Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
2008
Rishikesha T. Krishnan
Professor of Corporate Strategy & Policy
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
A 19% hike in the price of Aviation Turbine Fuel (ATF) announced by Indias oil companies at the end
of May 2008 jolted the Indian airline industry. With this hike, ATF prices had roughly doubled in a
year, and tripled in four years. A concerned Civil Aviation Minister, Praful Patel, rushed to the
Finance Minister seeking his support to prevent the industry from turning sick losses of the airlines
in 2007-08 were of the order of Rs. 40 billion and were predicted by some analysts to reach twice
that level in 2008 -09. Yet, just three years earlier, the ind ustry was seen as a sunshine industry that
would march in step with Indias economic growth. While individual airlines debated their survival
strategies, observers wondered how things could have gone wrong so fast.
(c) 2008. This case has been written by Prof. Rishikesha T. Krishnan, Indian Institute of Management
Bangalore, based on publicly available information. The focus of this case is on the domestic airline industry in
India. The author acknowledges with thanks the assistance provided by Ms. S. Krithika and the participants of
the Murugappa Group Business Leadership Programme (2008) in collecting data for this case. The author
acknowledges with thanks the perceptive comments of an industry stalwart who prefers to remain
anonymous. This case may not be reproduced or distributed without the permission of the author. He may be
contacted at +91 98450 22710 or at rishi@iimb.ernet.in
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
in matters such as fleet purchase decisions, route selection, appointment of chief executive officers,
appointment of General Sales Agents, postings of employees, and recruitment of employees. Two
clear instances of such interference were the purchase of A-310 aircraft by Air India in the mid-1980s
(these aircraft did not even meet the basic operational requirements of the airline) and the
extended grounding of newly-purchased A-320 aircraft of Indian Airlines (after an accident) by the
Minister of Civil Aviation in 1990 that almost resulted in the airline going bankrupt.
Opening up of the Aviation Sector
The deregulation of the Indian economy that started in the mid-1980s, and proceeded more
aggressively after the New Economic Policy in 1991, led to calls for opening up of the airline sector.
The government responded by first allowing the operation of Air Taxi services, and, in 1994, the
operation of scheduled air services.
Over the following years, several new airlines including Damania, EastWest, Jet, Sahara, Modiluft
and NEPC started operations. Though the airline industry is known to be highly capital-intensive,
these airlines were not started by Indias large and well- established industrial houses like the Tatas
or Birlas but by lesser-known entrepreneurs. For example, the founders of EastWest and Jet came
from the travel trade, while the founders of Sahara had made their money in financial services.
At first, the regulatory structure for new airlines lacked clarity, and the industry evolved in the
shadow of the domestic leader, Indian Airlines. The new airlines had to draw upon either foreign
airlines and aviation support companies or former employees of the national carriers for industry
specific expertise.
The new entrants started small with a few leased aircraft apiece, but charted different strategies.
Damania positioned itself as a luxury airline with on-board entertainment such as fashion shows.
EastWest tried to grow aggressively and had the most ambitious fleet expansion strategy. Jet
established a reputation for punctuality and good service, and rapidly became the preferred airline
of the business sector. With its base in Lucknow, Sahara offered excellent connectivity to a part of
the country that was historically under-served. Modiluft sought to exploit a technical tie-up with
Lufthansa by projecting itself as a safe and reliable airline.
The Shakeout
The provision of additional capacity by the new airlines helped address latent demand that had not
been served by Indian Airlines and the new carriers were able to quickly get a share of the market.
By March 1994, they accounted for 24% of the overall market and as much as 44% of the main trunk
routes. i However, they struggled to be profitable.
High fuel costs (as of mid -1995, domestic airlines operating in India had to pay $1.70 per gallon of
Aviation Turbine Fuel (ATF) compared to an international price of around $0.60 per gallon)ii, poor
infrastructure, and a regulation that required them to fly on routes to distant parts of the country as
well as on non-trunk routes (see Exhibit 1) threatened their financial viability. Under-capitalisation,
poor management, failure to build a network that could exploit economies of scale and scope, poor
cost economies, and overall high fare levels that suppressed demand spelt trouble for the fledgling
3
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
airline industry. iii One airline was even believed to have diverted funds raised from an equity issue to
other businesses of its promoter and was accused of gross financial mismanagement leading to the
abrupt withdrawal of its technical partner from their alliance. iv
By 1997, Damania, Modiluft, and NEPC were forced to suspend services, while EastWests demise
was hastened by the murder of one of its founders in broad daylight in Bombay city. Jet and Sahara
were thus the only survivors of the first phase of liberalisation of the Indian domestic airline
industry.
The survival of Jet Airways was attributed to its good financial planning and the involvement of
airline industry veterans (including several expatriates) in its management since inception.v Jet also
benefited from the distribution network of its parent company that had been the General Sales
Agent in India for many foreign airlines. Such relationships with foreign airlines helped Jet forge
interline arrangements with many of the worlds leading airlines. The expansion of Jets route
network also enabled it to offer broad connectivity.
The entry of private airlines did have one silver lining - the service offered by Indian Airlines
improved as it confronted competition for the first time. Indian Airlines also launched a frequent
flyer programme at this time and this was rapidly emulated by the private players. vi Indian Airlines
spun-off its Boeing-737 aircraft into a separate subsidiary Alliance Air that covered regional
routes. The creation of Alliance Air allowed Indian Airlines to take back into its fold pilots who had
left the airline for the private sector and wanted to return following the collapse of the private
airlines.
The rapid growth and decline of the Indian airline industry led to several changes in regulatory policy
including regulations on the minimum size of an airline (5 aircraft). However, somewhat contrarily,
the policy also forbade equity investment by foreign airlines in domestic carriers though foreign
investment by non-airline entities was allowed up to 49%, and by non-resident Indians up to 100%.
