JOURNAL OF CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY, 14(1&2), 2-12

Copyright O 2004, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Mood Effects on Attitudes, Perceived Risk and

Choice: Moderators and Mediators
Alexander Fedorikhin
Marketing Department
University of Southern California

Catherine A. Cole
Marketing Department
University of Iowa

How and when positive and negative moods affect attitudes, risk perceptions, and choice is a
problem that interests both consumer researchers and practitioners. We propose that the extent
of constructive processing moderates mood effects with stronger effects when constructive processing is higher. In addition, we propose that when consumers have unrestricted versus constrained processing resources, moods are more likely to operate through affect priming and less
likely to operate through the affect-as-information process. The results from 3 experiments
support these hypotheses. We discuss implications of the findings for models of how affect influences judgments and directions for future research.

During the days between the Kennedy assassination and his

funeral, the television networks aired continuous programming without commercials. Similarly, after the Sept. 11,
2001, attacks on the World Trade Center, the major television
networks pulled all commercials and instead ran 24-hr news
coverage of the disaster for days (Adiga, Birger, Carter, &
Feldman, 2001). In both cases, advertisers worried that consumers were not in the mood to buy ordinary products, such
as cars, toothpaste, magazines, and clothes (Gay, 2001).
Empirical research supports the omnipresent idea that
negative or positive moods created by one event can color
unrelated consumer judgments, such as evaluations of
brand extensions and actual choices (Barone, Miniard, &
Romeo, 2000; Gardner, 1985; Gorn, Pham, & Sin, 2001;
Pham, Cohen, Pracejus, & Hughes, 2001; Isen, 2001).
From theoretical and managerial perspectives, it is important to identify variables that moderate this effect. A small,
but growing, stream of research in both consumer research
and psychology identifies moderators such as consumers'
familiarity with a brand (Smll, 1990), perceived extension
relatedness to the parent brand (Barone et al., 2000), and

Requests for reprints should be sent to Alexander Fedorikhin, Marketing

Department, University of Southern California, 3660 Trousdale Parkway,
ACC 308-B, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0443 E-mail: afedorikhin@marshall.usc.edu

valence of the stimulus (Gorn et al., 2001; Isen & Shalker,

1982).
In three experiments, we investigate how the interplay
between constructive processing and positive and negative
moods affects consumers' attitudes, their perceived risk of
using a new product, and their brand choice. We also investigate how the valence of different thoughts mediates mood
effects on attitudes. In doing so, we extend existing literature in several ways. We show that consumers' level of constructive processing is a parsimonious explanation for varying mood effects on a range of important consumer
variables, including attitudes, choice, and perceived risk.
Second, we build on work by Petty and his colleagues
(Petty & Wegener, 1999; Petty, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1997)
showing through mediation analyses that different mechanisms underlie mood effects when consumers have different
amounts of cognitive capacity available. Finally, by studying both positive and negative moods, we contribute to a
richer understanding of negative moods. Although
underemphasized in the literature, negative mood effects
are important because they may arise in consumer settings
when consumers must cope with crowded shopping environments or delays in service.
In the section that follows, we review the relevant literature to develop the first two hypotheses about the moderating role of constructive processing in mood effects on atti-

MOOD AND ATTITUDES, PERCEIVED RISK AND CHOICE

tudes and perceived risk. Then, we discuss the first

experiment that tests these hypotheses. Next, we develop a
third hypothesis linking mood effects, constructive processing, and choice and describe our second experiment. We
then build the justification for a fourth hypothesis, which
relates mood, constructive processing, and processing resources and present a third study. Finally, we discuss theoretical contributions, limitations, and directions for future
research.

BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES

Mood Effects on Attitudes
Drawing from recent social psychology models that
explicitly link construction and affect (Fiedler, 1990;
Forgas, 1995), we propose that consumers' tendency to bias
their evaluations in mood-congruent directions will be
stronger when consumers engage in high, as opposed to
low, amounts of constructive processing. When consumers
construct judgments, they are involved in "the substantial
transformation rather than mere reproduction of existing
cognitive representations" (Forgas, 1995, p. 40; Schwarz &
Bohner, 2002). They compute decision rules or evaluations
or both on the spot at the time they are needed. On the other
hand, consumers may minimize effort and construction by
retrieving previously formed evaluations from memory
(Sanbonmatsu & Fazio, 1990)' or by using accessible external information about how to form evaluations. Interestingly, both the social psychology and the decision-making
literature report that context effects are stronger at relatively high levels of construction (Coupey, Irwin, & Payne,
1998; Forgas 1999). Apparently when processing strategies
recruit more constructive and generative processing, then
contextual variables, including mood, have more opportunity to influence judgments.
Over the past 20 years, two major theories have been
proposed to explain how moods inform consumers' thinking, judgments, and decisions: memory-based theories
(e.g., the affect priming model) and inferential models (e.g.,
the affect-as-information model). According to affect priming models (Bower, 1981; Fiedler, 1991; Petty, Schumann,
Richman, & Strathman, 1993) affect selectively primes
similar or related nodes. If one affective node is activated,
then other interconnected events will also be activated.
When moods operate in this way, they bias the flavor of internally generated cognitions, which in turn bias judgments.
Relatively higher levels of constructive processing should

