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Binay v.

Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 120681-83
October 1, 1999
Kapunan, J.:
Facts:
Cases were filed by the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan (SB for brevity) against Mayor Binay
of Makati for Illegal Use of Public Funds under Article 220 of the revised Penal Code and Violation
of Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) on September 1994. The informations filed
constituted crimes which were committed by the petitioner in his incumbency in the year 1987. The
petitioner filed a motion to quash alleging that the delay of more than 6 years constituted a violation of
his constitutional right of due process. His arraignment therefore was Held in abeyance pending the
resolution of the motions. Subsequently, the SB Issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to quash
and further the latters motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, the prosecution filed a motion to
suspend the accused pendente lite (benefits) which was later granted and ordered for a 90-day
suspension.
Petition for certiorari was filed by Mayor Binay in the SC praying that the resolution denying his motion
for reconsideration be set aside and claimed that he was denied of his rights when the suspension was
ordered even before he could file his reply to the petitioners opposition. SC then, directed the SB to
permit petitioner to file said reply. The SB nonetheless reiterated its previous resolutions and order after
the submission of the reply.
Meanwhile, RA 7975 redefining the jurisdiction of SB took effect on May 1995 so much so that the
petitioner filed before SB a motion to refer his cases to the RTC of Makati alleging that the SB has no
jurisdiction over said cases when it Issued its resolutions and suspension order on June 1995. The SB in
a follow-up resolution denied the petitioners motion.
Hence this present petition, prohibition and mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of SB over the
criminal cases.
Issue:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case of after the passage of RA 7975
Held:
Yes. Republic Act 7975 which was further amended by RA 8249 states that the Sandiganbayan
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 3019
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity
at the time of the commission of the offense: 1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions
of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989. Under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,
mayors are "local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher.
Intellectual Property Law

Samson vs Daway
(GR No 160054-55, July 21, 2004)
Facts:
The petitioner allegedly sold or offers the sale of garment product using the trademark Caterpillar to
the prejudice of its previous user, private respondent in this case. The respondent filed the case to the
RTC. The petitioner contended that the case should be filed with the MTC because violation of unfair
competition is penalized with an imprisonment not exceeding 6 years under RA 7691.
Issue:
Where do you file a suit for unfair competition?
Held:
The SC held that under Sec 163 of the IPC, actions for unfair competition shall be brought before the
proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws. The law contemplated in Sec 163 of IPC
is the Trademark Law. Sec 27 of Trademark Law states that action for unfair competition shall be filed
with the CFI (now RTC). Since RA 7691 is a general law and IPC in relation to Trademark law is a
special law, the latter shall prevail. Actions for unfair competition therefore should be filed with the
RTC.

COMELEC vs. HON. Thelma Canalas Trinidad Pe-Aguirre


G.R. no. 171208
Sept. 7,2007

Facts:
That on or about July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
(SK)Elections, in the City of Caloocan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
thisHonorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully, cast her
votein substitution of another person by misrepresenting herself to be Emely Genovia and voted
insubstitution of said Emely Genovia, a registered voter in Precinct No. 779-A, Barangay 60, Caloocan
City.By Order of September 21, 2005, Branch 129 of the Caloocan RTC dismissed the case for lack
of jurisdiction, it citing Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980) reading: Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and MunicipalCircuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.

Except in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of RegionalTrial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts andMunicipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding six (6)years irrespective of the amount of fine regardless of other imposable accessory
penalties, including thecivil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective
of kind, nature, or valueamount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminalnegligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
The COMELEC moved to reconsider the trial courts dismissal order, inviting att
ention to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code which reads:SECTION 268. Jurisdiction of courts.

The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal
action or proceedings for violation of this Code, except thoserelating to the offense of failure to register
or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of themetropolitan or municipal trial courts. From
the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminalcases.
ISSUE: WON the trial court has jurisdiction over the case
HELD: As correctly argued by the COMELEC, Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code
specificallyprovides, regional trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal
action orproceedings fo
r violation of the Code except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failureto vote.
The petition is GRANTED, respondent judge is DIRECTED to reinstate the case to the courtdocket and
to conduct appropriate proceedings thereon with reasonable dispatch.

Palana vs. People


(G.r. No. 149995, September 28, 2007)
FACTS:
On August 19, 1991, petitioner was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in an Information
which reads as follows: That on or about September 1987, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly make or draw and issue to Alex B. Carlos to
apply on account or for the value the check in the amount of P590,000.00.
Private complainant Alex B. Carlos testified that sometime in September 1987, petitioner and his
wife borrowed money from him in the amount of P590,000.00. To secure the payment of the loan,
petitioner issued a postdated check for the same amount in favor of the complainant. However, when the
check was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds. Subsequent
demand notwithstanding, petitioner failed to make good the said dishonored check.
Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him by private complainant was an investment by
the latter who was his business partner. He argued that the subject check was not issued in September
1987 to guarantee the payment of a loan since his checking account was opened only on December 1,
1987. He claimed that private complainant cajoled him to issue a check in his favor allegedly to be
shown to a textile supplier who would provide the partnership with the necessary raw materials.
Petitioner alleged that when the check was issued sometime in February 1988, complainant knew that
the same was not funded.
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court rendered on September 23, 1997 a Decision
finding petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed but it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the trial courts decision in toto.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
ISSUE/S:
WON petitioner was guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. WON the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
On the first issue, after a careful review of the records, this Court sustains petitioners conviction
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are as follows:
(1) the accused makes, draws, or issues any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the accused
knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the

payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Each element of the offense was duly proven by the prosecution. Petitioner admitted that at the
time he issued the subject check, he knew that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for payment of such check. Consequently, when the check was presented for payment, it
was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, he received demand letters to
pay the amount of the check from private complainant but he did not comply with it. The issue as to
whether the amount of the subject check represents the amount of the money loaned by private
complainant to petitioner or as an investment in the alleged partnership is a factual question involving
the credibility of witnesses. Where the issue is one of credibility, the appellate court will not generally
disturb the findings of the lower court considering that it is in a better position to settle that issue since it
had the advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing their conduct during the trial, which
circumstances carry great weight in assessing their credibility. In the present case, we see no reason to
reverse the finding of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that the amount of the subject
check was a loan and not an investment.
On the second issue, petitioners argument that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court and not
the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to R.A. 7691 is without
merit. It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by the law
in force at the time of the institution of the action and not during the arraignment of the accused.
The Information charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August 19, 1991.
At that time, the governing law determinative of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg. 129 which provides
Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than 30 days but
not more than one year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the
check which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the court. In the present case, the fine imposable is P200,000.00 hence, the
Regional Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case. The Metropolitan Trial Court
could not acquire jurisdiction over the criminal action because its jurisdiction is only for offenses
punishable with a fine of not more than P4,000.00. Indeed, R.A. No. 7691 contains retroactive
provisions. However, these only apply to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial
stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be construed that R.A. No.
7691 has retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial
Courts prior to its effectivity.