This policy was the outcome of the governments reaction to the proposed entry of a joint venture
between the Tatas and Singapore Airlines in the domestic airline business and was widely seen as a
move to protect the interests of Indian Airlines. vii Media reports suggested that the owners of Jet
and Sahara were equally keen to keep the Tata-Singapore Airlines venture out of the industry.
In the face of the quick demise of many of the early private airlines and the governments refusal to
allow the entry of the Tata-SIA combine into civil aviation, fresh entry into the airline industry
stopped for some time. Jet strengthened its position as the airline for the business community
considerably during this period. 80% of its passengers were business passengersviii who chose the
airline for its punctuality and excellent service 95% of Jets passengers gave it a rating of Good or
Excellent. ix Jet, Sahara, and Indian Airlines shared the market between themselves with market
shares of 46%, 9% and 40% respectively in the year-ending March 31, 2003. x
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Air Deccan
Leading the pack was Captain Gopinaths Air Deccan that promised to revolutionise air travel by
allowing everyone to fly by offering hitherto unheard of fares. Gopinath was a serial entrepreneur
who had earlier been a commissioned officer in the Indian army. After discharge from the army he
took up the challenge of farming barren land given to his family as compensation for land that had
been submerged due to a dam project. Since it proved to be difficult to grow conventional crops in
this land, Gopinath finally turned to sericulture and developed environmentally-friendly and
innovative ways of cultivating silk worms. He won the Rolex Challenge award for his work, and his
farm became a destination for governments and NGOs seeking innovations in farming. Gopinath
entered the aviation business as a response to a pilot friend who did not have a job as he felt that
there was good scope for a charter company in India given the distances and the economic
development taking place. He started Deccan Aviation in 1997 providing chartered helicopter and
small aircraft across India.
Many times people would approach Gopinath (at Deccan Aviation) to travel to smaller towns but
back away when they found out the price of the cha rter. He saw tremendous potential for aviation
in India if flying could be brought down to a reasonable price (everyone can fly). Inspired by the
low-cost airline model pioneered by Southwest Airlines in the United States (see Exhibit 2 for the
Southwest model) and later emulated by other successful carriers such as JetBlue and RyanAir, Air
Deccan sought to cut the frills out of airline operations and pass on the benefit to customers.
Starting in August 2003 with turboprop aircraft that connected small towns to large cities, Air
Deccan soon expanded to Airbus A-320 jet operations connecting major cities. Air Deccan offered a
single class point-to-point service, did not serve free meals or even free water on its flights, sold all
tickets only through the internet or its call centre, did not pay commissions or give credit to travel
agents (thereby avoiding the expensive process of managing credit and reconciliation with the travel
trade), had limited staff, and outsourced as many operations as possible. To reach more customers,
Air Deccan created a new network of travel intermediaries who would sell their tickets. The airline
also tied up with a major oil company and the Department of Posts (Post Offices) to enhance reach.
5
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Air Deccan adopted as its icon the common man made famous by cartoonist R.K. Laxman (see
Exhibit 3).
While Air Deccan was able to capture the imagination of the public and demand grew rapidly for its
services thanks to its throwaway fares, the airline itself was plagued by operational problems as it
sought to aggressively expand its network and fleet size. In the process, it developed a reputation for
delays, poor service and lack of reliability.
While the established players Indian Airlines, Jet and Sahara - initially ignored Air Deccan, the
obvious demand for air travel at lower fares and the urge to fill vacant seats prompted them to start
discounting fares as well. This took the form of a limited number of seats sold at lower prices (apex
fares) if purchased 7, 15 or 21 days in advance with substantial penalties for cancellation. Later, as
other low-cost carriers entered the airline industry, discounting without the pre-purchase
requirements of the Apex fares became the norm.
By September 2007, Air Deccan had reached a fleet size of 40 aircraft (10 ATR-42, 8 ATR-72, and 22
A-320 aircraft). It had achieved some success in connecting distant places it was the only carrier
offering service to twelve of its destinations, and one of only two carriers offering services to six
others. xii Air Deccan had 75 aircraft on order for delivery by December 2012.
Other Low -cost Airlines
Air Deccans growth in the Indian aviation sector induced other players to enter as well. Two of the
new entrants SpiceJet and IndiGo followed the classical low-cost airline model of very
competitive fares, a single type of aircraft and a single class of service, point -to-point operations,
quick turnarounds, no frills, and internet-based ticketing.
Launched in May 2005 by NRI investors and Indian entrepreneurs with operating experience,
SpiceJet built its operating model around the new generation Boeing 737s, the workhorse of
Southwest Airlines. SpiceJet was focused on twin pillars of cost control and growing its ancillary
revenue. It used partnerships with global leaders in their respective fields to enhance safety and
reliability. It also made significant investments in information technology to provide a backbone for
operational effectiveness. These approaches resulted in SpiceJet achieving the lowest costs in the
industry (Rs. 2.65/Available Seat Kilometre (ASKM) in 2008) and a flight dispatch reliability exceeding
99.5%. Some analysts believed that SpiceJets efficiency was comparable to that of the legendary
low-cost airlines an ICICIDirect report in 2007 placed SpiceJets operating cost (excluding lease
rentals) per ASKM at Rs. 2.15 compared to Rs. 2.21 for Southwest Airlines.
SpiceJet had 5 aircraft in its fleet at the end of the first year of operations, and had ramped up to 18
aircraft covering 17 destinations and 117 flights daily by May 2008. SpiceJet had another 30 aircraft
on order for delivery between 2008 and 2011.
IndiGo launched a year later than SpiceJet but followed a similar business model except that it was
based on the A-320 aircraft. IndiGo made the headlines when it announced an order for 100 A-320
aircraft soon after its inception. IndiGo was started by NRI investors with significant airline
6
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
experience including Rakesh Gangwal, former CEO of US Air. By April 2008, IndiGo was operating 17
aircraft out of the 100 ordered and flew to 17 destinations.
Kingfisher, Paramount, and GoAir
Three other airlines Kingfisher, Paramount, and GoAir - started by prominent industrial houses
followed diverse approaches to the airline business.
