Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
VILLA-REAL, J.:
It is so ordered.
This is an appeal taken by the plaintiffs Natividad Centeno in
her own behalf and as administratrix of the estate of her
deceased father, Valentin Centeno, Jesus Centeno First,
Rosalia and Rosario Centeno, and by the intervenors Nicolas,
Emilio, Isaac and Jesus Centeno Second, from the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, of which the following
is the dispositive part:
The agreement of partition in question is hereby upheld, with
the adjudications to the parties thereto, and therefore the
partition prayed for in this civil case by plaintiffs and
intervenors respecting the realty described in the sixth
paragraph of the original complaint is denied. The other
petition that said partition be held void and of no effect in so far
as it refers only to the said portion adjucated to defendants, is
also denied.
It is held parcels Nos. 70, 86, and 95, described in the
aforementioned sixth paragraphs of the original complaint, are
held by defendants pro indiviso; and the others, Nos. 53, 54,
55, 60, 62, and 69, with the metes and bounds given in the
said sixth paragraph, which are in possession of the plaintiff
Jesus Centeno First, as well as the others, Nos. 82, 85, and
99, which are in the possession of the defendant Telesforo
Centeno.
The defendants' petition that the first 51 parcels of land
described in the said sixth paragraph of the original complaint,
reproduced in the last amendatory complaint, be partitioned in
this case and parcel No. 116 described in the inventory Exhibit
F of the plaintiffs, and 6 of the defendants, as well as the said
parcels Nos. 53, 54, 55, 60, 62, and 69, and the credits is
denied; all of which are considered and declared to the pro
indiviso (Exhibit 7 of the defendants), without prejudice to said
partition being made in such manner as they may agree upon.
It is ordered that the plaintiffs deliver to defendants the two
parcels of land described in the latters' cross complaint in their
second cause of action, and said two mares and harness
cannot be ordered delivered, because they are not formally
detailed and difficulties would arise in the execution of such an
order.
As Fabian Cabanilla and Simplicio Gaberto possessors of
parcels Nos. 76, 77, 59, and 100 claimed by plaintiffs and
intervenorst, were not made defendants in this case, no
pronouncement is here made against them, nor as to parcels
Nos. 52, 66, 94, and 61, the possessors of which are unknown.
Defendants are absolved from the claims with respect to
parcels Nos. 105, 106, 107, 11, 57, 75, 93, 102, 112, 115, 56,
58, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84,
87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 97, 98, 101, 103, 108, 109, 110, 113,
and 114 (43) described in the complaint.
The present case being called for trial for the approval of the
account presented by the administratrix Gabriela F. de
Centeno, the latter appeared with the heirs name Telesforo and
Sisenando Centeno, and the legatee Antonina Centeno, minor.
(c) The third part shall be divided equally, neither more nor
less, among my sons Antonio and Faustino Centeno, may they
rest in peace, and Valentin Centeno. (Exhibit E of plaintiffs and
Exhibit 5 of defendants.)
10 | S u c c e s s i o n A r t . 9 9 2 f u l l t e x t
The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her
deceased uncle, a legitimate brother of her natural mother
(Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29).
WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
(h)
11 | S u c c e s s i o n A r t . 9 9 2 f u l l t e x t
There being two properties in this case both will be discussed
separately, as each has its own distinct factual setting. The first
was bought in 1908 by Maria Cailles under a deed of sale
(Exh. '60'), which describes it as follows:
. . . radicada en la calle Desposorio de este dicho Municipio
dentro de los limites y linderos siquientes: Por la derecha a la
entrada el solar de Teodorico Reyes por la izquierda el solar
de Maria Calesa (Cailles) arriba citada por la espalda la via
ferrea del Railroad Co., y la frente la dicha calle Desposorio
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles paid the realty
taxes starting from 1918 up to 1948. Thereafter as she and her
son Narciso Bracewell, left for Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes
managed the property and paid the realty tax of the land.
However, for unexplained reasons, she paid and declared the
same in her own name. Because of this, plaintiff decided to run
after this property, erroneously thinking that as the great
grandson of Francisca Reyes, he had some proprietary right
over the same.
