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B.M. No.

44 February 24, 1992


EUFROSINA Y. TAN vs. NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL

"Noted without action." The Court, however, on 10 February


1989, after considering his plea for mercy and forgiveness, his
willingness to reform and the several testimonials attesting to
his good moral character and civic consciousness, reconsidered
its earlier Resolution and finally allowed him to take the lawyer's
oath "with the Court binding him to his assurance that he shall
strictly abide by and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit
of the Lawyer's Oath and the highest standards of the legal
profession" (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 10 February 1989, 170
SCRA 211).

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992


EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant, vs. NICOLAS EL.
SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992
MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant, vs. NICOLAS EL.
SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992
HERVE DAGPIN, complainant, vs. NICOLAS
SABANDAL, respondent. Nelbert T. Paculan
respondent.
Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.

EL.
for

However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking,


complainants Tan, Dagpin and Boquia each filed separate
motions for reconsideration of the Resolution of 10 February
1989. These were acted upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989
hereunder quoted, in part, for ready reference:
On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616,
and Complainant Moises Boquia in SBC No. 609 also filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution allowing
respondent to take his oath. They alleged that respondent had
deliberately and maliciously excluded them in his Petition of 28
June 1988. That, of course, is without merit considering that in
his Petition of 28 June 1988, respondent had discussed said
cases quite lengthily.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that


Complainant Benjamin Cabigon in BM No. 59 and Complainant
Cornelio Agnis in SBC No. 624, had passed away so that they
are in no position to submit their respective Comments.

On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of


unauthorized practice of law filed against respondent Sabandal
and accordingly denied the latter's petition to be allowed to take
the oath as member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of
Attorneys.

One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing


respondent to take his oath, was a testimonial from the IBP
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, dated 29 December 1986,
certifying that respondent was "acting with morality and has
been careful in his actuations in the community."

From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of


the aforesaid Resolution, all of which were either denied or

Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed


only by the then President of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte

RESOLUTION

Chapter, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, without authorization from the


Board of Officers of said Chapter; and that Atty. Angeles was
respondent's own counsel as well as the lawyer of respondent's
parents-in-law in CAR Case No. 347, Ozamiz City. Attached to
Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration was a Certification,
dated 24 February 1989, signed by the IBP Zamboanga del
Norte Chapter President, Atty. Norberto L. Nuevas, stating that
"the present Board of Officers with the undersigned as President
had not issued any testimonial attesting to the good moral
character and civic consciousness of Mr. Nicolas Sabandal."
In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989,
respondent states that the IBP testimonial referred to by
Complainant Tan must have been that signed by the former IBP
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Senen O.
Angeles, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 29 December
1986, and that he himself had not submitted to the Court any
certification from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter Board
of Officers of 1988-1989.
Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to
require the present Board of Officers of the IBP, Zamboanga del
Norte Chapter, to MANIFEST whether or not it is willing to give
a testimonial certifying to respondent's good moral character as
to entitle him to take the lawyer's oath, and if not, the reason
therefor. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Norte is likewise required to submit a
COMMENT on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of
the Bar.
Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from
notice.
Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica,
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del
Norte, filed his Comment, dated 4 August 1989, and received on
25 August 1989, pertinently reading:

The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the


respondent, is not aware of any acts committed by him as would
disqualify him from admission to the Bar. It might be relevant to
mention, however, that there is Civil Case No. 3747 entitled
Republic of the Philippines, Represented by the Director of
Lands, Plaintiff, versus Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds of
Zamboanga del Norte and Rural Bank of Pinan, (Zamboanga
del Norte), Inc., for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion
pending in this Court in which said respondent, per complaint
filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have
secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of
land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland
and not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and
which he later mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc.
The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land sold at public
auction and respondent has not redeemed the land until the
present. (Emphasis Supplied)
The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a
Certification, dated 2 February 1990, signed by its Secretary
Peter Y. Co and attested to by its President Gil L. Batula, to wit:
This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the
Office of the Clerk of CourtMunicipal Trial Court in the City of
Dipolog; Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte and the
Office of the Provincial and City Prosecutors, Mr. Nicolas E.
Sabandal has not been convicted of any crime, nor is there any
pending derogatory criminal case against him. Based on the
above findings, the Board does not find any acts committed by
the petitioner to disqualify him from admission to the Philippine
Bar.
We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP
Certification and to reply to Executive Judge Pelagio Lachica's
comment in our Resolution of 15 February 1990.
On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement
objections of complainants Tan (in BM 44) and Boquia (in SBC
616) and the Certification by Executive Judge Lachica, dated 4

August 1989, that there is a pending case before his Court


involving respondent Sabandal, this Court resolved to DEFER
the setting of a date for the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal
and required Judge Lachica to inform this Court of the outcome
of the case entitled Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil Case 3747),
pending before his "Sala" as soon as resolved.
In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another
Comment, dated 13 March 1990, by complainant Herve Dagpin
in SBC 609, vehemently objecting to the oath-taking of
respondent Sabandal and describing his actuations in Civil
Case 3747 as manipulative and surreptitious. This comment
was Noted in the Resolution of 22 May 1990.
In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August
1990, complainant Tan in Bar Matter 44, informed the Court that
her relationship with Sabandal has "already been restored," as
he had asked forgiveness for what has been done to her and
that she finds no necessity in pursuing her case against him.
Complainant Tan further stated that she sees no further reason
to oppose his admission to the Bar as he had shown sincere
repentance and reformation which she believes make him
morally fit to become a member of the Philippine Bar. "In view of
this development," the letter stated, "we highly recommend him
for admission to the legal profession and request this Honorable
Court to schedule his oath-taking at a time most convenient."
This letter was Noted in the Resolution of 2 October 1990,
which also required a comment on Tan's letter from
complainants Boquia and Dagpin.
Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their
comment, dated 5 November 1990, stated thus:
Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private
personal disposition which raises the question whether personal
forgiveness is enough basis to exculpate and obliterate these
cases. On our part, we believe and maintain the importance and
finality of the Honorable Supreme Court's resolutions in these
cases. . . .

It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and


discretion of any party to change or amend said final resolutions
which are already res judicata. Viewed in the light of the
foregoing final and executory resolutions, these cases therefore
should not in the least be considered as anything which is
subject and subservient to the changing moods and dispositions
of the parties, devoid of any permanency or finality.
Respondent's scheming change in tactics and strategy could not
improve his case.
The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.
In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge
Pacifico M. Garcia, Regional Trial Court Judge of Branch 8,
Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded Judge Pelagio
Lachica, the latter having availed of optional retirement on 30
June 1990) submitted to this Court, on 17 December 1990, a
copy of the "Judgment," dated 12 December 1990, in Civil Case
3747, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal
et al" for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion, which,
according to him, was already considered closed and
terminated.
Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24
October 1990, had been reached between the principal parties,
approved by the Trial Court, and conformed to by the counsel
for defendant Rural Bank of Pinan.
Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original
Certificate of Title under Free Patent in Sabandal's name and
the latter's mortgage thereof in favor of the Rural Bank of Pinan;
provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the
Register of Deeds for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of
public domain the land covered by the aforesaid Certificate of'
Title with defendant Sabandal refraining from exercising acts of
possession or ownership over said land; caused the defendant
Sabandal to pay defendant Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of

P35,000 for the loan and interest; and the Rural Bank of Pinan
to waive its cross-claims against defendant Nicolas Sabandal.
Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned
Judgment were NOTED in our Resolution of 29 January 1991.
In the same Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia and Dagpin
were required to comment on the same.
Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December
1990, was sent by Executive judge Jesus Angeles of the RTC of
Zamboanga del Norte, certifying that Sabandal has no pending
case with his Court and that he has no cause to object to his
admission to the Philippine Bar. This was "Noted" in the
Resolution of 26 February 1991.
Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take
the lawyer's oath in a Motion dated 8 June 1991. In our
Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred action on the
aforesaid Motion pending compliance by the complainants with
the Resolution of 29 January 1991 requiring them to comment
on the letter of Judge Pacifico M. Garcia.
To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said
Resolution by submitting a Comment, dated 29 August 1991,
stating that the termination of Civil Case No. 3747 is "proof of
Sabandal's sincere reformation, of his repentance with
restitution of the rights of complainants he violated," and that
"there is no more reason to oppose his admission to the Bar."
This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 24 September 1991.
In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates
his plea to be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath.
His plea must be DENIED.
In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to
take the oath, ten (10) years having elapsed from the time he
took and passed the 1976 Bar examinations, after careful
consideration of his show of contrition and willingness to reform.

Also taken cognizance of were the several testimonials attesting


to his good moral character and civic consciousness. At that
time, we had not received the objections from complainant Tan
to Sabandal's taking the oath nor were we aware of the gravity
of the civil case against him.
It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the
Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal" was instituted by the
Government in 1985 and was brought about because of
respondent's procurement of a certificate of free patent over a
parcel of land belonging to the public domain and its use as
security for a mortgage in order to obtain a loan. At that time,
Sabandal was an employee of the Bureau of Lands. He did not
submit any defense and was declared it default by order of the
RTC dated 26 November 1986. The controversy was eventually
settled by mere compromise with respondent surrendering the
bogus certificate of title to the government and paying-off the
mortgagor, "to buy peace and forestall further expenses of
litigation incurred by defendants" (Rollo, Judgment in Civil Case
No. 3747). The Office of the Solicitor General interposed no
objection to the approval of the said amicable settlement and
prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, "as
the amicable settlement may amount to a confession by the
defendant" (Rollo, supra). It must also be stressed that in 1985,
at the time said case was instituted, Sabandal's petition to take
the lawyer's oath had already been denied on 29 November
1983 and he was then submitting to this Court motions for
reconsideration alleging his good moral character without,
however, mentioning the pendency of that civil case against
him.
In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances
attending its termination, the Court now entertains second
thoughts about respondent's fitness to become a member of the
Bar.
It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator
at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated his
procurement of the free patent title over property which he could

not but have known was public land. This was manipulative on
his part and does not speak well of his moral character. It is a
manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service,
which can not be erased by the termination of the case filed by
the Republic against him where no determination of his guilt or
innocence was made because the suit had been compromised.
Although as the Solicitor General had pointed out, the amicable
settlement was tantamount to a confession on his part. What is
more, he could not but have known of the intrinsic invalidity of
his title and yet he took advantage of it by securing a bank loan,
mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosure
of the mortgage and the sale of the land at public auction, he did
not lift a finger to redeem the same until the civil case filed
against him was eventually compromised. This is a sad
reflection on his sense of honor and fair dealing. His failure to
reveal to this Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion
filed against him during the period that he was submitting
several Motions for Reconsideration before us also reveal his
lack of candor and truthfulness.
There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character,
yes. But these were confined to lack of knowledge of the
pendency of any criminal case against him and were obviously
made without awareness of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case instituted by the Government against him.
Those testimonials can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his
acts of dishonesty and lack of good moral character.
That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC
606) and Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619) have not submitted any
opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no moment. They
have already expressed their objections in their earlier
comments. That complainant Tan has withdrawn her objection
to his taking the oath can neither tilt the balance in his favor, the
basis of her complaint treating as it does of another subject
matter.
Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a
matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who

