Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
EL.
for
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
RESOLUTION
P35,000 for the loan and interest; and the Rural Bank of Pinan
to waive its cross-claims against defendant Nicolas Sabandal.
Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned
Judgment were NOTED in our Resolution of 29 January 1991.
In the same Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia and Dagpin
were required to comment on the same.
Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December
1990, was sent by Executive judge Jesus Angeles of the RTC of
Zamboanga del Norte, certifying that Sabandal has no pending
case with his Court and that he has no cause to object to his
admission to the Philippine Bar. This was "Noted" in the
Resolution of 26 February 1991.
Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take
the lawyer's oath in a Motion dated 8 June 1991. In our
Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred action on the
aforesaid Motion pending compliance by the complainants with
the Resolution of 29 January 1991 requiring them to comment
on the letter of Judge Pacifico M. Garcia.
To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said
Resolution by submitting a Comment, dated 29 August 1991,
stating that the termination of Civil Case No. 3747 is "proof of
Sabandal's sincere reformation, of his repentance with
restitution of the rights of complainants he violated," and that
"there is no more reason to oppose his admission to the Bar."
This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 24 September 1991.
In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates
his plea to be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath.
His plea must be DENIED.
In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to
take the oath, ten (10) years having elapsed from the time he
took and passed the 1976 Bar examinations, after careful
consideration of his show of contrition and willingness to reform.
not but have known was public land. This was manipulative on
his part and does not speak well of his moral character. It is a
manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service,
which can not be erased by the termination of the case filed by
the Republic against him where no determination of his guilt or
innocence was made because the suit had been compromised.
Although as the Solicitor General had pointed out, the amicable
settlement was tantamount to a confession on his part. What is
more, he could not but have known of the intrinsic invalidity of
his title and yet he took advantage of it by securing a bank loan,
mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosure
of the mortgage and the sale of the land at public auction, he did
not lift a finger to redeem the same until the civil case filed
against him was eventually compromised. This is a sad
reflection on his sense of honor and fair dealing. His failure to
reveal to this Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion
filed against him during the period that he was submitting
several Motions for Reconsideration before us also reveal his
lack of candor and truthfulness.
There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character,
yes. But these were confined to lack of knowledge of the
pendency of any criminal case against him and were obviously
made without awareness of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case instituted by the Government against him.
Those testimonials can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his
acts of dishonesty and lack of good moral character.
That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC
606) and Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619) have not submitted any
opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no moment. They
have already expressed their objections in their earlier
comments. That complainant Tan has withdrawn her objection
to his taking the oath can neither tilt the balance in his favor, the
basis of her complaint treating as it does of another subject
matter.
Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a
matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who
are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character:
The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to
maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in
academic preparation and legal training as well as in honesty
and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves
are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of
the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this
noble profession only those persons who are known to be
honest and to possess good moral character. . . . (In re Parazo,
82 Phil. 230).
Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad
dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least common
honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30,
1963, 7 SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It
has also been held that no moral qualification for bar
membership is more important than truthfulness or candor
(Fellner v. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to
become a member of the BAR, this Court's Resolution, dated 10
February 1989 is RECALLED and his prayer to be allowed to
take the lawyer's oath is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla,
Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero
and Nocon, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4148. July 30, 1998]
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. ATTY.
LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of her
husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing
grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena
(Helen) Pea under scandalous circumstances.[1]
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively
charged four times for conduct unbecoming an officer of the
court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11,
1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was
meted the penalty of six months suspension without pay,[2]
while in Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI,
which were consolidated,[3] this Court on January 31, 1981
ordered the separation from service of respondent.[4]
Now he faces disbarment.
The records reveal the following facts:
From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on
Bar Discipline, it appears that complainant and respondent were
married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman
Catholic Church in Quezon City.
They established their
residence in Antipolo, Rizal, were eight of their eleven children
were born.
