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The
Divine
according
to
Freedom
St.
Thomas
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Thomas Murphy
God's free will <5) : the final explanation, then, of the contingency
of creatures lies in the freedom interior to the necessary act of the
divine will (6). God's absolute necessity is immanent in creatures,
to which it freely communicates itself.
The necessity of supposition is, indeed, for St. Thomas, a
concrete necessity: here and now God is actively communicating
His being and His necessity to the creature. The starting-point of
St. Thomas is from the nature of being, actually in process of
communicating itself (7). Proceeding from this starting-point, it is
convenient to divide the subsequent treatment as follows.
The first part, starting from the communication of act, discusses
the immediate presence of God in creation. This part will attempt
to show that, for St. Thomas, there is no conflict between the
transcendence of God and His immanence in created being. Indeed,
this is to say too little. For St. Thomas, the divine immanence
reveals itself precisely as the immanence of the transcendent God,
and conversely, God's transcendence would remain forever unknown
to us, were it not immanent in creatures.
The second part examines the question: why does God com
municate
His being ? Basing itself on a key text from the De
Potentia, this part shows that, according to St. Thomas, God's
final end in creating is not the communication of His goodness but
the divine goodness itself, out of love for which God wills to
communicate it: God acts not from a desire for the end, but from
a love of it (8).
The metaphysic of St. Thomas is a metaphysic of God's creative
presence and love, which give birth to a movement of divine resem
blance in the creature, in the whole universe. This divine resem
blance in creatures is closely connected, in the mind of St. Thomas,
with his conception of the fittingness (convenientia) of God's
love for creatures. The third part will examine this notion of fitting<5> De Pot., q. 5, a. 3, ad 12.
<6> 1.19.3, ad 5.
<7> As opposed to an abstract essence, the concrete nature is attained in
experience. Cf. De Pot-, q. 5, a. 4, c, secundo, where S. Thomas discovers in the
nature of creatures a concrete necessity subordinated to the supreme freedom of
God's creative love (from a. 3) and therefore guaranteed by the utichangeableness
of that love. Cf. A. HAYEN, Deux thologiens..., in Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 1953, p. 245.
() De Pot., q. 3, a. 15, ad 14.
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action, the intellect moving the will, and the will tending
by desire and love to the external good ; but in God this
circle is completed within Himself. God, in knowing Hims
elf, conceives His word, the pattern (ratio) of everything
which He knows, since He knows all things in His activity
of knowing Himself: and from this Word He proceeds to
the love of all things and of Himself <26).
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thereby shared, in a limited way, with many other beings, all made
like to God <47).
Whatever God wills concerning creatures is willed, as it were,
secondarily: the divine goodness is thus the reason of God's willing
all things, just as His essence is the reason of His knowing all
things <48).
The divine will necessarily wills God's goodness (the principale
volitum) : this necessity is not a necessity of coercion forced on
Him from outside but of natural order, which does not conflict
with freedom, for God cannot will Himself not to be good, and
consequently He cannot will Himself not to be powerful, or to be
deprived of any attribute included in His goodness (49).
Apart from the volition of the divine goodness, the divine will
does not act of necessity. The end is the reason for willing that
which is directed to the end (the ad finem). If that which is directed
to the end is, as it were, proportionate to the end, embracing it
perfectly and being required for its attainment, both the end and
that which is directed to the end will be willed of necessity. A
homely example is that of the will to live and to take the food
without which one cannot keep alive (50>.
(47) Ibid. : Voluntas igitur divina habet pro principali volito id quod naturaliter
vult, et quod est quasi finis voluntatis suae; scilicet ipsa bonitas sua, propter quam
vult quidquid aliud a se vult: vult enim creaturas propter suam bonitatem... ut
videlicet sua bonitas, quae per essentiam multiplicari non potest, saltern per quamdam similitudinis parti cipationem difundatur ad multa. Cf. I C. G. 75; De Pot.,
q. 3, a. 15, ad 14.
(*"' Ibid. : Unde ea quae circa creaturas vult, sunt quasi eius volita secundaria,
quae propter suam bonitatem vult; ut divina bonitas sit eius voluntati ratio volendi
omnia, sicut sua essentia est ei ratio cognoscendi omnia.
<49' Ibid. : Respectu igitur illius principalis voliti, quod est sua bonitas, voluntas
divina necessitatem habet, non quidem coactionis, sed naturalis ordinis, qui libertati non rpugnt... non enim potest Deus velle se non esse bonum, et per consequens se non esse intelligentem vel potentem, vel quodcumque eorum quae ratio
eius bonitatis includit.
<*) Ibid. : Sed respectu nullius alterius voliti necessitatem habet. Cum enim
ratio volendi his quae sunt ad finem, sit ipse finis; secundum hoc quod id quod est
ad finem, .comparatur ad finem, secundum hoc comparatur ad voluntatem. Unde
si id quod est ad finem, sit quasi fini proportionatum, hoc modo scilicet quod
finem perfecte includat, et sine eo finis haberi non possit; sicut de necessitate
appetitur finis, ita de necessitate appetitur id quod est ad finem; et praecipue a
voluntate quae sapientiae regulam exire non potest. Eiusdem enim rationia videtur
desiderare vitae continuationem, et nutrimenti sumptionem, quo vita conservatur,
et sine quo vita conservari non potest.
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2. The Summa contra Gentiles.
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could deny existence to things. For the same reason, then,
He can annihilate them <77).
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