Kingfisher Airlines started by flamboyant beer baron Vijay Mallya in May 2005 shared the name of
Indias leading beer brand. Though originally conceived and announced as a value carrier,
Kingfisher rapidly morphed into a full-service airline more in keeping with Mallyas style and went
head-on at Jet Airways. By September 2007, Kingfisher had 34 aircraft in its fleet (4 A-319, 12 A-320,
6 A-321, 12 ATR-72) and served 34 destinations. The airline had 51 A-320 family aircraft on order for
delivery by 2014, 35 ATR aircraft on order for delivery between 2006 and 2010, and 50 wide-bodied
aircraft (including the A-380) on order for delivery between 2008 and 2018 for a planned
international expansion. More details of Kingfishers strategy are in the Competitive Dynamics
section that follows.
Paramount Airways was launched in September 2005 by the young scion of the Loyal Textiles group
in south India as a business class-only airline at economy class prices. After some experimentation
with cross-country routes, Paramount settled into a regional presence with its Embraer -170 jet
aircraft connecting all the major business locations of south India and soon grew to a strong position
with an estimated regional market share of 26%. (The Embraer-170 aircraft is a smaller aircraft than
the B-737 or A-320 and offers the benefit of jet travel but with smaller break-even loads. )
Paramount also launched a Paramount First class on some of its routes. By April 2008, Pa ramounts
fleet consisted of five aircraft and it served 8 destinations, all in South India. Paramounts expansion
plans included having 40 aircraft by 2010 and moves into western and northern India. xiii
The Wadias of Bombay Dyeing started GoAir as a low -cost carrier in November 2005. Unlike the
steady expansion of other similar carriers, GoAir adopted a dynamic fleet strategy under which
they inducted aircraft in peak season (winter months) and returned aircraft to the lessors in the lean
season. Having started with seven A-320 aircraft, GoAir had reduced its fleet size to five by March
2007. GoAirs market share remained less than 5%. However, GoAir had announced long-term plans
of increasing its fleet strength to 18 by 2009 and 24 by 2011.
For a comparison of the financial performance of different airlines in India in 2005-06 and 2006-07,
see Exhibit 4.
Competitive Dynamics
The rapid entry of new players into the Indian Airline industry changed its competitive dynamics. On
the one hand, the low fares of the low -cost players changed the growth dynamics of the industry
(see Exhibit 5 for growth of domestic air traffic in a historical perspective ). On trunk routes such as
Mumbai-Delhi or Delhi-Bangalore, the fares of these airlines were close to the fares of airconditioned rail travel, yet air travel offered significant time advantages for instance, travel from
Delhi to Bangalore by air took only 2.5 hours against more than 30 hours by train.
7
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
On the other hand, since airlines had an expensive fixed asset (a new Airbus A-320 had a list price in
excess of US $70 million) and a perishable commodity (each seat on a given flight), they strove to fill
their seats by offering attractive deals such as special fares of Rupee 1 or Rupees 99 per passenger
for a seat that had cost passengers more than Rs. 10,000 in the past. Full service airlines were forced
to drop fares as well (and remove the restrictions that they had in the earlier apex fares) though
their minimum fares tended to be still higher than those offered by the low-cost carriers (See
Exhibit 6). By 2008, full-service carriers such as Jet Airways reported that three-fourths of their seats
were being sold at discounted fares and only one -fourth at full fares; just three years earlier this
ratio was 35:65. xiv
These low fares attracted leisure travellers to fly by air. The overall growth rate of the market was
about three times faster than the growth in business travellers. The proportion of business travellers
on full-service carriers such as Jet Airways came down to about two-thirds. xv
All airlines used revenue management systems to dynamically vary their fares according to supply
and demand, and to manage yield with the objective of achieving profitability. However, their
systems varied in sophistication.
For the traveller, comparison shopping was made easy by the emergence of specialised travel
portals such as makemytrip.com, and indiatimes.com that allowed customers to see all air travel
options on a single screen and choose between them. In parallel with the growth of e-commerce in
ticket purchase, the importance of travel agents declined. However, full-service airlines were still
dependent on travel agents e.g. 77% of Kingfishers sales were through travel agents and only 10%
through direct web purchase xvi while low cost carriers like Deccan sold 40% of their tickets through
direct internet purchase and only 44% through travel agents. xvii
Airlines sought to build strong relationships with the manufacturers of aircraft so as to get the best
possible terms and support (see Exhibit 7).
Besides connecting hitherto unconnected towns to bigger cities, the low-cost airlines created a
number of direct connections between city pairs that were earlier connected only through hub and
spoke networks of full-service carriers. For example, Deccan started direct flights from Bangalore to
Nagpur and Bangalore to Bhubaneswar whereas passengers had earlier to make such trips through
Mumbai and Kolkata respectively.
Low-cost carriers sought to supplement their revenue streams by advertising (in its early years, Air
Deccan carried advertisements even on the fuselage), sale of food on board, and selling other
services (e.g. insurance).
In the full-service airline category, competition took on several new dimensions. Kingfisher Airlines
introduced leather seats, in-flight entertainment wit h live television, gourmet meals, and a luxurious
Kingfisher First for its business travellers on board its fleet of new A-320 aircraft, and valet services
on the ground. It addressed its customers as guests rather than passengers and sought to build a
service-oriented company culture. Chairman Vijay Mallya promised to look personally into any
service complaints. By December 2007, Kingfisher had received 17 national and international
awards. xviii
8
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Kingfisher Airlines secured access to the relatively under-utilised departure terminals of Indian
Airlines in Delhi and Mumbai, thereby avoiding jostling for space with all the other private airlines. It
advertised aggressively and sponsored major sporting events. It specifically targeted the mosttravelled frequent flyer s of Jet Airways (passengers who had travelled more than 100,000 miles in
the previous year) by giving them a Mega Mile Move offer to transfer their frequent flyer miles to
Kingfisher (see Exhibit 8). It launched a major campaign to capture corporate accounts by targeting
large travel agents and big corporate houses with special deals.
