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Department of Economics
Job Market Candidates
2014-2015

Auclert, Adrien
Deshpande, Manasi
Easterbrook, Kathleen
Harari, Mariaflavia
Hernndez, Sara
Jang, Youngjun
Kim, Kyungmin
Luo, Ye
Moshary, Sarah
Nguyen, Hoai-Luu
Passadore, Juan
Struyven, Daan
Tsoy, Anton

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P= Primary Field, S= Secondary Field

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ADRIEN AUCLERT
aauclert@mit.edu

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY


OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E19-750
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-817-9083
aauclert@mit.edu

HOME CONTACT INFORMATION


491 Green Street, Apt. 3
Cambridge, MA 02139
Mobile: 617-817-9083

http://economics.mit.edu/grad/aauclert
MIT PLACEMENT OFFICER
Professor Benjamin Olken
617-253-6833
DOCTORAL
STUDIES

bolken@mit.edu

MIT PLACEMENT ADMINISTRATOR


Ms. Beata Shuster
bshuster@mit.edu
617-324-5857

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)


PhD, Economics, Expected completion June 2015
DISSERTATION: Essays in Monetary and Fiscal Policy
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES
Professor Ivn Werning
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-234
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-452-3662
iwerning@mit.edu

Professor Robert Townsend


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-230
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-452-3722
rtownsen@mit.edu

Professor Jonathan Parker


MIT Sloan School of Management
100 Main Street, E62-642
Cambridge, MA 02142
617-253-7218
japarker@mit.edu
PRIOR
EDUCATION

London School of Economics, UK


MSc in Econometrics and Mathematical Economics, 2009
ENSAE, France
Diplme dIngnieur Statisticien Economiste, 2009
University of Cambridge, Queens College, UK
Master of Advanced Study in Mathematics (Math Tripos, Part III), 2007
cole Centrale Paris, France
Diplme dIngnieur, 2007

CITIZENSHIP

French

LANGUAGES

English, French (native), Spanish

GENDER:

Male

ADRIEN AUCLERT
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 2
FIELDS

Primary Field: Macroeconomics


Secondary Fields: International Economics, Finance

TEACHING
EXPERIENCE

14.462 Advanced Macroeconomics II (Graduate)


Teaching Assistant to Professors Ricardo Caballero and
Jonathan Parker
14.453 Economic Fluctuations (Graduate)
Teaching Assistant to Professor Ivn Werning
14.462 Advanced Macroeconomics II (Graduate)
Teaching Assistant to Professors Emmanuel Farhi, Robert
Townsend, and Ivn Werning
14.453 Economic Fluctuations (Graduate)
Teaching Assistant to Professors Emmanuel Farhi and Ivn
Werning
14.453 Economic Fluctuations (Graduate)
Teaching Assistant to Professor Ivn Werning
14.582 International Economics (Graduate)
Teaching Assistant to Professor Fernando Broner

RELEVANT
POSITIONS

FELLOWSHIPS,
HONORS, AND
AWARDS

Spring 2015
Spring 2015
Spring 2014
Spring 2014
Spring 2013
Fall 2012

Research Assistant to Professor Robert Townsend


Research Assistant to Professor Ivn Werning
Research Assistant to Professor Leonid Kogan
Research Officer, International Monetary Fund
Research Assistant to Professor Guido Lorenzoni
Economist, Bank of England
Macro-Financial Analysis Division
Visiting Graduate Fellow, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Postgraduate Intern, Bank of England
Monetary Instruments and Markets Division

Fall 2012
Spring 2012
Spring 2012
Summer 2011
Spring 2011
2009-2010

Macro-Financial Modeling Group Dissertation Fellowship


Teaching Assistant of the Year Award
Awarded by the MIT Graduate Economics Association
Jean Gaillard Fellowship
Robert Gunassia Fellowship
Kenan Sahin MIT Presidential Fellowship
Bank of England Postgraduate Fellowship
Queens College Cambridge Foundation Scholar

2013-2015
2014

Summer 2009
Summer 2008

2012-2013
2011
2010
2008-2009
2007

PROFESSIONAL
ACTIVITIES

Presentations:
Macro Financial Modeling Conference (NYU Stern)
Financial Markets and Contracts Graduate Student Conference
(Becker-Friedman Institute)

RESEARCH
PAPERS

Monetary Policy and the Redistribution Channel (Job Market Paper)


This paper evaluates the role of redistribution in the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy to consumption. Using consumer theory, I show that
redistribution has aggregate effects whenever marginal propensities to

Spring 2014
May 2013

Spring 2013

ADRIEN AUCLERT
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 3
RESEARCH
PAPERS
(CONTINUED)

consume (MPCs) covary, across households, with balance-sheet exposures to


aggregate shocks. Unexpected inflation gives rise to a Fisher channel and real
interest rate shocks to an interest rate exposure channel; both channels are
likely to contribute to the expansionary effects of accommodative monetary
policy. Indeed, using a sufficient statistic approach, I find that redistribution
could be the dominant reason why aggregate consumer spending reacts to
transitory changes in the real interest rate, provided households' elasticities of
intertemporal substitution are reasonably small (0.3 or less in the United
States). I then build and calibrate a general equilibrium model with
heterogeneity in MPCs, and I evaluate how the redistribution channel alters the
economy's response to shocks. When household assets and liabilities have
short effective maturities, the interest rate exposure channel raises the elasticity
of aggregate demand to real interest rates, which dampens fluctuations in the
natural rate of interest in response to exogenous shocks and amplifies the real
effects of monetary policy shocks. The model predicts that if U.S. mortgages
all had adjustable ratesas they do in the U.K.the effect of changes in the
Federal Funds rate on consumer spending would more than double.
Monetary Union Begets Fiscal Union (with Matthew Rognlie)
We propose a mechanism through which monetary union between countries
leads to a stronger fiscal union. Although fiscal risk-sharing is valuable under
any monetary regime, given nominal rigidities it is more important within a
monetary union, when exchange rates can no longer adjust to offset shocks. As
a result, countries in a monetary union are capable of achieving better risksharing, partly overcoming their lack of commitment. Still, equilibria without
fiscal cooperation remain possible and imply inefficient cross-country
dispersion in output. A proactive central bank can encourage transfers by
providing extra accommodation when fiscal union is under stress.
Unique Equilibrium in the Eaton-Gersovitz Model of Sovereign Debt
(with Matthew Rognlie)
A common view of sovereign debt markets is that they are prone to multiple
equilibria: a market panic may inflate bond yields, deteriorate the sustainability
of government debt and precipitate a default event, justifying investor fears.
We show that, to the contrary, this multiplicity does not exist in the EatonGersovitz model, a widely adopted benchmark for quantitative analyses of
these markets. Our proof echoes Bulow and Rogoff's finding that debt cannot
be sustained by reputation alone; using a related arbitrage argument, we show
that deterioration in debt capacity in the Eaton-Gersovitz model cannot be selfsustaining. This result allays concerns in the literature that equilibrium
selection may influence the conclusions of quantitative work. It also implies
that any theory of self-fulfilling debt crises must rely on features absent in the
benchmark infinite-horizon model.

RESEARCH IN
PROGRESS

Consumer Bankruptcy Design under Incomplete Markets


I analyze the forces that drive the optimal design of consumer bankruptcy rules
under various forms of market incompleteness. When markets are exogenously
incomplete, optimal bankruptcy policy seeks to replicate complete markets. I
explain why this perspective is useful to understand the optimal rules that arise

ADRIEN AUCLERT
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 4
RESEARCH IN
PROGRESS
(CONTINUED)

under a variety of transfer costs: for example, why a strict income-based rule
for determining bankruptcy eligibilitysuch as the one in place under Chapter
7 since the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform Actis optimal in the limit of infinite
costs. I contrast this view of bankruptcy design with the one that emerges
when the friction is ex-post private information.
Household Credit and Employment Shocks: Evidence from Brazil (with
Sergio Mikio Koyama, Maurcio Matsumoto, and Robert Townsend)
We merge the Brazilian RAIS panela large administrative dataset containing
information on the labor market outcomes of tens of millions of formal-sector
workerswith the Central Banks household credit registry to investigate how
households use credit markets in response to employment shocks. Preliminary
evidence indicates that job losses lead households to significantly increase
their credit card borrowing and/or to default on unsecured debt, while
maintaining secured credit accounts current. We build and estimate a structural
model to understand these choices and to evaluate the welfare implications of
various policy interventions in consumer credit markets.

MANASI DESHPANDE
manasi@mit.edu

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY


OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E19-750
Cambridge, MA 02139
manasi@mit.edu

HOME CONTACT INFORMATION


235 Albany St., Apt. 3032
Cambridge, MA 02139
Mobile: 512-289-0776

http://economics.mit.edu/grad/manasi
MIT PLACEMENT OFFICER
Professor Benjamin Olken
617-253-6833
DOCTORAL
STUDIES

bolken@mit.edu

MIT PLACEMENT ADMINISTRATOR


Ms. Beata Shuster
bshuster@mit.edu
617-324-5857

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)


PhD, Economics, Expected completion June 2015
DISSERTATION: Essays on the Effects of Disability Insurance
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES
Professor David Autor
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-216
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-258-7698
dautor@mit.edu

Professor Amy Finkelstein


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-228
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-4149
afink@mit.edu

Professor Michael Greenstone


University of Chicago
Department of Economics
1126 E. 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
773-702-8250
mgreenst@uchicago.edu
PRIOR
EDUCATION

The University of Texas at Austin, 2007


B.A. with Highest Honors, Economics, Mathematics, Plan II (Humanities)

CITIZENSHIP United States


FIELDS

Primary Field: Public Finance


Secondary Field: Labor Economics

GENDER:

Female

MANASI DESHPANDE
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 2

TEACHING
EXPERIENCE

Principles of Economics (Undergraduate)


Supplemental Instructor, The University of Texas at Austin

Spring 2005Spring 2007

RELEVANT
POSITIONS

Research Assistant for Professor David Autor, MIT and NBER


Policy Advisor, White House National Economic Council
Research Assistant, The Hamilton Project at Brookings

2011
2009-10
2007-09

FELLOWSHIPS,
HONORS, AND
AWARDS

NBER Disability Pre-Doctoral Fellowship


NBER Health and Aging Pre-Doctoral Fellowship
NSF Graduate Research Fellowship
BC Center for Retirement Research Dissertation Fellowship
Phi Beta Kappa
Harry S. Truman Scholarship

2014-15
2012-14
2010-14
2012-13
2007
2006

PROFESSIONAL
ACTIVITIES

Referee for Journal of Public Economics


Referee for American Economic Journal: Policy
Referee for B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
Panelist for Social Security Advisory Board Disability Policy Panel

PUBLICATIONS

Comment on On the Economics of Climate Policy: Is Climate Change


Mitigation the Ultimate Arbitrage Opportunity? (with Michael Greenstone),
B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2010.