are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character:
The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to
maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in
academic preparation and legal training as well as in honesty
and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves
are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of
the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this
noble profession only those persons who are known to be
honest and to possess good moral character. . . . (In re Parazo,
82 Phil. 230).
Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad
dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least common
honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30,
1963, 7 SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It
has also been held that no moral qualification for bar
membership is more important than truthfulness or candor
(Fellner v. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to
become a member of the BAR, this Court's Resolution, dated 10
February 1989 is RECALLED and his prayer to be allowed to
take the lawyer's oath is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla,
Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero
and Nocon, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4148. July 30, 1998]
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. ATTY.
LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of her
husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing
grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena
(Helen) Pea under scandalous circumstances.[1]
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively
charged four times for conduct unbecoming an officer of the
court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11,
1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was
meted the penalty of six months suspension without pay,[2]
while in Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI,
which were consolidated,[3] this Court on January 31, 1981
ordered the separation from service of respondent.[4]
Now he faces disbarment.
The records reveal the following facts:
From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on
Bar Discipline, it appears that complainant and respondent were
married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman
Catholic Church in Quezon City.
They established their
residence in Antipolo, Rizal, were eight of their eleven children
were born.
In 1962 respondent relocated his family to
Dadiangas, Cotabato (Now General Santos City), where his last
three children were born and where he practiced his profession
until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on January
30, 1976.

In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge,


respondent began cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea,
in Nasipit, Agusan Del Norte. On December 28, 1977 Elena
gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Pea.
In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed
an administrative complaint against respondent for immorality.
After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for a
period of six months without pay was meted by this Court upon
respondent.[5]
Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with
Elena, giving rise to another charge of immorality and other
administrative cases, such as conduct unbecoming an officer of
the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were
consolidated and after investigation, this Court ordered his
dismissal and separation from the service.[6]
But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend
his ways. He continued living with Elena, which resulted in the
birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named Laella
Pea Tapucar.
Moreover, he completely abandoned
complainant and his children by her.
Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to
Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along Elena and their two children. And
on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage with Elena
in a ceremony solemnized by Metropolitan Trial Court Judge
Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was done while the
respondents marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on
record shows the dissolution thereof.
Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States
of America upon her retirement from the government service in
1990. However, her children, who remained in Antipolo, kept
her posted of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their
fathers acts, including deception and intrigues against them.
Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a similar case which

she filed in 1976, complainant was forced to file the present


petition for disbarment under the compulsion of the material
impulse to shield and protect her children from the despotic and
cruel acts of their own father. Complainant secured the
assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana TapucarBaua, to represent her in this case.
Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
the matter was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the
Commission through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez
recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his name be
stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on
the ground that, notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed
upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court, respondent
continued the illicit liaison with Elena.[7]
In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of
contradicting the charges against him, respondent displayed
arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the Court,
as when he said:
I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two
months without pay in 1980 for having a mistress, the same girl
Ms. Elena (Helen) Pea, now my wife.
Being ordered
separated in later administrative case constitute double
jeopardy. If now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Pea will
constitute triple jeopardy. If thats the law so be it.[8]
Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, passed on May 17, 1997, a Resolution
adopting the Commissioners recommendation, as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97
Adm. Case No. 4148
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby


ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-titled case,
herein made part of the Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and,
finding the recommendation therein to be fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and
that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner
Fernandez, as approved and adopted by the Board of
Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the
foregoing Resolution, herein considered as the recommendation
to this Court by said Board pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b),
of the Rules of Court.* We are in agreement that respondents
actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.
Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a
condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it
must also remain intact in order to maintain ones good standing
in that exclusive and honored fraternity.[9] There is perhaps no
profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned
morality is more imperative than that of law.[10] The Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01.
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.*
As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live
up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession,
by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a
high standards of legal proficiency, as well as morality including
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times

subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community


approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct both
public and private fails this scrutiny would have to be
disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized
accordingly.
Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once
a member of the judiciary, a fact that aggravates this
professional infractions. For having occupied that place of
honor in the Bench, he knew a judges actuations ought to be
free from any appearance of impropriety.[11] For a judge is the
visible representation of the law, more importantly, of justice.
Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of strength that
fortifies their will to obey the law.[12] Indeed, a judge should
avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his actuations,
lest it be a demoralizing example to others.[13] Surely,
respondent could not have forgotten the Code of Judicial
Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives.[14]
Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and
ethical conduct,[15] an attorney-at-law is also invested with
public trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of
justice. Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must ensure
the faith and confidence of the public that justice is administered
with dignity and civility. A high degree or moral integrity is
expected of a lawyer in the community where he resides. He
must maintain due regard for public decency in an orderly
society.
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties
to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.[16]
Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged with
the responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is
right, are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and
responsibility that have been compendiously described as
moral character. To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to
strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his

profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the
Bar but also the administration of justice.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a
lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.[17]
The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great
caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct which seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of
the Court of and member of the bar.[18] For disbarment
proceedings are intended to afford the parties thereto full
opportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action is
taken, to assure the general public that those who are tasked
with the duty of administering justice are competent, honorable,
trustworthy men and women in whom the Courts and the clients
may repose full confidence.
In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[19] a complaint for
disbarment was filed against a member of the bar by his wife.
She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and their
son; and that he had adulterous relations with a married but
separated woman. Respondent was not able to overcome the
evidence presented by his wife that he was guilty of grossly
immoral conduct. In another case,[20] a lawyer was disbarred
when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another
woman who had borne him a child. The Court held that
respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality
expected and required of a member of a bar.
In the present case, the record shows that despite previous
sanctions imposed upon by this Court, respondent continued his
illicit liaison with a woman other than lawfully-wedded wife. The
report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly
the complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the
contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance; in the
face of charges against him. The IBP Board of Governors,

tasked to determine whether he still merited the privileges


extended to a member of the legal profession, resolved the
matter against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral
conduct abounds against him and could not be explained away.
Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior
one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating
complainant and their children, show his disregard of family
obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyers
oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly
shows a serious flaw in respondents character, his moral
indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright
defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the
legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the
administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but
appropriate disciplinary action.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is
hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out
his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, and
Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, no part due to personal relationships.
Purisima, J., no part.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133090. January 19, 2001]
REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTEL
BUILDERS, INC., petitioners, vs. HON. DOLORES S.
ESPAOL, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, respondent.

opposed by the defendants. On November 5, 1996, petitioner


filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996,
filed a Rejoinder to Opposition and a Motion for Contempt of
Court.[3]
During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on
December 5, 1996, the following incident transpired:

DECISION

ATTY. BUGARING: For the plaintiff, your Honor, we are ready.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

ATTY CORDERO:
Honor.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision


dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals[1] affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus,
Cavite, declaring petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in
direct contempt of court.
The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing
held on December 5, 1996 of Civil Case No. 1266-96 entitled
Royal Becthel[2] Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran and
Beatriz Alvaran, et al., for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of
Title, Specific Performance and Damages with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order in
the sala of respondent judge Dolores S. Espaol of the Regional
Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite.
Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal
Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial court issued an order on
February 27, 1996 directing the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Cavite to annotate at the back of certain certificates
of title a notice of lis pendens. Before the Register of Deeds of
the Province of Cavite could comply with said order, the
defendant Spouses Alvaran on April 15, 1996, filed a motion to
cancel lis pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly
appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed an
opposition to the motion to cancel lis pendens. On August 16,
1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was granted by the
court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was

Same appearance for the defendant, your

ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, we are ready with


respect to the prosecution of our motion for contempt, your
Honor. May we know from the record if the Register of Deeds is
properly notified for todays hearing.
COURT:

Will you call on the Register of Deeds.

INTERPRETER:
your Honor.

Atty. Diosdado Concepcion, He is here,

ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready, your Honor.


COURT:
There is a motion for contempt in connection with
the order of this Court which directed your office to register lis
pendens of the complaint in connection with this case of Royal
Becthel Builder, Inc. versus spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz
Alvaran, et al.
ATTY. CONCEPCION:
Your Honor, I just received this
morning at ten o clock [in the morning] the subpoena.
ATTY. BUGARING: May we put it on record that as early as
November 6, 1996, the Office of the Register of Deeds was
furnished with a copy of our motion, your Honor please, and the
record will bear it out. Until now they did not file any answer,
opposition or pleadings with respect to this motion.

ATTY. CONCEPCION:
Well I was not informed because I
am not the Register of Deeds. I am only the Deputy Register of
Deeds and I was not informed by the receiving clerk of our
office regarding this case. As a matter of fact I was surprised
when I received this morning the subpoena, your Honor.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we put that on
record that the manifestation of the respondent that he was not
informed.
COURT:
That is recorded. This is a Court of record and
everything that you say here is recorded.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes your Honor please, we know that but
we want to be specific because we will be [filing] a case against
this receiving clerk who did not [inform] him your Honor please,
with this manifestation of the Deputy of the Register of Deeds
that is irregularity in the performance of the official duty of the
clerk not to inform the parties concerned.
COURT:
Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this
fellow who is taking the video recording at this proceedings.
There is no permission from this Court that such proceedings
should be taken.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise
him to take a video he just accompanied me this morning.
COURT:
Right, but the video recording is prepared process
and you should secure the permission of this Court.
ATTY. BUGARING: Actually, I did not instruct him to take some
video tape.
COURT:
Why would he be bringing camera if you did not
give him the go signal that shots should be done.

ATTY. BUGARING: This Court should not presume that, your


Honor please, we just came from an occasion last night and I
am not yet come home, your Honor please. I could prove your
Honor please, that the contents of that tape is other matters
your Honor please. I was just surprised why he took video tape
your Honor please, that we ask the apology of this Court if that
offend this Court your Honor please.
COURT:
It is not offending because this is a public
proceedings but the necessary authority or permission should
be secured.
ATTY. BUGARING: In fact I instructed him to go out, your
Honor.
COURT:
video tape.

After the court have noticed that he is taking a

ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, in fact that is not my


personal problem your Honor please, that is personal to that guy
your Honor please if this representation is being .
COURT:

That is very shallow, dont give that alibi.

ATTY. BUGARING: At any rate, your Honor please, we are


going to mark our documentary evidence as part of our motion
for contempt, your Honor please.
COURT:
this matter?

What has the Register of Deeds got to say with

ATTY. CONCEPCION:
Well as I have said before, I have
not received any motion regarding this contempt you are talking.
I am willing now to testify.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor I am still of the prosecution
stage, it is not yet the defense. This is a criminal proceedings,
contempt proceedings is a criminal.