Jet Airways was initially slow to respond to the rapid transformation of Kingfisher into a full-service
carrier. However, Kingfishers growth in share on major routes and its rapid expansion of fleet did
eventually elicit a response from Jet. Over a period of 12 -18 months, Jet sought to retain frequent
flyer s by making its frequent flyer programme more attractive (a special triple-mile offer followed by
establishment of frequent flyer exchange relationships with an increasing number of international
airlines, hotel chains and car rental agencies), installation of in-flight entertainment (IFE) systems on
new aircraft (retrofitting of IFE systems on existing aircraft was considered too expensive), removal
of a row of seats to improve leg space in its Premiere (business) class, modification of the Jet Airways
logo to give it a more contemporary look, and new uniforms for crew and ground staff. However,
Kingfisher sought to take credit for these changes (see Exhibit 9).
With only a fourth of the international air traffic from India being handled by Indian carriers, xix and
the government agreeing to allow private airlines to use the routes/capacity not used by Air India
and Indian Airlines, Jet had, in 2004, seen an opportunity to extend its strong domestic competitive
position to international markets. With the increased competition in the domestic market, Jet
intensified its efforts to take advantage of the deregulation of international air traffic and the Open
Skies policies of several countries to rapidly expand its international footprint; rival Kingfisher could
not expand internationally as it did not meet the Indian Civil Aviation Ministrys pre-requisite of five
years commercial operation. Between 2006 and 2008, Jet Airways international footprint expanded
to the United Kingdom, United States, Continental Europe (Brussels), South East Asia, the Persian
Gulf and China apart from existing services to neighbouring Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.
However, the cost of establishing operations to new destinations at a rapid pace put some strain on
Jets finances as well as organisational capabilities. By December 2007, Jets international operations
accounted for 37% of itsrevenue and this proportion was expected to rise to 50% by 2009-10.
Jet hoped to leverage its advantages such as the ability to provide end-to-end travel solutions for
customers, its domestic and international network, code-share agreements with leading
international airlines, strong frequent flyer programme, e-commerce innovations and highly trained,
service-oriented personnel to (1) sustain market leadership in domestic operations; (2) build
domestic and international as equally strong pillars; (3) maintain product and service excellence; (4)
achieve profitable growth; and (5) operate a young and modern fleet. xx
Barriers to Further Growth
Looking forward, further growth of the airline industry was threatened by several speed bumps.
Airport landing and navigation charges at Indian airports were 50% higher than international
benchmarks (though ATR aircraft were exempted from such charges), and amongst the highest in
9
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
the world. But these higher charges did not translate into superior infrastructure. On the contrary,
the increased air traffic between major airports resulted in congestion in the air and on the ground.
It was not unusual to find aircraft circling over major cities for 30-45 minutes awaiting clearance to
land. Overnight parking bays on the ground were scarce as well. These infrastructure constraints
resulted in delays and inconvenience to passengers as also consumption of extra fuel, reduced
availability of aircraft for operation, and additional crew hours/costs. To cover these additional
costs, from December 1, 2006, airlines (except Indian Airlines/Air India) started adding a separate
fixed congestion surcharge of Rs. 150 to the price of each ticket they sold. In addition, airport
terminals burst at their seams, and passengers had to check in well in advance so as to negotiate the
serpentine queues for check-in and security clearance.
Operationalisation of the second runway at Indias second busiest airport at Delhi (and the
construction of a third runway), greenfield airports at Hyderabad (started operations in March 2008)
and Bangalore (May 2008), modernisation and privatisation of Delhi and Mumbai airports, and
upgradation of Chennai and Kolkata airports were expected to address some of the infrastructural
bottlenecks. However, lack of space to build an independent second runway at Mumbai (Indias
busiest airport) and restricted availability of airspace for civil aviation meant that several problems
would continue indefinitely.
In the United States, low-cost airlines often operated from small airports that charged lower fees
and that did not suffer from the congestion at large airports. In India, however, government policy
did not allow the creation of airports closer than 150 km from each other, and the old airports at
Bangalore and Hyderabad were closed down when the new ones were started.
While government -run airports charged passengers on domestic routes an Inland Air Transport Tax
of Rs. 225 per passenger per flight, the new private airports at Bangalore and Hyderabad planned to
charge a much higher user fee. The new Bangalore International Airport started charging
international passengers a fee of Rs. 1070 per passenger per flight and was keen to extend this fee
to domestic passengers as well. However, the government had put such a levy on hold and planned
to create an Airport Regulatory Authority to oversee the levy of such charges.
The main suppliers of Aviation Turbine Fuel (ATF) to airlines in India were three public sector oil
companies that dominate d the Indian petroleum sector. While the prices of most of their products
(petrol, diesel, kerosene, cooking gas) were controlled and subsidised by the government, ATF was
sold at international market prices plus additional transportation and marketing margins
(approximately 20-25%). Further, most state governments tax ed ATF at high rates (sometimes as
much as 34%) as they saw aviation as a luxury industry. As a result, ATF prices in India were
estimated to be about 70% higher than international benchmarks. Domestic airlines were not
allowed to hedge their fuel costs. The take-off of the Indian airline industry coincided with a spurt in
fuel prices originally induced by the US presence in Iraq, but reinforced by worldwide shortage of
refining capacity and a sharp increase in fuel consumption in China and India. To cover the increasing
costs of fuel, from May 2006 airlines started adding a fixed fuel surcharge to the price of each ticket
sold. By June 2008, the fuel surcharge had risen to Rs. 2,250 for each ticket for a distance of less than
750 km and Rs. 2,900 for each ticket for a distance of more than 750 km. As a result the total taxes
10
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
and surcharges payable on each ticket rose to Rs. 2,625 or Rs. 3,275 depending on the distance
flown.
New airlines also found qualified people in short supply. Specialist roles that need prior certification
such as pilots and maintenance engineers were particularly difficult to fill and airlines were forced to
hire expatriate pilots at higher salaries to tide over the shortage.