RESEARCH
PAPERS

Does Welfare Inhibit Success? The Long-Term Effects of Removing LowIncome Youth from Disability Insurance (Job Market Paper)
I estimate the long-term effects of removing low-income youth with
disabilities from Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on the level and variance
of their earnings and income in adulthood. Using administrative data from the
Social Security Administration, I implement a regression discontinuity design
based on a change in the probability of SSI removal at age 18 created by the
welfare reform law of 1996. I find that SSI youth who are removed earn on
average $4,000 per year, an increase of just $2,600 relative to those who
remain on SSI. This increase in earnings covers only one-third of the $7,700
they lose in annual SSI income, and they lose an additional 10% each year in
other transfer income. As a result, removed SSI youth experience a present
discounted income loss of $73,000, or 80% of the original SSI income loss,
over the 16 years following removal. In addition to the large drop in income
levels, the within-person variance of income quadruples as a result of the SSI
loss. Based on back-of-the-envelope calculations assuming risk aversion and
limited intertemporal consumption smoothing, I find that up to one-quarter of
the recipient's welfare loss from SSI removal is attributable to the increase in
income volatility rather than to the fall in income levels. This result suggests
that ignoring the income stabilization effects of welfare and disability
programs could substantially underestimate their value to recipients.
The Effect of Disability Payments on Household Earnings and Income:
Evidence from the SSI Childrens Program
I estimate the effect of removing children with disabilities from the

MANASI DESHPANDE
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 3
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program on parental earnings and
household income. Using administrative data from the Social Security
Administration, I implement both a regression discontinuity design and a
difference-in-differences design based on changes in the budget for medical
reviews, which increase the likelihood of removal from SSI. I find that a loss of
$1,000 in the childs SSI payment increases parental earningsexclusively on
the intensive marginby $700-$1,400, indicating that parents fully offset the
SSI loss with increased earnings. The loss of the childs SSI payment also
discourages parents and siblings from applying for disability insurance. In
addition, I find evidence that family members often apply for disability
insurance at the same time, which suggests the importance of household-level
shocks in the decision to apply. Using the unique institutional context of the SSI
program, I provide suggestive evidence that the large response in parental
earnings is driven mostly by an income effect rather than a substitution effect.
RESEARCH IN
PROGRESS

Testing the Coase Theorem in the Context of the Sulfur Dioxide Market:
Does the Initial Allocation of Permits Affect Firms Pollution Decisions?
I test whether the initial allocation of permits in the U.S. Acid Rain Program
had an effect on the emissions decisions of covered firms. The initial allocation
could affect subsequent sulfur dioxide emissions if firms face market
uncertainty, transaction costs, or liquidity constraints, or if they exhibit
behavioral biases. To address potential endogeneity of unobserved marginal
abatement costs, I use variation in temperature across counties in 1985-1987 as
an instrument for the number of permits allocated to a plant. The formula for
the initial allocation was based on a plants heat input during this time period,
and higher temperatures lead to greater electricity demand. I find that the
initial allocation of permits has a large effect on firms pollution decisions.
Increasing a plants permits by one ton raises the firms emissions on average
by two tons. I propose and find evidence consistent with a lumpy abatement
hypothesis in which firms that receive fewer permits are more likely to invest
in high-fixed-cost technologies that reduce emissions in discrete amounts.
Does the Timing of Removal from Disability Insurance Affect Childrens
Long-Term Outcomes? Evidence from the SSI Childrens Program
The effect of removing children from disability insurance on their long-term
outcomes may depend on whether families have time to adjust education and
human capital investment decisions. I estimate the effect of removing lowincome children with disabilities from the Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
program during childhood, before education decisions are complete, on their
long-term outcomes in adulthood, including earnings, income, health care
utilization, and criminal activity. To identify these effects, I will use both a
regression discontinuity design and a difference-in-differences design based on
changes in the budget for medical reviews, which increase the likelihood of
removal from SSI. I will use administrative data from the Social Security
Administration linked to administrative data on health care utilization and
criminal outcomes from states. I will compare the estimates from this paper to
previous estimates of the effect of removing children at the age of 18, when
education decisions for these low-income children are largely complete.

KATHLEEN FEHRING EASTERBROOK


ktebrook@mit.edu

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY


OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E19-750
Cambridge, MA 02139

HOME CONTACT INFORMATION


287 Harvard Street, Apt. 65
Cambridge, MA 02139
Mobile: 650-245-1164

ktebrook@mit.edu
http://economics.mit.edu/grad/ktebrook
MIT PLACEMENT OFFICER
Professor Benjamin Olken
bolken@mit.edu
617-253-6833
DOCTORAL
STUDIES

MIT PLACEMENT ADMINISTRATOR


Ms. Beata Shuster
bshuster@mit.edu
617-324-5857

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)


PhD, Economics, Expected Completion June 2015
DISSERTATION: The Effects of Hospital Mergers
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES
Professor Jonathan Gruber
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-220
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-8892
gruberj@mit.edu

Professor Heidi Williams


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-222
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-324-4326
heidiw@mit.edu

Professor Nancy Rose


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E18-210
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-8956
nrose@mit.edu
PRIOR
EDUCATION

Stanford University, 2008


B.A. in Economics with Honors and Distinction

CITIZENSHIP

United States

FIELDS

Primary Fields: Health Economics, Public Finance

GENDER

Secondary Fields: Industrial Organization

Female

KATHLEEN FEHRING EASTERBROOK


OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 2

TEACHING
EXPERIENCE

RELEVANT
POSITIONS

Microeconomic Theory and Public Policy (undergraduate)


Teaching Assistant to Professor Nikhil Agarwal
Public Finance and Public Policy (undergraduate)
Teaching Assistant to Professor Jonathan Gruber

Spring 2015
Fall 2013 &
2012

Cornerstone Research, Summer Associate


MIT, Research Assistant to Professor Jonathan Gruber
Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Senior Research Assistant
Research Assistant

2014
2011-2013

FELLOWSHIPS,
HONORS, AND
AWARDS

NBER Health and Aging Pre-Doctoral Fellowship


Bradley Foundation Fellowship
MIT Department of Economics Fellowship
Presentation Award for Honors Thesis (Stanford University)
Graduated with Distinction (Stanford University)

2013-2015
2013
2010-2012
2008
2008

RESEARCH
PAPERS

The Effects of Hospital Mergers on Technology Adoption and Utilization


(Job Market Paper)
In this paper, I investigate how hospital mergers affect technology adoption and
utilization with an eye toward informing how hospitals compete and
understanding the implications for antitrust policy. Specifically, I analyze the
mergers of five for-profit hospital chains in a difference-in-difference
framework, comparing markets in which two or more of the merging chains
operated prior to the mergers to markets in which zero or one chain operated.
The estimates suggest that treated markets gained 4.5 to 6.5 technologies as a
result of the mergers. An increase of 4.5 technologies represents 35% of the
increase in technology levels in these markets during the post-merger period. I
find little evidence that overall utilization increased post-merger, but there is
some evidence that utilization of specific technologies increased when they
were more readily available.

RESEARCH IN
PROGRESS

Hospital Mergers and Medical Utilization


This study examines how hospital mergers impact medical utilization and
medical expenditure growth. To identify the effects of the mergers, I analyze a
series of hospital chain mergers, comparing markets in which two or more of
the merging chains operated prior to the mergers to markets in which zero or
one chain operated. Evidence suggests that total expenditures fell 3% in treated
markets after the mergers relative to markets without mergers. Further analysis
reveals two potential mechanisms: 1) total expenditures fell among the merging
chains in treatment markets as the newly formed chain closed hospitals, and 2)
treatment patterns changed following the merger, as suggested by a relative
decline in the number of surgeries performed in treatment markets. I find no
evidence that changes in admissions or inpatient days contributed to the relative
decline in expenditures.

2009-2010
2008-2009

MARIAFLAVIA HARARI
harari@mit.edu

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY


OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E19-750
Cambridge, MA 02139
harari@mit.edu
http://economics.mit.edu/grad/harari

HOME CONTACT INFORMATION


321 Harvard Street, apt. 307
Cambridge, MA 02139
Mobile: 224-678-3760

MIT PLACEMENT OFFICER


Professor Benjamin Olken
617-253-6833

MIT PLACEMENT ADMINISTRATOR


Ms. Beata Shuster
bshuster@mit.edu
617-324-5857

DOCTORAL
STUDIES

bolken@mit.edu

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)


PhD, Economics, Expected completion June 2015
DISSERTATION: Essays in Development Economics
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES
Professor Esther Duflo
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-201B
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-258-7013
eduflo@mit.edu

Professor Benjamin Olken


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-212
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-6833
bolken@mit.edu

Professor Dave Donaldson


Stanford Department of Economics
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305
650-725-3995
ddonald@stanford.edu
PRIOR
EDUCATION

Bocconi University, Milan, Italy


M.Sc. summa cum laude, Economics and Social Sciences
Bocconi University, Milan, Italy
B.A. summa cum laude, Economics and Social Sciences
New York University, New York City, NY
Undergraduate exchange student

CITIZENSHIP

Italy

LANGUAGES

English (fluent), Italian (native), German (upper-intermediate),


Spanish (upper-intermediate), French (upper-intermediate)

FIELDS

Primary Field: Development Economics


Secondary Field: Urban Economics

GENDER:

Female

2009
2007
2006

MARIAFLAVIA HARARI
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 2

TEACHING
EXPERIENCE

RELEVANT
POSITIONS

14.01 Principles of Microeconomics (Undergraduate)


Teaching assistant to Professor Jeffrey Harris
14.73x/MIT edX The Challenges of Global Poverty
(Undergraduate). Teaching assistant to Professors Abhijit
Banerjee and Esther Duflo
14.21 Health Economics (Undergraduate)
Teaching assistant to Professor Jeffrey Harris
14.771 Development Economics - Micro issues (Graduate)
Teaching assistant to Professors Esther Duflo and Benjamin
Olken
14.770 Introduction to Collective Choice and Political Economy
(Graduate). Teaching assistant to Professors Eliana La Ferrara
and Benjamin Olken
14.01 Principles of Microeconomics (Undergraduate)
Teaching assistant to Professor Jeffrey Harris
14.771 Development Economics - Micro issues (Graduate)
Teaching assistant to Professors Abhijit Banerjee and Benjamin
Olken

Spring 2015

Research assistant to Professor Esther Duflo,


Haryana, India
Research assistant to Professor Guido Tabellini, IGIER-Bocconi,
Milan, Italy
Research assistant to Professor Roberto Perotti, IGIER-Bocconi,
Milan, Italy

Summer 2011

FELLOWSHIPS, MIT Travel Grant (for Graduate Students)


HONORS, AND Albert Ando - Franco Modigliani fellowship for graduate
studies
AWARDS
Bocconi Scholarship for Outstanding Students
New York University Deans Honor Roll
PROFESSIONAL Presentations:
ACTIVITIES
Northeast Universities Development Consortium Conference,
Boston University.
Northeast Universities Development Consortium Conference,
Harvard University.
Invited Speaker, 28th Annual Congress of the European
Economic Association / 67th European Meeting of
the Econometric Society,
University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
Boston Working Group on African Political Economy,
MIT.

