LUIS MARCOS P. LAUREL VS. HON, ZEUS C. ABROGAR etc, et al.

G.R. NO. 155076, JANUARY 13, 2009

THEFT
Facts:
Petitioner Luis P. Laurel is charged with the crime of theftunder Article 308 of the RPC. Under the facts,
petitioner, withintent to gain and without consent from Philippine Long DistanceTelephone (PLDT),
stole and use the international long distancecalls belonging to PLDT by conducting International
SimpleResale (ISR), which is a method of routing and completinginternational long distance calls using
lines, cables, antennae,and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local ordomestic
exchange facilities of the country where the call isdestined, effectively stealing this business from
PLDT. Petitionerfiled a motion to quash, on the ground that the factualallegations in the Amended
Information do not constitute the
felony of theft. The trial court denied the motion. Petitioners
special civil action for certiorari was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Thus, petitioner filed the
instant petition for review withthis Court.
Issue:
Is petitioners act constitute theft of respondent PLDTs business and service?
Ruling:
Yes.
Under Article 308 of RPC, Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against,or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of
another without the latters consent.
Since the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8, 1930, the term "personal property" has
had agenerally accepted definition in civil law. In Article 335 of the Civil Code of Spain, "personal
property" is defined as "anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in the foregoing chapter
(not real property)." To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. The word "take" in
the Revised Penal Code includes any act intended to transfer possession which, as held in the assailed
Decision, may be committed through the use of the offenders own hands, as well as any mechanical
device, such as an access device or card as in the instant case. In the instant case, the act of conducting
ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDTs
telephone system, through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long distance calls
using respondent PLDTs facilities constitutes all three acts of subtraction. The acts of "subtraction"
include: (a) tampering with any wire, meter, or other apparatus installed or used for generating, containing,
conducting, or measuring electricity,telegraph or telephone service; (b) tapping or otherwise wrongfully
deflecting or taking any electric current from such wire, meter, or other apparatus; and (c) using or enjoying the
benefits of any device by means of which one may fraudulently obtain any current of electricity or any
telegraph or telephone service. The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is
likewise personal property which can be the object of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code. Business may be appropriated under Section 2 of Act No. 3952(Bulk Sales Law), hence, could
be object of theft:Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone service are
personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR is an act
of "subtraction" penalized under said article. However, the Amended Information describes the thing
taken as, "international long distance calls," and only later mentions "stealing the business from PLDT"
as the manner by which the gain was derived by the accused. In order to correct this inaccuracy
of description, this case must be remanded to the trial court and the prosecution directed to amend the
Amended Information, to clearly state that the property subject of the theft are the services and

business of respondent PLDT. Parenthetically, this amendment is not necessitated by a mistake in

charging the proper offense, which would have called for the dismissal of the information under Rule
110, Section 14 and Rule 119, Section 19of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. To be sure, the
crime is properly designated as one of theft. The purpose of the amendment is simply to ensure that the
accused is fully and sufficiently appraised of the nature and cause of the charge against him, and thus
guaranteed of his rights under the Constitution.
Ramirez v. Vda. De Ramirez G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982
Facts: The deceased was survived by his spouse, 2 grandnephews, and his
companion. The administrator submitted a partition to the court which divided the
estate into 2: one-half would go to the widow in satisfaction of her legitime; the
other half, which is the free portion, would go to the grandnephews; however, 1/3
of the free portion is charged with the widows usufruct and the remaining 2/3
with a usufruct in favor of the companion. The grandnephews opposed the
substitution on the ground that the 1st heirs are not related to thesubstitutes
within the 1st degree.
Issue: Whether the fidei commissary substitution is valid if the substitutes are
related to the companion within one degree.
Decision: SC ruled that the fidei commissary substitution is void. The substitutes
(grandnephews) are not related to the companion within one degree. In effect, the
SC ruled that one degree means one generation and not one designation.
So, it follows that the fidei commissary can only be either a child or a parent of
the 1st heir.

Secretary of Education vs. Heirs of Rufino Dulay (G.R. No.

164748, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 452)
FACTS:
On August 3, 1981, the spouses Rufino Dulay, Sr. and Ignacia Vicente Dulay executed a deed of donation over a
10,000-square-meter portion of their property in favor of the Ministry of Education and Culture.
The property was subdivided. On April 13, 1983, a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of the
Ministry of Education and Culture, represented by Laurencio C. Ramel, the Superintendent of Schools of
Isabela. However, the property was not used for school purposes and remained idle.
Sometime in 1988, the DECS, through its Secretary, started construction of the Rizal National High School
building on a parcel of land it acquired from Alejandro Feliciano. The school site was about 2 kilometers away
from the land donated by the spouses Dulay.
In a letter to the DECS Secretary dated August 19, 1994, the spouses Dulay requested that the property be
returned to them considering that the land was never used since 1981, or a period of more than 13 years. On
August 28, 1994, the Barangay Council of Rizal, Santiago City issued Resolution No. 397 recognizing the right of
the donors to redeem the subject parcel of land because of the DECS failure to utilize it for the intended
purpose. It further resolved that the Rizal National High School no longer needed the donated land "considering
its distance from the main campus and [the] failure to utilize the property for a long period of time."
On August 31, 1997, the heirs of Dulay, Sr., herein respondents, filed a complaint for the revocation of the deed
of donation and cancellation of the title, alleging that (1) there was a condition in the deed of donation: that the
DECS, as donee, utilize the subject property for school purposes, that is, the construction of a building to house
the Rizal National High School, (2) the DECS did not fulfill the condition and that the land remained idle up to the
present, and (3) the donation inter vivos was inofficious, since the late Rufino Dulay, Sr. donated more than what
he could give by will.
Petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed the following defenses: (a) the DECS
complied with said condition because the land was being used by the school as its technology and home
economics laboratory; (b) the donation was not inofficious for the donors were the owners of five other parcels of
land, all located at Rizal, Santiago City; (c) the DECS acquired the disputed property by virtue of purchase made
on December 8, 1997 by the barangay of Rizal, Santiago City in the amount of P18,000.00 as certified by its
former Barangay Captain, Jesus San Juan;11 and (d) the action of the respondents had prescribed. The OSG
also claimed that students planted a portion of the land with rice, mahogany seedlings, and fruit-bearing trees;
the produce would then be sold and the proceeds used for the construction of a school building on the subject
property.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or nor the DECS had complied with the condition imposed on the the deed of donation.
(2) Whether the respondents' right to seek the revocation of the deed of donation is already barred by
prescription and laches.
HELD:
The contention of petitioners has no merit.
As gleaned from the CA decision, petitioners failed to prove that the donated property was used for school
purposes as indicated in the deed of donation:
We find it difficult to sustain that the defendant-appellants have complied with the condition of donation. It is not
amiss to state that other than the bare allegation of the defendant-appellants, there is nothing in the records that
could concretely prove that the condition of donation has been complied with by the defendant-appellants. In the
same breadth, the planting of palay on the land donated can hardly be considered and could not have been the
"school purposes" referred to and intended by the donors when they had donated the land in question. Also, the
posture of the defendant-appellants that the land donated is being used as technology and home economics

laboratory of the Rizal National High School is far from being the truth considering that not only is the said school
located two kilometers away from the land donated but also there was not even a single classroom built on the
land donated that would reasonably indicate that, indeed, classes have been conducted therein. These
observations, together with the unrebutted ocular inspection report made by the trial court which revealed that
the land donated remains idle and without any improvement thereon for more than a decade since the time of
the donation, give Us no other alternative but to conclude that the defendant-appellants have, indeed, failed to
comply with what is incumbent upon them in the deed of donation.
The right to seek the revocation of donation had not yet prescribed when respondents filed their complaint
Anent the second issue, we reject the contention of the OSG that respondents cause of action is already barred
by prescription under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, or four years from the non-compliance with the condition
in the deed of donation. Since such failure to comply with the condition of utilizing the property for school
purposes became manifest sometime in 1988 when the DECS utilized another property for the construction of
the school building, the four-year prescriptive period did not commence on such date. Petitioner was given more
than enough time to comply with the condition, and it cannot be allowed to use this fact to its advantage. It must
be stressed that the donation is onerous because the DECS, as donee, was burdened with the obligation to
utilize the land donated for school purposes. Under Article 733 of the New Civil Code, a donation with an
onerous cause is essentially a contract and is thus governed by the rules on contract.

Office of the City Mayor of Paraaque City vs. Ebio(G.R. No. 178411 June
23, 2010)

Respondents filed an action for injunction with an application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the local government of Paraaque City
from proceeding with the construction of an access road that will traverse through
a parcel of land which they claim is owned by them by virtue of acquisitive
prescription.

They assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro

Vitalez,h a d o c c u p i e d a n d p o s s e s s e d t h e s u b j e c t l o t ( a n a l l u v i a l
deposit of the Cut-cut creek) as early as 1930.

In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit from the local

government of Paraaque for the construction of their family dwelling on
the said lot.

I n 1 9 6 6 , Pe d r o e xe c u t e d a n a ffi d a v i t o f p o s s e s s i o n a n d occupancy
allowing him to declare the property in his name for taxation purposes.

Curiously, it was also in 1966 when Guaranteed Homes, Inc.,the registered owner
of Road Lot No. 8 which adjoins the lando c c u p i e d b y t h e
re s p o n d e n t s , d o n a t e d R L 8 t o t h e l o c a l government of Paraaque. The
trial court denied their
petition,r e a s o n i n g t h a t r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e n o t a b l e t o p r o v
e successfully that they have an established right to the
property. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court rendered a decision in favor of
respondents.
HELD
: The character of possession and ownership by the respondentsover the
contested land entitles them to the avails of the action.
A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right. A party seeking to avail of an injunctive relief
must prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or existing. It should not be
contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one which may never arise. From the findings of fact by both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one conclusion can be made: that for more than
thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local government of Paraaque in its
corporate or private capacity sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are
deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription. Respondents can
assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to register their title over the said lot. It must
be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the
acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant already possessed
over the land. Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. A decree of
registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.

SPS. MANUEL AND VICTORIA

SALIMBANGON,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 185240

Present:
Carpio, J., Chairperson,
Brion,
Del Castillo,
Abad, and
Perez, JJ.