'Although this definition of construction is consistent with the Affect

Infusion Model (Forgas 1995), it is broader than that used in the decision-making literature, where it refers to occasions when consumers must
construct a choice rule or strategy (Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998).

provide more opportunities for mood to influence stimulus-related cognitions.2

According to the affect-as-informationmodel, people tend
to use their mood as information through a "how do I feel about
it?" heuristic when they are evaluating a stimulus. When they
use this heuristic, they end up mistaking their mood for their
feelings about the stimulus (Petty et al., 1993; Pham, 1998;
Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Consistent with this model, Gorn,
Goldberg, and Basu (1993) showed that mood effects on product evaluationsdisappear when respondents are made aware of
the reason for their current mood states. Pham (1998) showed
that feelings about the evaluated stimuli need to be deemed
both representative and relevant for this heuristic to work. We
propose that under this mechanism relatively higher levels of
constructive processing would be more likely to allow consumers to activate the heuristic. Hence, both of the previously
discussed mechanisms should lead to stronger mood effects on
attitudes under relatively higher levels of constructive processing.3 The previously mentioned reasoning leads to our
first hypothesis:
HI: There will be an interaction between the amount of
constructive processing and mood on consumers' attitudes toward a new product such that attitudes become more positive as mood becomes more favorable, with effects being stronger under high- than
under low-constructive processing.
Mood Effects on Loss Likelihood Estimates and
Perceived Risk
Although consumer researchers have studied perceived risk
and its two components-the uncertainty or perceived likelihood of a loss and the negative utility of the loss-these
investigators have not studied mood effects on perceived
risk (Dowling, 1986; Dowling & Staelin, 1994; Dunn,
Murphy, & Skelly, 1986; Jacoby & Kaplan, 1972; Kaplan,
Szybillo, & Jacoby, 1974). In contrast, the psychology literature indicates that moods influence perceived risk and its
components (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Nygren, Isen, Taylor, & Dulin, 1996). Participants in positive moods perceive
higher likelihood of positive events occurring and lower
2We believe the predictions will be consistent with the more recent
connectionist models of memory (Smith, 1998). Information associated
with affective states of similar valence should have similar patterns of activation. Hence, relatively high levels of constructive processing would allow
consumers to activate more mood-congruent information in memory, as
compared to relatively low-constructive processing conditions. This would,
in turn, mean stronger mood influence on evaluations under relatively higher
levels of constructive processing.
3Although we hypothesize that constructive processing leads to stronger
mood effects, it is also true that people in positive moods may increase their
effortful processing of nonthreatening stimuli (Isen, 1999). Interestingly,
this means that this could lead to a loop where constructive processing leads
to stronger mood effect, which could lead to more constructive processing
(Estrada, Isen, & Young, 1998; Isen, 1999).

FEDORIKHIN

likelihood of negative events than those in negative moods

because moods increase the accessibility of mood-congruent memories (MacLeod & Campbell, 1992). Most explanations for these effects center around the availability heuristic, which states that people will base their estimates of
the likelihood of future events on the ease with which they
can recall an exemplar of that event (Folkes, 1988). Under
high levels of constructive processing, consumers will be
more likely to retrieve mood-congruent information from
memory, and hence, there will be more opportunities for
moods to bias recall. We, thus, expect that the tendency of
positive mood to decrease consumers' estimates of perceived likelihood of losses will be stronger in high- than in
low-construction conditions:
H2: There will be an interaction between constructive
processing and mood on consumers' loss likelihood
estimates, such that the loss likelihood estimates
will decrease as mood becomes more favorable,
with effects being stronger under high- than under
low-constructive processing.
Investigators studying the relation between moods and
the second component of risk, disutility of losses, report
that how people perceive disutilities depends on mood as
well as the size and type of loss (Nygren et al., 1996;
Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989). In the context of gambles,
people in good moods see large disutilities in a loss, perhaps because they fear that losses will destroy their mood.
However, people in a negative mood are likely to downplay
the disutility of a bad outcome because they are already in a
bad mood (Leith & Baumeister, 1996). Outside of gambling contexts, investigators report that moods may operate
on disutilities in the opposite direction (Salovey &
Birnbaum, 1989). Because in a new product adoption decision, consumers face a variety of quantitative and
nonquantitative losses, we expect that the forces described
may offset each other and have a fairly weak effect. As a
result, we do not propose a formal hypothesis for mood effects on perceived disutilities.
To test our hypotheses, we developed multiple methods
to regulate consumers' level of constructive processing. In
the first study, we compare how moods affect the evaluations of two groups of respondents, those who construct an
evaluation on the spot and those who can retrieve preexisting evaluations (adapted from the direct access condition in
Srull, 1990). In the second experiment, we induce low-constructive processing by providing participants with consensus information, (see the second study in Meyers-Levy &
Tybout, 1997). Finally, in the third study, following the tradition of those who study constructive decision making, we
provide the low-construction participants with supplemental information about how to resolve conflicting information about the product (see Coupey et al., 1998).