ATTY. CONCEPCION:
Your Honor please, may I ask for
the assistance from the Fiscal.
COURT:
If this is going to proceed, we need the presence of
a Fiscal or a counsel for the Register of Deeds.
ATTY. CONCEPCION:
Can I appoint an outside lawyer not
a Fiscal but a private counsel, your Honor.
COURT:
That is at your pleasure. The Court will consider
that you should be amply represented.
ATTY. CONCEPCION:
As a matter of fact I have a lawyer
here, Atty. Barzaga if he is willing
ATTY. BARZAGA[4]:
records.

Yes, your Honor, I will just review the

ATTY. BUGARING: Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet


present my witness but I will just mark our documentary exhibits
which are part of the record of the case and thereafter your
Honor please.
COURT:
You wait for a minute counsel because there is a
preparation being done by newly appointed counsel of the
respondent, Atty. Barzaga is considered as the privately hired
counsel of the register of deeds and the respondent of this
contempt proceedings. How much time do you need to go over
the record of this case so that we can call the other case in the
meanwhile.
ATTY. BARZAGA:

Second call, your Honor.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------COURT:

Are you ready Atty. Barzaga?

ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor,


after reviewing the record of the case your Honor, I noticed that
the motion for contempt of Court was filed on November 6, 1966
and in paragraph 6 thereof, your Honor it is stated that, the
record of the case shows up to the filing of this motion, the
Register as well as the Deputy Register Diosdado Concepcion
of the Office of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite,
did not comply with the Court Orders dated February 27, 1996,
March 29, 1996, respectively. However, your Honor, Atty.
Diosdado Concepcion has shown to me a letter coming from
Atty. Efren A. Bugaring dated September 18, 1996 addressed to
the Register regarding this notice of Lis Pendens pertaining to
TCT Nos. T-519248, 519249 and 519250 and this letter request,
your Honor for the annotation of the lis pendens clearly shows
that it has been already entered in the book of primary entry.
We would like also to invite the attention of the Hon. Court that
the Motion for Contempt of Court was filed on November 6,
1996. The letter for the annotation of the lis pendens was made
by the counsel for the plaintiff only on September 18, 1996, your
Honor. However, your Honor, as early as August 16, 1996 an
Order has already been issued by the Hon. Court reading as
follows, Wherefore in view of the above, the motion of the
defendant is GRANTED and the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Cavite, is hereby directed to CANCEL the notice of
lis pendens annotated at the back of Certificate of Title Nos.
519248, 51949 (sic) and 51950 (sic).
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we proceed your
Honor, will first mark our documentary evidence.
COURT:
You wait until the Court allows you to do what you
want to do, okay. The counsel has just made manifestation, he
has not prayed for anything. So let us wait until he is finished
and then wait for the direction of this Court what to do to have
an orderly proceedings in this case.
ATTY. BARZAGA:
Considering your Honor, that the issues
appear to be a little bit complicated your Honor, considering that
the order regarding the annotation of the lis pendens has

already been revoked by the Hon. Court your Honor, we just


request that we be given a period of ten days from today your
Honor, within which to submit our formal written opposition your
Honor.
COURT:
Counsel, will you direct your attention to the
manifestation filed earlier by Atty. Tutaan in connection with the
refusal of the Register of Deeds to annotate the lis pendens
because of certain reasons. According to the manifestation of
Atty. Tutaan and it is appearing in the earlier part of the record
of this case, the reason for that is because there was a pending
subdivision plan, it is so stated. I think it was dated March,
1996. May I have the record please.
ATTY. BARZAGA:

Yes, your Honor.

COURT:
This Court would like to be enlightened with
respect to that matter.
ATTY. BARZAGA:
Well, according to Atty. Diosdado
Concepcion he could already explain this, your Honor.
COURT:
Have it properly addressed as part of the
manifestation so that this court can be guided accordingly.
Because this Court believes that the root of the matter started
from that. After the submission of the . what are you suppose
to submit?
ATTY. BARZAGA:
Comment your Honor, on the
motion to cite Atty. Diosdado Concepcion in contempt of Court.
COURT:
After the submission of the Comment and
furnishing a copy of the comment to the counsel for the plaintiff,
this Court is going to give the counsel for the plaintiff an equal
time within which to submit his reply.

our documentary evidence because this is set for hearing for


today, your Honor please.
COURT:
If you are going to mark your evidence and they do
not have their comment yet what are we going to receive as
evidence.
ATTY. BUGARING: If your Honor please
COURT:
Will you listen to the Court and just do whatever
you have to do after the submission of the comment.
ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor please, but the
record will show that the motion for contempt was copy
furnished with the Register of Deeds and Diosdado Concepcion.
COURT:
Precisely, if you are listening then you will get what
the Court would want to do. This should be an orderly
proceedings and considering that this is a Court of record the
comment has to be in first then in your reply you can submit
your evidence to rebut the argument that is going to be put up
by the respondent and so we will be able to hear the case
smoothly.
ATTY. BUGARING: My point here your Honor please, is that
the respondent had been long time furnished of this contempt
proceedings. With a copy of the motion they should have filed it
in due time in accordance with the rules and because it is
scheduled for trial, we are ready to mark our evidence and
present to this Court, your Honor.
COURT:

ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor.


COURT:

ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, it is the position of this


representation your Honor please, that we will be marking first

(Banging the gavel) Will you listen.

And this Court declares that you are out of order.

ATTY. BUGARING: Well, if that is the contention of the Court


your Honor please, we are all officers of the Court, your Honor,

please, we have also ---- and we know also our procedure, your
Honor.

COURT:
As far as this Court is concerned it is going to
follow the rules.

COURT:
If you know your procedure then you follow the
procedure of the Court first and then do whatever you want.

ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules.

ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor please, because we could


feel the antagonistic approach of the Court to this representation
ever since I appeared your Honor please and I put on record
that I will be filing an inhibition to this Hon. Court.
COURT:

Do that right away. (Banging the gavel)

ATTY. BUGARING:
justice in town.
COURT:

Because we could not find any sort of

Do that right away.

COURT:
Yes, you know your rules thats why you are
putting the cart ahead of the horse.
ATTY. BUGARING: No your Honor, Ive been challenged by
this Court that I know better than this Court. Modestly (sic)
aside your Honor please, Ive been winning in many certiorari
cases, your Honor.
COURT:
Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite you
for contempt of Court. (Banging the gavel) You call the police
and I am going to send this lawyer in jail. (Turning to the
Sheriff)

ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready to present our witness and


we are deprive to present our witness.

ATTY. BUGARING: I am just manifesting and arguing in favor


of my client your Honor please.

COURT:
You have presented a witness and it was an
adverse witness that was presented.

COURT:
You have been given enough time and you have
been abusing the discretion of this Court.

ATTY. BUGARING: I did not.

ATTY. BUGARING: I am very sorry your Honor, if that is the


appreciation of the Court but this is one way I am protecting my
client, your Honor.

COURT:
With respect to this, the procedure of the Court is
for the respondent to file his comment.
ATTY. BUGARING: Well your Honor please, at this point in
time I dont want to comment on anything but I reserve my right
to inhibit this Honorable Court before trying this case.
COURT:

You can do whatever you want.

ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, that is our prerogative


your Honor.

COURT:
That is not the way to protect your client that is an
abuse of the discretion of this Court. (Turning to the Sheriff)
Will you see to it that this guy is put in jail. (pp. 29-42. Rollo)
Hence, in an Order dated December 5, 1996, Judge Espaol
cited petitioner in direct contempt of court, thus:
During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were
present together with one (1) operating a video camera who
was taking pictures of the proceedings of the case while
counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making manifestation

to the effect that he was ready to mark his documentary


evidence pursuant to his Motion to cite (in contempt of court) the
Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite, Diosdado Concepcion.

move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for allegedly being
antagonistic to his client, and other invectives were hurled to
the discredit of the Court.

The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained


that he did not cause the appearance of the cameraman to take
pictures, however, he admitted that they came from a function,
and that was the reason why the said cameraman was in tow
with him and the plaintiffs.
Notwithstanding the flimsy
explanation given, the counsel sent out the cameraman after the
Court took exception to the fact that although the proceedings
are open to the public and that it being a court of record, and
since its permission was not sought, such situation was an
abuse of discretion of the Court.

Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct


contempt and order the Courts sheriff to arrest and place him
under detention.

When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion


manifested that he needed the services of counsel and right
then and there appointed Atty. Elpidio Barzaga to represent him,
the case was allowed to be called again. On the second call,
Atty. Bugaring started to insist that he be allowed to mark and
present his documentary evidence in spite of the fact that Atty.
Barzaga was still manifesting that he be allowed to submit a
written pleading for his client, considering that the Motion has so
many ramifications and the issues are complicated.
At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to
mark his documentary evidence and was raring to argue as in
fact he was already perorating despite the fact that Atty.
Barzaga has not yet finished with his manifestation. As Atty.
Bugaring appears to disregard orderly procedure, the Court
directed him to listen and wait for the ruling of the Court for an
orderly proceeding.
While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime
he felt like doing so. Thus, the Court declared him out of order,
at which point, Atty. Bugaring flared up and uttered words
insulting the Court; such as: that he knows better than the latter
as he has won all his cases of certiorari in the appellate Courts,
that he knows better the Rules of Court; that he was going to

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and the fact that Atty.


