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CRISIL Insight
CRISIL Insight
Analytical Contacts:
Pawan Agrawal
Senior Director CRISIL Ratings
Email: pawan.agrawal@crisil.com
Manish Gupta
Director CRISIL Ratings
Email: manish.gupta@crisil.com
Ramesh Karunakaran
Associate Director CRISIL Ratings
Email: ramesh.karunakaran@crisil.com
Shilpi Keshari
Senior Rating Analyst CRISIL Ratings
Email: shilpi.keshari@crisil.com
Kartik Shetty
Rating Analyst CRISIL Ratings
Email: kartik.shetty@crisil.com
9 Projects
90.50
6 Projects
30.00
JNNSM
State^
A Category
BBB Category
BB and below
CRISIL in this article analyses the critical factors that will drive the growth of the solar energy sector.
The entire article has been structured in the form of Q&As. The Q&As analyse the role of government
support, pre-commission and operational risks in the solar power projects, impact of recent antidumping issue, counterparty credit risks, and emerging large scale players in the sector.
1. What has kept solar capacity growing and what will drive future growth?
Solar power in India has witnessed impressive growth in a short span of time from just 35 MW as of
March 2011 to a respectable 2,647 MW as of March 2014 (Chart 2). The steep growth in these three
years has come on the back of a favourable policy environment, particularly the JNNSM scheme, and
Gujarats solar policy.
Enrich Energy Pvt Ltd (rated CRISIL BB+/ Stable/ CRISIL A4+) ,Novus Green Energy Systems Pvt Ltd (rated CRISIL BB/ Stable/ CRISIL A4+), Alectrona energy
Pvt Ltd (rated CRISIL BB-/Stable/ CRISIL A4+ [Placed on 'Notice of Withdrawal']), Refex Energy Ltd (rated CRISIL BB+/ Stable/ CRISIL A4+) and Photon Energy
Systems Limited (Rated CRISIL C/ CRISIL A4)
2
Tata Power Solar Systems Ltd (rated CRISIL A/Negative/ CRISIL A1), HHV Solar Technologies Pvt Ltd (rated CRISIL B-/Stable/CRISIL A4), Vega Solar Energy
Private Limited (rated CRISIL B-/Stable/ CRISIL A4), Surana Ventures Ltd (rated CRISIL BB+/Stable/ CRISIL A4+) and Empire Photovoltaic Systems Private
Limited (rated CRISIL D)
CRISIL Insight
JNNSM has opted for the bid-based tariff route in Phase 1 and bid-based viability gap funding in
Phase 2 (batch 1). This is further aided by government support in the form of infrastructure such as
land, accessibility via roads and grid connectivity. Gujarat, for instance, has provided a solar park with
all infrastructure in one place where multiple projects can be commissioned.
Indeed, Gujarat has become an attractive destination for solar power projects thanks to its policy of
attractive long-term preferential tariffs, creditworthiness of its state distribution company (discom) and
high level of solar radiation or insolation.
Around 296 MW of capacity under the Renewable Energy Certificates (REC) mechanism has come up
during 2012-13, mainly in Rajasthan, MP and AP. However, the attractiveness of this route has
decreased due to a failure on the governments part to enforce the Renewable Power Obligations
(RPO) mechanism, which creates demand for REC. Limited pricing visibility (CERC has fixed the
prices for these certificates only till 2017) of the mechanism has further eroded its attractiveness.
CRISIL believes the future of the REC mechanism is uncertain unless the RPO is strictly enforced by
the government. The capacity addition though this route is expected to come down.
Chart 2: Growth in solar capacity in India (in MW)
2,647
10.0
JNNSM
Gujarat
Karnataka
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
West Bengal
RPO
REC
Private
CPSUs
686.9
1,646
296.0
40.0
941
150.0
5.0
10
860.4
35
Mar 2010 Mar 2011 Mar 2012 Mar 2013 Mar 2014
130.0
25.0
Further, the technology curve for solar power is evolving. In the past two years, capital cost per MW
has fallen from Rs.14 crore per MW to less than Rs. 8 crore per MW, resulting in average solar tariff
rates falling from Rs. 15 per kWh to Rs. 8.0 per kWh.
