Cresencio Libi and Amelia Yap Libi, petitioners, vs Hon.

Intermediate
Appelate Court, Felipe Gotiong and Shirley Gotiong, respondents.
G.R. No. 70890
September 18, 1992
Wendell Libi, son of petitioners, and Julie Ann Gotiong, the daughter of
private respondent spouses, were sweethearts until Julie broke up with
Wendell upon finding out of his sadistic and irresponsible character.
Wendell tried hard to reconcile with Julie Ann but when the latter
refused, Wendell started making threats. On that fateful day of January 14,
1978, Julie Ann and Wendell died from a single gunshot wound each coming
from the same Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner
Cresencio Libi.
There being no eyewitnesses to the crime, petitioners and private
respondents herein advanced conflicting versions of the case. Private
respondents claimed that with the use of the same gun, Wendell took his
own life after killing Julie Ann. On the other hand, the petitioners argued that
an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased by reason of his
work as a narcotic informant, must have caused the death of Wendell and
Julie Ann.
As a result of the death of Julie Ann, private respondents filed an action
to recover damages arising from the vicarious liability of the parents of
Wendell (petitioners herein) under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. After
trial, the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Likewise, the
counterclaim filed by the petitioners was dismissed for lack of merit.
On appeal lodged by private respondents, the respondent court set
aside the dismissal of the case and held petitioners liable under Art. 2180 of
the NCC. Hence this case.
Herein petitioners seek for the reversal of judgment of requiring them
to pay P30,000.00 for moral damages, P10,000.00 for exemplary damages,
P20,000.00
as
attorney's
fees
and
costs.
Issue: Are petitioners liable for vicarious liability under Art 2180 of the NCC?
Held:
The Libi spouses are and should be held primarily liable for the civil

liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor son under
their legal authority or control, and who lives in their company.
Petitioners Libi failed to prove that they had exercised due diligence of
a good father of a family over their son Wendell as shown by the fact that it
was only when Wendell died that petitioners came to know that their son
Wendell was a CANU agent and that the gun of petitioner Cresencio Bili was
missing from their safety deposit box.
Petitioners are indeed liable under Art. 2180 of the NCC because it is
still the duty of the parents to know the activity of their children and, in this
case, had the petitioners been diligent in supervising the activities of
Wendell and in keeping said gun from his reach, the death of Julie and
Wendell could have been prevented.
Petitioners are indeed liable under Art. 2180 of the NCC because it is
still the duty of the parents to know the activity of their children and, in this
case, had the petitioners been diligent in supervising the activities of
Wendell and in keeping said gun from his reach, the death of Julie and
Wendell could have been prevented. The liability of the parents for damages
caused by their children imposed under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code
covers obligation arising from both quasi delict and criminal offenses.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with costs
against petitioners.

Anita Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al.G.R. No. L-4160 July 29, 1952
Facts:
Standard Vacuum Oil Co. ordered the delivery of gasoline to the Rural Transit
Company on May 13, 1949. Unfortunately, the gasoline tank-truck trailer
used in the delivery accidentally caught fire. Julito Sto. Domingo, the driver,
with Igmidio Rico, moved the truck and abandoned it in the middle of the
street resulting to the destruction of buildings within the area. Both Sto.
Domingo and Rico were acquitted of criminal charges because it cannot be
proved that it was their negligence that started the fire. Anita Tan, the
plaintiff, was one of the owners of the houses destroyed during the accident.
Tan filed a case against the two companies as well as the two employees
involved for the damages she suffered. However, the defendants filed
separate motions for the dismissal of the plaintiffs allegation.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants are liable for the damages incurred by the
plaintiff.
Held:
The Court, based on Article 23 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, decided
that Rural Transit Company is with no doubt liable for damages. With Sto.
Domingo moving the truck to avoid a greater harm, it was the Rural Transit
Company which benefited the most. The fire should have caused the
explosion of the companys gasoline deposit yet it was avoided. And under
Article23 of the Civil Code, the defendant is held liable as long as he gets
benefited even if the act or event that caused damage is not his fault, thus it
applies to the companys situation.
35 SCRA 160 Civil Law - Torts and Damages Liability of Parents
FACTS:
Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort were both classmates in Mabini Elementary School
Bacolod City. In July 1962, their teacher assigned the class to weed the school premises. While they
were doing so, MT Monfort found a headband and she jokingly shouted it as an earthworm and

