WS 502 Polarity & Warfare Chad KOHALYK
out for their own security. Survival is
Polarity & Warfare
A weak attraction
As the Cold War progressed and
states worldwide aligned themselves
with the world’s two new superpowers,
academics pondered whether a new kind
of stability had arisen in the aftermath of
the Second World War. While filled with
tension, the Cold War seemed to put a
damper on the outbreak of conflicts
around the world. Influenced by the rise
of systemic theorizing in the social sci-
ences political scientists asked if the
landscape of the international system,
contoured by massively powerful states,
could be the determinant of conflict.
Heavenly bodies orbiting one another
can be analyzed, and interactions pre-
dicted, by mathematical equations and
laws of physics. Could an understanding
of international structural geography aid
in the forecasting of state outcomes and
the ability to predict war and atrocity?
It was a lofty and difficult question to
answer that lead to a debate over the
general stability of systems with numer-
ous great powers versus systems with
only two powers, reflective of the inter-
national environment at the time. Politi-
cal scientist Kenneth Waltz threw oil on
the fire in the early 1960s by suggesting
in the face of overwhelming tension be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United
States, that the world was headed for a
"stability seldom known" to last
throughout the 20th century. He argued
that the propensity of war was deter-
mined by the number of great powers,
i.e. poles, in the system. 1
The debate over the the stability of
bipolar or multipolar systems flared dur-
1 Kenneth Waltz. “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus 93, 3 (1964). p.901
2 Ibid. p.901
ing the 1960s and 1970s, but was left
unresolved. Empirical evidence was any-
thing but conclusive. Though after the
fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet
Union, polarity and stability became a
major topic of inquiry once again. With
only one superpower remaining how
would other states in the international
system react? Would balance-of-power
politics require them to align themselves
against the United States, or could the
United States maintain it’s “Unipolar
Moment”?
Beyond Realism
In his 1979 book Theory of Interna-
tional Politics Kenneth Waltz proposed
that the interaction of states could be
explained through a system-level theory.
Waltz shifted focus from the behaviour
of individual states and concentrated on
their actions in relation to their position
with other structural elements, or coun-
tries of varying national power, within
the international system. Waltz posited
that the international structure constrains
the actions of states, thus outcomes of
state interaction can be predicted by an
understanding of the make up of the sys-
tem.
Structural realism, or neorealism,
shares the main assumptions of classical
realism: states are unitary, rational actors
within an anarchic international system
seeking security and acting in their own
self-interest. Structural realists argue that
since anarchical systems are devoid of an
all-powerful actor that commands obedi-
ence from other actors, states must look
1
dependent on preventing the rise of one
state or coalition of states from being
able to subordinate others. States there-
fore must be sensitive to changing capa-
bilities of other states as a matter of sur-
vival, and must strive to counterbalance
changes in relative power by either ex-
panding their own capabilities or form-
ing coalitions. Thus the international
system has a predisposition to balance-
of-power behaviour among its actors,
characterized by the never-ending recur-
rence of balancing equilibria. While clas-
sical realists such as Machiavelli argued
that balance-of-power politics was a
strategy to pursue, neorealists differ only
in perspective by saying that the balanc-
ing of power is a natural mechanism of
the international structure.
As time progresses and balance or
near-balance of power between dominant
states within a system is achieved, struc-
tural realists argue that the actions of
states will become more aligned. Waltz
suggested that this phenomenon is evi-
denced in the similar structural place-
ment of the Soviet Union and the United
States resulting in the convergence of
their armament policies, military doc-
trines and conduct of interventions. This
principle could also be applied to foreign
policy choices other than war such as
free trade, which would not occur if the
powerful states in the system chose pro-
tectionism.
Structural realism is a wide-ranging
research program from which a large
variety of theories and explanations of
foreign policy can be developed. In the
case of the foreign policy choice of war
Waltz argued that polarity alone could
explain the level of instability in the
world. His suggestion in 1964 that the
world was bipolar and therefore stable
was very controversial, and led to a
number of attempts to attack or defend
his position.