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Deccans prices increased. (Capt. Gopinath decided to leave the company and start a new cargo
airline.)
Kingfisher Airlines saw its strengths as its emphasis on aviation hospitality including a distinctive
Kingfisher First business class and its association with the Kingfisher brand. It saw the Kingfisher
brand as a symbol of the aspirational, upwardly mobile culture of Indias growing higher income
groups.xxii It planned to expand its range of customer service offerings, increase its fleet size and
number of flights per day in the domestic market, operate flights to international destinations, and
leverage the Kingfisher brand in order to strengthen customer loyalty and be perceived as a brand
in the airline industry and not just another airline. Deccan planned to use its reputation as the
pioneer of low-cost air travel in India, a diversified network, and a simplification of its operations to
reduce costs and keep services affordable to attract high volumes of passengers flying point-t o-point
routes, both between major cities, and to and from regional locations. xxiii
The third major consolidation was the merger of the two national carriers Indian Airlines and Air
India into a single national entity under the corporate name of National Aviation Company of India
and the brand name of Air India. This move was first mooted several years earlier, but was
ultimately consummated only in 2007. Shortly before the official approval of the merger, the boards
of Indian Airlines and Air India approved major fleet expansion plans that would result in a complete
overhaul of their respective fleets.
With no major new carrier having entered the airline industry since 2006 (partly due to the intense
competition in the industry, and partly due to the reluctance of the government to allow more
airlines to jostle for an already congested air infrastructure), consolidation was expected to help the
long-term sustainability of the airline business.
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Exhibit 1
Route Dispersal Guidelines
An airline providing scheduled services on domestic sectors in India is required to comply with Route
Dispersal Guidelines as formulated by the Government in March 1994. These guidelines provide for
the following categories of routes:
Category I
Twelve city pairs: Mumbai -Bangalore, Mumbai-Kolkata, Mumbai -Delhi, Mumbai-Hyderabad,
Mumbai-Chennai, Mumbai-Thiruvananthapuram, Kolkata-Delhi, Kolkata -Bangalore, Kolkata-Chennai,
Delhi-Bangalore, Delhi -Hyderabad, Delhi-Chennai.
Category II
Routes connecting the North East, Jammu & Kashmir, Andaman & Nicobar Islands, and Lakshadweep
with cities in Category I and Category III routes.
Category IIA
City pairs within the North East, Jammu & Kashmir, Andaman & Nicobar Islands, and Lakshadweep.
Category III
Any city pair that does not fall in Categories I, II and IIA.
According to the Route Dispersal Guidelines, scheduled domestic airlines must deploy their capacity
as follows:
On Category IIA routes, 10% of the capacity on Category II routes (which is aggregated for
meeting the requirement of Category II)
The Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) monitors compliance with these guidelines on a weekly
basis. Compliance with these guidelines is a pre-condition for renewal of an airlines operating
permit. In the event of non-compliance, DGCA requires an airline to make up any shortfall in the
subsequent period. Failure to comply with these guidelines will lead to restrictions being imposed
on the capacity deployed on Category I routes.
Source: UB Holdings Ltd. Prospectus, December 2007, p. 187.
13
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Exhibit 2
Southwest Airlines Activity Chart
Exhibit 3
Air Deccans Icon: The Common Man
14
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Exhibit 4
Financial Summary of Scheduled Indian Carriers during 2005-06 & 2006-07 (Rs. Million)
Airline
2005-06
2006-07
Operating
Revenue
Operating
Expenses
Operating
Result
Operating
Revenue
Operating
Expenses
Operating
Result
AIR INDIA
88337.1
92333.0
-3995.9
84388.6
96658.9
-12270.3
AIR INDIA
EXPRESS
4323.8
4275.4
48.4
7794.0
7629.0
165.0
INDIAN
AIRLINES
57660.1
56902
758.1
59862.7
73704.3
-13841.6
ALLIANCE AIR
5533.4
5971.2
-437.8
3802.7
4660.6
-857.9
TOTAL (PUBLIC
SECTOR
AIRLINES)
155854.4
159481.6
-3627.2
155848.0
182652.8
-26804.8
JET AIRWAYS
56960.6
51573.0
5387.6
70578.0
71098.2
-520.2
SAHARA
AIRLINES
20617.2
21212.1
-594.9
20153.3
25715.4
-5562.1
AIR DECCAN
13518.1
16741.4
-3223.3
21423.0
24960.7
-3537.7
PARAMOUNT
AIRWAYS
144.2
321.9
-177.7
2549.8
2306.6
243.2
SPICEJET
3418.6
3903.9
-485.3
7574.4
9241.0
-1666.6
10
KINGFISHER
4250.1
6587.8
-2337.7
15084.6
20415.3
-5330.7
11
GO AIR
384.0
968.0
-584.0
3482.6
5634.6
-2152.0
12
INDIGO
2162.8
3904.2
-1741.3
143008.5
163276.0
-20267.4
TOTAL
(PRIVATE)
99292.8
101308.1
-2015.3
Source: Compiled by DGCA from ICAO ATR Form EF furnished by scheduled Indian carriers
15
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Exhibit 5
Capacity and Demand for Air Services on Indian Domestic Routes
S. No.
Year
Scheduled
domestic
passengers
carried (,00,000)
Available
seat
Kilometres
on
scheduled
domestic services
Revenue
Passenger
Kilometres
on
Domestic Servi ces
(million)
(million)
1996-97
117.0
14812
9810
1997-98
115.5
16454
10599
1998-99
120.2
17932
10827
1999-00
127.1
19089
11419
2000-01
137.1
19897
12283
2001-02
128.5
20850
11574
2002-03
139.5
22833
12848
2003-04
156.8
24936
14566
2004-05
194.5
27790
18031
10
2005-06
252.0
35077
23709
11.
2006-07
357.9
48702
33519
12.