Spring 2014

Spring 2014
Fall 2012

Fall 2012

Spring 2012
Fall 2011

2008/2009
Summer 2008

2013
2009-2011
2007-2009
2006

Fall 2014
Fall 2013
Summer 2013

Fall 2012

Referee for:
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, The Economic Journal,
Journal of the European Economic Association, Global Environmental Change,
Climate and Development.

MARIAFLAVIA HARARI
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 3

RESEARCH
PAPERS

Cities in Bad Shape: Urban Geometry in India (Job Market Paper)


Cities are valuable to the extent they bring people (and jobs) together. To what
extent is this value affected by difficulty of commuting from various points in
the city to others? While many factors can affect commuting length, this paper
investigates one determining factor of urban commuting efficiency, previously
highlighted by urban planners but overlooked by economists: city shape. A
satellite-derived dataset of night-time lights is combined with historic maps to
retrieve the geometric properties of urban footprints in India over time. I
propose an instrument for urban shape, which combines geography with a
mechanical model for city expansion: in essence, cities are predicted to expand
in circles of increasing sizes, and actual city shape is predicted by obstacles
within each circle. With this instrument in hand, I investigate how city shape
affects the location choices of consumers, in a spatial equilibrium framework
la Roback-Rosen. Cities with more compact shapes are characterized by larger
population, lower wages, and higher housing rents, consistent with compact
shape being a consumption amenity. The implied welfare cost of deteriorating
city shape is estimated to be sizeable. I also attempt to shed light on policy
responses to deteriorating shape. The adverse effects of unfavorable topography
appear to be exacerbated by building height restrictions, and mitigated by road
infrastructure.
Conflict, Climate and Cells : a Disaggregated Analysis
(joint with Eliana La Ferrara)
First version: BREAD Working Paper No. 365, November 2012.
Current version: February 2014.
We conduct a disaggregated empirical analysis of civil conflict at the subnational level in Africa over the period 1997-2011 using a new gridded dataset.
We exploit within-year variation in weather and in the growing season of
different crops, as well as spatial variation in crop cover, to construct an
original measure of agriculture-relevant shocks. We also use state-of-the-art
spatial econometric techniques to test for the presence of temporal and spatial
spillovers in conflict. We show that negative climate shocks which occur
during the growing season of the main crop cultivated in a cell have a persistent
effect on conflict incidence. Exploiting variation in the type of conflict event,
we find that these effects are particularly pronounced for battles, violence
against civilians and riots. We use our estimates to trace the dynamic response
of conflict to shocks and predict how future warming scenarios may affect the
prevalence and diffusion of violence.
Womens Inheritance Rights and Bargaining Power: Evidence from
Kenya
This paper investigates the human capital effects of a statutory law reform
meant to grant Kenyan women equal inheritance rights. I employ a differencein-differences strategy, exploiting variation in pre-reform inheritance rights
across religious groups. I find that a variety of human capital outcomes are
affected: women exposed to the reform are more educated, both in absolute
terms and relative to males; they are less likely to undergo genital mutilation
and more likely to be medically assisted during childbirth; they tend to delay

MARIAFLAVIA HARARI
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 4

marriage and childbearing, and to have better marriage market outcomes. I


provide robustness checks by showing that these improvements occur across
ethnic groups, regardless of initial education level, and are more pronounced
for women with fewer siblings, for whom the absolute inheritance share is
potentially larger. These findings suggest that legal recognition of women's
inheritance rights can have an impact on womens empowerment even in a
context of poor enforcement and in spite of the persistence of deep-rooted
social norms.
OTHER PAPERS The Effect of Culture on the Functioning of Institutions: Evidence from
European Regions (joint with Guido Tabellini),
CESifo DICE Report 1/2009, forthcoming in Harrison, L. and E. Yasin, eds.,
Culture Matters II: Focus on Russia, New York: Lexington Books.

SARA HERNNDEZ
sara_hdz@mit.edu

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY


OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E19-750
Cambridge, MA 02139
Mobile: 617-251-9986
sara_hdz@mit.edu

HOME CONTACT INFORMATION


440 Mass Ave, apt. 4
Cambridge, MA 02139
Mobile: 617-251-9986

http://economics.mit.edu/grad/sara_hdz
MIT PLACEMENT OFFICER
Professor Benjamin Olken
617-253-6833
DOCTORAL
STUDIES

MIT PLACEMENT ADMINISTRATOR


Ms. Beata Shuster
bshuster@mit.edu
617-324-5857

bolken@mit.edu

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)


PhD, Economics, Expected completion June 2015
DISSERTATION: Essays in Development Economics
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES
Professor Esther Duflo
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-201B
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-258-7013
eduflo@mit.edu

Professor Dave Donaldson


Stanford Department of Economics
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
650-725-3995
ddonald@stanford.edu

Professor Abhijit Banerjee


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-201A
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-8855
banerjee@mit.edu
PRIOR
EDUCATION

B.A. in Economics
with Honors

CITIZENSHIP Spain

Universitat Pompeu Fabra


GENDER:

LANGUAGES

English, Spanish (native)

FIELDS

Primary Fields: Development Economics


Secondary Fields: Labor Economics

Female

2009

SARA HERNNDEZ
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 2

TEACHING
EXPERIENCE

RELEVANT
POSITIONS

FELLOWSHIPS,
HONORS, AND
AWARDS

PROFESSIONAL
ACTIVITIES

14.03/14.003 Microeconomic Theory and Public Policy


(Undergraduate and Graduate). Teaching Assistant to
Professor Nikhil Agarwal
MIT Sloan Introductory Economics (MBA)
Lecturer
14.01 Principles of Microeconomics (Undergraduate)
Teaching Assistant to Professor Jonathan Gruber
14.33 Research and Communication in Economics
(Undergraduate). Teaching Assistant to Professor Sara
Ellison
14.01 Principles of Microeconomics (Undergraduate)
Lecturer
14.01 Principles of Microeconomics (Undergraduate).
Teaching Assistant to Professor Jonathan Gruber
Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) Executive Course on
Evaluating Social Programs. Teaching Assistant
Research Assistant to Professor Esther Duflo
J-PAL South Asia Office
Research Assistant to Professors Esther Duflo, Pascaline
Dupas and Jon Robinson.
Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) Kenya. Projects:
-Nudging Farmers to Use Fertilizer: Theory and
Experimental Evidence from Kenya
-Education, HIV and Early Fertility: Experimental
Evidence from Kenya
Rafael del Pino Fellowship
Agricultural Technology Adoption Initiative (ATAI) for
Contract Farming in India
Graduate Resident Tutor for Simmons Hall (MIT
Undergraduate dorm)
La Caixa Fellowship
MISTI India Award Institute for Financial Management
and Research (IFMR) Chennai
Exceptional Achievement in Economics Award,
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Spanish National Award in Economics (3rd Prize)
Mahindra United World College of India (UWC)

(Expected)
Spring 2015
Summer 2014
Fall 2013
Fall 2013
Spring 2013
Fall 2012
Summer 2012
2010
2009-2010

2012 - 2014
2012 - 2013
2012 2013
2010 - 2012
2010
2009
2009
2003 - 2005

Northeast Universities Development Consortium Conference


(NEUDC, Boston University)

2014

Agricultural Technology Adoption Initiative (ATAI) Partnership Development Conference

2013

SARA HERNNDEZ
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 3

RESEARCH
PAPERS

Guns n Roses: The Impact of Female Employment on Violence in


Colombia (Job Market Paper)
This paper investigates the impact of the dramatic growth of the fresh-cut
flower sector in Colombia, on different forms of violence, measured at the
municipality level. The empirical strategy exploits municipal variation in the
geoclimatic suitability for floriculture, together with time variation from the
sectors growth. I show that the expansion of the sector was associated with a
reduction in unorganized violent crime (in particular homicide rate) in the
suitable municipalities, but not in any changes in participation in guerilla
warfare. In contrast, increases in coffee price are associated with a decrease in
guerilla warfare (Dube and Vargas, 2013) but, as I show in this paper, an
increase in homicide. I propose a household model where households both
participate in and indirectly consume criminal activities (organized and
unorganized) and women have different preferences than men, which can help
explaining those results.

RESEARCH IN
PROGRESS

Street Harassment and Social Cohesion in Mexico City with Paola Abril
Campos (Innovations for Poverty Action, Mexico), Claudia Daz (Innovations
for Poverty Action, Mexico), Kate Falb (Yale School of Public Health), and
Jumkha Gupta (Yale School of Public Health)
This study seeks to document the frequency of street harassment and
preventive measures women take to avoid it. It explores the association
between experiences of street harassment and perceptions of social cohesion
among women currently presenting for health care at public health clinics. The
study was conducted in Mexico City, the most populous city in North
America, which has a high documented prevalence of gender-based violence
against women, ranging from 20-30% in a womans lifetime. Despite the
pervasiveness of gender-based violence in the city, little is known about
experiences related to street harassment. Data were drawn from a baseline
survey among women currently participating in a randomized controlled trial
in Mexico City (N=952). Current findings underscore the needs for programs
and policies to promote the safety and well being of women and addressing
community and structural-level forms of gender discrimination and violence.

Pass Through of Quality Premiums to Small-Holder Farmers in Gujarat,


India (with Reshmaan Hussam and Natalia Rigol)
This project is a randomized control trial funded by the Agricultural
Technology Adoption Initiative (ATAI) that seeks to systematically identify
the barriers that small and marginal farmers, often females, face in the
production of high quality crops in India, and in turn understand what forms of
contracts can best incentivize such high quality production. Knowing how to
incorporate these farmers into the high value-added segments becomes
increasingly relevant as organized retailers replace traditional food sellers.
This is of special relevance presently in India as the country is rapidly opening
up to massive retail supermarkets which interact primarily with large farmers,

SARA HERNNDEZ
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 4

arguably pushing out many small and marginal farmers in the process.
Understanding how to construct optimal contracts with these small farmers
that streamline the production of high quality crops can thus facilitate their
reintegration into the quickly changing landscape of Indian agricultural
economy. We finished a baseline survey across our sample of 2,200 farmers
and we are currently in the process of cleaning and analyzing the data
collected.