Size matters
The identification of “Great Powers”,
or poles in the international system, was
a matter of common sense during the
Cold War. Kenneth Waltz noted that
“since the Treaty of Westphalia, there
have never been more than eight great
powers.”2 But in asking the question
“How many poles is best?” political sci-
entists had to decide on a definition of
what makes a pole. Measuring state
power with any intention of precision is
WS 502 Polarity & Warfare Chad KOHALYK
a decidedly difficult task. Although for
the purposes of determining poles within
a system it is not necessary to rank states
in an ordinal fashion, but only to identify
the greatest powers. Waltz proposed that
under the conditions of bipolarity, no
third power would be able to challenge
the top two. He also went on to argue
that to qualify as a pole a state must be
measured in terms of size of population,
resource endowment, economic capabil-
ity, military strength, political stability
and competence. Ted Hopf pointed out
that military strength “is the resultant of
the other six elements, not an equivalent
part of a bundle of power.”3 He simpli-
fied criteria when examining the distri-
bution of power in Europe during the
15th and 16th centuries, basing polar
status on the just three characteristics:
population, government revenue and
military power (in terms of soldiers and
ships). Hopf calculated the totals of each
characteristic and attributed pole status
to actors who held a disproportionate
amount of power within the system. The
top two states in the system, the Ottoman
Empire and the Habsburg Empire,
counted for more than 50% of the sys-
tem’s population, economics and military
power.
Figure 1: Distribution of Power in Bipolar Europe, 1521-59
Population
State
millions
Habsburg 30.4
Empire
Ottoman
21.0
Empire
France 17.0
England 6.0
Venice 1.6
TOTAL 76.0
Average 15.2
Source: Ted Hopf, “Polarity, Military Balance & War,” American Political Science Review 85, 2 (1991). p. 480
3 Ted Hopf. “Polarity, Military Balance & War,” American Political Science Review 85, 2 (1991). p. 478
4 Patrick James. “Structural Realism and the Causes of War.” Mershon International Studies Review, 39, 2 (1995). p. 184.
5 Manus Midlarsky. “Hierarchical Equilibria and the Long-Run Instability of Multipolar Systems,” Handbook of War Studies (1990). p. 63
6 Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer. “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability.” World Politics, 16, 3 (1964). p. 394-5.
2
Similar techniques have been used in Advocates of bipolar systems con-
other studies. It is important to note that tend that since the nature of bipolarity
great powers must score well on a num- means there is an equivalent distribution
ber of attributes, whereas would-be great of power, competitor powers must moni-
powers will be characterized by an un- tor closely any and all events that may
even distribution of attributes. North change the power equilibrium, and strive
Korea may be able to field the largest to maintain stability. System poles be-
military in the world, but that does not come vested system managers in the
make it a superpower. tiniest of world affairs, intent on limiting
conflicts within their sphere of influence
Two to tango so that they may not affect the balance of
power vis-a-vis their competitor. Also,
A bipolar system is characterized by
with such a small number of managers
two relatively equal powers, each ma-
problems prove to be easier to adminis-
neuvering to gain power over the other
ter. Bipolarity proponents argue that re-
while simultaneously countering the op-
current crises will substitute outright
ponent’s moves for power. Elimination
warfare, therefore lowering the instances
of the other power may be an option, if
of war and instability across the globe
the risks are calculated to be acceptable.
whereas multipolar systems offer more
Other actors may be present, but are ei-
potential for conflict.
ther nonaligned and do not threaten the
Such a balance is illustrated histori-
two dominant poles, or are too weak
cally in the confrontations of Rome ver-
militarily to tip the balance of power in
sus Carthage and the United States
one way or another. Both great powers
against the Soviet Union.
will compete for smaller powers to join
their bloc or prevent them from joining
The more the merrier
the enemy bloc. In bipolar systems hos-
tility between the two dominant powers Proponents of multipolarity argue
is particularly pronounced, contributing that “peace by crisis in bipolarity struc-
to an extreme “them and us” attitude, and tures is, at best, a dubious and perhaps
“each great power possesses a relatively very dangerous manner of conducting
clear set of beliefs about its limitations policy.”5 Bipolar systems by their very
and the origins of its problems.”4 nature are zero-sum, and thus more
prone to conflict.