EXPERIMENT 1
Overview
To test HI and H2, in this 2 (mood: positive or negative) x 2
(constructive processing: high or low) between-subject experiment, we assessed mood effects on consumer reactions to
a commercial for a new brand of cookies under two constructive processing conditions. We randomly assigned one of the
four mood-task conditions to groups of respondents drawn
from a large participant pool at a major Midwestern university. One hundred thirty-three respondents participated.

Procedure
Initially, respondents learned that they would participate in
two studies: one about advertising and the other about scale
development. To induce respondents to form initial judgments about the target product prior to the mood manipulation, respondents in the low-constructive processing condition did the following: viewed the target commercial for an
unfamiliar brand of cookies, evaluated the cookies on filler
scales, viewed a mood-inducing video segment, completed
the mood scales, viewed a filler commercial, evaluated
cookies on a questionnaire that included new items designed to measure attitudes toward the brand (As,), perceived likelihood of negative outcomes, perceived disutility
of those negative outcomes, and finally, evaluated the filler
product.4 To induce respondents to form their initial evaluations of the cookies after the mood manipulation, respondents in the high-constructive processing condition did the
following: viewed the filler commercial, evaluated the filler
product, viewed the mood-inducing video, completed mood
scales, watched the cookie commercial, and finally evaluated the cookies on the same cookie evaluation questionnaire as the low-construction group. Consistent with others,
to disguise our mood manipulation as a separate scale development study, a different experimenter showed respondents the 4-min mood-inducing movie episode and administered the measures.

Stimulus Development
To manipulate moods, we selected 4-min episodes from two
movies, including Tommy Boy, a comedy about a recent college graduate, for the positive mood manipulation, and The
4The first 42 participants completed paper-and-pencil questionnaires,
but the remaining respondents completed the "Advertising Study" on the
computer. Before pooling the two groups, we tested whether there were differences between the two groups in means and variances for each dependent
variable. We found no significant differences in variances due to mode of administration and no main effects or interactions of mode with other independent variables. Hence, we concluded that mode did not impact the results
of the analyses, and it is not discussed further.

MOOD AND ATTITUDES, PERCEIVED RISK AND CHOICE

perceived disutility for the participants was their average response to the six disutility items.

Day After; a movie showing devastation after a nuclear war,

for the negative mood manipulation. To find these episodes,
we conducted a pretest with 153 participants. In the pretest,
after respondents saw one of five video episodes, they reported their moods using Watson, Clark, and Tellegen's
(1988) Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS)
scale. Because we wanted to identify episodes that manipulated either positive or negative affect, but not both, we selected two episodes that met two criteria: (a) Pretest respondents who viewed the negative (positive) episode reported
significantly higher negative (positive) affect scores than
those who viewed either the selected positive (negative) or a
neutral control video episode (a video segment from House
on the Rock). (b) Pretest respondents who viewed the positive
(negative) and neutral control videos did not score statistically differently on the negative (positive) dimensions of the
PANAS scale.

Results
Out of the 133 respondents, we excluded 9 questionnaires
from the analyses because the participants were able to connect two parts of the study. Table 1 contains the means and
standard errors for the dependent variables.
Manipulation checks. After the respondents saw the
video episodes, we measured their moods using the PANAS
scale. Positive affect was significantly higher and negative
affect was significantly lower for the positive mood condition
than for the negative mood condition; positive affect: coefficient a = 39, 3.1 versus 2.4; F(1, 114) = 30.6, p < .0l; negative affect: coefficient a = .87, 1.9 versus 1.5; F(1, 113 =
1 0 . 7 ,<
~ .01. We checked whether we manipulated constructive processing in two ways: by analyzing responses to a
two-item self-reported construction effort (SRCE) scale and
unobtrusively measuring response time for participants who
completed the questionnaire on the computer. The SRCE
scale items asked respondents to indicate the extent to which
they agreed with the following two statements: The preceding questions about the cookies really made me think about
them; I really thought a lot about whether I liked the cookies
or not (the two items correlated .71). The mean on this scale
was significantly higher in the high- than in the low-constructive processing condition, 4.9 versus 3.5; F(1, 123) =
27.5, p < .01. Also, those in the high-constructive processing
condition spent more time completing the dependent variable
scales than those in the low-constructive processing condi~ .01.
tion, 128.6 sec versus 110.0 sec, F(1, 97) = 8 . 1 , <

Perceived Risk Scale Development

Because there is no universally accepted measure of perceived risk, we developed the measure from a focus group
and a pretest. From the comments of the 15 focus group participants, we developed a pool of 12 statements reflecting financial, performance, and social risk. To reduce the size of
the item pool, we used principal components factor analysis
to analyze the 24 perceived disutility and perceived likelihood items. We selected six consequences, where the perceived likelihood and perceived disutility items loaded on
separate factors with a minimum factor loading of .3 and no
higher loadings on other factors (e.g., the new cookies will
have a bad taste).
In the actual experiments, we asked respondents to imagine that they were considering bringing the new cookies to a
potluck at work. They then assessed on 11-point scales the
likelihood that each consequence would occur. Subsequently, they indicated on 11-point scales how badly they
would feel if each consequence actually occurred. The perceived likelihood of negative outcomes for the participants
was their average response to the six likelihood items; the