In 1962 respondent relocated his family to
Dadiangas, Cotabato (Now General Santos City), where his last
three children were born and where he practiced his profession
until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on January
30, 1976.
profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the
Bar but also the administration of justice.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a
lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.[17]
The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great
caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct which seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of
the Court of and member of the bar.[18] For disbarment
proceedings are intended to afford the parties thereto full
opportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action is
taken, to assure the general public that those who are tasked
with the duty of administering justice are competent, honorable,
trustworthy men and women in whom the Courts and the clients
may repose full confidence.
In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[19] a complaint for
disbarment was filed against a member of the bar by his wife.
She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and their
son; and that he had adulterous relations with a married but
separated woman. Respondent was not able to overcome the
evidence presented by his wife that he was guilty of grossly
immoral conduct. In another case,[20] a lawyer was disbarred
when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another
woman who had borne him a child. The Court held that
respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality
expected and required of a member of a bar.
In the present case, the record shows that despite previous
sanctions imposed upon by this Court, respondent continued his
illicit liaison with a woman other than lawfully-wedded wife. The
report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly
the complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the
contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance; in the
face of charges against him. The IBP Board of Governors,
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133090. January 19, 2001]
REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTEL
BUILDERS, INC., petitioners, vs. HON. DOLORES S.
ESPAOL, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, respondent.
DECISION
ATTY CORDERO:
Honor.
INTERPRETER:
your Honor.
ATTY. CONCEPCION:
Well I was not informed because I
am not the Register of Deeds. I am only the Deputy Register of
Deeds and I was not informed by the receiving clerk of our
office regarding this case. As a matter of fact I was surprised
when I received this morning the subpoena, your Honor.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we put that on
record that the manifestation of the respondent that he was not
informed.
COURT:
That is recorded. This is a Court of record and
everything that you say here is recorded.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes your Honor please, we know that but
we want to be specific because we will be [filing] a case against
this receiving clerk who did not [inform] him your Honor please,
with this manifestation of the Deputy of the Register of Deeds
that is irregularity in the performance of the official duty of the
clerk not to inform the parties concerned.
COURT:
Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this
fellow who is taking the video recording at this proceedings.
There is no permission from this Court that such proceedings
should be taken.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise
him to take a video he just accompanied me this morning.
COURT:
Right, but the video recording is prepared process
and you should secure the permission of this Court.
ATTY. BUGARING: Actually, I did not instruct him to take some
video tape.
COURT:
Why would he be bringing camera if you did not
give him the go signal that shots should be done.
ATTY. CONCEPCION:
Well as I have said before, I have
not received any motion regarding this contempt you are talking.
I am willing now to testify.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor I am still of the prosecution
stage, it is not yet the defense. This is a criminal proceedings,
contempt proceedings is a criminal.
ATTY. CONCEPCION:
Your Honor please, may I ask for
the assistance from the Fiscal.
COURT:
If this is going to proceed, we need the presence of
a Fiscal or a counsel for the Register of Deeds.
ATTY. CONCEPCION:
Can I appoint an outside lawyer not
a Fiscal but a private counsel, your Honor.
COURT:
That is at your pleasure. The Court will consider
that you should be amply represented.
ATTY. CONCEPCION:
As a matter of fact I have a lawyer
here, Atty. Barzaga if he is willing
ATTY. BARZAGA[4]:
records.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------COURT:
COURT:
This Court would like to be enlightened with
respect to that matter.
ATTY. BARZAGA:
Well, according to Atty. Diosdado
Concepcion he could already explain this, your Honor.
COURT:
Have it properly addressed as part of the
manifestation so that this court can be guided accordingly.
Because this Court believes that the root of the matter started
from that. After the submission of the . what are you suppose
to submit?
ATTY. BARZAGA:
Comment your Honor, on the
motion to cite Atty. Diosdado Concepcion in contempt of Court.
COURT:
After the submission of the Comment and
furnishing a copy of the comment to the counsel for the plaintiff,
this Court is going to give the counsel for the plaintiff an equal
time within which to submit his reply.
please, we have also ---- and we know also our procedure, your
Honor.
COURT:
As far as this Court is concerned it is going to
follow the rules.