Due to the proliferation of power
over a number of poles hostility between
powers will be less intense. States must
Soldiers (Ships) Revenue spread their attention across numerous
competitor states, thereby lessening the
% ‘000 % M, ducats %
chance for an arms race, a condition that
bipolar systems are particularly suscepti-
40 62 (200+) 29 (32) 8.5 32 ble to. The most prominent challengers
to Waltz’s bipolar argument, Karl Deutch
and J. David Singer, contended that the
28 74 (200+) 35 (32+) 9.5 36
number of possible interactions between
poles increases disproportionately to the
22 32 (20) 15 (3) 5.0 19 number of poles in the system, repre-
sented by the equation N(N-1)/2, where
8 31 (100) 15 (16) 2.1 8
N is the number of countries in the
2 12 (100) 6 (16) 1.5 6 system. 6 This indicates the existence of
numerous coalition possibilities and a
100 211 (620+) 100 (100) 26.2 100 flexible balance-of-power system, which
while may lead to sporadic conflict be-
20 42 (124) 20 (20) 5.3 20 tween subsets of states, will not produce
an extreme build-up of tension in the
system as a whole.
WS 502 Polarity & Warfare Chad KOHALYK
Tripolar systems are ideal since the
third power can play a balancing role
preventing conflict. A third emerging
superpower that chooses not to enter into
alliance with either of the dominant
powers is in the position to reap the
benefits of good relations with both main
powers in the form of concessions. Al-
ternatively, if two of the three superpow-
ers are considered “emerging” they may
ally against the dominant power and the
system would quickly degrade into a
bipolar system. Stable tripolar systems
are not readily evinced in history as they
are tricky to maintain. Some suggest that
nearing the end of the Cold War China
played the role of balancing third power
between the United States and the Soviet
Union. 7
Definitely maybe
Empirical evidence clearly support-
ing either bipolarity or multipolarity as
more stable has remained elusive. His-
torical research has produced only mixed
results.
Ted Hopf’s examination of 15th and
16th century Europe found that the bipo-
lar era of 1521-59 dominated by the
Habsburg and Ottoman Empires was
only marginally more stable than that
multipolar era between 1495-1521, as
influenced by Austria, England, France,
Spain, the Ottoman Empire and Venice.
In the multipolar era there were 26 dis-
crete wars, averaging 27 months in dura-
tion and totaling 58 war-years. The bipo-
lar years had 26 wars, averaging 28
months for a total of 59 years. Hardly a
significant variance. 8
Michael Brecker compared four dis-
tinct 20th century systems and found that
20 percent of conflicts that occurred
were in the multipolar period (1918-
1939), compared to 24 percent in the
bipolar period (1945-1962). Manus Mid-
larsky on the otherhand maintains that
Thompson (1986) and Levy (1985) illus-
7 John T. O’Rourke. International Politics on the World Stage (1999). p. 62
8 Hopf, p. 487.
9 Midlarsky, p. 63.
10 James, p. 186.
11 Midlarsky, p. 63.
12 Correlates of War Project. Online, http://correlatesofwar.org.
13 Jack S. Levy. “Size and Stability in the Modern Great Power System.” International Interactions (1984). p. 349.
Figure 2: Instability in Europe
Frequency and severity of wars during 15-16th C.
Severity
Polarity Type Freq. (%) (deaths per
war-year)
Multipolar
63 11,000
1495-1521
Bipolar
53 10,000
1521-59
Source: Ted Hopf, “Polarity, Military Balance &
War,” American Political Science Review 85, 2
(1991). p. 478-9,
trate bipolarity “to be decisively more
stable than multipolarity.”9
Patrick James points out a number of
other studies with conflicting findings,
and notes the interesting results of Char-
les Ostrom and Joan Aldtrich (1978) who
found that “the probability of war to be
‘moderately large’ with two poles, mini-
mal with three, greater with four and
five, and drastically lower with six.”10
This suggests that the relationship be-
tween the number of poles and level of
stability may be curvilinear, with war
more likely at both very low and moder-
ately high levels of polarization.