Rexie Efren Bugaring committed an open defiance, even
challenging the Court in a disrespectful, arrogant, and
contumacious manner, he is declared in direct contempt of
Court and is sentenced to three (3) days imprisonment and
payment of a fine of P3,000.00. His detention shall commence
immediately at the Municipal Jail of Imus, Cavite.[5]
Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day
sentence at the Imus Municipal Jail, and paid the fine of
P3,000.00.[6]
While serving the first day of his sentence on December 5,
1996, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
citing him in direct contempt of court. The next day, December
6, 1996, petitioner filed another motion praying for the resolution
of his motion for reconsideration. Both motions were never
resolved and petitioner was released on December 8, 1996.[7]
To clear his name in the legal circle and the general public,
petitioner filed a petition before the Court of Appeals praying for
the annulment of the Order dated December 5, 1996 citing him
in direct contempt of court and the reimbursement of the fine of
P3,000.00 on grounds that respondent Judge Dolores S.
Espaol had no factual and legal basis in citing him in direct
contempt of court, and that said Order was null and void for
being in violation of the Constitution and other pertinent laws
and jurisprudence.[8]
The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of the
transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing held on

December 5, 1996, it was obvious that the petitioner was indeed


arrogant, at times impertinent, too argumentative, to the extent
of being disrespectful, annoying and sarcastic towards the
court.[9] It affirmed the order of the respondent judge, but
found that the fine of P3,000.00 exceeded the limit
of
P2,000.00 prescribed by the Rules of Court,[10] and ordered the
excess of P1,000.00 returned to petitioner. On March 6, 1998, it
rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit and the assailed order dated December 5, 1996 issued by
the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the
excess fine of P1,000.00 is ORDERED RETURNED to the
petitioner.
Before us, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals this lone
error:
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED ORDER OF THE
TRIAL COURT WHICH TO PETITIONERS SUBMISSIONS
SMACKS OF OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY,
HENCE IT COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN ITS
QUESTIONED DECISION.[11]
Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript of
stenographic notes of the subject proceedings would reveal that
the contempt order issued by respondent judge had no factual
and legal basis. It would also show that he was polite and
respectful towards the court as he always addressed the court
with the phrase your honor please.
We disagree.
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended by
Administrative Circular No. 22-95 provides:
Direct contempt punished summarily. - A person guilty of
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to

obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including


disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive personalities
toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness,
or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required
to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court
or judge and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it
be a superior court, or a judge thereof, or by a fine not
exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding
one (1) day, or both, if it be an inferior court.
We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that
petitioners alleged deference to the trial court in consistently
addressing the respondent judge as your Honor please
throughout the proceedings is belied by his behavior therein:
1. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial
court (pp. 14-15, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 41-42, Rollo) is
contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before
the Courts.
2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge
was partial in favor of the other party (pp. 13-14, tsn, December
5, 1996; pp. 40-41, Rollo) is against Rule 11.04, Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers
from attributing to a judge motives not supported by the record
or have no materiality to the case.
3. behaving without due regard to the trial courts order to
maintain order in the proceedings (pp. 9-13, tsn, December 5,
1996; pp. 36-40, Rollo) is in utter disregard to Canon 1 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyers duty to
maintain towards the courts (1) respectful attitude in order to
maintain its importance in the administration of justice, and
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to

the Courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar


conduct by others.
4. behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow
counsel who at the time he was making representations in
behalf of the other party, was rudely interrupted by the petitioner
and was not allowed to further put a word in edgewise (pp. 7-13,
tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 34-39, Rollo) is violative of Canon
8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canon 22 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to
conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and
5. the refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of
the Province of Cavite, through counsel, to exercise his right to
be heard (Ibid) is against Section 1 of Article III, 1997
Constitution on the right to due process of law, Canon 18 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics which mandates a lawyer to
always treat an adverse witness with fairness and due
consideration, and Canon 12 of Code of Professional
Responsibility which insists on a lawyer to exert every effort
and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the
petitioners use of the phrase your honor please. For, after
using said phrase he manifested utter disrespect to the court in
his subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer
of the Court cannot and should not be countenanced, if proper
decorum is to be observed and maintained during court
proceedings.[12]
Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his
documentary evidence marked to the extent of interrupting the
opposing counsel and the court showed disrespect to said
counsel and the court, was defiant of the courts system for an
orderly proceeding, and obstructed the administration of justice.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and

to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the


court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice.[13]
Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a
court or judge, as in the case at bar, and can be punished
summarily without hearing.[14] Hence, petitioner cannot claim
that there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent judge in
issuing the contempt order inside her chamber without giving
the petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an
immediate reconsideration. The records show that petitioner
was cited in contempt of court during the hearing in the sala of
respondent judge, and he
even filed a motion for
reconsideration of the contempt order on the same day.[15]
Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried
by his emotions in espousing the case of his client - by
persisting to have his documentary evidence marked despite
the respondent judges contrary order - he did so in the honest
belief that he was bound to protect the interest of his client to
the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.
The Court of Appeals aptly stated:
But a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his
clients cause (Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656).
He should not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound to
exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice pursuant to Canon 12,
Canons of Professional Responsibility (Gomez v. Presiding
Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432, 439). He
should not , therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat
the ends of justice per Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility, or unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes, in
accordance with Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons
(Ibid).
Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist
the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which

tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice


contravenes such lawyers duty.[16]
Although respondent judge was justified in citing petitioner in
direct contempt of court, she erred in imposing a fine in the
amount of P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00
under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which
took effect on November 16, 1995. It was not established that
the fine was imposed in bad faith. The Court of Appeals thus
properly ordered the return of the excess of P1,000.00. Aside
from the fine, the three days imprisonment meted out to
petitioner was justified and within the 10-day limit prescribed in
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals
did not commit any reversible error in its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of
the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial
Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is ordered to return to
the petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00
out of the original fine of P3,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ.,
concur.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

against complainant. Respondent Alexander H. Lim appeared


as counsel for Yap while Attys. Roland B. Inting and Erico B.
Aumentado appeared for complainant (as defendant).

SECOND DIVISION

A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court on


23 January 1985, preventing complainant from getting her
pension checks from the Tagbilaran City post office. Yap later
filed an urgent omnibus motion to cite complainant in contempt
of court for attempting to circumvent the preliminary injunction
by changing her address to Mandaue City. Upon motion by Yap,
the court also issued an order dated 21 May 1985 expanding
the scope of the preliminary injunction to prevent all post offices
in the Philippines from releasing pension checks to complainant.

A.C. No. 3149

August 17, 1994

CERINA B. LIKONG, petitioner, vs. ATTY. ALEXANDER H.


LIM, respondent. Florentino G. Temporal for complainant.
Trabajo Lim Law Office for respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
Cerina B. Likong filed this administrative case against Atty.
Alexander H. Lim, seeking the latter's disbarment for alleged
malpractice and grave misconduct.
The circumstances which led to the filing of this complaint are
as follows:
Sometime in September 1984, complainant obtained a loan of
P92,100.00 from a certain Geesnell L. Yap. Complainant
executed a promissory note in favor of Yap and a deed of
assignment, assigning to Yap pension checks which she
regularly receives from the United States government as a
widow of a US pensioner. The aforementioned deed of
assignment states that the same shall be irrevocable until the
loan is fully paid. Complainant likewise executed a special
power of attorney authorizing Yap to get, demand, collect and
receive her pension checks from the post office at Tagbilaran
City. The above documents were apparently prepared and
notarized by respondent Alexander H. Lim, Yap's counsel.
On 11 December 1984, about three (3) months after the
execution of the aforementioned special power of attorney,
complainant informed the Tagbilaran City post office that she
was revoking the special power of attorney. As a consequence,
Geesnell Yap filed a complaint for injunction with damages

On 26 July 1985, complainant and Yap filed a joint motion to


allow the latter to withdraw the pension checks. This motion
does not bear the signatures of complainant's counsel of record
but only the signatures of both parties, "assisted by" respondent
Attorney Alexander H. Lim.
On 2 August 1985, complainant and Yap entered into a
compromise agreement again without the participation of the
former's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was stated
that complainant Cerina B. Likong admitted an obligation to Yap
of P150,000.00. It was likewise stated therein that complainant
and Yap agreed that the amount would be paid in monthly
installments over a period of 54 months at an interest of 40%
per annum discounted every six (6) months. The compromise
agreement was approved by the trial court on 15 August 1985.
On 24 November 1987, Cerina B. Likong filed the present
complaint for disbarment, based on the following allegations:
7.
In all these motions, complainant was prevented from
seeking assistance, advise and signature of any of her two (2)
lawyers; no copy thereof was furnished to either of them or at
least to complainant herself despite the latter's pleas to be
furnished copies of the same;

8.
Complainant was even advised by respondent that it was
not necessary for her to consult her lawyers under the pretense
that: (a) this could only jeopardize the settlement; (b) she would
only be incurring enormous expense if she consulted a new
lawyer; (c) respondent was assisting her anyway; (d) she had
nothing to worry about the documents foisted upon her to sign;
(e) complainant need not come to court afterwards to save her
time; and in any event respondent already took care of
everything;
9.
Complainant had been prevented from exhibiting fully her
case by means of fraud, deception and some other form of
mendacity practiced on her by respondent;
10.
Finally, respondent fraudulently or without authority
assumed to represent complainant and connived in her defeat; .
..1
Respondent filed his Answer stating that counsel for
complainant,
Atty. Roland B. Inting had abandoned his client. Atty. Lim further
stated that the other counsel, Atty. Enrico Aumentado, did not
actively participate in the case and it was upon the request of
complainant and another debtor of Yap, Crispina Acuna, that he
(respondent) made the compromise agreement.
Respondent states that he first instructed complainant to notify
her lawyers but was informed that her lawyer had abandoned
her since she could not pay his attorney's fees.
Complainant filed a reply denying that she had been abandoned
by her lawyers. Complainant stated that respondent never
furnished her lawyers with copies of the compromise agreement
and a motion to withdraw the injunction cash bond deposited by
Yap.
At the outset, it is worth noting that the terms of the compromise
agreement are indeed grossly loaded in favor of Geesnell L.
Yap, respondent's client.

Complainant's original obligation was to pay P92,100.00 within


one (1) year from 4 October 1984. There is no provision in the
promissory note signed by her with respect to any interest to be
paid. The only additional amount which Yap could collect based
on the promissory note was 25% of the principal as attorney's
fees in case a lawyer was hired by him to collect the loan.
In the compromise agreement prepared by respondent, dated 2
August 1985, complainant's debt to Yap was increased to
P150,000.00 (from 92,100.00) after the lapse of only ten (10)
months. This translates to an interest in excess of seventy-five
percent (75%) per annum. In addition, the compromise
agreement provides that the P150,000.00 debt would be
payable in fifty-four (54) monthly installments at an interest of
forty percent (40%) per annum. No great amount of
mathematical prowess is required to see that the terms of the
compromise agreement are grossly prejudicial to complainant.
With respect to respondent's failure to notify complainant's
counsel of the compromise agreement, it is of record that
complainant was represented by two (2) lawyers, Attys. Inting
and Aumentado. Complainant states that respondent prevented
her from informing her lawyers by giving her the reasons
enumerated in the complaint and earlier quoted in this decision.
There is no showing that respondent even tried to inform
opposing counsel of the compromise agreement. Neither is
there any showing that respondent informed the trial court of the
alleged abandonment of the complainant by her counsel.
Instead, even assuming that complainant was really abandoned
by her counsel, respondent saw an opportunity to take
advantage of the situation, and the result was the execution of
the compromise agreement which, as previously discussed, is
grossly and patently disadvantageous and prejudicial to
complainant.

Undoubtedly, respondent's conduct is unbecoming a member of


the legal profession.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:
9.

Negotiations with opposite party.