YOUNGJUN JANG
jyjglory@mit.edu

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY


OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E19-750
Cambridge, MA 02139
jyjglory@mit.edu
http://economics.mit.edu/grad/jyjglory

HOME CONTACT INFORMATION


70 Pacific Street, apt. 597A
Cambridge, MA 02139
Mobile: 650-248-5589

MIT PLACEMENT OFFICER


Professor Benjamin Olken bolken@mit.edu
617-253-6833

MIT PLACEMENT ADMINISTRATOR


Ms. Beata Shuster bshuster@mit.edu
617-324-5857

DOCTORAL
STUDIES

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)


PhD, Economics, Expected completion June 2015
DISSERTATION: Essays on Industrial Organization
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES
Professor Glenn Ellison
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E18-269F
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-8702
gellison@mit.edu

Professor Sara Ellison


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E18-269B
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-3821
sellison@mit.edu

Professor Paulo Somaini


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E18-212
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-3362
psomaini@mit.edu

PRIOR
EDUCATION

B.A.S. with Honors and Distinction


Economics and Mathematics

Stanford University

CITIZENSHIP

Korea, Republic of

GENDER:

LANGUAGES

English (fluent), Korean (native)

FIELDS

Primary Field: Industrial Organization


Secondary Fields: Finance, Economics of Education

Male

2007

YOUNGJUN JANG
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 2
TEACHING
EXPERIENCE

14.273 Advanced Topics in Industrial Organization


Teaching Assistant to Professor Paulo Somaini (Graduate)
14.03 Microeconomic Theory and Public Policy
Teaching Assistant to Professor Paulo Somaini (Undergraduate)
14.12 Game Theory
Teaching Assistant to Professor Muhamet Yildiz (Undergraduate)
14.01 Principles of Microeconomics
Teaching Assistant to Professor Jeffrey Harris (Undergraduate)
14.03 Microeconomic Theory and Public Policy
Teaching Assistant to Professor Stephen Ryan (Undergraduate)
14.271 Industrial Organization I
Teaching Assistant to Professor Glenn Ellison (Graduate)

Spring 2014
Spring 2014
Fall 2012
Spring 2012
Spring 2012
Fall 2011

RELEVANT
POSITIONS

Research Assistant to Professor Glenn Ellison, MIT

OTHER
EXPERIENCE

Military Service, Sergeant, Analysis and Assessment Group,


Republic of Korea Army Headquarters

2009-2011

FELLOWSHIPS,
HONORS, AND
AWARDS

Kwanjeong Educational Foundation Scholarship


Commendation, Analysis and Assessment Group,
Republic of Korea Army Headquarters
Special Combatant Award, Republic of Korea Army
MIT Presidential Fellowship
Samsung Lee Kun Hee Scholarship
Honorable Mention, William Lowell Putnam Competition,
2nd place at Stanford University
Silver Medal, 42nd International Mathematical Olympiad

2007-2014
2011

PROFESSIONAL Presentations:
Rising Stars Session, the 12th Annual International Industrial
ACTIVITIES
Organization Conference, Northwestern University
SSK International Conference on Competition and Information
Economy, Yonsei University
RESEARCH
PAPERS

2010

2010
2007-2009
2003-2007
2003
2001

2014
2014

The Effects of the Internet and Mobile Search Technologies on Retail


Markets: Evidence from the Korean Gasoline Market (Job Market Paper)
Since 2008, a Korean government website has posted daily prices of all gasoline
stations. Combined with the rapid increase of smartphone and mobile
technologies, this price information service may have changed the consumer
search environment significantly. This paper investigates the effects of these
technological advances on the retail gasoline market, using daily price data,
quantity data for select stations obtained from a credit card provider, and regional
smartphone penetration rates. In daily price data for four regions from January
2010 to June 2012, price dispersion among gasoline stations and markup increase
slightly when the smartphone penetration rate increases, even while additional
descriptive evidence suggests that demand is becoming more price-sensitive.
Structural estimation of a two-type consumer search model finds that the
proportion of highly informed consumers increases as the smartphone penetration

YOUNGJUN JANG
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 3
rate increases. A counterfactual analysis confirms that observed price changes are
consistent with theoretical models of pricing, given the structurally estimated
parameters.
RESEARCH IN
PROGRESS

Mental Accounting and Consumer Choices in the Korean Retail Gasoline


Market
This paper presents a new approach to measure consumer choices, using a
detailed transaction-level gasoline sales dataset for select stations in Korea. There
are two unique market properties: first, almost all gasoline stations in Korea offer
only full service; second, gas pumps can be set to fuel until pre-set integer dollar
amounts. From January 2010 to December 2012, about 30% of regular gasoline
consumers chose to simply fill up, while the remaining 70% of consumers spent
pre-selected dollar amounts. Retail gasoline price changes had little effect on this
tendency. I develop a discrete-choice utility model to explain the observed
consumer behavior and discuss optimal pricing policies.
Does Coeducation Reduce the Gender Gap? Evidence from Korean
Secondary Schools
In March 1997, the Korean government introduced a new policy to increase the
proportion of co-ed schools. A dataset of Korean SAT scores for the entire pool
of exam takers from 1999 to 2009 is used to examine the impact of the proportion
of exam takers from co-ed high schools on the gender gaps for the whole score
distribution, not only for mean or median scores. Focusing on two main subjects
(Korean and mathematics), this research investigates the differences between the
scores of male students and those of female students at 25%, 50%, 75%, 90%
percentile levels. Preliminary results show that, as the number of exam takers
attending co-ed high schools increases, so do the gender gaps at all percentile
levels, and this tendency is significant, especially for mathematics.
Ability Grouping and Student Achievement: Effects of the Equalization
Policy in Korea
This paper analyzes the effects of ability grouping on the academic performance
of high school graduating students in Korea. About half of the regions in Korea
adopted the equalization policy (EP), which means that high school students are
randomly assigned. For the other non-EP regions, students are sorted among
schools based on ability levels. I exploit that several regions adopted the EP
during 2000-2008 as a result of the exogenous policy shifts, and utilize a
difference-in-differences strategy. Studying a dataset of Korean SAT scores for
the entire pool of exam takers from 1999 to 2009, I find that after the EP, students
performed worse, especially those in high percentiles. In addition, there was an
increasing trend in the achievement levels in the treatment regions, but after the
introduction of the EP, this trend vanished.

KYUNGMIN KIM
kkim1@mit.edu

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY


OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E19-750
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-955-6801
kkim1@mit.edu

HOME CONTACT INFORMATIO


235 Albany Street, Apt. 2093
Cambridge, MA 02139
Mobile: 617-955-6801

http://economics.mit.edu/grad/kkim1
MIT PLACEMENT OFFICER
Professor Benjamin Olken
617-253-6833
DOCTORAL
STUDIES

bolken@mit.edu

MIT PLACEMENT ADMINISTRATOR


Ms. Beata Shuster bshuster@mit.edu
617-324-5857

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)


PhD, Economics, Expected completion June 2015
DISSERTATION: Essays on Financial Institutions
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES
Professor Robert Townsend
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-230
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-452-3722
rtownsen@mit.edu

Professor Alp Simsek


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-244
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-4836
asimsek@mit.edu

Professor Arnaud Costinot


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-232
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-324-1712
costinot@mit.edu

PRIOR
EDUCATION

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 2007


B.S. in Mathematics and Economics

CITIZENSHIP

South Korea

LANGUAGES

Korean (Native), English (Fluent)

FIELDS

Primary Fields: Macroeconomics


Secondary Fields: Finance

GENDER: Male

KYUNGMIN KIM
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 2
TEACHING
EXPERIENCE

14.04 Intermediate Microeconomic Theory (Undergraduate)


Teaching Assistant to Professor Juuso Toikka
14.30 Introduction to Statistical Methods (Undergraduate)
Teaching Assistant to David Colino
14.02 Principles of Macroeconomics (Undergraduate)
Teaching Assistant to Professor Francesco Giavazzi
Teaching Assistant to Professor Fernando Broner
Teaching Assistant to Professor Francesco Giavazzi

Fall 2014
Fall 2014

Spring 2014
Spring 2013
Spring 2012

RELEVANT
POSITIONS

Summer Research, Bank of Mexico

Summer 2012

FELLOWSHIPS,
HONORS, AND
AWARDS

Samsung Scholarship
MIT Fellowship
Phi Beta Kappa
Gold Medal, International Physics Olympiad

2009 2014
2009 2011
2007
2002

OTHER
EXPERIENCE

Mandatory Military Service, Sergeant, South Korean Army

2007 2009

RESEARCH
PAPERS

An Empirical Model of the Interbank Market and Its Application


(Job Market Paper)
We build a model of short-term interbank loans. The variation in the banks'
ability to handle an excess or a deficit of liquidity drives the variation in interest
rates. We derive equations that characterize the shape of the interest rate curve
as a function of loan size. The model is consistent with the following
observations on the Mexican interbank market, using a unique dataset of
interbank loan transactions: (i) the variation of interest rates on the loans
between two large banks is small; (ii) small banks lending to large banks
receive lower interest rates than large banks lending to other large banks; (iii)
small banks borrowing from large banks pay higher interest rates than large
banks borrowing from other large banks and (iv) controlling for bank
characteristics, small banks get more favorable interest rates for larger loans.
Finally, as an application of the model, we discuss how the environment in
which the banks operate changes during a financial crisis. In particular, we find
that in Mexico during the 2008 financial crisis, much of the extraordinary
behavior of the interbank market may be attributed to the increased need for
interbank transactions by banks, rather than to a more fundamental change in
the cost of handling liquidity.

YE LUO
lkurt@mit.edu

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY


OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E19-750
Cambridge, MA 02139
(860) 933-6236
lkurt@mit.edu

HOME CONTACT INFORMATION


550 Memorial Drive, apt. 2D-2
Cambridge, MA 02139
Mobile: (860) 933-6236

http://economics.mit.edu/grad/lkurt
MIT PLACEMENT OFFICER
Professor Benjamin Olken
(617) 253-6833
DOCTORAL
STUDIES

bolken@mit.edu

MIT PLACEMENT ADMINISTRATOR


Ms. Beata Shuster
bshuster@mit.edu
(617) 324-5857

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)


PhD, Economics, Expected completion June 2015
Dissertation:Essays in High Dimensional Econometrics and Model Selection
Dissertation Committee and References
Professor Victor Chernozhukov
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-242
Cambridge, MA 02139
(617) 253-4767
vchern@mit.edu

Professor Jerry Hausman


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-238A
Cambridge, MA 02139
(617) 253-3644
jhausman@mit.edu

Professor Whitney Newey


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E19-760
Cambridge, MA 02139
(617) 253-6420
wnewey@mit.edu

Professor Anna Mikusheva


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-210
Cambridge, MA 02139
(617) 253-5459
amikushe@mit.edu

PRIOR
EDUCATION

Massachusetts Institute of Technology


B.S. in Mathematics, B.S. in Economics
Peking University
Major in Mathematics

CITIZENSHIP

P.R. of China

LANGUAGES

Chinese, English

GENDER:

2007-2010
2005-2007
Male

YE LUO
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 2
FIELDS

Primary Field: Econometrics


Secondary Fields: Finance, Industrial Organization

TEACHING
EXPERIENCE

Statistical Method in Economics (PhD, MIT 14.381)


Teaching Assistant to Professor Anna Mikusheva and
Visiting Professor Alfred Galichon (2014)
Teaching Assistant to Professor Anna Mikusheva and
Visiting Professor Kirill Evodokimov (2013)
Non-Linear Econometric Analysis (PhD, MIT 14.385)
Teaching Assistant to Professor Victor Chernozhukov and
Professor Whitney Newey
Econometrics (PhD, MIT 14.382)
Teaching Assistant to Professor Jerry Hausman
Econometrics (Undergraduate, MIT 14.32)
Teaching Assistant to Visiting Professor Yingying Dong
Principles of Microeconomics (Undergraduate, MIT 14.01)
Lecturer, Teaching Assistant to Professor Jeffery Harris

