththetrialjudge'sfindings
and reasoning.109
We contendthatourinequivalents
doctrinejustifiestheoutcome
of thecase moreconvincingly
thanthe reasonschosenby thetrial
and appellatecourts.The courts'similarity
for
analysisis deficient
a simplereason.Hinkleyand Supermandid notmerelyhave similar superhumanpowers, outfit,vocabulary,and achievements.
Viewers'understanding
of the two faces of Hinkleycruciallydeon
their
withSuperman.Hinkleywas designed
pended
familiarity
as a hero-antihero
whose personalitysharplycontrastedwiththe
heroicpersonality
ofSuperman.To establishthisconunbendingly
trast,Hinkley'screatorshad to imitateSuperman'sfeaturesas
Thisimitationalso
closelyas possible,and theydid so successfully.
does notfitthecategoryof "parody"because The Greatest
American Hero attemptedto achievemorethanthatand, arguably,succeeded. The authorsof thisworkcreateda new fictionalcharacter
thatbrokenewgroundin thegenreofheroiccomics.110
Thischaracterwas categorically
different
fromhis "onlyhero" predecessors,
and uniformly
defeatedSupermanin one-sidedcopyright
battles.111
The GreatestAmericanHero was an exceptionallycreativework
thatcopyright
law shouldencourageratherthanblock.Thissimple
factpromptedthe courtsto finda doctrinethatwould keep Hero
alive. Our normativeanalysisis not constrainedby positivelaw.
- the
We thereforepropose to give exceptionallycreativeworks
trueinequivalents an explicitexemptionfromliabilityforcopying. Creatorsof these exceptionalworksbenefitsocietystrongly
enoughto deservethisexemption.
108
id.
1UV
Id. at243-45.
The Greatest
AmericanHero becamea cult-TVclassicafterbuildinga distinct
fanbasearoundtheworld.See, e.g.,JillKipnis,HomeVideoStudiosSeekTitlesWith
NicheAllure,Billboard,Apr.2, 2005,at 31, availableat http://www.imdb.com/news/
ni0751803/
in(notingthat"[rjecentcultreleasesfromAnchorBay [Entertainment]
clude'The Greatest
American
Hero- SeasonOne'").
See American
Cos.,720F.2d.at235.
Broadcasting
in
'

2009]
Originality
1533
B. TheAdded-ValueDoctrine
The second doctrinewe propose may be termedthe "addedthe desirablescope of
value doctrine."We designedit to identify
of
for
derivative
works
whose
authors
developmentinprotection
materialand who do not qualify
volvedcopyingfrompreexisting
As a general
forthe safe harborof the inequivalencedoctrine.112
matter,authorsare entitledto copyright
protectiononlyin their
the
does
not extendto "theprecontributions;
protection
original
in
An author'soriginal
the
work."113
material
employed
existing
full
receives copyright
contribution
protectioneven whenit is very
All authors,fromhighlyoriginalto virtually
modest.114
unoriginal,
have the powerto enjoinothersfromcopyingtheirworksand reforsuchcopying.115
covercompensation
these rules distortthe
Apart frombeing costlyto administer,
creators'incentiveto competewitheach otherforthemarketsegUnderour added-valuedoctrine,
mentthatvalueshighoriginality.
ownershouldonlybe able to enjoinworksthatare less
a copyright
willnot
protection
originalthanherown.Her work'sproperty-rule
exceed thislimit.To secureinjunctivereliefagainsta putativeintheauthorwillthusneed to showthatherworkcontainsa
fringer,
relativeto priorworksthan the inhigherdegree of originality
fringer'swork relativeto hers. Authorsof worksas originalas
112
work"as "a workbased upon
"derivative
See 17 U.S.C. 101 (2006) (defining
dramatizamusicalarrangement,
suchas a translation,
one ormorepreexisting
works,
art reproduction,
motionpictureversion,sound recording,
tion,fictionalization,
or anyotherformin whicha workmaybe recast,transcondensation,
abridgment,
oradapted");MicroStarv.FormGenInc.,154F.3d1107,1110(9thCir.1998)
formed,
work"in 17 U.S.C. 101 is "hopelessly
of "derivative
thatthedefinition
(attesting
frompriorart,and notingthatonly
becauseall worksborrowsomething
overbroad"
willmakea work"derivative"
materials
ofpreexisting
substantial
(citincorporation
736F.2d1352,1357(9thCir.1984)));GatesRubberCo. v.
v. Spielberg,
ingLitchfield
thata courtdecision
BandoChem.Indus.,9 F.3d823,839(10thCir.1993)(explaining
materialwas substantial
ofpreexisting
an incorporation
on whether
enoughto make
ratherthana purelyquantitative
theworkderivative
analysis"
requires"a qualitative
(citingWhelanAssocs.,v. JaslowDental Lab., Inc.,797 F.2d 1222,1245 (3d Cir.
1986))).
17 U.S.C. 103(b)(2006);see also CMM Cable Rep,Inc.v. UceanCoastFrops.,
thatwhenan infringement
allegaInc.,97 F.3d 1504,1515(1stCir.1996)(observing
to plaintiff,
thatis notproprietary
aboutan "expression
a complaint
tioncomprises
s primafaciecase").
is lackingfromplaintiff
thenan essential
ingredient
114
text.
See supranotes11-13andaccompanying
115
Id.