CRISIL believes that for solar power projects to achieve grid parity, capital cost needs to fall below
Rs. 5 crore per MW. And until grid parity is achieved, government support in terms of preferential tariff
or viability gap funding remains critical for growth in solar power.
Chart 4: Trends in solar projects capital cost
per MW
14
15
15
13
12
13
10
7.9
8
2009-10
2010-11
Solar PV
Source: CERC
10.7
17
Rupees per kWh
Rs crores per MW
17
2011-12
2012-13
2013-14
Solar Thermal
Soucre: CRISIL Ratings
5.8
5.7
4.6
4.1
4.1
3.9
3.8
3.6
2. Given the credit risk profile of state discoms, what will drive growth?
For a state to be attractive to solar power developers, the level of solar radiation and credit profile of
the counterparty are crucial. For instance, Gujarat, which has high capacity of 860 MW under its solar
policy, represents a good combination of abundant radiation leading to healthy plant load factors
(PLFs) and a creditworthy counter party in Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd (GUVNL). By contrast, in
Rajasthan, of the 667 MW of installed solar capacity, none is under state policy due to
creditworthiness of its state distribution company (discom). (Charts 6, 7).
Chart 6: State discoms credit profile
Most states barring Gujarat have lagged in adding solar capacities. Creditworthiness of state discoms
and delays in implementation have played a key role in investor interest. In the near term, based on
bidding initiated in 2012-13, CRISIL believes close to 500 MW capacity will be added under state solar
policies mainly in Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh.
For states with high solar radiation but relatively high risk in terms of creditworthiness, the majority of
the capacity addition will come under the central governments JNNSM scheme. The creditworthiness
of the Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI)3 provides comfort to investors. But developers are
finding it difficult to bid for larger projects as JNNSM has a cap on the maximum capacity that can be
awarded, which leads to aggressive bidding
Hence, CRISIL believes the recent introduction of ultra-mega power projects (UMPPs) in the solar
sector will play a crucial role in providing scale and a creditworthy counterparty (SECI). The Ministry of
New and Renewable Energy has rolled out 4 UMPP projects with cumulative capacity of 15,000 MW
in Rajasthan (4000 MW), Gujarat (4000 MW), Ladakh (5000 MW) and Kargil (2000 MW). Groundwork
has already commenced for the Rajasthan project. Under this, SECI will be the sole counterparty
which will then sell the power to discoms. This initiative will help developers to not only bid for larger
projects but also have a creditworthy counterparty.
MNRE has established SECI as the executing agency under Phase 2 (batch 1) of JNNSM. SECI will sign power purchase agreements (PPA) for 25 years
with the project developers.
CRISIL Insight
3. Who are the players bidding for solar projects?
Competitive bidding and a sharp drop in tariffs of late have led to the emergence of serious solar
players with massive growth plans. Groups like Welspun Energy, Acme Group, Moser Baer Solar, Sun
Edison Energy India, Azure Power, Essel Infra, Green Infra and Lanco Solar are aiming at huge
capacities and a portfolio of solar projects in the medium term. They have consistently bid for new
projects across JNNSM and state schemes. These projects have a combined portfolio (operational
and under development) of ~1400 MW, accounting for close to 30% of the domestic capacity. Many
large companies are building their own EPC/O&M arms for competitive advantage, which are run by
professionals with vast experience in the solar industry.
Given the increasing competition and aggressive bidding in JNNSM Phase 2, the ability of the
developers to manage interest rate and forex risk will be crucial to returns from projects. Development
institutions such as the International Finance Corporation, the US Exim Overseas Private Investment
Corporation, and Germanys DEG have provided foreign currency loans of Rs. 20 billion to large
players. The companies are also backed by private equity monies estimated at Rs.~45 billion, of
which more than 60% -- or ~Rs. 28 billion -- has gone to the large groups.
CRISIL believes that as the industry matures, serious players will keep adding capacities and build a
significant portfolio of assets. This will help them look at pooling and securitisation of cash flows from
projects or refinancing through bonds.