- versus -

SPS. SANTOS AND ERLINDA TAN,

Respondents.
Promulgated:
January 20, 2010
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the admissibility of testimony that tends to modify a written agreement among the
parties and the extinction of the easement of right of way upon consolidation in one person of the
ownership of the dominant and the servient estates.
The Facts and the Case
Guillermo Ceniza died intestate on July 11, 1951, leaving a parcel of land at
Poblacion, Mandaue City. Twenty years later on July 17, 1973 his children Benedicta, Guillermo, Jr.,
Victoria, Eduardo, and Carlos executed an extrajudicial declaration of heirs and partition, adjudicating
and dividing the land among themselves as follows:
1.
To Benedicta T. Cabahug, Lot A subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road
right of way 1.50 m. wide along its NW. boundary in favor of Lots B, E, and D, of
the subdivision;
2.
To Eduardo Ceniza, Lot B subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right
of way 1.50 m. wide along its SW. boundary in favor of Lots A, D & E of the
subdivision;
3.

To Carlos Ceniza, Lot C;

4.
To Guillermo Ceniza Jr., Lot D subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road
right of way 1.50 m. wide along its NE. boundary in favor of Lot B and E of the
subdivision; and

5.
To Victoria Ceniza, Lot E, subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right
of way 1.50 m. wide along its SW. boundary in favor of Lot D of the subdivision.[1]

Lots A, B, and C were adjacent to a city street. But Lots D and E were not, they being interior lots. To
give these interior lots access to the street, the heirs established in their extrajudicial partition an
easement of right of way consisting of a 3-meter wide alley between Lots D and E that continued on
between Lots A and B and on to the street. The partition that embodied this easement of right of way
was annotated on the individual titles issued to the heirs.
Roughly, the lots including the easement of right of way would take the following configurations,
[2] not drawn here to accurate size and proportion but illustrative of their relative locations:
But, realizing that the partition resulted in an unequal division of the property, the heirs modified their
agreement by eliminating the easement of right of way along Lots A, D, and E, and in its place,
imposed a 3-meter wide alley, an easement of right of way, that ran exclusively along the southwest
boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E to the street.[3] Thus:
Victoria (now petitioner Victoria Salimbangon) later swapped lots with Benedicta with the result that
Victoria became the owner of Lot A, one of the three lots adjacent to the city street. Victoria and her
husband (the Salimbangons) constructed a residential house on this lot and built two garages on it. One
garage abutted the street while the other, located in the interior of Lot A, used the alley or easement of
right of way existing on Lot B to get to the street. Victoria had this alley cemented and gated.
Subsequently, however, respondent spouses Santos and Erlinda Tan (the Tans) bought Lots B, C, D, and
E from all their owners. The Tans built improvements on Lot B that spilled into the easement
area. They also closed the gate that the Salimbangons built. Unable to use the old right of way, the
Salimbangons lodged a complaint with the City Engineer of Mandaue against the Tans. For their part,
the Tans filed an action with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue against the Salimbangons in
Civil Case MAN-3223 for the extinguishment of the easement on Lot B and damages with application
for preliminary injunction.[4] The Salimbangons filed their answer with counterclaims.
After hearing or on February 9, 2001 the RTC rendered judgment, upholding the Salimbangons
easement of right of way over the alley on Lot B, the lot that belonged to the Tans. The court pointed
out that the easement in this case was established by agreement of the parties for the benefit of Lots A,
D, and E. Consequently, only by mutual agreement of the parties could such easement be
extinguished. The RTC declined, however, to award damages to the Salimbangons.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV 73468. On July 27, 2007 the
CA[5] reversed the RTC decision, extinguished the easement of right of way established on the alley in
Lot B of the Tans, and denied the Salimbangons claim for damages. The court ruled that based on the
testimony of one of the previous owners, Eduardo Ceniza, the true intent of the parties was to establish
that easement of right of way for the benefit of the interior lots, namely, Lots D and E. Consequently,
when ownership of Lots B, D, and E was consolidated into the Tans, the easement ceased to have any
purpose and became extinct. The Salimbangons filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied
the same in its resolution of October 14, 2008. This prompted them to file the present petition.
Questions Presented
Two questions are presented:
1.

Whether or not the CA erred in admitting in evidence contrary to the parol evidence rule Eduardo

Cenizas testimony respecting the true intent of the heirs in establishing the easement of right of way as
against what they stated in their written agreement; and
2.

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the easement of right of way established by the

partition agreement among the heirs for the benefit of Lot A has been extinguished.
The Courts Ruling
One. The Salimbangons point out that the CA ought to have rejected Eduardo Cenizas testimony that
the heirs had intended to establish the easement of right of way solely for the benefit of the interior
Lots D and E which had no access to the city street. The partition agreement also made Lot A, now
owned by the Salimbangons, a beneficiary of that easement. Thus:
2. To Eduardo Ceniza [now the Tans], Lot B subject to a perpetual and
grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m. wide along its SW. boundary in favor of
Lots A, D & E of the subdivision;[6] (Underscoring supplied)
The parol evidence rule, said the Salimbangons, precluded the parties from introducing testimony that
tended to alter or modify what the parties had agreed on above.
But the exclusionary provision of the parol evidence rule admits of exceptions. Section 9, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence states:
Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. - When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party
may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a)

An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

(b)
The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
(c)
The validity of the written agreement; or
(d)
The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in
interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The term agreement includes wills. (7a)
Here, the Tans had put in issue the true intent and agreement of the parties to the partition when they
alleged in their complaint that, contrary to what paragraph 2 quoted above seems to imply, the
easement was actually for the benefit of Lots D and E only. The complaint thus said:
So that in the same partition instrument, the said heirs voluntarily agreed to
establish the so-called perpetual and gratuitous easement of road right of way
along LOT A, with 1.50 meters wide and along LOT B, with the same 1.50 meters
wide.
Understandably, this servitude voluntarily constituted on LOTS A and B was
had for the benefit and use by the owners of LOTS D (Guillermo Ceniza, Jr.) and
E (defendant Victoria Ceniza Salimbagon).[7] (Underscoring supplied)
Consequently, with the above averment, the Tans were entitled to introduce evidence to establish the
true intent and agreement of the parties although this may depart from what the partition agreement
literally provided.
At any rate, as the CA said, the Salimbangons did not object at the hearing to admission of Eduardo
Cenizas testimony even when this seemed at variance, as far as they were concerned, with the partition
agreement among the heirs. Consequently, the Salimbangons may also be deemed to have waived their
right to now question such testimony on appeal.
Two. The Salimbangons point out that the partition agreement among the heirs established in their
favor, as owners of Lot A, an easement of right of way on Lot B from the interior of their lot to the city
street. Since theirs was an easement established by agreement of the parties, only by mutual agreement
could the same be extinguished.
But, firstly, as Eduardo Ceniza testified, the true agreement of the heirs was for the establishment of an
easement of right of way for the benefit solely of the lots that did not have direct access to the street,
namely Lots D and E. His testimony made sense.
As originally constituted in that agreement, each of Lots A and B was to contribute a strip of 1.5 meters
between them that when combined formed a 3-meter wide alley leading from Lots D and E to the
street. To the extent that Lots A and B retained the right to use the 1.5-meter portion that they
contributed to the establishment of the easement, the agreement gave their owners the right to use the

common alley as well. As Eduardo testified, however, the true intent of the heirs was to give Lots D
and E access to the street. Lots A and B did not need this alley since they were facing the street.
Consequently, when the owner of Lots D and E also became the owner of Lot B, the easement of right
of way on Lot B became extinct by operation of law.[8] The existence of a dominant estate and a
servient estate is incompatible with the idea that both estates belong to the same person.
Secondly, there is no question that when the heirs realized that it was not fair to take strips of 1.5
meters from each of Lots A, D, and E for the easement of right of way when these lots were already
small, the heirs executed a Cancellation of Annotation of Right of Way, etc. that cancelled the
easement of right of way they earlier established on Lots A, D, and E and in its place imposed a 3meter wide easement of right of way solely on Lot B.
Although the cancellation document did not say so, it was implicit that the changed location of the
easement cancelled not only the 1.5-meter strip of easement imposed on Lot A of the Salimbangons but
also their right to use the new 3-meter easement alley that lay entirely on Lot B. Strictly speaking, if
the Salimbangons insist that their right as dominant estate under the original partition agreement
remains, then that would be partly on a 1.5-meter strip of their own Lot A and partly on the equivalent
1.5-meter strip on the side of Lot B, not on the new 3-meter alley established entirely on Lot B.
The point is that, obviously, in establishing the new easement of right of way, the heirs intended to
abandon the old one. Since this 3-meter alley on Lot B directly connected Lots D and E to the street, it
is also obvious that only the latter lots were its intended beneficiary. And, with the ownership of Lots
B, D, and E now consolidated in a common owner, namely, the Tans, then the easement of right of way
on Lot B may be said to have been extinguished by operation of law.[9]
ACCORDINGLY, this Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS in all respects the decision dated
July 27, 2007 and resolution dated October 14, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 73468.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 152319 : October 28, 2009

HEIRS OF THE LATE JOAQUIN LIMENSE, namely: CONCESA LIMENSE, Surviving Spouse; and DANILO and
JOSELITO, both surnamed Limense, children, Petitioners, v. RITA VDA. DE RAMOS, RESTITUTO RAMOS,
VIRGILIO DIAZ, IRENEO RAMOS, BENJAMIN RAMOS, WALDYTRUDES RAMOS-BASILIO, TRINIDAD RAMOSBRAVO, PAZ RAMOS-PASCUA, FELICISIMA RAMOS-REYES, and JACINTA RAMOS, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.,
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside
1
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 20, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33589 affirming in toto
2
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, dated September 21, 1990 in Civil Case No.
83-16128.
The antecedent facts are as follows:

cra:nad

Dalmacio Lozada was the registered owner of a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 12, Block No. 1074 of the
cadastral survey of the City of Manila covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 7036 issued at the
3
City of Manila on June 14, 1927, containing an area of 873.80 square meters, more or less, located in Beata
Street, Pandacan, Manila.
Dalmacio Lozada subdivided his property into five (5) lots, namely: Lot Nos. 12-A, 12-B, 12-C, 12-D and 124
E. Through a Deed of Donation dated March 9, 1932, he donated the subdivided lots to his daughters,
namely: Isabel, Salud, Catalina, and Felicidad, all surnamed Lozada. The Deed of Donation was registered
with the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila on March 15, 1932.
Under the said Deed of Donation, the lots were adjudicated to Dalmacio's daughters in the following manner:
a. Lot No. 12-A in favor of Isabel Lozada, married to Isaac Limense;
b. Lot No. 12-B in favor of Catalina Lozada, married to Sotero Natividad;
c. Lot No. 12-C in favor of Catalina Lozada, married to Sotero Natividad; Isabel Lozada, married
to Isaac Limense; and Salud Lozada, married to Francisco Ramos, in equal parts;
d. Lot No. 12-D in favor of Salud Lozada, married to Francisco Ramos; and
e. Lot No. 12-E in favor of Isabel Lozada, married to Isaac Limense, and Felicidad Lozada,
married to Galicano Centeno.
By virtue of the Deed of Donation executed by Dalmacio Lozada, OCT No. 7036, which was registered in his
name, was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) bearing Nos. 40041, 40042,
40043, 40044, and 40045 were issued in favor of the donees, except TCT No. 40044, which remained in his
5
name. These new TCTs were annotated at the back of OCT No. 7036.
cra

