De Janvry and Lynn Ground-Source, Types and Consequences of Land Reform in Latin America (1978)

Types and Consequences of Land Reform in Latin America
Author(s): Alain de Janvry and Lynn Ground

Source: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 4, Peasants, Capitalism, and the Class
Struggle in Rural Latin America (Autumn, 1978), pp. 90-112
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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TYPESANDCONSEQUENCES
OFLANDREFORM
INLATINAMERICA
by
Alain de Janvryand Lynn Ground*
Since the Mexican revolutionand in particularthe Punta del Este charter
of the Organization of American States in 1961, the issue of land reformhas
been ragingin Latin America. Most countriesof the continenthave had at least
some kind of land reform,and in many cases it has led to significantsocial
change. Yet, no literatureexists that analyzes systematicallythe process of
land reformin terms of the dynamics of the global social system in which it
occurs. That is one need which this paper seeks to meet. The other is to systematicallyclassify land reformsin Latin America according to a theoretically
consistent model based on the concepts of modes of production and social
classes and to discuss the consequences of the differenttypes of reformsrelative to a set of criteriaderived fromthe logic of public reforms.
The key aspects of the natureof capitalism in Latin America are firstspecified. This permitsus to identifyits major economic and social contradictions
and hence the logic of state interventionthroughpublic reformsin an attempt
to counteractthese contradictions.We focus, in particular,on the problems of
stagnationof food production relative to effectivedemand and of social tensions associated with rural poverty,for which resolutionby programsof land
reformhas been sought.By identifyinga hierarchyof factorsthat explain stagnation and poverty,we then constructa typologyof land reformsbased on
these factors.Seventeen land reformprogramsin ten countriesare thus classified. Their impacts on production and povertycan then be derived fromthe
extent to which differenttypes of reformsaffectthe factorsthat are the root
causes of these contradictions.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF LATIN AMERICAN
AGRICULTURE: THE LOGIC FOR REFORM
The social-class structureof peripheral capitalism in Latin America and
the economic and social contradictionsthat accompany the process of capital
accumulation provide a convenient analytical frameworkto determine both
the logic and the limitsof reforms(Amin, 1976; de Janvryand Garramon,1977).
Under domination of the class alliance that includes the dependent bourgeo*The authors are respectivelya memberof the facultyof the Departmentof Agriculturaland Resource Economics at the Universityof California, Berkeley,and an economist at the Economic
Commission forLatin America, Santiago, Chile. This article is a revised version of Giannini Foundation Paper No. 530.
90

DE JANVRY AND GROUND:TYPES AND CONSEQUENCES
OF LAND REFORM
91
isie, comprador class, and landed elite, the patternof accumulation is fundamentally"socially disarticulated."In this case, the marketfor industrydevelops principally either abroad (in export-orientedeconomies) or in the consumption of the upper classes, originatingin profitsand rents (after import
substitutionindustrialization)(Pinto,1976:114).This implies thatwages are not
a significantsource of effectivedemand and that the logic of capitalist accumulation requires cheap labor and an increasinglyregressive distributionof
income. The economy is also "sectorally disarticulated" since backward linkages in raw materialsand industrialproductionare largelyabsent. This implies
that the balance of payments is an effectiveconstrainton the development of
the productioncapacity.
Disarticulated accumulation is marked by serious contradictions and in
particularby a limiteddomestic market,low savings capacity, and foreignexchange bottlenecks.The objective forcheap labor also implies that food prices
must be maintained low. The result is a tendency for the productionof wage
foods to stagnate. And the cost of labor power is also reduced by "functional
dualism" whereby semiproletarianizationof large segments of the peasantry
allows forpart of subsistence needs to be produced in peasant agricultureand
hence wages to be collapsed below the cost of maintenance and reproduction
of the households. In this process, peasant agricultureis both functionalizedto
the needs of the capitalist mode of production and increasinglydestroyed as
producer of commodities,as it is dispossessed of control of means of production by transformationof the social relationsof precapitalistagricultureand by
competitionwith capitalist agriculture.And it is from among these impoverished rural masses that political demands for land and the possibilityof a destabilizingpeasant-workeralliance emerges.
Agriculturalstagnationis explained by a varietyof factorsthat include the
land-tenuresystem dominated by large-scale estates with absentee management,controlof the state by the agrarian oligarchy,and cheap food associated
with the logic of cheap labor under socially disarticulated accumulation. For
increased food production to obtain, progressive entrepreneurialbehavior
must exist (land tenure), technology and public services must be available
(controlof the state),and the termsof trade must permitprofitabilityof investmentin yield-increasinginnovations (cheap food). Any of these factorsis necessary but not sufficient:sufficiencyrequires all threeto obtain simultaneously. Yet, thereis a hierarchyin the determinationof these factorson the production performanceof agriculturethat runs, in decreasing order of importance,
fromcheap food, to control of the state by its landed elites, and to the landtenure system:cheap food blocks productive investmentsand reproduces the
need forcontrolof the state by the traditionalelites in order to derive compensatory institutionalrents;and institutionalrents,under cheap food, insure the
of the extensive latifundio which also restson functional
superiorprofitability
dualism with peasant agriculture.
The impact of land reformson food productioncan be derived fromspecifyingwhich of these limitingfactors can be relaxed by differenttypes of reforms.We, consequently,constructin the next section a typologyof land reformsbased on these factors.
All land reformsin Latin America duringthe twentiethcentury,excepting
the Cuban, have had the purpose of fomentingthe developmentof capitalism
in agriculture.In all these cases, the purpose of land reformswas to counteract
some of the economic and social contradictionsthat characterized,at particular points in history,the development patterns of Latin American countries
under the logic of social disarticulartion.Yet, the originsof land reformsand
the particularformstheyhave assumed have varied enormouslyover time peLatinAmericanPerspectives:Issue 19, Fall 1978, Vol. V, No. 4

92
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
riods and countries.