1534
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
- authorswhose worksare
those theycopy from,and- a fortiori
more originalthanthosetheycopy from,willnot be enjoinedby
law. Instead,the authorwhoseworkwas copied willrecopyright
ceive liability-rule
protectionand collectcompensationmeasured
The goal of our deby themarketvalue of the liftedexpression.116
is
to
on
the
that
authors
receivecompensaone
ensure,
hand,
sign
tioncommensurate
withthe marketvalue of theiroriginalcontributions,and, on the other hand, that workscontaininggreater
and creativity
thantheplaintiff's
originality
protectedworkare not
from
the
market.
expelled
Under thisdesign,the defendantwillcarrythe burdenof provwill then
The plaintiff
ing her work'sequal or higheroriginality.
have to proveto thecourtthemarketvalue of thedefendant'suse
of his work.Both burdenswillbe satisfiedby a preponderanceof
theevidence.Courtswillapplytheserulesbyrelyingon experttestimonyand bymakingtheirowncomparisonsbetweenworks.This
taskwillbe easierto perform
thanthecontroversial
dissectionanawhich
courts
determine
the
lysis117
by
protecpresently
copyright
tionofworksthatcombinebothoriginaland unoriginal
elements.118
The added-valuedoctrinewill promotecreativity
in two ways.
fororiginality
First,itwillstimulatecompetition
amongall authors.
the doctrinewill affordgreater
Second, and equally important,
freedomto more creativeauthorsof derivativeworksand lesser
freedomto authorswhose derivativeworks are only modestly
is
original.The combinedeffectofthoseincentivesand protections
an environment
thatinducesauthorsto optimizetheircreativeef116
In determining
theappropriate
courtscan relyon expert
amounts,
compensation
witnesses
andmarket
data.
See 4 Nimmeron Copyright,
difficulties
of
13.03[A]at 1-34 (2008) (discussing
thedissection
courtsuseindetermining
works'similarity);
analysisandothermethods
see also Sarah Brashears-Macatee,
Total Conceptand Feel or Dissection?:ApTestofSubstantial
L. Rev.
68 Chi.-Kent
proachesto theMisappropriation
Similarity,
913(1993)(discussing
courts'applications
ofthedissection
analysis).
For authoritative
formulation
and application
ofthedissection
see Apanalysis,
Inc.v.Microsoft
ple Computer,
Corp.,35 F.3d1435,1442-47(9thCir.1994).Forother
casesinwhichcourtsreliedon thedissection
see Concrete
Mach.Co. v. Clasmethod,
sic Lawn Ornaments,
Inc. v.AzrakInc.,843F.2d600,608-10(1stCir.1988);Mattel,
HamwayInt%Inc.,724F.2d357,360(2d Cir.1983);Eden Toys,Inc.v.MarshallField
& Co., 675F.2d498,500 (2d Cir.1982);ConanProperties,
Inc. v. Mattel,
Inc.,1Y1F.
Co. v. Thorman,
Supp.353,358-59(S.D.N.Y. 1989);Farmers
Independent
Telephone
648F. Supp.457,460-61(W.D. Wis.1986).

Originality
2009]
1535
- an incentivethat will likelyincrease the developmentof

forts
originaland creativeworks.
The doctrine'sallocationoftheburdenofproofconforms
to the
of
evidence
law.119
These
principlesrequire a
generalprinciples
to establishhis cause of actionby a preponderanceof the
plaintiff
evidence,whileplacinga similarburdenon the defendantwho redefense.120
lies on an affirmative
Our inequivalentsdoctrineplaces
she can establishher
a heavierburdenon the alleged infringer:
and inequivalenceonlyby clear and
work'sexceptionalcreativity
we
As
evidence.121
explained,thisproofburdenwillsepconvincing
arate worksthatare unequivocallyexceptionalin theiroriginality
Because authorsof such exceptional
fromthose that are not.122
courtdeciworkswillgeta fullexemptionfromcopyright
liability,
willcause
to
an
author
this
sionsthaterroneously
grant
exemption
to thebenefit
of a well-earnedcopyright
seriousharm:annihilation
of the infree-rider
and the ex ante distortion
of an opportunistic
centiveto create originalworks.The law consequentlyneeds to
thatwill
a stringent
proofrequirement
imposeon allegedinfringers
minimizethe incidence of those erroneous deprivations.The
beadded-valuedoctrineneed notincorporatesucha requirement
a completeexemptionfromcopycause itdoes notgivedefendants
a defendantwho copies anthis
Under
doctrine,
rightliability.
other'sworkto createan equallyor moreoriginalworkofherown
willnotgo scot-free.
Anysuchdefendantwillhave to pay thecopfee.
ied work'sownera market-priced
our added-valuedoctrinethroughthecase ofBateWe illustrate
comwhichinvolveda technologically
man v. Mnemonics,Inc.,123
was
court
the
importantdispute.There,
plex and fundamentally
asked to address compatibility-driven
copyingof computersoftA companyoperatingparkware as an issue of firstimpression.124
ing garages needed computersoftwarefor its operations.It rewho workedon thesoftwaredevelopmentas
tainedtwoengineers,
The engineersfailed to develop a proindependentcontractors.
119
Stein,supranote62,at 219-25.
120
Id.
121
SectionIII.A.
See
xuId. supra
123 F.3d 1532
79
filth Cir. 1996).
124 at 1536-37.
Id.

1536
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
and thepartiesdisgramwithwhichthecompanyfeltcomfortable,
solved theirengagement.125
The companysubsequentlyused parts
of the engineers'copyrighted
softwareto develop a programwith
whichit could work.126
The engineerssued the company,claiming
thatthisuse infringed
theircopyright.127
The company'sdefensere- a propositionthatcopying
lied on the "compatibility
exception"
fromanother'ssoftwaredoes notviolatecopyright
to the extentit
was dictatedbyinterface-compatibility
requirements.128
This propositionholds thatcertaincomponentsof a computer
- namely,the interfacecomponents
- set up communicaprogram
tion between the hardware,the operatingsystem,and specificapplication programs. To secure unimpeded communication
the system,thesecomponentsmustbe mutuallycomthroughout
patible.129
Ideally,theymustalso be standardin orderto minimize
learningcosts for computerusers.130
Makingcompatibility-driven
would give interfacedevelopersa
copyingactionablein copyright
colossal monopolisticpower,whiledeprivingthe users- and sociBased on thistheory,
ety at large- of crucialnetworkbenefits.131
the companyargued that its use of the engineers'softwarewas
and did notexceed thedictatesof compatibilcompatibility-driven
it urgedthe courtto filterout portionsof the
Furthermore,
ity.132
engineers'softwarethatwere dictatedby theinterfacewithitsgaThe companyrequested the trial
rage-management
program.133
to
instruct
the
about
thecompatibility
judge
jury
exception,butthe
judge denied that request.134
Subsequently,the jury decided the
case in theengineers'favor,and thecompanyappealed.135
The appellatecourtgrantedthecompany'sappeal withoutfitting
itsdecisionintoa specificdoctrinalniche.It heldthat,althoughin125
Id. at 1538-39.
126
Id. at 1539-40.
Id. at 1540.
128
Id. at 1546.
See TimothyS. Teter,Note, Mergerand the Machines: An Analysisof the ProCompatibilityTrend in ComputerSoftwareCopyrightCases, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1061,
1063-65 (1993).
130
Id. at 1065.
Ijl
Id. at 1067.
132
79 F.3d at 1537,1546.
tMBateman,
Id. at 1540.
'"Id.
135
Id. at 1536.

