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ALLAN PRED
ST R U C T U R A T IO N AND TIM E-G EO G RA PH Y
Individual and society. Practice and structure. Agency and structure. Social
ization and social reproduction. These are the coupled categories usually
depicted as dialectically reproducing and transforming one another in the
unbroken process of structuration. Although Bhaskar, Bourdieu, Giddens,
and the other social theorists and social philosophers identifiable with the
structuration school of thought differ in their selection of foci and categories,
they for the most part share certain overlapping and interlocking views that
may be crudely reduced as follows.^
Social reproduction is a constantly ongoing process whereby, in a given
area, the everyday p erform ance o f institutional activities (including those
m undane practices associated with the institution of the family) not only
results in biological reproduction, but also in the perpetuation or modifi
cation of: the institutions themselves; the knowledge necessary to repeat or
create activities;^ and already existing structural relationships. In the simul
taneous unfolding of socialization and social reproduction the individual and
her consciousness are shaped by society while society is unintentionally and
intentionally shaped by the individual and her consciousness. In order to
deal with the dialectical relationships between individual and society, the
constant becoming of both, one must really deal with m aterial continuity
and the dialectics of practice and structure, or with the process of structur
ation, whereby the structural properties of any social system express them
selves through the operation of everyday practices at the same time that
everyday practices generate and reproduce the micro- and macro-level struc
tural properties of the social system in question.
Giddens, Bourdieu, Bhaskar, and several others associated with the struc
turation school are in various ways sensitive to the fact that all practices, all
social activities, take the form of concrete interactions in time-space. Yet,
* This paper was written while the author was receiving research support from the
U .S. National Science Foundation.
46 Allan Pred
nobody identifiable with the structuration perspective really has succeeded
in conceptualizing the means by which the everyday shaping and repro
duction of self and society, of individual and institution, come to be ex
pressed as specific structure-influenced and structure-influencing practices
occurring at determinate locations in time and space, or as time-space detailed situ
ations that at one and the same time are rooted in past time-space detailed
situations and serve as the potential roots of future time-space detailed situ
ations. They all fail to inform us precisely how the everyday functioning and
reproduction of particular cultural, economic, and political institutions in
time and space are continuously bound up with the temporally and spatially
specific actions, knowledge build-up, and biographies of particular individ
uals. Or, they do not capture or fully account for the material continuity
and unbroken time-space flow of the structuration process.
It has been argued elsewhere that it is possible to conceptually augment
the theory of structuration and to overcome its just-nam ed limitations by
integrating it with the discipline-transcending language of Torsten Hagerstrands time-geography.^ Such an augmentation rests on the concepts of
path and project, the two basic building blocks of the time-geographic
language. According to the path concept, each of the actions and events
consecutively making up the existence of an individual has both temporal
and spatial attributes. Consequently, the biography of a person is ever on the
move with her and can be conceptualized and diagrammed at daily or
lengthier scales of observation as an uninterrupted, continuous path through
time-space subject to various types of constraints. (The biographies of
other living creatures, natural phenomena, and man-made objects also can
be conceptualized and diagrammed in the same manner.) In timegeographic terms a project consists of the entire series of simple or complex
tasks necessary to the completion of any intention-inspired or goal-oriented
behavior. Each of the sequential tasks in a project is synonymous with the
formation of activity bundles, or with the convergence in time and space
of the unbroken paths being traced out either by two or more people, or by
one or more persons and one or more physically tangible inputs or resources,
such as buildings, furniture, machinery, and raw materials.
The integration of time-geography with the theory of structuration com
mences with the recognition that each of societys component institutions
does not exist apart from the everyday and longer-term production, con
sumption, or other projects for which it is responsible. If all formal and
informal institutions are viewed in these terms, it then may be asserted that
the detailed situations and material continuity of structuration, and thereby of social
reproduction and individual socialization, are perpetually spelled out by the inter
section of particular individual paths with particular institutional projects occurring at
specific temporal and spatial locations.