COURT:
If you know your procedure then you follow the
procedure of the Court first and then do whatever you want.
ATTY. BUGARING:
justice in town.
COURT:
COURT:
Yes, you know your rules thats why you are
putting the cart ahead of the horse.
ATTY. BUGARING: No your Honor, Ive been challenged by
this Court that I know better than this Court. Modestly (sic)
aside your Honor please, Ive been winning in many certiorari
cases, your Honor.
COURT:
Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite you
for contempt of Court. (Banging the gavel) You call the police
and I am going to send this lawyer in jail. (Turning to the
Sheriff)
COURT:
You have presented a witness and it was an
adverse witness that was presented.
COURT:
You have been given enough time and you have
been abusing the discretion of this Court.
COURT:
With respect to this, the procedure of the Court is
for the respondent to file his comment.
ATTY. BUGARING: Well your Honor please, at this point in
time I dont want to comment on anything but I reserve my right
to inhibit this Honorable Court before trying this case.
COURT:
COURT:
That is not the way to protect your client that is an
abuse of the discretion of this Court. (Turning to the Sheriff)
Will you see to it that this guy is put in jail. (pp. 29-42. Rollo)
Hence, in an Order dated December 5, 1996, Judge Espaol
cited petitioner in direct contempt of court, thus:
During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were
present together with one (1) operating a video camera who
was taking pictures of the proceedings of the case while
counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making manifestation
move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for allegedly being
antagonistic to his client, and other invectives were hurled to
the discredit of the Court.
SECOND DIVISION
8.
Complainant was even advised by respondent that it was
not necessary for her to consult her lawyers under the pretense
that: (a) this could only jeopardize the settlement; (b) she would
only be incurring enormous expense if she consulted a new
lawyer; (c) respondent was assisting her anyway; (d) she had
nothing to worry about the documents foisted upon her to sign;
(e) complainant need not come to court afterwards to save her
time; and in any event respondent already took care of
everything;
9.
Complainant had been prevented from exhibiting fully her
case by means of fraud, deception and some other form of
mendacity practiced on her by respondent;
10.
Finally, respondent fraudulently or without authority
assumed to represent complainant and connived in her defeat; .
..1
Respondent filed his Answer stating that counsel for
complainant,
Atty. Roland B. Inting had abandoned his client. Atty. Lim further
stated that the other counsel, Atty. Enrico Aumentado, did not
actively participate in the case and it was upon the request of
complainant and another debtor of Yap, Crispina Acuna, that he
(respondent) made the compromise agreement.
Respondent states that he first instructed complainant to notify
her lawyers but was informed that her lawyer had abandoned
her since she could not pay his attorney's fees.
Complainant filed a reply denying that she had been abandoned
by her lawyers. Complainant stated that respondent never
furnished her lawyers with copies of the compromise agreement
and a motion to withdraw the injunction cash bond deposited by
Yap.
At the outset, it is worth noting that the terms of the compromise
agreement are indeed grossly loaded in favor of Geesnell L.
Yap, respondent's client.
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4807. March 22, 2000]
MANUEL N. CAMACHO, complainant, vs. ATTYS. LUIS
MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN, REGINA D. BALMORES,
CATHERINE V. LAUREL and HUBERT JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS
of PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES,
respondents.
D E C I S IO N
VITUG, J.: JVITUG
Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of
Professional Ethics, specifically Canon 9 thereof, viz:
"A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject
of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less
should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with
him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon
the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to
mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not
undertake to advise him as to law." barth
Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers
comprising the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices,
namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D.
Balmores, Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos.
Complainant, the hired counsel of some expelled students from
the AMA Computer College ("AMACC"), in an action for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for
Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged that
respondents, then counsel for the defendants, procured and
effected on separate occasions, without his knowledge,
compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with
four of his clients in the aforementioned civil case which, in
effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims they might
Following the execution of the letters of apology and ReAdmission Agreements, a Manifestation, dated 06 June 1997,
was filed with the trial court where the civil case was pending by
Attorney Regina D. Balmores of the Pangulayan and Associates
Law Offices for defendant AMACC. A copy of the manifestation
was furnished complainant. In his Resolution, dated 14 June
1997, Judge Lopez of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court
thereupon dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.