4. How will the anti-dumping duty on solar panels impact the industry?
In May 2014, the Union Ministry of Commerce recommended levying anti-dumping duty on solar cells
imported from the US, Malaysia, and China. More than two-thirds of the projects in India currently use
imported solar panels. This will increase the cost of capital, thereby necessitating higher tariffs to
maintain project feasibility. The cost of a solar panel imported from the US will rise 50-60% with an
anti-dumping duty of $0.48 per watt, while those of Chinese panels will double with a duty close to
$0.81 per watt. For a solar power plant based on imported module from the US, capital cost will go up
by about Rs.2 crore per MW, which require more than 26% escalation in tariff if the internal rate of
return (IRR) is to be maintained at 15% as shown in the Chart 8. CRISIL believes that without the antidumping duty to sustain solar power generation from 1,000 MW, annual subsidy support from
government should have to increase by Rs.3.0 billion (assuming grid parity at Rs.5.5 / kWh, IRR at
15% and imports from the US). However, higher subsidy support from government will be offset by the
anti-dumping duty that the government will receive on the imports.
Table 1: Anti-dumping duty on solar panel imports
Country of Import
Anti-dumping duty
7.9
8.3
6.5
USA
China
Malaysia
Taiwan
7.0
Imported
Domestic
8.4
CRISIL has assumed PLF of 19%, debt to equity ratio of 70:30, debt tenure of 12 years and interest cost of 12.50% for domestic credit and 8% for foreign
funding. The cost of capital is assumed at Rs.65.8 million/MW for a project based on imported modules assuming an exchange rate of Rs.60/USD.
The anti-dumping duty also puts in doubt the viability of 1,600 MW of solar projects being developed
under various schemes. Most of these were bid envisaging the use of equipment imported sans antidumping duty. For instance, under JNNSM Phase 2 (Batch 1), 375 MW of projects under the open
category were bid aggressively with an average viability gap funding of just Rs.10.07 million per MW.
CRISIL believes any increase in cost of capital will threaten the feasibility of these projects as returns
are already constrained (IRR 10-13%) due to aggressive bidding. This also does not augur well for
solar policies because many projects are already dragging due to creditworthiness issues of state
discoms. CRISIL believes higher cost of power will also thwart states from meeting their renewable
power obligations.
Today, solar panels are mostly imported from the US, China, Taiwan and Malaysia as prices there are
lower. In addition, developers get access to cheaper funding. While the US has built capacities based
on superior technology, its Asian rivals enjoy economies of scale. India currently is relatively less
competitive in the solar equipment industry due to the lack of:
a) Technology-led innovation
b) Economies of scale - the current manufacturing base in India is 700 MW cells (concentrated
with 4 major manufacturers) and 1,250 MW modules (fragmented with 80 players) against a
global capacity of more than 100 GW
c) Backward integration No silicon wafer manufacturing capacity (a key raw material for
manufacturing cells and modules)
Also, panel quality varies by manufacturer. CRISIL believes that domestic solar equipment industry
will take time to achieve scale, technological competitiveness, quality and backward integration. In
addition, many of the domestic equipment players lack the creditworthiness to back their performance
warranties to solar power projects. With the imposition of anti-dumping duties on import from the US
and China, CRISIL believes developers may look to other countries such as Japan, Germany,
Singapore, and Korea for sourcing panels. Although, the players in these countries supply panels at a
cost slightly higher than imports from China or US, they maintain the quality standard and have the
creditworthiness to fulfill their warranties. Though the imposition of anti-dumping duty is detrimental to
solar power project developers, in the longer term, it will benefit domestic solar equipment
manufacturers, including CRISIL-rated players like Tata Power Solar Systems Ltd (CRISIL
A/Negative/CRISIL A1).
5. What are the pre-commissioning risks to look out for in a solar project?
Like any power project, construction is a key risk in solar power projects. In CRISILs experience, most
of the solar power projects have witnessed low to moderate pre-commissioning risks. In general,
construction complexity for solar PV projects is significantly lower than for thermal power projects.
There are no moving parts like turbines and fuel conveyers and high pressure parts, which
significantly reduce risk levels. Modularity of construction and ability to start generating power in
phases also reduces pre-commission risks. Because the complexity is lower, even smaller
construction firms can design and execute solar PV plants. However, for large plants, ability to
manage delays and cost overruns remains critical. A comprehensive EPC contract that provides a
fixed price, timeline based commitment helps in managing completion risk. Ease of availability of land,
technology and evacuation infrastructure are also critical for solar power projects. For the CRISILrated portfolio, the technology risk has been low as more than 90% of the projects have opted for the
established PV technology and all the PV projects rated by CRISIL are operational except for a 25
MW concentrated solar power (CSP)5 project by Cargo Solar (Gujarat) Pvt Ltd (rated CRISIL BB/Stable)6 Developers prefer PV over CSP because of the latters complexity of technology.