W hen elaborated upon, the fundamental assertion underlying the integra
IN D IV ID U A L-LEV EL C O N T IN U IT Y IN TH E
ST R U C T U R A T IO N PROCESS
At the individual level continuity arises in the process of structuration be
cause as a person traces out her unbroken path she does not either encounter
separate institutional projects, or independently undertake separate pro
jects outside of an institutional context, in a disjointed or unconnected
manner. Instead, her incessant progress through time-space from project to
project, from one detailed here and now to another, is characterized by a
complex external-internal dialectic, by a repeated dialectical interplay
between her corporeal actions and her mental activities and intentions,
between w hat she does and w hat she knows and thinks. In rather over
simplified and abbreviated terms, external physical action or any steering
of an individuals path through specific temporal and spatial locations in
order to either participate in, or get to and from, a project cannot occur
without resulting in internal mental activity because it always involves con
frontation with environmental stimuli, personal contacts, influences, infor
mation in general, or emotions and feelings that otherwise would not have
been experienced. Yet, the addition of external physical actions to an indi
viduals path prerequires internal mental activity the formation of inten-
48 Allan Pred
tions or unconscious goals, the making of choices between existing project
alternatives that do not violate basic time-geographic constraints mental
activity that is itself intricately based on the experience and knowledge
acquired by that individual through previous physical participation in tem
porally and spatially specific projects. It is to be recognized that even when a
person physically enters a project that she has defined for herself outside the
workings of any institution, she cannot escape the mental im print left by the
previous intersection of her path with particular institutional projects. For,
whether it is a m atter of the satisfaction of either non-physiological or
physiological wants and needs, there are always culturally arbitrary
mental dispositions or elements of practical knowledge associated with the
creation and definition of independent projects that only can be acquired
via socialization, or path intersections with institutional projects.^
Individual-level continuity in the process of structuration also is linkable
to another dialectical relationship much akin to the external-internal dialec
tic. This life path-daily path dialectic is central to the reproduction of
class and involves the interplay between long-term commitment and every
day practice ; between, on the one hand, an individuals previous suc
cession of long-term institutional roles and resultant record of everyday
project participation and, on the other hand, the objective long-term op
portunities open to her. Through the operation of this dialectic the long
term institutional roles that an adult person may reahstically choose among
at any point are, in whole or in part, both walled off and thrown open by
the m anner in which her previous institutional role commitrhents have
affected, and been affected by, certain of her specific daily paths. More
exactly, when a persons life path, or biography, becomes associated with a
given family role or committed to a specialized role within some other
institution she must as a consequence intermittently steer her daily path to
activity bundles belonging to specific routine or nonroutine projects. But,
when participating in those activity bundles at precise geographic locations
and more or less fixed temporal locations, and when thus having her participation
in other types of activity bundles and projects constrained,^ the individual daily
undergoes experiences, interacts with other people, acquires or reinforces
competencies, and encounters symbolically laden inanimate objects, ideas,
and information stimuli in general that otherwise would not have come her
way in exactly the same form. These daily-path experiences, interactions,
and encounters occasionally result in the intentional or unintentional dis
covery of additional or alternative long-term institutional role possibilities
that, on the basis of her life history and competition from other individuals,
she may or may not have a realistic chance of entering into. Moreover, these
daily-path experiences, interactions, and encounters help her to define and
redefine herself, to renew and initiate strengths and weaknesses, to form
intentions, and to crystallize the consciously or unconsciously motivated
SENSE OF PLACE
During the last decade or so the theme of sense of place has assumed a
position of central importance among those hum an geographers identified
with the new humanistic geography. Heavily influenced by the major
works of phenomenology and existentialism, new humanistic geographers
have portrayed sense of place in varying, but highly overlapping and
interrelated, terms and concepts. For them, place is never merely an object.
It is always an object for a subject. It is seen, for each individual, as a center
of meanings, intentions, or felt values; a focus of emotional or sentimental
attachm ent; a locality of felt significance.
