G.R. No.

166862

December 20, 2006

MANILA METAL CONTAINER CORPORATION, petitioner,

REYNALDO C. TOLENTINO, intervenor,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondent,
DMCI-PROJECT DEVELOPERS, INC., intervenor.

Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the

Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court Branch 71, Pasig City

December 15, 1984 to act on the proposal; otherwise, its P725,000.00

deposit would be returned and the property would be sold to other
interested buyers.16
Petitioner, however, did not agree to respondent PNB's proposal.
Instead, it wrote another letter dated December 12, 1984 requesting
for a reconsideration. However, it was denied.
On June 4, 1985, respondent PNB informed petitioner that the PNB
Board of Directors had accepted petitioner's offer to purchase the
property, but for P1,931,389.53 in cash less the P725,000.00 already
deposited with it.

FACTS:
Petitioner was the owner of a 8,015 square meter parcel of land
located in Mandaluyong Metro Manila. To secure a P900,000.00 loan
obtained from respondent Philippine National Bank, petitioner
executed a real estate mortgage over the lot. Respondent PNB later
granted petitioner a new credit accommodation of P1,000,000.00;
and, on November 16, 1973, petitioner executed an Amendment 4 of
Real Estate Mortgage over its property. On March 31, 1981,
petitioner secured another loan of P653,000.00 from respondent
PNB, payable in quarterly installments of P32,650.00, plus interests
and other charges.5
On August 5, 1982, respondent PNB filed a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and sought to have the
property sold at public auction for P911,532.21, petitioner's
outstanding obligation to respondent PNB as of June 30, 1982, 6 plus
interests and attorney's fees.
After due notice and publication, the property was sold at public
auction where respondent PNB was declared the winning bidder
for P1,000,000.00.
Petitioner sent a letter to respondent requesting that it be granted an
extension of time to redeem the property in its reply, respondent
informed petitioner that the request had been referred to its Pasay
City Branch for appropriate action and recommendation. 9
Some PNB Pasay City Branch personnel informed petitioner that as a
matter of policy, the bank does not accept "partial redemption."12
Since petitioner failed to redeem the property, the Register of Deeds
cancelled TCT No. 32098 on June 1, 1984, and issued a new title in
favor of respondent PNB.13 Petitioner's offers had not yet been acted
upon by respondent PNB.
Special Assets Management Department (SAMD) had prepared a
statement of account, and as of June 25, 1984 petitioner's obligation
amounted to P1,574,560.47. This included the bid price
of P1,056,924.50, interest, advances of insurance premiums,
advances on realty taxes, registration expenses, miscellaneous
expenses and publication cost.14 When apprised of the statement of
account, petitioner remitted P725,000.00 to respondent PNB as
"deposit to repurchase," and Official Receipt No. 978191 was issued
to it.15
SAMD recommended to the management of respondent PNB that
petitioner be allowed to repurchase the property for P1,574,560.00.
In a letter, the PNB management informed petitioner that it was
rejecting the offer and the recommendation of the SAMD and
suggested that petitioner purchase the property for P2,660,000.00, its
minimum market value. Respondent PNB gave petitioner until