The social origin of land reformschanged dramatically in the late 1950s
with the emergence of surplus labor. Prior to this date, the scarcity of labor
which prevailed in most parts of Latin America conflicted sharply with the
objective need forcheap labor in commercialagriculture.The resolutionof this
contradictionrequired thatrurallabor be preventedfromgettingaccess to land
as freeholdersand fromcapturingits opportunitycost on labor markets.The
precapitalistlatifundioserved this purpose ideally by monopolizingthe bulk of
the land and by bonding labor to the estates throughdebt peonage and extraeconomic coercion. As a result,the origins of land reformmovementsduring
this period were found primarilyin the exercise of subjective forces by intellectual and peasant groups in reaction to the severe social contradictionsassociated with the colonato and aparceria formsof labor exploitation. All these
reformswere initiatedfromoutside the traditionalinstitutionalprocess, usually afterviolentoutbursts.This was trueof land reformsin Mexico (1917), Guatemala (1952),Bolivia (1952), and to some extentVenezuela (1959).
By the late 1950s,the emergenceof a labor surplus in agriculturebroke the
logic of the internalsubsistence economy (colonato and aparceria) and provided the objective basis for interventionby the state to eliminate remnants of
precapitalistsocial relations throughlegal reforms.The economic purpose of
unleashing the development of capitalism in agriculturewas to increase food
production and agriculturalexports in order to meet the cheap food and foreign exchange requirementsof industry.Reformwas also spurred by subjective forces originatingin: peasant militancystimulatedby the example of the
Cuban revolutionthat generated threats and fears of agrarian revolutions in
many countries;the extension of the social contradictionsassociated with surplus rural labor to the urban sectors under the form of rapid migrationand
extensivemarginality;and in the internationalpressures derived fromthe Punta del Este charterof the Organization of American States in 1960.
LAND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA
A Typologyof Land Reforms
Correspondingto the contradictionsof disarticulated accumulation, land
reformshave both political and economic purposes. The political purpose is
fundamentallyto furtherand stabilize the social relations of capitalism by
changing the class structurein agricultureto eliminate the landed elite from
those groups controllingthe state,creatinga pettybourgeoisiefromamong the
peasantry, and eliminatingsemifeudal forms of labor exploitation. The economic purpose is fundamentallyto develop the forces of productionin agricultureby puttingidle lands in production,encouragingthe reorganizationof precapitalist estates on a capitalist basis, inducingtheirmodernization,and transformingjunker estates into medium-sizecommercialfarms.A typologyof land
reformsmust reflectthese varied purposes and means of achievingthemit it is
to be useful forevaluatingtheirsuccess.
It is importantto distinguish,as a firststep, between lands that become
incorporatedin the "reform"and "nonreform"sectors in the process of land
reform.The reformsector is composed of lands appropriated (usually expropriated) fromthe formerlandlords and adjudicated on a varietyof institutional
bases (familyfarms,cooperatives, and state farms) to the beneficiariesof the
reform.It is in the reformsector thatpeasants are given access to land and that
a petty bourgeoisie is eventually created. The nonreformsector includes the
unexpropriatedlands retained or sold privately by their formerowners, the
lands that are subdivided by their owners to avoid expropriationthrougha
restrictionon maximum size (hijuelas), and the "reserves" which the former
owners are allowed to retainor sell. The nonreformsector can thus include the

DE JANVRYAND GROUND:TYPES AND CONSEQUENCES
OF LAND REFORM
93
lands of the precapitalistlanded elite, the junker landed elite, or the capitalist
farmers,dependingon the type of reform.
Reformand nonreformsectors play differenteconomic and political roles
in the process of land reform.While land reformshave usually been analyzed
in terms of the creation of a reformsector (the more glamorous and visible
aspect of reform),we will show this to be only one, generallysecondary,aspect
of land reformand the impact of the reformon the nonreformsector to be
anotherimportant,oftenprincipal aspect of any reform.
The typologyof land reformsin Table 1 is based on the impact of different
reformson the two determinantsof stagnationthat can be affectedby a land
reform:(1) the land-tenuresystem,characterizedby the dominantmode of production in agriculture(precapitalist or capitalist) and type of farm enterprise
(latifundioor commercial farms); and (2) the social class that has hegemonic
controlover the state (landed elite or bourgeoisie). This gives three categories
of agrarian systems before the inititationof land reform:those dominated by
precapitalistlatifundios,by capitalist latifundios,or by commercialfarms.The
precapitalist latifundio is, of course, found in precapitalist agriculturewhile
the capitalist latifundio and commercial farms both correspond to capitalist
agriculture.On the other hand, control of the state by a landed elite obtains
under a structurecharacterized by predominance of eitherthe precapitalistor
the capitalist latifundio.Under a structurein which the commercial farmpredominates,the state is controlledby the bourgeoisieat large.
Each of these three systems can be transformedthroughland reforminto
either of the other two. In Table 1, there consequently exist nine paths that
relate the agrarian systems before and afterreform.'In all of these reforms,a
reformsector is added to the dominant type of farm enterprisethroughland
expropriation and redistributionin the form of collective or family farms.
While some reformsgo so far as to change both the dominant farm type and
controlof the state, the major determinantof stagnation- cheap food - remains in all cases a given constant that they cannot affect.This implies that
functionaldualism (the transferof cheap food into cheap semiproletarianlabor) also remains as a derived constant. Land reformsare thus severely constrained in their impact on either production (by cheap food) or poverty (by
functionaldualism) due to the permanence of the logic of accumulation under
social disarticulation.
The typologyof reformscontains three major types, all of which are undertaken with the capitalist mode of production dominant in the country at
large: (1) reformsthat imply some redistributionof land but do not challenge
the precapitalist latifundios' domination of agriculture,(2) reformsthat promote the transitionto capitalism in agriculturetoward eitherjunker or farmer
roads of development,and (3) reformswithin capitalist agriculture,either to
induce a shiftfromjunker to farmerroads of capitalist development or to redistributethe land withinjunker or farmerroads.2To each type of reformthat
Table 1 is to be read as a matrixof transitionsamong states of the agrarian structurebefore and
afterland reform.A same countrycan thus re-enterthe matrix more than once, as land reform
programsare redefinedover time,but it must always re-enterthe matrixin the state to which it
was transformedby the previous land reform.
2The junker (or Prussian) and farmerroads correspond to the patternsof development of capitalism in agricultureidentifiedby Lenin (1974). In the junker road, the landed elites become the capitalistsand hence maintaincontrolover the state. The social relationsof productionon theirestates
are redefinedfrominternalpeasant labor, paying debit in labor services and kind and subject to
extra-economiccoercion, to external proletarianlabor. In the farmerroad, some peasants concentratethe means of production,hire labor power, and become a ruralbourgeoisiewhile the majority
loses controlof the means of productionand is increasinglysemiproletarianizedand proletarianized. In thiscase, the ruralbourgeoisieshares controlof the state with the bourgeoisieat large.
LatinAmericanPerspectives:Issue 19, Fall 1978, Vol. V, No. 4