T uan, Relph, and others emphasize that space and physical features are
mobilized and transformed into place through hum an residence and involve
m ent in local activities and routines; through familiarity and the accumula
tion of memories; through the bestowal of meaning by images, ideas, and
symbols; through the actual experience of meaningful or moving events
and the establishment of individual or communal identity, security, and
concern.^ Tuan, in particular, has distinguished between those instances in
which place becomes known and sensed by purely visual means, and those in
which place becomes known and sensed via prolonged contact and experi
ence. In the former instances sense of place is acquired from outside know
ledge; from seeing objects of high imageability that one has been
trained to discern as either beautiful, or of public symbolic significance,
tangibly and commandingly expressing communal life, aspirations, needs,
and values.^^ In the latter instances sense of place results from inside, inti
mate knowledge: from the establishment of fields of care, networks of inter
personal concern, in a physical setting; from emotional ties to the material
environment and a conscious awareness of that environments identity and
spatial lim it; from long and close association intensified through the senses
of hearing, smell, taste, and touch; from the traditional recurrence of pa
geants, and solemn and jovial festivities or rivalries with other settlements;
from a total experience of milieu the feel of grass on bare feet, the
smells and sounds of various seasons, the places and times I rrteet friends on
walks, the daily ebb and flow of milking time, meals, reading and thinking,
sleeping, and waking. ^^ Although T uan is not entirely consistent in separa
ting the two, he suggests that a public-symbolic sense of place is most apt to
50 Allan Pred
arise in connection with larger areal units the city or region of ones re
sidence, the nation state while a field-of-care sense of place is most apt to
emerge in connection with smaller areal units the corner of a room, or the
urban street, farm, or rural village of ones residence.
Relph instead prefers to stress the distinction between an authentic and
inauthentic sense of place : An authentic sense of place is above all that of
being inside and belonging to your place both as an individual and as a
member of the community and to know this without reflecting upon it,
whereas an inauthentic attitude to place is essentially no sense of place, for
it involves no awareness of the deep and symbolic significance of places and
no appreciation of their identities. Thus, an authentic sense of place is
largely unselfconscious, an array of deeply dissolved meanings, built upon
those attributes of objects, settings, events, and fundamental particulars of
everyday practice and life that become taken for granted, no longer regard
ed as what is, but as what ought to be.
Not surprisingly, these and similar portrayals of sense of place have come
under heavy attack. In addition to its being methodologically eclectic and
frequently cast in obscurantist terms, most of the literature on sense of place
suffers from either a total neglect or inadequate treatment and conceptual
ization of context and contextual processes. Historical context, social con
text, and biographical context do not serve as theoretical underpinnings.
They are either ignored or vaguely and insufficiently dealt with. The im
pression is all too often conveyed that sense of place is the product of auton
omous mind freely interpreting the world of experience of memories,
meanings, and attachm ents flowing from independent actions inspired by
independent intentions. Thus, sense of place is too frequently seen as a
free-floating phenomenon, in no way influenced either by historically specific
power relationships that enable some to impose upon others their view of the
natural and acceptable, or by social and economic constraints on action and
thereby th o u g h t.A lth o u g h the new humanist geographers writing on sense
of place sometimes make reference to society, to intersubjective communica
tion and consensus of meaning, to social position, and to social conditioning,
those terms are only employed as mere backdrops to individual experience
and the idealism and voluntarism of their users remains poorly disguised, if
disguised at all. W ith few real exceptions, the nebulous societies they fleetingly refer to are somehow devoid of both specific rule-providing, activityorganizing institutions and structural relations among collectivities,
individuals, and institutions. Moreover, the experiences portrayed as un
derlying the emergence of sense of place cannot occur in a biographical
vacuum. An individuals sense of place cannot come into being on its own,
divorced from her development of consciousness and ideology in general, or
unaffected by predispositions deeply and complexly embedded in her pre
vious history of language acquisition, and other forms of code absorption
Allan Pred
52
sidents of the same locale or area are inescapable since hum an physical
indivisibility, plus the impossibility of two objects occupying the same space
at the same time, by definition precludes the accumulated projectparticipation elements of any two individual paths from being identical in
their time-space details. Or, within a given area over a given period of time,
each persons physically observable daily paths and life path, or biographical
contact with the countless detailed alternatives of objective reahty, are unrepeatably and uniquely arrayed, and thereby each persons constitution of