2009]
Originality
1537
in principle,compatibility
are copyrightable
terfacespecifications
demands"mayworkto denycopyright
protectionto certainporAs faras doctrineis concerned,
tionsof a computerprogram."136
the courtruled that"[w]hetherthe protectionis unavailablebecause thesefactorsrendertheexpressionunoriginal,
nonexpressive
or
whether
thesefactors
of
the
Copyright
Act],
per [Section102(b)
or
fair
a
of
use, copyright
estoppel, misuse,therecompel finding
sult is to deny copyright
protectionto portionsof the computer
program."137
This decisionobviouslyfailsto delivera criterionby whichto
thatare copyrightable
betweeninterfacespecifications
distinguish
of the
and those thatare not. Amongthe academicformulations
Both formulations
twostandout as attractive.138
requiredcriterion,
The two formuladoctrine.139
on
the
merger
idea/expression
rely
for
conditions
different
set
tions,however,
removingthecopyright
for
allowingcompatibilityprotectionfrominterfacesoftwareand
Under one of thosefordrivencopyingof interfacespecifications.
mulations,interfacespecificationsnecessaryfor achievingcomshouldbe categorizedas unprotected
"ideas,"as opposed
patibility
formore
restrictive
Under another,
to protected"expressions."140
mulation,an interfaceelementwouldbe classifiedas an "idea" afEach of
standardstatus.141
teractuallyattaininga de factoindustry
thoseproposalsacknowledgesits dependencyon a legal doctrine
136
Id. at 1547.
137
Id.
138
raisedinnovation
See Teter,supranote129,at 1067-68("Two frequently
argubutbothare inconto achievecompatibility,
mentsmilitate
againstallowingcopying
softthatifinterface
maintains
innovation
clusiveat best.The 'incentive'
argument
to achievecompatibility,
warecan be copiedto theextentnecessary
developerswill
not botherto create new interfaces The second innovationconcern,the
an old stannotesthatdue to theuser'scostsof abandoning
'QWERTY argument,'
see alsoPeterS.
bothconstrains
innovation.");
dard,standardization
designandstifles
39 Stan.L. Rev. 1329,
forComputerSoftware,
Menell,TailoringLegal Protection
forintellecindesigning
costsandbenefits
1340-41(1987)(balancing
legalprotection
tualwork).
139
and themergerdocSee Teter,supranote129,at 1072(relatingcompatibility
trine).
140
Id.
141
forAppliProtection
See PeterS. Menell,An AnalysisoftheScopeofCopyright
41 Stan.L. Rev.1045,1101(1989).
cationPrograms,

1538
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
thatis notoriously
difficult
to apply,butclaimsto be an optimalsolutionofa difficult
problem.142
The added-valuedoctrineresolvesthisproblemin a simpleand
intuitivefashionwithoutinvokingthe fuzzydistinctionbetween
"ideas" and "expressions."The doctrinewill requirethe courtto
determinewhetherthe allegedlyinfringing
computerprogramis
If
it
of
the
is,
original.
programmer's
copying interfacespecificationsfromanotherprogramwillbe permitted,
subjectto compensation.The defendant'screativeendeavorwill not be suppressed
by theinterfacedeveloper,but she wouldhave to pay theplaintiff
If thissoftwareis
themarketpriceofthecopiedinterface
software.
not generallyaccessible,the developerwould be entitledto compensationthatthecourtwoulddeterminewiththehelp of experts.
In cases in whichthe copied partis publiclyavailablecode, either
because it is a non-protected
standardor open-sourcecode, the
compensationamountwill be zero. This straightforward
liabilityrule solutionwould allow developersof computerprogramsto internalizethe benefitstheyproducewithoutblockingeach others'
innovativeefforts.143
Our second illustrationof the added-valuedoctrineis AcuffRose v.Jostens.144
This case featureda plaintiff
whoseworkwas not
to
receive
full
originalenough
copyright
protectionthatincludes
but
was
creative
to qualifyforthe liinjunctiverelief,
sufficiently
ability-rule
protectionunderour added-valuedoctrine.The court,
however,dismissedthe plaintiffsentiresuit.As we will now exof explain,thisoutcomeresultedfromthe court'sinterpretation
doctrines
that
divert
courts'
attention
from
the
istingcopyright
added-valueanalysis.
straightforward
142
See id. at 1103;Teter,supranote 129,at 1066-72 .
143
Note that our proposal does not chill creativeinventorsof path-breakinginterface programs.Any such programcan be patented.The Batemancourtacknowledged
it by observingthat"[i]t is particularly
importantto exclude methodsof operationand
processes fromthe scope of copyrightin computerprogramsbecause much of the
contentsof computerprogramsis patentable.Were we to permitan authorto claim
copyrightprotectionfor those elementsof the work thatshould be the provinceof
the competitiveprinciplesthatare fundamental
patentlaw, we would be undermining
to the patentsystem."Bateman,79 F.3d at 1541 n.21; see also Menell,supra note 141,
at 1103; cf. Miller,supra note 9 (proposingto model copyrightprotectionon a standard akin to thenon-obviousnessrequirementof patentlaw).
144
155 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 1998).