TCT No. 40043, which covered Lot No. 12-C, was issued in the name of its co-owners Catalina Lozada,
married to Sotero Natividad; Isabel Lozada, married to Isaac Limense; and Salud Lozada, married to
Francisco Ramos. It covered an area of 68.60 square meters, more or less, was bounded on the northeast by

Lot No. 12-A, on the southwest by Calle Beata, and on the northwest by Lot No. 12-D of the subdivision plan.
In 1932, respondents' predecessor-in-interest constructed their residential building on Lot No. 12-D, adjacent
to Lot No. 12-C.
On May 16, 1969, TCT No. 96886
of Lot No. 12-C.

was issued in the name of Joaquin Limense covering the very same area

On October 1, 1981, Joaquin Limense secured a building permit for the construction of a hollow block fence
on the boundary line between his aforesaid property and the adjacent parcel of land located at 2759 Beata
Street, Pandacan, Manila, designated as Lot No. 12-D, which was being occupied by Respondents. The fence,
however, could not be constructed because a substantial portion of respondents' residential building in Lot
No. 12-D encroached upon portions of Joaquin Limense's property in Lot No. 12-C.
Joaquin Limense demanded the removal of the encroached area; however, respondent ignored both oral and
written demands. The parties failed to amicably settle the differences between them despite referral to the
barangay. Thus, on March 9, 1983, Joaquin Limense, duly represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Teofista L.
7
Reyes, instituted a Complaint against respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
15, for removal of obstruction and damages.
Joaquin Limense prayed that the RTC issue an order directing respondents, jointly and severally, to remove
the portion which illegally encroached upon his property on Lot No. 12-C and, likewise, prayed for the
payment of damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
8
Respondents, on the other hand, averred in their Answer that they were the surviving heirs of Francisco
9
Ramos, who, during his lifetime, was married to Salud Lozada, one of the daughters of Dalmacio Lozada,
the original owner of Lot No. 12. After subdividing the said lot, Dalmacio Lozada donated Lot No. 12-C in
favor of his daughters Catalina, married to Sotero Natividad; Isabel, married to Isaac Limense; and Salud,
married to Francisco Ramos. Being the surviving heirs of Francisco Ramos, respondents later became coowners of Lot No. 12-C. Lot No. 12-C has served as right of way or common alley of all the heirs of Dalmacio
Lozada since 1932 up to the present. As a common alley, it could not be closed or fenced by Joaquin Limense
without causing damage and prejudice to Respondents.
10
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision
dated September 21, 1990 dismissing the complaint
of Joaquin Limense. It ruled that an apparent easement of right of way existed in favor of Respondents.
Pertinent portions of the decision read as follows:
cra:nad

The Court finds that an apparent easement of right of way exists in favor of the defendants under Article 624
of the Civil Code. It cannot be denied that there is an alley which shows its existence. It is admitted that this
alley was established by the original owner of Lot 12 and that in dividing his property, the alley established
by him continued to be used actively and passively as such. Even when the division of the property occurred,
the non-existence of the easement was not expressed in the corresponding titles nor were the apparent sign
of the alley made to disappear before the issuance of said titles.
The Court also finds that when plaintiff acquired the lot (12-C) which forms the alley, he knew that said lot
could serve no other purpose than as an alley. That is why even after he acquired it in 1969, the lot
continued to be used by defendants and occupants of the other adjoining lots as an alley. The existence of
the easement of right of way was therefore known to plaintiff who must respect the same in spite of the fact
that his transfer certificate of title does not mention the lot of defendants as among those listed therein as
entitled to such right of way. It is an established principle that actual notice or knowledge is as binding as
11
registration.
chanroble svirtuallawlibary

Aggrieved by said decision, Joaquin Limense filed a notice of appeal. The records of the case were
transmitted to the Court of Appeals (CA). During the pendency of the appeal with the CA, Joaquin Limense
12
died in 1999.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibary

The CA, Seventh Division, in CA-G.R. CV No. 33589, in its Decision

the appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.

13

dated December 20, 2001 dismissed

Frustrated by this turn of events, petitioners, as surviving heirs of Joaquin Limense, elevated the case to this
14
Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari
raising the following issues:

1. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN HOLDING, LIKE THE TRIAL COURT DID, THAT RESPONDENTS' LOT 12-D HAS AN
EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY OVER JOAQUIN LIMENSE'S LOT 12-C?
cralaw

2. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN FAILING TO HOLD, LIKE THE TRIAL COURT DID,
THAT THE PROTRUDING PORTIONS OF RESPONDENTS' HOUSE ON LOT 12-D EXTENDING INTO
JOAQUIN LIMENSE'S LOT 12-C CONSTITUTE A NUISANCE AND, AS SUCH, SHOULD BE
REMOVED?
Petitioners aver that the CA erred in ruling that since Lot No. 12-C was covered by two TCT's, i.e., TCT Nos.
40043 and 96886, and there was no evidence on record to show how Joaquin Limense was able to secure
another title over an already titled property, then one of these titles must be of dubious origin. According to
the CA, TCT No. 96886, issued in the name of Joaquin Limense, was spurious because the Lozada sisters
never disposed of the said property covered by TCT No. 40043. The CA further ruled that a co-ownership
existed over Lot No. 12-C between petitioners and Respondents. Petitioners countered that TCT No. 96886,
being the only and best legitimate proof of ownership over Lot No. 12-C, must prevail over TCT No. 40043.
Respondents allege that it was possible that TCT No. 96886, in the name of Joaquin Limense, was obtained
thru fraud, misrepresentation or falsification of documents because the donees of said property could not
possibly execute any valid transfer of title to Joaquin Limense, as they were already dead prior to the
issuance of TCT No. 96886 in 1969. Respondents further allege that petitioners failed to produce proof
substantiating the issuance of TCT No. 96886 in the name of Joaquin Limense.
Apparently, respondents are questioning the legality of TCT No. 96886, an issue that this Court cannot pass
upon in the present case. It is a rule that the validity of a torrens title cannot be assailed
15
collaterally.
Section 48 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 provides that:
cra:nad

[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
In the case at bar, the action filed before the RTC against respondents was an action for removal of
obstruction and damages. Respondents raised the defense that Joaquin Limense's title could have been
obtained through fraud and misrepresentation in the trial proceedings before the RTC. Such defense is in the
nature of a collateral attack, which is not allowed by law.
Further, it has been held that a certificate of title, once registered, should not thereafter be impugned,
altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in a direct proceeding permitted by law.
Otherwise, the reliance on registered titles would be lost. The title became indefeasible and incontrovertible
after the lapse of one year from the time of its registration and issuance. Section 32 of PD 1529 provides
that "upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title shall
become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his
16
remedy by action for damages against the applicant or other persons responsible for the fraud."
It has,
therefore, become an ancient rule that the issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was
17
fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.
In the present
case, TCT No. 96886 was registered in 1969 and respondents never instituted any direct proceeding or action
to assail Joaquin Limense's title.
Additionally, an examination of TCT No. 40043 would readily show that there is an annotation that it has
18
been "CANCELLED."
A reading of TCT No. 96886 would also reveal that said title is a transfer from TCT No.
19
48866
and not TCT 40043. Thus, it is possible that there was a series of transfers effected from TCT No.
40043 prior to the issuance of TCT No. 96886. Hence, respondents' position that the issuance of TCT No.
96886 in the name of Joaquin Limense is impossible, because the registered owners of TCT No. 40043 were
already dead prior to 1969 and could not have transferred the property to Joaquin Limense, cannot be taken
as proof that TCT No. 96886 was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation or falsification of documents.
Findings of fact of the CA, although generally deemed conclusive, may admit review by this Court if the CA
failed to notice certain relevant facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion, and if
20
the judgment of the CA is premised on a misapprehension of facts.
As with the present case, the CA's
observation that TCT No. 96886 is of dubious origin, as TCT No. 40043 does not appear to have been

disposed of by Catalina, Isabel and Salud Lozada, is improper and constitutes an indirect attack on TCT No.
96886. As we see it, TCT No. 96886, at present, is the best proof of Joaquin Limense's ownership over Lot
No. 12-C. Thus, the CA erred in ruling that respondents and petitioners co-owned Lot No. 12-C, as said lot is
now registered exclusively in the name of Joaquin Limense.
Due to the foregoing, Joaquin Limense, as the registered owner of Lot 12-C, and his successors-in-interest,
may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other
21
means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.
cra

However, although the owner of the property has the right to enclose or fence his property, he must respect
servitudes constituted thereon. The question now is whether respondents are entitled to an easement of right
of way.
Petitioners contend that respondents are not entitled to an easement of right of way over Lot No. 12-C,
because their Lot No. 12-D is not duly annotated at the back of TCT No. 96886 which would entitle them to
enjoy the easement, unlike Lot Nos. 12-A-1, 12-A-2, 12-A-3, 12-A-4, 12-A-5, and 12-A-6. Respondents, on
the other hand, allege that they are entitled to an easement of right of way over Lot No. 12-C, which has
been continuously used as an alley by the heirs of Dalmacio Lozada, the residents in the area and the public
in general from 1932 up to the present. Since petitioners are fully aware of the long existence of the said
alley or easement of right of way, they are bound to respect the same.
As defined, an easement is a real right on another's property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner
of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his
22
property, for the benefit of another person or tenement.
chanroble svirtuallawlibary

Easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent.

Continuous easements are those the use of which is or may be incessant, without the intervention of any act
of man. Discontinuous easements are those which are used at intervals and depend upon the acts of man.
Apparent easements are those which are made known and are continually kept in view by external signs that
reveal the use and enjoyment of the same. Non-apparent easements are those which show no external
23
indication of their existence.
cra

In the present case, the easement of right of way is discontinuous and apparent. It is discontinuous, as the
use depends upon the acts of respondents and other persons passing through the property. Being an alley
that shows a permanent path going to and from Beata Street, the same is apparent.
Being a discontinuous and apparent easement, the same can be acquired only by virtue of a title.