consciousness, including sense of place, is uniquely accumulated.^^
While all the components of everyday ennui and euphoria, daily drudgery
and dram a, going into sense of place cannot be duphcated from person-toperson, the recognition of certain symbols and other common features of
consciousness are to a considerable degree bound up with the reproduction
of power or class relationships that accompanies the enactment of institu
tional projects, or the social reproduction that occurs within the unbroken
time-space flow of the structuration process. Insofar as they exist, person-toperson similarities in sense-of-place among the inhabitants of a modern
urban environment are not likely often to be random in origin, or the result
of experiences being shared by people of dissimilar background because their
paths have unintentionally or coincidentally crossed in the course of pur
suing completely unrelated projects. They are considerably more likely to be
the outcome of occupying pretty much the same social space, the same general
place in society, and some of the shared habitual interactions with people and
objects that almost inevitably follow. Such shared interactions are com
monplace since ones place in the society of a given place means ones daily
path, or ones potential reach in time-space, is hemmed in or thrown open in
part by a residence which is similar in quality and location to the residence
of some other persons of the same social stratum , and in part by the sexual
division of labor one has been socialized to accept and the specific types of
institutional projects and project roles that dominate ones life as well as the
lives of some other people belonging to the same group or class in the same
place. W ith respect to residence, it also should be recognized that the nature
of similarities in sense of place among members of the same localized social
group or class will be much influenced by whether their homes and neigh
borhood are willingly or unwillingly chosen and are of their own design or
passed along from previous occupants of another social standing.^
M ore importantly, it is to be understood that dom inant institutional pro
jects greatly afl'ect the similarity of daily paths, and thereby the similarity of
internal experience and sense-of-place, because their underpinning explicit
or implicit rules require that participating individuals expend their labor
power or in some other way engage themselves in activity in a given manner,
at a given time and place, rather than doing something else, somewhere else,
during the same time period. (Participation in dom inant institutional pro-
54 Allan Pred
goal-setters and decision-makers themselves, or from the external-internal
and life path-daily path dialectics of the business executives, government
bureaucrats, workplace supervisors, parents, or other individuals involved.
Put otherwise, the project-defining, or place-creating, goals and decisions
arrived at by individuals holding institutional positions of varying im port
ance cannot be severed from the awareness of local and nonlocal resources
and opportunities those people have built up through their limited acquisi
tion of imperfect information; from the way in which they reflectively or
unselfconsciously interpret and react to political, economic, and other oc
currences outside the institution; from any anticipation they may hold of
rewards or penalties; and from their absorption or rejection of prevaiUng
group or cultural values. And, all of these things, in turn, cannot be divorced
from the uniquely accumulated path histories of those same individuals, or
the temporal and spatial details of their own past involvement in the dialec
tical process of structuration. Moreover, it is contendable that the project- or
rule-determining goals and decisions of institutional power holders or their
contributions to the becoming of place are jointly determined, or over
determined, in another way by the time-space flow of the structuration
process. For, it is often so that the goals and decisions are not merely rooted
in the past details of socialization, and thereby structuration, but also evoked
or forced by a confrontation with the micro- or macro-level structural con
flicts or contradictions of an historically specific set of circumstances with
local or more widely based conflicts or contradictions that are themselves
inseparable from the dialectics of practice and structure.
STR U C TU R E OF FEELING
Since first discussing the term at length some two decades ago in The Long
Revolution, Raymond Williams has repeatedly written on the nature and
specific historical expression of structure of feeling.
As initially presented, this thought-provoking and original concept was
addressed to w hat Williams defined as the theory of culture the study of
relationships between elements in a whole way of life and the analysis of
culture, or the attem pt to discover the nature of the [total or general]
organization which is the complex of these relationships. According to
Williams, the complex general organization of a whole way of life only can
be known in full through actual living experience, for it is a structure of
feeling, a felt sense of the quality of life at a particular place and time; a
sense of the ways in which the particular activities combine into a way of
thinking and living. Williams also refers to any past or present structure of
feeling as a not easily situated common element which remains after allow
56 Allan Pred
general. It is viewed as always becoming and inseparable from the total
relational complex of national or local culture. All the same, Williams
structure of feeling is not without its problematic aspects.