Originality
2009]
1539
The defendantpromotedsales of class ringsby usingtheslogan

Thissloganportrayed
theringas a
"U Got 2 Stand4 Something."145
of
wearer's
social
and
affiliation
to
his or her
its
identity
symbol
was
identical
to
the
name
of
The
Aaron
school.146 slogan
Tippin's
famouscowboylyric"You've Got to Stand forSomething"that
repeatedlyuses theexpression,"You've gotto standforsomething
The song'scopyright
ownersued the
or you'llfallforanything."147
The
defendantdenied
defendantfor copyrightinfringement.
claimingthat the phrase "You've got to stand for
wrongdoing,
clichethatbelongsto the publicdosomething"is an unprotected
the defendantraisedthe "fairuse" deAs an alternative,
main.148
fense.149
The creaThe defendant'sdenialof copyingwas untrustworthy.
withthe
coincided
tion and approvalof its advertising
campaign
almost
The
advertisement
song'speakingpopularity.150 campaign's
from
the
song by statingthat
expresslyacknowledgedcopying
"The song saysit best:If you don't standforsomething,
you'llfall
The identitybetweenthe defendant'scampaign
for anything."151
could notbe accidental.
sloganand Tippin'sfamousline therefore
the
that defendantcopiedthe
thecourtdetermined
Unsurprisingly,
This determination,
however,did not avail
sloganfromthe song.152
because the court accepted the defendant'ssecond
the plaintiff
This
claimand held thatthecontestedphraseis,indeed,a cliche.153
"If
holdingreliedon numerousdocumenteduses ofthephrase you
145
Acuff-RoseMusic v. JostensInc., 988 F. Supp. 289,291 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
The defendant'ssales brochures,fliers,and postersread:
The song says it best: If you don't stand forsomething,you'll fall foranything.
And one of the best ways to show you standforsomethingis by wearinga Jostens Class Ring. The ringstands foryour school. It stands forthe people you
know.It standsforthe greatestclass of all time(yours,of course). And it stands
forthe thingsyou do to make yourclass the greatest.Most of all, it standsfor
theyadd up to nothingless than a
you. The gold, the stone, the inscriptions,
small piece of your personal history.The ring stands for who you are- and
that'ssomethingworthstandingfor.
Id.
ul
Acuff-Rose,155 F.3d at 141.
148
Acuff-Rose,988 F. Supp. at 290.
149
Id.
nuId. at293.
151
Id. at291(emphasis
added).
152
Id. at293.
153
Id. at295.

1540
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
don't standforsomething,
in sermons,
you willfallforanything"
and
articles
that
bore
no
connection
politicalspeeches,
newspaper
to Tippin'ssong.154
We believe thatthisdecisionis flawed.The decisionfailedto
addressthe significance
of the defendant'scopyingfromTippin's
The
defendant's
song.
campaignused the phrase "You've got to
standforsomething
or you'llfallforanything"
as appearingin that
The
defendant
did
not
use
this
as
song.
phrase a cliche,nor did it
refer to similar phrases that appeared in sermons,political
thedespeeches,or elsewherein thepublicdomain.Mostcrucially,
fendant'sadvertisementof the ring alluded specificallyto the
song's line "You've got to stand forsomethingor you'll fall for
The defendantdesignatedthisline to be the focusof
anything."155
its prospectivebuyers'attention.This designationconstitutedan
almost explicit acknowledgmentof the song's creativityand
The defendanttherefore
couldnotevendenythatthe
prominence.
or "modicum"157
of creativity
song'sline exhibiteda "scintilla"156
the originality
level thatthe law deems sufficient
forestablishing
Nor
could
the
defendant
copyright
protection.158
denythefactthat
ittradedon thepublicapprobationofTippin'sefforts.159
The court'srulingagainsttheplaintiff
also reliedon thefactthat
"a
moral
lesson
in theformof a father's
Tippin'slyricrepresented
advice to his son to live a principledlife,"160
whilethe defendant's
campaignextolledthe virtueof wearingthe advertisedringas a
Based on thisfact,the
symbolof social statusand achievement.161
courtconcludedthat"the 'totalconceptand feel' of thetwoworks
differdramatically."162
This inference,
however,resultedfromthe
154
id.
155
Id. at291.
^ Luck'sMusic
Inc.v. Ashcroft,
321F. Supp.2d 107,118(D.D.C. 2004).
Library,
w/
FeistPubl'ns,Inc.v. RuralTel. Serv.Co.,499 U.S. 340,345^6 (1991);see also 1
& FBI.
Nimmer,
supranote117, 2.01FA1
158
1 Nimmer,
supranote117, 2.01[A]& [Bl.
See Arnstein
v. Porter,
154F.2d464,473(2ndCir.1946)(Frank,J.)(rationalizing
a musician's
entitlement
as protecting
"hisinterest
inthepotential
financial
copyright
returns
fromhiscompositions
whichderivefromthelaypublic'sapprobation
ofhis
efforts").
lw
988F. Supp.at 296.
Acuff-Rose,
101
Id.
162
Id. (quotingKretschmer
v. WarnerBros.,1994WL 259814,at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June
8, 1994)).