24
cra

In the case at bar, TCT No. 96886, issued in the name of Joaquin Limense, does not contain any annotation
that Lot No. 12-D was given an easement of right of way over Lot No. 12-C. However, Joaquin Limense and
his successors-in-interests are fully aware that Lot No. 12-C has been continuously used and utilized as an
alley by respondents and residents in the area for a long period of time.
Joaquin Limense's Attorney-in-Fact, Teofista L. Reyes, testified that respondents and several other residents
in the area have been using the alley to reach Beata Street since 1932. Thus:
cra:nad

Atty. Manuel B. Tomacruz:

Q: Mrs. Witness, by virtue of that Deed of Donation you claim that titles were issued to the children of
Dalmacio Lozada namely Salud Lozada, Catalina Lozada and Isabel Lozada, is that right?
cralaw

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And after the said property was adjudicated to his said children the latter constructed their
houses on their lots.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, the herein defendants have constructed their houses on the premises
alloted to them since the year 1932?
cralaw

A: Yes, sir, they were able to construct their house fronting Beata Street.

Q: And that house they have constructed on their lot in 1932 is still existing today?

cralaw

A: Yes, sir and they still used the alley in question and they are supposed to use Beata Street
but they are not using Beata Street.
Q: They are using the alley?

cralaw

A: Yes, sir, they are using the alley and they do not pass through Beata Street.
Q: And they have been using the alley since 1932 up to the present?

cralaw

A: Yes, sir they have been using the alley since that time. That was their mistake and they
should be using Beata Street because they are fronting Beata Strret.
Q: As a matter of fact, it is not only herein defendants who have been using that alley since
1932 up to the present?
cralaw

A: Yes, sir they are using the alley up to now.

Q: As a matter of fact, in this picture marked as Exh. "C-1" the alley is very apparent. This is the
alley?
cralaw

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And there are houses on either side of this alley?

cralaw

A: Yes, sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, all the residents on either side of the alley are passing through this alley?
cralaw

A: Yes, sir, because the others have permit to use this alley and they are now allowed to use the
25
alley but the Ramos's family are now [not] allowed to use this alley.
In Mendoza v. Rosel,

26

this Court held that:

cra:nad

Petitioners claim that inasmuch as their transfer certificates of title do not mention any lien or encumbrance
on their lots, they are purchasers in good faith and for value, and as such have a right to demand from
respondents some payment for the use of the alley. However, the Court of Appeals found, as a fact, that
when respondents acquired the two lots which form the alley, they knew that said lots could serve no other
purpose than as an alley. The existence of the easement of right of way was therefore known to petitioners
who must respect the same, in spite of the fact that their transfer certificates of title do not mention any
burden or easement. It is an established principle that actual notice or knowledge is as binding as
registration.
Every buyer of a registered land who takes a certificate of title for value and in good faith shall hold the same
free of all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate. It has been held, however, that "where the
party has knowledge of a prior existing interest that was unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the
27
same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him."
chanroble svirtuallawlibary

In the case at bar, Lot No. 12-C has been used as an alley ever since it was donated by Dalmacio Lozada to
his heirs. It is undisputed that prior to and after the registration of TCT No. 96886, Lot No. 12-C has served
as a right of way in favor of respondents and the public in general. We quote from the RTC's decision:
cra:nad

x x x It cannot be denied that there is an alley which shows its existence. It is admitted that this alley was
established by the original owner of Lot 12 and that in dividing his property the alley established by him
continued to be used actively and passively as such. Even when the division of the property occurred, the

non-existence of the easement was not expressed in the corresponding titles nor were the apparent sign of
the alley made to disappear before the issuance of said titles.
The Court also finds that when plaintiff acquired the lot (12-C) which forms the alley, he knew that said lot
could serve no other purpose than as an alley. That is why even after he acquired it in 1969 the lot continued
28
to be used by defendants and occupants of the other adjoining lots as an alley. x x x
cra

Thus, petitioners are bound by the easement of right of way over Lot No. 12-C, even though no registration
of the servitude has been made on TCT No. 96886.
However, respondents' right to have access to the property of petitioners does not include the right to
continually encroach upon the latter's property. It is not disputed that portions of respondents' house on Lot
No. 12-D encroach upon Lot No. 12-C. Geodetic Engineer Jose Agres, Jr. testified on the encroachment of
29
respondents' house on Lot No. 12-C, which he surveyed.
In order to settle the rights of the parties relative
to the encroachment, We should determine whether respondents were builders in good faith.
Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition; and it
encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of a design to
defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individual's personal good faith is a concept of his own
mind and, therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of
intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The
essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and
absence of intention to overreach another. Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not
30
aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
cra

Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the
31
burden of proof.
It is a matter of record that respondents' predecessor-in-interest constructed their
32
residential building on Lot No. 12-D, adjacent to Lot No. 12-C, in 1932.
Respondents' predecessor-ininterest owned the 1/3 portion of Lot No. 12-C at the time the property was donated to them by Dalmacio
Lozada in 1932. The Deed of Donation executed by the late Dalmacio Lozada, dated March 9, 1932,
specifically provides that:
cra:nad

I hereby grant, cede and donate in favor of Catalina Lozada married to Sotero Natividad, Isabel Lozada
married to Isaac Simense and Salud Lozada married to Francisco Ramos, all Filipinos, of legal age, the parcel
33
of land known as Lot No. 12-C, in equal parts.
chanroble svirtuallawlibary

The portions of Lot No. 12-D, particularly the overhang, covering 1 meter in width and 17 meters in length;
the stairs; and the concrete structures are all within the 1/3 share alloted to them by their donor Dalmacio
Lozada and, hence, there was absence of a showing that respondents acted in bad faith when they built
portions of their house on Lot No. 12-C.
Using the above parameters, we are convinced that respondents' predecessors-in-interest acted in good faith
when they built portions of their house on Lot 12-C. Respondents being builders in good faith, we shall now
discuss the respective rights of the parties relative to the portions encroaching upon respondents' house.
Articles 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code provide:

cra:nad

Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have
the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided
for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one
who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner
of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall
agree upon the terms of the lease and, in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may
retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the
person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or
of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.

34
In Spouses Del Campo v. Abesia,
this provision was applied to one whose house, despite having been built
at the time he was still co-owner, overlapped with the land of another. In that case, this Court ruled:
cra:nad

The court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants
or sows on the land owned in common for then he did not build, plant or sow upon the land that exclusively
belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person under the
circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership.
However, when, as in this case, the ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of
defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the
defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply.
35
xxx
cra

In other words, when the co-ownership is terminated by a partition, and it appears that the house of an
erstwhile co-owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to another co-owner, but the encroachment
was in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 should apply to determine the respective rights of the
parties. In this case, the co-ownership was terminated due to the transfer of the title of the whole property in
favor of Joaquin Limense.
Under the foregoing provision, petitioners have the right to appropriate said portion of the house of
respondents upon payment of indemnity to respondents, as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise, petitioners may oblige respondents to pay the price of the land occupied by their house. However,
if the price asked for is considerably much more than the value of the portion of the house of respondents
built thereon, then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. Respondents shall then pay the reasonable
rent to petitioners upon such terms and conditions that they may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial
court shall fix the terms thereof. Of course, respondents may demolish or remove the said portion of their
36
house, at their own expense, if they so decide.
cra

The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession that the
37
accessory follows the principal and not the other way around.
Even as the option lies with the landowner,
the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner
38
of the building to instead remove it from the land.
cra

The obvious benefit to the builder under this article is that, instead of being outrightly ejected from the land,
he can compel the landowner to make a choice between two options: (1) to appropriate the building by
39
paying the indemnity required by law, or (2) to sell the land to the builder.
cra

The raison d'etre for this provision has been enunciated, thus:

cra:nad

Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners,
and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of
the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a
just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the
proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He
cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option,
because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the
40]
accessory thing.
cra

41
In accordance with Depra v. Dumlao,
this case must be remanded to the trial court to determine matters
necessary for the proper application of Article 448 in relation to Article 546. Such matters include the option
that petitioners would take and the amount of indemnity that they would pay, should they decide to
appropriate the improvements on the lots.
Anent the second issue, although it may seem that the portions encroaching upon respondents' house can be
considered a nuisance, because it hinders petitioners' use of their property, it cannot simply be removed at
respondents' expense, as prayed for by petitioner. This is because respondents built the subject
encroachment in good faith, and the law affords them certain rights as discussed above.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 20, 2001 in CAG.R. CV No. 33589 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. No co-ownership exists over Lot No. 12-C, covered by TCT No. 96886, between petitioners
and Respondents.
2. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Manila, for further proceedings
without further delay to determine the facts essential to the proper application of Articles 448
and 546 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 173252 : July 17, 2009

UNISOURCE COMMERCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. JOSEPH CHUNG, KIAT CHUNG
and KLETO CHUNG, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
1
2
The instant petition assails the Decision dated October 27, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 19, 2006
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76213. The appellate court had reversed and set aside the
3
Decision dated August 19, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49, in Civil Case No. 0097526.
The antecedent facts are as follows:

cra:nad

Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the registered owner of a parcel of land
4
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 176253 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The title
contains a memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement which has been carried over from the
5
Original Certificate of Title of Encarnacion S. Sandico. The certified English translation of the annotation
reads:
cra:nad

By order dated 08 October 1924 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Chamber IV (AP-7571/T-23046), it
is declared that Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico has the right to open doors in the course of his lot described as
Lot No. 2, Block 2650 of the map that has been exhibited, towards the left of the Callejon that is used as a
passage and that appears as adjacent to the said Lot 2 and to pass through the land of Encarnacion Sandico
y Santana, until the bank of the estero that goes to the Pasig River, and towards the right of the other
6
Callejon that is situated between the said Lot 2 and Lot 4 of the same Block N.
cra

As Sandico's property was transferred to several owners, the memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary
easement in favor of Francisco M. Hidalgo was consistently annotated at the back of every title covering
Sandico's property until TCT No. 176253 was issued in petitioner's favor. On the other hand, Hidalgo's
property was eventually transferred to respondents Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung and Cleto Chung under TCT
7
No. 121488.
cra

On May 26, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary Easement of Right of
8
Way on the ground that the dominant estate has an adequate access to a public road which is Matienza
Street. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it is a land registration case. Petitioner

moved for reconsideration. Thereafter, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the property. In an
9
Order dated November 24, 2000, the trial court granted the motion and made the following observations:
1. The dominant estate is a property enclosed with a concrete fence with no less than three (3) doors in it,
opening to an alley belonging to the servient estate owned by the petitioner. The alley is leading to Matienza
St.;
2. The dominant estate has a house built thereon and said house has a very wide door
accessible to Matienza St. without any obstruction. Said street is perpendicular to J.P. Laurel St.
It is therefore found that the dominant estate has an egress to Matienza St. and does not have to use the
10
servient estate.
cra