As presented by Wilhams, the feeling or ambiance of being situated in a
particular generation (and perhaps class) at a particular time, or the com
munity of experience that is structure of feeling, is grounded in active living
and particular activities. However, when Wilhams translates his powerful
and very general theoretical concept into example it is usually rather diffi
cult to discern the bridge from particular individual and institutional prac
tices to structure of feeling and its becoming. Too often, structures of feehng
are made visible while actual living and practices are left invisible. This is so,
for example; when we are told that in England between 1660 and 1690 two
structures of feeling (among the defeated Puritans and in the restored Court)
can be readily distinguished; and when comments are made upon that
structure of feeling which was beginning to form, from Goldsmith to the
poets of the Rom antic movement, and which is particularly visible in
C l a r e . I n The Country and the City, much is made of the fact that the
structures of feeling with respect to N ature conveyed over several cen
turies by English writers have been greatly influenced by the practices not
directly experienced by the vast majority of them, by their lack of personal
experience of agricultural labor. In yet other instances some attention is
given to institutional changes or the growth of particular cultural institutions
without really dealing with the concrete everyday practices associated with
those institutions. Such is the case when the structure of feeling underlying
the British novels of the 1840s is revealingly sketched, or when the structure
of feeling of the emergent productive class of Great Britain in the 1960s is
insightfully captured and analyzed.^
How then is one to conceptually specify the fusion of concrete practices
and the becoming of structure of feeling? Since the real problem is that of
simultaneously accounting for determ inate situations and individual and
collective social becoming, an integrated usage of time-geography and the
theory of structuration would again appear appropriate.
In time-geographic terms an individual acquires a structure of feeling
partly by having her path exposed to news of particular political-historical
events by word-of-mouth, the printed word, or the modern media; partly by
the everyday intersection of her path with time-space specific institutional
projects which also require both the path intersections of other persons (some
of whom belong to the same generation or class) and common interaction
with objects (e.g., buildings, roadways, furniture, and pieces of machinery or
equipment) ; and partly by the constraints and possibilities imposed on her
other forms of project participation, and thereby knowing, by fixed commit
ments to dom inant institutional p r o je c ts .P u t otherwise, it is the spe
cificness of path-based common exposures, projects, and interactions (the
58 Allan Pred
tains, through the active participation of people in the unbroken time-space
flow of the structuration process. T hat is, whether or not structure of feeling
contributes to the definition and rules of institutional projects, its becoming,
like the becoming of sense of place, is inseparable from the becoming of
place, from the unfolding dialectics of practice and structure in place. In
fact, it may be contended that if structure of feeling is a generation- and
class-centered array of meanings and feelings equivalent to a felt sense of
the quality of a life at a particular place {locality] and time, then it corre
sponds to the common meaning and feehng elements of sense of place held
by some of those people of the same generation and class residing in the same
place. For, just as some of the components of structure of feeling will vary
from place to place, so will the activity- and interaction-based quality of the
common meaning and feeling elements of sense of place result in their vary
ing from generation to generation within the same place (except perhaps
where the place in question is characterized by extreme institutional stability
and isolation from other locahties). Presumably, not even Williams himself
would object to such a conflation of structure of feeling and sense of place;
for, in occasionally speaking of sense of city , sense of setdement , and his
own attachm ent to the place, the landscape which was the Black M oun
tain village of his birth, he employs terms that much resemble those used for
structure of feeling.
SENSE O F PLACE AND STR U C TU R E OF FEELIN G:
PAST AND PRESENT
The reinterpretation of sense of place and structure of feeling presented here
does not represent much more than a scaffolding from which to build specific
analyses. The integration of time-geography and the theory of structuration,
for whatever reinterpretative conceptual purposes, cannot provide a model
which plumbs the depths of all relevant situations in all times and places.