Petitioner rejected respondent's proposal in a letter dated July 14,

1988. It maintained that respondent PNB had agreed to sell the
property for P1,574,560.47, and that since its P725,000.00
downpayment had been accepted, respondent PNB was proscribed
from increasing the purchase price of the property.21 Petitioner
averred that it had a net balance payable in the amount
of P643,452.34. Respondent PNB, however, rejected petitioner's
offer to pay the balance of P643,452.34 in a letter dated August 1,
1989.22
On August 28, 1989, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent
PNB for "Annulment of Mortgage and Mortgage Foreclosure,
Delivery of Title, or Specific Performance with Damages and alleged
that:
PNB had accepted the down payment from Manila Metal in
the substantial amount of P725,000.00 for the
redemption/repurchase price of P1,574,560.47 as approved
by its SMAD and considering the reliance made by Manila
Metal and the long time that has elapsed, the approval of
the higher management of the Bank to confirm the
agreement of its SMAD is clearly a potestative condition
which cannot legally prejudice Manila Metal which has
acted and relied on the approval of SMAD.
PNB approved the repurchase price of P1,574,560.47 for
which it accepted P725,000.00 from Manila Metal. PNB
cannot take advantage of its own delay and long inaction in
demanding a higher amount based on unilateral
computation of interest rate without the consent of Manila
Metal.
In its Answer to the complaint, respondent PNB averred that it had
acquired ownership over the property after the period to redeem had
elapsed. It claimed that no contract of sale was perfected between it
and petitioner after the period to redeem the property had expired.
On May 31, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment ordering
respondent PNB to refund the P725,000.00 deposit petitioner had
made.32 The trial court ruled that there was no perfected contract of
sale between the parties; hence, petitioner had no cause of action for
specific performance against respondent. It further declared that
the P725,000.00 remitted by petitioner to respondent PNB on June 4,
1985 was a "deposit," and not a downpayment or earnest money.
The CA rendered judgment on May 11, 2000 affirming the decision
of the RTC.37 It declared that petitioner obviously never agreed to the
selling price proposed by respondent PNB (P1,931,389.53) since
petitioner had kept on insisting that the selling price should be
lowered to P1,574,560.47. Clearly therefore, there was no meeting of
the minds between the parties as to the price or consideration of the
sale.

The CA ratiocinated that petitioner's original offer to purchase the

subject property had not been accepted by respondent PNB. In fact, it
made a counter-offer through its June 4, 1985 letter specifically on
the selling price; petitioner did not agree to the counter-offer; and the
negotiations did not prosper. Moreover, petitioner did not pay the
balance of the purchase price within the sixty-day period set in the
June 4, 1985 letter of respondent PNB. Consequently, there was no
perfected contract of sale, and as such, there was no contract to
rescind.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA likewise
denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner and respondent PNB had entered
into a perfected contract for petitioner to repurchase the property
from respondent.

giving of earnest money cannot establish the existence of a perfected

contract of sale.63
It appears that, per its letter to petitioner dated June 4, 1985, the
respondent had decided to accept the offer to purchase the property
for P1,931,389.53.
It appears that although respondent requested petitioner to conform to
its amended counter-offer, petitioner refused and instead requested
respondent to reconsider its amended counter-offer. Petitioner's
request was ultimately rejected and respondent offered to refund
its P725,000.00 deposit.
In sum, then, there was no perfected contract of sale between
petitioner and respondent over the subject property.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED.

HELD:
The ruling of the appellate court that there was no perfected contract
of sale between the parties on June 4, 1985 is correct.
A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one
binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to
render some service.41 Under Article 1318 of the New Civil Code,
there is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the
contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
Contracts are perfected by mere consent which is manifested by the
meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause
which are to constitute the contract.42 Once perfected, they bind other
contracting parties and the obligations arising therefrom have the
form of law between the parties and should be complied with in good
faith.
It appears that the SAMD had prepared a recommendation for
respondent to accept petitioner's offer to repurchase the property even
beyond the one-year period; it recommended that petitioner be
allowed to redeem the property and pay P1,574,560.00 as the
purchase price. Respondent later approved the recommendation that
the property be sold to petitioner. But instead of the P1,574,560.47
recommended by the SAMD and to which petitioner had previously
conformed, respondent set the purchase price at P2,660,000.00. In
fine, respondent's acceptance of petitioner's offer was qualified,
hence can be at most considered as a counter-offer. If petitioner had
accepted this counter-offer, a perfected contract of sale would have
arisen; as it turns out, however, petitioner merely sought to have the
counter-offer reconsidered. This request for reconsideration would
later be rejected by respondent.
We do not agree with petitioner's contention that the P725,000.00 it
had remitted to respondent was "earnest money" which could be
considered as proof of the perfection of a contract of sale under
Article 1482 of the New Civil Code. The provision reads:
Thus, the P725,000.00 was merely a deposit to be applied as part of
the purchase price of the property, in the event that respondent would
approve the recommendation of SAMD for respondent to accept
petitioner's offer to purchase the property for P1,574,560.47. Unless
and until the respondent accepted the offer on these terms, no
perfected contract of sale would arise. Absent proof of the
concurrence of all the essential elements of a contract of sale, the

The assailed decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner

Manila Metal Container Corporation.
SO ORDERED.