Originality
2009]
1541
court'sfailureto considertheworks'commontheme:approbation
of people who "belongto something"by virtueof havingironclad
commitments
and affiliations.
The defendantundoubtedlyexpandedthe meaningof Tippin's
phrasein an originalway.This expansion,however,was notexceptionallycreativeand thusdid not turnthe defendant'suse of the
phraseintoan inequivalent.Noticethatthe defendant'scampaign
to the popularityof Tippin'ssong.On the condid not contribute
Our theory
it attemptedto profitfromthesong'spopularity.
trary,
callsfortheapplicationoftheadded-valuedoctrine.This
therefore
doctrinewouldhave affordedthesong'sownera liability-rule
prothedefendantto compensatetheownerfortheuntection,forcing
authorizeduse of the song. As for the compensationamount,
courtsshould be able to determineit by relyingon expertsand
commonsense. Courtswill not make such determinations
easily.
and it hardlyproThis difficulty,
however,is not insurmountable
worksintoa fairgame
videsa good reasonforturning
copyrighted
foropportunists.
for
The added-valuedoctrinehas a sociallydesirableimplication
is onlyslight.We
whoseworks'originality
cases involving
plaintiffs
in Matthews
T-shirts
found
of
a
battle
this
by
exemplify implication
deA souvenirchildren'sT-shirtthatthe plaintiff
v. Freedman.163
Boston
Went
to
"Someone
featured
a
marketed
and
slogan,
signed
and got me thisshirtbecause theylove me Verymuch."This slogan was surroundedby smalldrawingsof a fish,a sailboat,a lobster,Faneuil Hall, and scatteredhearts.A souvenirchildren'sTshirtdesigned and marketedby the defendanttold the world
"SomeoneWho Loves Me Wentto Bostonand Got Me thisShirt."
This sloganwas surroundedby smalldrawingsof a fish,a sailboat,
a lobster,a swan boat, ducklings,and a smilingsun. The two deeach otherat the Boston GiftShow and subsesignersconfronted
quentlyin court.164
Both the trialcourtand theFirstCircuitfoundno infringement
The two T-shirtswere
in the defendant'sT-shirt.165
of copyright
The
similarto each other.
defendant,in all likelihood,
strikingly
163157F.3d25(lstCir.l998).
104
Id. at 26.
165
Id. at 27-28.

1542
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
T-shirtdesign.Both T-shirts,
however,exhibcopied theplaintiff's
ited a trivialcompilationof ideas, expressions,and imageseasily
extractablefromthepublicdomain.166
Because of thislack of origithe
courts
held
that
the
T-shirtdeservesonlyweak
nality,
plaintiffs
The defendant'sTprotectionagainstcompleteliteralcopying.167
shirtwas not completelyidenticalto theplaintiff's.
The defendant
won
the
suit.168
consequently
The courts'decisionto scale theplaintiffsprotectiondownand
unlocktheadded value ofthecompetitor's
productperfectly
aligns
withour proposal.Our added-valuedoctrinewould yieldexactly
the same result.Given the plaintiffsalmostinvisibleadditionto
betweenher and the defendant'sT-shirt
priorart,any difference
contestor,
designwouldallow thedefendantto wintheoriginality
establish
that
his
of
the
T-shirt
was
as original
alternatively,
design
as hers.As faras compensation
is concerned,theplaintiff's
eligibilityforthatremedywilldependon themarketvalue of theexpression that the defendantborrowedfromher work. The plaintiff
wouldobviouslyfailto provethather additionto phrasesand images extractableforfreefromthepublicdomainhad anyvalue on
themarket.Adjudicatorsapplyingtheadded-valuedoctrinewould
have to dismisshersuit.169
consequently
C. The Sameness Rule
Our thirddoctrinalproposal,the "samenessrule," is different
fromthefirsttwodoctrineswe advanced.It is designedto penalize
whose worksare plainlyunoriginal.It also
copiersand imitators
bears emphasisthatour samenessruleresemblesthe copyright
inthe
Seventh
we
Circuit,
fringement
analysisadopted by
although
believethatour designimprovesupon thatcircuit'sapproach.The
primary
purposeof thisruleis to detercreatorsfromcopyingprior
worksand incentivizethemto ensurethattheirworkscontainat
least some originality.The rule's secondary purpose is to
166
id.
167
id.
168
id.
The outcomeofthatsuitwouldbe different
iftheplaintiff
couldestablish
literal
ofherdesignbythedefendant.
The courtwouldthenenjointhedefendant.
copying
The plaintiff,
wouldstillhavedifficulties
in proving
hercompensable
damhowever,
age.

2009]
Originality
1543
the copyrightprotectionof originalcreators,whose

strengthen
- afterbecomingsuccessful
- enticecopyingand imitation.
works
An authorwho copies a priorwork of anotherperson does not
merelyfailthe testfororiginality.
By and large,he also acknowledgesthatthecopiedworkis originaland valuable.
The samenessrule achievesits desiderataby settingup a strong
in cases featuring
of copyright
infringement
striking
presumption
the
and
the
between
defendant'sworks.To
plaintiffs
similarity
will have to establishthather
benefitfromthisrule,the plaintiff
simiand the defendant'sworksare identical,or at least strikingly
to a workor objectin the
lar to each other,and bear no similarity
will also have to prove thatshe crepublicdomain.The plaintiff
ated her workbeforethe defendantcreatedhers.Based on these
workoriginaland deserving
facts,thecourtwilldeemtheplaintiff's
and
imitation
ofprotection
byothers.The deagainstreproduction
rebut
this
be
able
to
will
then
fendant
presumption
by adducing
workitselfis inclear and convincingevidencethatthe plaintiff's
protectionor thatshe createdher own work
eligibleforcopyright
If
defendantfailsto establishone of thosedethe
independently.
the
hold her responsiblefor infringing
would
fenses,the court
The clear and convincingevidence requirecopyright.
plaintiff's
mentwillthussolidifythe protectionof authorsof originalworks
and deterfree-riders.
doctrineand thesamenessrulebothaim at caThe inequivalents
in her
libratinga defendant'sliabilityto the degree of originality
work.Yet, the two doctrinesoperateat the oppositeextremesof
doctrineoperatesat the
The inequivalents
theoriginality
spectrum.
it attemptsto grant
where
spectrum,
highend of the originality
to defendantswhose workscontainsignificant
originalimmunity
of the
low
end
at
the
The
sameness
contrast,
rule,
operates
by
ity.
the
increases
where
it
potentialliabilityofdespectrum,
originality
no
to
little
whoseworkspossess
fendants
originality.
the
The samenessrule thusinducesoriginality
by incentivizing
that
those
from
differ
that
works
novel
of
substantially
production
alreadyexist.Creationof a highlyoriginalworkwillguaranteeits
authornotonlythehighestdegreeof protectionbut also complete
againstsuit.Authorswho wishto take advantageof the
immunity
doctrinemayneed to researchpreexisting
expressive
inequivalents
theirworksfromthem.The breadthof that
worksand distinguish