Figure 3: Curveball
Possible propensity of conflict in relation to number
of poles in the international system
# Poles →
3
Meanwhile, Richard Rosecrance,
searching for some middle ground, sug-
gested that multipolarity was associated
with a higher frequency of war and bipo-
larity with greater severity. Waltz argued
back that in nearly all cases of bipolarity
relative peace prevailed, and that multi-
polarity inherently contained instabilities
that were likely to lead to very severe
wars. 11
All this confusion has lead some
theorists to question the effect of system
elements on conflict propensity in the
first place. Jack Levy assembled a list of
great power wars between 1495 and
1975 using data from the Correlates of
War Project12 and analyzed three indica-
tors: (1) frequency of war in a given pe-
riod, (2) magnitude or total number of
years of each war; and (3) severity of
each war in terms of fatalities. He con-
cluded that it was not the number of
poles in the system, but the differences in
power between great powers that ac-
counted for instability. 13 The finding that
differences in distribution of power leads
to a higher chance of conflict seems to
have been generally accepted, but unfor-
tunately did not end the debate: Manus
Midlarsky countered with the argument
that inequalities between poles are far
more likely under a multipolar system
and thus bipolarity is a more stable inter-
national structure.
A time and a place
No study as yet has resulted in unde-
niable evidence for one theory or the
other. Studies into the effects of polarity
are faced with difficult methodological
problems and challenges. Firstly there is
the problem of geography, not only in the
sense that most of the historical data in
the literature is Eurocentric, but also in
that it has the potential to obscure re-
gional patterns within the system. For
example, in a multipolar system a few
states might be partaking in a majority of
wars, skewing the data for the entire sys-
WS 502 Polarity & Warfare Chad KOHALYK
tem and hiding the fact that most of the
powers experienced few wars. 14
Secondly, finding comparable cases
in different chronological periods is ex-
ceedingly difficult not only due to
change in technology, but also the lack of
available sources. Comparing the bipo-
larity of the Soviet Union and United
States dominated system to the system of
Rome and Carthage is tough when one
must discount nuclear weapons and can-
not make use of accurate sources on
population, GDP, armed forces and se-
verity of wars in terms of accurate battle-
deaths. The alternative is to look at re-
gional as opposed to global systems
within a similar timeframe, but this
raises questions regarding the hierarchi-
cal interactions between regional and
supra-regional polar systems. The actions
of regional polar states are not only con-
strained by their local competitors, but
also by their supra-regional pole. This is
an influence that does not affect global
poles, rendering any comparison suspect.
The presence of nuclear weapons
themselves is a challenge when examin-
ing the historical stability of bipolar sys-
tems. In 1964 Kenneth Waltz asserted
that nuclear weapons consolidated bipo-
larity in the Cold War by making the two
strongest states still more powerful, but
since bipolarity preceded the two-power
nuclear competition, the weapons them-
selves could not be credited solely with
the stability of the international system.
He argued that the build-up of conven-
tional forces would have simply replaced
nuclear detente. 15 There is no doubt that
a conventional arms race was both possi-
ble and probable, but the bipolar stability
that lasted out the Cold War was affected
deeply by policies based specifically on
nuclear stockpiles and "mutually assured
destruction." Even current policy is be-
ing determined by the proliferation and
construction of nuclear weapons. Noth-
ing like this existed in the past. Thus
comparing the nuclear age with ages
gone by necessitates a stretch of the
imagination.
Lastly, the rise of intergovernmental
organizations since the mid-19th century
proves a troublesome asymmetry when
comparing different historical periods.