94
implies eithera transitionamong modes or a shiftamong roads, therealso corresponds the possibilityof counterreform.
Undoubtedly,the classification of many of the reformsin Table 1 will be
questioned. Each is based on data and descriptions of modes of production,
land tenure,and the distributionof public resources and services among different farmenterprisesand social classes (to determinecontrolof the state) in the
pre- and post-reformperiods. Empirical informationon each reformis given in
Table 2. The specific allocation of one or more cases to each type of reform
will be brieflydiscussed.
Redistributivereforms.The three types of reform on the diagonal of
Table 1 leave both the dominant mode of production in agricultureand the
classes in control of the state unchanged, affectingonly quantitativelythe
land-tenuresystemby changingthe distributionof land among differenttypes
of enterprises.These reformsare thus, in essence, redistributive.The reform
itselfdoes not relax any of the fundamentaldeterminantsof stagnation.Three
types can be identified:redistributivereformsunder the preserved dominance
of the (1) precapitalistlatifundio[Precapitalist Redistributive(PKR)], (2) capitalist latifundio [JunkerRedistributive(JR)], and (3) the commercial farm
[FarmerRedistributive(FR)]. In everycase a reformsector is created by expropriatingeitheridle lands (PKR), or lands already under capitalist junker (JR)or
farmer(FR) use.
An example of a precapitalist redistributivereformis the 1962-1967land
reformin Chile. It was intendedto induce a more intensivepatternof land use
on the precapitalistlatifundioswithoutalteringthe social relations of production in agricultureor affectingthe privilegedposition of the landowning class.
In fact,no land was expropriatedunder the 1962 law until Frei assumed office
in 1965 (see Table 2).
In the decades since the expropriation of the latifundia class in the
1934-1940period, the land reformin Mexico has redistributedland fromcommercial farms to the ejidos and is thus classified as a farmerredistributive
reform.
Transitionfromprecapitalistmode to junker road. These reformsinduce a
transitionfromprecapitalistto capitalist agricultureeitherby threatsof expropriationif land remains underutilizedor by makingsemifeudal social relations
illegal. The internal subsistence economy is eliminated, a reform sector is
created, and the precapitalistlatifundiois thus transformedinto a large-scale,
capitalist ("junker") enterprisehiringwage laborers - oftensemiproletarians.
The landed elite retains controlof the state and, hence, only the thirddeterminant of stagnation,archaic land tenure,is eliminated. Both the 1968 land reformin Colombia and the 1964 reformin Ecuador provide clear examples of a
reformwhich affects a transitionfrom precapitalist to capitalist relations of
production. Following the 1961 redistributivereform,the 1968 legislation in
Colombia prohibitedaparceria (rentsin exchange forusufructof land) and expropriated the land farmed under aparceria and distributedit to the occupants. The 1964 reformin Ecuador similarly proscribed huasipungaje (labor
services in exchange forusufructof land) and titledthe plots to the occupants.
The classification of the 1953 land reformin Bolivia as a transitionto the
junker way (as opposed to a farmerway) is based on the fact that, with the
importantexception of the Cochabamba region,most landowners were able to
retain part of all of theirholdings. Of the 11,426propertiesaffectedby expropriationproceedingsthrough1970,only 1,441were classified as latifundiosand
sufferedpartial or total expropriation(Ergueta, 1973:68). The remainingholdings were eitherclassified as "medium properties"and thus were entitledto be
retainedin the amout of 80-350hectares in the Altiplano,24-200hectares in the

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Yungas (valleys), and 180-600 hectares in the Oriente; or classified as "agricultural enterprises"and thus entitledto be retained at 400 to 800 hectares in
the Altiplano,80-500hectares in the Yungas, and 2,000hectares in the Oriente.3
Also, cattle ranches were allowed an exemption of 50,000hectares in the Oriente. At the same time,most observers agree that the colonos (peasants who
provided rentsand labor services to landlords in exchange forusufructof land)
received titlesonly to the plots they occupied at the time of the reform(Heyduck, 1974; Burke,1974; Carter,1964). That is, althoughthe colonato was abolished, the productiveresources used by peasants were not generallyincreased
by the land reform.
Also, many of the agriculturalpolicies applied after the reformactually
strengthenedthe economic position of the landed elites, particularlythose in
the Oriente. These included price supports,subsidized credits and machinery,
and the constructionof a sugar refineryin Santa Cruz (Heath, Erasmus, and
Buechler,1969; Clark, 1974). Peasants, by contrast,have received only minimal
creditand access to public services (FAO, 1968).
Transition from precapitalist mode to farmerroad. This type of reform
promotesa transitionin both the agrarian mode of productionand the classes
in controlof the state. Agricultureis transformedfromprecapitalistto capitalist, thus changing the basis of the social relations of productionfrominternal
to external semiproletarianization.The precapitalist latifundiois replaced by
commercial farms as size limits are imposed on landownership,and a reform
sector is created. The urban and rural bourgeoisies displace the landed elite
fromcontrolof the state. With this transferof class power, these reformsthus
remove the second (control of the state) as well as the third determinantof
stagnation.Examples of this type of reformare provided by Chile (1967-1973),
Mexico (1934-1940),and Guatemala (1952-1954).The 1967 legislation in Chile
gave the state the power to expropriatethe latifundia class, a task completed
under the same law by the Allende government.At the same time,precapitalist
relations of productionwere prohibited.Large capitalist commercial farms of
no more than 80 hectares of basic irrigatedland were thus created. These were
also the salient featuresof the indicated reformsin Mexico and Guatemala.
Shift fromjunker road to farmerroad. These reformsoccur within the
capitalist mode of production and bring about a shiftfromthe junker to the
the basis of
farmerroad of development.Since they are aimed at transforming
the agrarian structurefromcapitalist latifundioto commercial farms,a ceiling
on landholdingsis imposed. The landed elite is eliminated,and the bourgeoisie
assumes controlof the state. The second determinantof stagnationis relaxed.
The military'sland reformin Peru (1969) provides the only example of this
type of reform.Under the 1964 land reform,precapitalistrelations of production (yanaconaje) had been prohibited.The militaryeffectivelydestroyed the
landed elite class by imposingand enforcinga limiton the size of landholdings
to 50 irrigatedhectares on the coast and 30 in the Sierra or to theirproductive
equivalent of rainfedland (Caballero, 1977).
Transitionfromjunker road to precapitalist mode. These counterreforms
induce a transitionfromcapitalist agricultureback to noncapitalistagriculture.
There is clearly no objective basis for such a counterreformwhen surplus labor is prevalent,as is the case in most Latin American countriestoday. If labor
would be conceivable; indeed, isolated inciwere scarce, such a counterreform
dents of such reversals can be uncovered in the historyof the Bolivian land
reform(Clark, 1974).
Transition from farmerroad to precapitalist mode. Such counterreforms
3The survivial of the landowning class has been treated by Graeff (1974), Heath, Erasmus, and
Buechler (1969), and Clark (1974).

OF LAND REFORM
99
also induce a transitionout of the capitalist mode of productionas commercial