Hypotheses testing. A 2 x 2 analysis of variance

(ANOVA) on an attitude toward the brand (AB,)scale (unenjoyabletenjoyable, badgood, worthless/valuable, unlikableAikable,tastelessttasteful, boringtfun, unfavorabletfavorable; coefficient a = .95) yielded a significant mood effect,
F(1,120) = 1 7 . 5 , <
~ .01, and a significantmood-by-task inter-

TABLE 1
Means and Standard Errors for Experiments 1 and 2

Low Constructive Processing

Dependent Variable
Experiment 1
Brand attitudes
Loss likelihood
Experiment 2
Brand attitudes
Loss likelihood
Test brand choice
Note:

High Constructive Processing

Positive Mood

Negative Mood

Positive Mood

Negative Mood

4.6 (0.23)
3.7 (0.22)

4.3 (0.21)
3.8 (0.19)

5.5 (0.19)
3.1 (0.23)

3.9 (0.24)
4.2 (0.28)

4.7 (0.29)
3.2 (0.22)
52%

4.7(0.32)
3.1(0.24)
67%

5.4 (0.25)
2.6 (0.24)
71%

4.0 (0.27)
4.0 (0.33)
32%

Standard errors are in parentheses.

FEDORIKHIN

action, F(1, 120) = 8.31, p < .01. Follow up t tests indicated

that, consistent with HI, in the high-constructive processing
condition, consumers in a positive mood had higher ABrthan
thoseinanegativemood, 5.5 versus 3.9, t(63)=5.14,p< .01.In
the low-constructiveprocessing condition there was no signif, versus 4.6, t(57) = .9, ns.
icant difference in A B ~4.3
A 2 x 2 ANOVA on the loss likelihood scale (coefficient a
= .74) indicated a significant mood effect, F(1, 120) = 5 . 7 , <
~
.02, and a significant mood-by-task interaction, F(1, 120) =
4.4, p < .01. Consistent with H2, follow up t tests indicated
significant difference in loss likelihood estimates between
the positive and negative mood conditions in the high-, 3.1
versus 4.2, t(63) = 3.25, p < .01, but not in the low-constructive processing condition, 3.7 versus 3.8, t(57) = .2, ns. There
was no mood effect on the second component of perceived
risk-perceived disutility of losses.
Discussion
This experiment provides evidence for our first two hypotheses: The level of constructive processing moderates mood effects on attitudes and perceived likelihood of adverse consequences. In the low-constructive processing condition, we
had the participants form a judgment about the product at the
beginning of the study. Then, when we asked them to evaluate the product again, at the end of the experimental session,
they were already familiar with the product in the low-construction condition but not familiar with it in the high-constructive processing condition. We extrapolate from this result to suggest that mood effects on consumers' attitudes and
perceptions about risk are stronger when consumers are
forming opinions for unfamiliar than for familiar brands.
However, when we manipulated constructive processing,
we also manipulated the timing of the mood induction. In Experiments 2 and 3, we ask all respondents to sample and evaluate the product after the mood induction.

EXPERIMENT 2
Hypotheses
In addition to testing H1 and H2, we develop and test H3,
which relates mood and constructive processing to consumer choice. Consumers in positive moods, when compared to those in negative moods, will be more likely to
choose a new product over a familiar one. Compared to
those in a negative mood, consumers in a positive mood not
only perceive lower risk in, and develop more favorable attitudes toward, new products, but they also seek variety
when selecting brands among safe, enjoyable products
(Isen, 2001; Kahn & Isen, 1993). As established in Experiment 1, however, consumers' tendency to favor the new
brand when under the influence of a positive mood will not

spread to familiar brands, where consumers have preexisting opinions. We hypothesize

H3: There will be an interaction of constructive processing and mood on consumers' choices such that consumers will be more likely to choose a new product
as mood becomes more favorable, with the effect
being stronger under high- than under low-constructive processing.
Overview
In this experiment to test HI through H3, we asked all consumers to evaluate a new cookie by tasting it after the mood
induction. This 2 (mood: positive or negative) x 2 (constructive processing: high or low) between-subject experiment exposed consumers to positive or negative mood-inducing
movie episodes and induced different levels of constructive
processing by providing or withholding consensual information. We randomly assigned one of the four cells of our design to groups of respondents drawn from the same participant pool in a different semester.
Procedure
At the beginning of the experiment, the respondents learned
that they would sample a new brand of cookies and compare
it to a familiar store brand.5 All respondents completed a
short computer familiarization exercise. Those in the
low-constructive processing condition then obtained consensual information about a new cookie in the form of survey results showing that in previous taste tests with children, the
new cookies did much better than the store brand cookies
(adapted from Meyers-Levy & Tybout, 1997). Those in the
high-constructive processing condition received no such information. Then, the experimenter told the participants that
while he prepared everything for the sampling, another experimenter would run a short paper-and-pencil study.
A different experimenter then showed participants one of
the two mood-inducing videos and collected the same measures as used in Experiment l . Once this "scale development
study" was completed, the first experimenter returned with
cookies on a cart. After the participants tried both the new
cookie, and the store brand, they continued with the questionnaire on the computer. We used the same scales as in Experiment 1 to measure the dependent variables. Then, we offered
the respondents a choice of one of the two cookies they had

5Toconfirm the manipulation of old and new cookies, in a posttest, participants evaluated the actual cookies on a two-item familiarity scale. They
rated the new cookies as less familiar than the old cookies. In Study 2, the
difference in familiarity between the two cookies equaled 2.5, t(17) = 5.3, p
< .05. In Study 3, the difference between the twocookies equaled 3.9, t(17) =
8.4, p < .05.