Both parties filed a motion for reconsideration and/or

clarification, with petitioner, praying that the prevailing market price
be the value of the property in February 1986, the time when the sale
would have been consummated. SIHI, on the other hand, prayed that
the market price of the property be based on the prevailing price
index at least 10 years later, that is, 1996.

[G.R. No. 124791. February 10, 1999]

JOSE RAMON CARCELLER, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS
and
STATE
INVESTMENT
HOUSES,
INC., respondents.

Before us is a petition for review of the Decision of the

Court of Appeals as well as its Resolution denying both
parties motion for partial reconsideration.

Respondent court promulgated the assailed resolution, which

denied both parties motions, and directed the trial court to conduct
further hearings to ascertain the prevailing market value of real
properties
Hence, the instant petition for review.
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioner be allowed to exercise the option to
purchase the leased property, despite the alleged delay in giving the
required notice to private respondent
HELD:

FACTS:
Private respondent State Investment Houses, Inc. (SIHI) is the
registered owner of two parcels of land with a total area of 9,774
square meters located at Bulacao, Cebu City.
Petitioner and SIHI entered into a lease contract with option to
purchase two parcels of land, at a monthly rental of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) pesos for a period of eighteen (18) months.
Approximately three weeks before the expiration of the lease
contract, SIHI notified petitioner of the impending termination of the
lease agreement.
Petitioner requested for a six-month extension of the lease
contract, alleging that he needs ample time to raise sufficient funds in
order to exercise the option.
SIHI notified petitioner that his request was disapproved.
Nevertheless, it offered to lease the same property to petitioner at the
rate of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) pesos a month, for a period of
one (1) year. It further informed the petitioner of its decision to offer
for sale said leased property to the general public.[9]
Petitioner notified SIHI of his decision to exercise the option to
purchase the property and at the same time he made arrangements for
the payment of the downpayment in the amount of Three Hundred
Sixty Thousand (P360,000.00) pesos.[10]
SIHI sent another letter to petitioner stressing that the period
within which the option should have been exercised had already
lapsed. SIHI asked petitioner to vacate the property within ten (10)
days from notice, and to pay rental and penalty due. [11]
Hence, a complaint for specific performance and damages was
filed by petitioner against SIHI before the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, to compel the latter to honor its commitment and execute
the corresponding deed of sale.
Trial court promulgated its decision ordering the defendant to
execute a deed of sale in favor of the plaintiff in accordance with the
lease contract executed on January 10, 1984 between the plaintiff and
the defendant, but the purchase price may be by one shot payment
of P1,800,000.00;
Not satisfied with the judgment, SIHI elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review.
CA rendered its decision, affirming the trial courts judgment,
but modified the basis for assessing the purchase price. It added that,
the purchase price must be based on the prevailing market price of
real property in Bulacao, Cebu City.]