11
In their Answer,
respondents countered that the extinguishment of the easement will be of great prejudice
to the locality and that petitioner is guilty of laches since it took petitioner 15 years from acquisition of the
property to file the petition.
In a Decision dated August 19, 2002, the trial court ordered the cancellation of the encumbrance of voluntary
easement of right of way in favor of the dominant estate owned byRespondents. It found that the dominant
estate has no more use for the easement since it has another adequate outlet to a public road which is
Matienza Street. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
cra:nad

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby orders the cancellation of the Memorandum of
Encumbrance annotated in TCT No. 176253 which granted a right of way in favor of the person named
therein and, upon the finality of this decision, the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila is hereby directed to
cancel said encumbrance.
With respect to the other prayers in the petition, considering that the same are mere incidents to the
exercise by the owners of right of their ownership which they could well do without the Court's intervention,
this Court sees no need to specifically rule thereon. The Court cannot award plaintiff's claims for damages
and attorney's fees for lack of sufficient bases therefor.
12
SO ORDERED.

cra

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On October 27, 2005, the appellate court reversed the
decision of the trial court and dismissed the petition to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of
right of way.
The appellate court ruled that when petitioner's petition was initially dismissed by the executive judge, the
copy of the petition and the summons had not yet been served onRespondents. Thus, when petitioner moved
to reconsider the order of dismissal, there was no need for a notice of hearing and proof of service upon
respondents since the trial court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over them. The trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the case and over respondents only after the summons was served upon them and they
were later given ample opportunity to present their evidence.
The appellate court also held that the trial court erred in canceling the encumbrance of voluntary easement
13
of right of way. The appellate court ruled that Article 631(3)
of the Civil Code, which was cited by the trial
court, is inapplicable since the presence of an adequate outlet to a highway extinguishes only legal or
compulsory easements but not voluntary easements like in the instant case. There having been an
agreement between the original parties for the provision of an easement of right of way in favor of the
dominant estate, the same can be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of
the dominant estate.
The decretal portion of the decision reads:

cra:nad

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the petition to cancel the encumbrance of right of way is dismissed
for lack of merit.
No costs.
14
SO ORDERED.

cra

Before us, petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in:

I.
. BRUSHING ASIDE PETITIONER'S CONTENTION THAT THE EASEMENT IS PERSONAL SINCE THE
ANNOTATION DID NOT PROVIDE THAT IT IS BINDING ON THE HEIRS OR ASSIGNS OF SANDICO.
II.
. NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE EASEMENT IS PERSONAL SINCE NO COMPENSATION WAS
GIVEN TO PETITIONER.
III.
. DISREGARDING THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION ON UNJUST ENRICHMENT.
IV.
. TREATING THE EASEMENT AS PREDIAL.

15

Petitioner contends that the fact that Sandico and Hidalgo resorted to judicial intervention only shows that
they contested the existence of the requisite factors establishing a legal easement. Besides, the annotation
itself provides that the easement is exclusively confined to the parties mentioned therein, i.e., Sandico and
Hidalgo. It was not meant to bind their heirs or assigns; otherwise, they would have expressly provided for
it. Petitioner adds that it would be an unjust enrichment on respondents' part to continue enjoying the
easement without adequate compensation to petitioner. Petitioner also avers that to say that the easement
has attached to Hidalgo's property is erroneous since such property no longer exists after it has been
16
subdivided and registered in respondents' respective names.
Petitioner further argues that even if it is
bound by the easement, the same can be cancelled or revoked since the dominant estate has an adequate
outlet without having to pass through the servient estate.
Respondents adopted the disquisition of the appellate court as their counter-arguments.
The petition lacks merit.
As defined, an easement is a real right on another's property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner
of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his
property, for the benefit of another person or tenement. Easements are established either by law or by the
17
will of the owner. The former are called legal, and the latter, voluntary easements.
cra

In this case, petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary easement of right of way exists in favor
of Respondents. In its petition to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way, petitioner
alleged that "[t]he easement is personal. It was voluntarily constituted in favor of a certain Francisco Hidalgo
18
y Magnifico, the owner of [the lot] described as Lot No. 2, Block 2650."
It further stated that "the
voluntary easement of the right of way in favor of Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico was constituted simply by
will or agreement of the parties. It was not a statutory easement and definitely not an easement created by
such court order because '[the] Court merely declares the existence of an easement created by the
19
20
parties."
In its Memorandum
dated September 27, 2001, before the trial court, petitioner reiterated that
21
"[t]he annotation found at the back of the TCT of Unisource is a voluntary easement."
cra

Having made such an admission, petitioner cannot now claim that what exists is a legal easement and that
the same should be cancelled since the dominant estate is not an enclosed estate as it has an adequate
22
access to a public road which is Callejon Matienza Street.
As we have said, the opening of an adequate
outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the
case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does
23
not detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of the necessity.
A
voluntary easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only by mutual agreement
24
or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.
cra

Neither can petitioner claim that the easement is personal only to Hidalgo since the annotation merely
mentioned Sandico and Hidalgo without equally binding their heirs or assigns. That the heirs or assigns of the
parties were not mentioned in the annotation does not mean that it is not binding on them. Again, a
voluntary easement of right of way is like any other contract. As such, it is generally effective between the
parties, their heirs and assigns, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are
25
not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
Petitioner cites City of Manila v.
26
Entote
in justifying that the easement should bind only the parties mentioned therein and exclude those
not so mentioned. However, that case is inapplicable since the issue therein was whether the easement was
intended not only for the benefit of the owners of the dominant estate but of the community and the public
27
at large.
In interpreting the easement, the Court ruled that the clause "any and all other persons
whomsoever" in the easement embraces only "those who are privy to the owners of the dominant estate,
Lots 1 and 2 Plan Pcs-2672" and excludes "the indiscriminate public from the enjoyment of the right-of-way
28
easement."
cra

We also hold that although the easement does not appear in respondents' title over the dominant estate, the
same subsists. It is settled that the registration of the dominant estate under the Torrens system without the
annotation of the voluntary easement in its favor does not extinguish the easement. On the contrary, it is the
registration of the servient estate as free, that is, without the annotation of the voluntary easement, which
29
extinguishes the easement.
cra

Finally, the mere fact that respondents subdivided the property does not extinguish the easement. Article
30
618
of the Civil Code provides that if the dominant estate is divided between two or more persons, each
of them may use the easement in its entirety, without changing the place of its use, or making it more
burdensome in any other way.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 27, 2005 and the Resolution dated
June 19, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76213 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 185477 : December 4, 2009

HERMINIO M. GUTIERREZ and ELISA A. GUTIERREZ-MAYUGA, Petitioners, v. FLORA MENDOZA-PLAZA and
PONCIANO HERNANDEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Amended
2
Decision dated 26 September 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89555, which recalled and set
3
aside its earlier Decision dated 2 June 2008. The prior Decision of the appellate court reversed the
4
Decision dated 15 June 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tanauan City, Branch 83, in Civil Case No.
06-04-2929, which pronounced that herein respondents Flora Mendoza and Ponciano Hernandez
(respondents) were the lawful owners of the property subject of this case.
As culled from the records, the antecedents of the case are as follows:

cra:nad

Ignacio Mendoza is the common ascendant of the parties herein. Ignacio was first married to Juana
5
6
Jaurigue, to whom Dominador and Victoria were born. Petitioner Herminio M. Gutierrez (Herminio) is the
7
son of Victoria, and petitioner Elisa A. Gutierrez-Mayuga (Elisa) is the daughter of Herminio.
After the death of Juana in 1913, Ignacio married Ignacia Jaurigue, the younger sister of Juana. Out of this
second marriage, five children were born, namely: Crisostomo, Flora, Felisa, Mercedes and Constancia. As
aforesaid, respondent Flora Mendoza-Plaza (Flora) is the daughter of Ignacia, while respondent Ponciano
Hernandez (Ponciano) is the son of Felisa.

The parcel of land subject of this case (subject property) is an unregistered land located in Barangay Sta.
Clara, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, containing an area of 446 square meters, more or less.
On 25 March 1916, Ignacio acquired the subject property by way of purchase from Luis Custodio
8
for P200.00, which sale was contained in a notarized document entitled Escritura Publica.
cra

9
Thereafter, on 8 March 1940, Ignacio executed a deed of donation inter vivos, whereby the subject property
was donated to the children whom he begot with Ignacia, his second wife. Ignacia accepted the donation in
the same instrument on behalf of her children. Dominador and Victoria were also signatories to the deed of
donation inter vivos as instrumental witnesses. The deed was likewise duly notarized, but the same was not
recorded in the Registry of Deeds.
Subsequently, on 27 April 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria, Publiciana and
Quieting of Title against petitioners in the RTC of Tanauan City, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 06-042929. Respondents alleged that after the execution of the deed of donation inter vivos, the subject property
was assigned to Flora and her sister Felisa, who then possessed and occupied the same as owners. Ponciano
took over and exercised the rights of his mother Felisa after the latter died in 1988. On or about late January
or early February of 2006, petitioners took possession of the southern portion of the subject property and
constructed a house of strong materials therein, despite the vigorous objection and opposition of
the Respondents. As the parties were close relatives, respondents exerted efforts to compromise and
amicably settle the case, but petitioners refused. Respondents prayed, inter alia, that they be declared the
true and rightful owners of the subject land; petitioners be directed to demolish and remove the house of
strong materials, which they built in bad faith; and petitioners be ordered to pay attorney's fees, expenses of
litigation, damages and judicial costs.
10
Petitioners accordingly denied the above material averments in their Answer,
asserting that Ignacio and his
first wife, Juana, had been in possession of the subject property as early as 1900. After the death of Juana,
Dominador, Victoria and Ignacio took over possession of the subject property. When Dominador and Victoria
died in 1940 and 1943, respectively, their heirs, including petitioners, occupied and possessed the subject
property openly, peacefully and publicly. Petitioners likewise disputed the genuineness and authenticity of the
deed of donation inter vivos, considering that for more than 65 years the said document was not registered
with the office of the Register of Deeds to cause its transfer to Respondents. Respondents' presence on and
occupancy of a portion of the subject property were allegedly a mere tolerance on the part of petitioners.
Thus, the title and rights of petitioners over the subject property were absolute and legal by virtue of
succession.
On 15 June 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which
provides:
cra:nad

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the [respondents] and against [petitioners]:

1. Pronouncing and confirming that the [respondents] are the lawful, true and rightful owners of the land
described in paragraph 4 of the complaint [subject property], and hereby remove the cloud and quiet their
title thereto:
cra:nad

2. Ordering the [petitioners] to refrain from disturbing in whatever manner the ownership and
possession of the [respondents] over the land subject matter of this litigation;
3. Pronouncing [petitioners] to have lost the house of strong and concrete materials which they
built in bad faith on the land of the [respondents] without right to indemnity, and ordering the
[petitioners] to demolish and remove the said house from the [respondents'] land within thirty
(30) days from the date this judgment becomes final at their own expense and thereafter vacate
and restore to the [respondents] possession of the portion of the land which the [petitioners]
have occupied.
4. Ordering the [petitioners] to pay [respondent] Ponciano Hernandez the sum of P50,000.00 for
moral damages, and another sum of P20,000.00 to both [respondents] for attorney's fees.
5. Plus the costs assessed against the [petitioners].