14 James, p. 189.
15 Waltz, p. 885-6, 907.
16 Charles Krauthammer. “The Unipolar Moment.” Foreign Affairs 70, 1 (1990/91).
17 Michael Mastanduno. “Preserving the Unipolar Moment.” International Security 21 (Spring 97). p. 53.
Figure 4: The Player’s Club
Nuclear stockpiles
US 10,640
Russia 16,000
UK 200
France 350
China 400 (?)
Israel 200
India 110-150
Pakistan 200
North Korea 13-15 (?)
Source: GlobalSecurity.org, Jan 2005
IGOs are more than just alliances be-
tween states for security purposes or
otherwise, yet lack all the distinct power
characteristics of states. By their very
nature they possess only a one-sided
attribute of power, whether military, po-
litical or economic.Intergovernmental
organizations cannot be considered as
great powers in the strict sense of pos-
sessing superior "population, resource
endowment, economic capability, mili-
tary strength, political stability and com-
petence." Even so, they do have an effect
on the interactions between great powers.
The United Nations proved an invaluable
forum for communication between the
US and the USSR, helping them to
achieve the equilibrium necessary for the
"peace by crisis" maintained throughout
the Cold War. Institutions such as these
did not exist in previous bipolar periods;
yet another hurdle for historical compari-
son.
Thus, in the face of such methodo-
logical obstacles, the polarity debate
seemed to trail off in the late 1970s.
Then came a new development, and the
polarity of the system changed com-
pletely.
One is the loneliest number
The post-Cold War era brought hope
that the threat of war would be dramati-
4
cally diminished as power was dis-
persed to a number of other centers in-
cluding Europe, Japan and China. It
seemed the first multipolar system was
upon us in a half century. Syndicated
columnist Charles Krauthammer argued
differently asserting that the world was
not becoming multipolar, but unipolar:16
There is today no lack of second-rank
powers. Germany and Japan are eco-
nomic dynamos. Britain and France
can deploy diplomatic and to some
extent military assets. The Soviet Un-
ion possesses several elements of
power – military, diplomatic and po-
litical – but all are in rapid decline.
There is but one first-rate power and
no prospect in the immediate future of
any power to rival it.
With nearly one third of the world's
GDP, the third largest population and a
military force that far outstrips any pos-
sible competitor it is evident that the
United States is the world's sole super-
power. Waltz's condition of bipolarity,
that no third power would be able to
challenge the top two, could be applied
appropriately to the current international
structure, except in this instance there is
only one power.
Of course there still remain a number
of other great powers in the post-Cold
War system. Regional systems may con-
tain a number of poles. But if conflict
were to get out of hand, spreading and
threatening the global interests of the
United States, disagreements will be
settled by intervention on behalf of the
superpower. Ultimately the system is
unipolar.
Unipolar systems are rare in history:
only the ancient Roman, Mongolian and
Chinese empires controlled all or most of
the established societies in the known
world. Unipolar systems are considered
transitional stages in international struc-
ture: the rise of new powers is only a
matter of time. Waltz and others pre-
dicted that a multipolar system would
materialize early in the 21st century,
within 10-20 years after the end of the
Cold War. 17
Unipolar systems obviously lack
great power war, but are characterized by
WS 502 Polarity & Warfare Chad KOHALYK
Figure 5: Poles du jour
Abridged list of world powers
Population
State millions
288.5
USA
China 1294.4
India 1041.1
Russia 143.8
Japan 127.5
Source: The Economist
"small wars" such as interventions as
well as background conflicts of a mostly
domestic nationalistic or ethnic nature.
Krauthammer argues that the only chal-
lenge to the solitary pole, and thus threat
to the stability of the international sys-
tem, is the "weapon state." Weapon states
are those that do not possess power
across a spectrum "in terms of size of
population, resource endowment, eco-
nomic capability, military strength, po-
litical stability and competence," but in
fact lack most of these characteristics.