We hold that the appellee [herein petitioner] acted with

honesty and good faith. Verily, We are in accord with the trial court
that he should be allowed to exercise his option to purchase the lease
property. In fact, SIHI will not be prejudiced. A contrary ruling,
however, will definitely cause damage to the appellee, it appearing
that he has introduced considerable improvements on the property
and has
SIHIs agreement to enter first into a lease contract with option
to purchase with herein petitioner, is a clear proof of its intent to
promptly dispose said property although the full financial returns
may materialize only in a years time. Furthermore, its letter dated
January 7, 1986, reminding the petitioner of the short period of time
left within which to consummate their agreement, clearly showed its
desire to sell that property. Also, SIHIs letter dated February 14,
1986 supported the conclusion that it was bent on disposing said
property. For this letter made mention of the fact that, said property
is now for sale to the general public.
Petitioners determination to purchase said property is equally
indubitable. He introduced permanent improvements on the leased
property, demonstrating his intent to acquire dominion in a years
time. To increase his chances of acquiring the property, he secured
an P8 Million loan from the Technology Resources Center (TRC),
thereby augmenting his capital. He averred that he applied for a loan
since he planned to pay the purchase price in one single payment,
instead of paying in installment, which would entail the payment of
additional interest at the rate of 24% per annum, compared to 7%
per annum interest for the TRC loan. His letter earlier requesting
extension was premised, in fact, on his need for time to secure the
needed financing through a TRC loan.
In contractual relations, the law allows the parties reasonable
leeway on the terms of their agreement, which is the law between
them.[21] Note that by contract SIHI had given petitioner 4 periods:
(a) the option to purchase the property for P1,800,000.00 within the
lease period, that is, until January 30, 1986; (b) the option to be
exercised within the option period by written notice at anytime; (c)
the document of sale...to be consummated within the month
immediately following the month when petitioner exercises the
option; and (d) the payment in equal installments of the purchase
price over a period of 60 months.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of respondent court, is
hereby AFFIRMED. However the purchase price should be based on
the fair market value of real property in Bulacao, Cebu City, as of
February 1986, when the contract would have been
consummated. Further, petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private
respondent SIHI legal interest on the said purchase price beginning
February 1986 up to the time it is actually paid, as well as the taxes

due on said property, considering that petitioner have enjoyed the

beneficial use of said property. The case is hereby remanded to
Regional Trial Court to determine promptly the fair market value of
said real property as of February 1986, in Bulacao, Cebu City.

G.R. No. 134971

March 25, 2004

HERMINIO TAYAG, petitioner,

vs.
AMANCIA LACSON, ROSENDO LACSON, ANTONIO
LACSON, JUAN LACSON, TEODISIA LACSON-ESPINOSA
and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

The respondents-petitioners therein, filed a petition for certiorari in

the Court of Appeals for the nullification of orders of the trial court.
Court of Appeals rendered its decision against the petitioner,
annulling and setting aside orders of the trial court
The CA ruled that the respondents could not be enjoined from
alienating or even encumbering their property, especially so since
they were not privies to the deeds of assignment executed by the
defendants-tenants. The defendants-tenants were not yet owners of
the portions of the landholdings respectively tilled by them; as such,
they had nothing to assign to the petitioner. Finally, the CA ruled that
the deeds of assignment executed by the defendants-tenants were
contrary to P.D. No. 27 and Rep. Act No. 6657.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as amended, enumerates the
grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, thus:

Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 and the

Resolution2 of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 44883.

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and

the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained
of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either
for a limited period or perpetually;

Respondents Angelica Tiotuyco Vda. de Lacson,3 and her children

were the registered owners of three parcels of land located in
Mabalacat, Pampanga.. The properties, which were tenanted
agricultural lands were administered by Renato Espinosa for the
owner.

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance

of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or

On 1996, a group of original farmers/tillers, individually executed in

favor of the petitioner separate Deeds of Assignment6 in which the
assignees assigned to the petitioner their respective rights as
tenants/tillers of the landholdings possessed and tilled by them for
and in consideration of P50.00 per square meter. The said amount
was made payable "when the legal impediments to the sale of the
property to the petitioner no longer existed." The petitioner was also
granted the exclusive right to buy the property if and when the
respondents, with the concurrence of the defendants-tenants, agreed
to sell the property. In the interim, the petitioner gave varied sums of
money to the tenants as partial payments, and the latter issued
receipts for the said amounts.
Petitioner called a meeting of the defendants-tenants to work out the
implementation of the terms of their separate agreements.7 However,
defendants-tenants, through Joven Mariano, wrote the petitioner
stating that they were not attending the meeting and instead gave
notice of their collective decision to sell all their rights and interests,
as
tenants/lessees,
over
the
landholding
to
the
respondents.8 Explaining that petitioner failed to meet their
expectation thus affecting their trust and confidence over the
petitioner.
Petitioner filed a complaint against the defendants-tenants, as well as
the respondents, for the court to fix a period within which to pay the
agreed purchase price of P50.00 per square meter to the defendants,
as provided for in the Deeds of Assignment. The petitioner also
prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendants and
the respondents.
Petitioner alleged that the defendants TIAMSON, et. al., have no
right to deal with the defendants LACSON or with any third persons
while their contracts with the plaintiff are subsisting.
The court ruled that the petitioner, on the basis of the material
allegations of the complaint, was entitled to injunctive relief.