11

Principally, the RTC relied on the deed of donation inter vivos in awarding the subject property
to Respondents. The same was properly identified and described in the testimony of Mercedes Mendoza, one
of the daughters of Ignacio by his second marriage. The deed was also a notarized document, which was
executed with all the formal requirements of the law. Thus, the recitals contained therein were presumed to
be true and authentic, which presumption the petitioners failed to overcome with clear, convincing,
overwhelming and more than merely preponderant evidence. The RTC also ruled that the deed of donation
12
inter vivos was an ancient document,
having been executed on 8 March 1940 and being clearly more than
thirty (30) years old. The deed was in the proper custody of respondent Ponciano who acquired the same
from his mother Felisa, before the latter's death. On its face, the deed was free from any alterations,
interlineations, or erasures of a material character, or any circumstance that may generate suspicion of its
authenticity. The certificate of the Clerk of Court of Batangas City offered by petitioners, stating that the
office had no available records/documents notarized by the notary public who signed the deed of donation
inter vivos, did not rule out the authenticity of the said deed. It did not follow that the deed was also
inexistent in another government depositories of ancient documents.
Moreover, the RTC declared petitioners to be in bad faith in building a house of strong materials on a portion
of the subject property. The respondents strongly opposed the construction from the start, given that the
occupation and possession by the petitioners were merely tolerated.
Petitioners filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 89555.
On 2 June 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision, reversing the ruling of the RTC, ratiocinating
in this wise:
cra:nad

It is undisputed that the subject property is an unregistered land over which both parties, who are
descendants of Ignacio Mendoza, claim ownership. [Respondents] claim ownership by virtue of a donation
inter vivos, allegedly executed in 1940 by Ignacio in favor of Ignacia, and possession thereof. On the other
hand, [petitioners] claim that they are owners of a portion of the property by acquisitive possession. Both
parties presented receipts proving that they have been paying realty taxes on the property. Thus, the
controversy boils down to the examination of the evidence presented.
The RTC herein relied heavily on the donation inter vivos, Exh. "B" dated March 8, 1940, allegedly executed
by Ignacio Mendoza in favor of [his children with his second wife Ignacia], which was acknowledged by
Ignacia in the same instrument x x x. Reliance on Exh. "B", however, is flawed. It must be noted that the
property subject of controversy is an unregistered land, and the parties therein are [the children of Ignacio
with his second wife] and Ignacio Mendoza. [Petitioners] are strangers to the instrument. Thus, while Exh.
"B" is valid between Ignacio Mendoza and [respondents], the same cannot affect third parties such as
[petitioners], unless the same is registered in the manner provided under Section 194 of Act No. 2711,
effective March 10, 1917, as amended by Act No. 2837 and later by Act No. 3344, which states:
cra:nad

"Sec. 194. Recording of instruments or deeds relating to real estate not registered under Act Numbered Four
Hundred and Ninety-Six or under the Spanish Mortgage Law. - No instrument or deed establishing,
transmitting, acknowledging, modifying or extinguishing rights with respect to real estate not registered
under the provisions of Act Numbered Four Hundred and Ninety-Six entitled "The Land Registration Act," and
its amendments, or under the Spanish Mortgage Law, shall be valid, except as between the parties thereto,
until such instrument or deed has been registered x x x in the office of the register of deeds for the province
or city where the real estate lies.
xxx
The above provision of the law has been reiterated in Section 113 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, as
amended, which states:
cra:nad

"Sec. 113. Recording of instruments relating to unregistered lands. - No deed, conveyance, mortgage, lease
or other voluntary instrument affecting land not registered under the Torrens system shall be valid, except as
between the parties thereto, unless such instrument shall have been recorded in the manner herein
prescribed in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
xxx
A careful review of the records shows that Exh. "B", purporting to be a deed of donation, was not registered
at all. Apropos, the [petitioners], being third parties thereto, are not bound by the transmittal of rights from
Ignacio Mendoza to the [respondents] x x x.
Setting aside Exh. "B", the pieces of evidence left are the tax declarations presented during the trial.
However, it is an established jurisprudence that tax declarations and tax receipts are not conclusive evidence

of ownership x x x. "In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for
tax purposes does not prove ownership" x x x. Further examination of the tax declarations x x x show that
both parties have been paying realty taxes thereon in the name of Ignacio Mendoza. Likewise, while the
parties rely on the tax receipts and tax declarations coupled with the assertions of adverse possession, these
do not indicate that they own the same because the property was not declared in their names. x x
13
x.
(Emphases ours.)
The Court of Appeals, thus, decreed:

cra:nad

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
dated June 15, 2007, promulgated by Branch 83, City of Tanuan, Batangas, in Civil Case No. 06-04-2929, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Civil Case No. 0614
04-2929. No cost.
cra

15
Respondents forthwith filed a Motion for Reconsideration
on the above Decision, contending, inter alia, that
where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which was unregistered at the time he acquired a
right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to
him. The knowledge of Victoria, an instrumental witness to the deed of donation inter vivos, of the existing
prior interest of the heirs of Ignacio by his second marriage is deemed in law to be knowledge of the
petitioners.
On 26 September 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated an Amended Decision,
Decision, holding that:

16

setting aside its earlier

cra:nad

After a careful analysis of the circumstances of this case, We find merit in the arguments of the plaintiffappellees.
xxx
To clarify, as a general rule, "no deed, conveyance, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument affecting
land not registered under the Torrens system shall be valid, except as between the parties thereto, unless
such instrument shall have been recorded in the manner herein prescribed in the office of the Register of
Deeds for the province or city where the land lies" (Section 113, Presidential Decree No. 1529, as amended).
This means that any instrument dealing with unregistered land shall not bind third persons, unless the
instrument is registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds albeit valid as between the parties therein.
As correctly pointed out by the [respondents], the law has exceptions. "The conveyance shall not be valid
against any person unless registered, except (1) the grantor, (2) his heirs and devisees, and (3) third
persons having actual notice of knowledge thereof" (Heirs of Eduardo Manlapat v. Court of Appeals, supra, p.
426, citing Pea, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1994 ed. p. 28.)
xxx
Appropriately, the proper exception applicable in this case to bind the [petitioners] to the donation inter vivos
should be under the second exception, that is, being heirs of Ignacio Mendoza. It should be stressed that the
owner of the unregistered property is Ignacio Mendoza and that both parties are his successors.
[Respondents] are his successors by his second marriage, while [petitioners] are his successors by his first
marriage. Thus, being his heirs and successors, the [petitioners] must be bound for they are considered
mere extension of the grantor (Pea, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, p. 28).
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. This Court's
Decision promulgated on June 2, 2008 is RECALLED AND SET ASIDE, and a new one entered AFFIRMING the
Regional Trial Court's Decision dated June 15, 2007, in Civil Case No. 06-04-2929. No Cost. (Emphases
ours.)
17
18
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration,
but
the Court of Appeals was not persuaded. On 21 November 2008, the appellate court issued a
19
Resolution,
finding that:
cra:nad

A careful review of the motion for reconsideration shows that the issues raised therein have been already
been (sic) clarified in and by Our Amended Decision. As to the arguments raised in the Supplement, i.e., that
the [petitioners'] legitimes are prejudiced, the same must likewise be denied for having been raised for the
first time at this stage of the appeal in a motion for reconsideration. In any case, the [petitioners] are not
without recourse regarding their alleged prejudiced right to their legitimes.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant motion for reconsideration and Supplement are DENIED.
Petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari , imploring the Court to take another judicious
look at their case, in their hope of securing a more favorable judgment.
Petitioners insist on disputing the authenticity of the deed of donation inter vivos in favor of the children of
Ignacio and his second wife, Ignacia. Not only was the deed belatedly introduced by Ponciano; the same is
also fatally invalid in view of its non-registration as prescribed by law. Supposedly, the said deed is likewise
inherently flawed substantively, because its provisions totally exclude petitioners from participating in the
sharing of the property subject of the case, thereby impairing their legitimes. Furthermore, petitioners claim
that they have occupied and possessed a portion of the subject property in their own right and in the concept
of owners, thus acquiring the same by prescription, if not laches.
We deny the petition.
Petitioners seem to have overlooked the fact that the deed of donation inter vivos is a notarized document.
According to Section 30, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, "every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and
certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being a prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved." A
20
notarial document is evidence of the facts expressed therein.
A notarized document enjoys a prima facie
presumption of authenticity and due execution. Clear and convincing evidence must be presented to
21
overcome such legal presumption.
cra

In the instant case, petitioners failed to adduce sufficient evidence to overcome the above presumption. The
22
only evidence offered by petitioners to impugn the deed of donation inter vivos was the testimony
of
petitioner Elisa, wherein she stated that the contents of the deed could not have been true, given that
petitioners inherited the subject property from Victoria Mendoza, the daughter of Ignacio with his first wife
Juana. Such testimony was utterly lacking. Furthermore, the Court finds nothing wrong and/or unusual in the
fact that the deed of donation inter vivos was produced and made known to petitioners only in the early part
of the year 2006 or more than sixty (60) years after its execution. Understandably, it was only when
petitioners claimed ownership of a portion of the subject property that respondents were compelled to assert
their own title to the property, which they traced to the deed of donation inter vivos.
The non-registration of the aforesaid deed does not also affect the validity thereof. Registration is not a
requirement for validity of the contract as between the parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly to
bind third persons. The principal purpose of registration is merely to notify other persons not parties to a
23
contract that a transaction involving the property has been entered into.
The conveyance of unregistered
land shall not be valid against any person unless registered, except (1) the grantor, (2) his heirs and
devisees, and (3) third persons having actual notice or knowledge thereof. As held by the Court of Appeals,
petitioners are the heirs of Ignacio, the grantor of the subject property. Thus, they are bound by the
provisions of the deed of donation inter vivos.
Anent the argument that the donation inter vivos impaired the legitimes of petitioners, the Court deems it
unnecessary to discuss the same. Said argument was indeed only raised for the first time on appeal to the
Court of Appeals and in the Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court's Amended
Decision at that. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for
24
the first time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie this rule.
cra