MOOD AND ATTITUDES, PERCEIVED RISK AND CHOICE

sampled earlier. At the end of the study, participants answered questions about the study's goals.
Results
We dropped 4 out of 91 questionnaires from the analyses because these participants were able to link the two parts of the
experiment. Means and standard errors for the dependent
variables are in Table 1.
Manipulation checks. To determine whether the mood
manipulation worked, we used the same PANAS scales as in
Experiment 1: positive affect: coefficient a = 39; negative
affect: coefficient a = 22. As expected, respondents reported
higher positive affect, 3.0 versus 2.3, F(l,84) = 22.9, p < .01,
and lower negative affect, 1.7 versus 1.3, F(l,84) = 12.7,p <
.01, in the positive than in the negative mood condition.
To determine whether the task manipulated constructive
processing, we assessed both responses to a three-item SRCE
scale and time needed to complete the dependent variable
scales. The three-item SRCE scale included the two items
from Experiment 1. As expected, both the average on the
SRCE scale (coefficient alpha was .74) and the time spent
completing the scales were significantly higher for the highthan for the low-constructive processing conditions: SCRCE,
5.7 versus 5.1; F(1,82) = 7.6, p < .01; time, 154.5 sec versus
~ .01.
124.2 sec, F(1, 82) = 1 4 . 2 ; <
Hypotheses testing. In the ANOVA analysis with A B ~
(coefficient a = .95) as a dependent variable, the mood effect
and the mood-by-task interaction were significant: mood,
~ .03; interaction: F(1, 80) = 5 . 3 5 , ~< .03.
F(1, 80) = 5 . 2 , <
Consistent with HI, follow up t tests indicated that there was
a significant difference in ABrbetween positive and negative
mood conditions in the high-, 5.4 versus 4.0, t(39) = 3.17, p <
.01, but not in the low-constructive processing condition, 4.7
versus 4.7, t(45) = .Ol , ns.
For the ANOVA with perceived likelihood of losses as a
dependent variable, the mood effect and the mood-by-task
interaction were significant: coefficient a = .68, mood: F(1,
~ .04, interaction: F(l,80) = 6 . 6 , <~ .02. Consis80) = 4 . 6 , <
tent with H2, follow-up t tests showed a significant difference in perceived likelihood of losses between positive and
negative mood conditions in the high-, 2.6 versus 4.0, t(39) =
3.27, p < .01, but not in the low-constructive processing conditions, 3.2 versus 3.0, t(45) = .8, ns.
To test H3 about the effect of mood and constructive processing on choice, we ran a logistic regression with mood,
task, and the mood-by-task interaction as the independent
variables and choice as the dependent variable. This analysis
showed nonsignificant mood and task effects but a significant mood-by-task interaction ( ~ =2 4.24, p < .04). We followed this up with chi-square tests in the high-constructive
processing condition, which showed that as respondents

moved from negative to positive moods, choice of the new

cookie increased (32% vs. 71%; ~2 = 4.52, p < .04), but there
was no significant difference in the low-constructive processing condition (67% vs. 52%, x2 = .52, ns).
Discussion
Experiment 2 builds on Experiment 1 by showing that mood
effects on new brand evaluations, perceived risk, and also
choice depend on the extent of constructive processing, even
if the mood induction happens prior to the judgment process.
By providing consensus information we limit construction
and thus limit mood effects. In Experiment 3, we delve
deeper into the mechanisms underlying mood effects on the
dependent variables.

EXPERIMENT 3
Hypotheses
We propose that the availability of processing resources influences which mechanisms underlie mood effects on attitudes. When motivated to construct opinions, consumers
with unrestricted processing resources will use a relatively
slow piecemeal process to systematically analyze the different attributes of the object and to form an evaluation (Pham et
al., 2001; Sanbonmatsu & Fazio, 1990; Sujan, 1985). The affect-priming process described earlier can color these attribute-oriented thoughts by selectively priming mood-congruent memory nodes and by directing attention to
mood-congruent details (Fiedler, 1991). Consistent with affect priming, Petty et al. (1993) showed that the valence of
cognitive responses to a persuasive message mediates positive mood effects on attitudes in high-elaboration conditions.
When consumers face constrained processing resources,
but are motivated to construct evaluations, their moods may
still bias these evaluations (Petty et al., 1993). However, when
consumers have few processing resources, they tend to form
evaluationsby using a categorizationprocess instead of attribute analysis (Brewer, 1988; Sanbonmatsu & Fazio, 1990;
Sujan, 1985).By classifying anew stimulus into afamiliarcategory, consumers can quickly retrieve and apply the affect associated with the category to the new stimulus. The affect-as-information mechanism described earlier may drive
these mood effects because people may confuse their mood
with the affective tag for the category through a "how do I feel
about it?'heuristic (Petty et al., 1993;Pham, 1998;Schwarz &
Clore, 1983).In summary, when compared to consumers with
unrestricted processing resources, these consumers will be
more likely to report relying on their feelings to make judgments and will have thought protocols that contain more references to categorization and fewer references to attribute-oriented thoughts (Sujan, 1985). As a result, we predict that