The second parcel on the other hand, was purchased by Maria
Cailles in 1917 under a deed of sale (Exh. '3') which describes
the property as follows:
. . . una parcela de terreno destinado al beneficio de la sal, que
linda por Norte con la linea Ferrea y Salinar de Narciso
Mayuga, por Este con los de Narciso Mayuga y Domingo
Lozada, por Sur con los de Domingo Lozada y Fruto Silverio y
por Oeste con el de Fruto Silverio y Linea Ferrea de una
extension superficial de 1229.00 metros cuadrados.
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles likewise paid the
realty tax in 1917 and continued paying the same up to 1948.
Thereafter when she and her son, Narciso Bracewell,
established their residence in Nueva Ecija, Francisco Reyes
administered the property and like in the first case, declared in
1949 the property in her own name. Thinking that the property
is the property of Francisca Reyes, plaintiff filed the instant
complaint, claiming a portion thereof as the same allegedly
represents the share of his father,
As earlier stated, the court a quo decided the case in favor of
the plaintiff principally because defendants' evidence do not
sufficiently show that the 2 properties which they bought in
1908 and 1917, are the same as the properties sought by the
plaintiff.
Carefully going over the evidence, We believe that the trial
judge misinterpreted the evidence as to the identification of the
lands in question.
To begin with, the deed of sale (Exh. '60') of 1908 clearly states
that the land sold to Maria Cailles is en la cane Desposorio in
Las Pinas Rizal which was bounded by adjoining lands owned
by persons living at the time, including the railroad track of the
Manila Railroad Co. ('la via ferrea del Railroad Co.')
With the exception of the area which was not disclosed in the
deed, the description fits the land now being sought by the
12 | S u c c e s s i o n A r t . 9 9 2 f u l l t e x t
tree of the deceased Francisca Reyes. However, this piece of
evidence does not in any way lend credence to his tale.
This is because the name of the child described in the birth
certificate is not that of the plaintiff but a certain 'Alfredo
Leonardo' who was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero
Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. Other than his bare allegation,
plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that the
'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other
than he himself. Thus, even without taking time and space to
go into further details, We may safely conclude that plaintiff
failed to prove his filiation which is a fundamental requisite in
this action where he is claiming to be an heir in the inheritance
in question. 4
That is likewise a factual finding which may not be disturbed in
this petition for review in the absence of a clear showing that
said finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or that
there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court
making the finding of fact.
Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that
petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by
right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the
deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by
the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown
by the fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his
alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and
what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still
subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child
who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca
Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to
be reviewed in this petition is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
February 6, 1990
The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel was
opposed by her brothers, who averred that their mother was
already senile at the time of the execution of the will and did
not fully comprehend its meaning. Moreover, some of the
properties listed in the inventory of her estate belonged to them
exclusively. 2
Meantime, Isabel was appointed special administratrix by the
probate court. 3 Alfredo subsequently died, leaving Vicente the
lone oppositor. 4
On August 1, 1974, Vicente de la Puerta filed with the Court of
First Instance of Quezon a petition to adopt Carmelita de la
Puerta. After hearing, the petition was granted. 5 However, the
decision was appealed by Isabel to the Court of Appeals.
During the pendency of the appeal, Vicente died, prompting
her to move for the dismissal of the case 6
On November 20, 1981, Carmelita, having been allowed to
intervene in the probate proceedings, filed a motion for the
payment to her of a monthly allowance as the acknowledged
natural child of Vicente de la Puerta. 7 At the hearing on her
motion, Carmelita presented evidence to prove her claimed
status to which Isabel was allowed to submit counter-evidence.
On November 12,1982, the probate court granted the motion,
declaring that it was satisfied from the evidence at hand that
Carmelita was a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta and was
entitled to the amounts claimed for her support. The court
added that "the evidence presented by the petitioner against it
(was) too weak to discredit the same. 8
On appeal, the order of the lower court was affirmed by the
respondent court, 9 which is now in turn being challenged in
this petition before us.