Calendar 2007
420.9
Source: DGCA
16
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Exhibit 6
Comparative Fares on a Select
Sector
17
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Exhibit 7
Airlines & the Aircraft Manufacturing Industry
Airlines purchased new aircraft typically from either Airbus Industrie (a European consortium of
aircraft companies strongly supported by the French and German governments) or Boeing (an
American aircraft manufacturer). As there were significant cost advantages in having a standard
fleet, airlines tended to be loyal to a manufacturer for a particular category of aircraft. Both Airbus
and Boeing offered families of aircraft with different seating capacities but common cockpit systems
that facilitated pilot and engineer certification across the family.
The A-320 family of Airbus (A319/A320/A321) and the Boeing-737 family of Boeing (Boeing 737700/800/900) were both well-engineered and state -of-the-art. They had excellent records for
reliability and safety. Since aircraft are built -to-order and manufacturing capacity cant be ramped
up and down very easily, airlines had to order aircraft in advance and wait for delivery. In addition to
firm orders, airlines could also book options for the purchase and delivery of aircraft.
The aircraft manufacturing industry had consolidated over time as companies such as Lockheed and
McDonnell Douglas could not deal with the cyclicality of the industry and the huge, uncertain
investments involved in developing and launching new aircraft.
During the 1980s and 1990s, a new industry segment of jet aircraft with capacities of 50 -100 seats
emerged to meet the needs of regional operators in the United States. This segment had two major
players Bombardier (a diversified transportation equipment company based in Canada) and
Embraer (a Brazilian company). The upper end of capacity of these regional transport aircraft (RTA)
was just short of the A-319 and B-737/700 aircraft.
Turboprop aircraft flew at lower speeds than jet aircraft (500 kmph vs. 800+ kmph) and also
consumed less fuel. However, they flew at lower heights and were therefore more susceptible to the
weather. In 2008, the French ATR series of aircraft was the only commercially available turboprop
aircraft.
All aircraft manufacturers offered their customers financing packages. Besides, the aircraft leasing
industry had several large players including GECAS, a division of GE Financial Services, that offered
both operating and financial lease alternatives to airlines purchasing new aircraft.
Second-hand aircraft could be leased from leasing com panies or from airlines that had excess
capacity. New aircraft offered major advantages in terms of operating and maintenance costs but
were much more expensive than used aircraft.
Aircraft manufacturers also provided maintenance and spares support to airlines. Aircraft had to
periodically undergo major checks and overhauls; facilities for such checks were expensive and often
run by third parties. In markets where a critical mass of aircraft operated, aircraft manufacturers
were willing to build or support the creation of Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) centres to
facilitate these checks and overhauls. By 2008, the Indian market had reached the size where such
MRO centres were being contemplated by aircraft manufacturers as well as entrepreneurs.
18
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Aircraft manufacturers fought hard for customers and were known to offer significant incentives to
airlines making large purchases. Pricing depended on the market situation, financial position of the
airline, sellers/lessors perception of the credibility of the management of the airline, long -term
plans of the airline, etc. Airbus and Boeing were aggressive and often bitter rivals, and had often
accused each other of obtaining illegal subsidies. Both sought to be leaders in terms of number of
aircraft sold/delivered in a year and order backlog on hand. Bombardier and Embraer had a similar
rivalry in the RTA business.
Aircraft Manufacturers & their Indian Customers
Boeing 737 family:
A320 family:
ERJ170 (Embraer):
Paramount
ATR:
19
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Exhibit 8
Kingfishers MegaMileMove Invitation
Exhibit 9
Jet Airways Change & Kingfishers Response
20
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Exhibit 10
Fleet Size of Indian Carriers
AIR INDIA
9697
9798
9899
9900
0001
0102
0203
0304
0405
0506
0607
28
26
26
26
28
29
31
35
37
38
35
13
55
59
91
AIR INDIA
EXPRESS
39
INDIAN
AIRLINES
52
ALLIANCE AIR
12
12
12
11
11
11
15
15
15
15
(just before
merger)
JET AIRWAYS
13
19
25
28
30
38
41
41
42
53
53
81 (05/08)*
SAHARA/
JETLITE
10
12
20
22
29
29
24 (05/08)
16
29
39
41 (09/07)
PARAMOUNT
AIRWAYS
6 (04/08)
SPICEJET
11
18 (05/08)
KINGFISHER
11
25
34 (09/07)
GO AIR
5 (mid 07)
17 (04/08)
AIR DECCAN
44
44
42
44
43
47
INDIGO
52
Latest
Position
ARCHNA
No
NEPC
Longer in
SKYLINE NEPC
(DAMANIA)
Operation
21
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Exhibit 11
Indian Domestic Airline Industry: Market Share Data
(In Per Cent)
Airline
Jet Airways
Y.E. 31/3/02
Y.E. 31/3/03
45.3
45.9
Q.E. 06/06
Q.E. 03/07
34
JetLite
Q.E. 03/08
24.2
22.7
8.12
7.4
Sahara
4.8
9.3
Indian
44.3
39.6
21
19.2
14.8
Air Deccan
19
18.6
14.6
Kingfisher
10.6
14.5
SpiceJet
8.1
10.3
1.5
1.2
4.7
4.4
10.3
Paramount
GoAir
IndiGo
Others
5.6
5.2
Sources: Jet Airways IPO Prospectus February 2005; Press reports based on DGCA data
22
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Exhibit 12
The New Deccan
Old Logo
New Logo
Old Uniform
New Uniform
23
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Exhibit 13
Financial & Operational Performance of SpiceJet Ltd.
Income Statement: Rupees Million
Year-ending
31.5.2006
1.
Net
Sales
(Income
from
10 months to
31.3. 07
Qtr ending
30.06.2007
Qtr ending
30.09.2007
4196.45
6404.44
2653.77
2226.15
Other Income
323.34
1078.35
460.39
473.75
Total Income
4519.80
7482.79
3114.17
2699.90
Operations)
2.
3.