H4(a): Under constrained processing resources, consumers will generate more categorization-oriented and
fewer attribute-oriented thoughts and will indicate
higher reliance on feelings in forming judgments
than consumers under unrestricted processing resources.
Accordingly, we expect that different cognitive variables
will mediate mood effects under different resource conditions. Under constrained processing resources, the valence of
categorization thoughts will mediate the mood-attitude relation. Under unrestricted processing resources, the valence of
attribute-orientedthoughts will mediate mood effects on attitudes. This reasoning leads to the following hypotheses
about differences in the mechanisms underlying mood effects under different levels of resource availability:
H4(b): In high-constructive processing conditions, under
unrestricted resources, the valence of attribute-oriented thoughts will be more likely to mediate the
effects of moods on attitude than the valence of
categorization thoughts.
H4(c): In high-constructive processing conditions, under
constrained processing resources, the valence of
consumers' categorization thoughts will be more
likely to mediate mood effects on attitudes than
the valence of attribute-oriented thoughts.
Overview
To test hypotheses H1 through H4, this 2 (mood) x 2 (constructive processing) x 2 (levels of processing resources) between-subject experiment exposed consumers to one of two
different mood-inducing movie episodes, manipulated the
task to induce either high or low levels of constructive processing, and manipulated availability of processing resources
by putting respondents under different levels of cognitive
load. We collected the same dependent variables as in the

previous experiments. To trace underlying mechanisms, we

also collected thought-listing information.
Procedure
We randomly assigned small groups of participants to one of
the eight cells of our design. Initially, they learned that they
would participate in three studies. The first "scale pretest
study" manipulated mood in the same way as previously discussed. To manipulate the availability of cognitive processing resources, a different experimenter asked consumers to
participate in a "consumer memory study" by memorizing
for later recall either a seven- or a two-digit number. In a
"third" study consumers compared a new brand of cookies
(introduced recently) to an old one (on the market for a long
time).5They read that "experts had previously rated these two
cookies on two attributes of sensory score and appearance.
Both attributes are important in the rating of cookies." Respondents also saw a table, which showed that the new target
cookie had a sensory score of 87 and an appearance rating of
good, whereas the old cookie had a sensory score of 72 and
an appearance rating of superior. In the task inducing
low-construction, respondents also read, "but the sensory
score is more important," whereas in the task inducing high
construction, respondents had to generate a decision rule to
resolve the conflicting information (after Coupey et al.,
1998). All consumers received samples of the new and old
cookies, completed the questionnaire, and recalled the number. We also collected cognitive response data by asking participants to list any thoughts that went through their mind
while they were evaIuating the cookies.
Results
After we eliminated the 5 respondents who correctly identified the goal of the study, we had 129 respondents. Table 2
contains the means and standard errors for the dependent
variables.

TABLE 2
Means and Standard Errors for Experiment3
Unrestricted Processing Resources
Low Construction

Dependant Variable
AB~
L1
Choice
Nattr
Ncat
Feelings

Constrained Processing Resources

High Construction

Low Construction

High Construction

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

5.33(.17)
2.04 (.26)
61%
2.5 (.34)
.67 (. 18)
31%

5.29(.24)
1.6 (.I81
42%
2.2 (.34)
.37 (.13)
11%

5.8(.24)
1.4 ( 7
66%
3.4 (.45)
.61 (.24)
17%

4.3(.40)
2.9 (.52)
25%
3.8 (.44)
.92 (.23)
50%

5.2 (2.1)
2.1 (.28)
52%
1.8 (.44)
.94 (.24)
47%

4.8 (.32)
2.6 (.29)
44%
2.5 (.45)
.65 (.21)
53%

5.37 (.22)
1.56 (.27)
39%
1.5 (.27)
1.I (.22)
57%

4.36 (.35)
2.6 (.38)
29%
2.4 (.39)
1.2 (.21)
64%

--

Note. Ae, = attitude toward the brand; L1= loss likelihood; Choice = % of consumers choosing the test brand; Nattr is the number of attribute-oriented (categorization) thoughts in the protocol; Ncat is the number of categorization thoughts; Feelings = % of respondents mentioning feelings in relationship to use of the
product.