farms are transformedinto noncapitalist latifundio. A concrete example is
provided by the events in Guatemala afterthe overthrowof the Arbenz governmentand reversal of the land reformin 1954. At the time of the counterreform,Guatemala was not yet characterized by surplus labor. As a result,not
only did the counterreformreturnpracticallyall expropriatedlands but it also
reinstitutedthe colonato system. The second and thirddeterminantsof stagnation were therebyrestored.
occur within
Shiftfromfarmerroad to junker road. These counterreforms
the capitalist mode of productionand create a shiftbetween roads of development fromfarmerto junker. Commercial farmsgive way to capitalist latifundios. This type of counterreformoccurred in Chile after the militaryjunta
seized power in 1973. While the reformsector included 39 percentof the total
agriculturalland area in 1973, it had been reduced to only 9 percent in 1975
(Fazio, 1978; Fenner,1977).
The typologypresentedhere can be contrastedwith alternativetypologies
of land reformsdeveloped by Griffin(1974:chapter5), Frank (1969: chapter 17),
Barraclough (1973), Warriner (1971), Flores (1972), and Feder (1965). None of
these typologies uses the concepts of mode of production (transitions)or of
social class structureand control of the state (shiftsamong roads of development). Redistributiveand economic reforms are usually characterized as
"modernizing"or "technocratic"while socio-economic and social reformsare
classified as "reformist."In these typologies,the Cuban experience is characterized as a "radical" reform.This is, in our view, incorrect:the Cuban land
reformwas executed in the context of a transitionto socialism and, as such,
was not a reformsince it was not aimed at reproducingthe dominant social
relationsin the national economy,those of peripheralcapitalism. Such typologies are, in addition, insufficientto explain the expected consequences of reformsbecause the criteriaon which they are based are specified ad hoc rather
than derived froma theoreticalframework.They also oftenerroneouslyconsider togetherland reformsthat occur in central and peripheral countries althoughthe contradictionsof accumulation and hence the purpose of reformism
are markedlydifferentin the two cases.
Consequences of Land Reforms
The major economic and political impacts of land reformscan be summarized in the followingfiveobservations:
- Observation I: The role of land reformsin expanding the domestic market
forthe modernindustrialsector and thus contributingto social articulationvia
increased peasant consumptionexpendituresis insignificant.
This observationis importantbecause land reformhas oftenbeen viewed
by the national bourgeoisie and the political forces promotinga national bourthe national economy fromsocialgeois revolutionas a means of transforming
ly disarticulatedto articulated.For this to happen, however, the resultingemploymentand income effectswould have to be sufficientto permitbenefited
peasants to have access to the consumptionof modern-sectorindustrialgoods.
Clearly, peasant incomes before land reformswere far below the necessary levels to allow forany significantconsumptionof modern-sectordurables.
In Chile the average monthlyper capita incomes, includingthe imputed value
of wages in kind, of peasants and landless agriculturalworkers prior to the
reformequalled $108 (or $65 cash per capita incomes) [CIDA-Chile, 1966]. In
Ecuador the per capita income forthe same groups was $33.50 (CIDA-Ecuador,
1965),and in Peru from$17 to $47 (CIDA-Peru, 1966).
Land reformprograms,however, tended to have a limitedimpact on peasLatinAmericanPerspectives:Issue 19, Fall 1978, Vol. V, No. 4

100
ant incomes. First,they produced a small net employmenteffect.On the one

hand, few of those who actually received land were landless or external peasants, most having been laborers on the latifundio.On the other hand, during
and afterthe process of land reform,some peasants were expelled from the
latifundio as the number of permanent and seasonal workers was reduced
(Bayer, 1975:33-34,53).4 And the labor forcewas oftenslashed when latifundios
were privatelysubdivided to avoid expropriationby size limitations(Harding,
1973; Barracloughand Fernandez, 1974).
The employmenteffectof the reformprogramin Ecuador on the internal
peasants - the supposed beneficiaries of the reform- illustrates another
negative social impact of land reformsas well as the objective logic for destroyingthe internalsubsistence economy when surplus labor exists. Because
internalsemiproletarianlabor was nearly gratuitous,it was overemployedrelative to actual labor requirementson the latifundio.For this reason, the internal peasants were fully employed and relativelybetteroff than the external
peasants. In commentingon the effectsof the reform,CIDA stated:
... the patron is no longerobligated to the workers.When theywere [internalpeasants]
they enjoyed habitual work assignments; now, in contrast,they must compete in the
labor market,which allows the patrons to tailor employmentto theirlabor requirements
(CIDA-Ecuador, 1965:451).
In other words, the expropriation of the internal subsistence economy

transformedlabor froma fixed to a variable cost and thus made employment
opportunitiesdependent on marketconditions. While this may have had a favorable impact on production,CIDA found that it was not uncommon for the
haciendas to reduce employmentby as much as 50 percent after the reform
(CIDA-Ecuador, 1965:450).The Costales cite cases in which employmentof former internalpeasants was reduced by 25 to 50 percent (Costales and Costales,
1971:64 and 282).
The formin which the reformenterprisesare organized may also create
negativeemploymenteffects.The cooperatives established in Peru by the military'sland reform(1969-1975)and in Chile under Frei (1967-1973)provided real
incentives to reduce or limit employment.Indeed, in the cooperatives established on the formersugar plantationsin Peru, memberswere extremelyrelucinstead to hire temporarylaborers
tantto incorporatenew members,preferring
of
the cooperative (Horton, 1975).
benefits
in
the
social
not
share
who would
The same phenomenon was observable in Chile (Zemelman and Petras,
1972:138) where, in addition, the substitutionof capital for labor on the landreformcooperatives was particularlyintense.5
On the other hand, the organization of the reformsector into familyand
subfamily units, as occurred in Venezuela, implies a limited contributionto
employment.In the Venezuelan land-reformsettlements,only 2.1 percent of
the total labor input was contracted from outside (Wing, 1970:46; CIDA/
CENDES, 1967).
4The negative employmenteffectsof land reformare oftenmagnifiedby the reaction of landowners to new labor codes commonlycontained in the land reformlaws. For instance,in the Peruvian
Sierra, landowners expelled the permanentworkers and rehiredthem as temporaryworkers for
whom the minimumwage and social securitylegislationdid not apply. Anotherexample is provided by the reaction of landowners to the increase of the minimumwage contained in the reform
law in Colombia (CIDA-Colombia, 1966: chapter6 and appendix 5).
"Between1970 and 1972,the importationof machineryincreased 306 percentwhile the importation
of fertilizersdeclined 29 percent(Barraclough and Fernandez, 1974:132).This strongtrendof labor
displacement in the reformsector was in greatpart a consequence of,on the one hand, the continuing subsidization of capital and, on the other,the policy of boosting the living standards in the
reformsector with state credit.

OF LAND REFORM
101
The income effectof land reformhas been equally ambiguous. Reforms

that induce a transitionfromthe precapitalist mode to the farmerroad have
the largestpotentialincome effectbecause they entail the eliminationof absolute rents and unremuneratedlabor and provide for the diffusionby the state
organizationin the
of yield-increasingtechnologies.Under a family/subfamily
reformsector, the implied net income effectover time is near zero, although
there may be a "one shot" increase. Under commercial or cooperative reform
units,the pontentialnet income effectis greatersince a surplus can be generated. Ultimately,the impact on the marketfordurable goods will depend on the
general distributionof the income effectamong those directlyand indirectly
benefitedand those directlyand indirectlyharmed. Given the absolute income
transfer,the more unequal the distributionof the transfer,the greaterthe potentialimpact on the marketfordurable goods.
A survey of directreformbeneficiariesin Venezuela revealed that 37 percent had lower cash incomes afterthe reformthan before,28 percentremained
unchanged,and 35 percenthad higherincomes (Wing, 1970:50).The per capita
incomes of reformbeneficiariesaveraged $129 of which $105 was in cash. The
sources of this income were: 19 percent,consumptionof home production;35
percent,sales of farm production;and 46 percent,outside employment.This
high degree of semiproletarianizationreflectsthe subsistence nature of the reformsector. Data on the prereformincome levels of the beneficiarieswere not
supplied. In any event,it is clear that the absolute income levels attained were
too low to permita significantpurchase of industrialgoods. Indeed, according
to Kirby,in Venezuela ". . . the most serious criticismof the land reformso far
is that the settlers(beneficiaries) have been able to increase their purchasing
power to a verylimitedextent"(Kirby,1975).
A study of several of INCORA's land-reformprojects revealed similarly
limitedand oftennegativeincome effectson beneficiaries.Thus in the Atlantico #3 project,productionactually declined duringthe firstthreeyears, and 68
percent of the rural families had sufferednegative income effectsin the first
fiveyears of operation(Howard, 1976).
A 1966 study on consumptionhabits of land-reformbeneficiariesin the La
Paz region of Bolivia showed that,while nominal consumption expenditures
had increased substantially- 433 percent in 14 years - the absolute level of
familyexpenditures,$101 (or $17 per capita), was still far too low to include
purchase of durables (Clark, 1972). And, yet, the group surveyed was among
the greatestbeneficiariesof the reformdue to its close proximityto the La Paz
market.
The most privilegedbeneficiariesof the military'sland reformin Peru
the permanentworkersof the expropriatedsugar plantations who became the
members of cooperatives - saw their annual nominal wages (advanced
against year-end profits)increase from $377 to $662 between 1968 and 1972,
representingan increase of 33 percent (Horton, 1973:69). Again, however, the
absolute income levels of even these most privilegedreformbeneficiariesremained too low to permitsignificantparticipationin the marketfor industrial
goods.
Land reformdoes have an impact on the marketforfood and some nondurable industrial goods, however.6 Nevertheless, a significantchange in these
markets would require a substantial increase in incomes, a development not
ensured by any type of land reformper se. In addition,where rentsand forced
deliveriesat semigratuitousprices are eliminatedthroughland reform(e.g., Bolivia and Peru), consumption of home-produced food increases. Thus, while
diets improve,the marketedsurplus of food may decline immediatelyafterthe
6See the data on Bolivia discussed above.