Petitioners' claim of prescription in their favor likewise deserves scant consideration. Unlike respondents who
can trace their title to the subject property by virtue of the deed of donation inter vivos, petitioners cannot
adequately explain how they entered and possessed the subject property to become owners thereof. More
25
importantly, petitioners cannot even rebut the testimony
of Mercedes Mendoza that she was present when
Victoria entreated their father Ignacio to allow her (Victoria) to construct a house on a portion of the subject
property. Ignacio gave permission to Victoria, but only on the condition that she would have to leave when
his children by his second marriage would need the property. Thus, the possession of the property by Victoria
was only by virtue of the mere tolerance thereof by Ignacio and the children of his second marriage. As such,
the alleged possession by petitioners, which they claim to trace to Victoria, was also by mere tolerance on
the part of Respondents.
Prescription as a mode of acquisition requires the existence of the following: (1) capacity to acquire by
prescription; (2) a thing capable of acquisition by prescription; (3) possession of the thing under certain

conditions; and (4) lapse of time provided by law. Acquisitive prescription may either be ordinary, in which
case the possession must be in good faith and with just title; or extraordinary, in which case there is neither
good faith nor just title. In either case, there has to be possession, which must be in the concept of an
26
owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted.
As a corollary, Article 1119 of the Civil Code provides that:
cra:nad

Art. 1119. Acts of possessory character executed in virtue of license or by mere tolerance of the owner shall
not be available for the purposes of possession.
Acts of possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en
concepto de dueo, and such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start the running of
the period of prescription.
In light of the foregoing, petitioners cannot claim any better right to the subject property as
against Respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is DENIED. The
Amended Decision dated 26 September 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89555 is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133705. March 31, 2005 C-J YULO & SONS, INC., Petitioner, vs. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SAN
PABLO, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari are the Decision [1] dated December 19,
1997 and Resolution [2] dated April 30, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45392, reversing an
earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court at Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34, which ruled in favor of the herein
petitioner C-J Yulo & Sons, Inc., in a suit for revocation of donation with reconveyance of title, thereat
commenced by the petitioner against the herein respondent, Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc.
The facts are not at all disputed:
On September 24, 1977, petitioner donated unto respondent a parcel of land at Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna
with an area of 41,117 square meters and registered in its name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-82803. The deed of donation which also bears the acceptance of the donee recites the considerations
therefor and the conditions thereto attached, to wit:
WHEREAS, Donee is a religious corporation engaged in much (sic) humanitarian Christian work in Laguna and
elsewhere, educating and forming the young, caring for the infirm and the aged in the fulfillment of its
mission;
WHEREAS, Donor recognizes the need for a privately endowed institution that will care for the homeless and
destitute old people in the community, as well as the other senior citizens who for some reason or other find
themselves without family with whom to live the last years of their life:
WHEREFORE, Donor is willing, in order to help establish and support such an institution to donate the land
necessary for its housing, as well as an area of land whereon it may raise crops for its support and for the
sustenance of its residents;
WHEREAS, Donee is willing and able, with the wanted help of Donor and of other benefactors, to establish,
operate and maintain such a home for the aged.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of all the foregoing premises, Donor hereby transfers and conveys to
Donee by way of donation all its rights, title and interest in that certain parcel of land covered by TCT No. T82803 of the Land Records of Laguna, the technical descriptions of which are recited above, subject to the
following conditions and covenants, each of which is a material consideration for this Deed:
1. So much of the land as may be necessary shall be used for the construction of a home for the aged and
infirm, regardless of religion or creed, but preferably those coming from Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna;
provided that retired and/or aged priests may be admitted to the home; and provided further that any senior
citizen from the area who has retired from business or work may likewise be admitted to the home, subject
to the payment to the institution of such sum as he may afford for his support.
2. A Green Belt that is 15 meters wide shall be established and maintained by the Donor along the length of
the land to separate and insulate it from the projected highway.
3. Such part of land as may not be needed for the residence and the Green Belt shall be devoted by Donee
with the help of such residents of the home as are able, to the raising of agricultural crops for the
consumption of the residents of the home, and of such other crops that may be sold to defray the cost of
running the home and feeding its residents; provided, that should the area later become so fully urbanized
as to make this limitation on use economically, impractical, any portion of the land may, with the written
consent of the Donor, be put to commercial use by the Donee by leasing the same for wholesome and
socially-acceptable activities; provided further that the rentals from such commercial leases shall be used,
first, to meet the expenses of the home; second, to enlarge its population and expand its facilities; and
finally for other charitable purposes in Laguna, in that order.
4. Donee acknowledges that Donor's generous act will greatly aid Donee in accomplishing its mission on
earth, and, recognizing the generosity of the Yulo family as the reason for such act, Donee undertakes to
cause every year the celebration of masses for the intention of the various members of the family of Mr. Jose
Yulo, Sr., on festive and solemn occasions in the said family.
5. Except with prior written consent of the Donor or its successor, the Donee shall not use the land except for
the purpose as provided above in paragraph 1 hereof, nor sell or dispose the land for any reason whatsoever,
nor convey any portion of the same except in lease for commercial use as provided above in paragraph 3
hereof, otherwise the said land with all real improvements thereon shall revert in trust to the Donor for
prompt disposition in favor of some other charitable organization that Donor may deem best suited to the
care of the aged. (Underscoring supplied).
On the basis of the same deed, TCT No. T-82803 of the donor was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T91348 in the name of donee Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc.
Thereafter, or sometime in 1980, the donee, for purposes of generating funds to build the perimeter fence on
the donated property and the construction of a nucleus building for the aged and the infirm, leased a portion
of the donated property to one Martin Gomez who planted said portion with sugar cane. There is no dispute
that the lease agreement was entered into by the doneewithout the prior written consent of the donor, as
required in the deed of donation. The lease to Gomez ended in 1985.
The following year, 1986, a portion of the donated property was again leased by the donee, this time to one
Jose Bostre who used the leased area as a ranch. As explained by the donee, it entered into a lease
agreement with Bostre to protect the premises from vandals and for the electrification of the nucleus building
of the home for the aged and in the infirm, which was named as ' Casa dela Merced. As before, however, the
donee executed the lease contract without the prior written consent of the donor.
After the termination of the Bostre lease agreement, the donee, for the third time, leased a portion of the
donated property to one Rudy Caballes who used the leased area for fattening cattles. The donee explained
that the lease agreement with Bostre was also for the purposes of generating funds for the completion of
'Casa dela Merced. Again, however, the donee did not secure the prior written consent of the donor.
Hence, on September 20, 1990, pursuant to a board resolution, the donor, through its president Miguel A.
Yulo, addressed a letter to the donee informing the latter that it was revoking the donation in accordance
with Section 5 of the deed due to the donee's non-compliance with and material breach of the conditions
thereunder stipulated. In the same letter, the donor requested for the turn-over of the donee's TCT No. T91348 over the donated property.
In a reply-letter dated November 5, 1990, the donee, through Bishop Pedro N. Bantigue, D.D., denied any
material breach of the conditions of the deed of donation and manifested its continued and faithful
compliance with the provisions thereof. In the same letter, the donee refused the turn-over of its title to the
donor.

It was against the foregoing backdrop of events when, on November 19, 1990, in the Regional Trial Court at
Calamba, Laguna the donor, alleging non-compliance with and violation by the donee of the conditions of the
deed of donation, filed its complaint in this case against donee Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Pablo, Inc.,
therein reciting the imputed non-compliance and violations by the donee of the terms and conditions of the
deed of donation, as follows:
a) non-construction of the home for the aged and infirmed in the lot despite the lapse of a reasonable and
considerable length of time;
b) present land use of the area is a cattle farm, the owner of which has a lease contract with the donee; and
c) no prior written consent of the donor has been obtained for the present and actual use of the property
donated,
and accordingly prayed that the subject deed of donation be adjudged revoked and void and the donee
ordered to return and/or reconvey the property donated.
In its answer, defendant donee alleged that it was doing its best to comply with the provisions of the deed of
donation relative to the establishment of the home for the aged and the infirm, adding that the leases of
portions of the land were with the express, albeit unwritten consent, of Jesus Miguel Yulo himself. In the
same answer, defendant donee interposed the defense that the donor's cause of action for revocation, if any,
had already prescribed because the leases were known to the latter since 1980.
In a decision dated December 22, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment for donor-plaintiff C-J Yulo & Sons,
Inc., thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for plaintiff and against the defendant, declaring the Deed of
Donation dated September 24, 1977 (Exh. C') REVOKED, affirming plaintiff's revocation of the same in the
letter dated September 20, 1990 (Exh. 'D').
Defendant and all persons claiming rights under them are hereby ordered to immediately vacate the
premises of the donated property and to hand over to plaintiff the peaceful possession of the aforesaid
premises.
To avoid multiplicity of suits, the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna, is hereby ordered to require the
defendant to surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-91348 (Exh. 'B') and thereafter cancel the same and
issue, upon payment of the required fees, a new Transfer Certificate of Title in favor of plaintiffs, with cost
against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.
Therefrom, donee-defendant Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc., went to the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 45392.
In the herein assailed Decision dated December 19, 1997,[3] the Court of Appeals reversed that of
the trial court and upheld the donation in question, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated December 22, 1993 is hereby REVERSED and the
donation dated September 24, 1977 (Exhibit C) which conveyed title to the donated property in
the appellee's name is hereby UPHELD.
SO ORDERED.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the same court in its Resolution of April 30,
1998,[4] donor C-J Yulo & Sons, Inc., has come to this Court via the present recourse on its sole
submission that '
THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS (THAT THE REVOCATION OF THE DONATION BY
PETITIONER WAS IMPROPER) IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE.
We DENY.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's finding that the donation is an onerous one since
the donee was burdened with the establishment on the donated property of a home for the aged
and the infirm. It likewise agreed with the trial court that there were violations of the terms and
conditions of the deed of donation when the donee thrice leased a portion of the property without
the prior written consent of the donor. Likewise upheld by the appellate court is the ruling of the
trial court that the prescriptive period of the donor's right to revoke the donation is ten (10)
years based on Article 1144 of the Civil Code, instead of four (4) years per Article 764 of the same
Code, and therefore the action for revocation filed by the petitioner is not barred by prescription.