EN BANC
attorneys, but with the words "Ney & Bosque - C.W. Ney,
abogado."chanrobles virtual law library
for
law
In the year 1902 this court decided that the defendant, J. Garcia
Bosque, was not entitled to admission to practice law in the
Philippine Islands, upon the ground that after the change of
sovereignty he had elected to remain a Spanish subject and as
such was not qualified for admission to the bar ( In re Bosque, 1
Phil.
Rep.,
88),
and
an
order
was
entered
accordingly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
THIRD DIVISION
circumstances,
that
my
consent
was
vitiated
by
misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of
confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds
between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the
real facts from me."
2.
"Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and
established reputation;"
4.
Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular
members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
3.
"Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage
**;" and
VALES
1987 P
1,403.00
567.00
1988 720.00
760.00
200.00
1989 686.00
130.00
1,500.00
1990 605.00
570.00
1991 165.00
2,300.00
3,579.00
1,000.00
4,327.00
2,700.00
AMALGAMATED
LABORERS'
ASSOCIATION
and/or
FELISBERTO M. JAVIER for himself and as General
President,
ATTY. JOSEUR. CARBONELL, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND ATTY.
LEONARDO C. FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Jose Ur. Carbonell for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Leonardo C. Fernandez for and in his own behalf as
respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Controversy over attorneys' fees for legal services
rendered in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu.
The background facts are as follows:
On May 30, 1956, Florentino Arceo and 47 others
together with their union, Amalgamated Laborers' Association,
and/or Felisberto Javier, general president of said union, lodged
a complaint 1 in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), for unfair
labor practices specified in Sec. 4(a) 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the
Industrial Peace Act. Made respondents were their former
employer, Binalbagan Sugar Central Company, Inc. (Biscom),
Rafael Jalandoni, its president and general manager; Gonzalo
Guillen, its chief engineer and general factory superintendent;
and Fraternal Labor Organization and/or Roberto Poli, its
president.
xxx
xxx
growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above
principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and
determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over
the principal matter, even though the Court may thus be, called
on to consider and decide matters, which as original causes of
action, would not be within its cognizance (Bartholomew vs.
Shipe, 251 S.W. 1031), (21 C.J.S. pp. 136-138.)
Thus, in Gomez vs. North Camarines Lumber Co., L11945, August 18, 1958, and Serrano vs. Serrano, L-19562,
May 23, 1964, we held that the court having jurisdiction over the
main cause of action, may grant the relief incidental thereto,
even if they would otherwise, be outside its competence. 6
To direct that the present dispute be lodged in another
court as petitioners advocate would only result in multiplicity of
suits, 7 a situation abhorred by the rules. Thus it is, that usually
the application to fix the attorneys' fees is made before the court
which renders the judgment. 8 And, it has been observed that
"[a]n approved procedure, where a charging lien has attached to
a judgment or where money has been paid into court, is for the
attorney to file an intervening petition and have the amount and
extent of his lien judicially determined." 9 Appropriately to be
recalled at this point, is the recent ruling in Martinez vs. Union
de Maquinistas, 1967A Phild. 142, 144, January 30, 1967,
where, speaking thru Mr. Justice Arsenio P. Dizon, explicit
pronouncement was made by this Court that: "We are of the
opinion that since the Court of Industrial Relations obviously had
jurisdiction over the main cases, ... it likewise had full jurisdiction
to consider and decide all matters collateral thereto, such as
claims for attorney's fees made by the members of the bar who
appeared therein." 10
2. The parties herein join hands in one point - the ten (10)
successful complainants in C.I.R Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu
should pay as attorneys' fees 30% of the amount adjudicated by
the court in the latter's favor (P79,755.22).
They are at odds, however, on how to split the fees.
xxx
xxx