MOOD AND ATTITUDES, PERCEIVED RISK AND CHOICE

Manipulation checks. Participants reported higher

positive affect: 2.9 versus 2.4, F(1, 127) = 18.5, p < .01, and
lower negative affect: 1.5 versus 1.8, F(1, 127) = 5.5, p < .03,
in the positive mood condition than in the negative mood
condition. To determine whether we manipulated constructive processing, we assessed both responses to a four-item
SRCE scale and measured response time. The four-item
scale included the three items we used in Experiment 2. Both
the time spent completing the scales and the mean on the
SRCE were significantly higher for the high- than for the
low-constructive processing condition; time: 103.8 versus
94.6 sec, F(1, 126) = 5.50, p < .03; SRCE: 5.0 versus 4.5;
F(1, 126) = 4 . 9 4 , ~< .03.
To determine whether our cognitive load manipulated
processing resources, we analyzed both the responses to a
three-item scale and recall accuracy. The three-item scale
asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they concentrated on memorizing the number (e.g., I couldn't think
about anything else but the number, while I was answering
the questions; coefficient alpha was .80). The scale score was
significantly higher for the constrained resources
(seven-digit number to remember) than for the unrestricted
resources condition (two-digit number to remember): 3.1
versus 2.4; F(1, 127) = 9.00, p < .01. In the constrained resources condition, although only 33 out of 62 respondents
were able to recall the seven-digit number correctly; all the
remaining respondents recalled at least four of the seven digits correctly. In the unrestricted resources condition, all participants recalled the two-digit number.
Hypotheses testing. In the ANOVA on ABr (coefficient a = .94) as a dependent variable, the mood effect and
the mood-by-task interaction were significant: mood, F(l,
125) = 14.5, p < .01; interaction, F(1, 125) = 7.6, p < .01.
The results did not vary by the level of processing resources. Consistent with HI, follow-up t tests showed a significant difference in ABr between positive and negative
mood conditions in the high-, 5.6 versus 4.3, t(55) = 4.4, p
< .01, but not in the low-constructive processing conditions,
5.3 versus 5.1, t(70) = .01, ns. For the ANOVA with perceived likelihood of losses as a dependent variable, the
mood effect and the mood-by-task interaction were significant (coefficient a = .71, mood: F(1, 125) = 9.6, p < .01;
interaction: F(1, 125) = 9.27, p < .01. The results did not
vary by the level of processing resources. Consistent with
H2, follow-up t tests showed a significant difference in perceived likelihood of losses between negative and positive
mood conditions in the high-, 2.8 versus 1.5, t(55) = 4.1, p
< .01, but not in the low-constructive processing condition,
2.1 versus 2.1, t(70) = .03, ns.
Logistic regression analysis showed a significant mood
~ .02), but the mood-by-task ineffect on choice ( ~ =25 . 5 6 , <
teraction did not reach statistical significance. However, the
pattern of results was consistent with our expectations. In the

high-constructive processing condition, we found that as respondents moved from negative to positive moods, choice of
the new cookie increased significantly (27% vs. 55%; ~2 =
4.52, p < .04), whereas in the low-constructive processing
condition, mood did not significantly affect choice (43% vs.
57%; = 1.39, ns).
To test H4, two judges independently coded each participant's thought protocol. They classified the valence of each
thought and whether each thought was attribute oriented, categorization related, or other (see Sujan, 1985). Attribute-oriented thoughts were statements related to the evaluation of an
attribute or comparisons of attributes; categorization
thoughts noted how the test cookie was similar to an overall
category (such as cookies, food one takes to a potluck, snack
food).6 In addition, they judged whether respondents made at
least one statement connecting feelings to the use of the new
cookies (e.g., I would be embarrassed to take the new cookies
to a potluck).
Consistent with H4(a) ANOVA analyses on the number of
attribute-oriented and categorization thoughts and chi-square
analysis on the proportion of respondents using feelings-oriented thoughts showed significant effects of cognitive load.
Consumers generated more attribute-oriented and fewer categorization thoughts under unrestricted than under constrained resource conditions (attribute-oriented thoughts: 2.9
versus 2.1, F(1, 126) = 8.0, p < .01; categorization thoughts:
1.0 versus .6, F(1, 127) = 5.1, p < .03. In addition, a larger
proportion of respondents in the constrained (54%) than in
the unrestricted processing resources condition (25%) made
statements connecting their feelings to the use of the cookies
( ~ =2 1 0 . 6 , <
~ .01). We also analyzed participants' responses
to a question: "When evaluating the cookies I relied mostly
on my ... " anchored by feelings or thoughts. Again, consistent with H4(a), those in the unrestricted resources condition
indicated higher reliance on thoughts than those in the constrained resources conditions: 4.77 versus 4.09 accordingly,
with higher numbers indicating higher relative reliance on
thoughts, F(1, 126) = 4.37, p < .04.
To test H4(b), we did a mediation analysis in the unrestricted resources, high-constructive processing condition,
to test whether the proportion of positive attribute-oriented
thoughts (PPAT) mediated the effects of mood on AB~.
(PPAT is the number of positive attribute-oriented thoughts
divided by the total number of attribute-oriented thoughts).
We found evidence of strong mediation. Mood had a significant effect on ABr: mood, F(1, 31) = 10.4, p < .01. In another ANOVA, mood had a significant effect on PPAT, F(1,
27) = 19.4, p < .01. In addition, when PPAT was added to
the first ANOVA on ABn PPAT achieved statistical signifi-

x2

6Examples include positive attribute thoughts (I like the chocolate), negative attribute thoughts (The inside cookies part is too dry), positive category
thoughts (These cookies would be great snacks), negative category thoughts
(I wouldn't take those cookies to a potluck).