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,

threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation
of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the
action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
We found that, the petitioner failed to establish the essential
requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hence,
the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying the respondents
comment/motion as well as their motion for reconsideration.
First. The trial court cannot enjoin the respondents, at the instance of
the petitioner, from selling, disposing of and encumbering their
property. As the registered owners of the property, the respondents
have the right to enjoy and dispose of their property without any
other limitations than those established by law, in accordance with
Article 428 of the Civil Code.
The respondents were not parties to the said deeds. There is no
evidence that the respondents agreed, expressly or impliedly, to the
said deeds or to the terms and conditions set forth therein. Indeed,
they assailed the validity of the said deeds on their claim that the
same were contrary to the letter and spirit of P.D. No. 27 and Rep.
Act No. 6657.
Second. The petitioner clearly has no cause of action against the
respondents for the principal relief prayed for therein, for the trial
court to fix a period within which to pay to each of the defendantstenants the balance of the P50.00 per square meter, the consideration
under the Deeds of Assignment executed by the defendants-tenants.
The respondents are not parties or privies to the deeds of assignment.
The matter of the period for the petitioner to pay the balance of the
said amount to each of the defendants-tenants is an issue between
them, the parties to the deed.

Third. On the face of the complaint, the action of the petitioner

against the respondents and the defendants-tenants has no legal basis.
Under the Deeds of Assignment, the obligation of the petitioner to
pay to each of the defendants-tenants the balance of the purchase
price was conditioned on the occurrence of the following events: (a)
the respondents agree to sell their property to the petitioner; (b) the
legal impediments to the sale of the landholding to the petitioner no
longer exist; and, (c) the petitioner decides to buy the property. When
he testified, the petitioner admitted that the legal impediments
referred to in the deeds were (a) the respondents refusal to sell their
property; and, (b) the lack of approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform

In fine, one who is not a party to a contract and who interferes

thereon is not necessarily an officious or malicious intermeddler. The
only evidence adduced by the petitioner to prove his claim is the
letter from the defendants-tenants informing him that they had
decided to sell their rights and interests over the landholding to the
respondents, instead of honoring their obligation under the deeds of
assignment because, according to them, the petitioner harassed those
tenants who did not want to execute deeds of assignment in his favor,
and because the said defendants-tenants did not want to have any
problem with the respondents who could cause their eviction for
executing with the petitioner the deeds of assignment as the said
deeds are in violation of P.D. No. 27 and Rep. Act No. 6657. 49

It is only upon the occurrence of the foregoing conditions that the

petitioner would be obliged to pay to the defendants-tenants the
balance of the P50.00 per square meter under the deeds of
assignment. Thus:

Even if the respondents received an offer from the defendants-tenants

to assign and transfer their rights and interests on the landholding, the
respondents cannot be enjoined from entertaining the said offer, or
even negotiating with the defendants-tenants. The respondents could
not even be expected to warn the defendants-tenants for executing the
said deeds in violation of P.D. No. 27 and Rep. Act No. 6657. Under
Section 22 of the latter law, beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 who
have culpably sold, disposed of, or abandoned their land, are
disqualified from becoming beneficiaries.