102
reform.And obtainingsocial articulationon the basis of this effectivedemand

would require transformationof the modern industrial sector away fromthe
productionof durable goods, a change beyond the reach of a land reform.
In the case of land reformsthat establish the farmerroad, the elimination
of the landed elites fromcontrolof the state opens the way to the diffusionof
land-saving techniques and infrastructuredevelopment. The resultant increased demand for means of productionmanufacturedby the modern industrial sector - usually dominated by transnationalcorporations- may be important.This does not, however, lead to social articulation.Sectoral disarticulation furtherimplies that increased derived demand for capital goods will
largelybe translatedinto increased imports.
Observation II: The greatest potential impact on production is obtained
from reformsthat promote a transitionto the farmerroad, followed in descending order by those that induce a shiftfromjunker to farmer,a transition
to junker,and by redistributivereforms.
This theoreticalorderingis derived fromthe effectof each type of reform
on the hierarchyof determinantsof stagnation: reformsthat induce a transition to the farmerroad remove the second and thirddeterminants;reformsthat
induce a shiftfrom junker to farmerremove the second; while reformsthat
create a transitionto the junker road eliminate the third. Redistributivereformsdo not affectany of the determinantsof stagnation. Unfortunately,for
numerous reasons this specific orderingcannot be verifieddirectly:the initial
land-tenuresystemshave been differentfromcountryto country;the land reforms have occurred at differenttimes; several countries have experienced
more than one type of land reform(e.g., Colombia, Chile, and Peru); land reformsthat promote a transitionto the farmerroad have more often than not
been reversed (e.g., the counterreformsin Guatemala and Chile). Finally, the
expected effectsof policy changes in terms of production performancemay
become apparent only aftera relativelylong period of time.
However, it is possible to verifythat governmentpolicy aimed at increasing production changes under those land reformsthat induce either a transition to farmeror a shiftfromjunker to farmer,both of which imply controlof
the state passing to the bourgeoisie.
Afterthe landed elites were expropriated in Mexico during the 1934-1940
period, the Mexican state embarked on a massive programof agriculturaldevelopment.The primaryemphasis of this programwas on extendingthe agriculturalfrontierthroughirrigationprojects and on the diffusionof biochemical
(land-saving) technologies(Hertford,1971). Similarly,in Peru, afterexpropriation of the landed elite, the governmentinitiated the constructionof massive
irrigationworks,one of which will irrigate150,000hectares (USDA, 1977:22).
With respect to production performance,the contrastingexperiences of
Bolivia and Mexico - the only two countries which have undergone a long
and uninterruptedprocess of land reform- do tend to confirmthe hypothesis
thatthe potentialproductiongains are greatestwhen both the second and third
determinants of stagnationare relaxed. In Mexico betwen 1934-1938 and
1950-1951,total agricultural output increased 4.3 percent annually; between
1948 and 1963, it increased at an annual rate of 6.3 percent; and between 1960
and 1970, 5.8 percent. For Bolivia, the annual growth rates after the reform
were only 1.2 percent(1951-1964)and 1.7 percent(1960-1970)(FAO).
Observation III: The production effectof land reformis sought through
the development of capitalism principallyin the nonreformsector. The function of the nonreformsector is to increase the marketedsurplus of both food
and exportables in orderto reduce pressure on wage costs and relieve the deficit in the balance of payments.Conversely,the impact of land reformson pro-

OF LAND REFORM
103
ductionforthe marketthroughthe reformsector is slight.

This observation follows from a study of the provisions of land reform
laws as well as fromthe contrasted production performancesof reformand
nonreformsectors.
The development of capitalism in the nonreformsector is encouraged by
law in a varietyof ways:
1) Patternsof extensive land use are discouraged throughthreatsof expropriation and incentives for adoption of more intensive production methods.
This approach is typical of all land reformsand is the primarymethod applied
under reformsthatseek to induce the transitionto junkeragriculture.
2) Indirectformsof farmmanagement(absenteeism) are prohibitedor restrictedto corporate holdings. This encourages direct management and presumably promotes greater productivity.This provision is typical of most
reforms.
3) Many land-reformlaws dictate the rental or sale of idle lands, thus
promotinga more intensivepatternof land use.
4) Through expropriation of the internal peasant plots, prohibition of
bonded labor, and institutionof minimum wage laws, labor is transformed
froma fixed to a variable cost, and the social relationsof noncapitalistlatifundio are transformedinto those of a capitalist enterprise.This is typical of the
transitionreforms.
5) Landlords affectedby expropriationunder the clause of farm size are
allowed to retain a land "reserve" of maximum legal size on which fixed and
variable workingcapital are concentrated.Consequently,the ratio of capital to
land increases substantiallyon these farms.This is typical of the reformsthat
aim at establishinga farmerroad in the nonreformsector. The size of the reserves may also vary with intensityof land use, thus encouragingthe developmentof the productiveforces.
6) To escape expropriationunder the clauses restrictingthe size of holdings, latifundios are encouraged, informallyor officially,to subdivide into
smaller unitswith the objective of improvingfarmmanagementand increasing
the intensityof land use.
These provisions of the law and the manner in which the law is applied
thus aim at promotingthe development of the productiveforces in the nonreformsector while using the reformsector as an instrumentfor this purpose
more than as a locus forproductionincrease. This can be observed throughthe
followingdata:
Exemptions fromexpropriationon the basis of size - the so-called "reserves" - have generallybeen quite liberal, as can be seen fromTable 2, column 5, even under the Mexican, Chilean, and Peruvian reformsthat induced a
transitionor a shiftto the farmerroad. Since landowners were invariably allowed to choose the location of reserves, they were established on the best
lands of the formerlatifundio. In most cases, since neither working capital
(including livestock) nor water rightswere affected by the reform(Table 2,
column 6), the land incorporatedinto the reformsector had been decapitalized
and lacked guaranteed access to water while the capital/land ratio had increased substantiallyon the reserves.7There are also innumerableobstacles to
expropriationcontained in the land-reformlaw, and the enforcementof the
law was usually delayed, thus allowing timeto decapitalize expropriatedlands
and capitalize reserves.
Land which is intensivelyutilized was entirely (transitionto junker) or
partially(transitionand shiftto farmer)exempt fromexpropriation.Generous
7ForChile, see Barracloughand Fernandez (1974:43); forPeru, see Bayer (1975:9); forColombia, see
INCORA (1972), Wing (1970:44),and Soto (1973:80).