10

FEDORIKHIN

cance, and mood was no longer significant: PPAT, F(1, 26)

= 9.5, p < .01; mood, F(1, 26) = 1.8, p < .19. Finally, we
tested and found that in the unrestricted resources,
high-constructive processing condition (PCAT) (the number
of positive categorization thoughts divided by the total
number of categorization thoughts) did not mediate mood
effects. Mood did not have a significant effect on the valence of categorization thoughts in this condition, F(1, 12)
< 1. We conclude the data are consistent with H4(b) about
the mediating role of attribute-oriented thoughts in unrestricted processing resources conditions.
To test H4(c) about the valence of categorization thoughts
as a mediator of mood effects on ABrin the constrained processing resources conditions, we did a mediation analysis using the proportion of positive categorization thoughts
(PCAT) in the constrained resources high-constructive processing conditions. We obtained evidence of strong mediation because in separate ANOVA analyses mood had a significant effect on PCAT, F(1, 21) = 14.0, p < .01, and on AB~,
F(l, 21) = 6.0, p < .02. But when PCAT was added to the
mood on Aer model, PCAT was significant, F(1,20) = 6.1, p
< .05, and mood was not F(1,20) < 1.00. We also tested and
found that, consistent with the hypothesis, PPAT did not mediate mood effects in the constrained resources condition.
Specifically,mood did not have a significant effect on PPAT,
F(1, 18) < 1, ns, nor did PPAT achieve significance when
added to the mood model on ABr,F(1,18) < 1, ns.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
Understanding how moods influence consumer behavior is
important because consumers bring a variety of moods into
decision-making and because the shopping experience itself
can induce different moods. From a theoretical perspective,
these three experiments provide several new insights. Our
work highlights constructive processing as an important
moderator of mood effects on attitude, perceived risk, and
choice in both high- and low-elaboration conditions. Although dual-process models such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) do not explicitly incorporate constructive processing, they do allow a variety of peripheral and
central cues to compete with and diminish mood effects in
both high- and low-elaboration conditions (Petty & Wegener,
1999). By studying cognitive markers in high- and low-processing resources conditions, we show that the type of
cognitions that mediate mood effects on attitudes depends on
the cognitive resources that consumers have available.
Through mediation analysis and coding of thought protocols,
we find evidence that moods bias attitudes through an affect-as-information process when consumers have limited
processing resources, but when consumers have unrestricted
processing resources, we find evidence that consumers'
moods bias cognitions in a manner consistent with the affect-priming process.

Two additional contributions stem from our study of risk

perceptions and choice. Regarding risk, in all three studies,
we found that consumers in a positive mood perceive lower
probabilities of incurring losses from purchasing a new product than consumers in a negative mood. However, the perceived disutilities from these losses were relatively flat. By
studying choice, we learn that consumers in positive moods
are more likely to choose a new cookie than consumers in
negative moods. This effect is particularly strong in the constructive processing condition where attitudes and risk perceptions of the new cookie are also subject to relatively stronger mood influences.
The limitations of our research suggest directions for future investigators. Although we varied brands and tasks, the
findings need to be replicated with different product categories, different manipulations of processing, and in different
contexts. Regarding product categories, the effect of moods
on loss likelihood estimates and perceived disutilities might
be stronger for higher risk decisions, such as the purchase
of expensive high technology products. Regarding our constructive processing manipulations, even though we varied
our procedures across the experiments, by providing information to some consumers, we may have inadvertently introduced a demand effect in these groups. However, the
patterns of means are not consistent with the demand effect
explanation of our results. Regarding the means, in Studies
2 and 3, where we introduced information to restrict construction, the demand effect would create more favorable
attitudes in the low-construction condition than in the
high-construction condition, but in both studies we failed to
obtain a main effect for construction. In addition, the demand effect, would not explain our finding of a bigger difference between the positive and negative mood conditions
within the high-construction condition as compared to the
low-construction condition. Nonetheless, future investigators may want to use other manipulations of construction,
such as fear of invalidity or need for closure (Kruglanski,
1996; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).
Future research could expand the study of mood and constructive processing by studying whether mood impacts attention to positive and negative product features as well as
processes for combining information as consumers form
judgments. Future investigators might explore when other
mechanisms, such as affect confirmation (Adaval, 2001) and
even conditioning underlie mood effects. Finally, future investigators might examine whether the mechanisms underlying mood effects influence the strength, persistence across
time, and resistance to change of attitudes, loss likelihood estimates, perceived risk, and preferences.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This article is based on Alexander Fedorikhin's Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Iowa under the guidance of

MOOD AND ATTITUDES, PERCEIVED RISK AND CHOICE

catherine Cole. We thank Irwin Levin, Peter Riesz, Baba

Shiv, and David Watson from the University of Iowa; Debbie
MacInnis from the University of Southern California;
Pamela Henderson from Washington State University; Bob
Wyer from Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Alice Isen from Cornell University; Wagner Kamakura
from Duke University, and Bob Burnkrant from Ohio State
university for their helpful comments at various stages of
this work.

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