The petitioner's main argument is that Carmelita was not the
natural child of Vicente de la Puerta, who was married to
Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 and remained his wife until his
death in 1978. Carmelita's real parents are Juanita Austrial and
Gloria Jordan.
Invoking the presumption of legitimacy, she argues that
Carmelita was the legitimate child of Juanita Austrial and Gloria
Jordan, who were legally or presumably married. Moreover,
Carmelita could not have been a natural child of Vicente de la
Puerta because he was already married at the time of her birth
in 1962.
To prove her point, Isabel presented Amado Magpantay, who
testified that he was a neighbor of Austrial and Jordan.
According to him, the two were living as husband and wife and
had three children, including a girl named "Puti," presumably
Carmelita. He said though that he was not sure if the couple
was legally married. 10
Another witness, Genoveva de la Puerta, Identified herself as
Vicente de la Puerta's wife but said they separated two years
after their marriage in 1938 and were never reconciled. In
1962, Gloria Jordan started living with Vicente de la Puerta in
his house, which was only five or six houses away from where
she herself was staying. Genoveva said that the relationship
13 | S u c c e s s i o n A r t . 9 9 2 f u l l t e x t
between her husband and Gloria was well known in the
community. 11
(1)
(2)
By the fact that the husband and wife were living
separately in such a way that access was not possible;
(3)
xxx
xxx
(bb)
That a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage;
14 | S u c c e s s i o n A r t . 9 9 2 f u l l t e x t
error to contend that as she is not a natural child but a spurious
child (if at all) she cannot prove her status by the record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or any
authentic writing. On the contrary, it has long been settled that:
She is my daughter. 17
xxx
xxx
xxx
It is settled that
The reason for this rule was explained in the recent case of
Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 21 thus:
15 | S u c c e s s i o n A r t . 9 9 2 f u l l t e x t
family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate
child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child the
latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former in turn
sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no
more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of
resentment. 22
Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be
barred from inheriting from Dominga Revuelta for there would
be no natural kindred ties between them and consequently, no
legal ties to bind them either. As aptly pointed out by Dr. Arturo
M. Tolentino:
If the adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the
latter cannot represent the former in the inheritance from the
parents or ascendants of the adopter. The adopted child is not
related to the deceased in that case, because the filiation
created by fiction of law is exclusively between the adopter and
the adopted. "By adoption, the adopters can make for
themselves an heir, but they cannot thus make one for their
kindred. 23
The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of
Vicente de la Puerta, has successional rights to the intestate
estate of her father but not to the estate of Dominga Revuelta.
Her claims for support and inheritance should therefore be filed
in the proceedings for the settlement of her own father's
estate 24 and cannot be considered in the probate of Dominga
Revuelta's Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed
decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs
against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
PARAS, J.:
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with
the Court of First Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B21, "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying among other things, that the
corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her favor
and that she be appointed as special Administratrix of the
properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's
16 | S u c c e s s i o n A r t . 9 9 2 f u l l t e x t
Appellate Court on December 14, 1983 (reversing the decision
of the trial court) the dispositive portion of which reads
WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent
with the facts and law applicable, the same is hereby set aside
and another one entered sustaining the Orders of December 1
and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner as the sole heir of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not
to interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in
the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Costs against the oppositors-appellees.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees
(petitioners herein) was denied by the same respondent court
in its order dated February 17, 1984 hence, the present petition
for Review with the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I.
The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate
succession of petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct
descending line (Art. 978) and/or natural/"illegitimate children"
(Art. 988) and prefering a niece, who is a collateral relative
(Art. 1003);
II.
The Decision erred in denying the right of
representation of the natural grandchildren Santero to
represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession to the
intestate estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero (Art. 982);
III.
The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of
the grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the estate
of "legitimate child or relative" of Pablo Santero, her son and
father of the petitioners' grandchildren Santero;
IV.
The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-appellant
Felisa P. Jardin who is a niece and therefore a collateral
relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero excludes the
natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who are her direct
descendants and/or grand children;
V.
The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts.
988, 989 and 990 are the applicable provisions of law on
intestate succession; and
VI.