104
delays were often given to allow for intensificationof land use as well as to
subdivide latifundiosand escape expropriationon the basis of size.
The resultis that the effectivequantityof land under controlof the landed
elite was only marginallyreduced under precapitalistredistributiveand transition to junker reforms.As Table 2, column 3, shows, the nonreformsector still
includes 99 percentof the land in Ecuador, 90 percentin Colombia, 84 percent
in Venezuela, and 82 percent in Bolivia. Under reformsthat create the farmer
road, the nonreformsector is reduced to a smaller fractionof total land: 57
percent in Mexico, 58 percent in Peru, and 60 percent in Chile (1973). These
lands, however, are usually the best in the country,receive the bulk of public
services in credit,infrastructure,
extension,and research,and produce most of
the commodifiedagriculturalproduct.
For instance,in Mexico where the reformsector is proportionallylargerin
termsof land and labor force than in any other country,the nonreformsector
monopolizes the bulk of institutionalservices. During the 1956-1969period, although the private commercial-farmsector encompassed 55 percent of total
agriculturallands, it received 85 percentof public agriculturalcredit.
In Chile under Allende, where the reformsector was enlarged to the maximum allowed under the 1967 reformlaw, the nonreformsector stillreceived 69
percentof state creditin 1971-1972(Barracloughand Fernaindez,1974: 134-135).
Also while the 1967 land reformconferredupon the state controlof all irrigation works, neitherFrei nor Allende exercised that power and, as a result,the
nonreformsector,and, in particularthe remaininglarge landholders, retained
control of 77.1 percent of the capacity of the country'sirrigationworks (Barracloughand Fernandez, 1974:39).
In Bolivia, where 18.2 percent of agriculturallands and 39 percent of the
peasantryhave been incorporatedinto the reformsector,all sources agree that
the smallholders,both withinand withoutthe reformsector,have received virtuallyno credit(FAO, 1968:13).
The limitedavailable productiondata do suggestthat the productioneffect
of land reformwas obtained in the nonreformsector, not the reformsector.
Appropriatedata exist only forBolivia and Mexico, the two countrieswith the
longesthistoryof land reformin Latin America.
In Bolivia, the productionof potatoes and cereals can be taken as a proxy
forthe performanceof the reformsector and thatof sugar cane and cottonseed
forthe nonreformsector.8Between 1952-1953and 1974,the average annual per
capita increase in the productionof potatoes and cereals was 2.3 percent And
0.5 percent,respectively.For sugar cane and cottonseed,the figureswere 37.1
percentand 94.6 percent,respectively.9
In Mexico, there is a rough equivalence between the area contained in the
reform(ejido) and nonreformsectors. The private commercial farms sector
contains 55 percentof all cultivablelands and 49 percentof all irrigatedlands.'0
It is however clear thatthese data overestimatethe effectivesize and contribution to productionof the nonreformsector as an importantfractionof the ejido
8Potatoesand cereals are produced mainlyin the Altiplano where most of the land reformactivity
took place, while sugarcane and cottonseed are produced mainly in the Santa Cruz region which
was relativelyunaffectedby the land reform.It is true,of course, that the disparate production
performancesin these commoditiescould be due to factorsother than a "plan" designed to favor
the nonreformsector. However, the design of governmentprogramswith respect to agricultural
developmentdid indeed favorthe nonreformsector; see, forinstance: Heath, Erasmus, and Buechler (1969:290),Antezano (1970,:157-162),Ruhl (1975), and Clark (1974).
9Forcottonseed,the figurescover the 1961-1965to 1974 period; see FAO (1961 and 1975).
"'Thereare essentially threesectors in Mexican agriculture:the ejido, the private capitalist sector,
and the privatesmallholdersector.

OF LAND REFORM
105
land which is not used forsubsistence productionhas been illegallyrentedout

to large landowners. According to NACLA, "for most ejidatarios, whose income average less than $50 a month,the most viable solution today is to rent
theirplot to a large landowner and then work full time as a day laborer in the
tomato or cotton fields. In Sonora, about 70 percent of the ejidos are rented,
especially in the irrigatedareas of Navajoa and the Valle del Yaqui, while estimates for the percentage of rented ejidos in Sinaloa range between 40 and 80
percent"(NACLA, 1976:18)
Under precapitalist redistributiveand transition to junker reforms,the
bulk of the land incorporatedinto the reformsector is oftenfound on the agricultural frontierand, consequently,is not only of low quality but is also hobbled by poor infrastructureand limited access to effectivedemand. For instance, in Colombia the World Bank found that "the land resources [acquired
for the reformsector] are largely those which have been ceded by previous
holders because it would be impossible forthem to make the necessary investments to bringland into production.Consequently, much of the land held by
INCORA [the land-reforminstitute]is marginal whereas extensive good land
resources continue to be underutilized" (World Bank, 1972:235). The same
problemcharacterizes much of the lands distributedto peasants in Venezuela,
leading to poor economic conditions and a high rate of abandonment and reconsolidation of these lands. Between 1967 and 1975, the contributionof the
reformsector to national crop productionhas declined from32 percent to 20
percentwhile thatof livestockdeclined from6 to 3.4 percentbetween 1967 and
1972 (Cox, 1978:table27). Growthin national productionhas been achieved by
a small number of medium and large commercial farmersin the nonreform
sector,the emergenceof which has been stimulatedby the threatsand incentives of the agrarianreform(Cox, 1978:54-55).
units (Table 2,
The organizationof the reformsector into subfamily/family
column 7) proscribes access to cheap labor and therebyrelegates the reform
sector to stagnation,as it is unable to compete with the nonreformsector.The
small size of the units in the reformsector oftenrequires thatheads of families
seek outside employment.Reform-sectorland gradually becomes appropriated
by the nonreformsectorin spite of legal constraints."
The social behavior of peasants, in reflectingthe productiveoperations at
which they labored prior to land reform,is also an importantdeterminantof
the success or failureof productionin the reformsector (Lehmann,1976).
When the preland reformtenureconsists of decentralized productiveoperations characteristicof the latifundio employing the aparceria form of labor
exploitation,the subsequent organizationof the reformsector into cooperative
or collective farms is generally precluded in the absence of strongincentives
that are unlikelyto come under domination of the capitalist mode of production. The consequent atomisticorganization of the reformsector implies little
use of new technology,stagnant production,and a declining marketable surplus (e.g., Bolivia and parts of the Peruvian highlands). Even when the bulk of
productive operations is centralized prior to the reform,the strongdesire for
individual proprietorshiptends to frustratethe formationof effectivecooperatives or collectives (e.g., Chile).
Experience shows that, when productive operations are completely centralized before the reform,as in plantations,cooperative enterprises(e.g., the
production cooperatives created from the expropriated plantations in Peru)
can be most effective.
Observation IV: Political stabilizationfunctionof land reforms:
"This problem has been particularlyacute in Mexico. See the CIDA-Mexico study (CIA/CIDA,
1970) and RestrepoFernandez and Sanchez Cortes (n.d.).
LatinAmericanPerspectives:Issue 19, FaIl 1978, Vol. V, No. 4