They pursue nuclear weapons as a way
to "leapfrog history" in order to be able
to challenge a so-called Western-imposed
order. 18 These states could in no way
survive a nuclear stand-off, and consider
nuclear capability as a way to deter an
intervening conventional force, so preva-
lent in the post-Cold War world. Of
course there is an added fear that weap-
ons states may pass technology or
knowledge onto non-state actors to carry
out attacks, and hopefully elude retribu-
tion.
Intergovernmental organizations play
an interesting role in this new unipolar
world. Kenneth Waltz's assertion that
"the skillful foreign policy ... is designed
to gain an advantage over one state with-
out antagonizing others and frightening
them into united action"19 could be ap-
plied to the United States vis-a-vis its
international legitimacy as threatened by
the organizing principle of IGOs in try-
ing to balance the weaker many against
the stronger one. Michael Mastunduno
encourages the US to play a delicate
game of "balance-of-threat" politics and
not "succumb to the arrogance of power"
in order to maintain its unipolar status.
"It is ironic that in a unipolar setting the
18 Krauthammer, p. 31.
19 Waltz, p. 884.
20 Mastunduno, p. 85.
5
poses is "soft balancing" through the
United Nations Security Council. De-
spite recent blows to its international
Armed Forces (Reserves) GDP legitimacy, it is likely that the dominant
‘000 $bn
position of the United States will remain
1414 (1259) 10383.1 beyond the original forecast of Waltz and
others.
2270 (550) 1266.1
Moderately attractive results
1298 (535) 510.2
The relationship between the number
988 (2400) 346.5 of poles and level of conflict in a system
remains obscure. There may be subtle
240 (47) 3993.4 effects on the equality of power distrib-
uted across poles, thereby affecting sta-
bility indirectly. After decades of theoriz-
ing, researching and arguing a conclu-
sion has not been attained. Was it all for
dominant state, less constrained by other
naught? Not at all.
great powers, must constrain itself."20
Although structural realism has had a
Thus far the 10 to 20 year lifespan of
harrowing time trying to explain interna-
the "unipolar moment" has held firm.
tional conflict in system level terms, it
China, America's most feared potential
has influenced other areas of interna-
near-peer competitor still has substantial
tional relations theory, having a profound
development to undergo before it may
impact on the development of its main
challenge the US. India, currently a close
rivals: liberalism and constructivism.
ally of America, is much further behind
Besides the ongoing discussion about the
China in terms of economic and military
stability of unipolarity, the polarity de-
power, and although the remilitarization
bate has also lived on in another lively
of pacifist Japan seems imminent, it is
form as power transition theory. The
unlikely that Tokyo would balance
future of stability in the international
against America in the foreseeable fu-
system may be unforeseeable but as No-
ture. The leaves Russia, who scores high
bel laureate Sir William Bragg once
on population, number of troops and
noted, "The important thing in science is
stockpiled nuclear weapons, but whose
not so much to obtain new facts as to
floundering economy is still trying to
discover new ways of thinking about
comes to terms with the free market, and
them."
shake off the incapacitating effects of
communism. The only threat Russia
Cited Works
Karl Deutsch & J. David Singer. “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability.” World Politics, 16, 3
(1964).
The Economist, Pocket World in Figures (2005).
Ted Hopf, “Polarity, Military Balance & War,” American Political Science Review, 85, 2 (1991).
Patrick James. “Structural Realism and the Causes of War.” Mershon International Studies Review, 39, 2 (1995).
Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment.” Foreign Affairs 70, 1 (1990/91).
Jack S. Levy, “Size and Stability in the Modern Great Power System.” International Interactions (1984).
Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment.” International Security 21 (Spring 97).
John J. Mearsheimer, The Trajedy of Great Power Politics (2001).
Manus Midlarsky, “Hierarchical Equilibria and the Long-Run Instability of Multipolar Systems,” Handbook of War
Studies (1990).
John T. O’Rourke, International Politics on the World Stage (1999).
Kenneth Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus 93, 3 (1964).
Correlates of War Project. Online, http://correlatesofwar.org.
GlobalSecurity.org. Online, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/summary.htm