The Decision erred in considering the orders of
December 1 and December 9, 1976 which are provisional and
interlocutory as final and executory.
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows
who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren (the
natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero and the issue here is whether
oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children
of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero
who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.
17 | S u c c e s s i o n A r t . 9 9 2 f u l l t e x t
riot inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the
Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it
reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992,
but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995
and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the
illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the
illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in
the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of
an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being
indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil
Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that
the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of
representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or
contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and
998. The first solution would be more in accord with an
enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections
on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quater, 1976, Volume 4,
Number 1, pp. 40-41).
SO ORDERED.
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that
the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word
"relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. 7
The record shows that from the commencement of this case
the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the
late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin
and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions
of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did
not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the
sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court erred in ruling that the Orders of the Court a
quo dated December 1, 1976 and December 9, 1976 are final
and executory. Such contention is without merit. The Hon.
Judge Jose Raval in his order dated December 1, 1976 held
that the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled to
intervene and hence not allowed to intervene in the
proceedings for the declaration of the heirship in the intestate
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Subsequently,
Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated December 9, 1976,
which declared Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate
heir of Simona Pamuti. The said Orders were never made the
subjects of either a motion for reconsideration or a perfected
appeal. Hence, said orders which long became final and
executory are already removed from the power of jurisdiction of
the lower court to decide anew. The only power retained by the
lower court, after a judgment has become final and executory
is to order its execution. The respondent Court did not err
therefore in ruling that the Order of the Court a quo dated May
30, 1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir of the
deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero "is clearly a total
reversal of an Order which has become final and executory,
hence null and void. "
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the
assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
(b)
Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the
full blood of the deceased, to wit:
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
Manuel C. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
Erlinda C. Pascual
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
(c)
Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of
the deceased, to wit:
Avelino Pascual
Isoceles Pascual
Loida Pascual-Martinez
18 | S u c c e s s i o n A r t . 9 9 2 f u l l t e x t
Virginia Pascual-Ner
Nona Pascual-Fernando
Octavio Pascual
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
(d)
Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual,
brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:
Olivia S. Pascual
Hermes S. Pascual
(e)
Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half
blood of the deceased and represented by the following:
Dominga M. Pascual
Mamerta P. Fugoso
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
Domiga P. San Diego
Nelia P. Marquez
Silvestre M. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late
Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding,
Case No. 7554, for administration of the intestate estate of her
late husband (Rollo, p. 47).
On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a
Supplemental Petition to the Petition for letters of
Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual
and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres
Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual
executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her own knowledge,
Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late
husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by
the oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs
of the deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered
into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement
objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and
Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of such compromise
agreement provides, to wit:
This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the
continuation of the above-entitled proceedings until the final
determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise
agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and
Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres
Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into
despite the Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia
Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary
rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle
(Rollo, pp. 111-112).
19 | S u c c e s s i o n A r t . 9 9 2 f u l l t e x t
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor
shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child.
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in
Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court ruled that:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in
that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between
the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of
the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and
illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the
family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn,
sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no
more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his
illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC
did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent
their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the
intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood
brother of their father.
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the
light of Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil Code allows them
(Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate
estate of Don Andres Pascual.
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC,
this Court further elucidated the successional rights of
illegitimate children, which squarely answers the questions
raised by the petitioner on this point.
The Court held:
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights
of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their
descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of
representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever
manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to
be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named
provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of
legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate
grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the
illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to
represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which
20 | S u c c e s s i o n A r t . 9 9 2 f u l l t e x t
G.R. No. 126707 February 25, 1999
BLANQUITA E. DELA MERCED, LUISITO E. DELA
MERCED, BLANQUTIA M. MACATANGAY, MA. OLIVIA M.
PAREDES, TERESITA P. RUPISAN, RUBEN M. ADRIANO,
HERMINIO M. ADRIANO, JOSELITO M. ADRIANO,
ROGELIO M. ADRIANO, WILFREDO M. ADRIANO, VICTOR
M. ADRIANO, CORAZON A. ONGOCO, JASMIN A.
MENDOZA and CONSTANTINO M. ADRIANO, petitioners,
vs.