106
A) With the productionstrategyof the land reformcentered on the nonreformsector,the primaryrole of the reformsector is political. Its functionis to
stimulate the development of a conservative agrarian petty bourgeoisie and
thus reduce the threatof social instabilityin the countryside.
This observation is clearly illustratedin the philosophy of the Colombian
Land Reform Institute(INCORA). In an article it authored for USAID, INCORA stated that "INCORA was founded and its funds and staffwere systematically builtup to levels which enabled it to investsubstantiallyin land-tenure
modifications,land improvements,credit,and otherservices fora new class of
campesino landowners. Politically,it [land reform]offersthe hope of reducing
the threatof instabilityin the countryside"(INCORA, 1970).
The goal of political stabilization is implementedby a dual strategy:cooption and patronage of reformbeneficiaries,and repression of the uprisingsof
peasants excluded fromthe reform.
By creatingupward mobility,land reformscan constitutepowerful political cooptive forces on the mass of peasants. However, since land reformsdo
not reach the bulk of peasants but are usually confinedto the upper peasantry,
the generation of expectations among those not benefited is likely to negate
political stabilization if strong peasant organizations exist.12Peasant frustrations can become powerful destabilizing factors, as in Peru during the last
years of the Belaunde reformand in Chile under Frei.
B) Reformsthatattempt to establish the farmerroad are potentiallythe
most destabilizing due to the political reaction of expropraited landed elites
and to the frustrationsof the large mass of peasants excluded fromthe reform.
Preservationof the bulk of the land in the nonreformsectorlimitsaccess to
the land to a small fractionof the peasantry.The frustrationsof those excluded
can be a destabilizing force that pushes throughstrikesand land seizures for
an acceleration,amplification,and radicalization of the land reform.This pressure is particularlyacute in reformsthat aim at a farmerroad since the bourgeoisie requires political allies to successfullyexecute a land reformagainst the
landed elite. Thus, in an electoral context,as in Chile, the peasants must be
mobilized. However, while over 100,000 Chilean peasants joined
unions between 1965 and 1970,only 21,000gained access to the land by the end
of this period (Chile, 1973: 272). Frustratedby limitedconcrete benefits,workers' strikesin the latifundiosincreased from142 in 1965 to 1,580 in 1970, and
land invasions multiplied from 7 to 456 (Klein, 1972; Affonso, 1970). Meanwhile, the landed elite's strongopposition to the land reformand fear that it
threatenedtheir propertyin other sectors of the economy led to a ruptureof
the conservative-liberalalliance which had broughtthe Christian Democrats
an electoral victoryin 1964. In the 1970 presidentialcampaign, the combination
of these two forces, division between liberals and conservatives and the increasing radicalization of the peasantry,broughtthe leftUnidad Popular (UP)
to power. The political destablization unleashed by the land reformunder Frei
intensifiedunder Allende until the military intervened on the side of the
propertiedclasses.
In Guatemala, peasants were also mobilized by the governmentto carry
out the expropriationof the landed elite. However, the expropriatedlandowners, with backing fromthe U.S. government,regained political control;the land
reformwas completelyreversedafterArbenz was deposed in 1954.
Observation V. With the need for cheap food maintained by the objective
2Criteria forselection of those to be benefitedby land reformsare usually that they were internal
peasants and/or possess some education, "managementskills," etc. Internalpeasants are generally
the better-offsegment of the peasantry due to stable employmentand access to the resources
(pasturage,sometimesschools, medical attention,kindling,etc.) of the latifundio.

OF LAND REFORM
107
logic of cheap labor under social disarticulation,no land reformcan eliminate

functionaldualism with a semiproletarianizedpeasantry.Thus, irrespectiveof
the type of land reform,the subsistence sector is maintained as the necessary
source of cheap labor.
The proportionof the peasantrybenefitedby differentland reformsis given in Table 2, column 4. Even the most extensive land reformin Latin American history,that of Mexico, after60 years still has not incorporatedmore than
50 percentof the peasantryinto the reformsector. Similarly,in Peru as of November1976,68 percentof the potentialbeneficiaries(the subsistence peasants
and landless agriculturallaborers existingin 1964) remained outside the reform
sector; and, according to governmentfigures,the maximum percentage to be
incorporatedinto the reformsector is 39 percent (Caballero, 1976:11). In Chile,
duringthe governmentof the UP, the proportionof potential beneficiariesexcluded fromthe reformsectorreached 80 percent.
Thus, althoughthe social relations of productionare redefinedunder transition reformsand the large estates eliminatedunder the reformsthat establish
the farmerroad, the minifundioalways remains; this permits the continued
transferof the cost of cheap food and of generally unfavorable agricultural
prices to semiproletarianlabor.
External subsistence peasants seldom gained access to additional land resources under any type of reform;and, despite the popularity of the slogan,
"consolidaci6n de minifundios,"no serious or even marginalattempthas ever
been made to eliminate the minifundio.In fact,the reformedsector is usually
designed to extend,ratherthan curtail,functionaldualism. This is achieved by
units in the reformsector where they
tyingbeneficiariesto subfamily/family
become purveyorsof cheap labor to capitalist entrepreneurs(Table 2, column
7).
In Venezuela, reformbeneficiaries averaged 107 days laboring in the reform sector and 106 days outside the reform sector (Kirby, 1975: 207; CIDA/CENDES, 1967). Kirbyobserved that:"Far frombeing the foundationof an
improvingsocial welfare . . in many cases the land or land reformhas fixed
families in a position where they can do little more than inflate the pool of
cheap labor" (Kirby, 1975:209). Elsewhere, he adds: "it is . . . clear that the
reformhas stabilized a pool of casual laborers to be called on at the convenience of the large landowners" (1975:219).
In Colombia the planned distributionof land in the reformsector reproduced the functionaldualism prevailingin the nonreformedsector. In 1968, for
example, 7,037 families were given plots of 10 hectares or less, 7,125 received
between 10 and 50 hectares,906 obtained from50 to 200 hectares,and 64 families each received in excess of 200 hectares (Felstehausen, 1971: 173).
The Mexican ejido is particularly illustrativeof a contrived functional
dualism. Under Cardenas (1934-1940),the ejido was viewed as a collectivstalternativeto capitalist agriculture.Over time,however, most ejido lands have,
under officialor unofficialpressures, been individually appropriated. Consequently,the vast majorityof the ejidatarios differfromprivate peasants today
only in that the ejido plots may not be legally sold or transferredin any
manner.
Althoughthese stipulationsare ostensiblydesigned to avoid the reconcentrationof landholdingsand protectthe reformbeneficiaries,theyeffectivelytie
them to plots of land insufficientforfamilysubsistence. Thus, while the ejido
was initially"merely a response to the political pressures and land hunger of
the peasants" (Stavenhagen, 1973),it has been an integralpart of agrarian policy since 1940 and serves as a purveyorof cheap labor to commercial agriculture in a regime of planned functionaldualism. And the degree of semiproleLatinAmericanPerspectives:Issue 19, Fall 1978, Vol. V, No. 4