(Refer to Chart 9 & Table 2).
5
CSP technology captures sunlight through mirrors and lenses, converts that into heat energy, which, in turn, generates electrical energy through a
thermodynamic cycle. This is a more complex system than PV, where solar energy is directly converted to electrical energy through photovoltaic cells.
The 25 MW CSP project under Cargo Solar has been delayed for more than three years now due to land issues and disbursal of loans by the lending
consortium. The main concerns for the lenders are the minimal track record of CSP projects in India, which exposes the project to greater implementation and
stabilisation risks relative to PV technology.
CRISIL Insight
Chart 9: Key pre-commissioning risks observed in the CRISIL-rated portfolio
Selection of EPC & equipment supplier
Experience of the EPC contractor in solar power
projects lowers the risks
Performance guarantee by EPC & output
guarantee by manufacturer give visibility for
future performance of the plant
Technology selection
The correct technology should be chosen based
on the irradiation & climatic conditions
The PV technology with proven track record is
preferred globally, while the solar thermal
technology is still to achive scale globally
Pre-commissioning
risks
Grid connectivity
Evacuation infrastructure is a key determinant
as delay in getting grid connectivity has led to
project delays in the past
Land availability
Selection of land with primary infrastructure in
place (road connectivity and water availability)
is critical
Ease of acquisition of land is critical to meet
project timelines
For the CRISIL rated portfolio, close to two-thirds of the projects were commissioned within the
scheduled execution period, ranging from 8 to 12 months. Delays were only a few -- and mainly due to
land clearance issues or evacuation infrastructure.
While three out of 15 projects were delayed because grid evacuation wasnt tied up on time, two were
delayed because of land availability. Compared with conventional projects, overall delays in solar
projects have been minimal at 2 to 4 months. CRISIL has observed longer delays in road projects due
to right-of-way issues and thermal projects due to fuel availability and linkage issues.
CRISIL believes that as the industry matures, the risks associated with technology, radiation data, and
experience of the EPC contractor will be mitigated to a great extent. However, uncertainties over land
availability and grid connectivity will remain a concern in the medium term and will continue to require
government support. CRISIL believes facilitation by the government will boost investor confidence.
Table 2: Pre-commissioning and operational risks of solar projects compared with other power projects
Risks
Wind
Conventional energy
Relatively low
Relatively low
Relatively high
Project construction
duration
Short (4 -6 months)
Moderate to high
Moderate
Not applicable
Data availability
Moderately evolving in
nature
Margin of error
Technology risk
PLF risk
Solar
Depends on
availability and
quality of fossil fuels
22%
20%
16%
17%
20%
18%
19%
17%
19%
19%
20%
21%
17%
The average CUF for projects based in Gujarat and Rajasthan had been around 18% and 20%, respectively, over the past year. Solar irradiance in these
states has shown less variability over the years.
CRISIL Insight
7. How has the counterparty credit risk panned out for these solar projects?
The CRISIL-rated solar projects are healthy on this count, driven by creditworthiness of the
counterparty and robust debtor policy. All the projects have signed long-term power purchase
agreements (PPAs) for 25 years with close to 80% of them either with GUVNL or NTPC Vidyut Vyapar
Nigam Ltd (NVVN; rated CRISIL AA+/Stable/CRISIL A1+). These counterparties have a track record
of timely payments, which supports the credit quality of solar projects.
These PPAs have adequate covenants for timely payment and penalties, thus ensuring high
probability of timely realisation of receivables. The track record of payments from GUVNL and NVVN
has been good its mostly done before or on time. The risk is further lowered by the presence of a
payment security mechanism in the case of solar power plants under both JNNSM and the state solar
policy (Table 3). CRISIL believes this security mechanism leads to efficient and structured flow of
funds, which strengthens the liquidity profile.
Table 3: Typical payment security mechanism in solar power projects ensures cash trapping
LC mechanism
PPAs are supported by unconditional, revolving and irrevocable letter of credit (LC) given by
counterparty. Projects have a LC extended by the off-taker valid for 1 year and equivalent to
estimated average monthly bill of the year.