JOSELITO P. DELA MERCED, respondent.
PURISIMA, J.:
In dismissing the petition, the trial court stated:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated October 17, 1996, in CA-G.R. CV No.
41283, which reversed the decision, dated June 10, 1992, of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 67, Pasig City, in Civil Case
No. 59705.
The facts of the case are, as follows:
On March 23, 1987, Evarista M. dela Merced died intestate,
without issue. She left five (5) parcels of land situated in
Orambo, Pasig City.
xxx
xxx
21 | S u c c e s s i o n A r t . 9 9 2 f u l l t e x t
xxx
xxx
xxx
22 | S u c c e s s i o n A r t . 9 9 2 f u l l t e x t
HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA
BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, respondents.
The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is
the inheritance left by an illegitimate child who died intestate
without any surviving descendant or ascendant.
Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel
and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit. During his marriage with
Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula
Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born.
Several years passed before Antonio Manuel, his wife Beatriz,
and his mistress Ursula finally crossed the bar on, respectively,
06 August 1960, 05 February 1981 and 04 November 1976.
Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married
Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a
donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of
2,700 square meters, covered by Original Certificate of Title
("OCT") No. P-20594 was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by
Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of land, covered by
OCT P-19902 and Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No.
41134, were later bought by Juan and registered in his name.
The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their
desire to have one impelled the spouses to take private
respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so
raised her as their own "daughter".
On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of
Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a
10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of
his land covered by TCT No. 41134. Juan Manuel died
intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04
February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.
On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza,
Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for
herself the three parcels of land covered by OCT P-20594,
OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134 (all still in the name of Juan
Manuel). Following the registration of the document of
adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three
titles
(OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134) in the name
of Juan Manuel were canceled and new titles, TCT No.
184223, TCT No. 184224 and TCT No. 184225, were issued in
the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. On 19 October 1992,
Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa
Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the
unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now covered by
TCT No. 184225) that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel
under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts
of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a
complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, the petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of
the aforesaid instruments.
The case, there being no material dispute on the facts, was
submitted to the court a quo for summary judgment.
The trial court, in its now assailed 15th August 1994 decision,
dismissed the complaint holding that petitioners, not being
heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel,
were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit.
23 | S u c c e s s i o n A r t . 9 9 2 f u l l t e x t
the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand,
although it does not totally disavow such succession in the
direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of
the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary
dispositions.
This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and
illegitimate family in intestacy is explained by a noted
civilist. 2 His thesis:
Order of Preference
Legitimate Children and
What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers
and sisters, nephews and nieces, as legal or intestate Descendants
heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that
under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing
members of the illegitimate family from members of
Legitimate Parents and
the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this
barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as Ascendants
the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such
brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the
illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks
of"brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal Illegitimate Children and
heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate
Descendants (in the absence
brothers and sisters as well as to the children,
of ICDs and LPAs, the
whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers
Illegitimate Parents)
and sisters. (Emphasis supplied)
Surviving Spouse
Order of Concurrence
(a) Legitimate Children and
Descendants, Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(b) Legitimate Parents and
Ascendants Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(c) Illegitimate Children and
Descendants and Surviving
Spouse
(d) Surviving Spouse and
Illegitimate Parents
(e) Brothers and Sisters/
Nephews and Nieces
and Surviving Spouse
(f) Alone
The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain",
firstly, in the early case of Grey v. Fabie 3 and, then, in the
Brothers and Sisters/
relatively recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate
Nephews and
Court 4 and De la Puerta v. Court of Appeals. 5 InDiaz, we have
Nieces
said:
Other Collateral Relatives
(within the fifth civil degree)
Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
State
(g) Alone
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly
child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is
admitted that she herself is not an intestate heir of
not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992.
Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without
Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a
family there is presumed to be an intervening
compulsory nor a legal heir. 13
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child
is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the
We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged
petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Selfcondition of the former, and the resources of which it
Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3)
is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law
Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court.
does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest" 14 in
further grounds of resentment.
the case, had neither the standing nor the cause of
action to initiate the complaint.