108
tarianization among ejidatarios has been increasing continuously. While in

1950,only 16 percentof ejido families earned over half of theirincome outside
theirland, by 1960 this percentage had increased to 34 percent (Rello and de
Oca, 1974:70).Stavenhagen concludes:
On the one hand, the peasant economy (small ejido and privatesmallholders) provides a
minimumsubsistence income to its membersat littlecost to the national economy,and it
helps to keep the process of rural to urban migrationin check. On the other hand, it is
unable to really increase levels of livingsubstantiallywith the poor resources at its disposal, and thus necessarily forces peasants to seek complementarysources of income
elsewhere. It constitutes,thus, a reserve of labour not only for the large agricultural
farmsbut also for industry,construction,services and so forth.. . . As long as labour
does not constitutea scarce or expensive element among the factorsof production,it is
in the interestof the systemto maintain a numerous but unstable peasantry fromwhich
it can draw its inexpensive labour force for the process of capitalist accumulation
(1973:32).
In conclusion, no land reformcan eliminate the primarydeterminantof

stagnation- the low price of food. Consequently, no land reformcan eliminate functionaldualism. The subsistence sector remains the necessary source
of cheap labor forboth nonreformand reformsectors. And so, too, remain the
fundamentaleconomic and social contradictionsof peripheralcapitalism in agriculture:a global tendencytoward stagnation,sharply uneven developmentof
the productiveforces,and massive ruralpoverty.
Conclusions
Today, the precapitalistlatifundiowith rentin labor services has virtually
disappeared in Latin America. Those with rentin kind remain importantonly
in some Central American countriesand in parts of Brazil. Otherwise,precapitalistsocial relationshave been largelyeliminated.
This has resulted fromthe incentiveof marketforces,the subjective pressures exercised by internal peasants, and the coercion of reformistpolicies.
Particularlyeffectivewere land reformswhich threatenedprecapitalistestates
with expropriationif theywould not modernize (transitionto junker) and took
controlof the state away fromthe landed elites to place it in the hands of the
bourgeoisie (transitionto farmer).Under these reforms,promoted against the
remnants of feudalism, the conflict between production (accumulation) and
distribution(legitimation)was presumed nonexistent.They, consequently,offered an attractive common rallying cause for the national and dependent
bourgeoisies and theirforeignallies. Such reformsalso appealed to those radical forces who saw land reformas a step toward the implementationof a national bourgeois revolutionwhich they deemed a necessary firststage in the
transitionto socialism. As a resultof all this support,these transitionalreforms
were activelyimplementedbeginningin the late 1950s. Today, theycan be considered successfully terminatedeven though the publicized banner of expropriation and redistributiontoward formationof a reformsector has generally
been held to a minimum.
Future land reforms(redistributiveunder capitalism and shift to farmer
road) must, with the noted exceptions, be directed at capitalist enterprises.
They are, consequently,unlikelyto occur under the hegemonic domination of
the capitalist mode of productionexcept afterthe most severe social pressure
such as Echeverria's 1977 land reformin the Valley of Sinaloa in response to
peasant invasions, or under exceptionallyfavorable fiscal conditions,as in the
swap of urban propertiesin Trujillo's personal estate for rice land in the Dominican Republic.

OF LAND REFORM
109
Not only do redistributivereformsimplyquestioningthe concept of private

propertyby takingland away fromsome capitalists to distributeto peasants
and landless workers,but the conflictbetween productionand distributionis
enhanced. Since large-scale farmsof the commercial sector,with full backing
of state services,tend to be highlyefficient(withinthe confines of cheap food
and with a consequent bias towards the productionof exportables,inputs for
industry,and luxuryfoods), the familyor cooperative farmscreated by expropriationswill generallynot be able to ensure deliveryof an equivalent net surplus on the market,at least not in the shortrun or withouta drastic redesignof
agrarianpolicy toward servicingpeasants.
Reforms that seek to shift the nonreformsector from junker to farmer
roads are also unlikelyto occur even though some production gains could be
expected fromthis change in tenure.The stronglyentrenchedposition of the
capitalist landed elites as part of the social-class alliance that supports the
model of disarticulatedaccumulation tends to eliminatethe possibilityof such
reforms.
In addition,both the problem of deficientand uneven productionperformance in agricultureand the persistentproblem of rural poverty increasingly
arise fromthe firstdeterminantof stagnation- cheap food - a constraintthat
derives directlyfromdisarticulated accumulation and the associated logic of
functional dualism. A resolution of these contradictionslies far beyond the
scope of land reform.
For all these reasons, new land reformsare unlikely to occur in the near
futurein Latin America, even though land reformremains an active political
issue for the elements of the national bourgeoisie and for radical forces that
militatefor restructurationof the economic system toward a model of articulated accumulation.
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Types and Consequences of Land Reform in Latin America

Author(s): Alain de Janvry and Lynn Ground

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DE JANVRY AND GROUND:TYPES AND CONSEQUENCES

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LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

riods and countries.

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DE JANVRYAND GROUND:TYPES AND CONSEQUENCES

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LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

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DE JANVRY AND GROUND:TYPES AND CONSEQUENCES

Issu 19 Fal 1978 Vol

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LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

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DE'IANVRY AND GROUND:TYPES AND CONSEQUENCES

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LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

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DE JANVRY AND GROUND:TYPES AND CONSEQUENCES

also induce a transitionout of the capitalist mode of productionas commercial

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LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

ant incomes. First,they produced a small net employmenteffect.On the one

In other words, the expropriation of the internal subsistence economy

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DE JANVRYAND GROUND:TYPES AND CONSEQUENCES

The income effectof land reformhas been equally ambiguous. Reforms

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LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

reform.And obtainingsocial articulationon the basis of this effectivedemand

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DE JANVRY AND GROUND:TYPES AND CONSEQUENCES

ductionforthe marketthroughthe reformsector is slight.

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LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

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DE JANVRY AND GROUND:TYPES AND CONSEQUENCES

land which is not used forsubsistence productionhas been illegallyrentedout

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LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

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DE JANVRYAND GROUND:TYPES AND CONSEQUENCES

logic of cheap labor under social disarticulation,no land reformcan eliminate

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LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

tarianization among ejidatarios has been increasing continuously. While in

In conclusion, no land reformcan eliminate the primarydeterminantof

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DE JANVRYAND GROUND:TYPES AND CONSEQUENCES

Not only do redistributivereformsimplyquestioningthe concept of private

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LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

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DE IANVRY AND GROUND:TYPES AND CONSEOUENCES

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LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

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