Total Expenditure
Operating Expenses:
3783.73
Aircraft Fuel
2465.07
1989.83
3494.39
1402.35
771.67
1367.06
508.65
Airport Charges
339.33
601.59
244.35
Aircraft Maintenance
470.56
671.57
210.36
456.27
193.81
Professional
&
479.73
855.00
285.89
305.90
26.32
37.55
14.14
17.94
90.57
72.18
9.43
15.13
505.23
124.91
138.78
27.31
9.75
18.69
58.47
16.30
18.70
(33.67)
(0.04)
0.04
(697.50)
188.66
(374.72)
13.12
9.94
3.31
3.00
(414.20)
(707.44)
185.35
(377.72)
Consultancy
Other
4.
Interest
5.
Depreciation/Obsolescence
6.
7.
8.
9.
Net Profit/Loss
31.34
(459.76)
58.68
24
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
As at March 31,
2006
Shareholders Funds
Sha re Capital
Reserves & Surplus
Loan Funds
Secured Loans
Unsecured Loans
APPLICATION OF FUNDS
Fixed Assets
Gross Block
Less: Depreciation
Net Block
Capital Work in progress
Investments
Current Assets, Loans & Advances
Inventories
Sundry Debtors
Cash & Bank Balances
Loans and Advances
Less: Current Liabilities & Provisions
Current Liabilities
Provisions
Net Current Assets
Miscellaneous Expenditure
Deferred Revenue Expenditure
Profit & Loss Account
As at March 31,
2007
1843.39
1060.90
2904.29
2406.51
3178.71
5585.22
3596.40
610.85
7111.54
3571.82
749.70
9906.74
588.83
98.40
490.43
3628.92
0.00
621.12
137.34
483.78
6943.51
812.22
33.98
37.21
634.32
798.76
1504.27
79.40
55.61
3510.46
1153.79
4799.26
1495.96
141.92
1637.88
(133.61)
6456.22
415.25
6871.47
(2072.21)
93.78
3032.02
7111.54
3739.44
9906.74
Selected Operational Parameters of SpiceJet Ltd. (Adapted from Reports by Prabhudas Liladher)
Oct-Dec 06
July-Sept 07
Oct-Dec 07
ASKMs (m)
955
1298
1647
RPKMs (m)
724
883
1255
Load Factor
75.8
68.0
76.2
Rev/RPKM
2.86
2.53
3.25
Cost/ASKM
2.50
2.34
2.59
87
93
80
25
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Average Fare
NA
NA
Rs. 3150
SpiceJets net revenue per passenger was Rs. 2209 in the period ending May 31, 2006 and Rs. 2320 in the
period ending March 31, 2007.
26
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Exhibit 14
Financial Performance of Deccan Aviation Ltd.
15 months
ending
30.6.2006
1.
Net
Sales
(Income
from
Year ending
30.6.2007
Quarter ending
31.12.2007
12363.9
17745.5
5676.3
1154.1
3677.6
96.6
Operations)
2.
Other Income
3.
Total Income
4.
Total Expenditure
Employee
5772.9
remuneration
&
1706.2
2517.9
818.7
Aircraft Fuel
6254.5
9795.0
2876.8
2162.3
4030.5
1138.6
Aircraft Maintenance
1775.6
2275.0
639.6
Airport Charges
1926.2
2979.5
763.5
1327.7
1611.0
582.3
1091.2
1312.7
487.4
322.8
439.2
119.4
24960.8
7426.3
319.5
624.0
244.1
(3368.0)
(4161.7)
(1897.5)
37.5
34.1
11.1
(3405.5)
(4195.8)
(1908.6)
benefits
Other
Direct
Expenses
Operating
and
Amortisation
Total
5.
27
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
July - Sep 06
ASKMs (m)
RPKMs (m)
No. of
seats
available
No. of
passengers
flown
Passenger
Load
Factor
Number of
Flights
Operated
per Day
Number of
Airports
Operated
Oct-Dec 06
1695
1266
1898867
Jan Mar
Apr Jun
July- Sep 07 Oct-Dec 07
07
07
1887
1874
2122
2221
2053
1465
1570
1791
1515
1601
2142031
2150568
2490981
2641438
2272036
1378655
1643868
1746765
2013345
1696319
1765690
72.6%
76.74%
81.22%
80.83%
64.22%
77.71%
220
258
264
270
267
260
52
58
61
64
63
63
28
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Ex hibit 15
Financial Performance of Kingfisher Airlines Ltd.
(Rs. Million)
Year ending
31.3.2006
Net
Sales
(Income
from
Year ending
31.3.2007
Six months
ending
30.09.2007
4358.1
13824.2
11313.7
4381.9
15529.5
11914.0
680.6
1575.0
Aircraft Fuel
2356.2
7068.0
1164.8
2762.5
Commissions to Agents
268.7
762.0
22.9
391.7
381.9
41.2
402.9
36.2
490.0
(1933.7)
(5081.1)
Operations)
Other Income
Total Income
Expenditure:
Employee
remuneration
&
benefits
and
Net Profit/Loss
2017.1
(3993.2)
Note: Kingfisher Airlines Ltd. Is not a listed company. This information has been pieced together from data
contained in United Breweries (Holdings) Ltd. Preliminary placement document dated December 3, 2007. It is
incomplete and may be treated as merely indicative.
Number of passengers flown was 1.23 million in 2005-06 and 3.26 million in 2006 -07.
60% seats were filled in 2005-06 and 68% in 2006- 07.
Revenue per passenger was Rs. 3554 in 2005- 06 and Rs. 4 241 in 2006- 07.
th
29
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Exhibit 16
Financial Performance & Selected Operational Parameters of Indian Airlines
Operational Fleet before Merger (Includes Alliance Air)
Airbus A-300
Airbus A-330
Airbus A-321
Airbus A-320
48
Airbus A-319
11
Boeing 737-200
11
Dornier DO-228
ATR-42
CRJ
Total Fleet
91
[This includes 11 of the 43 aircraft ordered from Airbus Industrie in February 2006. The balance 32
aircraft are to be delivered by 2010.]