DSRA Account
About two-thirds of the rated projects have their term debt secured by Debt Service Reserve
Account (DSRA) equivalent to at least 3 months of interest and principal payment, ensuring
adequate and timely debt servicing.
TRA/Escrow account
In 60% of the rated projects, the payments are routed through escrow/ TRA account, which
ensures efficient cash-flow structure.
For better receivables management, the PPA provides for pre-payment options to the off-taker in
exchange of discounts (1-5%). Also, in case of any delay, the counterparty will have to pay late
payment surcharge (the SBI base rate + 7% in the case of GUVNL).
Unless the developer flouts the agreement terms regarding maintaining minimum shareholding,
or any other material clauses such as bankruptcy, the off-taker will have to purchase power at
the agreed rate for 25 years.
10
Going forward, with increasing competitive intensity in tariff bidding, the ability to reduce the capital
and interest cost, improve CUF, and elongate debt profile will be the key to the credit risk profile of
projects.
Chart 11: Trend in projects tariff (with COD) and DSCR in CRISIL-rated portfolio
RPSSGP
18
Jan-12
Oct-11
18
Jan-12 Feb-12
16
Tariff in Rs/Unit
16
14
14
12
Feb-12 Feb-12
Dec-11
Mar-12 June-12
10
12
Dec-12
10
Dec-12 Dec-12 Dec-12 Feb-13
8
6
6
4
1.7
1.4
Tariff (Rs/unit)
1.4
1.2
1.2
1.1
1.3
20
Source: CRISIL Ratings; Dates represent commercial operations date (COD) of the projects
11
Palace
solar
Astonfield
Solar
Alex
spectrum
Sunborne
Energy
Waa
solar
Aatash
Power
S.J.Green
Euro
Solar
Lexicon
Vinaya
KVR
construction
Sunkon
Molisati
Vinimay
Cargo
solar#
15
15
10.25
5.125
5.125
10
10
25
Location
Gujarat
Rajasthan
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Gujarat
Gujarat
Gujarat
Gujarat
Rajasthan
Jharkhand
Gujarat
Orissa
Gujarat
Counterparty
GUVNL
NVVN
NVVN
GUVNL
GUVNL
GUVNL
GUVNL
GUVNL
NVVN
JSEB
GUVNL
GRIDCO
GUVNL
COD
(mmm-yy)
Mar-12
Oct-11
Feb-12
Jun-12
Dec-11
Dec-12
Dec-12
Dec-12
Feb-13
Jan-12
Dec-12
Jan-12
25 Year PPA
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Capital cost
(Rs. Cr/MW)
11
15
15
14
15.06
10.12
9.76
9.76
10.5
11.5
13.8
15.5
30
Debt to equity
70:30
70:30
65:35
70:30
65:35
83:17^
70:30
70:30
70:30
70:30
70:30
70:30
70:30
Tariff (Rs/unit)
17.91
12.5
Rs.15 (for
1-12 years)
; Rs.5
thereafter
Rs.11.25
(for 1-12
years) ;
Rs.7.50
thereafter
Rs.9.98
(for 1-12
years) ;
Rs.7
thereafter
8.69
17.91
12
18.52
Rs.11 (for
1-12
years) ;
Rs.4
thereafter
Operating Margin
Above 90%
Above 90%
Above 90%
Above 90%
Above 90%
Around 90%
Above 90%
Above
90%
Above
90%
Above 90%
Above 90%
Around
90%
Above
90%
DSRA
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Escrow/TRA
account
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Forex exposure
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Un-hedged
Un-hedged
Fully Hedged
Un-hedged
Fully
Hedged
Debt tenure
14
14
12
12 to 13
10.5
12
11
15
12
CRISIL BBB
CRISIL
BBB
CRISIL
BBB-
CRISIL BBB-
CRISIL
BBB-
CRISIL
BBB-
CRISIL B+
CRISIL
BB-
Particulars
Capacity in MW
Credit Rating
CRISIL A
CRISIL A-
CRISIL BBB+
#Cargo Solar is based on solar thermal technology CSP; ^Rs.122 million unsecured debt from promoters treated as debt
CRISIL BB
CRISIL B+
Exp Nov14
Yes
(15 years
PPA)
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Phone: +91 22 3342 3000 | Fax: +91 22 3342 3001
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