RELEVANT
POSITIONS

Research Assistant to Professor Jerry Hausman


Research Assistant to Professor Victor Chernozhukov

FELLOWSHIPS, MIT Economics Department Fellowship


HONORS, AND Mingde Fellowship, Peking University
AWARDS
Gold Medal and 1st rank with perfect score,
45th International Mathematical Olympiad
Gold Medal and 1st rank with perfect score,
20th Chinese Mathematical Olympiad

Fall 2014 &


Fall 2013

Fall 2014 &


Fall 2012
Spring 2014
Fall 2013
Spring 2013
2012-Present
2009-Present
2010-2012
2005-2007
2005
2005

PROFESSIONAL Referee for Bernoulli, Econometric Theory


ACTIVITIES
RESEARCH
PAPERS

Selecting Informative Moments via LASSO (Job Market Paper)


The traditional optimal GMM estimator is biased when there are many moments.
This paper considers the case when information is sparse, i.e., only a small set of
the moment conditions is informative. We propose a LASSO based selection
procedure in order to choose the informative moments and then, using the
selected moments, conduct optimal GMM. Our method can significantly reduce
second-order bias of the optimal GMM estimator while retaining most of the
information in the full set of moments. The LASSO selection procedure allows
the number of moments to be much larger than the sample size. We establish
bounds and asymptotics of the LASSO and post-LASSO estimators. Under our
approximate sparsity condition, both estimators are asymptotically normal and
nearly efficient when the number of strongly informative moments grows at a
slow rate compared to the sample size. The formulation of LASSO is a convex
optimization problem and thus the computational cost is low compared to other
moment selection procedures such as those described in Donald, Imbens and

YE LUO
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 3
RESEARCH
PAPERS

Newey (2008). In an IV setting with homoskedastic errors, our procedure


reduces to the IV-LASSO method stated in Belloni, Chen, Chernozhukov and
Hansen (2012). We propose penalty terms using data-driven methods. Since the
construction of the penalties requires the knowledge of unknown parameters, we
propose adaptive algorithms which perform well globally. These algorithms can
be applied to more general L1-penalization problems when the penalties depend
on the parameter to be estimated. In simulation experiments, the LASSO-based
GMM estimator performs well when compared to the optimal GMM estimator
and CUE.
Summarizing Partial Effects Beyond Average
With Victor Chernozhukov
For partial effects under consideration, the usual modus operandi is to report the
average partial effects. In this paper, instead of the average, we consider sorting
the effects into an increasing function. We derived the asymptotic properties of
the sorted curve of partial effects given any probability measure. In particular,
we proved the asymptotic properties of the rearranged curve for the empirical
measure, thereby providing inferences for each quantile of the partial effect with
i.i.d data. Though the analytical confidence interval is often difficult to compute,
we suggest a bootstrap method which proves to be valid for inference. The
technique we develop in this paper allows us to demonstrate the entire image of
the partial effects rather than simply the average as is usual in econometrics. We
present Monte-Carlo examples to show how the procedure works. We apply our
method to study the returns-to-education problem using 1980 PUMS data.
Shape Regularization In Econometrics
With Victor Chernozhukov and Ivan Fernandez-Val
In many economic applications one encounters functions with certain shapes.
We study a group of functional operators including Legendre Transformation,
rearrangement and projection, which enforce certain shapes such as convexity
and monotonicity on functions. Suppose there is an estimator of the true
function. If the true function has certain shape properties, by applying the
corresponding functional operators to the estimator, one can construct a function
of the desired shape that is closer to the true function under some distance. We
show that the inference can be done similarly by applying the corresponding
operators on the boundary of the uniform confidence bands of the true function
(with slight modifications). We provide conditions for such a simple inference
strategy to be valid.
EIV on Dependent Variable of Quantile Regression Models
With Jerry Hausman and Christopher Palmer
The usual quantile regression estimator of Koenker and Bassett (1978) is biased
if there is an additive error term in the dependent variable. We analyze this
problem as an errors-in-variables problem where the dependent variable suffers
from the classical measurement error and develop a sieve maximum-likelihood
approach that is robust to left-hand side measurement error. After describing
sufficient conditions for identification, we employ global optimization
algorithms (specifically, a genetic algorithm) to solve the MLE optimization
problem. We also propose a computationally tractable EM-type algorithm that

YE LUO
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 4
RESEARCH
PAPERS

accelerates the computational speed in the neighborhood of the optimum. When


the number of knots in the quantile grid is chosen to grow at an adequate speed,
the sieve maximum-likelihood estimator is asymptotically normal. We verify our
theoretical results with Monte Carlo simulations and illustrate our estimator with
an application to the returns to education highlighting important changes over
time in the returns to education that have been obscured in previous work by
measurement-error bias.
Core Determining Sets: Construction, Approximation and Inference
With Hai Wang
The relations between unobserved events and observed outcomes in partially
identified models can be characterized by a bipartite graph. We estimate the
probability measure on the events given observations of the outcomes based on
the graph. The feasible set of the probability measure on the events is defined by a
set of linear inequality constraints. The number of inequalities is often much
larger than the number of observations. The set of irredundant inequalities is
known as the Core Determining Class. We propose an algorithm that explores the
structure of the graph to construct the exact Core Determining Class when data
noise is not taken into consideration. We prove that if the graph and the measure
on the observed outcomes are non-degenerate, the Core Determining Class does
not depend on the probability measure of the outcomes but only on the structure
of the graph. For more general problem of selecting linear inequalities under
noise, we investigate the sparse assumptions on the full set of inequalities, i.e.,
only a few inequalities are truly binding. We show that the sparse assumptions are
equivalent to certain sparse conditions on the dual problems. We propose a
procedure similar to the Dantzig Selector to select the truly informative
constraints. We analyze the properties of the procedure and show that the feasible
set defined by the selected constraints is a nearly sharp estimator of the true
feasible set. Under our sparse assumptions, we prove that such a procedure can
significantly reduce the number of inequalities without discarding too much
information. We apply the procedure to the Core Determining Class problem and
obtain a stronger theorem taking advantage of the structure of the bipartite graph.
We design Monte-Carlo experiments to demonstrate the good performance of our
selection procedure, while the traditional CHT inference is difficult to apply.
Semi-Parametric Interval Regression with Extension to Generalized IV
Models
With Victor Chernozhukov and Denis Chetverikov
Conditional moment inequalities induce infinitely many inequality constraints on
the parameter of interest. One important case is that the observed dependent
variables are intervals in the linear regression model. We develop a geometric
method of depicting the identification region given a set of linear inequalities.
Using the Legendre Transformation, we establish a simple duality between the
convex hull of the covariates and the identification region of the parameter. The
order-preserving property of the Legendre transformation provides an additional
duality between the confidence set of the parameter and the confidence set of the
convex hull of the covariates. The procedure is computationally tractable and
easy to implement. We propose a similar procedure to estimate and perform
inference of the identified region when the conditional moment inequalities are

YE LUO
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 5
semiparametric and partially linear in the parameter of interest. We propose a
uniform-inference procedure based on non-parametric inference of the convex
hull of the covariates. We extend our results to a class of Generalized IV models.
We demonstrate the performance of our procedure in Monte-Carlo experiments.
RESEARCH IN
PROGRESS

Functional Inequalities: Optimal Discretization, Estimation and Inference


With Hai Wang
This paper extends the Core-Determining-Sets problem to the situation with
continuous correspondence mapping instead of discrete mapping. Our setting
allows partially-identified models to be estimated non-parametrically under
certain smooth assumptions. We discuss optimal discretization of the
correspondence mapping and derive the optimal number of cells being
discretized. Our method adaptively adjusts this number in order to balance the
approximation error and the estimation error given a specific model and
observed data.
Adaptive Non-Parametric Smoothing on Discrete Variables
With Martin Spindler
Non-parametric smoothing proposed in Li and Racine (2001) may substantially
improve the performance of non-parametric methods such as kernel estimation
when there exist discrete variables. While Li and Racine (2001) makes
smoothing weights equally the same across different values of the discrete
variables, we develop a method using data-driven weights based on test statistics
proposed in Hardle and Mammen (1993) and Dette and Neumeyer (2003).
Preliminary results show that our procedure performs better than Li and Racine
(2001) and traditional non-parametric methods, especially when the sample size
is relatively small.

SARAH MOSHARY
smoshary@mit.edu

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY


OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E19-750
Cambridge, MA 02139
917-376-4396
smoshary@mit.edu
http://economics.mit.edu/grad/smoshary

HOME CONTACT INFORMATION


305 Memorial Drive, Apt 3019
Cambridge, MA 02139
Mobile: 917-376-4396

MIT PLACEMENT OFFICER


Professor Benjamin Olken
617-253-6833

MIT PLACEMENT ADMINISTRATOR


Ms. Beata Shuster
bshuster@mit.edu
617-324-5857

DOCTORAL
STUDIES

bolken@mit.edu

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)


PhD, Economics, Expected completion June 2015
DISSERTATION: Essays on Price Discrimination & Regulation
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES
Professor Glenn Ellison
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E18-269F
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-8702
gellison@mit.edu

Professor Nancy Rose


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E18-210
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-8956
nrose@mit.edu

Professor Paulo Somaini


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E18-212
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-3362
psomaini@mit.edu
PRIOR
EDUCATION

Harvard College, A.B., magna cum laude in Economics


Secondary field in Mathematics

CITIZENSHIP

United States

FIELDS

Primary Fields: Industrial Organization, Political Economy

TEACHING
EXPERIENCE

14.33 Research & Communications in Economics (Undergraduate)


Teaching assistant to Professor Heidi Williams
14.20 Industrial Organization & Competitive Strategy
(Undergraduate)
Teaching assistant to Professor Nancy Rose
14.01 Introductory Microeconomics (Undergraduate)
Head Teaching Assistant to Professor Jonathan Gruber

GENDER

2010

Female

Fall 2014
Spring 2014
Fall 2013

SARAH MOSHARY
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 2

RELEVANT
POSITIONS

14.01 Introductory Microeconomics (Undergraduate)


Teaching Assistant to Professor Jeffrey Harris
14.271 Industrial Organization I (Graduate)
Teaching Assistant to Professor Glenn Ellison

Spring 2013

Research Assistant for Professors Joseph Doyle and


Heidi Williams

2012-2014

Fall 2012

FELLOWSHIPS, MIT George and Obie Shultz Fund Grant


HONORS, AND Harvard College, Phi Beta Kappa
AWARDS
Harvard College, Highest Honors in Economics

2012
2010
2010

PROFESSIONAL Chicago Price Theory Summer Camp


ACTIVITIES

2012

RESEARCH
PAPERS

Price Discrimination across Political Action Committees and the


Consequences of Political Advertising Regulation (Job Market Paper)
The rapid growth of Political Action Committees expenditures neared $500
million in the 2012 presidential election is center-stage in the debate over
money in American politics. The effect of PACs on elections depends on
regulation and its interaction with imperfect competition. Congress requires
stations to treat candidates to the same office equally, and to sell campaigns
airtime at lowest unit rates (LURs) within sixty days of a general election. This
paper examines pricing to PACs, which are not protected under the law, and the
impact of political advertising regulation, in particular, lowest unit rate
regulation. Using novel data on prices paid for individual ad spots from the 2012
presidential election, I find that stations price discriminate substantially across
PACs for indistinguishable purchases. On average, PACs pay 40% markups
above regulated rates. Republican PACs pay 14% higher prices on average, but
there is substantial idiosyncratic variation in prices paid across ad spots. I
develop and estimate a model of political demand for ad spots, exploiting
misalignments of state borders and media markets to address potential price
endogeneity. Findings indicate that pricing to PACs reflects buyer willingnessto-pay for viewer demographics. Taken together, these results indicate the
current regulatory regime differentially subsidizes candidates depending on the
characteristics of their base. Using a station price discrimination model, I then
estimate a cost of regulation: strategic quantity withholding of airtime to keep
regulated rates high. Using Bayesian MCMC methods, I estimate this effect is
substantial on the order of 7% of total advertising airtime relative to a
counterfactual without regulation.

RESEARCH IN
PROGRESS

The Welfare Effects of Market Segmentation: Evidence from Parallel


Importation Restrictions
(with Bradley Larsen and Bradley Shapiro)
This study examines the welfare effects of a Supreme Court decision in 2013
that legalized parallel importationpurchasing products abroad at deeply
discounted prices, and reselling them in the US marketin the textbook
industry. By facilitating arbitrage across international boundaries, the court

SARAH MOSHARY
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 3
RESEARCH IN
PROGRESS
(CONTINUED)

decision reduced publishers ability to price discriminate. This study aims to


measure the reduced-form impact of the legal change on prices, sales, and seller
composition, as well as provide structural estimates of the costs and benefits of
international price discrimination in this industry. We bring to bear a rich, novel
dataset on textbook sales by integrating three separate data sources: Nielsens
PubTrack database of retail sales in the US; BooksinPrint data on MSRPs
(manufacturers suggested retail price) for both international and domestic
editions; and eBay.com data on used textbook sales.
The Efficiency of State Monopoly: Evidence from Deregulation of Liquor
Sales
(with Gaston Illanes)
The 2012 deregulation of liquor sales in Washington State provides a unique
opportunity to observe the merits of state monopoly compared to a regulated
private sector. We estimate the effect of liberalization on product availability,
prices, sales, and store location using data from the Washington State Liquor
Control Board and Nielsen retail scanner data on liquor sales in the post-reform
period. We then consider the welfare consequences of the reform, which are
theoretically ambiguous. The government monopolist set prices for spirits at the
state level. Privatization allows firms to tailor prices to local demand conditions,
but potentially creates a welfare loss if firms have market power or if there is
inefficient duplication of fixed costs. We estimate the empirical significance of
these separate effects.

HOAI-LUU Q. NGUYEN
HQN@mit.edu

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY


OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E19-750
Cambridge, MA 02139

HOME CONTACT INFORMATION


100 Memorial Dr.
Apt. 5-14C
Cambridge, MA 02142
Mobile: 406-531-5792

HQN@mit.edu
http://economics.mit.edu/grad/HQN
MIT PLACEMENT OFFICER
Professor Benjamin Olken
617-253-6833
DOCTORAL
STUDIES

bolken@mit.edu

MIT PLACEMENT ADMINISTRATOR


Ms. Beata Shuster
bshuster@mit.edu
617-324-5857

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)


PhD, Economics, Expected completion June 2015
DISSERTATION: Essays on Banking and Local Credit Markets
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES
Professor Michael Greenstone
University of Chicago
Department of Economics
1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
773-702-8250
mgreenst@uchicago.edu

Professor Robert Townsend


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-230
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-452-3722
rtownsen@mit.edu

Professor Abhijit Banerjee


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-201A
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-8855
banerjee@mit.edu
PRIOR
EDUCATION

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007


S.B. in Economics, Minor in Mathematics

CITIZENSHIP

United States

FIELDS

Primary Fields: Development, Finance


Secondary Field: Industrial Organization

GENDER:

Female

HOAI-LUU Q. NGUYEN
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 2

TEACHING
EXPERIENCE

RELEVANT
POSITIONS

14.32 Econometrics (Undergraduate)


Teaching Assistant to Professor Joshua Angrist, MIT
14.01 Principles of Microeconomics (Undergraduate)
Teaching Assistant to Professor Jonathan Gruber, MIT

Spring 2015

Visiting Graduate Fellow, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston


Research Assistant to Professor Robert Townsend, MIT
Assistant Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Research Assistant to Professor Jonathan Gruber, MIT
Research Assistant to Dr. Joanna Lahey, NBER

2013-2014
2010-2012
2007-2010
2006-2007
2005-2006

FELLOWSHIPS, Legatum Center Fellowship


HONORS, AND MIT Economics Department Fellowship
AWARDS
Phi Beta Kappa, MIT

Fall 2013

2012-2013
2010-2012
2007

PUBLICATIONS Hedge Fund Tail Risk (with Tobias Adrian and Markus K.
Brunnermeier), in Quantifying Systemic Risk, ed. by Joseph G. Haubrich
and Andrew W. Lo, 2013.
The Global Financial Crisis and Offshore Dollar Markets (with Niall
Coffey, Warren B. Hrung, and Asani Sarkar), Current Issues in Economics
and Finance, October 2009.
RESEARCH
PAPERS

Do Bank Branches Still Matter? The Effect of Closings on Local Economic


Outcomes (Job Market Paper)
I study the relationship between bank-specific capital and credit access in a new
setting: bank branch closings in markets where the branch network is dense.
Existing regulation in the U.S. is targeted toward areas with few branches
where closings inhibit physical access to the branch network. I show that, even
in crowded markets, closings can have large effects on local credit supply. To
generate plausibly exogenous variation in the incidence of closings, I use
Census tract level data paired with a novel identification strategy that exploits
within-county variation in exposure to post-merger consolidation. This
instrument identifies the effect of closings that occur in close proximity to other
branches. I find that closings have a prolonged negative impact on credit supply
to local small businesses, but only a temporary effect on local mortgage
lending. The number of new small business loans is 13% lower for several
years, and this decline persists even after the entry of new banks. The decline in
lending is highly localized, dissipating 8 miles out, and is concentrated in lowincome and high-minority neighborhoods. These results show closings have
large effects on local credit supply when lending is information-intensive and
lender-specific relationships are difficult to replace. I provide a framework for
discussing the welfare implications, which depend on the characteristics of the
marginal borrower.

HOAI-LUU Q. NGUYEN
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 3

RESEARCH IN
PROGRESS

Do Credit Market Shocks Affect the Real Economy? Quasi-Experimental


Evidence from the Great Recession and Normal Economic Times
(with Michael Greenstone and Alexandre Mas)
We estimate the effect of the sharp reduction in credit supply that followed the
2008 financial crisis on the real economy. The identification strategy relies on
the substantial heterogeneity in the degree to which banks cut lending over this
period. We predict changes in county-level small business lending over 20072009 by estimating the national change in each banks lending that is
attributable to supply factors, and allocating this quantity to counties based on
banks pre-crisis market shares. This measure is highly predictive of actual
small business loan originations, indicating that a firm cannot easily find a new
lender if its bank limits access to credit. Using confidential microdata from the
U.S. Census Longitudinal Business Database, we find a small but significant
relationship between an areas exposure to banks that cut small business lending
in 2009 and small establishment employment growth. The point estimates imply
that the 2007-2009 decline in small business lending accounted for no more
than 10% of the aggregate decline in employment in firms with less than 20
employees. Finally, we note that the relationship between lending supply and
economic activity is not evident in the 1997-2007 period.
A Choice Amongst Many: Household Borrowing in a Setting with
Multiple Providers (with Robert Townsend)
We seek an in-depth understanding of the choices that households and small
businesses make when choosing among several sources of credit in an emerging
market country, Thailand. Borrowers in this setting face a number of different
financial service providers. Even within the formal and informal categories,
these lenders offer contracts that differ along many dimensions including the
interest rate, collateral requirement, and duration. To understand how
households choose optimally amongst these different options, we make use of a
rich monthly panel dataset that tracks income, cash flow, and balance sheet
activity at the level of the individual household or enterprise, in addition to
complementary annual data with a larger geographic coverage. Within these
data, we observe variation by region in terms of the level of wealth and
industrialization, urban and rural status, and distance from financial providers,
which generates heterogeneity in the set of potential lenders faced by different
households. We also exploit various supply-side regulations, including the
introduction of a large government microcredit program, that induce plausibly
exogenous variation in credit supply over time and across villages. Combining
these with data on each household's realized portfolio of loans, we estimate a
model of household decision-making among multiple providers and explore
policy implications.

JUAN PASSADORE
juanpass@mit.edu

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY


OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E19-750
Cambridge, MA 02139
Mobile: 617-699-4931
juanpass@mit.edu

HOME CONTACT INFORMATION


100 Memorial Drive, apt. 89A
Cambridge, MA 02142
Mobile: 617-699-4931

http://economics.mit.edu/grad/juanpass

MIT PLACEMENT OFFICER


Professor Benjamin Olken
617-253-6833
DOCTORAL
STUDIES

bolken@mit.edu

MIT PLACEMENT ADMINISTRATOR


Ms. Beata Shuster
bshuster@mit.edu
617-324-5857

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)


PhD, Economics, Expected completion June 2015
DISSERTATION: Essays in Macroeconomics
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES
Professor Robert Townsend
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-230
Cambridge, MA 02142
617-452-3722
rtownsen@mit.edu

Professor Ivan Werning


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-234
Cambridge, MA 02142
617-452-3662
iwerning@mit.edu

Professor Marios Angeletos


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E18-222
Cambridge, MA 02142
617-452-3859
angelet@mit.edu

Professor Alp Simsek


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-244
Cambridge, MA 02142
617-253-4669
asimsek@mit.edu

Universidad Torcuato Di Tella


Advanced Economics Program

2008

Universidad de Montevideo
B.A. in Economics

2006

CITIZENSHIP

Uruguay

GENDER: Male

LANGUAGES

Spanish (Native), English (Fluent), Portuguese (Intermediate)

PRIOR
EDUCATION

JUAN PASSADORE
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 2
FIELDS

Primary Fields: Macroeconomics


Secondary Fields: Finance, International Economics

TEACHING
EXPERIENCE

RELEVANT
POSITIONS

Intermediate Macroeconomics (Undergraduate, MIT course 14.05)


Teaching Assistant to Alp Simsek
Principles of Macroeconomics (Undergraduate, MIT course 14.02)
Teaching Assistant to Athanasios Orphanides
Topics in Contract Theory (Graduate, Universidad de Montevideo)
Lecturer
Principles of Macroeconomics (Undergraduate, MIT course 14.02)
Teaching Assistant Refet Gurkaynak
Time Series Analysis (Graduate, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella)
Teaching Assistant to Martin Sola
Econometrics I (Graduate, Universidad de Montevideo)
Teaching Assistant to Martin Sola
Financial Econometrics (Graduate, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella)
Teaching Assistant to Martin Sola
Econometrics (Graduate, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella)
Teaching Assistant to Martin Gonzalez Rozada
Industrial Organization (Undergraduate, Universidad Torcuato Di
Tella), Teaching Assistant to Leandro Arozamena
Topics in Microeconomics (Undergraduate, Universidad Torcuato
Di Tella), Teaching Assistant to Marzia Raybaudi
Microeconomics (Undergraduate, Universidad de Montevideo)
Teaching Assistant to Marcelo Caffera

Research Assistant to Professor Robert Townsend


MIT
Research Assistant to Professor Martin Sola
Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
Research Assistant to Professor Pablo Bockzkowski
Northwestern University
Research Assistant to Professor Marcelo Caffera
Universidad de Montevideo
Financial Analyst, Renmax S.A.