W hat the wedding of time-geography and structuration theory does provide,
with respect to any reinterpreted grand conceptual category or theme, is a
general framework for analyzing the interplay of constitution, transform
ation and practice within the context of particular historical situations.
According to the argument made here, the attributes and transformation
of the feelings, meanings, and memories that make up sense of place or
structure of feeling although definitionally not fully accessible to the his
torical or geographical outsider because based in direct activity participation
and experience should be indirectly recoverable in part from the recons
truction of some of the daily paths, and thereby common exposures and
projects, characteristic of the individuals belonging to a given group or
generation at a given place and time. Moreover, since the content of a
60 Allan Pred
assortment of paternal institutional projects, complete uniformity was lack
ing for a num ber o f reasons. Most importantly, the French Canadians, Poles,
Irish, Scots, Swedes, and others who migrated to mill employment did not
begin their lives in M anchester with blank minds. Instead, they all came
with a previously shaped consciousness, with previously existing senses of
place and structures of feeling; and thus they were re-placed, and their
children were socialized somewhat differently, not least of all because the
division of labor within the mills had a highly pronounced ethnic skew. In a
clear m anner the books docum entation also enables us to see how macro
level structural conditions were instrumental to the calling forth of dram atic
local events in the form of strikes, work speedups, layoffs, firings, and mill
shutdowns that drastically altered daily paths and left a heavy imprint on
individual sense of place and structure of feeling.
Helias beautifully written Horse of Pride is another example of a single
book which enables the recovery of many of the connections between indi
vidual path-institutional project intersections and the becoming of sense of
place and structure of feeling in a specific place over a given time period (in
this case the Breton village of Plozevet during the pre-Second W orld W ar
decades of this c e n tu ry ).E m p lo y in g his own recollections and the verbal
recoundngs of his mother and grandfather, Helias provides a fine-grained
picture of the experiences arising both from integrated daily path compon
ents and from the longer-term repeated participation in the details of a wide
variety of institutional projects, including those involving food preparation
and other household practicalities, agricultural production, education, the
local rites and ceremonies of the Catholic Church, organized play, and
communal weddings. Among other things, Helias succeeds in communicat
ing how the feelings, meanings, and memories that others would term sense
of place and structure of feeling are rooted in the interaction with specific
people and things at very precise local sites and times, in the interwoven
building-up of the life paths, or biographies, of self and others. In his depic
tion he is also unintentionally suggestive of the common and disparate senseof-place and structure-of-feeling elements of Red and W hite youths
living respectively at the high and low ends of the village. Perhaps most
noteworthily, Helias helps us to see how national-level economic change and
centraUzed nonlocal institutions including those associated with higherlevel education, military service, and the provision of mass culture at one
and the same time altered the becoming of Plozevet, undermined usage of
the Breton language, and markedly altered the micro-level content and
expectations of everyday life in that village, thereby producing generationally sharp differences in sense of place and structure of feehng.
A few completed and in-process studies have centered on the m anner in
which major transformations in the content and definition of dom inant pro
jects in specific places have led to new activity-participation, or coupling.
61
62
Allan Pred
63
64
Allan Pred
features there may be, the possibilities for experience and becoming of con
sciousness are no more identical in San Francisco, Chicago, or Philadelphia
than they are in the farming communities of Californias Central Valley, the
Great Plains, or Mississippi.
A FINAL D ISPLA CEM ENT
W hat, in essence, have the conceptualizations and arguments put forth in
this place m eant?
An understanding of sense of place requires a sense of the place of struc
ture and the uninterrupted temporal and spatial unfolding of structuration.
An understanding of structure of feeling requires a feeling, an awareness,
of structure and structuration in place.
Areally-centered sense of place and generation- and class-centered struc
ture of feeling are one
with the becoming of consciousness,
biography,
place,
with the m aterial continuity of socialization and social reproduction,
the ceaseless time-space flow of the society-encompassing
structuration process,
the endless dialectical spiral of practice and structure,
in given historical circumstances
where the projects of some institutions, and not others, are dominant.