2. That in case the ASSIGNOR and LANDOWNER will

mutually agree to sell the said lot to the ASSIGNEE, who is
given an exclusive and absolute right to buy the lot, the
ASSIGNOR shall receive the sum of FIFTY PESOS
(P50.00) per square meter as consideration of the total area
actually tilled and possessed by the ASSIGNOR, less
whatever amount received by the ASSIGNOR including
commissions, taxes and all allowable deductions relative to
the sale of the subject properties.
3. That this exclusive and absolute right given to the
ASSIGNEE shall be exercised only when no legal
impediments exist to the lot to effect the smooth transfer of
lawful ownership of the lot/property in the name of the
ASSIGNEE;
4. That the ASSIGNOR will remain in peaceful possession
over the said property and shall enjoy the fruits/earnings
and/or harvest of the said lot until such time that full
payment of the agreed purchase price had been made by the
ASSIGNEE.42
There is no showing in the petitioners complaint that the respondents
had agreed to sell their property, and that the legal impediments to
the agreement no longer existed.
We do not agree with the contention of the petitioner that the deeds
of assignment executed by the defendants-tenants are perfected
option contracts.
In this case, the defendants-tenants-subtenants, under the deeds of
assignment, granted to the petitioner not only an option but the
exclusive right to buy the landholding. But the grantors were merely
the defendants-tenants, and not the respondents, the registered owners
of the property. Not being the registered owners of the property, the
defendants-tenants could not legally grant to the petitioner the option,
much less the "exclusive right" to buy the property.
Fourth. The petitioner impleaded the respondents as partiesdefendants solely on his allegation that the latter induced or are
inducing the defendants-tenants to violate the deeds of assignment,
contrary to the provisions of Article 1314 of the New Civil Code
which reads:
Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party.

From the pleadings of the petitioner, it is quite evident that his

purpose in having the defendants-tenants execute the Deeds of
Assignment in his favor was to acquire the landholding without any
tenants thereon, in the event that the respondents agreed to sell the
property to him. The petitioner knew that under Section 11 of Rep.
Act No. 3844, if the respondents agreed to sell the property, the
defendants-tenants shall have preferential right to buy the same under
reasonable terms and conditions:
Under Section 12 of the law, if the property was sold to a third person
without the knowledge of the tenants thereon, the latter shall have the
right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration. By
assigning their rights and interests on the landholding under the deeds
of assignment in favor of the petitioner, the defendants-tenants
thereby waived, in favor of the petitioner, who is not a beneficiary
under Section 22 of Rep. Act No. 6657, their rights of preemption or
redemption under Rep. Act No. 3844. The defendants-tenants would
then have to vacate the property in favor of the petitioner upon full
payment of the purchase price. Instead of acquiring ownership of the
portions of the landholding respectively tilled by them, the
defendants-tenants would again become landless for a measly sum of
P50.00 per square meter. The petitioners scheme is subversive, not
only of public policy, but also of the letter and spirit of the agrarian
laws. That the scheme of the petitioner had yet to take effect in the
future or ten years hence is not a justification. The respondents may
well argue that the agrarian laws had been violated by the defendantstenants and the petitioner by the mere execution of the deeds of
assignment. In fact, the petitioner has implemented the deeds by
paying the defendants-tenants amounts of money and even sought
their immediate implementation by setting a meeting with the
defendants-tenants. In fine, the petitioner would not wait for ten years
to evict the defendants-tenants. For him, time is of the essence.
We agree with the petitioners contention that the appellate court
erred when it permanently enjoined the RTC from continuing with
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 10910. The only issue before the
appellate court was whether or not the trial court committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
denying the respondents motion to deny or dismiss the petitioners
plea for a writ of preliminary injunction. Not one of the parties
prayed to permanently enjoin the trial court from further proceeding
with Civil Case No. 10910 or to dismiss the complaint. It bears
stressing that the petitioner may still amend his complaint, and the
respondents and the defendants-tenants may file motions to dismiss
the complaint. By permanently enjoining the trial court from

proceeding with Civil Case No. 10910, the appellate court acted
arbitrarily and effectively dismissed the complaint motu proprio,
including the counterclaims of the respondents and that of the
defendants-tenants. The defendants-tenants were even deprived of
their right to prove their special and affirmative defenses.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals nullifying the
Orders of the RTC is AFFIRMED. The writ of injunction issued by
the Court of Appeals permanently enjoining the RTC from further
proceeding is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court of Mabalacat, Pampanga, Branch 44, is ORDERED to continue
with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 10910 as provided for by the
Rules of Court, as amended.