A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject


of controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less
should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with
him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon
the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to
mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not
undertake to advise him as to the law.
The Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct.
Rule 8.02 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach
upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however,
it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper
advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful
or neglectful counsel.
Rule 15.03
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts.
The violation of the aforementioned rules of professional
conduct by respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim, warrants the
imposition upon him of the proper sanction from this Court.
Such acts constituting malpractice and grave misconduct cannot
be left unpunished for not only do they erode confidence and
trust in the legal profession, they likewise prevent justice from
being attained.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim is hereby


imposed the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law
for a period of ONE (1) YEAR, effective immediately upon his
receipt of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in respondent's personal
record as attorney and member of the Bar, and furnished the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4807. March 22, 2000]
MANUEL N. CAMACHO, complainant, vs. ATTYS. LUIS
MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN, REGINA D. BALMORES,
CATHERINE V. LAUREL and HUBERT JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS
of PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES,
respondents.
D E C I S IO N
VITUG, J.: JVITUG
Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of
Professional Ethics, specifically Canon 9 thereof, viz:
"A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject
of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less
should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with
him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon
the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to
mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not
undertake to advise him as to law." barth
Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers
comprising the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices,
namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D.
Balmores, Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos.
Complainant, the hired counsel of some expelled students from
the AMA Computer College ("AMACC"), in an action for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for
Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged that
respondents, then counsel for the defendants, procured and
effected on separate occasions, without his knowledge,
compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with
four of his clients in the aforementioned civil case which, in
effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims they might

have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to


terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed
against it. Complainant averred that such an act of respondents
was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession
warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law.
In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not
one of his co-respondents had taken part in the negotiation,
discussion, formulation, or execution of the various ReAdmission Agreements complained of and were, in fact, no
longer connected at the time with the Pangulayan and
Associates Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements, he
claimed, had nothing to do with the dismissal of Civil Case Q97-30549 and were executed for the sole purpose of effecting
the settlement of an administrative case involving nine students
of AMACC who were expelled therefrom upon the
recommendation of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal. The
students, namely, Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil
Jason R. Salcedo, Melissa F. Domondon, Melyda B. De Leon,
Leila D. Joven, Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and
Cleo B. Villareiz,, were all members of the Editorial Board of
DATALINE, who apparently had caused to be published some
objectionable features or articles in the paper. The 3-member
Student Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately convened, and
after a series of hearings, it found the students guilty of the use
of indecent language and unauthorized use of the student
publication funds. The body recommended the penalty of
expulsion against the erring students. Jksm
The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R.
Aguiluz V, AMACC President, gave rise to the commencement
of Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14th March 1997 before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. While the civil
case was still pending, letters of apology and Re-Admission
Agreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf of
some of the expelled students, to wit: Letter of Apology, dated
27 May 1997, of Neil Jason Salcedo, assisted by his mother,
and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 June 1997 with the AMACC

President; letter of apology, dated 31 March 1997, of Mrs.


Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter Melyda B. De Leon and
Re-Admission Agreement of 09 May 1997 with the AMACC
President; letter of apology, dated 22 May 1997, of Leila Joven,
assisted by her mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22
May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated
22 September 1997, of Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission
Agreement of 10 October 1997 with the AMACC President; and
letter of apology, dated 20 January 1997, of Michael Ejercito,
assisted by his parents, and Re-Admission Agreement of 23
January 1997 with the AMACC President.

civil case. Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this


fact. Although aware that the students were represented by
counsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to
negotiate with them and their parents without at the very least
communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant,
who was counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This
failure of respondent, whether by design or because of
oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons of
professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a
colleague. Respondent fell short of the demands required of him
as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

Following the execution of the letters of apology and ReAdmission Agreements, a Manifestation, dated 06 June 1997,
was filed with the trial court where the civil case was pending by
Attorney Regina D. Balmores of the Pangulayan and Associates
Law Offices for defendant AMACC. A copy of the manifestation
was furnished complainant. In his Resolution, dated 14 June
1997, Judge Lopez of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court
thereupon dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.

The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements


centers only on the administrative aspect of the controversy is
belied by the Manifestation[1] which, among other things,
explicitly contained the following stipulation; viz:

On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar


of the Philippines ("IBP") passed Resolution No. XIII-99-163,
thus:
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex 'A,' and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment
Atty. Meinrado Pangulayan is suspended from the practice of
law for SIX (6) MONTHS for being remiss in his duty and
DISMISSAL of the case against the other Respondents for they
did not take part in the negotiation of the case." Chief
It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and
Re-Admission Agreements were formalized, complainant was
by then already the retained counsel for plaintiff students in the

"1.......Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4)


of whom assisted by their parents/guardian already executed a
Re-Admission Agreement with AMACC President, AMABLE R.
AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for violating the AMA
COMPUTER COLLEGE MANUAL FOR DISCIPLINARY
ACTIONS and agreed among others to terminate all civil,
criminal and administrative proceedings which they may have
against the AMACC arising from their previous dismissal. Esm
"x x x......x x x......x x x
"3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion to
Withdraw from Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 will by filed them."
The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating
Commission and the IBP Board of Governors in their findings;
nevertheless, the recommended six-month suspension would
appear to be somewhat too harsh a penalty given the
circumstances and the explanation of respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan
is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of

THREE (3) MONTHS effective immediately upon his receipt of


this decision. The case against the other respondents is
DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of
respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and
furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24114

June 30, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY


ACTION AGAINST ATTY. CLEMENTE M. SORIANO IN L24114, People's Homesite and Housing Corporation and
University of the Philippines,
vs. HON. EULOGIO
MENCIAS, ELPIDIO TIBURCIO, MARCELINO TIBURCIO, ET
AL.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
By virtue of a pleading entitled "Appearance" filed with this
Court on October 10, 1969, Clemente M. Soriano, a member of
the Philippine Bar since January 19, 1954, entered his
appearance in the present case (L-24114, PHHC and U.P. vs.
Mencias, Tiburcio, et al.) as "chief counsel of record" for the
respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al. This act in itself would
have been innocuous were it not for the fact that it was done
one year and eight months after the decision in this case
became final. Wittingly or unwittingly, therefore, Atty. Soriano
was in effect asking this Court to exhume this case from the
archives. We thus considered it needful that he explain in full
and in writing his unprecedented, if not altogether bizzare
behavior.
His subsequent explanation did not, however, serve to dissuade
this Court from requiring him to show cause why disciplinary
action should not be taken against him for entering an
appearance at such a late date. He forthwith came with a recital
of the circumstances under which he had agreed to have his
services retained by the respondents Tiburcio, et al.

He alleged that sometime during the first week of October 1969,


the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio, in his own behalf and as
attorney-in-fact of the other respondents, went to him to engage
his professional services in two cases, to wit: this terminated
case (L-24114), and the case entitled "Varsity Hills vs. Hon.
Herminio C. Mariano, etc., et al." (L-30546). At their conference,
Marcelino Tiburcio supposedly informed Atty. Soriano of the
precise status of each of the two cases, thus: that the Varsity
Hills case was set for hearing by this Court on October 27,
1969, while the present case was still pending and the date of
hearing thereof was yet undetermined. In addition to Marcelino
Tiburcio's representations, Atty. Soriano allegedly relied upon
the assurance of a mutual acquaintance, Atty. Antonio J.
Dalangpan that indeed these two cases were pending in this
Court. And so Atty. Soriano prepared a letter-contract dated
October 8, 1969, by virtue of which he agreed to render
professional services in the two cases in consideration of a
contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of land out of the 430
hectares (more or less) involved in the two cases. It was on the
same date, October 8, 1969, that he then caused the
preparation of his written appearance in the present case.
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the contingent fee of
143.33 hectares of land would find no justification if Atty.
Soriano were to render his professional services solely in the
Varsity Hills case, for in this latter case, the records of which we
are in a position to take judicial notice, an area of only about 19
hectares is involved, 1 the bulk of the property claimed by the
respondents having been litigated in the present case.
The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which has long
been sealed and terminated by a final judgment, besides being
an unmitigated absurdity in itself and an unwarranted
annoyance to the court which pronounced the judgment, is a
sore deviation from normal judicial processes. It detracts heavily
from the faith which should be accorded final judgments of
courts of justice, generating as it does in the minds of the
litigants, as well as of the public, an illusory belief that

something more can be done toward overturning a final judicial


mandate.
In the incident before us, we find Atty. Soriano grossly remiss
and inexcusably precipitate in putting an officious finger into the
vortex of the case. He was wanting in the reasonable care
which every member of the Bar must needs exercise before
rushing into the midst of a case already litigated or under
litigation.
Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar, a lawyer
is enjoined to obtain the conformity of the counsel whom he
would substitute. And if this cannot be had, then he should, at
the very least, give notice to such lawyer of the contemplated
substitution. 2 Atty. Soriano's entry of appearance in the present
case as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents in effect
sought to preempt the former counsel, Atty. Nemesio Diaz, of
the premier control over the case. Although at the hearing of the
present incident he averred that he exerted efforts to
communicate with Atty. Diaz to no avail, we are far from being
convinced that he really did so. Nowhere in his written
manifestations to this Court did he make mention of such efforts
on his part. His subsequent assertions to the contrary are plainly
mere after thoughts.
Furthermore, we note that Atty. Soriano has joined one Atty.
Bonifacio T. Doria as counsel for the respondents in the Varsity
Hills case now pending before this Court. Atty. Doria, who was
counsel of record in that case even prior to October 10, 1969,
certainly knew the status of the present case since the scope of
our decision in the latter is a prime issue raised in the Varsity
Hills case. Clearly, therefore, when Atty. Soriano accepted the
two cases for the respondents, especially the Varsity Hills case,
he had not bothered at all to communicate with Atty. Doria, as is
the befitting thing to do when a lawyer associates with another
in a pending cause. 3 He did not bother either to comprehend
the substance of the Varsity Hills case before accepting the said
case, something which is elementary in the lawyer's trade. Had
he been less precipitate in his actions, he would have surely

detected the existence of a final judgment in the present case.


Further still, if it were true, as claimed by Atty. Soriano at the
hearing of this incident, that his clients complained to him about
having been left out in the cold by their former lawyer, then that
circumstance of itself should have indicated to him the
imperative need for verification of the true status of the present
case. Atty. Soriano cannot lean on the supposed assurance of
Atty. Dalangpan that the case was still pending with his Court
which assurance Atty. Dalangpan, at the hearing of this incident,
categorically denied having given. What Atty. Soriano should
have done, in keeping with the reasonable vigilance exacted of
members of the legal profession, was to pay a verification visit
to the records section of this Court, which is easily and quickly
accessible by car or public conveyance from his office (May
Building, Rizal Avenue, Manila). If this office were situated in the
province and he did not have the time to come to the Supreme
Court building in Manila, he could have posed the proper query
to the Clerk of Court by registered mail or by telegram.
We find Atty. Clemente M. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in
the performance of his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of
this Court. This inexcusable negligence would merit no less than
his suspension from the practice of the law profession, were it
not for his candor, at the hearing of this incident, in owning his
mistake and the apology he made to this Court. It is the sense
of this Court, however, that he must be as he is hereby severely
censured. Atty. Soriano is further likewise warned that any
future similar act will be met with heavier disciplinary sanction.
Atty. Soriano is hereby ordered, in the present case, to forthwith
withdraw the appearance that he has entered as chief counsel
of record for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal record
of Atty. Clemente M. Soriano on file in the Bar Division of this
Court.