Everyplace, everysense, everystructure
are to be scene in place, taking place,
becoming
becoming
becoming
everyday
through the continuous intersection of
particular individual paths with
particular institutional projects
at specific temporal and spatial locations.
Allan Pred
Department o f Geography
University o f California
Berkeley, California 94720
U.S.A.
65
N O TES
W hile the list of authors who may be directly or indirectly associated with the
theory of structuration is a lengthy one, I have the following set of works most
particularly in mind when making my unavoidably oversimplified distillation of
views: Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction o f Reality: A
Treatise in the Sociology o f Knowledge (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1967); Anthony
Giddens, New Rules o f Sociological Method (London: Hutchinson, 1976) ; idem. Central
Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1979); Karel Kosik, Dialectics o f the Concrete (Boston
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 52, 1976) ; Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory o f
Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Alain Touraine, The SelfProduction o f Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); Raymond W il
liams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); Roy Bhaskar,
On the Possibihty of Social Scientific Knowledge and the Limits of Naturalism, in
John M epham and David-Hillel Ruben (eds.). Issues in Marxist Philosophy, vol. 3,
Epistemology, Science, Ideology (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979), pp. 107-39; and
idem, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique o f the Contemporary Human
Sciences (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979).
^ Nigel Thrift, The Limits to Knowledge in Social Theory: Towards a Theory o f Practice
(Canberra: Department of Human Geography, Australian National University,
1979, mimeographed).
^ Allan Pred, Social Reproduction and the Time-Geography of Everyday Life,
Geografiska Annaler, 63B (1981), pp. 5-22; and idem, Power, Everyday Practice and
the Discipline of Human Geography, in idem (ed.), Space and Time in Geography:
Essays Dedicated to Torsten Hagerstrand (Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1981), pp. 30-55.
Also note Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, op. cit., pp. 205-6; and Nigel
Thrift and Allan Pred, Time-Geography : A New Beginning, Progress in Human
Geography, 5 (1981), pp. 277-86.
A fu ll compreherision and absorption o f these concepts normally requires, among other
things, an extensive and prolonged exposure to the variety o f diagrams developed for their
portrayal. For further elaboration and diagrammatic representation of the concepts of
path and project see, for example: Torsten Hagerstrand, W hat about People in
Regional Science? Papers o f the Regional Science Association, 24 (1970), pp. 7-21 ; idem,
On Socio-Technical Ecology and the Study of Innovations, Ethnologica Europaea, 1
(1974), pp. 17-34; Allan Pred, Urbanisation, Domestic Planning Problems and
Swedish Geographic Research, Progress in Geography, 5 (1973), pp. 1-76; idem, The
Impact of Technological and Institutional Innovations on Life Content: Some TimeGeographic Observations, Geographical Analysis, 10 (1978), pp. 345-72; idem, O f
Paths and Projects: Individual Behavior and its Societal Context, in R. Golledge
and K. Cox (eds.). Behavioral Geography Revisited (London: M ethuen, 1982), pp. 23155; Don Parkes and Nigel Thrift, Times, Spaces, and Places, A Chronogeographic Per
spective (New York: W iley, 1980); and Tommy Carlstein, Tinu Resources, Society and
Ecology: On the Capacity fo r Human Interaction in Time and Space (London: Edward
Arnold, 1981).
^ C f Nigel Thrift, Local History: A Review Essay, Environment and Planning A,
12 (1980), pp. 855-62; and idem and Pred, Tim e-G eography: A New Beginning,
op. cit., pp. 278-9.
The individuals ability to choose among production, consumption, and other
project alternatives is always circumscribed by time-geographic, or physical, realities.
The projects that can be incorporated within an individuals daily path are hmited
66
Allan Pred
67
68
Allan Pred
ture of feeling and that used in the literature of the time is of major importance in the
analysis of culture (ibid, p. 84).
Wilhams, Marxism and Literature, op. cit., pp. 131-2. Also note idem, Politics and
Letters, op. cit., pp. 156-70.