The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the
Court in several other cases. Thus, it has ruled that where the
The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to
illegitimate child had
sustain the award of amounts for moral and
half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation
former's inheritance; 6 that the legitimate collateral relatives of
expenses. An adverse result of a suit in law does not
the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; 7 that a
mean that its advocacy is necessarily so wrongful as
natural child cannot represent his natural father in the
to justify an assessment of damages against the
succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; 8 that
actor. 15
the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her
deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional
father; 9 and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 37) is AFFIRMED,
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
except insofar as it has awarded moral and exemplary
father. 10 Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a
damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation
uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered
24 | S u c c e s s i o n A r t . 9 9 2 f u l l t e x t
expenses, in favor of private respondents, which
portion is hereby DELETED. No special
pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
25 | S u c c e s s i o n A r t . 9 9 2 f u l l t e x t
was better equipped than respondent to administer and
manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina. Additionally,
Emilio III averred his own qualifications that: [he] is presently
engaged in aquaculture and banking; he was trained by the
decedent to work in his early age by involving him in the
activities of the Emilio Aguinaldo Foundation which was
established in 1979 in memory of her grandmothers father; the
significant work experiences outside the family group are
included in his curriculum vitae; he was employed by the
oppositor [Federico] after his graduation in college with
management degree at F.C.E. Corporations and Hagonoy
Rural Bank; x x x.[10]
A.
IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE UNDER SECTION 6 OF
RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHETHER ARTICLE
992 OF THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES; and
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[12]
B.
UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE
HEREIN PETITIONER WAS REARED BY THE DECEDENT
AND HER SPOUSE SINCE INFANCY, WHETHER ARTICLE
992 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE APPLIES SO AS TO BAR HIM
FROM BEING APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
DECEDENTS ESTATE.[13]
26 | S u c c e s s i o n A r t . 9 9 2 f u l l t e x t
For the benefit of the estate and its claimants, creditors, as well
as heirs, the administrator should be one who is prepared,
academically and by experience, for the demands and
responsibilities of the position. While [respondent], a practicing
physician, is not unqualified, it is clear to the court that when it
comes to management of real estate and the processing and
payment of debts, [Emilio III], a businessman with an
established track record as a manager has a decided edge and
therefore, is in a position to better handle the preservation of
the estate.[14]
2.
The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as
the iron curtain bar rule,[18] is quite the opposite scenario in
the facts obtaining herein for the actual relationship between
Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the
other, was akin to the normal relationship of legitimate
relatives;
3.
Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent,
Cristina, and her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged
him as their grandchild;
4.
Federico claimed half of the properties included in the
estate of the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their
conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their
marriage;
5.
Cristinas properties forming part of her estate are still
commingled with that of her husband, Federico, because her
share in the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon her
death, remains undetermined and unliquidated; and
6.
Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to
share in the distribution of the latters estate as a direct heir,
one degree from Federico, not simply representing his
deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in
excluding Emilio III from the administration of the decedents
estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the
estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the
interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even
declared that under the law, [Federico], being the surviving
spouse, would have the right of succession over a portion of
the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in
the conjugal partnership. Thus, we are puzzled why the CA
resorted to a strained legal reasoning Emilio IIIs nomination
was subject to a suspensive condition and rendered
inoperative by reason of Federicos death wholly inapplicable
to the case at bar.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of
preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration
granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a)
To the surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or
to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;
(b)
If such surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of
kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to
apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
27 | S u c c e s s i o n A r t . 9 9 2 f u l l t e x t
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c)
If there is no such creditor competent and
willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the
court may select.
28 | S u c c e s s i o n A r t . 9 9 2 f u l l t e x t
the stage of distribution of the estate which must come after
the inheritance is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from
the foregoing admonition:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made.
x x x. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are
the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive
shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum
to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over
the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to
both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in
Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to
make a determination and to declare the heirs of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu
as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal
interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to settle the
estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.