Even then, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, the reversal being premised on
the appellate court's finding that the breaches thrice committed by the respondent were
merely casual breaches which nevertheless did not detract from the purpose of which the
donation was made: the establishment of a home for the aged and the infirm.
We agree.
Petitioner contends that the case at bar is similar to the 1995 case of Central Philippine University vs.
Court of Appeals,[5] where the donee failed for more than 50 years to establish, as required, a
medical school on the land donated, and where this Court declared the donation to have been
validly revoked.
To the mind of the Court, what is applicable to this case is the more recent [2001] case of Republic
vs. Silim ,[6] where respondent Silim donated a 5,600-square meter parcel of land in favor of the
Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur with the condition that
the said property should be used exclusively and forever for school purposes only. Although a
school building was constructed on the property through the efforts of the Parent-Teachers
Association of Barangay Kauswagan, the funds for a Bagong Lipunan school building could not be
released because the government required that it be built on a one-hectare parcel of land. This
led the donee therein to exchange the donated property for a bigger one.
In Silim, the Court distinguished the four (4) types of donations:
Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2)
remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous. A pure or simple
donation is one where the underlying cause is plain gratuity. This is donation in its truest form.
On the other hand, a remuneratory or compensatory donation is one made for the purpose of
rewarding the donee for past services, which services do not amount to a demandable debt. A
conditional or modal donation is one where the donation is made in consideration of future
services or where the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges upon the donee,
the value of which is inferior than that of the donation given. Finally, an onerous donation is that
which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be more precise, this is the kind of
donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more than the thing
donated.
Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the onerous type are the most distinct. This is
because, unlike the other forms of donation, the validity of and the rights and obligations of the
parties involved in an onerous donation is completely governed not by the law on donations but
by the law on contracts. In this regard, Article 733 of the New Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 733 Donations with onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and
remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which
exceeds the value of the burden imposed.
The donation involved in the present controversy is one which is onerous since there is a burden
imposed upon the donee to build a school on the donated property.
Here, the Court of Appeals correctly applied the law on contracts instead of the law on donations
because the donation involved in this case is onerous, saddled as it is by a burden imposed upon
the donee to put up and operate a home for the aged and the infirm. We thus quote with approval
the terse ruling of the appellate court in the challenged decision:
First, the violations of the conditions of the donation committed by the donee were merely casual
breaches of the conditions of the donation and did not detract from the purpose by which the
donation was made, i.e., for the establishment of a home for the aged and the infirm. In order for
a contract which imposes a reciprocal obligation, which is the onerous donation in this case
wherein the donor is obligated to donate a 41,117 square meter property in Canlubang, Calamba,
Laguna on which property the donee is obligated to establish a home for the aged and the infirm
(Exhibit C), may be rescinded per Article 1191 of the New Civil Code, the breach of the conditions
thereof must be substantial as to defeat the purpose for which the contract was perfected
(Tolentino, 'Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, pp. 179-180; Universal Food Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 33 SCRA 1, 18; Ocampo v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 551, 562). Thus, in the case of
'Ocampo v. C.A. (ibid), citing the case of 'Angeles v. Calasanz (135 SCRA 323, 330), the Supreme
Court ruled:

The right to rescind the contract for non-performance of one of its stipulations x x x is not
absolute. In Universal Food Corp. v. Court of Appeals (33 SCRA 1) the Court stated that:
The general rule is that rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach,
but only for such substantial and fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of the
parties in making the agreement (Song Fo & Co. v. Hawaiian-Philippine Co., 47 Phil. 821,827).
The question of whether a breach of a contract is substantial depends upon the attendant
circumstances (Corpus v. Hon. Alikpala, et al., L-23707 & L-23720, Jan. 17, 1968).
The above ruling of the Court of Appeals is completely in tune with this Court's disposition in
Republic vs. Silim, supra. The donor therein sought to revoke the donation on the ground that the
donee breached the condition to exclusively and forever use the land for school purpose only, but
this Court ruled in favor of the donee:
Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was not in any way violated when the
lot donated was exchanged with another one. The purpose for the donation remains the same,
which is for the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or
affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and
enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved way for the
release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be
accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.
As in Silim, the three (3) lease contracts herein entered into by the donee were for the sole
purpose of pursuing the objective for which the donation was intended. In fact, such lease was
authorized by the donor by express provision in the deed of donation, albeit the prior written
consent therefor of the donor is needed. Hence, considering that the donee's acts did not detract
from the very purpose for which the donation was made but precisely to achieve such purpose, a
lack of prior written consent of the donor would only constitute casual breach of the deed, which
will not warrant the revocation of the donation.
Besides, this Court cannot consider the requirement of a prior written consent by the donor for all
contracts of lease to be entered into by the donee as an absolute ground for revocation of the
donation because such a condition, if not correlated with the purpose of the donation, would
constitute undue restriction of the donee's right of ownership over the donated property.
Instructive on this point is the ruling of this Court in The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs.
Court of Appeals,[7] viz:
Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over the
property from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the
absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose certain conditions in the
deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and
public policy.
xxx
In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation against the alienation of
the property for an entire century, being an unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral
attribute of ownership, should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the
contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically stated in said
statutory provision, such condition shall be considered as not imposed. No reliance may
accordingly be placed on said prohibitory paragraph in the deed of donation. The net result is
that, absent said proscription, the deed of sale supposedly constitutive of the cause of action for
the nullification of the deed of donation is not in truth violative of the latter, hence, for lack of
cause of action, the case for private respondents must fail.
If petitioner would insist that the lack of prior written consent is a resolutory condition that is
absolute in character, the insistence would not stand the validity test under the foregoing
doctrine. What would have been casual breaches of the terms and conditions of the donation,
may, in that event, even be considered as no breach at all when the Court strikes down such
absolute condition of prior written consent by the donor in all instances without any exception
whatsoever. The Court, however, understands that such a condition was written with a specific
purpose in mind, which is, to ensure that the primary objective for which the donation was
intended is achieved. A reasonable construction of such condition rather than totally striking it
would, therefore, be more in accord with the spirit of the donation. Thus, for as long as the
contracts of lease do not detract from the purpose for which the donation was made, the

complained acts of the donee will not be deemed as substantial breaches of the terms and
conditions of the deed of donation to merit a valid revocation thereof by the donor.
Finally, anent petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals failed to consider that respondent
had abandoned the idea of constructing a home for the aged and infirm, the explanation in
respondent's comment is enlightening. Petitioner relies on Bishop Bantigue's letter[8] dated June
21, 1990 as its basis for claiming that the donee had altogether abandoned the idea of
constructing a home for the aged and the infirm on the property donated. Respondent, however,
explains that the Bishop, in his letter, written in the vernacular, expressed his concern that the
surrounding area was being considered to be re-classified into an industrial zone where factories
are expected to be put up. There is no question that this will definitely be disadvantageous to the
health of the aged and the infirm. Thus, the Bishop asked permission from the donor for a
possible exchange or sale of the donated property to ultimately pursue the purpose for which the
donation was intended in another location that is more appropriate.
The Court sees the wisdom, prudence and good judgment of the Bishop on this point, to which it
conforms completely. We cannot accede to petitioner's view, which attributed the exact opposite
meaning to the Bishop's letter seeking permission to sell or exchange the donated property.
In Silim, supra, this Court ruled that such exchange does not constitute breach of the terms and
conditions of the donation. We see no reason for the Court to think otherwise in this case. To
insist that the home for the aged and infirm be constructed on the donated property, if the
industrialization indeed pushes through, defies rhyme and reason. Any act by the donor to
prevent the donee from ultimately achieving the purpose for which the donation was intended
would constitute bad faith, which the Court will not tolerate.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED in toto.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Yulo and Sons v. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo

March 31, 2005Garcia, J.
facts:
1977: petitioner donated unto respondent a parcel of land in Calamba.Deed of
donation also bears acceptance of done.Condition that it be used for the building
of an institution for thehomeless.1980: for the purpose of generating funds for the
erection of building,leased the donated property to Gonez wuth prior consent from
donor.1986: leased again to Jose Bostre, who used it as a ranch.In 1990,
petitioners seek revocation.
Held:
Considering that the donees act
did not detract from the very purposefor which the donation was made but
precisely to achieve suchpurposed, a lack of prior written consent of the donor
would onlyconstitute casual breach, which will not warrant revocation
B A P C I v. O b i a s
G.R. No. 172077. October 9, 2009.Easement or
praedial
servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovablefor the benefit of
another immovable belonging to a different owner. By its creation,easement is
established either by law (in which case it is a legal easement) or by willof the
parties (a voluntary easement).I n t e rm s o f u s e , e a s e m e n t m a y e i t h e r
b e c o n t i n u o u s o r d i s c o n t i n u o u s . A n easement is continuous if its use is, or
may be, incessant without the intervention of any act of man, like the easement
of drainage; and it is discontinuous if it is used atintervals and depends on the
act of man, like the easement of right of way. The easement of right of way
is considered discontinuous because it is exercised only if a person passes or sets
foot on somebody elses land. Like a road for the passage of vehicles or persons,
an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is discontinuousbecause the right is
exercised only if and when a train operated by a person passesover another's
property. In other words, the very exercise of the servitude dependsu p o n t h e
act or intervention of man which is the very essence of
d i s c o n t i n u o u s easements. The easement of right of way the privilege of
persons or a particularclass of persons to pass over anothers land, usually
through one particular path orline is characterized as a discontinuous easement

because its use is in intervals anddepends on the act of man. Because of this
character, an easement of a right of way may only be acquired by virtue of a title
not by prescription.T h e p re s e n c e o f m o re o r l e s s p e rm a n e n t r a i l r o a d
t r a c k s d o e s n o t , i n a n y way, convert the nature of an easement of right of
way to one that is continuous. Itis not the presence of apparent signs or physical
indications showing the existenceo f a n e a s e m e n t , b u t r a t h e r t h e m a n n e r
o f e xe rc i s e t h e re o f , t h a t c a t e g o r i z e s s u c h easement into continuous or
discontinuous. The presence of physical or visual signso n l y c l a s s i fi e s a n
e a s e m e n t i n t o a p p a re n t o r n o n - a p p a re n t . T h u s , a ro a d
( w h i c h reveals a right of way) and a window (which evidences a right to light and
view) areapparent easements, while an easement of not building beyond a
certain height isnon-apparent.The same rules were reiterated in
Privatization and Management Office v. Legaspi Towers
(G.R. No. 147957, 22 July2009) and in
Heirs of Limense v. Vda. De Ramos
(G.R.No. 152319, 28 October 2009).