Williams, Marxism and Literature, op. cit., p. 134; and idem, The Country and the
City, op. cit., p. 137.
Williams, The Long Revolution, op. cit., pp. 70-88, 319-83.
C f footnotes 6 and 19, above.
This line of reasoning is compatible with positions taken elsewhere in W illiams
own writings. Williams, for example, sees language and other usable signs as evi
dence of a continuing social process, into which individuals are born and within
which they are shaped, but to which they then also actively contribute, in a contin
uing process which others would label structuration. (Williams, Marxism and Litera
ture, op. cit., p. 37).
Williams, The Country and the City, op. cit., p. 297.
Cf. Giddens definition of locale in Central Problems in Social Theory, op. cit., pp
206-7.
Williams, The Country and the City, op. cit., p. 84.
Cf. Thrift, Local History: A Review Essay, op. cit.
Tamara K. Hareven and Randolph Langenbach, Amoskeag : Life and Work in an
American Factory City (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
Pierre-Jakz Hlias, The Horse o f Pride: Life in a Breton Village (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1978).
Allan Pred, Production, Family, and Free-Time Projects: A Time-Geographic
Perspective on the Individual and Societal Change in Nineteenth-Century U .S.
Cities, Journal o f Historical Geography, 7 (1981), pp. 3-36.
Susan Christopherson, Family and Class in the Mew Industrial City (unpublished
dissertation, Department of Geography, University of California, Berkeley, 1982).
My thinking along these lines has been very much influenced both by conversa
tions with Johan Asplund and an as yet unpublished book manuscript by that same
brilliant Swedish social psychologist.
Buttimer, Home, Reach, and the Sense of Place, op. cit., p. 35; David
Lowenthal, Past Tim e, Present Place: Landscape and M emory, Geographical
Review, 65 (1975), pp. 1-36; and Relph, Place and Placelessness, op. cit. C f p. 50,
above, on inauthentic sense of place.
Relph, Place and Placelessness, op. cit., pp. 90, 143, 140. For a critique of R elphs
observations on placelessness see Hudson, Space, Place, and Placelessness, op. cit.
Quotes from Tuan, Space and Place: Humanistic Perspective, op. cit., p.
418; and Relph, Place and Placelessness, op. cit., pp. 143, 119, 58. The other assertions
are so frequently made that the provision of references is impractical.
** On residual, dominant, and emergent forms of culture c f Williams, Marxism and
Literature, op. cit.
ROM HARR
I take it that my task is to identify those features of the substantive papers in
this volume that chime in with the ethogenic point of view and to comment
on the various ways in which they run counter to or go beyond that stand
point. For this purpose I can summarize the ethogenic position in three
doctrines ;
1. A sociological doctrine: society involves at least two social orders, one
concerned with the organization of work, the other with the or
ganization of honour. They could be called the practical and the ex
pressive orders. In general the expressive order dominates the practical.
2. A psychological doctrine: social actions are structured and their struc
ture is the realization of prior structure, located in the intentions and
belief systems of actors, sometimes individually, more often collectively.
The study of actors accounts gives us access to that belief system.
3. A social psychological doctrine: many features of the mental life that
are experienced as attributes of individuals are derived from social
forms.
Sm iths discussion of the psychology of the pure bred beef business clearly
depends on a version of the distinction between practical and expressive
orders, since his study shows that the continued existence of the business and
the ways in which it is conducted are explicable only if the cattle are seen as
symbols of status, reputation and honour. T hat said I am inclined to think
that his analysis could have gone a good deal further if he had had a more
differentiated scheme than his generic concept of symbol to do the analyti
cal and explanatory work. By treating the symbolic value of the activity as
involving a social order, as say the expressive order, further features of that
order could have been drawn in. A hint of this comes in the concept of
gendeman farmer but that is not enough to explain why the dairy
business (with its own pure breeds) does not engender the same measure of
honour, nor why there is no pure bred lamb business with the same social
cahbre. The expressive order in the United States involves a further series of
images not yet drawn in by Smith. The musical Oklahoma exemplifies them