1544
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
researchwilldependon its cost and the author'sexpectedbenefit

fromthecontemplated
work.Creatorsofworksthathave highexvalue
willhave a strongincentiveto intensify
pected
consequently
the preemptionsearch.The search,admittedly,
can neverbe perfectin lightof the numberof expressiveworksthatalreadyexist.
theirworksfrom
it can help authorsin distinguishing
Nevertheless,
preexisting
expressions.
As we alreadymentioned,our samenessrule aims to preserve
the independentcreationdefenserecognizedby extantcopyright
law,and it is designedto do so. That said,we need to posta caveat
here.In thereal world,thereis a riskthatcourtswilltendto infer
between two
wheneverthere is strikingsimilarity
infringement
works.Based on an experience-driven
againstcoincipresumption
is nevdences,courtsmaydecidethatsucha highlevelofsimilarity
er accidental,and ifso, theymightsometimestrampleupon theindependent creation defense by erroneously identifyingas
some cases ofindependentcreation.We are also coginfringement
nizantof the factthatthe clear and convincingevidencerequirementthatwe imposeon defendantswillexacerbatethisrisk.This
allocationoftheriskoferrorwillachievethefollowing
effect:relative to the generalrule thatimposesthe burdenof proofon the
the incidenceof false negatives(decisionserroneously
plaintiff,
the
denying claimof independentcreation)willincrease,whilethe
incidenceof false positives(decisions erroneouslygrantingthe
Hence, thesamenessruleenhancestheproclaim)willdecrease.170
tectionof highlyoriginalauthorsat the price of exposingindeworksto
pendentcreatorsof worksthatare similarto preexisting
an increasedriskof copyright
Froman ex postperspecliability.171
is farfromobvious.Yet, theproperwayto examtive,thistradeoff
ine itseffectsis to evaluatethe ex ante incentivesforindependent
creators.Those creatorswould have to preserveevidencedemon170
Tradeoffbetweenfalsepositivesand falsenegativesis whatevidentiary
rules
do: see Stein,supranote62, at 133-40.Formulation
of evidentiary
rules
generally
therefore
shouldalwaysreflect
societalpreferences
in theallocationoftheriskoferrorthatvaryfromonecategory
ofcasesto another.
Id. at 118-33.
It shouldbe emphasized
thattheincreaseinriskis verysmallbecauseevenunder
current
doctrines
creationis verydifficult
to establishand defendants
independent
whoseworksare identicalor strikingly
similarto thoseof the plaintiffs
farevery
our amendment
willworsenthelot of independent
poorlyin court.So, in practice,
creators
onlymarginally.

2009]
Originality
1545
Because prethattheycreatedtheirworksindependently.
strating
that
evidence
is
creators
are truly
such
easy,
self-regarding
serving
to
their
be
able
defense.
would
always
prove
virtually
independent
their
true
claims
from
the
would
These creators
easily separate
creation.
falsedefensesofindependent
illustrates
The SeventhCircuitcase of Ty v. GMA Accessories112
how the samenessrulewillpenalize unoriginalcreators.This case
a prewas resolvedby ChiefJudgePosner'sdecisionthataffirmed
from
a
simithe
defendant
selling
toy
enjoining
injunction
liminary
and marketedby the plaintiff.173
lar to a bean-bagpig copyrighted
ChiefJudgePosnerbeganhisanalysisofthecase byobservingthat
the two pigs are "nearlyidentical."174
Identity,of course,does not
entailcopyingthatthelaw proscribes:"ifindependentcreationresultsin an identicalwork,the creatorof thatworkis freeto sell
betweenthe two works,howit."175
Showinga strikingsimilarity
ever,can establishcopying and it can do so, accordingto Chief
JudgePosner,even in the absence of an independentdemonstraThis
tion thatthe defendanthad access to the plaintiffswork.176
evidence
be
must
provingthe
accompaniedby
showing,however,
mustprove
the plaintiff
protectedwork'suniqueness.Specifically,
thathe did not copy an object or a workthatexistsin the public
domainfromwhichthe defendantcould copy as well. As Chief
betweenworksreplicatingthe
JudgePosner explained,similarity
withoutbeing
same thingin the public domain "may be striking
suspicious."177
172
132 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1997).
173
Id. at 1169,H73.
174
Id. at 1169.
175
Id. (citingGrubbv. KMS Patriots,L.P, 88 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996)); Selle v. Gibb,
741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984). The courtalso explainedthe rule's practicalrationale:
[T]he creator of an expressivework an author or sculptoror composer
his
whether
to
discover
works
cannotcanvass the entireuniverseof copyrighted
poem or song or, as in this case, "softsculpture"is identicalto some work in
whichcopyrightsubsists,especiallysince unpublished,unregisteredworks are
copyrightable.
Id.
176 the court
As
explains, "[the defendant]must produce evidence of access, all
thatis so close as to be highlyunlikely
right-but,as we have just said ... a similarity
to have been an accidentof independentcreationis evidenceof access." Id. at 1170.
Id. The courtillustratesthispropositionby "two people photographingNiagara
Falls fromthe same place at the same timeof the day and yearand in identicalweath-