Operational Network
Domestic
59
International
15
Total
74
30
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Equity Capital
Reserves & Surplus
Secured Loans
Unsecured Loans
Net Worth
2005-06
57888.2
57258.2
630.0
495.0
2006-07
71962.4
74272.1
(230.97)
(240.29)
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
Available Tonne
Kilometres (Millions)
1308
1334
1472
1593
1692
Revenue-Tonne
Kilometres (Millions)
845
877
1017
1141
1236
64.6
65.8
69.1
71.6
73.1
Revenue Passengers
Carried (Millions)
5654
5900
7132
7861
8570
31
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Exhibit 17
Financial Performance & Selected Operating Parameters of Jet Airways (India) Ltd.
Company P&L (Rs. Millions)
2005- 06
2006-07
Apr-Jun 07
July- Sep07
Oct-Dec07
Income
Operating Revenues
56458
70578
18067
18186
24260
4417
3435
1763
4356
912
60876
74013
19830
22542
25172
5672
9381
2634
2863
3027
16789
24276
5996
6960
9173
7261
8008
2140
2305
2622
13111
18833
5061
5813
6531
4340
6458
1532
1253
1365
Depreciation
4064
4141
1328
1743
2204
Interest
2416
2402
644
1180
1554
53653
73499
19336
22117
26476
7223
514
495
425
(1304)
2702
234
186
141
(393)
4520
280
309
284
(911)
13625
10079
2235
245
2907
Total Expenditure
EBITDAR
32
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
As on 31.3.2007
Sources of Funds
Shareholders Funds
23059
22979
Loan Funds
48956
60563
3207
3311
75221
86852
47882
72920
1872
689
38754
33645
13286
20402
25468
13243
75221
86852
2005- 06
2006-07
Apr-Jun 07
July- Sep07
Oct-Dec07
Income
Operating Revenues
Non- operating Revenues
Total Revenues
501125
57004
13708
12526
15397
4417
3431
1759
4345
906
54543
60435
15467
16870
16304
5179
8194
2302
2352
2583
14550
18878
4421
4673
5257
6263
6894
1654
1595
1762
Expenditure
Employees Remuneration &
Benefits
Aircraft Fuel Expenses
Selling & Distribution Expenses
33
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
10615
13942
3357
3883
3811
2604
4041
905
886
1037
Depreciation
3980
3707
1002
1067
1155
Interest
2416
2358
514
809
843
45607
58013
14155
15265
16448
8936
2422
1312
1606
(144)
13518
9096
1974
22
1985
Apr-Jun 07
July-Sep07
Total Expenditure
Profit Before Taxation
EBITDAR
Apr 06Mar07
Oct-Dec07
100, 958
112,759
27,832
28,128
28,870
ASKMs (Million)
10,683
12,155
2990
3046
3040
RPKMs (Million)
7875
8538
2129
2020
2198
73.7%
70.2%
71.2%
66.3%
72.3%
9.12
9.90
2.41
2.31
2.52
Revenue/RPKM (Rupees)
5.43
5.66
5.61
5.28
6.16
3.42
3.95
3.56
4.01
4.50
63.0%
69.8%
63.4%
75.9%
73.1%
5165
5295
5285
5006
5667
34
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
Exhibit 18
Select Financial & Operating Parameters of JetLite
th
Source: Jet Airways (India) Ltd. Presentation on Financial Results Q3 FY08 dated 28 January 2008.
Downloaded from Investor Relations Pages on www.jetairways.com
35
v 2.0 / 1.7.2008
References
i
ii
Flying into the Storm Business India, June 19-July 2, 1995, p. 70.
iii
Divorces are made in Heaven Business India, June 17-30, 1996, pp. 67-76.
iv
Divorces are made in Heaven Business India, June 17-30, 1996, pp. 67-76.
vi
Attractive Offers Business India, August 29-September 11, 1994, pp. 35 -36.
vii
viii
Jet Airways (India) Ltd. Initial Public Offer Prospectus, February 28, 2005, p. 50.
ix
Jet Airways (India) Ltd. Initial Public Offer Prospectus, February 28, 2005, p. 49.
Jet Airways (India) Ltd. Initial Public Offer Prospectus, February 28, 2005, p. 57.
xi
United Breweries (Holdings) Ltd., Preliminary Placement Document, December 3, 2007, p. 106.
xii
United Breweries (Holdings) Ltd., Preliminary Placement Document, December 3, 2007, p. 147.
xiii
on 1.7.2008
xiv
Wolfgang Prock -Schauer Full Service Carriers: Adapting to the New Environment Presentation at CAPA Conference,
Wolfgang Prock-Schauer Airline Developments, State of the Industry and Way Ahead Presentation at the South Asia
th
United Breweries (Holdings) Ltd., Preliminary Placement Document, December 3, 2007, p. 142.
xvii
United Breweries (Holdings) Ltd., Preliminary Placement Document, December 3, 2007, p. 153.
xviii
United Breweries (Holdings) Ltd., Preliminary Placement Document, December 3, 2007, p. 124.
xix
Wolfgang Prock -Schauer Airline Developments, State of the Industry and Way Ahead Presentation at the South Asia
Aviation Finance conference, 5th February 2007. Downloaded from www.jetairways.com on 9.6.2008.
xx
Wolfgang Prock-Schauer Airline Developments, State of the Industry and Way Ahead Presentation at the South Asia
Aviation Finance conference, 5th February 2007. Downloaded from www.jetairways.com on 9.6.2008.
xxi
United Breweries (Holdings) Ltd., Preliminary Placement Document, December 3, 2007, p. 156.
xxii
United Breweries (Holdings) Ltd., Preliminary Placement Document, December 3, 2007, p. 124.
xxiii
United Breweries (Holdings) Ltd., Preliminary Placement Document, December 3, 2007, pp. 19-20.
36