FELLOWSHIPS, Macro Financial Modelling Group, Dissertation Fellowship


HONORS, AND George and Obie Schultz Fund Grant , MIT
Graduate Fellowship, Department of Economics, MIT
AWARDS
Graduate Fellowship, Department of Science Technology and
Innovation, Government of the Argentine Republic

2014
2013
2012
2011
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008-07
2007
2006-05

2011-13
2007-08
2008
2005
2004-06

2014-15
2014
2009-15
2007-08

JUAN PASSADORE
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 3
RESEARCH
PAPERS

Robust Conditional Predictions in Dynamic Games: An application to


Sovereign Debt (Job Market Paper 1)
(with Juan Xandri)
We study the problem of an outside observer who, based on observations on a
particular economic setting, tries to make an inference about the set of equilibria
where the economy could be; our aim is to obtain robust predictions conditional
on equilibrium history for dynamic policy games. Our main result is a
characterization of equilibrium consistent outcomes: outcomes of the game in
a particular period, that are consistent with a Subgame perfect equilibrium
conditional on an equilibrium history. We focus on a model of sovereign debt as
in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981); but, our methodology can be readily applied to
other dynamic policy games as in models of capital taxation or monetary policy.
For this model, we characterize the set of equilibrium consistent debt prices.
While the upper bound is the price in the optimal Markov equilibria (as in Eaton
and Gersovitz 1981), the lowest equilibrium price is both positive and backward
looking. In our baseline case, where output is continuous or there is a public
randomization device, the last opportunity cost (the amount of debt just repaid,
the conditions under which that debt was repaid, and how much debt was issued)
is a sufficient statistic of the set of equilibrium consistent prices. When income is
discrete or there are no randomization devices available, the whole history could
determine equilibrium consistent prices; whether or not a particular event in
history matters for equilibrium consistent prices today depends on the likelihood
and the length of that particular history.
Liquidity risk in Sovereign Debt Markets (Job Market Paper 2)
(with Yu Xu)
We study debt policy of emerging economies accounting for credit and liquidity
risk. To account for credit risk, we study an incomplete markets model with
limited commitment and exogenous costs of default following the quantitative
literature of sovereign debt. To account for liquidity risk, we introduce search
frictions in the market for sovereign bonds. In our model, default and liquidity
will be jointly determined. This permits us to structurally decompose spreads
into a credit and liquidity component. To evaluate the quantitative performance
of the model we perform a calibration exercise using data for Argentina. We find
that introducing liquidity risk does not harm the overall performance of the
model in matching key moments of the data (mean debt to GDP, mean sovereign
spread and volatility of sovereign spread). At the same time, the model
endogenously generates bid ask spreads that can match those for Argentinean
bonds in the period of analysis. Regarding the structural decomposition, we find
that the liquidity component can explain up to 50 percent of the sovereign spread
during bad times; when the sovereign is not close to default, the liquidity
component is negligible. Finally, regarding business cycle properties, the model
matches key moments in the data.

JUAN PASSADORE
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 4
RESEARCH IN
PROGRESS

Robust Reputation formation and the cost of Sovereign Defaults


(with Juan Xandri)
We study the cost of a bad reputation in a model of Sovereign Debt as in Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981). To model reputation we introduce private information
regarding the governments payoff type. Because dynamic games with private
information exhibit multiple equilibria, our objective is to obtain a bound on the
cost of a bad reputation. We focus on the case where initial beliefs place
probability one on the bad type. For this case, we show that in the worst Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium there are no learning dynamics (no reputation acquisition).
So, in addition, we assume that there is common knowledge of strong certainty
of rationality. In this setting, we characterize the worst equilibrium, and show
that past actions taken by the government refine the set of continuation
equilibrium strategies for each type managing interest rates. At the same time,
past actions signal the payoff type; there is strong separation whenever lenders
observe actions that would be irrational for the bad government.
A note on Robustness and One Sided Lack of Commitment
We characterize the optimal risk sharing contract between a risk neutral money
lender and an agent that faces Knightian uncertainty about the distribution of his
endowment and cannot commit on future transfers. We find that, in the optimal
contract, model uncertainty contributes to increase consumption of the agent
over time. In particular, we find that when the money lender and the agent share
the same discount factor, consumption increases every period until it reaches a
maximum value, where remains constant. This differs from the case without
Knigthian uncertainty where consumption increases only with high realizations
of the endowment.
What is the value of commitment during a liquidity trap?
(with Sebastian Di Tella and Su Wang)
When the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is binding, the central bank
can still stimulate the economy by committing to keep interest rates low after the
liquidity trap in order to create inflation and an output boom in the future.
Without commitment, the central bank would revert to an optimal policy right
after the liquidity trap, eliminating this policy tool. However, to the extent that
the economy remains weak and at risk of falling back into a liquidity trap, the
central bank might find it optimal to keep interest rates low for purely forward
looking motives. We explore how this affects the value of commitment during
liquidity traps.
Credibility and Debt Management
To finance spending shocks governments raise taxes and issue money. To
smooth the distortions caused by these policies they borrow. The assets that the
government optimally chooses to smooth these distortions depend not only on
which assets are available, but also on the government ability to commit to
repaying these assets. Each choice implies different prescriptions for tax policy
and debt management. In this project, I study how different degrees of
commitment to monetary policy and repayment affect the optimal asset mix in an
economy with linear labor taxes, a cash in advance constraint and two non-state

JUAN PASSADORE
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 5
RESEARCH IN
PROGRESS
(CONTINUED)

contingent bonds (nominal bond, real bond). I conjecture that, when the
government can fully commit to a path of monetary policy, the complete markets
allocation can be implemented using only nominal debt. This is not the case
when there is lack of commitment in monetary policy (but full commitment for
repayment) because real debt acts as a commitment device that alleviates the
time inconsistency problem. In an economy with no commitment both, on
monetary policy and repayment, the role of real debt of alleviating the time
inconsistency problem is contrasted with higher default risk.

DAAN STRUYVEN
daan@mit.edu

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY


OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E19-750
Cambridge, MA 02139

HOME CONTACT INFORMATION


36 Highland Avenue, Apt. 53
Cambridge, MA 02139
Mobile: 617-710-2805

617-710-2805
daan@mit.edu
http://economics.mit.edu/grad/daan
MIT PLACEMENT OFFICER
Professor Benjamin Olken
617-253-6833
DOCTORAL
STUDIES

bolken@mit.edu

MIT PLACEMENT ADMINISTRATOR


Ms. Beata Shuster
bshuster@mit.edu
617-324-5857

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)


PhD, Economics, Expected completion June 2015
DISSERTATION: Essays on Housing and Credit Markets
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES
Professor James Poterba
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-214
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-6673
poterba@mit.edu

Professor Antoinette Schoar


MIT Sloan School of Management
100 Main Street, E62-638
Cambridge, MA 02142
617-253-3763
aschoar@mit.edu

Professor William Wheaton


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E18-214F
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-1723
wheaton@mit.edu
PRIOR
EDUCATION

Universit Libre de Bruxelles, 2009


M.A., Business Engineering (Highest Distinction)
Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, 2008
Visiting Student
Universit Libre de Bruxelles, 2007
B.A., Business Engineering (Highest Distinction)
B.A., Political Sciences

CITIZENSHIP

Belgium, Netherlands

FIELDS

Primary Fields: Public Finance, Corporate Finance


Secondary Fields: Macroeconomics, Real Estate Finance

GENDER: MALE

DAAN STRUYVEN
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 2
TEACHING
EXPERIENCE

RELEVANT
POSITIONS

FELLOWSHIPS,
HONORS, AND
AWARDS

Research & Communication Methods in Economics (MIT 14.33)


Teaching Assistant to Sara Ellison
Public Economics (MIT 14.471)
Teaching Assistant to James Poterba and Ivan Werning
Microeconomics (MIT 14.01)
Teaching Assistant to Jonathan Gruber
Introductory Economics (ULB)
Teaching Assistant to Mathias Dewatripont
Applied Econometrics (ULB)
Teaching Assistant to Catherine Dehon

2015
2012
2012
2006-2008
2007

Research Assistant for Antoinette Schoar, MIT


Financial Economics Consultant, Econopolis Advisory, Belgium
Researcher, Spatial Development, World Bank, Washington D.C.
Economic Consultant, World Bank, Madagascar
Summer Business Analyst, McKinsey & Company, Netherlands
Macroeconomics Research Analyst, Petercam Investment
Management, Belgium
Global Markets Analyst, BNP Paribas Fortis, Belgium

2012-2014
2010
2009
2009-2010
2008
2007

Macro Financial Modeling Sloan Foundation Fellowship


MIT Financial Insights Foundation Grant
Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation Fellowship
MIT Department of Economics Fellowship
Francqui Foundation Fellowship
Belgian American Education Foundation Fellowship
GUTT Memorial Master Thesis Prize
Wallonia Jury Master Thesis Prize
De Barsy Master Thesis Prize
Finalist Flemish Physics Olympiad

2013-2015
2013-2014
2013-2014
2011-2013
2010-2011
2010-2011
2010
2010
2010
2004

2005

PROFESSIONAL Presentations:
ACTIVITIES
Macro Financial Modeling Conference (New York, NYU Stern, 2014)
Why Nations Fail Econopolis Conference (Brussels, 2014)
American Finance Association Annual Meeting (Philadelphia, 2014)
Congress of Belgian Economists (Brussels, 2010)
World Bank (Washington, 2009)
PUBLICATIONS