1546
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
Once theplaintiff
provesthatthe defendant'sworkis similarto
his but not to anythingelse in the public domain,the burdenof
The defendantmustprove by a
proofshiftsto the defendant.178
of
the
evidence
that
she createdher work indepreponderance
ChiefJudge
pendentlyratherthan copied the plaintiffswork.179
Posnerheld in thisregardthatthe defendant'sevidenceof independentcreationought to be more detailed and, consequently,
morepersuasivethana genericclaimthattheworkwas independThisevidencemustexplainawaythesuspicionarisentlycreated.180
from
the
betweenthe defendant'sdesign and the
ing
similarity
work.181
The
defendant's
plaintiff's
explanationalso needs to specthe
choices
she
made
with
ify
regardto herdesign'sindividualfeatures.182
The defendantin Ty failedto providesuchevidenceand consequentlywas unable to defeatthe plaintiff's
requestfora prelimiThe
in
due to thecomplete
outcome
this
case
was
naryinjunction.183
of the plaintiffstoy and the completeunoriginality
of
originality
the defendant'sproduct.As Chief JudgePosner explained,the
plaintiff's
bean-bagpighad a fictionalappearancethatwas original
and unique.184
This appearancestarklydiffered
fromthatofnatural
and lifeliketoypigs.185
The unique appearanceof theplaintiff's
toy
er." Id.; see also First Am. ArtificialFlowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits,Inc., 342
F. Supp. 178, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("[A] copyrighton a workwhichbears practicallya
photographiclikeness to the natural article,as here, is likely to prove a relatively
weak copyright.").
1/srv,132F.3datll71.
179
Id. (holdingthatu[a]ccess (and copying)may be inferredwhen two worksare so
similarto each otherand not to anythingin the public domain thatit is likelythatthe
creatorof the second workcopied the first,but the inferencecan be rebuttedby disaccess or otherwiseshowingindependentcreation").
proving
180
Id. at 1171-72.
181
Id.
In ChiefJudgePosner'swords:
Silencecan be pregnant;
theabsenceof anyevidenceofhowthe[defendant's]
designer'sdrawingwas translatedinto the Squealer-resembling
production
withthesimilarity
ofthatmodelto Squealer(andtonothing
in
model,combined
thepublicdomain). . . overbore
theweakevidenceofthe[designer's]
affidavit.
Id.
183
Id. at 1173.
184
Id. at 1170.
185
As ChiefJudgePosner put it, "[r]eal pigs are not the onlypigs in the public domain.But GMA has not pointedto anyfictionalpig in thepublicdomainthatPreston
resembles."Id.

2009]
Originality
1547
to its commercialsuccess.The defenpig was a majorcontributor

dantmade an opportunistic
attemptat sharingthissuccessby dea
veloping similarly
lookingtoy.
in Ty would receivethe
Under our samenessrule,the plaintiff
protectionforher originalwork.The
highestdegreeof copyright
to
would
be
entitled
enjointheunoriginaldefendantfrom
plaintiff
her
replicating toy(and makingprofitsfromthatreplication).The
rule's applicationwould thusmake copyright
protectioncoextenof theworksin question.ChiefJudgePossivewiththeoriginality
ner's decisionin Ty squarelyalignswiththe samenessrule and
promotesitsgoals.186
Applicationof the samenessrule will not alwaysproduce the
same resultsas extantdoctrine.We illustratethispointwithanThis case featureda
otherSeventhCircuitopinion,Selle v. Gibb.1*7
the
Bee Gees' hittune
a
that
Ronald
Selle, composer,
complaintby
thecopyright
of his song
"How Deep Is Your Love" had infringed
Aftertrial,the jury decided thatthe alleged in"Let It End."188
tookplace,butthejudge grantedBee Gees' motionfor
fringement
theverdict.189
Selle appealed.
judgmentnotwithstanding
thetrialjudge's decisionand endedthelitigaThe courtaffirmed
of pop
tion thatthreatenedthe famouscreatorsand performers
The court'sdisand financiallosses.190
musicwithembarrassment
missalof Selle's appeal was based on the appraisalof the tunes'
186
A more recentdecision of the SeventhCircuit,JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty,Inc.,
This case featuredan infringement
482 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2007), is equally illustrative.
suitby one plushdoll manufacturer
againstanotherthatreplicateditsdoll. The plaintiffsdoll, althoughpeculiar,was highlyoriginaland created a nichemarketforitself.
Id. at 912-13. Aware of the success of the plaintiffsproduct,the defendantsoughtto
a similarlydesigneddoll thatreplicatedthe totallook and
competewithit by offering
sued the defendantforcopyrightinfringefeel of the plaintiffsdoll. Id. The plaintiff
mentand obtained a summaryjudgment.The defendantappealed. Id. The Seventh
Circuitaffirmedthe lower court's decision. It acknowledgedthat the plaintiffsdoll
evoked social stereotypesand humorthatexistin the publicdomain,but held thatthe
doll's unique combinationof featuressinglesit out as an originalexpressionof these
the Cirphenomenathatdeservescopyrightprotection.Id. at 916. Most importantly,
thatthe
of the plaintiffsdoll as a proxyforits determination
cuitused the originality
cordefendantcopied it. This rulingimplicitlyacknowledgesthata work'soriginality
will
receive.
it
relateswiththe level of copyright
protection
187
741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984).
188
Id. at 898.
189
Id.
190
Id.

1548
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
was not striking

The courtdecidedthatthissimilarity
similarity.191
the
This
decision
overrode
the
of
onlyexpertwho
enough.
opinion
testifiedabout the tunes' similarity.
This expertwas a renowned
whosetestiprofessorof musicfromtheNorthwestern
University,
inmonyunequivocallysupportedSelle's complaintof copyright
notes
The
the
two
musical
fringement.192 expertcompared
songs'
and foundthat"the firsteightbars of each song. . . have twentyfourof thirty-four
notesin plaintiffscompositionand twenty-four
of fortynotes in defendants'compositionwhichare identicalin
pitchand symmetrical
rhythmic
position"and that"[o]fthirty-five
in
impulses plaintiff's
thirty
compositionand fortyin defendants',
are identical."193
The expertalso pointedto striking
similarities
betweenthe notesand rhythmic
impulsesin thelast fourbars of the
Based
on
these
the expertopined that the
similarities,
songs.194
could
not
have
been
ofone another
songs
composedindependently
and thathe had neverencounteredtwosongsbydifferent
composersthatare so similarto each other.195
Bee Gees did notcall expertwitnesses.Instead,itssinger,songwriterand producer,BarryGibb,testified
that"How Deep Is Your
Love" was the group'sindependentcreation.196
The group'smanThe work
ager and two musicianscorroboratedthistestimony.197
of
"How
Is
Your
Love"
indicated
that
its
tape
Deep
singers,the
Gibb brothers,hummedand sang the tune to a keyboardplayer,
who subsequently
Bee Gees' witnesses
playedit on hiskeyboard.198
authenticated
thistape as a contemporaneous
recordof thesong's
creation.199
Two factswerenotin controversy.
Selle's song"Let It End" was
created and copyrightedbefore the creationof "How Deep Is
Your Love."200
The publicdissemination
of "Let It End" was minimal. Selle and his band playedthe song two or threetimesin the
191
Id. at 901-06.
""Id. at 899.
1V3Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
Id. at 898.