EN BANC

attorneys, but with the words "Ney & Bosque - C.W. Ney,
abogado."chanrobles virtual law library

G.R. No. 3593 March 23, 1907


THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff, vs. C.W. NEY and JUAN
GARCIA BOSQUE, defendants.
Attorney-General Araneta for plaintiff.
C.W. Ney for defendants.
TRACEY, J.:
This proceeding is to punish the defendants
contempt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
library

On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the other on


September 15, 1906, this court refused to consider petitions so
singed with the names of the defendants and the practice being
repeated, on the 2nd day of October, 1906, ordered the papers
sent to the Attorney-General to take appropriate action thereon,
and
he
thereupon
instituted
this
proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

for
law

The defendants disclaim any intentional contempt, and defend


their acts as being within the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

In the year 1902 this court decided that the defendant, J. Garcia
Bosque, was not entitled to admission to practice law in the
Philippine Islands, upon the ground that after the change of
sovereignty he had elected to remain a Spanish subject and as
such was not qualified for admission to the bar ( In re Bosque, 1
Phil.
Rep.,
88),
and
an
order
was
entered
accordingly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Section 102 of the Code of Civil procedure, providing that every


pleading must be subscribed by the party or his attorney, does
not permit, and by implication prohibits, a subscription of the
names of any other persons, whether agents or otherwise;
therefore a signature containing the name of one neither a party
nor an attorney was not a compliance with this section, nor was
it aided by the too obvious subterfuge of the addition of the
individual name of a licensed attorney. The illegality in this
instance was aggravated by the fact that one of the agents so
named was a person residing in these Islands to whom this
court had expressly denied admission to the bar. The papers in
question were irregular and were properly rejected. We refuse
to recognize as a practice any signature of names appended to
pleadings or other papers in an action other than those specified
in the statute. A signature by agents amounts to a signing by
non-qualified attorneys, the office of attorney being originally
one of agency. ( In re Cooper, 22 N.Y., 67.) We do not,
however, mean to discountenance the use of a suitable firm
designation by partners, all of whom have been duly admitted to
practice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the year 1904 he made an arrangement with the defendant


Ney, a practicing attorney, to carry on business together,
sending out a circular signed "Ney & Bosque," stating that they
had established an office for the general practice of law in all the
courts of the Islands and that Bosque would devote himself
especially to consultation and office work relating to Spanish
law. The paper was headed "Law Office - Ney & Bosque. Juan
G. Bosque, jurisconsulto espaol - C.W. Ney, abogado
americano."chanrobles virtual law library
Since that time the defendant Bosque has not personally
appeared in the courts, and with one exception, occuring
through an inadvertance, papers from the office were signed not
with the firm name alone nor with any designation of the firm as

It is to be noted that we are not now considering an application


for the suspension or removal of the defendant Ney from his

office as attorney. The defendant Bosque, not being an officer of


the court, could not be proceeded against in that way, and
probably for that reason the Attorney-General instituted this
form of proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Should either of these defendants be thus punished for
contempt?chanrobles virtual law library
Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt
as follows:
1.
Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted
by a court or judge;chanrobles virtual law library
2.
Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance
of his official duties or in his official transactions.
Where the law defines contempt, the power of the courts is
restricted to punishment for acts so defined. ( Ex parte
Robinson, 86 U.S., 505.)chanrobles virtual law library
As to the first subdivision of this section, no direct order or
command of this court has been disobeyed or resisted by the
defendant Ney. The only order that the defendant Bosque can
have disobeyed is the one denying him the right to practice law.
This order, however, was directly binding upon him,
notwithstanding proceedings taken for its review, and any hope
on his part of ultimately reversing it furnished no excuse for its
violation. Even had he been entitled under the statute to
practice law without any license from the court and without an
application to it, yet its order made on his own petition. A
mandate of the court, while in force, must be obeyed. The
irregular signature to papers, though affixed by his associate,
had his authorization and constitutes a substantial attempt to
engage in practice. Moreover the firm circular in setting forth the
establishment of an office for the general practice of law in all
the courts of the Islands, amounted to an assertion of his right

and purpose, not effectively qualified by the addition that he


would devote himself to consultation and office work relating to
Spanish law. Spanish law plays an important part in the
equipment of a lawyer in the Archipelago, standing on a
different footing from the law of other foreign countries, in regard
to which a skilled person might as a calling, advise without
practicing law. The fact stated on the circular that he was a
Spanish lawyer did not amount to a disclaimer of his
professional character in the Islands. Independent of statutory
provisions, a foreigner is not by reason of his status disqualified
from practicing law. One of the most eminent American
advocates was an alien barrister admitted to the bar after a
contest in the court of New York State. ( In re Thomas Addis
Emmett, 2 Cain's Cases, 386.) Consequently the conduct of the
defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order made in
a proceeding to which he was a party.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Under the second subdivision of the section cited, Bosque is
obviously not answerable, inasmuch as he was not an officer of
the court. On the other hand, under this subdivision, the
defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conduct
amounted to misbehavior. We are of the opinion that it did. In
the offense of Bosque in holding himself out as a general
practitioner Ney participated, and for the improper signature of
the pleadings he was chiefly and personally responsible. It is
impossible to say that the signature itself was a violation of the
law, and yet hold guiltless the man who repeatedly wrote it.
Moreover we regret to add that his persistent and rash disregard
of the rulings of the court has not commended him to our
indulgence, while the offensive character of certain papers
recently filed by him forbids us from presuming on the hope of
his voluntarily conforming to the customary standard of
members of the bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The judgment of the court is that each of the defendants is fined
in the sum of 200 pesos, to be paid into the office of the clerk of

this court within ten days, with the costs de oficio. So


ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, and Willard, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., does not concur in the result.

THIRD DIVISION

unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous


Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."

[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]


SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA,
Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City,
respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales
representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co.,
Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari
M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates,
and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed
for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing
units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply
Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan
was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995,
Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He
wrote:
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying
you of my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered
into between me and your company, as represented by your
Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's
branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that
my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid
sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales
agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and

He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite


acerbic language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad
faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed
with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual
rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I
categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract
**. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said
onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be
annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the
need to annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of
Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The
envelope containing it, and which actually went through the
post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the
description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD
26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to
Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group
of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)
at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and
void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for
cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which
was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a
month. Among other things, he said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby
annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the 'manipulated contract'
entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co.,
Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA
ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said
contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract
itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending

circumstances,
that
my
consent
was
vitiated
by
misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of
confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds
between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the
real facts from me."

2.
"Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and
established reputation;"

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some


detail what he took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia
Alawi.

4.
Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular
members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC,


dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all
of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the
cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of
deductions from his salary on account thereof.a He also wrote
on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the
Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance
Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in
relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous
manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the
contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the
Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's
UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with
Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and
** the refund of ** (his) payments."c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15,
1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint
dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the
letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the
typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that
complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1.
"Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no
solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad
faith;"

3.
"Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage
**;" and

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous,


swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of
evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth,"
denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions,
lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident
bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had
been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the
plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be
appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the
complaint. Conformably with established usage that notices of
resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk
of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty.
Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2]
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he
questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an
explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not
to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive
Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court
Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that
the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms.
Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the
complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for
being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio
Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a
Royal Family **."[4]

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much


less aggressive, even obsequious tones,[5] Alauya requested
the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he
might comment thereon.[6] He stated that his acts as clerk of
court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law;
and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by
falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan
contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his
salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5,
1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered "undue
injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and
untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total
of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[7] He
declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in
defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking
privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to
a subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain
letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were
typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment
corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV
(subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and
attached to the comment as Annex J);[8] and as far as he knew,
his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he
had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed
with the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently
and because of an honest mistake.[9]
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion
that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title
to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he
prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often
mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term
"consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor.
Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did


"is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured."[10] He
claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a
classmate and friend.[11] He was induced to sign a blank
contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the
completed document to him later for correction, but she had
since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he
still does not know where the property -- subject of his supposed
agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is
situated;[12] He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from
his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day,
she did not do so until after several months. He also claims that
in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged
his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding
the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the
house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.[13]
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without
malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack
of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless
allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court
with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing
loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to
Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and
April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated
December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M.
Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the
title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.[14]
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid
letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi)
with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident
bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her

honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had


written inter alia that:
1)
Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by
gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;"
2)
Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and
unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and
interests;"
3)
Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent"
who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4)
Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the
contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and
pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and against
** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements,
he was merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing only
what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured,"
who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded
feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six
months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his
salary.[15]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy
of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility
in the public service.[16] Section 4 of the Code commands that
"(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights
of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good
morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety
and public interest."[17] More than once has this Court
emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and
employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice,
from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be

circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their


conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others,
strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect
of the public for the judiciary."[18]
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good
morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for the rights
of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed -- however
sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in
excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya
is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against
Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with
propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to
anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated,
that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith."[19] Righteous indignation, or
vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language,
or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and
an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct
more stringent than for most other government workers. As a
man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive,
offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.[20] As
a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the
person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every
act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint,
courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary
norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by
his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously
wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has
already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the
Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.[21] While
one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has
been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of

"attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the


necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the
Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;
and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or
"counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there are pejorative
connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given
to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no
moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does
not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the
franking privilege, the record contains no evidence adequately
establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby
REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a
judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is
warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 111474

August 22, 1994

FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners, vs.


NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO
MALDIGAN and GILBERTO SABSALON, respondents.
Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this
special civil action for certiorari to annul the decision 1 of
respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
ordering petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo
Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and
car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from
the date of promulgation of judgment to the date of actual
payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney's
fees.
We have given due course to this petition for, while to the
cynical the de minimis amounts involved should not impose
upon the valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to
clarify some issues the resolution of which are important to
small wage earners such as taxicab drivers. As we have
heretofore repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist
only for the rich or the powerful, with their reputed monumental
cases of national impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the
underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that beset
their individual lives.

Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon


were hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers 2 and, as such, they
worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside
from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or
P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also required to
pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00
deposit to answer for any deficiency in their "boundary," for
every actual working day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra
driver by the petitioners, he already failed to report for work for
unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he was
working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to
Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners on September 6,
1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took all his
money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and
after his discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate.
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a
taxi driver under the same terms and conditions as when he
was first employed, but his working schedule was made on an
"alternative basis," that is, he drove only every other day.
However, on several occasions, he failed to report for work
during his schedule.
On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary"
of P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab
in Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated
requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly
refused. Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for
"Bulaklak Company."
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the
reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein
petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his
deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount
spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was
allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the
expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When

Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners


terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his
termination from employment was effected when he refused to
pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint
with the Manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations
Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and
illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor
arbiter holding that it took private respondents two years to file
the same and such unreasonable delay was not consistent with
the natural reaction of a person who claimed to be unjustly
treated, hence the filing of the case could be interpreted as a
mere afterthought.
Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the
observation that private respondents failed to controvert the
evidence showing that Maldigan was employed by "Mine of
Gold" Taxi Company from February 10, 1987 to December 10,
1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on September 1,
1990; and that they voluntarily left their jobs for similar
employment with other taxi operators. It, accordingly, affirmed
the ruling of the labor arbiter that private respondents' services
were not illegally terminated. It, however, modified the decision
of the labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to pay private
respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this
resolution.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by
the NLRC, this petition is now before us imputing grave abuse
of discretion on the part of said public respondent.
This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of
quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters, are generally accorded not only respect but, at times,
finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. 3
Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by the
evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical and

capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of


discretion. 4
Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by
respondents to defray any shortage in their "boundary" is
covered by the general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor
Code against requiring employees to make deposits, and that
there is no showing that the Secretary of Labor has recognized
the same as a "practice" in the taxi industry. Consequently, the
deposits made were illegal and the respondents must be
refunded therefor.
Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Art. 114.
Deposits for loss or damage. No employer shall
require his worker to make deposits from which deductions shall
be made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools,
materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except when
the employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or
business where the practice of making deposits is a recognized
one, or is necessary or desirable as determined by the
Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.
It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the
rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or
equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same does
not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which
the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his "boundary."
Also, when private respondents stopped working for petitioners,
the alleged purpose for which petitioners required such
unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other case, any
balance due to private respondents after proper accounting
must be returned to them with legal interest.
However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of
Sabsalon is as follows:
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES

VALES

1987 P

1,403.00

567.00

1988 720.00

760.00

200.00

1989 686.00

130.00

1,500.00

1990 605.00

570.00

1991 165.00

2,300.00

3,579.00

1,000.00

4,327.00

2,700.00

The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon


was able to withdraw his deposits through vales or he incurred
shortages, such that he is even indebted to petitioners in the
amount of P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's deposits,
nothing was mentioned questioning the same even in the
present
petition.
We
accordingly
agree
with
the
recommendation of the Solicitor General that since the evidence
shows that he had not withdrawn the same, he should be
reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash deposits. 5
On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had
this to say in his decision: "Anent the issue of illegal deductions,
there is no dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi
industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to
restore the unit he has driven to the same clean condition when
he took it out, and as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in
the present case), complainant(s) (private respondents herein)
were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount
doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit,
thus we find nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to
consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in
the context of the law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.)
Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund
of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be noted

that there was nothing to prevent private respondents from


cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their
P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted, car
washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and
is, in fact, dictated by fair play.
On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private
respondents' authorized representative, Article 222 of the Labor
Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or
any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if
they represent their organization or the members thereof. While
it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized
representative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who
did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear
mandate of the law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees.
Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled
to have and recover from his client a reasonable compensation
for his services 7 necessarily imports the existence of an
attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of
attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist unless the
client's representative is a lawyer. 8
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National
Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED by deleting
the awards for reimbursement of car wash expenses and
attorney's fees and directing said public respondent to order and
effect the computation and payment by petitioners of the refund
for private respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal
interest thereon from the date of finality of this resolution up to
the date of actual payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23467

March 27, 1968

AMALGAMATED
LABORERS'
ASSOCIATION
and/or
FELISBERTO M. JAVIER for himself and as General
President,
ATTY. JOSEUR. CARBONELL, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND ATTY.
LEONARDO C. FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Jose Ur. Carbonell for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Leonardo C. Fernandez for and in his own behalf as
respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Controversy over attorneys' fees for legal services
rendered in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu.
The background facts are as follows:
On May 30, 1956, Florentino Arceo and 47 others
together with their union, Amalgamated Laborers' Association,
and/or Felisberto Javier, general president of said union, lodged
a complaint 1 in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), for unfair
labor practices specified in Sec. 4(a) 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the
Industrial Peace Act. Made respondents were their former
employer, Binalbagan Sugar Central Company, Inc. (Biscom),
Rafael Jalandoni, its president and general manager; Gonzalo
Guillen, its chief engineer and general factory superintendent;
and Fraternal Labor Organization and/or Roberto Poli, its
president.

Failing in their attempts to dismiss the complaint (motions


to dismiss dated June 30, 1956 and July 6, 1956), 2
respondents Biscom, Jalandoni, and Guillen, on July 9, 1957,
answered and counterclaimed. Respondents Fraternal Labor
Union and Poli also filed their answer dated July 12, 1957.
With the issues joined, the case on the merits was heard
before a trial commissioner.
At the hearings, only ten of the forty-eight complainant
laborers appeared and testified. Two of these ten were
permanent (regular) employees of respondent company; the
remaining eight were seasonal workers. The regular employees
were Arsenio Reyes and Fidel Magtubo. Seasonal workers were
Catalino Bangoy, Juan Fernandez, Jose Garlitos, Dionisio Pido,
Santiago Talagtag, Dominador Tangente, Felimon Villaluna and
Brigido Casas.
On November 13, 1962, CIR, thru Associate Judge
Arsenio I. Martinez, rendered judgment, which provides, inter
alia, that the two regular employees (Reyes and Magtubo) be
reinstated "to their former positions, without loss of seniority and
other benefits which should have accrued to them had they not
been illegally dismissed, with full back wages from the time of
their said dismissals up to the time of their actual
reinstatements, minus what they have earned elsewhere in the
meantime" and that the eight seasonal workers "be readmitted
to their positions as seasonal workers of respondent company
(Biscom), with back wages as seasonal workers from the time
they were not rehired at the start of the 1955-1956 milling
season on October 1, 1955 up to the time they are actually
reinstated, less the amount earned elsewhere during the period
of their lay-off."
Respondents Biscom, Jalandoni and Guillen appealed
direct to this Court. 3 On March 28, 1963, this Court dismissed
the appeal, without costs. Ground: Petitioners therein did not
seek reconsideration of CIR's decision of November 13, 1962.
The judgment became final.

Upon the ten complainants' motion to name an official


computer to determine the actual money due them, CIR, on
June 4, 1963, directed the Chief Examiner of its Examining
Division to go to the premises of Biscom and compute the back
wages due the ten complainants.
On August 9, 1963, the Chief Examiner reported that the
total net back wages due the ten complainants were
P79,755.22. Biscom and the complainants moved for
reconsideration: Biscom on August 17, 1963; complainants on
September 24, 1963.
In the interim, Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez (a respondent
herein) filed on July 15, 1963 in the same case CIR Case No.
70-ULP-Cebu a "Notice of Attorney's Lien." He alleged
therein that he had been the attorney of record for the laborers
in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu "since the inception of the
preliminary hearings of said case up to the Supreme Court on
appeal, as chief counsel thereof"; that he "had actually rendered
legal services to the laborers who are subject of this present
litigation [CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu] since the year 1956,
more or less"; that the laborers "have voluntarily agreed to give
[him], representing his attorney's fees on contingent basis such
amounts equivalent to 25% thereof which agreement is
evidenced by a Note"; and that the 25% attorney's fee so
contracted is "reasonable and proper taking into consideration
the length of services he rendered and the nature of the work
actually performed by him."
On September 25, 1963, Atty. Fernandez filed an
"Amended Notice of Attorney's Lien," which in part reads:
3. That the laborers, subject of this present litigation, sometime
on February 3, 1956, had initially voluntarily agreed to give
Undersigned Counsel herein, representing his Attorney's fees
on contingent basis, such amounts as equivalent to Thirty Per
Cent (30%) of whatever money claims that may be adjudicated
by this Honorable Court, copy of said Agreement, in the local

Visayan dialect and a translation of the same in the English


language are hereto attached as annexes "A" "A-1" hereof;
4. That subsequently thereafter, when the above-entitled Case
was already decided in their favor, Arsenio Reyes, in behalf of
his co-laborers who are also Complainants in this Case begged
from the Undersigned Counsel herein that he reduce his
attorney's fees to Twenty-Five Per Cent (25%) only for the
reason that they have to share and satisfy also Atty. Jose Ur.
Carbonell in the equivalent amount of Five Per Cent (5%)
although the latter's actual services rendered was so
insignificant thereof;
5. That because of the pleadings of said Arsenio Reyes, who is
the President of said Union, the Undersigned Counsel herein
finally agreed and consented that his attorney's fees be reduced
to only Twenty-Five Per Cent (25%) instead of Thirty Per Cent
(30%) as originally agreed upon in 1956.
On October 7, 1963, Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell (a petitioner
herein) filed in court a document labelled "Discharge" informing
CIR of the discharge, release and dismissal thru a union
board resolution (attached thereto as Annex A thereof) of
Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez as one of the lawyers of the
complainants in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu, effective February
28, 1963.
On October 14, 1963, Atty. Fernandez replied. He
averred that the grounds for his discharge specified in the board
resolution were "malicious and motivated by greed and
ungratefulness" and that the unjustifiable discharge did not
affect the already stipulated contract for attorneys' fees.
On March 19, 1964, CIR Judge Arsenio I. Martinez
resolved
Biscom's
and
complainants'
motions
for
resonsideration objecting to the Chief Examiner's Report and
also respondent Fernandez' Amended Notice of Attorney's Lien.
Judge Martinez' order reads in part:

(b) Respondent company is further directed to deposit the


amount representing 25% of P79,755.22 with the Cashier of this
Court, as attorney's fees;
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(d) The amount representing attorney's fees to be


deposited by the respondent company is hereby awarded and
granted to Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez, and he may collect the
same from the Cashier of the Court upon the finality of this
order, subject to existing auditing procedures; ....
Biscom complied with the order of deposit. 4
On April 10, 1964, Atty. Carbonell moved to reconsider
the March 19, 1964 order with respect to the award of attorneys'
fees. Amongst his grounds are that CIR has no jurisdiction to
determine the matter in question, and that the award of 25% as
attorneys' fees to Atty. Fernandez is excessive, unfair and
illegal. This motion was denied on April 28, 1964 by CIR en
banc.
On June 9, 1964, a motion for reconsideration of the April
28, 1964 resolution was filed by Atty. Carbonell. This was
amplified by a similar motion filed on June 11, 1964.
On June 25, 1964, two things happened: First. CIR en
banc denied the motion of June 11, 1964. Second. On Atty.
Fernandez' motion, Judge Martinez authorized the Cashier of
the court to disburse to Fernandez the amount of P19,938.81
representing attorneys' fees and deducting therefrom all legal
fees incident to such deposit.
Petitioners herein, Atty. Carbonell, Amalgamated
Laborers' Association, and the ten employees, appealed from
the June 25, 1964 resolution of CIR, direct to this Court.
1. Petitioners press upon this Court the view that CIR is
bereft of authority to adjudicate contractual disputes over

attorneys' fees. Their reasons: (1) a dispute arising from


contracts for attorneys' fees is not a labor dispute and is not one
among the cases ruled to be within CIR's authority; and (2) to
consider such a dispute to be a mere incident to a case over
which CIR may validly assume jurisdiction is to disregard the
special and limited nature of said court's jurisdiction.
These arguments are devoid of merit.
The present controversy over attorneys' fees is but an
epilogue or a tail-end feature of the main case, CIR No. 70-ULPCebu, which undoubtedly is within CIR's jurisdiction. And, it has
been held that "once the Court of Industrial Relations has
acquired jurisdiction over a case under the law of its creation, it
retains that jurisdiction until the case is completely decided,
including all the incidents related thereto." 5 Expressive of the
rule on this point is this
4. It is well settled that:
A grant of jurisdiction implies the necessary and usual
incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and every regularly
constituted court has power to do all things reasonably
necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its
jurisdiction, and for the enforcement of its judgments and
mandates, even though the court may thus be called upon to
decide matters which would not be within its cognizance as
original causes of action.
While a court may be expressly granted the incidental
powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of
jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the
necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it
(In re Stinger's Estate, 201 P. 693), and, subject to existing laws
and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court
has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, and
for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates. So
demands, matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or

growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above
principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and
determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over
the principal matter, even though the Court may thus be, called
on to consider and decide matters, which as original causes of
action, would not be within its cognizance (Bartholomew vs.
Shipe, 251 S.W. 1031), (21 C.J.S. pp. 136-138.)
Thus, in Gomez vs. North Camarines Lumber Co., L11945, August 18, 1958, and Serrano vs. Serrano, L-19562,
May 23, 1964, we held that the court having jurisdiction over the
main cause of action, may grant the relief incidental thereto,
even if they would otherwise, be outside its competence. 6
To direct that the present dispute be lodged in another
court as petitioners advocate would only result in multiplicity of
suits, 7 a situation abhorred by the rules. Thus it is, that usually
the application to fix the attorneys' fees is made before the court
which renders the judgment. 8 And, it has been observed that
"[a]n approved procedure, where a charging lien has attached to
a judgment or where money has been paid into court, is for the
attorney to file an intervening petition and have the amount and
extent of his lien judicially determined." 9 Appropriately to be
recalled at this point, is the recent ruling in Martinez vs. Union
de Maquinistas, 1967A Phild. 142, 144, January 30, 1967,
where, speaking thru Mr. Justice Arsenio P. Dizon, explicit
pronouncement was made by this Court that: "We are of the
opinion that since the Court of Industrial Relations obviously had
jurisdiction over the main cases, ... it likewise had full jurisdiction
to consider and decide all matters collateral thereto, such as
claims for attorney's fees made by the members of the bar who
appeared therein." 10
2. The parties herein join hands in one point - the ten (10)
successful complainants in C.I.R Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu
should pay as attorneys' fees 30% of the amount adjudicated by
the court in the latter's favor (P79,755.22).
They are at odds, however, on how to split the fees.

Respondent Atty. Fernandez claims twenty-five per cent


(25%) of the 30% attorneys' fees. He explains that upon the
plea of Arsenio Reyes, union president and one of the 10
successful complainants, he had to reduce his fees to 25%
since "they have to share and satisfy also Atty. Jose Ur.
Carbonell in the equivalent amount of Five Per Cent (5%)." Atty.
Fernandez exhibited a contract purportedly dated February 3,
1956 before the 48 employees have even filed their
complaint in CIR. The stipulated fee is 30% of whatever amount
the ten might recover. Strange enough, this contract was signed
only by 8 of the 10 winning claimants. What happened to the
others? Why did not the union intervene in the signing of this
contract? Petitioners dispute said contract. They say that Atty.
Fernandez required the ten to sign the contract only after the
receipt of the decision.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the verbal
agreement entered into by the union and its officers thru its
President Javier and said two lawyers, Atty. Carbonell and Atty.
Fernandez, is that the 30% attorneys' fees, shall be divided
equally ("share and share alike") amongst Atty. Carbonell, Atty.
Fernandez and Felisberto Javier, the union president.
After hearing, CIR Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez
awarded 25% attorneys' fees to respondent Atty. Fernandez.
CIR noted that "the active conduct and prosecution of the
above-entitled case was done by Atty. Fernandez up to the
appeal in the Supreme Court," and that petitioner Atty.
Carbonell manifested that "Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez was
the counsel mainly responsible for the conduct of the case." It
noted, too, that petitioner Atty. Carbonell did not file any notice
of Attorney's Lien.
3. We strike down the alleged oral agreement that the
union president should share in the attorneys' fees. Canon 34 of
Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement in terms clear and
explicit. It says: "No division of fees for legal services is proper,
except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or

responsibility." The union president is not the attorney for the


laborers. He may seek compensation only as such president.
An agreement whereby a union president is allowed to share in
attorneys' fees is immoral. Such a contract we emphatically
reject. It cannot be justified.
4. A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of
recovery an attorney is to receive in a suit "should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including
the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always
be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness." 11
Lately, we said: 12
The principle that courts should reduce stipulated
attorney's fees whenever it is found under the circumstances of
the case that the same is unreasonable, is now deeply rooted in
this jurisdiction....
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Since then this Court has invariably fixed counsel fees on


a quantum meruit basis whenever the fees stipulated appear
excessive, unconscionable, or unreasonable, because a lawyer
is primarily a court officer charged with the duty of assisting the
court in administering impartial justice between the parties, and
hence, the fees should be subject to judicial control. Nor should
it be ignored that sound public policy demands that courts
disregard stipulations for counsel fees, whenever they appear to
be a source of speculative profit at the expense of the debtor or
mortgagor. See, Gorospe, et al. v. Gochangco, L-12735,
October 30, 1959. And it is not material that the present action
is between the debtor and the creditor, and not between
attorney and client. As courts have power to fix the fee as
between attorney and client, it must necessarily have the right to
say whether a stipulation like this, inserted in a mortgage
contract, is valid. Bachrach v. Golingco, 39 Phil. 138.

In the instant case, the stipulated 30% attorneys' fee is


excessive and unconscionable. With the exception of Arsenio
Reyes who receives a monthly salary of P175, the other
successful complainants were mere wage earners paid a daily
rate of P4.20 to P5.00. 13 Considering the long period of time
that they were illegally and arbitrarily deprived of their just pay,
these laborers looked up to the favorable money judgment as a
serum to their pitiful economic malaise. A thirty per cent (30%)
slice therefrom immensely dilutes the palliative ingredient of this
judicial antidote.
The ten complainants involved herein are mere laborers.
It is not far-fetched to assume that they have not reached an
educational attainment comparable to that of petitioner
Carbonell or respondent Fernandez who, on the other hand, are
lawyers. Because of the inequality of the situation between
laborers and lawyers, courts should go slow in awarding huge
sums by way of attorneys' fees based solely on contracts. 14
For, as in the present case, the real objective of the CIR
judgment in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu is to benefit the
complaint laborers who were unjustifiedly dismissed from the
service. While it is true that laborers should not be allowed to
develop that atavistic proclivity to bite the hands that fed them,
still lawyers should not be permitted to get a lion's share of the
benefits due by reason of a worker's labor. What is to be paid to
the laborers is not windfall but a product of the sweat of their
brow. Contracts for legal services between laborer and attorney
should then be zealously scrutinized to the end that a fair share
of the benefits be not denied the former.
5. An examination of the record of the case will readily
show that an award of twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees
reasonably compensates the whole of the legal services
rendered in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu. This fee must be
shared by petitioner Atty. Carbonell and respondent Atty.
Fernandez. For, after all, they are the counsel of record of the
complainants. Respondent Atty. Fernandez cannot deny this
fact. The pleadings filed even at the early stages of the
proceedings reveal the existence of an association between

said attorneys. The pleadings were filed under the name of


"Fernandez & Carbonell." This imports a common effort of the
two. It cannot be denied though that most of those pleadings up
to judgment were signed for Fernandez & Carbonell by
respondent Fernandez.
We note that a break-up in the professional tie-up
between Attorneys Fernandez and Carbonell began when
petitioner Atty. Carbonell, on November 26, 1962, complained to
CIR that respondent Atty. Fernandez "failed to communicate
with him nor to inform him about the incidents of this case." He
there requested that he be furnished "separately copies of the
decision of the court and other pleadings and subsequent
orders as well as motions in connection with the case."
Subsequent pleadings filed in the case unmistakably
show the widening rift in their professional relationship. Thus, on
May 23, 1963, a "Motion to Name and Authorize Official
Computer" was filed with CIR. On the same day, a "Motion to
Issue Writ of Execution" was also registered in the same court.
Although filed under the name of "Carbonell & Fernandez,"
these pleadings were signed solely by petitioner Atty. Carbonell.
On September 16, 1963, an "Opposition to respondent
Biscom's Motion for Reconsideration" was filed by petitioner
Atty. Carbonell. On September 24, 1963, he filed a "Motion for
Clarification" of the November 13, 1962 judgment of CIR
regarding the basic pay of Arsenio Reyes and Fidel Magtubo.
On September 24, 1963, he also filed a "Motion to Reconsider
Report of Chief Examiner." These, and other pleadings that
were filed later were signed solely by petitioner Atty. Carbonell,
not in the name of "Carbonell & Fernandez." While it was
correctly observed by CIR that a good portion of the court battle
was fought by respondent Atty. Fernandez, yet CIR cannot
close its eyes to the legal services also rendered by Atty.
Carbonell. For, important and numerous, too, were his services.
And, they are not negligible. The conclusion is inevitable that
petitioner Atty. Carbonell must have a share in the twenty-five

per cent (25%) attorneys' fees awarded herein. As to how much,


this is a function pertaining to CIR.
6. We note that CIR's cashier was authorized on June 25,
1964 to disburse to Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez the sum of
P19,938.81 which is 25% of the amount recovered. In the event
payment actually was made, he should be required to return
whatever is in excess of the amount to which he is entitled in
line with the opinion expressed herein. 15
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the award of twenty five
per cent (25%) attorneys' fees solely to respondent Atty.
Fernandez contained in CIR's order of March 19, 1964 and
affirmed by said court's en banc resolutions of April 28, 1964
and June 25, 1964, is hereby set aside; and the case is hereby
remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations with instructions to
conduct a hearing on, and determine, the respective shares of
Attorney Leonardo C. Fernandez and Attorney Jose Ur.
Carbonell in the amount of P19,938.81 herein awarded as
attorneys' fees or both. No costs. So ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

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