Central Bank Liquidity Provision and Collateral Quality, Journal of


Banking and Finance 49, pp. 113-130, December 2014.
(with Franois Koulischer)
Should central banks lend against low quality collateral? We characterize
efficient central bank collateral policy in a model where a bank borrows from the
interbank market or the central bank. Collateral has favorable incentive effects
but is costly to transfer to lenders who value the collateral less because of
imperfect collateral quality. We show that a fall in the quantity or the quality of
the bank's collateral can increase interest rates in the economy even with a
constant policy rate. A looser central bank collateral policy can reduce the

DAAN STRUYVEN
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 3
spread, alleviate the credit crunch and increase output.
RESEARCH
PAPERS

Housing Lock: Dutch Evidence on the Impact of Negative Home Equity on


Household Mobility (Job Market Paper)
This paper tests the housing lock hypothesis: the conjecture that homeowners
with limited or negative home equity, low levels of financial assets and restricted
opportunities to borrow are unable to move. It employs unique, administrative
population data on residential location, home-ownership, family structure, and
household balance sheets from the Netherlands. The rapid rise in Dutch house
prices during the 1995-2008 period, and their substantial decline thereafter, has
generated large variation in the home equity of buyers who bought homes a few
years apart. I find that buyers in the cohorts that purchased homes around the
peak have higher Loan-To-Value (LTV) ratios than earlier buyers. They also
have much lower mobility rates in every year after purchase. A decline in home
equity, particularly with LTV ratios between 90 and 110%, is associated with
large and statistically significant reductions in household mobility. The reduction
in mobility is observed both within and across labor markets. The mobility
effects of falling home equity are substantially larger for households with low
financial asset holdings. These results emerge from comparisons of mobility
rates from different purchase cohorts after removing time and region effects, as
well as from an analysis of homebuyers whose purchase timing was determined
by arguably exogenous changes in family structure. Since Dutch mortgages are
full recourse, which rules out strategic default behavior, the findings provide
new support for the housing lock hypothesis.

RESEARCH IN
PROGRESS

ACE Hit: Does the Corporate Tax Bias Impact Leverage?


Most countries corporate tax codes provide a relative incentive for debt
financing over equity financing by allowing firms to deduct interest payments
when calculating their taxable income. In 2006, Belgium introduced an
Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE), permitting an additional deduction
proportional to the equity base. Our analysis of the data suggests that the
response of debt-asset ratios to this change in relative tax burdens may have been
much smaller than what standard theoretical analyses and recent empirical work
would suggest. In fact, a few years after the policy change, it is difficult to
identify any changes at all. Our conclusion relies on two findings. First, firms
that took up the Allowance for Corporate Equity did not clearly reduce their
debt-asset ratio by more than firms who did not. Second, large firms, which on
average face higher marginal tax rates and hence benefit more from the
deduction, did not reduce their debt-asset ratio significantly more than small
firms.

DAAN STRUYVEN
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 4
RESEARCH IN
PROGRESS
(CONTINUED)

Household Debt Overhang and Labor Supply: Evidence from Mortgage


Modifications
(with Asaf Bernstein and Antoinette Schoar)
Using proprietary consumer-level panel data on income, spending, debt and
investments from a major financial institution, we investigate the effect of
housing wealth on labor supply for households with negative home equity. We
intend to exploit principal reductions in the U.S. National Mortgage Settlement
mortgage modification program as positive shocks to housing wealth. While the
standard income effect predicts a negative response of labor supply to positive
wealth shocks, underwater households may respond differently, due to strategic
default considerations or to liquidity constraints, which could hamper residential
mobility or discourage investments in human capital.
The Effects of Public Mortgage Insurance on Loan-To-Value Ratios:
Evidence from the Netherlands
Using novel loan-level data, I study the impact of the availability of public
mortgage insurance on Loan-To-Value ratios in the Netherlands, the country
with the highest housing debt as a share of GDP in the world. In case of default
on an insured mortgage, the lender loses recourse to the assets and income of the
borrower, but is compensated for the loss by public insurance. Over the last
fifteen years, the insurance take-up rate has tripled. The mortgage insurance is
associated with significantly lower interest rates. Exploiting variation in
insurance eligibility, preliminary findings suggest that mortgages with public
mortgage insurance have significantly higher Loan-To-Value ratios.

POLICY PAPER Garantir une solidarit responsable en Belgique en amliorant les

incitations la cration demplois par les entits fdres


(with Mathias Dewatripont), Actes du 18ime Congrs des conomistes de
langue franaise, CiFOP, Brussels, November 2009

ANTON TSOY
atsoy@mit.edu

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY


OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E19-750
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-821-8147
atsoy@mit.edu

HOME CONTACT INFORMATION


259 Broadway, apt. 3
Cambridge, MA 02139
Mobile: 617-821-8147

http://economics.mit.edu/grad/atsoy
MIT PLACEMENT OFFICER
Professor Benjamin Olken
617-253-6833
DOCTORAL
STUDIES

bolken@mit.edu

MIT PLACEMENT ADMINISTRATOR


Ms. Beata Shuster
bshuster@mit.edu
617-324-5857

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)


PhD, Economics, Expected completion June 2015
DISSERTATION: Essays on Sequential Bargaining and Mechanism Design
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES
Professor Glenn Ellison
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E18-269F
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-8702
gellison@mit.edu

Professor Juuso Toikka


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E17-246
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-324-3666
toikka@mit.edu

Professor Muhamet Yildiz


MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E18-226
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-5331
myildiz@mit.edu

Professor Andrey Malenko


MIT Sloan School of Management
100 Main Street, E62-619
Cambridge, MA 02142
617-225-9301
amalenko@mit.edu

PRIOR
EDUCATION

M.A. in Economics
B.A. in Economics

New Economic School, 2009


Lomonosov Moscow State University, 2007

CITIZENSHIP

Russia

GENDER:

LANGUAGES

English, Russian

FIELDS

Primary Fields: Theory, Finance

Male

Secondary Fields: Macroeconomics


TEACHING
EXPERIENCE

Economic Applications of Game Theory (Undergraduate), MIT


Teaching Assistant to Professor Muhamet Yildiz

Fall 2014,
2013, 2011

ANTON TSOY
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 2

TEACHING
EXPERIENCE
(CONTINUED)

RELEVANT
POSITIONS

Microeconomic Theory III (Graduate), MIT


Teaching Assistant to Professor Muhamet Yildiz
Game Theory (Graduate), MIT
Teaching Assistant to Professor Mihai Manea
Topics in Game Theory (Graduate), MIT
Teaching Assistant to Professor Mihai Manea
Advanced Macroeconomics II (Graduate), MIT
Teaching Assistant to Professors George-Marios Angeletos,
Guido Lorenzoni, Ivan Werning
Intermediate Microeconomics (Undergraduate), MIT
Teaching Assistant to Professor Juuso Toikka
Industrial Organization (Graduate), New Economic School
Teaching Assistant to Professor Grigory Kosenok
Contract Theory (Graduate), New Economic School
Teaching Assistant to Professor Sergei Guriev
Microeconomics I (Graduate), New Economic School
Teaching Assistant to Professor Paul Dower
Research Assistant to Muhamet Yildiz
Research Assistant to Juuso Toikka

FELLOWSHIPS, MIT Economics Department Fellowship


HONORS, AND Petr Aven Fellowship
Oxford Russian Fund Fellowship
AWARDS

Spring 2014
Spring 2013
Fall 2012
Fall 2012,
Spring 2012
Fall 2011
Spring 2009
Fall 2008
Fall 2008

2010, 2013, 2014


2011, 2012
2009-2011
2008-2009
2007-2008

PROFESSIONAL Presentation:
2014 Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory
ACTIVITIES
RESEARCH
PAPERS

Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Private Correlated Values


This paper studies an infinite-horizon bilateral bargaining model with alternating
offers and private correlated values. The paper characterizes frequent-offer limits of
common screening equilibria in which both parties make offers to screen the
opponent's type, and all types of either party follow the same path of offers. Even in
the limit when the correlation of values is nearly perfect, common screening equilibria
exhibit two-sided screening dynamics and involve inefficient delay, in contrast with
the unique equilibrium outcome of the complete-information bargaining game.
Segmentation equilibria, in which types partially separate themselves into segments
by the initial offer, are also constructed. Most of the types in the segments trade in
the first rounds, while types near the boundaries of the segments delay trade to
convince the opponent that they belong to a segment with more favorable terms of
trade. Segmentation equilibria are efficient in the limit as the correlation of values
becomes nearly perfect and establish the connection between the limit outcome of
nearly-perfect correlation and the complete information outcome. The model sheds
light on the relative importance of various sources of inefficiency for different levels
of correlation, the role of public and private information in bargaining, and the
robustness of the complete-information bargaining model to higher-order uncertainty
about values.

ANTON TSOY
OCTOBER 2014 -- PAGE 3
Trade Delay, Liquidity, and Asset Prices in Over-the-Counter Markets
In over-the-counter markets, the presence of two frictions is central to determine
prices, liquidity, and efficiency: the search friction reflected in how long it takes to
find a trading opportunity and the bargaining friction reflected in how promptly gains
from trade are realized once an opportunity is identified. This paper captures both
frictions by introducing an asset-specific trade delay into a standard search-andbargaining model. For both exogenous and endogenous specifications of delay, the
set of traded assets and the dependence of asset prices and spreads on default risk,
liquidity, and market conditions are determined in equilibrium. The proposed model
with endogenous delay has several implications. First, it offers a novel testable
prediction: for assets within the same credit-rating class, liquidity is U-shaped in
quality. Assets closer to the extremes of the quality range are more liquid, while assets
in the middle of the quality range may be not traded at all. This is in contrast with a
monotone relation in models with asymmetric information. Second, this model shows
that the reduction in search and bargaining frictions may have opposite effects on
market liquidity, which is reflected in the range of traded assets. Finally, this model
establishes a connection between market uncertainty about an assets payoff and
market liquidity. This link sheds light on the role of transparency in over-the-counter
markets and explains dried-up liquidity and flights-to-quality during periods of
increased market uncertainty.
RESEARCH IN Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms with Infinite Horizon
(with Juuso Toikka)
PROGRESS
This paper studies the problem in optimal mechanism design of allocating a durable
good to a privately informed buyer without commitment. The horizon is infinite, and
the seller can commit to the allocation mechanism in the current round, but not in
future rounds. With two buyer types, posting a price in each round is generally an
optimal mechanism for the seller. Under more stringent conditions, posted prices are
also optimal with continuum of types. This provides foundations for the restriction to
posted-price mechanisms commonly made in the bargaining literature.
Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Private Correlated Values
This paper studies the role of strategic delay in an alternating-offer bargaining model
with private correlated values. Players choose price offers, and also the duration of
offer delay. The focus is on common screening equilibria in which types pool on price
offers and separate by acceptance time. Under the intuitive-criterion-style refinement,
the upper bound on the efficiency of common screening equilibria is decreasing in
the degree of correlation of values. With correlation of values, by delaying the
counter-offer, a player not only signals the information about his/her value, but also
makes public the information about the opponent's value. This way, higher correlation
of values results in higher guaranteed utilities for both sides and longer equilibrium
delay.

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