2009]
Originality
1549
Chicago area. Selle also sent the song to eleven musicrecording

and publishing
companies.These companiesshowedno interestin
thesong.201
The courtbased its decisionto dismissthe appeal on a theory
thatattributed
a miscalculation
to Selle's expert.Accordingto that
the
underestimated
theprobability
of thetunes'actheory, expert
cidentalsameness.This probability
is muchhigherthanestimated
by the expertbecause the genreof pop musicis simplisticby design.All pop songsare relativelyshortand buildon repeatedpatternsthatare mostlynot unique.202
Two independently
composed
melodiesthereforemay containmanyaccidentalsimilarities.
Alternatively,similar melodies may originate from a common
source.203
This genre-specific
realityerodes the significanceof
evidence.
Factfinders
cannotdeduce fromthis
"striking
similarity"
evidencethatthe defendanthad access to the plaintiffsmelody
The plaintiff
and copied it.204
consequentlyneeds to adduce indeSelle's failureto adduce such evipendentevidenceof access.205
dencedoomedhissuitto dismissalwithouta newtrial.206
We are puzzled by
We believe thatthisrulingwas unjustified.
to
and homogeneity
of musicalminimalism
the court'sattribution
the entirepop genre.Any musicalgenreaccommodatescompositionsthatoccupydifferent
spectrum.
positionson the originality
Some compositionsscore highon thatspectrum,and some score
low. The Bee Gees' song "How Deep Is Your Love" scoredlow
that
because itsmelodywas similarto "Let It End." Selle testified
"Let It End" was his originalcreationand Bee Gees did not disputeit.Nor did thegroupadvancea "priorcommonsource"claim.
Instead,it arguedthat"How Deep Is Your Love" is itsindependentcreation.Because Selle's songprecededthatcreation,itsscore
on theoriginality
spectrumwas superior.Underthesamenessrule,
would go to trial.The Bee Gees would then
case
the
therefore,
have to provetheirindependentcreationclaimby clear and convincingevidence.Iftheyfailto do so, Selle wouldwinthecase.
201
Id.
202
Id.at905.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
Id.at904-05.
206
Id.at905-06.

1550
VirginiaLaw Review
[Vol. 95:1505
Conclusion
HermanMelvillefamouslyobservedthat"it is betterto failin
than to succeed in imitation."207
This sayingcertainly
originality
sociea
human
intuition.
history,
Throughout
captures deep-seated
ties alwayshad a special interestin originaland highlycreative
worksof art and expression.It is not surprisingthereforethat
and creativity
were selectedas the gatekeepersof our
originality
the
Yet,
copyright
system.
existingcopyright
systemdoes not use
these two criteriaproperly.By assigninga veryminimalrole to
thesecriteria,
thesystemdeprivedsocietyofa considerableexpressive wealththatcould have been realizedundera more efficient
andjustdesign.
In thisArticle,we soughtto remedythisdesignflawby proposframeworkfor reshapingour copyright
ing an originality-based
law. Our goal was to calibrateprotectionand liabilityto the level
oforiginality
ofworks.Insteadofusingoriginality
as
and creativity
thresholdrequirements
whosesatisfaction
makesan ownereligible
foruniformly
strongcopyright
protection,we utilizedoriginality
and creativity
as continuums
and variedthe scope of rightsand liabilitiesin accordancewitha slidingoriginality
scale. In so doing,
we remained mindfulof practicability
constraintsand supplementedour substantivelegal mechanismswithevidentiaryrules
thatshouldassistcourtsin implementing
ourproposal.We demonstratedthatan originality-based
systemcan help overcopyright
come some of the main shortcomings
of the currentregimeand
lead to theproductionof moreoriginaland creativeworks.To returnto Melville'squote, manybelieve thatthe currentcopyright
We prosystem"succeeds in imitationand fails in originality."
a
to
turn
around
and
law
posed way
things
put copyright back on
track.
207
HermanMelville,Hawthorneand His Mosses, The LiteraryWorld,Aug. 17 & 24,
1850,available at http://www.ibiblio.org/eldritch/nh/hahm.html.


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Originality

Author(s): Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein

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Professor,Universityof PennsylvaniaLaw School; Bar-Ilan UniversityFacultyof

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the expressionforwhichprotectionis soughtoriginatedwithher

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This content downloaded from 14.139.209.67 on Fri, 1 Aug 2014 11:02:24 AM

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soughtmustbe originaland mustbe fixedin a tangiblemediumof

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This content downloaded from 14.139.209.67 on Fri, 1 Aug 2014 11:02:24 AM

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liaccess will be inferred.31

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mostdebeyondthisstage.Faced witha preliminary

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trendof expansionin copyright

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worksat theircompetitiveprice mustforego

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tectionto anyexpressiveor artform.Quite theopposite;we accept

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tectionto whichtheywillbe entitled.Second,theyreduce- and,in

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Expressiveworks,regardlessof how originaltheyare, are among

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Thisis notthecase in thecontextofinaggrievedowner'swealth.77

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rizationof Randall'sbook as a "parody"was deeplyproblematic.95

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lents.There is no reasonable way to perceive them differently.

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in the exclusiveuse of his work."108

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This content downloaded from 14.139.209.67 on Fri, 1 Aug 2014 11:02:24 AM

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- an incentivethat will likelyincrease the developmentof

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The defendantpromotedsales of class ringsby usingtheslogan

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the copyrightprotectionof originalcreators,whose

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researchwilldependon its cost and the author'sexpectedbenefit

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to its commercialsuccess.The defenpig was a majorcontributor