thereafter tossed it MT Cuadra who was hit in her eye. MT Cuadras eye got infected. She was
brought to the hospital; her eyes were attempted to be surgically repaired but she nevertheless got
blind in her right eye. MT Cuadras parents sued Alfonso Monfort (MT Monforts dad) based on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court ruled that Monfort should pay for actual damages
(cost of hospitalization), moral damages and attorneys fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monfort is liable under Article 2180.
HELD: No. Article 2180 provides that the father, in case of his incapacity or death, the mother, is
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. The basis of
this vicarious, although primary, liability is fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which
accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is merelyprima facie and may
therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last
paragraph of Article 2180, which states that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
In the case at bar there is nothing from which it may be inferred that Alfonso Monfort could have
prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the
exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On
the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he
had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act
which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play
and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard
against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the childs character
which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her
parents.
Civil Law Torts and Damages Article 2180 Liability of Schools of Arts and Trades and
Academic Schools Liability of Teachers and Heads of School

Jose Amadora vs Court of Appeals

FACTS:
In April 1972, while the high school students of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos were in the school
auditorium, a certain Pablito Daffon fired a gun. The stray bullet hit Alfredo Amadora. Alfredo died.
Daffon was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The parents of Alfredo sued the
school for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because of the schools negligence.
The trial court ruled in favor of Amadora. The trial court ruled that the principal, the dean of boys, as
well as the teacher-in-charge are all civilly liable. The school appealed as it averred that when the
incident happened, the school year has already ended. Amadora argued that even though the
semester has already ended, his son was there in school to complete a school requirement in his
Physics subject. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the school. The CA ruled that under the last
paragraph of Article 2180, only schools of arts and trades (vocational schools) are liable not
academic schools like Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, an academic school, is liable under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code for the tortuous act of its students.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court made a re-examination of the provision on the last paragraph of Article
2180 which provides:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.
The Supreme Court said that it is time to update the interpretation of the above law due to the
changing times where there is hardly a distinction between schools of arts and trade and academic
schools. That being said, the Supreme Court ruled that ALL schools, academic or not, may be held
liable under the said provision of Article 2180.
The Supreme Court however clarified that the school, whether academic or not, should not be held
directly liable. Its liability is only subsidiary.
For non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school who should be directly liable
for the tortuous act of its students. This is because historically, in non-academic schools, the head of
school exercised a closer administration over their students than heads of academic schools. In
short, they are more hands on to their students.
For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be directly liable for the tortuous
act of the students and not the dean or the head of school.
The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability does not cease when the school year ends or when
the semester ends. Liability applies whenever the student is in the custody of the school authorities
as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the
semester has not yet begun or has already ended at the time of the happening of the incident. As
long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate
student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility
of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing
nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying
the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the
discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and for the school, to avoid
subsidiary liability, is to show proof that he, the teacher, exercised the necessary precautions to
prevent the injury complained of, and the school exercised the diligence of a bonus pater familias.
In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly named, and there was no
sufficient evidence presented to make the said teacher-in-charge liable. Absent the direct liability of
the teachers because of the foregoing reason, the school cannot be held subsidiarily liable too.
This case abandoned fully the cases of Exconde vs Capuno and Mercado vs Court of Appeals.

St. Marys v. Carpitanos

Digests by Sheryl, Cayo, Rosa 11

Lecture Notes and Notes from Jona Bautistas ReviewerSt. Marys Academy of
Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet
of the
enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees
were studying. As a student
of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. On
the fateful day, Sherwin,
along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
defendant Vivencio Villanueva on
their way to Larayan Elementary School. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II
then 15 years old and a student
of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as
a result the jeep turned
turtle.
Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident.
The parents claimed damages from the school, and won.
ISSUE: Whether St. Marys should be liable for the death of a student as a result of a
car accident in an
authorized school activity
HELD: No.
The Court of Appeals mistakenly held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the
death of Sherwin Carpitanos
under Articles 218[7] and 219[8] of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner
was negligent in allowing a minor
to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental
authority over a minor child while
under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and
teachers; or (2) the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority
and responsibility applies to
all authorized activities.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those
exercising special parental
authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated
minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence
must have a
causal connection to the accident.
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was
the proximate cause of the death
of the victim.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva
admitted the documentary
exhibits establishing that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the

jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II
but the mechanical
defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James
Daniel II to drive the jeep of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, the grandson, who had
possession and control of the
jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive
the jeep at the time of the
accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor
driver or mechanical detachment
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents
primarily. The negligence of
petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between
the remote cause
and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the
detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep.