[G.R. No. 167614. March 24, 2009.

]
ANTONIO M. SERRANO, petitioner, vs. GALLANT MARITIME
SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC., respondents.

Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd.
(respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)approved Contract of Employment with the following terms and conditions:
Duration of contract 12 months
Position Chief Officer

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
For decades, the toil of solitary migrants has helped lift entire
families and communities out of poverty. Their earnings have built
houses, provided health care, equipped schools and planted the
seeds of businesses. They have woven together the world by
transmitting ideas and knowledge from country to country. They
have provided the dynamic human link between cultures, societies
and economies. Yet, only recently have we begun to understand
not only how much international migration impacts development,
but how smart public policies can magnify this effect. TacESD
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon
Global Forum on Migration and Development
Brussels, July 10, 2007 1
For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph
of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, 2 to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. . . . In case of termination of overseas
employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by
law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent
(12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
does not magnify the contributions of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) to national
development, but exacerbates the hardships borne by them by unduly limiting their
entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to their lump-sum salary either for the
unexpired portion of their employment contract "or for three months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less" (subject clause). Petitioner claims that the
last clause violates the OFWs' constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of
their contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them due process.
By way of Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the
December 8, 2004 Decision 3 and April 1, 2005 Resolution 4 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), which applied the subject clause, entreating this Court to declare the subject clause
unconstitutional.

Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00

Hours of work 48.0 hours per week
Overtime US$700.00 per month
Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month 5
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly
salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he
would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. 6
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. 7 Hence,
petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on
May 26, 1998. 8 DHAcET
Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998
up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served
only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of
nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint 9 against respondents for
constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of
US$26,442.73, broken down as follows:
May 27/31, 1998 (5 days) incl. Leave pay US$413.90
June 01/30, 1998 2,590.00
July 01/31, 1998 2,590.00
August 01/31, 1998 2,590.00
Sept. 01/30, 1998 2,590.00
Oct. 01/31, 1998 2,590.00
Nov. 01/30, 1998 2,590.00
Dec. 01/31, 1998 2,590.00
Jan. 01/31, 1999 2,590.00
Feb. 01/28, 1999 2,590.00
Mar. 1/19, 1999 (19 days) incl. leave pay 1,640.00

Page |
1


25,382.23
Amount adjusted to chief mate's salary
(March 19/31, 1998 to April 1/30, 1998) + 1,060.50 10

"[b]asic salary, US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed overtime pay, +

US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay = US$2,590.00/compensation per month." 14
Respondents appealed 15 to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to
question the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed. ESacHC

TOTAL CLAIM US$26,442.73 11

Petitioner also appealed 16 to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not Page |
applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor
2
Relations Commission 17 that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their
salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts. 18

=============

In a Decision dated June 15, 2000, the NLRC modified the LA Decision, to wit:

as well as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. SIDTCa

The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of petitioner
illegal and awarding him monetary benefits, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring that the dismissal of the complainant (petitioner) by the
respondents in the above-entitled case was illegal and the
respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner],
jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of
exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of EIGHT
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS
(US $8,770.00), representing the complainant's salary for three (3)
months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of
employment.
The respondents are likewise ordered to pay the complainant
[petitioner], jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, based on
the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount
of FORTY FIVE U.S. DOLLARS (US$ 45.00), 12 representing the
complainant's claim for a salary differential. In addition, the
respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant, jointly and
severally, in Philippine Currency, at the exchange rate prevailing at
the time of payment, the complainant's (petitioner's) claim for
attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total amount
awarded to the aforesaid employee under this Decision.
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages
are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 13 (Emphasis supplied)
In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his computation
on the salary period of three months only rather than the entire unexpired portion of
nine months and 23 days of petitioner's employment contract applying the subject
clause. However, the LA applied the salary rate of US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner's

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 15 July 1999 is MODIFIED.

Respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant, jointly and
severally, in Philippine currency, at the prevailing rate of exchange
at the time of payment the following:
1. Three (3) months salary
$1,400 x 3 US$4,200.00
2. Salary differential 45.00
US$4,245.00
3. 10% Attorney's fees 424.50

TOTAL US$4,669.50
==========
The other findings are affirmed.
SO ORDERED. 19
The NLRC corrected the LA's computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner
by reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A.
No. 8042 "does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven to
have been actually performed, and for vacation leave pay." 20
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the subject clause. 21 The NLRC denied the motion. 22
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari 23 with the CA, reiterating the constitutional
challenge against the subject clause. 24 After initially dismissing the petition on a
technicality, the CA eventually gave due course to it, as directed by this Court in its
Resolution dated August 7, 2003 which granted the petition for certiorari, docketed
as G.R. No. 151833, filed by petitioner.

In a Decision dated December 8, 2004, the CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the
reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue
raised by petitioner. 25
His Motion for Reconsideration 26 having been denied by the CA, 27 petitioner brings
his cause to this Court on the following grounds:
I
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way not
in accord with applicable decision of the Supreme Court involving similar issue
of granting unto the migrant worker back wages equal to the unexpired portion
of his contract of employment instead of limiting it to three (3) months.
II
In the alternative that the Court of Appeals and the Labor Tribunals were
merely applying their interpretation of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, it
is submitted that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law when it failed to
discharge its judicial duty to decide questions of substance not theretofore
determined by the Honorable Supreme Court, particularly, the constitutional
issues raised by the petitioner on the constitutionality of said law, which
unreasonably, unfairly and arbitrarily limits payment of the award for back
wages of overseas workers to three (3) months. HETDAa
III
Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of Republic
Act No. 8042, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in excluding from
petitioner's award the overtime pay and vacation pay provided in his contract
since under the contract they form part of his salary. 28
On February 26, 2008, petitioner wrote the Court to withdraw his petition as he is already
old and sickly, and he intends to make use of the monetary award for his medical
treatment and medication. 29 Required to comment, counsel for petitioner filed a motion,
urging the court to allow partial execution of the undisputed monetary award and, at the
same time, praying that the constitutional question be resolved. 30
Considering that the parties have filed their respective memoranda, the Court now takes
up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme importance of the constitutional
question raised therein.
On the first and second issues
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of petitioner was
illegal is not disputed. Likewise not disputed is the salary differential of US$45.00
awarded to petitioner in all three fora. What remains disputed is only the computation of
the lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of
petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of

the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of
US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition
to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23
more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and
23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the monthly rate of Page |
US$2,590.00. 31 AcTHCE
3
The Arguments of Petitioner
Petitioner contends that the subject clause is unconstitutional because it unduly impairs
the freedom of OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their overseas employment
contracts a determinate employment period and a fixed salary package. 32 It also
impinges on the equal protection clause, for it treats OFWs differently from local Filipino
workers (local workers) by putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum salary to which
OFWs are entitled in case of illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary
award for local workers when their dismissal is declared illegal; that the disparate
treatment is not reasonable as there is no substantial distinction between the two
groups; 33and that it defeats Section 18, 34 Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees the protection of the rights and welfare of all Filipino workers, whether
deployed locally or overseas. 35
Moreover, petitioner argues that the decisions of the CA and the labor tribunals are not in
line with existing jurisprudence on the issue of money claims of illegally dismissed
OFWs. Though there are conflicting rulings on this, petitioner urges the Court to sort
them out for the guidance of affected OFWs. 36
Petitioner further underscores that the insertion of the subject clause into R.A. No. 8042
serves no other purpose but to benefit local placement agencies. He marks the statement
made by the Solicitor General in his Memorandum, viz.:
Often, placement agencies, their liability being solidary, shoulder
the payment of money claims in the event that jurisdiction over the
foreign employer is not acquired by the court or if the foreign
employer reneges on its obligation. Hence, placement agencies that
are in good faith and which fulfill their obligations are unnecessarily
penalized for the acts of the foreign employer. To protect them and
to promote their continued helpful contribution in deploying
Filipino migrant workers, liability for money claims was reduced
under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. 37 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner argues that in mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, the
subject clause sacrifices the well-being of OFWs. Not only that, the provision makes
foreign employers better off than local employers because in cases involving the illegal
dismissal of employees, foreign employers are liable for salaries covering a maximum of
only three months of the unexpired employment contract while local employers are liable
for the full lump-sum salaries of their employees. As petitioner puts it:

In terms of practical application, the local employers are not limited

to the amount of backwages they have to give their employees they
have illegally dismissed, following well-entrenched and
unequivocal jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand, foreign
employers will only be limited to giving the illegally dismissed
migrant workers the maximum of three (3) months unpaid salaries
notwithstanding the unexpired term of the contract that can be more
than three (3) months. 38
Lastly, petitioner claims that the subject clause violates the due process clause, for it
deprives him of the salaries and other emoluments he is entitled to under his fixed-period
employment contract. 39
The Arguments of Respondents
In their Comment and Memorandum, respondents contend that the constitutional issue
should not be entertained, for this was belatedly interposed by petitioner in his appeal
before the CA, and not at the earliest opportunity, which was when he filed an appeal
before the NLRC. 40 cTACIa
The Arguments of the Solicitor General
The Solicitor General (OSG) 41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on July 15,
1995, its provisions could not have impaired petitioner's 1998 employment contract.
Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded petitioner's contract, the provisions thereof are
deemed part of the minimum terms of petitioner's employment, especially on the matter
of money claims, as this was not stipulated upon by the parties. 42
Moreover, the OSG emphasizes that OFWs and local workers differ in terms of the
nature of their employment, such that their rights to monetary benefits must necessarily
be treated differently. The OSG enumerates the essential elements that distinguish OFWs
from local workers: first, while local workers perform their jobs within Philippine
territory, OFWs perform their jobs for foreign employers, over whom it is difficult for
our courts to acquire jurisdiction, or against whom it is almost impossible to enforce
judgment; and second, as held in Coyoca v. National Labor Relations
Commission 43 and Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission, 44 OFWs are
contractual employees who can never acquire regular employment status, unlike local
workers who are or can become regular employees. Hence, the OSG posits that there are
rights and privileges exclusive to local workers, but not available to OFWs; that these
peculiarities make for a reasonable and valid basis for the differentiated treatment under
the subject clause of the money claims of OFWs who are illegally dismissed. Thus, the
provision does not violate the equal protection clause nor Section 18, Article II of the
Constitution. 45
Lastly, the OSG defends the rationale behind the subject clause as a police power
measure adopted to mitigate the solidary liability of placement agencies for this
"redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers whose welfare the government seeks to
promote. The survival of legitimate placement agencies helps [assure] the government
that migrant workers are properly deployed and are employed under decent and humane
conditions." 46

The Court's Ruling

The Court sustains petitioner on the first and second issues.
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts of its
co-equals, such as the Congress, it does so only when these conditions obtain: (1) that
there is an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial Page |
determination; 47 (2) that the constitutional question is raised by a proper party 48 and at
4
the earliest opportunity; 49 and (3) that the constitutional question is the very lis mota of
the case, 50 otherwise the Court will dismiss the case or decide the same on some other
ground. 51 DICcTa
Without a doubt, there exists in this case an actual controversy directly involving
petitioner who is personally aggrieved that the labor tribunals and the CA computed his
monetary award based on the salary period of three months only as provided under the
subject clause.
The constitutional challenge is also timely. It should be borne in mind that the
requirement that a constitutional issue be raised at the earliest opportunity entails the
interposition of the issue in the pleadings before a competent court, such that, if the issue
is not raised in the pleadings before that competent court, it cannot be considered at the
trial and, if not considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal. 52 Records
disclose that the issue on the constitutionality of the subject clause was first raised, not in
petitioner's appeal with the NLRC, but in his Motion for Partial Reconsideration with
said labor tribunal, 53 and reiterated in his Petition for Certiorari before the
CA. 54Nonetheless, the issue is deemed seasonably raised because it is not the NLRC but
the CA which has the competence to resolve the constitutional issue. The NLRC is a
labor tribunal that merely performs a quasi-judicial function its function in the present
case is limited to determining questions of fact to which the legislative policy of R.A. No.
8042 is to be applied and to resolving such questions in accordance with the standards
laid down by the law itself; 55 thus, its foremost function is to administer and
enforceR.A. No. 8042, and not to inquire into the validity of its provisions. The CA, on
the other hand, is vested with the power of judicial review or the power to declare
unconstitutional a law or a provision thereof, such as the subject clause. 56 Petitioner's
interposition of the constitutional issue before the CA was undoubtedly seasonable. The
CA was therefore remiss in failing to take up the issue in its decision.

The third condition that the constitutional issue be critical to the resolution of the case
likewise obtains because the monetary claim of petitioner to his lump-sum salary for the
entire unexpired portion of his 12-month employment contract, and not just for a period
of three months, strikes at the very core of the subject clause.
Thus, the stage is all set for the determination of the constitutionality of the subject
clause.
Does
the
Article
III
of contracts?

subject
of
the

clause
violate
Constitution
on

Section
10,
non-impairment

The answer is in the negative.

Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his
contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive 57 is
not tenable. ETAICc
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides:
No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a
prospective
operation, 58 and
cannot
affect
acts
or
contracts
already
perfected; 59however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into
contracts and deemed a part thereof. 60 Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section
10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way
derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner
changing the intention of the parties thereto.
As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the
execution of the employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998.
Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired
the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when the parties executed their 1998
employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions
of R.A. No. 8042.
But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be
declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the
law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business,
profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the
noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever
they may be employed. 61 Police power legislations adopted by the State to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people are
generally applicable not only to future contracts but even to those already in existence,
for all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the
State to promote public welfare. 62
Does
the
subject
Article
III
of
the
Article
II
and
Section
as a protected sector?

clause
violate
Section
Constitution,
and
Section
3,
Article
XIII
on

The answer is in the affirmative.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of the law.

1,
18,
labor

Section 18, 63 Article II and Section 3, 64 Article XIII accord all members of the labor
sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and
welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions
translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed
by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them Page |
in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or 5
spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances. 65 AECacT
Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate,
when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the
classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial
distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing
conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the class. 66
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a
classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the
challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a
legitimate state interest; 67 b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the
government must show that the challenged classification serves an important state
interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that
interest; 68and c) strict judicial scrutiny 69 in which a legislative classification which
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right 70 or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class 71 is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden
is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve
a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest. 72
Under American jurisprudence, strict judicial scrutiny is triggered by suspect
classifications 73 based on race 74 or gender 75 but not when the classification is drawn
along income categories. 76
It is different in the Philippine setting. In Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 77 the
constitutionality of a provision in the charter of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), a
government financial institution (GFI), was challenged for maintaining its rank-and-file
employees under the Salary Standardization Law (SSL), even when the rank-and-file
employees of other GFIs had been exempted from the SSL by their respective charters.
Finding that the disputed provision contained a suspect classification based on salary
grade, the Court deliberately employed the standard of strict judicial scrutiny in its review
of the constitutionality of said provision. More significantly, it was in this case that the
Court revealed the broad outlines of its judicial philosophy, to wit: aHDTAI
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid
classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition and
respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the
Constitution. The deference stops where the classification violates a
fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this

Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of

constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting
adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not
suffice.
Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution requires a stricter judicial scrutiny
finds no support in American or English jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not per se
controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive and
have been used to support many of our decisions. We should not
place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as
indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our
own decisions through the employment of our own endowments.
We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems
in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and
even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept
of law and justice. Our laws must be construed in accordance with
the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced
from the language of each law and the context of other local
legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must be
construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and
the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our
public interest is distinct and different from others.
xxx xxx xxx
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the
use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in
the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal
precisely in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society.
The command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in
"all phases of national development", further explicitated in Article
XIII, are clear commands to the State to take affirmative action in
the direction of greater equality. . . . [T]here is thus in the Philippine
Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more vigorous state
effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital
social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society,
including labor. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends
over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class
on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life
should have more in law. And the obligation to afford protection
to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive
branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a
living reality. Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and

the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that

justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at
least be approximated. TDcHCa
xxx xxx xxx
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint
in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad
discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power.
Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the
legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment.

But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a

fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons
favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial
scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view
would call for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike
down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it
enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the
unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or
one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down
regardless of the character or nature of the actor.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the
salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction
based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as
recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower
grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation
packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer,
low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the
SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file
employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while
employees higher in rank possessing higher and better education
and opportunities for career advancement are given higher
compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that
majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people
whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in
terms of job marketability, it is they and not the officers who
have the real economic and financial need for the
adjustment. This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to
free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services,
extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality
of life for all." Any act of Congress that runs counter to this
constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court
before it can pass muster. (Emphasis supplied)

Page |
6

Imbued with the same sense of "obligation to afford protection to labor", the Court in the
present case also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the
subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all
OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a
discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one
year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis
employment; cITCAa

local

workers with

fixed-period

OFWs with employment contracts of

less than one year vis--vis OFWs with
employment contracts of one year or
more
As pointed out by petitioner, 78 it was in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission 79 (Second Division, 1999) that the Court laid down the
following rules on the application of the periods prescribed under Section 10 (5) of R.A.
No. 804, to wit:
A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which
amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker,
i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or three (3) months' salary for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when
the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1)
year or more. This is evident from the words "for every year of the
unexpired term" which follows the words "salaries . . . for three
months". To follow petitioners' thinking that private respondent is
entitled to three (3) months salary only simply because it is the
lesser amount is to completely disregard and overlook some words
used in the statute while giving effect to some. This is contrary to
the well-established rule in legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a
statute, care should be taken that every part or word thereof be given
effect since the law-making body is presumed to know the meaning
of the words employed in the statute and to have used them
advisedly. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 80 (Emphasis supplied)
In Marsaman, the OFW involved was illegally dismissed two months into his 10month contract, but was awarded his salaries for the remaining 8 months and 6 days
of his contract.
Prior to Marsaman, however, there were two cases in which the Court made conflicting
rulings on Section 10 (5). One was Asian Center for Career and Employment System and

Services v. National Labor Relations Commission (Second Division, October

1998), 81 which involved an OFW who was awarded a two-year employment contract,
but was dismissed after working for one year and two months. The LA declared his
dismissal illegal and awarded him SR13,600.00 as lump-sum salary covering eight
months, the unexpired portion of his contract. On appeal, the Court reduced the award to
SR3,600.00 equivalent to his three months' salary, this being the lesser value, to wit:
Under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, a worker dismissed from
overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause is
entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less. SATDEI
In the case at bar, the unexpired portion of private respondent's
employment contract is eight (8) months. Private respondent should
therefore be paid his basic salary corresponding to three (3) months
or a total of SR3,600. 82
Another was Triple-Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission (Third Division, December 1998), 83 which involved an OFW (therein
respondent Erlinda Osdana) who was originally granted a 12-month contract, which was
deemed renewed for another 12 months. After serving for one year and seven-and-a-half
months, respondent Osdana was illegally dismissed, and the Court awarded her salaries
for the entire unexpired portion of four and one-half months of her contract.
The Marsaman interpretation of Section 10 (5) has since been adopted in the following
cases:
Case
Title Contract Period
Period Service Period in
of
the
Award
Skippers
Maguad 84

v. 6

Bahia 9
Shipping
Reynaldo
Chua 85

months 8

Centennial 9
Transmarine
dela Cruz l 86
Talidano
Falcon 87
Univan
CA 88

months 2

months 4
months 4

months 4

v. 12
v. 12

Oriental
v. 12
CA 89 months

of Unexpired Period
Applied
the
Computation
Monetary

months 3
months 3
months more

months 4
months 4

months 5

months 5

months
months
v.

months
v.

months 9

months 3

months

months 9

months 3

months

than

2 10

months 3

months

Page |
7

PCL v. 12 months more

NLRC 90 months months
Olarte
v. 12
months 21
Nayona 91 9 days
JSS
v. 12
months 16
Ferrer 92 24 days

than

2 more

days 11
days 11

or
months

months

less

93

months

contract, instead of US$14,000.00 for the unexpired portion of 14 months of his contract,
as the US$3,000.00 is the lesser amount.

and 3

months

and 3

months

The disparity becomes more aggravating when the Court takes into account jurisprudence
that, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042 on July 14, 1995, 97 illegally dismissed
OFWs, no matter how long the period of their employment contracts, were entitled to
their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. The matrix below speaks Page |
for itself:
8

Pentagon v. 12 months 9 months and 2 months and 2 months and

Adelantar 93 7 days 23 days 23 days
Phil.
Employ 12
v.
et al. 94 ECDHIc
Flourish 2
years 26
Maritime
v. 4
Almanzor 95 each
contract

months 10

days 23

months 2

months Unexpired
Paramio, portion

months
and 6
months
days 3
months
year

Athenna 1
year,
10 1
month 1
Manpower
v. months months
Villanos 96 and
28
days 28
contract

year,
96
months
and 3
months
days each
year

or
for
of
or
for
of

As the foregoing matrix readily shows, the subject clause classifies OFWs into two
categories. The first category includes OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of
less than one year; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to their salaries for the
entire unexpired portion of their contract. The second category consists of OFWs with
fixed-period employment contracts of one year or more; in case of illegal dismissal, they
are entitled to monetary award equivalent to only 3 months of the unexpired portion of
their contracts. IaSCTE
The disparity in the treatment of these two groups cannot be discounted. In Skippers, the
respondent OFW worked for only 2 months out of his 6-month contract, but was awarded
his salaries for the remaining 4 months. In contrast, the respondent OFWs
in Oriental and PCL who had also worked for about 2 months out of their 12-month
contracts were awarded their salaries for only 3 months of the unexpired portion of their
contracts. Even the OFWs involved in Talidano and Univan who had worked for a longer
period of 3 months out of their 12-month contracts before being illegally dismissed were
awarded their salaries for only 3 months.
To illustrate the disparity even more vividly, the Court assumes a hypothetical OFW-A
with an employment contract of 10 months at a monthly salary rate of US$1,000.00 and a
hypothetical OFW-B with an employment contract of 15 months with the same monthly
salary rate of US$1,000.00. Both commenced work on the same day and under the same
employer, and were illegally dismissed after one month of work. Under the subject
clause, OFW-A will be entitled to US$9,000.00, equivalent to his salaries for the
remaining 9 months of his contract, whereas OFW-B will be entitled to only
US$3,000.00, equivalent to his salaries for 3 months of the unexpired portion of his

Case
Title Contract Period
of Unexpired Period
Period Service Period the
of
the
Award
ATCI
v. 2
CA, et al. 98
Phil. 2
years 7
Integrated
NLRC 99

years 2
days 23
v. 23

months 22
months

Applied
in
Computation
Monetary

months 22
and 23
days 23

months

months
and
days

JGB
v. 2
NLC 100

years 9

months 15

months 15

months

Agoy
v. 2
NLRC 101

years 2

months 22

months 22

months

EDI
v. 2
NLRC,
et al. 102

years 5

months 19

months 19

months

months 8

months

Barros
NLRC,
et al. 103

v. 12

months 4

months 8

Philippine 12 months 6 months and 5 months and 5 months and

Transmarine
v. 22
days 18
days 18
days
Carilla 104
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the
unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their
monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform
rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of
their employment contracts. TaDSHC
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of
computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their
employment periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts have an
unexpired portion of one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage
of having their monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the

unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category
from such prejudice, simply because the latter's unexpired contracts fall short of one year.
Among
OFWs
Contracts of More Than One Year

With

Employment

Upon closer examination of the terminology employed in the subject clause, the Court
now has misgivings on the accuracy of the Marsaman interpretation.
The Court notes that the subject clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less" contains the qualifying phrases "every year" and
"unexpired term". By its ordinary meaning, the word "term" means a limited or definite
extent of time. 105 Corollarily, that "every year" is but part of an "unexpired term" is
significant in many ways: first, the unexpired term must be at least one year, for if it were
any shorter, there would be no occasion for such unexpired term to be measured by every
year; and second, the original term must be more than one year, for otherwise, whatever
would be the unexpired term thereof will not reach even a year. Consequently, the more
decisive factor in the determination of when the subject clause "for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" shall apply is not the length of
the original contract period as held in Marsaman, 106 but the length of the unexpired
portion of the contract period the subject clause applies in cases when the unexpired
portion of the contract period is at least one year, which arithmetically requires that the
original contract period be more than one year. EDCIcH
Viewed in that light, the subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination among
OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one year: those who are illegally
dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries
for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed with one
year or more remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the subject clause, and their
monetary benefits limited to their salaries for three months only.
To concretely illustrate the application of the foregoing interpretation of the subject
clause, the Court assumes hypothetical OFW-C and OFW-D, who each have a 24-month
contract at a salary rate of US$1,000.00 per month. OFW-C is illegally dismissed on the
12th month, and OFW-D, on the 13th month. Considering that there is at least 12 months
remaining in the contract period of OFW-C, the subject clause applies to the computation
of the latter's monetary benefits. Thus, OFW-C will be entitled, not to US$12,000.00 or
the latter's total salaries for the 12 months unexpired portion of the contract, but to the
lesser amount of US$3,000.00 or the latter's salaries for 3 months out of the 12-month
unexpired term of the contract. On the other hand, OFW-D is spared from the effects of
the subject clause, for there are only 11 months left in the latter's contract period. Thus,
OFW-D will be entitled to US$11,000.00, which is equivalent to his/her total salaries for
the entire 11-month unexpired portion.
OFWs vis--vis Local
With Fixed-Period Employment

Workers

As discussed earlier, prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the
monetary awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was
applicable even to local workers with fixed-term employment. 107

The earliest rule prescribing a uniform system of computation was actually Article 299 of
the Code of Commerce (1888), 108 to wit:
Article 299. If the contracts between the merchants and their shop
clerks and employees should have been made of a fixed period,
none of the contracting parties, without the consent of the other,
may withdraw from the fulfillment of said contract until the
termination of the period agreed upon.
Persons violating this clause shall be subject to indemnify the loss
and damage suffered, with the exception of the provisions contained
in the following articles.
In Reyes v. The Compaia Maritima, 109 the Court applied the foregoing provision to
determine the liability of a shipping company for the illegal discharge of its managers
prior to the expiration of their fixed-term employment. The Court therein held the
shipping company liable for the salaries of its managers for the remainder of their fixedterm employment. cAEaSC
There is a more specific rule as far as seafarers are concerned: Article 605 of the Code of
Commerce which provides:
Article 605. If the contracts of the captain and members of the crew
with the agent should be for a definite period or voyage, they cannot
be discharged until the fulfillment of their contracts, except for
reasons of insubordination in serious matters, robbery, theft,
habitual drunkenness, and damage caused to the vessel or to its
cargo by malice or manifest or proven negligence.
Article 605 was applied to Madrigal Shipping Company, Inc. v. Ogilvie, 110 in which the
Court held the shipping company liable for the salaries and subsistence allowance of its
illegally dismissed employees for the entire unexpired portion of their employment
contracts.
While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present, 111 Article 299 of the Code
of Commerce was replaced by Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, to wit:
Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and other laborers
hired for a certain time and for a certain work cannot leave or be
dismissed without sufficient cause, before the fulfillment of the
contract. (Emphasis supplied.)
Citing Manresa, the Court in Lemoine v. Alkan 112 read the disjunctive "or" in Article
1586 as a conjunctive "and" so as to apply the provision to local workers who are
employed for a time certain although for no particular skill. This interpretation of Article
1586 was reiterated in Garcia Palomar v. Hotel de France Company. 113 And in
both Lemoine andPalomar, the Court adopted the general principle that in actions for
wrongful discharge founded on Article 1586, local workers are entitled to recover
damages to the extent of the amount stipulated to be paid to them by the terms of their
contract. On the computation of the amount of such damages, the Court in Aldaz v.
Gay 114 held: ITDHcA

Page |
9

The doctrine is well-established in American jurisprudence, and

nothing has been brought to our attention to the contrary under
Spanish jurisprudence, that when an employee is wrongfully
discharged it is his duty to seek other employment of the same kind
in the same community, for the purpose of reducing the damages
resulting from such wrongful discharge. However, while this is the
general rule, the burden of showing that he failed to make an effort
to secure other employment of a like nature, and that other
employment of a like nature was obtainable, is upon the
defendant. When an employee is wrongfully discharged under a
contract of employment his prima facie damage is the amount
which he would be entitled to had he continued in such
employment until the termination of the period. (Howard vs.
Daly, 61 N. Y., 362; Allen vs. Whitlark, 99 Mich., 492; Farrell vs.
School District No. 2, 98 Mich., 43.) 115 (Emphasis supplied)
On August 30, 1950, the New Civil Code took effect with new provisions on fixed-term
employment: Section 2 (Obligations with a Period), Chapter 3, Title I, and Sections 2
(Contract of Labor) and 3 (Contract for a Piece of Work), Chapter 3, Title VIII, Book
IV. 116 Much like Article 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, the new provisions of the
Civil Code do not expressly provide for the remedies available to a fixed-term worker
who is illegally discharged. However, it is noted that in Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,
Inc. v. Rich,117 the Court carried over the principles on the payment of damages
underlying Article 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889 and applied the same to a case
involving the illegal discharge of a local worker whose fixed-period employment contract
was entered into in 1952, when the new Civil Code was already in effect. 118
More significantly, the same principles were applied to cases involving overseas Filipino
workers whose fixed-term employment contracts were illegally terminated, such as
inFirst Asian Trans & Shipping Agency, Inc. v. Ople, 119 involving seafarers who were
illegally discharged. In Teknika Skills and Trade Services, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 120 an OFW who was illegally dismissed prior to the expiration
of her fixed-period employment contract as a baby sitter, was awarded salaries
corresponding to the unexpired portion of her contract. The Court arrived at the same
ruling in Anderson v. National Labor Relations Commission, 121 which involved a
foreman hired in 1988 in Saudi Arabia for a fixed term of two years, but who was
illegally dismissed after only nine months on the job the Court awarded him salaries
corresponding to 15 months, the unexpired portion of his contract. In Asia World
Recruitment, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 122 a Filipino working as a
security officer in 1989 in Angola was awarded his salaries for the remaining period of
his 12-month contract after he was wrongfully discharged. Finally, in Vinta Maritime
Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 123 an OFW whose 12-month
contract was illegally cut short in the second month was declared entitled to his salaries
for the remaining 10 months of his contract.

In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment
who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their

money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired
portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the
adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of
one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in that
their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed
on local workers with fixed-term employment. DEAaIS

Page |

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in 10
the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally
discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion
of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local
workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification
of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the
Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and
determines whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive
means.
What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers
arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. 124 It is akin to the paramount
interest of the state 125 for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the
public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical standards, 126 or in
maintaining access to information on matters of public concern. 127
In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state
interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.
The OSG defends the subject clause as a police power measure "designed to protect the
employment of Filipino seafarers overseas . . . . By limiting the liability to three
months [sic], Filipino seafarers have better chance of getting hired by foreign
employers." The limitation also protects the interest of local placement agencies, which
otherwise may be made to shoulder millions of pesos in "termination pay". 128
The OSG explained further:
Often, placement agencies, their liability being solidary, shoulder
the payment of money claims in the event that jurisdiction over the
foreign employer is not acquired by the court or if the foreign
employer reneges on its obligation. Hence, placement agencies that
are in good faith and which fulfill their obligations are unnecessarily
penalized for the acts of the foreign employer. To protect them and
to promote their continued helpful contribution in deploying
Filipino migrant workers, liability for money are reduced under
Section 10 of RA 8042. IaHDcT
This measure redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers whose
welfare the government seeks to promote. The survival of legitimate
placement agencies helps [assure] the government that migrant

workers are properly deployed and are employed under decent and
humane conditions. 129 (Emphasis supplied)
However, nowhere in the Comment or Memorandum does the OSG cite the source of its
perception of the state interest sought to be served by the subject clause.
The OSG locates the purpose of R.A. No. 8042 in the speech of Rep. Bonifacio Gallego
in sponsorship of House Bill No. 14314 (HB 14314), from which the law
originated; 130but the speech makes no reference to the underlying reason for the
adoption of the subject clause. That is only natural for none of the 29 provisions in HB
14314 resembles the subject clause.
On the other hand, Senate Bill No. 2077 (SB 2077) contains a provision on money
claims, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to
the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days
after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of the complaint, the
claim arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue
of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
employment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and
other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal and the recruitment/placement agency
or any and all claims under this Section shall be joint and several.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on
any money claims exclusive of damages under this Section shall not
be less than fifty percent (50%) of such money
claims: Provided, That any installment payments, if applicable, to
satisfy any such compromise or voluntary settlement shall not be
more than two (2) months. Any compromise/voluntary agreement in
violation of this paragraph shall be null and void. TaDAHE
Non-compliance with the mandatory period for resolutions of cases
provided under this Section shall subject the responsible officials to
any or all of the following penalties:
(1) The salary of any such official who fails to render his
decision or resolution within the prescribed period shall
be, or caused to be, withheld until the said official
complies therewith;
(2) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or
(3) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to hold
any appointive public office for five (5) years.

Provided, however, That the penalties herein provided shall be

without prejudice to any liability which any such official may have
incurred under other existing laws or rules and regulations as a
consequence of violating the provisions of this paragraph.
But significantly, Section 10 of SB 2077 does not provide for any rule on the
computation of money claims.

Page |
A rule on the computation of money claims containing the subject clause was inserted 11
and eventually adopted as the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. The Court
examined the rationale of the subject clause in the transcripts of the "Bicameral
Conference Committee (Conference Committee) Meetings on the Magna Carta on OCWs
(Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill No. 2077 and House Bill No. 14314)." However,
the Court finds no discernible state interest, let alone a compelling one, that is sought to
be protected or advanced by the adoption of the subject clause.
In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a
compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against
OFWs under the subject clause.
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect
the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such
callous and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can never be a justification
for any form of government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes
the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of
private businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is
composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea
that private business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is
odious. EScIAa
Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of
placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are mechanisms already in
place that can be employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the
constitutional rights of OFWs.
The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of LandBased Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative disciplinary
measures on erring foreign employers who default on their contractual obligations to
migrant workers and/or their Philippine agents. These disciplinary measures range from
temporary disqualification to preventive suspension. The POEA Rules and Regulations
Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contains
similar administrative disciplinary measures against erring foreign employers.
Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of
aiding local placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign
principals.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative
of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.

Further, there would be certain misgivings if one is to approach the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the subject clause from the lone perspective that the clause directly
violates state policy on labor under Section 3, 131 Article XIII of the Constitution.
While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed self-executing, 132 there
are some which this Court has declared not judicially enforceable, Article XIII being
one, 133 particularly Section 3 thereof, the nature of which, this Court, in Agabon v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 134 has described to be not self-actuating:
Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security
of tenure may be deemed as self-executing in the sense that these
are automatically acknowledged and observed without need for any
enabling legislation. However, to declare that the constitutional
provisions are enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights
embodied therein, and the realization of ideals therein expressed,
would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view
presents the dangerous tendency of being overbroad and
exaggerated. The guarantees of "full protection to labor" and
"security of tenure", when examined in isolation, are facially
unqualified, and the broadest interpretation possible suggests a
blanket shield in favor of labor against any form of removal
regardless of circumstance. This interpretation implies an
unimpeachable right to continued employment a utopian notion,
doubtless but still hardly within the contemplation of the framers.
Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the parameters of
these guaranteed rights to ensure the protection and promotion, not
only the rights of the labor sector, but of the employers' as well.
Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at
a loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the
aims of the Constitution. cSCTEH

Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on its own,

be a source of a positive enforceable right to stave off the dismissal
of an employee for just cause owing to the failure to serve proper
notice or hearing. As manifested by several framers of the 1987
Constitution, the provisions on social justice require legislative
enactments for their enforceability. 135 (Emphasis added)
Thus, Section 3, Article XIII cannot be treated as a principal source of direct enforceable
rights, for the violation of which the questioned clause may be declared unconstitutional.
It may unwittingly risk opening the floodgates of litigation to every worker or union over
every conceivable violation of so broad a concept as social justice for labor.
It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow on the working
class any actual enforceable right, but merely clothes it with the status of a sector for
whom the Constitution urges protection through executive or legislative action
and judicial recognition. Its utility is best limited to being an impetus not just for the
executive and legislative departments, but for the judiciary as well, to protect the welfare

of the working class. And it was in fact consistent with that constitutional agenda that the
Court in Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, penned by then Associate Justice now Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, formulated the judicial precept that when the challenge to a statute is
premised on the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution
with special protection such as the working class or a section thereof the Court may
Page |
recognize the existence of a suspect classification and subject the same to strict judicial
12
scrutiny.
The view that the concepts of suspect classification and strict judicial scrutiny formulated
inCentral Bank Employee Association exaggerate the significance of Section 3, Article
XIII is a groundless apprehension. Central Bank applied Article XIII in conjunction with
the equal protection clause. Article XIII, by itself, without the application of the equal
protection clause, has no life or force of its own as elucidated in Agabon. aCTHDA
Along the same line of reasoning, the Court further holds that the subject clause violates
petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of property, consisting of
monetary benefits, without any existing valid governmental purpose. 136
The argument of the Solicitor General, that the actual purpose of the subject clause of
limiting the entitlement of OFWs to their three-month salary in case of illegal dismissal,
is to give them a better chance of getting hired by foreign employers. This is plain
speculation. As earlier discussed, there is nothing in the text of the law or the records of
the deliberations leading to its enactment or the pleadings of respondent that would
indicate that there is an existing governmental purpose for the subject clause, or even just
a pretext of one.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is
for that precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner's right to equal
protection, but also her right to substantive due process under Section 1, 137 Article III of
the Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the
entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant
to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
On the Third Issue
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis in
the computation of his monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that have been
stipulated into his contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10 (5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For
seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a
Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic
wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is
compensation for all work "performed" in excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday
pay is compensation for any work "performed" on designated rest days and
holidays.SAcCIH

By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the automatic inclusion of
overtime and holiday pay in the computation of petitioner's monetary award, unless there
is evidence that he performed work during those periods. As the Court held in Centennial
Transmarine, Inc. v. Dela Cruz, 138
However, the payment of overtime pay and leave pay should be
disallowed in light of our ruling in Cagampan v. National Labor
Relations Commission, to wit:
The rendition of overtime work and the submission of
sufficient proof that said was actually performed are
conditions to be satisfied before a seaman could be entitled
to overtime pay which should be computed on the basis of
30% of the basic monthly salary. In short, the contract
provision guarantees the right to overtime pay but the
entitlement to such benefit must first be established.
In the same vein, the claim for the day's leave pay for the
unexpired portion of the contract is unwarranted since the
same is given during the actual service of the seamen.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause "or for three months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in the 5th paragraph of Section
10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the
December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for the entire
unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days
computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month.
No costs.
||| (Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009)

Page |
13

[G.R. No. 175558. February 8, 2012.]

Name: Isidro L. Lata ETCcSa

Position: 4th Engineer

SKIPPERS UNITED PACIFIC, INC. and SKIPPERS MARITIME

SERVICES,
INC.,
LTD., petitioners, vs.
NATHANIEL
DOZA,
NAPOLEON DE GRACIA, ISIDRO L. LATA, and CHARLIE
APROSTA, respondents.

Contract Duration: 12 months

Basic Monthly Salary: US$600.00
Contract Date: 17 April 1998 15

The Case
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the 5 July 2006 Decision 1 and 7
November 2006 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88148. 3
This arose from consolidated labor case 4 filed by seafarers Napoleon De Gracia (De
Gracia), Isidro L. Lata (Lata), Charlie Aprosta (Aprosta), and Nathaniel Doza (Doza)
against local manning agency Skippers United Pacific, Inc. and its foreign principal,
Skippers Maritime Services, Inc., Ltd. (Skippers) for unremitted home allotment for the
month of December 1998, salaries for the unexpired portion of their employment
contracts, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Skippers, on the other
hand, answered with a claim for reimbursement of De Gracia, Aprosta and Lata's
repatriation expenses, as well as award of moral damages and attorney's fees.
De Gracia, Lata, Aprosta and Doza's (De Gracia, et al.) claims were dismissed by the
Labor Arbiter for lack of merit. 5 The Labor Arbiter also dismissed Skippers'
claims. 6 De Gracia, et al. appealed 7 the Labor Arbiter's decision with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), but the First Division of the NLRC dismissed the
appeal for lack of merit. 8 Doza, et al.'s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied
by the NLRC, 9 so they filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). 10
The CA granted the petition, reversed the Labor Arbiter and NLRC Decisions, and
awarded to De Gracia, Lata and Aprosta their unremitted home allotment, three months
salary each representing the unexpired portion of their employment contracts and
attorney's fees. 11 No award was given to Doza for lack of factual basis. 12 The CA
denied Skippers' Motion for Partial Reconsideration. 13 Hence, this Petition.
The Facts
Skippers United Pacific, Inc. deployed, in behalf of Skippers, De Gracia, Lata, and
Aprosta to work on board the vessel MV Wisdom Star, under the following terms and
conditions:
Name: Napoleon O. De Gracia
Position: 3rd Engineer
Contract Duration: 10 months
Basic Monthly Salary: US$800.00
Contract Date: 17 July 1998 14

Name: Charlie A. Aprosta

Position: Third Officer
Contract Duration: 12 months
Basic Monthly Salary: US$600.00
Contract Date: 17 April 1998 16
Paragraph 2 of all the employment contracts stated that: "The terms and conditions of the
Revised Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All Seafarers approved per
Department Order No. 33 and Memorandum Circular No. 55, both series of 1996 shall be
strictly and faithfully observed." 17 No employment contract was submitted for Nathaniel
Doza.
De Gracia, et al., claimed that Skippers failed to remit their respective allotments for
almost five months, compelling them to air their grievances with the Romanian Seafarers
Free Union. 18 On 16 December 1998, ITF Inspector Adrian Mihalcioiu of the Romanian
Seafarers Union sent Captain Savvas of Cosmos Shipping a fax letter, relaying the
complaints of his crew, namely: home allotment delay, unpaid salaries (only advances),
late provisions, lack of laundry services (only one washing machine), and lack of
maintenance of the vessel (perforated and unrepaired deck). 19 To date, however,
Skippers only failed to remit the home allotment for the month of December 1998. 20 On
28 January 1999, De Gracia, et al. were unceremoniously discharged from MV Wisdom
Stars and immediately repatriated. 21 Upon arrival in the Philippines, De Gracia, et al.
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter on 4 April 1999 and prayed
for payment of their home allotment for the month of December 1998, salaries for the
unexpired portion of their contracts, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees. 22
Skippers, on the other hand, claims that at around 2:00 a.m. on 3 December 1998, De
Gracia, smelling strongly of alcohol, went to the cabin of Gabriel Oleszek, Master of MV
Wisdom Stars, and was rude, shouting noisily to the master. 23 De Gracia left the
master's cabin after a few minutes and was heard shouting very loudly somewhere down
the corridors. 24 This incident was evidenced by the Captain's Report sent via telex to
Skippers on said date. 25
Skippers also claims that at 12:00 noon on 22 January 1999, four Filipino seafarers,
namely Aprosta, De Gracia, Lata and Doza, arrived in the master's cabin and demanded
immediate repatriation because they were not satisfied with the ship. 26 De Gracia, et al.
threatened that they may become crazy any moment and demanded for all outstanding

Page |
14

payments due to them. 27 This is evidenced by a telex of Cosmoship MV Wisdom to

Skippers, which however bears conflicting dates of 22 January 1998 and 22 January
1999. 28
Skippers also claims that, due to the disembarkation of De Gracia, et al., 17 other
seafarers disembarked under abnormal circumstances. 29 For this reason, it was
suggested that Polish seafarers be utilized instead of Filipino seamen. 30 This is again
evidenced by a fax of Cosmoship MV Wisdom to Skippers, which bears conflicting dates
of 24 January 1998 and 24 January 1999. 31
Skippers, in its Position Paper, admitted non-payment of home allotment for the month of
December 1998, but prayed for the offsetting of such amount with the repatriation
expenses in the following manner: 32
SeafarerRepatriation ExpenseHome AllotmentBalance
De GraciaUS$1,340.00US$900.00US$440.00
AprostaUS$1,340.00US$600.00US$740.00
LataUS$1,340.00US$600.00US$740.00
Since De Gracia, et al., pre-terminated their contracts, Skippers claims they are liable for
their repatriation expenses 33 in accordance with Section 19 (G) of Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) Memorandum Circular No. 55, series of 1996
which states:
G.A seaman who requests for early termination of his contract shall
be liable for his repatriation cost as well as the transportation cost of
his replacement. The employer may, in case of compassionate
grounds, assume the transportation cost of the seafarer's
replacement.
Skippers also prayed for payment of moral damages and attorney's fees. 34
The Decision of the Labor Arbiter
The Labor Arbiter rendered his Decision on 18 February 2002, with its dispositive
portion declaring: cDCEHa
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing herein
action for lack of merit. Respondents' claim for reimbursement of
the expenses they incurred in the repatriation of complainant
Nathaniel Doza is likewise dismissed.
SO ORDERED. 35
The Labor Arbiter dismissed De Gracia, et al.'s complaint for illegal dismissal because
the seafarers voluntarily pre-terminated their employment contracts by demanding for
immediate repatriation due to dissatisfaction with the ship. 36 The Labor Arbiter held that
such voluntary pre-termination of employment contract is akin to resignation, 37 a form
of termination by employee of his employment contract under Article 285 of the Labor
Code. The Labor Arbiter gave weight and credibility to the telex of the master of the

vessel to Skippers, claiming that De Gracia, et al. demanded for immediate

repatriation. 38 Due to the absence of illegal dismissal, De Gracia, et al.'s claim for
salaries representing the unexpired portion of their employment contracts was
dismissed. 39
The Labor Arbiter also dismissed De Gracia et al.'s claim for home allotment for
December 1998. 40 The Labor Arbiter explained that payment for home allotment is "in Page |
the nature of extraordinary money where the burden of proof is shifted to the worker who 15
must prove he is entitled to such monetary benefit." 41 Since De Gracia, et al., were not
able to prove their entitlement to home allotment, such claim was dismissed. 42
Lastly, Skippers' claim for reimbursement of repatriation expenses was likewise denied,
since Article 19 (G) of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 55, Series of 1996 allows the
employer, in case the seafarer voluntarily pre-terminates his contract, to assume the
repatriation cost of the seafarer on compassionate grounds. 43
The Decision of the NLRC
The NLRC, on 28 October 2002, dismissed De Gracia, et al.'s appeal for lack of merit
and affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision. 44 The NLRC considered De Gracia, et al.'s
claim for home allotment for December 1998 unsubstantiated, since home allotment is a
benefit which De Gracia, et al., must prove their entitlement to. 45 The NLRC also
denied the claim for illegal dismissal because De Gracia, et al., were not able to refute the
telex received by Skippers from the vessel's master that De Gracia, et al., voluntarily preterminated their contracts and demanded immediate repatriation due to their
dissatisfaction with the ship's operations. 46
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
The CA, on 5 July 2006, granted De Gracia, et al.'s petition and reversed the decisions of
the Labor Arbiter and NLRC, its dispositive portion reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED.
The Resolution dated October 28, 2002 and the Order dated August
31, 2004 rendered by the public respondent NLRC are ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. Let another judgment be entered holding private
respondents jointly and severally liable to petitioners for the
payment of:
1.Unremitted home allotment pay for the month of December, 1998
or the equivalent thereof in Philippine pesos:
a.De Gracia = US$900.00
b.Lata = US$600.00
c.Aprosta = US$600.00
2.Salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract or for
3 months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less, or the equivalent thereof in Philippine pesos:

a.De Gracia = US$2,400.00

We deny the petition and affirm the CA Decision, but modify the award.

b.Lata = US$1,800.00

For a worker's dismissal to be considered valid, it must comply with both procedural and
substantive due process. The legality of the manner of dismissal constitutes procedural
due process, while the legality of the act of dismissal constitutes substantive due
process. 56

c.Aprosta = US$1,800.00
3.Attorney's fees and litigation expenses equivalent to 10% of the
total claims.
SO ORDERED. 47
The CA declared the Labor Arbiter and NLRC to have committed grave abuse of
discretion when they relied upon the telex message of the captain of the vessel stating
that De Gracia, et al., voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts and demanded immediate
repatriation. 48 The telex message was "a self-serving document that does not satisfy the
requirement of substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify the conclusion that petitioners indeed
voluntarily demanded their immediate repatriation." 49 For this reason, the repatriation of
De Gracia, et al., prior to the expiration of their contracts showed they were illegally
dismissed from employment. 50 DaIACS
In addition, the failure to remit home allotment pay was effectively admitted by Skippers,
and prayed to be offset from the repatriation expenses. 51 Since there is no proof that De
Gracia, et al., voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts, the repatriation expenses are for
the account of Skippers, and cannot be offset with the home allotment pay for December
1998. 52
No relief was granted to Doza due to lack of factual basis to support his
petition. 53 Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total claims was granted since it
involved an action for recovery of wages or where the employee was forced to litigate
and incur expenses to protect his rights and interest. 54
The Issues
Skippers, in its Petition for Review on Certiorari, assigned the following errors in the CA
Decision:
a)The Court of Appeals seriously erred in not giving due credence
to the master's telex message showing that the respondents
voluntarily requested to be repatriated.
b)The Court of Appeals seriously erred in finding petitioners liable
to pay backwages and the alleged unremitted home allotment pay
despite the finding of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the
claims are baseless.
c)The Court of Appeals seriously erred in awarding attorney's fees
in favor of respondents despite its findings that the facts attending in
this case do not support the claim for moral and exemplary
damages. 55
The Ruling of this Court

Page |

Procedural due process in dismissal cases consists of the twin requirements of notice and
16
hearing. The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the
termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first notice apprises the employee of
the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second
notice informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. Before the
issuance of the second notice, the requirement of a hearing must be complied with by
giving the worker an opportunity to be heard. It is not necessary that an actual hearing be
conducted. 57
Substantive due process, on the other hand, requires that dismissal by the employer be
made under a just or authorized cause under Articles 282 to 284 of the Labor Code.
In this case, there was no written notice furnished to De Gracia, et al., regarding the cause
of their dismissal. Cosmoship furnished a written notice (telex) to Skippers, the local
manning agency, claiming that De Gracia, et al., were repatriated because the latter
voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts. This telex was given credibility and weight by
the Labor Arbiter and NLRC in deciding that there was pre-termination of the
employment contract "akin to resignation" and no illegal dismissal. However, as correctly
ruled by the CA, the telex message is "a biased and self-serving document that does not
satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence." If, indeed, De Gracia, et al., voluntarily
pre-terminated their contracts, then De Gracia, et al., should have submitted their written
resignations.
Article 285 of the Labor Code recognizes termination by the employee of the
employment contract by "serving written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in
advance." Given that provision, the law contemplates the requirement of a written notice
of resignation. In the absence of a written resignation, it is safe to presume that the
employer terminated the seafarers. In addition, the telex message relied upon by the
Labor Arbiter and NLRC bore conflicting dates of 22 January 1998 and 22 January 1999,
giving doubt to the veracity and authenticity of the document. In 22 January 1998, De
Gracia, et al., were not even employed yet by the foreign principal. For these reasons, the
dismissal of De Gracia, et al., was illegal.
On the issue of home allotment pay, Skippers effectively admitted non-remittance of
home allotment pay for the month of December 1998 in its Position Paper. Skippers
sought the repatriation expenses to be offset with the home allotment pay. However,
since De Gracia, et al.'s dismissal was illegal, their repatriation expenses were for the
account of Skippers and could not be offset with the home allotment pay.
Contrary to the claim of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC that the home allotment pay is in
"the nature of extraordinary money where the burden of proof is shifted to the worker
who must prove he is entitled to such monetary benefit," Section 8 of POEA

Memorandum Circular No. 55, series of 1996, states that the allotment actually
constitutes at least eighty percent (80%) of the seafarer's salary: ScCDET
The seafarer is required to make an allotment which is payable once
a month to his designated allottee in the Philippines through any
authorized Philippine bank. The master/employer/agency shall
provide the seafarer with facilities to do so at no expense to the
seafarer. The allotment shall be at least eighty percent (80%) of
the seafarer's monthly basic salary including backwages, if any.
(Emphasis supplied)
Paragraph 2 of the employment contracts of De Gracia, Lata and Aprosta incorporated
the provisions of above Memorandum Circular No. 55, series of 1996, in the employment
contracts. Since said memorandum states that home allotment of seafarers actually
constitutes at least eighty percent (80%) of their salary, home allotment pay is not in the
nature of an extraordinary money or benefit, but should actually be considered as salary
which should be paid for services rendered. For this reason, such non-remittance of home
allotment pay should be considered as unpaid salaries, and Skippers shall be liable to pay
the home allotment pay of De Gracia, et al., for the month of December 1998.
Damages
As admitted by Skippers in its Position Paper, the home allotment pay for December
1998 due to De Gracia, Lata and Aprosta is:
SeafarerHome Allotment Pay
De GraciaUS$900.00
AprostaUS$600.00
LataUS$600.00

is less, shall be awarded to the overseas Filipino worker, in cases of illegal dismissal.
However, in 24 March 2009, Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services and Marlow
Navigation Co., Inc., 58 the Court, in an En Banc Decision, declared unconstitutional the
clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" and
awarded the entire unexpired portion of the employment contract to the overseas Filipino
worker.

Nevertheless, since the termination occurred on January 1999 before the passage of the
amendatory RA 10022, we shall apply RA 8042, as unamended, without touching on the
constitutionality of Section 7 of RA 10022.
The declaration in March 2009 of the unconstitutionality of the clause "or for three
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in RA 8042 shall be
given retroactive effect to the termination that occurred in January 1999 because an
unconstitutional clause in the law confers no rights, imposes no duties and affords no
protection. The unconstitutional provision is inoperative, as if it was not passed into law
at all. 59
As such, we compute the claims as follows:
Seafarer Contract Contract Repatriation Unexpired Monthly Total
TermDateDateTermSalaryClaims
De Gracia10 months17 Jul. 199828 Jan. 19993 months & US$800US$2933.34
20 days
Lata12 months17
20 days

Apr.

199828

Jan.

19992

months

& US$600US$1600

The monthly salary of De Gracia, according to his employment contract, is only

US$800.00. However, since Skippers admitted in its Position Paper a higher home
allotment pay for De Gracia, we award the higher amount of home allotment pay for De
Gracia in the amount of US$900.00. Since the home allotment pay can be considered as
unpaid salaries, the peso equivalent of the dollar amount should be computed using the
prevailing rate at the time of termination since it was due and demandable to De Gracia,
et al., on 28 January 1999.

Given the above computation, we modify the CA's imposition of award, and grant to De
Gracia, et al., salaries representing the unexpired portion of their contracts, instead of
salaries for three (3) months.

Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act) provides for money claims
in cases of unjust termination of employment contracts:

Article 2219 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides for recovery of moral damages
in certain cases: HTDAac

In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or

authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest
of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
The Migrant Workers Act provides that salaries for the unexpired portion of the
employment contract or three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever

Page |

On 8 March 2010, however, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 (RA 10022) amended 17
Section 10 of the Migrant Workers Act, and once again reiterated the provision of
awarding the unexpired portion of the employment contract or three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

Aprosta12 months17 Apr. 199828 Jan. 19992 months & US$600US$1600

20 days

Art. 2219.Moral damages may be recovered in the following and

analogous cases:
(1)A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2)Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3)Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4)Adultery or concubinage;

(6)In actions for legal support;

(5)Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(7)In actions for the recovery of wages of household

helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(6)Illegal search;

(8)In

(7)Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8)Malicious prosecution;

(9)In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising

from a crime;

(9)Acts mentioned in Article 309;

(10)When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(10)Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28,

29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

(11)In any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused,

referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may
bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order
named.
Article 2229 of the Civil Code, on the other hand, provides for recovery of exemplary
damages:
Art. 2229.Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
In this case, we agree with the CA in not awarding moral and exemplary damages for
lack of factual basis.
Lastly, Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides for recovery of attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation:
Art. 2208.In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1)When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2)When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest;
(3)In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the
plaintiff;
(4)In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or
proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5)Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad
faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly
valid, just and demandable claim;

actions for indemnity under workmen's

compensation and employer's liability laws;

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be

reasonable.
Article 111 of the Labor Code provides for a maximum award of attorney's fees in cases
of recovery of wages:
Art. 111.Attorney's fees.
a.In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party may
be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the
amount of wages recovered. cHaDIA
b.It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept, in any
judicial or administrative proceedings for the recovery of
wages, attorney's fees which exceed ten percent of the
amount of wages recovered.
Since De Gracia, et al., had to secure the services of the lawyer to recover their unpaid
salaries and protect their interest, we agree with the CA's imposition of attorney's fees in
the amount of ten percent (10%) of the total claims.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 5 July 2006
with MODIFICATION. Petitioners Skippers United Pacific, Inc. and Skippers Maritime
Services, Inc., Ltd. are jointly and severally liable for payment of the following:
1)Unremitted home allotment pay for the month of December 1998 in its equivalent rate
in Philippine Pesos at the time of termination on 28 January 1999:
a.De Gracia = US$900.00
b.Lata = US$600.00
c.Aprosta = US$600.00
2)Salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract or its current equivalent in
Philippine Pesos:

Page |
18

a.De Gracia = US$2,933.34

b.Lata = US$1,600.00
c.Aprosta = US$1,600.00
3)Attorney's fees and litigation expenses equivalent to 10% of the total claims.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Perez, Sereno and Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Doza, G.R. No. 175558, February 08, 2012)
[G.R. No. 170029. November 21, 2012.]
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., AND RIZALINA
LAMSON, petitioners, vs. MARICEL N. BAJARO, PAMELA P.
MORILLA, DAISY L. MAGDAONG, LEAH J. TABUJARA, LEA M.
CANCINO, MICHIEL D. MELIANG, RAQUEL SUMIGCAY, ROSE R.
SARIA, LEONA L. ANGULO AND MELODY B. INGAL, respondents.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
Assailed in this Petition for Review is the August 22, 2005 Decision 1 and October 11,
2005 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87672 which
nullified and set aside the March 31, 2004 Decision 3 and September 22, 2004
Resolution 4 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and reinstated in
toto the July 12, 2002 Decision 5 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC OFW CASE No. (M) 0107-1366-00.
The Facts
It is undisputed that sometime in 1999, 6 petitioner company Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency, Inc. deployed respondents Maricel N. Bajaro (Bajaro), Pamela P. Morilla
(Morilla), Daisy L. Magdaong, Leah J. Tabujara, Lea M. Cancino, Michiel D. Meliang,
Raquel Sumigcay (Sumigcay), Rose R. Saria, Leona L. Angulo and Melody B. Ingal to
Taiwan to work as operators for its foreign principal, Mabuchi Motors Company, Ltd.
under individual two-year employment contracts, 7 with a monthly salary of Taiwan
Dollars (NT$) 15,840.00 each. Prior to their deployment, each respondent paid petitioner
company the amount of P47,900.00 as placement fee. cAISTC
However, after working for only a period of eleven (11) months and before the expiration
of the two-year period, respondents' employment contracts were terminated and they
were repatriated to the Philippines. This prompted the filing of a complaint for illegal
dismissal against petitioner company and its President and General Manager, individual
petitioner Rizalina Lamson, 8 with prayer for the payment of salaries and wages covering
the unexpired portion of their employment contracts in lieu of reinstatement, and with
allegations of illegal deductions and illegal collection of placement fees. Respondents

Bajaro, Morilla and Sumigcay likewise sought reimbursement of the amount they
personally expended for their plane tickets for their return flight, alleging that their
employment contracts provided for free transportation expenses in going to and from
Taiwan. Collectively, respondents prayed for the award of damages as well as attorney's
fees.
In defense, petitioners claimed that respondents were validly retrenched due to severe Page |
business losses suffered by their foreign principal. They denied the alleged deductions 19
amounting to NT$7,500.00 from petitioners' monthly salaries and that, consequently,
petitioners are not entitled to damages and attorney's fees.
The Labor Arbiter's Ruling
In its July 12, 2002 Decision, 9 the Labor Arbiter found respondents to have been
illegally dismissed for petitioners' failure to substantiate their defense of a valid
retrenchment. Hence, the Labor Arbiter granted respondents' money claims, citing
Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 10 as then applicable, 11 which provides:
Section 10.Money claims. . . .
The liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under
this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall
be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment
and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The
performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement
agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all
money claims or damages that may be awarded to the
workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical
being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as
the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily
liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid
claims and damages. SEIDAC
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or
duration of the employment contract and shall not be
affected by any substitution, amendment or modification
made locally or in a foreign country of the said contract.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary
agreement on money claims inclusive of damages under
this section shall be paid within four (4) months from the
approval of the settlement by the appropriate authority.
In case of termination of overseas employment without
just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or
contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three

(3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever

is less. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, petitioners were directed to pay each respondent, jointly and solidarily,
the amount of P47,900.00 as full reimbursement of their individual placement fees,
with an interest of 12% per annum; the amount of NT$47,520.00 each, representing
three (3) months' worth of their salary amounting to NT$15,840.00; the amount of
NT$7,500.00 which had been illegally deducted from respondents' monthly salaries;
the amount of NT$6,000.00 each as reimbursement for the transportation expenses
of respondents Bajaro, Sumigcay and Morilla in going home to the Philippines; and
attorney's fees of 10% of the total monetary award.
The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, respondents
SAMEER
OVERSEAS
PLACEMENT
AGENCY,
INCORPORATED and RIZALINA LAMZON, are hereby ordered
jointly and severally to: AEaSTC
(a)pay each complainant an amount equivalent to three (3) months
salary which is NT$47,520 or a total of FOUR
HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED TAIWAN DOLLARS (NT$475,200) or its
Philippine currency equivalent at the time of payment;
(b)pay each complainant NT$82,500.00 representing the amount
that has been illegally deducted from their salaries for a
period of eleven (11) months or a total of EIGHT
HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND TAIWAN
DOLLARS (NT$825,000) or its Philippine currency
equivalent at the time of payment;
(c)pay each complainant, Php47,900.00 by way of reimbursement of
placement fees or a total of FOUR HUNDRED
SEVENTY NINE THOUSAND PESOS (Php479,000.00)
plus twelve percent (12%) interest per annum;
(d)pay complainants MARICEL BAJARO, RAQUEL SUMIGCAY
and PAMELA MORILLA NT$6,000.00 as and by way of
reimbursement to their transportation expenses in going
home to the Philippines, or its Philippine currency at the
time of payment;
(e)pay attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total
monetary award.
SO ORDERED.
The NLRC's Ruling

On appeal, the NLRC vacated and set aside 12 the Labor Arbiter's Decision upon a
finding that all the requirements for a valid retrenchment have been established, thus, the
respondents were not illegally dismissed. Therefore, it found that the awards of salaries
corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contracts and the refund of placement fees
to be bereft of any basis in fact and in law. The award for the payment of the salary
deductions was also not considered for respondents' failure to substantiate it, and the
Page |
claim for reimbursement of expenses for the return flight of respondents Bajaro,
Sumigcay and Morilla was similarly disallowed, not having been raised as a cause of 20
action in their complaint. ESTDcC
Lastly, the NLRC absolved petitioner Lamson of any personal liability for dearth of
evidence showing that she acted in bad faith, following the oft-repeated principle that
corporate officers cannot be held jointly and severally liable for the obligations of a
corporation arising from employment-related claims.
Respondents sought reconsideration 13 of the NLRC's Decision, which was subsequently
denied in the Resolution 14 dated September 22, 2004.
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case via petition for certiorari before the CA which,
in its assailed August 22, 2005 Decision, 15 nullified and set aside the previous issuances
of the NLRC and reinstated in toto the July 12, 2002 Decision of the Labor Arbiter. The
CA concurred with the findings of the Labor Arbiter that petitioners failed to comply
with the substantive and procedural requirements to effect a valid retrenchment.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the Resolution 16 dated
October 11, 2005.
Issues Before the Court
In this petition for review, petitioners impute reversible error on the part of the CA in
nullifying the NLRC issuances and in reinstating in toto the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter, as the latter failed to take into consideration the principles of private international
law, which form part of the law of the land, as well as the labor standards laws of the
Republic of China, in resolving the complaint filed before it. Petitioners also contend that
the Labor Arbiter misconstrued and misapplied Section 10 of R.A. 8042.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit. aDACcH
At the outset, the Court notes that petitioners are raising before the Court for the first
time, the applicability of the principles of private international law and the labor
standards laws of the Republic of China in the proper interpretation of respondents'
employment contracts. Records show that petitioners never advanced this issue at the first
opportunity before the Labor Arbiter, and even in the subsequent proceedings before the
NLRC and the CA. Instead, petitioners' arguments consistently centered on the existence
of a valid retrenchment and compliance with the requirements to legally effect the same.
It bears stressing that issues not raised in the proceedings below cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal. 17 Specifically, points of law, theories and arguments not raised
before the appellate court will not be considered by the Court. 18

The Court, therefore, shall limit the resolution of this case on the sole question of whether
the Labor Arbiter's Decision, as reinstated in toto by the CA, properly applied and
interpreted Section 10 of R.A. 8042, the pertinent portions of which state:
Sec. 10.Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to
the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days
after filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employeremployee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for
actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
xxx xxx xxx
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, . . . (Emphasis
supplied) SCIAaT
Indisputably, respondents' illegal dismissal complaint with money claims is anchored on
the overseas employment contracts with petitioners and the allegations that they were
dismissed without just, valid or authorized cause. With these allegations, Section 10
afore-quoted clearly applies in this case. 19 As petitioners failed to establish a valid
retrenchment, respondents were clearly dismissed without just, valid or authorized cause.
Consequently, petitioner Lamzon is jointly and severally liable with petitioner company.
To reiterate, Section 10 of R.A. 8042 provides that "[i]f the recruitment/placement
agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors . . . shall themselves be
jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation . . ." for any claims and damages that
may be due to the overseas workers.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the Court finds that a modification of the
monetary award in the amount of NT$47,520.00 per respondent corresponding to
three (3) months' worth of salaries granted by the Labor Arbiter is in order,
conformably with the pronouncement in the case of Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services
and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc. 20 (Serrano case) where the Court En Banc declared
unconstitutional, for being violative of the Constitutionally-guaranteed rights to equal
protection and due process of the overseas workers, the clause "or for three months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" found in Section 10 of R.A. 8042,
which originally reads:
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest
of twelve percent (12%) per annum plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less. EIAHcC

In Skippers United Pacific, Inc. and Skippers Maritime Services, Inc. Ltd. v. Doza, 21 the
Court declared that an unconstitutional clause in the law, being inoperative at the outset,
confers no rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. Hence, even if
respondents' illegal dismissal occurred sometime in August 2000, 22 the declaration of
unconstitutionality found in the Serrano case promulgated in March 2009 shall
retroactively apply.

Page |

Since the unexpired portion of respondents' individual two-year contracts is still for 13 21
months, as they worked in Taiwan for a period of only 11 months, each respondent is
therefore entitled to a total amount of NT$205,920.00 23 or its current equivalent in
Philippine Peso, by way of unpaid salaries, in addition to the other monetary awards
granted by the Labor Arbiter.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals reinstating in toto the July 12, 2002 Decision of the Labor
Arbiter
isAFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION awarding
the
amount
of NT$205,920.00 or its current equivalent in Philippine Peso to each of the respondents
by way of unpaid salaries for the unexpired portion of their employment contracts. The
rest of the Decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Bajaro, G.R. No. 170029, November 21,
2012)

[G.R. No. 166803. October 11, 2012.]

for the minor Eimaereach Rose de Gracia Teringtering but was refused without any valid
cause. Hence, a complaint was filed against the petitioners.

CREWLINK, INC. and/or GULF MARINE SERVICES, petitioners, vs.

EDITHA TERINGTERING, for her behalf and in behalf of minor
EIMAEREACH ROSE DE GARCIA TERINGTERING, respondents.

Respondent claimed that in order for her husband's death to be compensable it is enough
that he died during the term of his contract and while still on board. Respondent asserted
that Jacinto was suffering from a psychotic disorder, or Mood Disorder Bipolar Type,
which resulted to his jumping into the sea and his eventual death. Respondent further Page |
asserted that her husband's death was not deliberate and not of his own will, but was a 22
result of a mental disorder, thus, compensable.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
the reversal of the Decision 1 dated July 8, 2004 and Resolution 2 dated January 17, 2005
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79966, setting aside the Resolutions
dated February 20, 2003 3 and July 31, 2003 4 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), which affirmed in toto the Decision 5 dated February 12, 2002 of
the Labor Arbiter.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Respondent Editha Teringtering (Teringtering), spouse of deceased Jacinto Teringtering
(Jacinto), and in behalf of her minor child, filed a complaint against petitioner Crewlink,
Inc. (Crewlink), and its foreign principal Gulf Marine Services for the payment of death
benefits, benefit for minor child, burial assistance, damages and attorney's fees.
Respondent alleged that her husband Jacinto entered into an overseas employment
contract with Crewlink, Inc. for and in behalf of its foreign principal Gulf Marine
Services, the details of which are as follows:
Duration of Contract :12 months
Position:Oiler
Basic Monthly Salary:US$385.00
Hours of Work:48 hrs./wk.
Overtime:US$115.50
Vacation Leave with pay:1 mo. leave after 12 months

For its part, petitioner Crewlink alleged that sometime on April 9, 2001, around 8:20 p.m.
while at Nasr Oilfield, the late Jacinto Teringtering suddenly jumped into the sea, but the
second engineer was able to recover him. Because of said incident, one personnel was
directed to watch Jacinto. However, around 10:30 p.m., while the boat dropped anchor
south of Nasr Oilfield and went on standby, Jacinto jumped off the boat again. Around
11:00 p.m., the A/B watchman reported that Jacinto was recovered but despite efforts to
revive him, he was already dead from drowning.
Petitioner asserted that Teringtering was not entitled to the benefits being claimed,
because Jacinto committed suicide. Despite the non-entitlement, however, Teringtering
was even given burial assistance in the amount of P35,800.00 and P13,273.00 on May 21,
2001. She likewise received the amount of US$792.51 representing donations from the
GMS staff and crew. Petitioner likewise argued that Teringtering is not entitled to moral
and exemplary damages, because petitioner had nothing to do with her late husband's
untimely demise as the same was due to his own doing.
As part of the record, respondent submitted Ship Captain Oscar C. Morado's report on the
incident, which we quote: *
At arround 2000 hrs. M/V Raja 3404 still underway to Nasr
Complex w/ 1 passenger. 2018 hrs. A/side Nasr Complex
boatlanding to drop 1 passenger At 2020 hrs. Mr. Jacinto Tering
Tering suddenly jump to the sea, while the boat cast off from Nasr
Complex boatlanding. And the second Engr. Mr. Sudarto jump and
recover Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering the oiler.

Point of Hire:Manila, Philippines

xxx xxx xxx
Teringtering claimed that before her husband was employed, he was subjected to a preemployment medical examination wherein he was pronounced as "fit to work." Thus, her
husband joined his vessel of assignment and performed his duties as Oiler.
On or about April 18, 2001, a death certificate was issued by the Ministry of Health of
the United Arab Emirates wherein it was stated that Jacinto died on April 9, 2001 due to
asphyxia of drowning. Later on, an embalming and sealing certificate was issued after
which the remains of Jacinto was brought back to the Philippines. IECAaD
After learning of the death of Jacinto, respondent claimed from petitioners the payment of
death compensation in the amount of US$50,000.00 and burial expenses in the amount of
US$1,000.00, as well as additional death compensation in the amount of US$7,000.00,

2040 hrs. Dropped anchor south of Nasr oilfield and standby. And
that time informed to GMS personnel about the accident, And we
informed to A/B on duty to watch Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering. 2230
hrs. The A/B watch man informed that Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering
jump again to the sea. And that time the wind NW 10-14 kts. and
strong current. And the second Engr. jump to the sea with life ring
to recover Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering. 2300 hrs. We recovered Mr.
Jacinto Tering Tering onboard the vessel and apply Respiration Kiss
of life Mouth to Mouth, And proceed to Nasr Complex to take
doctor.
2320 hrs. A/side Nasr Complex boatlanding and the doctor on-board
to check the patient. 2330 hrs. As per Nasr Complex Doctor the

patient was already dead. Then informed to GMS personnel about

the accident. HTCIcE
I Captain Oscar C. Morado certify this report true and correct with
the best of my knowledge and reserve the right, modify, ratify
and/or enlarge this statement at any time and place, According to
the law. 6
In a Decision dated February 12, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, after hearing, dismissed the
case for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter held that, while it is true that Jacinto
Teringtering died during the effectivity of his contract of employment and that he died of
asphyxiation, nevertheless, his death was the result of his deliberate or intentional
jumping into the sea. Thus, his death was directly attributable to him.
Teringtering then appealed before the NLRC which affirmed in toto the ruling of the
Labor Arbiter.
Unsatisfied, Teringtering filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of
Appeals and sought the nullification of the NLRC Resolution, dated February 20, 2003,
which affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision dated February 12, 2002.
On July 8, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the assailed Resolution of the NLRC, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated February
20, 2003 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents
Crewlink, Inc. and Gulf Marine Services are hereby DECLARED
jointly and severally liable and, accordingly, are directed to pay
deceased Jacinto Teringtering's beneficiaries, namely respondent
Editha Teringtering and her daughter Eimaereach Rose de Gracia,
the Philippine Currency equivalent to US$50,000.00, and an
additional amount of US$7,000, both at the exchange rate prevailing
at the time of payment.
SO ORDERED. 7
Thus, before this Court, Crewlink, Inc. and/or Gulf Marine Services, as petitioner, raised
the following issues:
I
WHETHER
A
SPECIAL
CIVIL
ACTION
OF CERTIORARI INCLUDES CORRECTION OF THE NLRC'S
EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE AND FACTUAL
FINDINGS BASED THEREON OR CORRECTION OF ERRORS
OF FACTS IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE NLRC;
II
WHETHER THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF SUPPOSEDLY
FAILING TO TAKE SUCH MEASURES FOR THE COMFORT

AND SAFETY OF THE DECEASED SEAFARER, AMONG

OTHERS, WHICH WERE ESPECIALLY EMPHASIZED IN THE
ASSAILED CA DECISION AND WHICH ACTUALLY
REFERRED TO ACTS COMMITTED BY THE SHIPMATES OF
THE DECEASED, BUT POSITIVELY ATTRIBUTED TO
PETITIONERS AND FOR WHICH THE LATTER ARE NOW
BEING HELD LIABLE ARE IN THE NATURE OF AN
ENTIRELY DIFFERENT SOURCE OF OBLIGATION THAT IS
PREDICATED ON QUASI-DELICT OR TORT AS PROVIDED
UNDER OUR CIVIL LAWS AND, THUS, HAS NO
REFERENCE TO OUR LABOR CODE; ITAaHc
III
WHETHER THE DEATH OF SEAFARER IN THIS CASE WAS
A RESULT OF A DELIBERATE/WILLFUL ACT ON HIS OWN
LIFE, AN ACT DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE
DECEASED, AND NO OTHER, AS FOUND AND SO RULED
BY THE LABOR ARBITER AND NLRC, AS TO RENDER HIS
DEATH NOT COMPENSABLE.
Petitioner claimed that Jacinto's death is not compensable, considering that the latter's
death resulted from his willful act. It argued that the rule that the employer becomes
liable once it is established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his employment
contract is not absolute. The employer may be exempt from liability if he can
successfully prove that the seaman's death was caused by an injury directly attributable to
his deliberate or willful act, as in this case.
We find merit in the petition.
In a petition for review on certiorari, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law
in the absence of any showing that the factual findings complained of are devoid of
support in the records or are glaringly erroneous. We are not a trier of facts, and this
applies with greater force in labor cases. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and
quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined
to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. They
are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or
where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the
evidence on record. This case is no different.
As found by the Labor Arbiter, Jacinto's jumping into the sea was not an accident but was
deliberately done. Indeed, Jacinto jumped off twice into the sea and it was on his second
attempt that caused his death. The accident report of Captain Oscar Morado narrated in
detail the circumstances that led to Jacinto's death. The circumstances of Jacinto's actions
before and at the time of his death were likewise entered in the Chief Officer's Log Book
and were attested to by Captain Morado before the Philippine Embassy. Even the A/B
personnel, Ronald Arroga, who was tasked to watch over Jacinto after his first attempt of
committing suicide, testified that despite his efforts to prevent Jacinto from jumping
again overboard, Jacinto was determined and even shoved him and jumped anew which
eventually caused his death.

Page |
23

Considering the foregoing, we do not find any reason to discredit the evidence presented
as well as the findings of the Labor Arbiter. Settled is the rule that factual findings of
labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their
jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts when
supported by substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. More so, when there is
no showing that said findings were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on
record.

The Court commiserates with the respondent, but absent substantial evidence from which
reasonable basis for the grant of benefits prayed for can be drawn, the Court is left with
no choice but to deny her petition, lest an injustice be caused to the employer. Otherwise
stated, while it is true that labor contracts are impressed with public interest and the
provisions of the POEA-SEC must be construed logically and liberally in favor of
Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels, still the
Page |
rule is that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of
24
established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence. 9

Likewise, the provisions of the Code of Commerce are certainly inapplicable in this case.
For precisely, the issue for resolution here is the obligation of the employer to its
employee should the latter die during the term of his employment. The relationship
between the petitioner and Jacinto is one based on contract of employment and not one of
contract of carriage. HTIEaS

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. SP No. 79966, dated July 8, 2004, and its January 17, 2005 Resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The February 20,
2003 and July 31, 2003 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission in
NLRC NCR OFW Case No. (M) 01-06-1144-00, affirming the February 12, 2002
Decision of the Labor Arbiter, are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

Under No. 6, Section C, Part II of the POEA "Standard Employment Contract Governing
the Employment of All Filipino Seamen On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels" (POEA-SEC),
it is provided that:
xxx xxx xxx
6.No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury,
incapacity, disability or death resulting from a willful act on his
own life by the seaman, provided, however, that the employer
can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is
directly attributable to him. (Emphasis ours)
Indeed, in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur during
the effectivity of the employment contract. The death of a seaman during the term of
employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. This
rule, however, is not absolute. The employer may be exempt from liability if it can
successfully prove that the seaman's death was caused by an injury directly attributable to
his deliberate or willful act.
In the instant case, petitioner was able to substantially prove that Jacinto's death was
attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by jumping into the sea. Meanwhile,
respondent, other than her bare allegation that her husband was suffering from a mental
disorder, no evidence, witness, or any medical report was given to support her claim of
Jacinto's insanity. The record does not even show when the alleged insanity of Jacinto did
start. Homesickness and/or family problems may result to depression, but the same does
not necessarily equate to mental disorder. The issue of insanity is a question of fact; for
insanity is a condition of the mind not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man
would know what goes on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's
mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an
accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately
acquainted with the person claimed to be insane, or who has rational basis to conclude
that a person was insane based on the witness' own perception of the person, or who is
qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. 8 No such evidence was presented to
support respondent's claim.

SO ORDERED.
||| (Crewlink, Inc. v. Teringtering, G.R. No. 166803, October 11, 2012)

[G.R. No. 171448. February 28, 2007.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
COMILA and AIDA COMILA, accused-appellants.

CHARLIE

On April 5, 1999, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, an Information 1 for
Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale by a syndicate, as defined and penalized
under Article 13(6) in relation to Articles 38 (b), 34 and 39 of Presidential Decree No.
442, otherwise known as the New Labor Code, as amended, was filed against Charlie
Comila, Aida Comila and one Indira Ram Singh Lastra, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of September, 1998, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and
mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously offer, recruit, and promise employment as contract
workers in Italy, to the herein complainants, namely: MARLYN
ARO y PADCAYAN, ANNIE FELIX y BAKISAN, ELEONOR
DONGGA-AS y ANGHEL, ESPERANZA BACKIAN y LAD-EY,
ZALDY DUMPILES y MALIKDAN, JOEL EDIONG y
CALDERON, RICKY WALDO y NICKEY, JEROME
MONTAEZ y OSBEN, DOVAL DUMPILES y SAP-AY,
JONATHAN NGAOSI y DUMPILES, EDMUND DIEGO y
SUBIANGAN and MARLON PETTOCO y SUGOT, without said
accused having first secured the necessary license or authority from
the Department of Labor and Employment.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Information was docketed in the RTC as Crim. Case No. 16427-R and raffled to
Branch 60 thereof.
On the same date April 5, 1999 and in the same court, twelve (12) separate
Informations 2 for Estafa were filed against the same accused at the instance of the same
complainants. Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 16428-R to 16439-R and likewise raffled
to the same branch of the court, the twelve (12) Informations for Estafa, varying only as
regards the names of the offended parties and the respective amounts involved, uniformly
recite:
That on or about the 10th day of November, 1998, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and
feloniously
defraud
one ZALDY
DUMPILES
Y
MALIKDAN by way of false pretenses, which are executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, as follows, to
wit: the accused knowing fully well that he/she/they is/are not
AUTHORIZED job RECRUITERS for persons intending to secure

work abroad convinced said Zaldy Dumpiles y Malikdanand

pretended that he/she/they could secure a job for him/her abroad, for
and in consideration of the sum of P25,000.00 and representing the
placement and medical fees when in truth and in fact could not; the
said Zaldy Dumpiles y Malikdan deceived and convinced by the
false pretenses employed by the accused parted away the total sum
of P25,000.00 in favor of the accused, to the damage and prejudice
of the said Zaldy Dumpiles y Malikdan in the aforementioned
amount of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00),
Philippine currency. EICSTa
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Of the three accused named in all the aforementioned two sets of Informations, only
accused Aida Comila and Charlie Comila were brought under the jurisdiction of the trial
court, the third, Indira Ram Singh Lastra, being then and still is at large.
Arraigned with assistance of counsel, accused Aida Comila and Charlie Comila entered a
plea of "NOT GUILTY" not only to the Information for Illegal Recruitment (Crim. Case
No. 16427-R) but also to the twelve (12) Informations for Estafa (Crim. Case Nos.
16428-R to 16439-R).
Thereafter, a joint trial of the cases ensued.
Of the twelve (12) complainants in both the illegal recruitment and estafa charges, the
prosecution was able to present only seven (7) of them, namely: Annie Felix y Bakisan;
Ricky Waldo y Nickey; Jonathan Ngaosi y Dumpiles; Marilyn Aro y Padcayan; Edmund
Diego y Subiangan; Jerome Montaez y Osben; and Eleonor Dongga-as y Anghel. A
certain Jose Matias of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) was
supposed to testify for the prosecution but his testimony was dispensed after the defense
agreed that he will merely testify to the effect that as per POEA records, accused Aida
Comila and Charlie Comila were not duly licensed or authorized to recruit workers for
overseas employment.
In a consolidated decision 3 dated October 3, 2000, the trial court found both accused
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment committed in
large scale by a syndicate, as charged in Crim. Case No. 16427-R, and of estafa, as
charged in Crim. Case Nos. 16430-R; 16431-R, 16432-R, 16434-R, 16436-R, 16438-R,
and 16439-R. The other informations for estafa in Crim. Case Nos. 16428-R, 16429-R,
16433-R, 16435-R and 16437-R were, however, dismissed for lack of evidence. We
quote the fallo of the trial court's decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby finds the
accused, Aida Comila and Charlie Comila:
1. In Criminal Case No. 16427-R, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale Committed by a Syndicate. They are hereby sentenced to
each suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
P100,000.00;

Page |
25

2. In Criminal Case No. 16430-R, GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa. There being no
mitigating and aggravating circumstances and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are hereby
sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. They shall
also jointly and severally pay the complainant, Marilyn Aro,
the sum of P25,500.00 plus interest from the date this
Information was filed until it is fully paid;
3. In Criminal Case No. 16431-R, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa. There being no
mitigating and aggravating circumstances and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are hereby
sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. They shall
also jointly and severally pay the complainant, Annie Felix, the
sum of P50,000.00 plus interest from the date this Information
was filed until it is fully paid;
4. In Criminal Case No. 16432-R, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa. There being no
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are hereby
sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. They shall
also jointly and severally pay the complainant, Eleanor
Dongga-as, the sum of P50,000.00 plus interest from the date
this Information was filed until it is fully paid;
5. In Criminal Case No. 16434-R, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa. There being no
mitigating and aggravating circumstances and applying the
provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are hereby
sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. They shall
also jointly and severally pay the complainant, Edmund Diego,
the sum of P25,000.00 plus interest from the date this
Information was filed until it is fully paid;
6. In Criminal Case No. 16436-R, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa. There being no
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are hereby
sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4)

years and two (2)months of prision correccional, as minimum,

to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. They shall
also jointly and severally pay the complainant, Jonathan
Ngaosi, the sum of P25,000.00 plus interest from the date this
Information was filed until it is fully paid;
7. In Criminal Case No. 16438-R, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa. There being no
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are hereby
sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum. They shall
also jointly and severally pay the complainant, Ricky Waldo,
the sum of P25,000.00 plus interest from the date this
Information was filed until it is fully paid;
8. In Criminal Case No. 16439-R, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa. There being no
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are hereby
sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum
to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. They shall
also jointly and severally pay the complainant, Jerome
Montaez, the sum of P25,000.00 plus interest from the date
this Information was filed; and
9. Criminal Cases Nos. 16428-R; 16429-R; 16433-R; 16435R and 16437-R are hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
In the service of the various prison terms herein imposed upon the
accused Aida Comila and Charlie Comila, the provisions of Article
70 of the Revised Penal Code shall be observed.
As to the accused, Indira Sighn Lastra, let all these cases be
archived in the meantime until the said accused is arrested.
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to a Notice of Appeal 4 filed by the two accused, the trial court forwarded the
records of the cases to this Court in view of the penalty of life imprisonment meted in
Crim. Case No. 16427-R (Illegal Recruitment in large scale). In its Resolution 5 of
October 3, 2001, the Court resolved to accept the appeal and the subsequent respective
briefs for the appellants 6 and the appellee 7 as well as the appellants' reply brief. 8
Thereafter, and consistent with its pronouncement in People v. Mateo, 9 the Court, via its
Resolution 10 of September 22, 2004, transferred the cases to the Court of Appeals (CA)
"for appropriate action and disposition." In the CA, the cases were assigned one docket
number and thereat docketed as CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 01615.

Page |
26

In a decision 11 promulgated on December 29, 2005, the appellate court affirmed that of
the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated October 3,
2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 60, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 16427-R to 16439-R finding accusedappellants guilty of (1) illegal recruitment committed in large scale;
and (2) seven (7) counts of estafa is hereby AFFIRMED and
UPHELD. AICDSa
With costs against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
The cases are again with this Court in view of the Notice of Appeal 12 interposed by the
herein accused-appellants from the aforementioned affirmatory CA decision.
Acting thereon, the Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desire.
In their respective manifestations, 13 the parties opted not to file any supplemental brief
and instead merely reiterated what they have said in their earlier appellants' and appellee's
briefs.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in the brief 14 it filed for appellee People,
summarizes the facts of the case in the following manner:
Annie Felix was introduced by her sister-in-law, Ella Bakisan, to
appellant Aida Comila in August 1998 (pp. 3, 24, tsn, September
14, 1999). Ella Bakisan told her that appellant Aida Comila could
help her find work abroad as she was recruiting workers for a
factory in Palermo, Italy (ibid.). Annie Felix then went to meet
appellant Aida Comila at the Jollibee outlet along Magsaysay
Avenue, Baguio City in August, 1998 to inquire about the supposed
work in Italy (pp. 3-4, tsn, ibid.). There were other applicants, aside
from Annie at the Jollibee outlet at the time, similarly inquiring
about the prospective jobs abroad (ibid.).
Annie met appellant again at the St. Theresa's College on or about
September 6 or 7, 1998 (p. 11, ibid.). there were around fifty (50) to
sixty (60) applicants at that time (ibid.). Appellant introduced them
to a certain Erlinda Ramos, one of the agents of Mrs. Indira Lastra,
a representative of the Far East Trading Corporation (p. 4, 11,ibid.).
Accordingly, Erlinda Ramos would be responsible for the
processing of the applicants' visas (ibid.). Erlinda Ramos even
showed them the copy of the job order from Italy (ibid.). Like
Ramos, appellant likewise introduced herself to Annie and the other
applicants as an agent of Lastra (pp. 3-4, ibid.).

Annie submitted all her requirements to appellant, along with the

amount of two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) as processing fee (p. 6,
tsn, ibid.). She also paid a total of twenty three thousand
(P23,000.00) as partial payment of her placement fee of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) on or about September 6 or 7, 1998.
Appellant issued a common receipt detailing the amounts she
received not only from Annie Felix (23,000.00) but also for her
fellow applicants, Zaldy Dumpiles (P23,000.00), Joel Ediong
(P25,000.00), and Ricky Baldo (P25,000.00) (p. 8, tsn, ibid.).
Annie went to Manila several times to complete her medical
examination as required (pp. 14-16, tsn, ibid.). Considering
appellant Aida Comila's pregnancy at that time, her husband Charlie
Comila, also an agent of Lastra, accompanied Annie and the other
applicants during their medical check-up (pp. 22-24, ibid.).
On the last week of October, 1998, Annie again paid appellant the
total amount of twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) to
complete her placement fee of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
Annie was told that her flight to Italy was scheduled on September
14, 1998 (p. 20, ibid.). Later on, Erlinda Ramos told Annie that her
flight to Italy was re-scheduled to October, 1998 due to a typhoon
(p. 20, ibid.).
There were others like Annie Felix who were similarly enticed to
apply for the promised job in Italy (pp. 4-5, tsn, September 22,
1999). Among them were Ricky Waldo, Edmund Diego, Eleanor
Donga-as, Jonathan Ngaosi, Marilyn Aro and Jerome Montaez (pp.
4-5; 19-28, tsn, September 22, 1999, afternoon session). AIDTSE
In the briefing at St. Theresa's College, Navy Road, Pacdal, Baguio
City, (p. 7, tsn, September 22, 1999; pp. 29-30, tsn, September 14,
1999) appellant briefed Ricky Waldo and the rest of the applicants
on their application requirements (pp. 7-8, tsn, Sept. 22, 1999). The
briefing was conducted by appellants Aida Comila, Charlie Comila,
and Erlinda Ramos who alternately talked about the documents to
be submitted for the processing of their applications and the
processing fee of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) they have to pay
(p. 8, tsn, September 22, 1999). In the same briefing, they were also
told that Erlinda Ramos was scheduled to go to Italy on September
14, 1998 and that whoever would pay P25,000.00 first, or half of the
P50,000.00 processing fee would be able to go with her to Italy (p.
8. tsn, September 22, 1999). Per the job order shown to Jonathan
Ngaosi, for instance, male workers were to receive a salary of two
thousand three hundred dollars ($2,300.00) plus an additional eight
dollars ($8.00) for overtime work (p. 8, tsn, September 21, 1999,
afternoon session).

Page |
27

After undergoing the required medical examination in Manila,

applicants Ricky Waldo and company paid the following amounts
for their respective processing fees, which were duly receipted by
appellant Aida Comila in three separate documents, thus:
"8-23-98, received the amount of P14,000.00 from Ella Bakisan.
Signed, Aida Comila. The second document again is a piece of
paper of which the following is written: 9-7-98. Received the
amount of the following: Philip Waldo, P20,000.00; Doval
Dumpiles, P23,000.00 Edmund Diego, P25,000.00; Jerome
Montaez, P25,000.00 Total P93,000.00. Received by A.
Comila. The 3rd document is 1/2 page of a yellow pad and it reads
9-7-98, received the following amounts from Zaldy Dumpiles
P23,000.00; Joel Ediong P25,000.00; Ricky Waldo
P25,000.00; Annie Felix P23,000.00; Marlon Tedoco
P23,000.00. Total P119,000.00. Received by Aida Comila;
witnesses Ella Bakisan. (p. 14, tsn, of witness Edmund Diego,
September 22, 1999, morning session).
Considering the payments they made, Ricky Waldo's flight to Italy
was scheduled on September 14, 1999 while those of Marilyn Aro,
Edmund Diego, Jerome Montanez, Jonathan Ngaosi, and Eleanor
Donga-as were scheduled on October 27, 1999 (pp. 8-9, tsn,
September 22, 1999; pp. 32-33, tsn, September 14, 1999; pp. 2-4,
tsn, September 15, 1999; p. 24, September 21, 1999; p. 10, tsn,
September 22, 1999, morning session; p. 27, tsn, September 22,
1999, afternoon session).
Like Annie Felix, Ricky Waldo's flight did not push through as
scheduled on September 14, 1999 (pp. 32-34, tsn, September 14,
1999; pp. 2-4, tsn, September 15, 1999). Appellant Aida Comila
explained that the re-scheduling was due to typhoon (ibid.). Ricky's
flight was then re-scheduled to October 7, 1999 but was again
moved to October 27, 1999 as, according to appellant Aida Comila,
there were some problems in his papers and that of the other
applicants (pp. 2-3, ibid.).
On October 25, 1998, appellant Aida Comila called the applicants
for a briefing at the St. Therese Building at the Navy Base, Baguio
City (p. 24, tsn, September 21, 1999). In the same briefing, Erlinda
Ramos, as representative of the supposed principal, Indira Lastra,
explained to the applicants that their flight on October 27, 1999 was
cancelled but will be re-scheduled (ibid.). Appellant Aida Comila
told them that they have to wait for the notice from the Italian
Embassy (ibid.).
On the first week of November, 1998, appellant Charlie Comila told
Marilyn Aro and several other applicants that their visas would be
released (p. 25, September, 21, 1999). Appellant Charlie Comila

accompanied them and the others to the Elco Building at Shaw

Boulevard, Pasig City purportedly to see Erlinda Ramos (p. 25, tsn,
September 21, 1999). When Erlinda Ramos arrived, she told
Marilyn and the other applicants to wait for the release of their
visas, the following day (p. 25, ibid.). Marilyn and the rest came
back each day for one whole week but the promised visas were not
released to them (ibid.). AaHcIT
Marilyn and the other applicants complained to appellant Charlie
Comila about the delay and told him of their doubts about their
application and the promised job in Italy (ibid.). At this point,
appellant Charlie Comila assured them that they should not worry
and that everything will be alright (ibid ). Appellant Charlie Comila
then brought them to Indira Lastra (p. 26, ibid.).
Marilyn Aro, Annie Felix, and the rest were all shocked to find out
that Indira Lastra was actually an inmate of Manila (Quiapo) city
jail. (p. 26, ibid.; p. 13, tsn, September 14, 1999). They felt at once
that they were, indeed, victims of illegal recruitment (ibid.).When
they demanded the return of their money from Indira Lastra, the
latter told them to withdraw their money from appellant Aida
Comila (p. 26. ibid.).
Upon their return to Baguio, Marilyn's group proceeded to appellant
Aida Comila's residence at Km. 6, La Trinidad, Benguet to demand
the return of their money (p. 27, tsn, ibid.). Appellant Aida Comila,
however, told them to wait as Indira Lastra will soon be out of jail
and will personally process their papers at the Italian Embassy
(ibid.). Marilyn and the other applicants followed-up several times
with appellant Aida Comila the return of the amounts of money they
paid for their supposed placement fee, but were simply told to wait
(ibid.). the last time complainants visited them, appellants Aida
Comila and Charlie Comila were already in a Bulacan jail (p.
27, ibid.).
In April, 1999, Marilyn Aro, Edmund Diego, Annie Felix, Eleanor
Donga-as, Jerome Montanez, Ricky Waldo and Jonathan Ngaosi
filed their complaint against appellants Aida Comila and Charlie
Comila before the Criminal Investigation Group (CIG).
In the same month of April 1999, separate Informations for estafa
and illegal recruitment committed in large scale by a syndicate or
violation of Article 13 (b) in relation to Article 38 (b) 34, and 39
of P.D. No. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines were filed against appellants Charlie Comila, Aida
Comila and Indira Lastra.
In their appellants' brief, accused-appellants would fault the two courts below in (1)
finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment and
estafa; and (2) totally disregarding the defense of denial "honestly advanced" by them.

Page |
28

It is not disputed that accused-appellants Charlie Comila and Aida Comila are husbandand-wife. Neither is it disputed that husband and wife knew and are well-acquainted with
their co-accused, Indira Ram Singh Lastra, and one Erlinda Ramos. It is their posture,
however, that from the very beginning, appellant Aida Comila never professed that she
had the authority to recruit and made it clear to the applicants for overseas employment
that it was Erlinda Ramos who had such authority and who issued the job orders from
Italy. Upon this premise, this appellant contends that the subsequent transactions she had
with the applicants negate the presence of deceit, an essential element of estafa under
paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. On the charge of illegal
recruitment, this appellant argues that "she was merely trying to help the applicants to
process their papers, believing that Indira Ram Sighn Lastra and Erlinda Ramos would
really send the applicants to Italy." With respect to co-appellant Charlie Comila, the
defense submits that the prosecution "miserably failed to prove his participation in the
illegal recruitment and estafa."
The appeal must fail.
After a careful and circumspect review of the records, we are fully convinced that both
the trial and appellate courts committed no error in finding both appellants guilty beyond
moral certainty of doubt of the crimes charged against them. Through the respective
testimonies of its witnesses, the prosecution has satisfactorily established that both
appellants were then engaged in unlawful recruitment and placement activities. The
combined testimonies of the prosecution witnesses point to appellant Aida Comila as the
one who promised them foreign employment and assured them of placement overseas
through the help of their co-accused Indira Ram Singh Lastra. For sure, it was Aida
herself who informed them of the existence of job orders from Palermo, Italy, and of the
documents needed for the processing of their applications. Aida, in fact, accompanied the
applicants to undergo medical examinations in Manila. And relying completely on Aida's
representations, the applicants-complainants entrusted their money to her only to discover
later that their hopes for an overseas employment were but vain. In the words of the trial
court:
Aida Comila cannot escape culpability by the mere assertion that
the recruitment activities were done by Ella Bakisan, Erlinda Ramos
and Indira Lastra as if she was just a mere observer of the activities
going on right under her nose, especially so that the seven
complainants who testified all pointed to her as their recruiter. She
could not adequately explain why: (1) she had to show and explain
the job order and the work and travel requirements to the
complainants; (2) she had to meet the complainants at Jollibee,
Magsaysay Ave., Baguio City and in her residence; (3) she had to
be present at the briefings for the applicants; (4) she received the
placement fees even if she claims that she received them from Ella
Bakisan; (5) she had to go down to Manila and accompanied the
complainants for their medical examination; and (6) she had to go
out of her way to do all these things even when she was pregnant
and was about to give birth. Certainly, she was not a social worker
or a humanitarian who had all the time in this world to go out of her
way to render free services to other people whom she did not know

or just met. To be sure, Aida Comila had children to attend to and a

husband who was unemployed to be able to conduct such timeconsuming charitable activities. 15
Running in parallel vein is what the CA wrote in its appealed decision: 16
As regards appellant Aida Comila's contention that she did not
represent herself as a licensed recruiter, and that she merely helped
complainants avail of the job opportunity on the belief that Indira
Lastra and Erlinda Ramos would really send them to Italy, the same
hardly deserves merit. The crime of illegal recruitment is committed
when, among other things, a person who, without being duly
authorized according to law represents or gives the distinct
impression that he or she has the power or the ability to provide
work abroad convincing those to whom the representation is made
or to whom the impression is given to thereupon part with their
money in order to be assured of that employment. EaSCAH
In fact, even if there is no consideration involved, appellant will still
be deemed as having engaged in recruitment activities, since it was
sufficiently demonstrated that she promised overseas employment to
private complainants. To be engaged in the practice and placement,
it is plain that there must at least be a promise or offer of an
employment from the person posing as a recruiter whether locally or
abroad.
As regards appellant Charlie Comila, it is inconceivable for him to feign ignorance of the
illegal recruitment activities of his wife Aida, and of his lack of participation therein.
Again, we quote with approval what the trial court has said in its decision: 17
Charlie Comila could not, likewise, feign ignorance of the illegal
transactions. It is contrary to human experience, hence, highly
incredible for a husband not to have known the activities of his wife
who was living with him under the same roof. In fact, he admitted
that when Aida gave birth, he had to accompany the complainants to
Manila for their medical examination and again, on another trip, to
bring them to the office of Erlinda Ramos to follow-up their visas.
The fact that he knew the ins and outs of Manila was a desperate
excuse or reason why he accompanied the complainants to Manila
considering that, as he and his wife claimed, they have nothing to do
with the recruitment activities. Furthermore, if he and his wife had
nothing to do with the recruitment of the complainants, why did he
have to sign the letter and accommodate the request of Myra Daluca
whom they have not really known. But damning was his statement
that he signed the letter because Aida was not there to sign it. Such a
statement would only show that they were indeed parties to these
illegal transactions. Charlie Comila would even claim that he was
just an elementary graduate and so he did not understand what he
was asked to sign. But his booking sheet showed that he was a high

Page |
29

school graduate. He was a conductor of a bus company who should

know and understand how to read and write. Furthermore, he was
already a grown up man in his thirties who knew what was right and
wrong and what he should or should not do.
It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for
both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is malum in se. In the first, the criminal
intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such an intent is
imperative. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, is
committed by any person who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely
pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of fraud. 18 Here, it has been sufficiently proven
that both appellants represented themselves to the complaining witnesses to have the
capacity to send them to Italy for employment, even as they do not have the authority or
license for the purpose. Doubtless, it is this misrepresentation that induced the
complainants to part with their hard-earned money for placement and medical fees. Such
act on the part of the appellants clearly constitutes estafa under Article 315, paragraph
(2), of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellants next bewail the alleged total disregard by the two courts below their defense
of denial which, had it been duly considered and appreciated, could have merited their
acquittal.
The Court disagrees. The two courts below did consider their defense of denial. However,
given the positive and categorical testimonies of the complainants who were one in
pointing to appellants, in cahoots with their co-accused Indira Ram Singh Lastra, as
having recruited and promised them with overseas employment, appellants' defense of
denial must inevitably collapse. IAcDET
All told, we rule and so hold that the two courts below committed no error in adjudging
both appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment
committed by a syndicate in large scale and of estafa in seven (7) counts. We also rule
that the penalties imposed by the court of origin, as affirmed by the CA, accord with law
and jurisprudence.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision of
the CA, affirmatory of that the trial court, is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Comila, G.R. No. 171448, February 28, 2007)

Page |
30

[G.R. No. 169076. January 23, 2007.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
JOSEPH JAMILOSA, appellant.

This is an appeal from the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City
in Criminal Case No. Q-97-72769 convicting appellant Joseph Jamilosa of large scale
illegal recruitment under Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, and
sentencing him to life imprisonment and to pay a P500,000.00 fine.
The Information charging appellant with large scale illegal recruitment was filed by the
Senior State Prosecutor on August 29, 1997. The inculpatory portion of the Information
reads:
That sometime in the months of January to February, 1996, or
thereabout in the City of Quezon, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, representing to have
the capacity, authority or license to contract, enlist and deploy or
transport workers for overseas employment, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally recruit, contract and promise to
deploy, for a fee the herein complainants, namely, Haide R. Ruallo,
Imelda D. Bamba, Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E. Singh, for
work or employment in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in Nursing
Home and Care Center without first obtaining the required license
and/or authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA).
Contrary to law. 2
On arraignment, the appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The case for the prosecution, as synthesized by the Court of Appeals (CA), is as follows:
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: private
complainants Imelda D. Bamba, Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E.
Singh.
Witness Imelda D. Bamba testified that on January 17, 1996, she
met the appellant in Cubao, Quezon City on board an aircon bus.
She was on her way to Shoemart (SM), North EDSA, Quezon City
where she was working as a company nurse. The appellant was
seated beside her and introduced himself as a recruiter of workers
for employment abroad. The appellant told her that his sister is a
head nurse in a nursing home in Los Angeles, California, USA and
he could help her get employed as a nurse at a monthly salary of
Two Thousand US Dollars ($2,000.00) and that she could leave in
two (2) weeks time. He further averred that he has connections with
the US Embassy, being a US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

agent on official mission in the Philippines for one month.

According to the appellant, she has to pay the amount of US$300.00
intended for the US consul. The appellant gave his pager number
and instructed her to contact him if she is interested to apply for a
nursing job abroad.
On January 21, 1996, the appellant fetched her at her office. They
then went to her house where she gave him the photocopies of her
transcript of records, diploma, Professional Regulatory Commission
(PRC) license and other credentials. On January 28 or 29, 1996, she
handed to the appellant the amount of US$300.00 at the McDonalds
outlet in North EDSA, Quezon City, and the latter showed to her a
photocopy of her supposed US visa. The appellant likewise got
several pieces of jewelry which she was then selling and assured her
that he would sell the same at the US embassy. However, the
appellant did not issue a receipt for the said money and jewelry.
Thereafter, the appellant told her to resign from her work at SM
because she was booked with Northwest Airlines and to leave for
Los Angeles, California, USA on February 25, 1996.
The appellant promised to see her and some of his other recruits
before their scheduled departure to hand to them their visas and
passports; however, the appellant who was supposed to be with
them in the flight failed to show up. Instead, the appellant called and
informed her that he failed to give the passport and US visa because
he had to go to the province because his wife died. She and her
companions were not able to leave for the United States. They went
to the supposed residence of the appellant to verify, but nobody
knew him or his whereabouts. They tried to contact him at the hotel
where he temporarily resided, but to no avail. They also inquired
from the US embassy and found out that there was no such person
connected with the said office. Thus, she decided to file a complaint
with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Prosecution witness Geraldine Lagman, for her part, testified that
she is a registered nurse by profession. In the morning of January
22, 1996, she went to SM North EDSA, Quezon City to visit her
cousin Imelda Bamba. At that time, Bamba informed her that she
was going to meet the appellant who is an FBI agent and was
willing to help nurses find a job abroad. Bamba invited Lagman to
go with her. On the same date at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
she and Bamba met the appellant at the SM Fast-Food Center,
Basement, North EDSA, Quezon City. The appellant convinced
them of his ability to send them abroad and told them that he has a
sister in the United States. Lagman told the appellant that she had no
working experience in any hospital but the appellant assured her
that it is not necessary to have one. The appellant asked for
US$300.00 as payment to secure an American visa and an

Page |
31

additional amount of Three Thousand Four Hundred Pesos

(P3,400.00) as processing fee for other documents.
On January 24, 1996, she and the appellant met again at SM North
EDSA, Quezon City wherein she handed to the latter her passport
and transcript of records. The appellant promised to file the said
documents with the US embassy. After one (1) week, they met
again at the same place and the appellant showed to her a photocopy
of her US visa. This prompted her to give the amount of US$300.00
and two (2) bottles of Black Label to the appellant. She gave the
said money and liquor to the appellant without any receipt out of
trust and after the appellant promised her that he would issue the
necessary receipt later. The appellant even went to her house, met
her mother and uncle and showed to them a computer printout from
Northwest Airlines showing that she was booked to leave for Los
Angeles, California, USA on February 25, 1996. cTDaEH
Four days after their last meeting, Extelcom, a telephone company,
called her because her number was appearing in the appellant's
cellphone documents. The caller asked if she knew him because
they were trying to locate him, as he was a swindler who failed to
pay his telephone bills in the amount of P100,000.00. She became
suspicious and told Bamba about the matter. One (1) week before
her scheduled flight on February 25, 1996, they called up the
appellant but he said he could not meet them because his mother
passed away. The appellant never showed up, prompting her to file
a complaint with the NBI for illegal recruitment.
Lastly, witness Alma Singh who is also a registered nurse, declared
that she first met the appellant on February 13, 1996 at SM North
EDSA, Quezon City when Imelda Bamba introduced the latter to
her. The appellant told her that he is an undercover agent of the FBI
and he could fix her US visa as he has a contact in the US embassy.
The appellant told her that he could help her and her companions
Haidee Raullo, Geraldine Lagman and Imelda Bamba find jobs in
the US as staff nurses in home care centers.
On February 14, 1996 at about 6:30 in the evening, the appellant got
her passport and picture. The following day or on February 15,
1996, she gave the appellant the amount of US$300.00 and a bottle
of cognac as "grease money" to facilitate the processing of her visa.
When she asked for a receipt, the appellant assured her that there is
no need for one because she was being directly hired as a nurse in
the United States.
She again met the appellant on February 19, 1996 at the Farmers
Plaza and this time, the appellant required her to submit photocopies
of her college diploma, nursing board certificate and PRC license.
To show his sincerity, the appellant insisted on meeting her father.

They then proceeded to the office of her father in Barrio Ugong,

Pasig City and she introduced the appellant. Thereafter, the
appellant asked permission from her father to allow her to go with
him to the Northwest Airlines office in Ermita, Manila to reserve
airline tickets. The appellant was able to get a ticket confirmation
and told her that they will meet again the following day for her to
give P10,000.00 covering the half price of her plane ticket. Singh
did not meet the appellant as agreed upon. Instead, she went to
Bamba to inquire if the latter gave the appellant the same amount
and found out that Bamba has not yet given the said amount. They
then paged the appellant through his beeper and told him that they
wanted to see him. However, the appellant avoided them and
reasoned out that he could not meet them as he had many things to
do. When the appellant did not show up, they decided to file a
complaint for illegal recruitment with the NBI.
The prosecution likewise presented the following documentary
evidence:
Exh. "A" Certification dated February 23, 1998 issued
by Hermogenes C. Mateo, Director II, Licensing Branch,
POEA.
Exh. "B" Affidavit of Alma E. Singh dated February
23, 1996. 3
On the other hand, the case for the appellant, as culled from his Brief, is as follows:
Accused JOSEPH JAMILOSA testified on direct examination that
he got acquainted with Imelda Bamba inside an aircon bus bound
for Caloocan City when the latter borrowed his cellular phone to
call her office at Shoe Mart (SM), North Edsa, Quezon City. He
never told Bamba that he could get her a job in Los Angeles,
California, USA, the truth being that she wanted to leave SM as
company nurse because she was having a problem thereat. Bamba
called him up several times, seeking advice from him if Los
Angeles, California is a good place to work as a nurse. He started
courting Bamba and they went out dating until the latter became his
girlfriend. He met Geraldine Lagman and Alma Singh at the Shoe
Mart (SM), North Edsa, Quezon City thru Imelda Bamba. As
complainants were all seeking advice on how they could apply for
jobs abroad, lest he be charged as a recruiter, he made Imelda
Bamba, Geraldine Lagman and Alma Singh sign separate
certifications on January 17, 1996 (Exh. "2"), January 22, 1996
(Exh. "4"), and February 19, 1996 (Exh. "3"), respectively, all to the
effect that he never recruited them and no money was involved.
Bamba filed an Illegal Recruitment case against him because they
quarreled and separated. He came to know for the first time that
charges were filed against him in September 1996 when a

Page |
32

preliminary investigation was conducted by Fiscal Daosos of the

Department of Justice. (TSN, October 13, 1999, pp. 3-9 and TSN,
December 8, 1999, pp. 2-9) 4

On November 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. 5 The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in large scale;
accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00), plus costs.
Accused is ordered to indemnify each of the complainants, Imelda
Bamba, Geraldine Lagman and Alma Singh the amount of Three
Hundred US Dollars ($300.00).
SO ORDERED. 6
In rejecting the defenses of the appellant, the trial court declared:
To counter the version of the prosecution, accused claims that he
did not recruit the complainants for work abroad but that it was they
who sought his advice relative to their desire to apply for jobs in
Los Angeles, California, USA and thinking that he might be
charged as a recruiter, he made them sign three certifications, Exh.
"2," "3" and "4," which in essence state that accused never recruited
them and that there was no money involved.
Accused's contention simply does not hold water. Admittedly, he
executed and submitted a counter-affidavit during the preliminary
investigation at the Department of Justice, and that he never
mentioned the aforesaid certifications, Exhibits 2, 3 and 4 in said
counter-affidavit. These certifications were allegedly executed
before charges were filed against him. Knowing that he was already
being charged for prohibited recruitment, why did he not bring out
these certifications which were definitely favorable to him, if the
same were authentic. It is so contrary to human nature that one
would suppress evidence which would belie the charge against him.
Denials of the accused can not stand against the positive and
categorical narration of each complainant as to how they were
recruited by accused who had received some amounts from them for
the processing of their papers. Want of receipts is not fatal to the
prosecution's case, for as long as it has been shown, as in this case,
that accused had engaged in prohibited recruitment. (People v.
Pabalan, 262 SCRA 574).

That accused is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers

for overseas employment, is shown in the Certification issued by
POEA, Exh. "A."
In fine, the offense committed by the accused is Illegal Recruitment
in large scale, it having been committed against three (3) persons,
individually. 7
Appellant appealed the decision to this Court on the following assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
IN LARGE SCALE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE LATTER'S
GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
BY THE PROSECUTION. 8
According to appellant, the criminal Information charging him with illegal recruitment
specifically mentioned the phrase "for a fee," and as such, receipts to show proof of
payment are indispensable. He pointed out that the three (3) complaining witnesses did
not present even one receipt to prove the alleged payment of any fee. In its eagerness to
cure this "patent flaw," the prosecution resorted to presenting the oral testimonies of
complainants which were "contrary to the ordinary course of nature and ordinary habits
of life [under Section 3 (y), Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence] and defied credulity."
Appellant also pointed out that complainants' testimony that they paid him but no receipts
were issued runs counter to the presumption under Section [3] (d), Rule 131 of the Rules
on Evidence that persons take ordinary care of their concern. The fact that complainants
were not able to present receipts lends credence to his allegation that it was they who
sought advice regarding their desire to apply for jobs in Los Angeles, California, USA.
Thus, thinking that he might be charged as a recruiter, he made them sign three (3)
certifications stating that he never recruited them and there was no money involved. On
the fact that the trial court disregarded the certifications due to his failure to mention
them during the preliminary investigation at the Department of Justice (DOJ), appellant
pointed out that there is no provision in the Rules of Court which bars the presentation of
evidence during the hearing of the case in court. He also pointed out that the counteraffidavit was prepared while he was in jail "and probably not assisted by a lawyer." 9
Appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that the absence
of receipts signed by appellant acknowledging receipt of the money and liquor from the
complaining witnesses cannot defeat the prosecution and conviction for illegal
recruitment. The OSG insisted that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of
appellant beyond reasonable doubt via the collective testimonies of the complaining
witnesses, which the trial court found credible and deserving of full probative weight. It
pointed out that appellant failed to prove any ill-motive on the part of the complaining
witnesses to falsely charge him of illegal recruitment. cASEDC
On appellant's claim that the complaining witness Imelda Bamba was his girlfriend, the
OSG averred:
Appellant's self-serving declaration that Imelda is his girlfriend and
that she filed a complaint for illegal recruitment after they quarreled

Page |
33

and separated is simply preposterous. No love letters or other

documentary evidence was presented by appellant to substantiate
such claim which could be made with facility. Imelda has no reason
to incriminate appellant except to seek justice. The evidence shows
that Alma and Geraldine have no previous quarrel with appellant.
Prior to their being recruited by appellant, Alma and Geraldine have
never met appellant. It is against human nature and experience for
private complainants to conspire and accuse a stranger of a most
serious crime just to mollify their hurt feelings. (People v. Coral,
230 SCRA 499, 510 [1994]) 10
The OSG posited that the appellant's reliance on the certifications 11 purportedly signed
by the complaining witnesses is misplaced, considering that the certifications are barren
of probative weight.
On February 23, 2005, the Court resolved to transfer the case to the CA. 12 On June 22,
2005, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC. 13
The OSG filed a Supplemental Brief, while the appellant found no need to file one.
The appeal has no merit.
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines defines recruitment and placement as
follows:
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or
not. Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons
shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 defined when recruitment is illegal:
SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment
shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes
referring, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by
a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under
Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any
such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall
be deemed so engaged. . . .
Any recruitment activities to be undertaken by non-licensee or non-holder of contracts
shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines. 14 Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. 15

To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution is burdened to prove three (3)
essential elements, to wit: (1) the person charged undertook a recruitment activity under
Article 13 (b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) accused
did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers; and (3) accused committed the same against three or more persons
individually or as a group. 16 As gleaned from the collective testimonies of the
Page |
complaining witnesses which the trial court and the appellate court found to be credible
and deserving of full probative weight, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of 34
evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged.
Indeed, the findings of the trial court, affirmed on appeal by the CA, are conclusive on
this Court absent evidence that the tribunals ignored, misunderstood, or misapplied
substantial fact or other circumstance.
The failure of the prosecution to adduce in evidence any receipt or document signed by
appellant where he acknowledged to have received money and liquor does not free him
from criminal liability. Even in the absence of money or other valuables given as
consideration for the "services" of appellant, the latter is considered as being engaged in
recruitment activities.
It can be gleaned from the language of Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code that the act of
recruitment may be for profit or not. It is sufficient that the accused promises or offers for
a fee employment to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment. 17 As the Court held
in People v. Sagaydo: 18
Such is the case before us. The complainants parted with their
money upon the prodding and enticement of accused-appellant on
the false pretense that she had the capacity to deploy them for
employment abroad. In the end, complainants were neither able to
leave for work abroad nor get their money back.

The fact that private complainants Rogelio Tibeb and Jessie Bolinao
failed to produce receipts as proof of their payment to accusedappellant does not free the latter from liability. The absence of
receipts cannot defeat a criminal prosecution for illegal recruitment.
As long as the witnesses can positively show through their
respective testimonies that the accused is the one involved in
prohibited recruitment, he may be convicted of the offense despite
the absence of receipts. 19
Appellant's reliance on the certifications purportedly signed by the complaining witnesses
Imelda Bamba, Alma Singh and Geraldine Lagman 20 is misplaced. Indeed, the trial
court and the appellate court found the certifications barren of credence and probative
weight. We agree with the following pronouncement of the appellate court:
Anent the claim of the appellant that the trial court erred in not
giving weight to the certifications (Exhs. "2," "3" & "4") allegedly
executed by the complainants to the effect that he did not recruit

them and that no money was involved, the same deserves scant
consideration.
The appellant testified that he was in possession of the said
certifications at the time the same were executed by the
complainants and the same were always in his possession; however,
when he filed his counter-affidavit during the preliminary
investigation before the Department of Justice, he did not mention
the said certifications nor attach them to his counter-affidavit.
We find it unbelievable that the appellant, a college graduate, would
not divulge the said certifications which would prove that, indeed,
he is not an illegal recruiter. By failing to present the said
certifications prior to the trial, the appellant risks the adverse
inference and legal presumption that, indeed, such certifications
were not genuine. When a party has it in his possession or power to
produce the best evidence of which the case in its nature is
susceptible and withholds it, the fair presumption is that the
evidence is withheld for some sinister motive and that its production
would thwart his evil or fraudulent purpose. As aptly pointed out by
the trial court:
". . . These certifications were allegedly executed before
charges were filed against him. Knowing that he was
already being charged for prohibited recruitment, why
did he not bring out these certifications which were
definitely favorable to him, if the same were authentic.
It is so contrary to human nature that one would
suppress evidence which would belie the charge against
him." (Emphasis Ours) 21
At the preliminary investigation, appellant was furnished with copies of the affidavits of
the complaining witnesses and was required to submit his counter-affidavit. The
complaining witnesses identified him as the culprit who "recruited" them. At no time did
appellant present the certifications purportedly signed by the complaining witnesses to
belie the complaint against him. He likewise did not indicate in his counter-affidavit that
the complaining witnesses had executed certifications stating that they were not recruited
by him and that he did not receive any money from any of them. He has not come
forward with any valid excuse for his inaction. It was only when he testified in his
defense that he revealed the certifications for the first time. Even then, appellant lied
when he claimed that he did not submit the certifications because the State Prosecutor did
not require him to submit any counter-affidavit, and that he was told that the criminal
complaint would be dismissed on account of the failure of the complaining witnesses to
appear during the preliminary investigation. The prevarications of appellant were
exposed by Public Prosecutor Pedro Catral on cross-examination, thus:
Q Mr. Witness, you said that a preliminary investigation [was]
conducted by the Department of Justice through State
Prosecutor Daosos. Right?

A Yes, Sir.
Q Were you requested to file your Counter-Affidavit?
A Yes, Sir. I was required.
Q Did you file your Counter-Affidavit?
A Yes, Sir, but he did not accept it.
Q Why?
A Because he said "never mind" because the witness is not
appearing so he dismissed the case.
Q Are you sure that he did not accept your Counter-Affidavit, Mr.
Witness?
A I don't know of that, Sir.
Q If I show you that Counter-Affidavit you said you prepared, will
you be able to identify the same, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, Sir.
Q I will show you the Counter-Affidavit dated June 16, 1997 filed
by one Joseph J. Jamilosa, will you please go over this and
tell if this is the same Counter-Affidavit you said you
prepared and you are going to file with the investigating
state prosecutor?
A Yes, Sir. This the same Counter-Affidavit.
Q There is a signature over the typewritten name Joseph J. Jamilosa,
will you please go over this and tell this Honorable Court
if this is your signature, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, Sir. This is my signature.
Q During the direct examination you were asked to identify [the]
Certification as Exh. "2" dated January 17, 1996, allegedly
issued by Bamba, one of the complainants in this case,
when did you receive this Certification issued by Imelda
Bamba, Mr. Witness?
A That is the date, Sir.
Q You mean the date appearing in the Certification.
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where was this handed to you by Imelda Bamba, Mr. Witness?
A At SM North Edsa, Sir.

Page |
35

Q During the direct examination you were also asked to identify a

Certification Exh. "3" for the defense dated February 19,
1996, allegedly issued by Alma Singh, one of the
complainants in this case, will you please go over this and
tell us when did Alma Singh allegedly issue to you this
Certification?

asked the kindness of the state prosecutor to ask the

complainants to show and produce the receipts that I gave
to them that was stated in the sworn statement of the NBI;
4) the allegation of the complainants that the charges filed
by them should be dismissed because I never [received]
any amount from them and they can not show any receipt
that I gave them," Manila City Jail, Philippines, June 16,
1997. So, Mr. Witness, June 16, 1997 is the date when you
prepared this. Correct?

A On February 19, 1996, Sir.

Q And also during the direct examination, you were asked to
identify a Certification which was already marked as Exh.
"4" for the defense dated January 22, 1996 allegedly
issued by Geraldine M. Lagman, one of the complainants
in this case, will you please tell the court when did
Geraldine Lagman give you this Certification?
A January 22, 1996, Sir.

A Yes, Sir.
Q Now, my question to you, Mr. Witness, you said that you have
with you all the time the Certification issued by [the] three
(3) complainants in this case, did you allege in your
Counter-Affidavit that this Certification you said you
claimed they issued to you?

Q During that time, January 22, 1996, January 17, 1996 and
February 19, 1996, you were in possession of all these
Certification. Correct, Mr. Witness?

A I did not say that, Sir.

A Yes, Sir.

A None, Sir.

Q These were always in your possession. Right?

Q What is your educational attainment, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, Sir, with my papers.

A I am a graduate of AB Course Associate Arts in 1963 at the

University of the East.

Q Do you know when did the complainants file cases against you?
A I don't know, Sir.
Q Alright. I will read to you this Counter-Affidavit of yours, and I
quote "I, Joseph Jamilosa, of legal age, married and
resident of Manila City Jail, after having duly sworn to in
accordance with law hereby depose and states that: 1) the
complainants sworn under oath to the National Bureau of
Investigation that I recruited them and paid me certain
sums of money assuming that there is truth in those
allegation of this (sic) complainants. The charge filed by
them should be immediately dismissed for certain lack of
merit in their Sworn Statement to the NBI Investigator; 2)
likewise, the complainants' allegation is not true and I
never recruited them to work abroad and that they did not
give me money, they asked me for some help so I [helped]
them in assisting and processing the necessary documents,
copies for getting US Visa; 3) the complainant said under
oath that they can show a receipt to prove that they can
give me sums or amount of money. That is a lie. They
sworn (sic), under oath, that they can show a receipt that I
gave to them to prove that I got the money from them. I

Q So, it is not here in your Counter-Affidavit?

Q You said that the State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice

did not accept your Counter-Affidavit, are you sure of that,
Mr. Witness?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Did you receive a copy of the dismissal which you said it was
dismissed?
A No, Sir. I did not receive anything.
Q Did you receive a resolution from the Department of Justice?
A No, Sir.
Q Did you go over the said resolution you said you received here?
A I just learned about it now, Sir.
Q Did you read the content of the resolution?
A Not yet, Sir. It's only now that I am going to read.
COURT

Page |
36

Q You said it was dismissed. Correct?

A Yes, Your Honor.

A Because one of the complainants told me to sign and they are

planning to sue me.

A No, Your Honor.

Q You mean they told you that they are filing charges against you
and yet you [made] them sign certifications in your favor,
what is the reason why you made them sign?

FISCAL CATRAL

A To prove that I'm settling this case.

Q What did you receive?

Q Despite the fact that they are filing cases against you and yet you
were able to make them sign certifications?

A I did not receive any resolution, Sir. It's just now that I learned
about the finding.

A Only one person, Your Honor, who told me and he is not around.

Q Did you receive a resolution of this dismissal?

Q You said you learned here in court, did you read the resolution
filed against you, Mr. Witness?
A I did not read it, Sir.
Q Did you read by yourself the resolution made by State Prosecutor
Daosos, Mr. Witness?
A Not yet, Sir.
Q What did you take, if any, when you received the subpoena from
this court?
A I was in court already when I asked Atty. Usita to investigate this
case.
Q You said a while ago that your Affidavit was not accepted by
State Prosecutor Daosos. Is that correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you please read to us paragraph four (4), page two (2) of this
resolution of State Prosecutor Daosos.
(witness reading par. 4 of the resolution)
Alright. What did you understand of this paragraph 4, Mr. Witness?
A Probably, guilty to the offense charge. 22

It turned out that appellant requested the complaining witnesses to sign the certifications
merely to prove that he was settling the cases:
COURT
Q These complainants, why did you make them sign in the
certifications?

Q But they all signed these three (3) certifications and yet they filed
charges against you and yet you made them sign
certifications in your favor, so what is the reason why you
made them sign?
(witness can not answer) 23
The Court notes that the trial court ordered appellant to refund US$300.00 to each of the
complaining witnesses. The ruling of the appellate court must be modified. Appellant
must pay only the peso equivalent of US$300.00 to each of the complaining witnesses.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of Joseph Jamilosa for large scale illegal
recruitment under Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8042 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. The appellant is hereby ordered to refund to each of the complaining
witnesses the peso equivalent of US$300.00. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Jamilosa, G.R. No. 169076, January 23, 2007)

Page |
37

[G.R. No. 156029. November 14, 2008.]

pending, she filed the instant case before the NLRC for underpayment of salary for a
period of one year and six months, nonpayment of vacation pay and reimbursement of
return airfare. EHSITc

SANTOSA
B. DATUMAN, petitioner, vs. FIRST COSMOPOLITAN MANPOWER
AND PROMOTION SERVICES, INC., respondent.

When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement before the Labor Arbiter, they
were required to file their respective position papers, subsequent pleadings and
Page |
documentary exhibits.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated August 7,
2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 59825, setting aside the Decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). HCSEIT
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in 1989, respondent First Cosmopolitan Manpower & Promotion Services, Inc.
recruited petitioner Santosa B. Datuman to work abroad under the following terms and
conditions:

In its Position Paper, 7 respondent countered that petitioner actually agreed to work in
Bahrain as a housemaid for one (1) year because it was the only position available then.
However, since such position was not yet allowed by the POEA at that time, they
mutually agreed to submit the contract to the POEA indicating petitioner's position as
saleslady. Respondent added that it was actually petitioner herself who violated the terms
of their contract when she allegedly transferred to another employer without respondent's
knowledge and approval. Lastly, respondent raised the defense of prescription of cause of
action since the claim was filed beyond the three (3)-year period from the time the right
accrued, reckoned from either 1990 or 1991. 8
On April 29, 1998, Labor Arbiter Jovencio Mayor, Jr. rendered a Decision finding
respondent liable for violating the terms of the Employment Contract and ordering it to
pay petitioner: (a) the amount of US$4,050.00, or its equivalent rate prevailing at the time
of payment, representing her salary differentials for fifteen (15) months; and, (b) the
amount of BD180.00 or its equivalent rate prevailing at the time of payment, representing
the refund of plane ticket, thus: DAaEIc

Site of employment - Bahrain

Employees Classification/Position/Grade - Saleslady
Basic Monthly Salary - US$370.00
Duration of Contract - One (1) year
Foreign
Employer - Mohammed
Abbas Ghulam Hussain 2

Sharif

On April 17, 1989, petitioner was deployed to Bahrain after paying the
required placement fee. However, her employer Mohammed Hussain took her
passport when she arrived there; and instead of working as a saleslady, she was
forced to work as a domestic helper with a salary of Forty Bahrain Dinar (BD40.00),
equivalent only to One Hundred US Dollars (US$100.00). This was contrary to the
agreed salary of US$370.00 indicated in her Contract of Employment signed in the
Philippines and approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA). 3
On September 1, 1989, her employer compelled her to sign another contract, transferring
her to another employer as housemaid with a salary of BD40.00 for the duration of two
(2) years. 4 She pleaded with him to give her a release paper and to return her passport
but her pleas were unheeded. Left with no choice, she continued working against her will.
Worse, she even worked without compensation from September 1991 to April 1993
because of her employer's continued failure and refusal to pay her salary despite demand.
In May 1993, she was able to finally return to the Philippines through the help of the
Bahrain Passport and Immigration Department. 5
In May 1995, petitioner filed a complaint before the POEA Adjudication Office against
respondent for underpayment and nonpayment of salary, vacation leave pay and refund of
her plane fare, docketed as Case No. POEA ADJ. (L) 95-05-1586. 6 While the case was

From the foregoing factual backdrop, the only crucial issue for us to
resolve in this case is whether or not complainant is entitled to her
monetary claims. AacDHE
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, from the facts and circumstances laid down, it is
thus self-evident that the relationship of the complainant and
respondent agency is governed by the Contract of Employment, the
basic terms a covenants of which provided for the position of
saleslady, monthly compensation of US$370.00 and duration of
contract for one (1) year. As it is, when the parties complainant
and respondent Agency signed and executed the POEA
approved Contract of Employment, this agreement is the law that
governs them. Thus, when respondent agency deviated from the
terms of the contract by assigning the position of a housemaid to
complainant instead of a saleslady as agreed upon in the POEAapproved Contract of Employment, respondent Agency committed a
breach of said Employment Contract. Worthy of mention is the
fact that respondent agency in their Position Paper paragraph
2, Brief Statement of the Facts and of the Case admitted that
it had entered into an illegal contract with complainant by
proposing the position of a housemaid which said position was
then not allowed by the POEA, by making it appear in the
Employment Contract that the position being applied for is the

38

position of a saleslady. As it is, we find indubitably clear that the

foreign employer had took advantage to the herein hopeless
complainant and because of this ordeal, the same obviously
rendered complainant's continuous employment unreasonable if
not downright impossible. The facts and surrounding
circumstances of her ordeal was convincingly laid down by the
complainant in her Position Paper, from which we find no flaws
material enough to disregard the same. Complainant had clearly
made out her case and no amount of persuasion can convince us to
tilt the scales of justice in favor of respondents whose defense was
anchored solely on the flimsy allegations that for a period of more
than five (5) years from 1989 until 1995 nothing was heard
from her or from her relatives, presuming then that complainant had
no problem with her employment abroad. We also find that the
pleadings and the annexes filed by the parties reveal a total lapse on
the part of respondent First Cosmopolitan Manpower and
Promotions their failure to support with substantial evidence
their contention that complainant transferred from one employer to
another without knowledge and approval of respondent agency in
contravention of the terms of the POEA approved Employment
Contract. Obviously, respondent Agency anchored its disquisition
on the alleged "contracts" signed by the complainant that she agreed
with the terms of said contracts one (1) year duration only and as
a housemaid to support its contention that complainant violated
the contract agreement by transferring from one employer to another
on her own volition without the knowledge and consent of
respondent agency. To us, this posture of respondent agency is
unavailing. These "documents" are self-serving. We could not but
rule that the same were fabricated to tailor-fit their defense that
complainant was guilty of violating the terms of the Employment
Contract. Consequently, we could not avoid the inference of a more
logical conclusion that complainant was forced against her will to
continue with her employment notwithstanding the fact that it
was in violation of the original Employment Contract including
the illegal withholding of her passport.
With the foregoing, we find and so rule that respondent Agency
failed to discharge the burden of proving with substantial evidence
that complainant violated the terms of the Employment Contract,
thus negating respondent Agency's liability for complainant's money
claims. All the more, the record is bereft of any evidence to show
that complainant Datuman is either not entitled to her wage
differentials or have already received the same from respondent. As
such, we are perforce constrained to grant complainant's prayer for
payment of salary differentials computed as follows:
January 1992 April 1993 (15 months)
US$370.00 agreed salary

US$100.00 actual paid salary

US$270.00 balance
US$270.00 x 15 months = US$4050.00
We are also inclined to grant complainant's entitlement to a refund
of her plane ticket in the amount of BD180 Bahrain Dinar or the
equivalent in Philippine Currency at the rate of exchange prevailing
at the time of payment. SHCaDA
Anent complainant's claim for vacation leave pay and overtime pay,
we cannot, however, grant the same for failure on the part of
complainant to prove with particularity the months that she was not
granted vacation leave and the day wherein she did render overtime
work.
Also, we could not grant complainant's prayer for award of damages
and attorney's fees for lack of factual and legal basis.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered,
finding respondent Agency liable for violating the term of
Employment Contract and respondentFirst Cosmopolitan Manpower
and Promotions is hereby ordered:
To pay complainant the amount of US$ FOUR THOUSAND AND
FIFTY (US$4,050.00), or its equivalent rate prevailing at the time
of payment, representing her salary differentials for fifteen (15)
months;
To pay complainant the amount of BD180.00 or its equivalent rate
prevailing at the time of payment, representing the refund of plane
ticket;
All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 9 (emphasis supplied)
On appeal, the NLRC, Second Division, issued a Decision 10 affirming with
modification the Decision of Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr., by reducing the award of salary
differentials from US$4,050.00 to US$2,970.00 ratiocinating as follows:
Accordingly, we find that the claims for salary differentials accruing
earlier than April of 1993 had indeed prescribed. This is so as
complainant had filed her complaint on May 31, 1995 when she
arrived from the jobsite in April 1993. Since the cause of action for
salary differential accrues at the time when it falls due, it is clear
that only the claims for the months of May 1993 to April 1994 have
not yet prescribed. With an approved salary rate of US$370.00 vis-vis the amount of salary received which was $100.00, complainant
is entitled to the salary differential for the said period in the amount
of $2,970.00. IHcTDA

Page |
39

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
MODIFYING the assailed Decision by reducing the award of salary
differentials to $2,970.00 to the complainant.
The rest of the disposition is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 11
On July 21, 2000, respondent elevated the matter to the CA through a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
On August 2, 2000, 12 the CA dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form
pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended.
On October 20, 2000, 13 however, the CA reinstated the petition upon respondent's
motion for reconsideration. 14
On August 7, 2002, the CA issued the assailed Decision 15 granting the petition and
reversing the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, thus:
Under Section 1 (f), Rule II, Book II of the 1991 POEA Rules and
Regulations, the local agency shall assume joint and solidary
liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities which may
arise in connection with the implementation of the contract,
including but not limited to payment of wages, health and disability
compensation and repatriation.
Respondent Commission was correct in declaring that claims of
private respondent "for salary differentials accruing earlier than
April of 1993 had indeed prescribed." It must be noted that
petitioner company is privy only to the first contract. Granting
arguendo that its liability extends to the acts of its foreign principal,
the Towering Recruiting Services, which appears to have a hand in
the execution of the second contract, it is Our considered opinion
that the same would, at the most, extend only up to the expiration of
the second contract or until 01 September 1991. Clearly, the money
claims subject of the complaint filed in 1995 had
prescribed. STIcEA
However, this Court declares respondent Commission as not only
having abused its discretion, but as being without jurisdiction at all,
in declaring private respondent entitled to salary differentials. After
decreeing the money claims accruing before April 1993 as having
prescribed, it has no more jurisdiction to hold petitioner company
for salary differentials after that period. To reiterate, the local
agency shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer

for all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the
implementation of the contract. Which contract? Upon a judicious
consideration, we so hold that it is only in connection with
the first contract. The provisions in number 2, Section 10 (a),
Rule V, Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
Section 1 (f), Rule II, Book II of the 1991 POEA Rules and
Regulations were not made to make the local agency a perpetual
insurer against all untoward acts that may be done by the foreign
principal or the direct employer abroad. It is only as regards the
principal contract to which it is privy shall its liability extend.
In Catan v. National Labor Relations Commission, 160 SCRA 691
(1988), it was held that the responsibilities of the local agent and the
foreign principal towards the contracted employees under the
recruitment agreement extends up to and until the expiration of the
employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed
pursuant to the said recruitment agreement.
xxx xxx xxx
Foregoing considered, the assailed Decision dated 24 February 2000
and the Resolution dated 23 June 2000 of respondent Commission
in NLRC NCR CA 016354-98 are hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED. 16
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 17 thereon was denied in the assailed
Resolution 18 dated November 14, 2002.
Hence, the present petition based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ABANDONED THE
FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER AS
AFFIRMED BY THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION. IADaSE
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT AGENCY IS ONLY
A [sic] PRIVY AND LIABLE TO THE PRINCIPAL CONTRACT.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE
PETITIONER ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

Page |
40

The respondent counters in its Comment that the CA is correct in ruling that it is not
liable for the monetary claims of petitioner as the claim had already prescribed and had
no factual basis.
Simply put, the issues boil down to whether the CA erred in not holding respondent liable
for petitioner's money claims pursuant to their Contract of Employment.
We grant the petition.
On
whether
respondent
for petitioner's monetary claims

is

solidarily

liable

Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA Rules and Regulations states that:

Section 1. Requirements for Issuance of License. Every applicant
for license to operate a private employment agency or manning
agency shall submit a written application together with the
following requirements:
xxx xxx xxx
f. A verified undertaking stating that the applicant:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer
for all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with
the implementation of the contract; including but not limited to
payment of wages, death and disability compensation and
repatriation. (emphasis supplied) ADECcI
The above provisions are clear that the private employment agency shall assume joint and
solidary liability with the employer. 19 This Court has, time and again, ruled that private
employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based
employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of
employment.20 This joint and solidary liability imposed by law against recruitment
agencies and foreign employers is meant to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate
and sufficient payment of what is due him. 21 This is in line with the policy of the state to
protect and alleviate the plight of the working class.
In the assailed Decision, the CA disregarded the aforecited provision of the law and the
policy of the state when it reversed the findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter. As
the agency which recruited petitioner, respondent is jointly and solidarily liable with the
latter's principal employer abroad for her (petitioner's) money claims. Respondent cannot,
therefore, exempt itself from all the claims and liabilities arising from the implementation
of their POEA-approved Contract of Employment.
We cannot agree with the view of the CA that the solidary liability of respondent extends
only to the first contract (i.e. the original, POEA-approved contract which had a term of
until April 1990). The signing of the "substitute" contracts with the foreign
employer/principal before the expiration of the POEA-approved contract and any
continuation of petitioner's employment beyond the original one-year term, against the

will of petitioner, are continuing breaches of the original POEA-approved contract. To

accept the CA's reasoning will open the floodgates to even more abuse of our overseas
workers at the hands of their foreign employers and local recruiters, since the recruitment
agency could easily escape its mandated solidary liability for breaches of the POEAapproved contract by colluding with their foreign principals in substituting the approved
contract with another upon the worker's arrival in the country of employment. Such
Page |
outcome is certainly contrary to the State's policy of extending protection and support to
our overseas workers. To be sure, Republic Act No. 8042 explicitly prohibits the 41
substitution or alteration to the prejudice of the worker of employment contracts already
approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) from the
time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the
expiration of the same without the approval of the DOLE. 22 ECTHIA
Respondent's contention that it was petitioner herself who violated their Contract of
Employment when she signed another contract in Bahrain deserves scant consideration. It
is the finding of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which, significantly, the CA
did not disturb that petitioner was forced to work long after the term of her original
POEA-approved contract, through the illegal acts of the foreign employer.
In Placewell International Services Corporation v. Camote, 23 we held that the
subsequently executed side agreement of an overseas contract worker with her foreign
employer which reduced his salary below the amount approved by the POEA is void
because it is against our existing laws, morals and public policy. The said side agreement
cannot supersede the terms of the standard employment contract approved by the POEA.
Hence, in the present case, the diminution in the salary of petitioner from US$370.00 to
US$100 (BD40.00) per month is void for violating the POEA-approved contract which
set the minimum standards, terms, and conditions of her employment. Consequently, the
solidary liability of respondent with petitioner's foreign employer for petitioner's money
claims continues although she was forced to sign another contract in Bahrain. It is the
terms of the original POEA-approved employment contract that shall govern the
relationship of petitioner with the respondent recruitment agency and the foreign
employer. We agree with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the precepts of justice and
fairness dictate that petitioner must be compensated for all months worked regardless of
the supposed termination of the original contract in April 1990. It is undisputed that
petitioner was compelled to render service until April 1993 and for the entire period that
she worked for the foreign employer or his unilaterally appointed successor, she should
have been paid US$370/month for every month worked in accordance with her original
contract. HTSIEa

Respondent cannot disclaim liability for the acts of the foreign employer which forced
petitioner to remain employed in violation of our laws and under the most oppressive
conditions on the allegation that it purportedly had no knowledge of, or participation in,
the contract unwillingly signed by petitioner abroad. We cannot give credence to this
claim considering that respondent by its own allegations knew from the outset that the
contract submitted to the POEA for approval was not to be the "real" contract.
Respondent blithely admitted to submitting to the POEA a contract stating that the

position to be filled by petitioner is that of "Saleslady" although she was to be employed

as a domestic helper since the latter position was not approved for deployment by the
POEA at that time. Respondent's evident bad faith and admitted circumvention of the
laws and regulations on migrant workers belie its protestations of innocence and put
petitioner in a position where she could be exploited and taken advantage of overseas, as
what indeed happened to her in this case.
We look upon with great disfavor the unsubstantiated actuations of innocence or
ignorance on the part of local recruitment agencies of acts of their foreign principals, as if
the agencies' responsibility ends with the deployment of the worker. In the light of the
recruitment agency's legally mandated joint and several liability with the foreign
employer for all claims in connection with the implementation of the contract, it is the
recruitment agency's responsibility to ensure that the terms and conditions of the
employment contract, as approved by the POEA, are faithfully complied with and
implemented properly by its foreign client/principal. Indeed, it is in its best interest to do
so to avoid being haled to the courts or labor tribunals and defend itself from suits for
acts of its foreign principal. IaEACT
On
whether
petitioner's
underpaid salaries have prescribed

claims

for

It should be recalled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC similarly found that petitioner
is entitled to underpaid salaries, albeit they differed in the number of months for which
salary differentials should be paid. The CA, on the other hand, held that all of petitioner's
monetary claims have prescribed pursuant to Article 291 of the Labor Code which
provides that:
Art. 291. Money Claims. All money claims arising from
employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this
Code shall be filed within three yearsfrom the time that cause of
action accrued; otherwise, they shall be forever barred. (emphasis
supplied)
We do not agree with the CA when it held that the cause of action of petitioner had
already prescribed as the three-year prescriptive period should be reckoned from
September 1, 1989 when petitioner was forced to sign another contract against her will.
As stated in the complaint, one of petitioner's causes of action was for underpayment of
salaries. The NLRC correctly ruled the right to claim unpaid salaries (or in this case,
unpaid salary differentials) accrue as they fall due. 24 Thus, petitioner's cause of action
to claim salary differential for October 1989 only accrued after she had rendered service
for that month (or at the end of October 1989). Her right to claim salary differential for
November 1989 only accrued at the end of November 1989, and so on and so forth.
Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that petitioner was forced to work until
April 1993. Interestingly, the CA did not disturb this finding but held only that the extent
of respondent's liability was limited to the term under the original contract or, at most, to
the term of the subsequent contract entered into with the participation of respondent's
foreign principal, i.e. 1991. We have discussed previously the reasons why (a) the CA's
theory of limited liability on the part of respondent is untenable and (b) the petitioner has
a right to be compensated for all months she, in fact, was forced to work. To determine

for which months petitioner's right to claim salary differentials has not prescribed, we
must count three years prior to the filing of the complaint on May 31, 1995. Thus, only
claims accruing prior to May 31, 1992 have prescribed when the complaint was filed on
May 31, 1995. Petitioner is entitled to her claims for salary differentials for the period
May 31, 1992 to April 1993, or approximately eleven (11) months. 25
We find that the NLRC correctly computed the salary differential due to petitioner at Page |
US$2,970.00 (US$370.00 as approved salary rate - US$100.00 as salary received = 42
US$290 as underpaid salary per month x 11 months). However, it should be for the
period May 31, 1992 to April 1993 and not May 1993 to April 1994 as erroneously stated
in the NLRC's Decision.
A final note
This Court reminds local recruitment agencies that it is their bounden duty to guarantee
our overseas workers that they are being recruited for bona fide jobs with bona
fideemployers. Local agencies should never allow themselves to be instruments of
exploitation or oppression of their compatriots at the hands of foreign employers. Indeed,
being the ones who profit most from the exodus of Filipino workers to find greener
pastures abroad, recruiters should be first to ensure the welfare of the very people that
keep their industry alive. CAaSHI
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 7, 2002 and Resolution dated November 14, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 59825 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission dated February 24, 2000 is REINSTATED with a qualification
with respect to the award of salary differentials, which should be granted for the period
May 31, 1992 to April 1993 and not May 1993 to April 1994.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Datuman v. First Cosmopolitan Manpower and Promotion Services, Inc., G.R. No.
156029, November 14, 2008)

[G.R. No. 182232. October 6, 2008.]

PEOPLE OF
THE
appellee, vs. NENITA B. HU, accused-appellant.

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by accused-appellant Nenita B. Hu (Hu)

seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated 9 October
2007 in CA-G.R.-CR.-H.C. No. 02243, affirming with modification the Decision 2 dated
4 January 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, in Criminal
Case No. 03-356. The RTC in its Decision found Hu guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined and penalized under Section 7
(b) of Republic Act No. 8042, 3 and accordingly, sentenced her to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment, to pay the fine of P500,000.00, and to indemnify private complainants
Paul Abril (Abril), Joel Panguelo (Panguelo) and Evangeline Garcia (Garcia) in the
amounts of P44,000.00, P50,000 and P50,000, respectively. The decretal part of the
assailed Court of Appeals Decision reads: ACEIac
Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 66, in Criminal
Case No. 03-856, finding appellantNenita B. Hu, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.
As modified, the award of actual damages in the amount of P50,000
in favor of Evangeline Garcia, is DELETED. 4
The antecedent facts are as follows:
An Information 5 for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale was filed against Hu and
Ethel V. Genoves (Genoves) which reads:
The undersigned Prosecutor accuses Ethel V. Genoves a.k.a. Merry
Ann Genoves and Nenita B. Hu, of the crime of Violation of
Section 6 penalized under Section 7(b) of RA 8042 6 (Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale) committed as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of October 2001, in the City of Makati,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
both of them helping and aiding one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit, promise
employment/job placement abroad for an overseas employment and
collect fees from the following persons to wit:
NOEL P. DELAYUN JOEY F. SILAO
JOEL U. PANGUELO PAUL C. ABRIL
EVANGELINE E. GARCIA ERIC V. ORILLANO

thus in large scale amounting to economic sabotage without any

license or authorized by the POEA of the Department of Labor and
Employment to recruit workers for an overseas employment.
Upon arraignment, Hu assisted by counsel entered a plea of not guilty while Genoves
remained at large. 7 Subsequently, trial on the merits ensued. While the Information for
illegal recruitment named several persons as having been promised jobs by Hu and Page |
Genoves, only four of them Panguelo, Garcia, Abril and Orillano 43
testified. CHcETA
Hu was the President of Brighturn International Services, Inc. (Brighturn), a land-based
recruitment agency duly licensed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA) to engage in the business of recruitment and placement of workers abroad, with
principal address at No. 1916 San Marcelino St., Malate, Manila. Brighturn was
authorized by the POEA to recruit, process and deploy land-based workers for the period
18 December 1999 to 17 December 2001. 8
Genoves worked as a consultant and marketing officer of Brighturn. Aside from her stint
at Brighturn, Genoves was also connected with Riverland Consultancy Service
(Riverland), another recruitment agency located at Room No. 210, LPL Building, Sen.
Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City.
Private complainants Orillano, Panguelo, Abril and Garcia sought employment at
Brighturn for the positions of factory worker and electronic operator in
Taiwan. 9Notwithstanding private complainants' compliance with all of the preemployment requirements, including the payment of placement fees, they were not able
to leave the country to work abroad.
Sometime in June 2001, Panguelo was informed by a friend that Brighturn was hiring
factory workers for Taiwan. When Panguelo went to Brighturn, he was promised
employment abroad by Hu for P50,000.00. Upon Hu's instruction, Panguelo paid in full
the placement fee in the amount of P50,000.00 to Genoves. The payment was evidenced
by an Official Receipt dated 16 October 2001 bearing Genoves' signature. Panguelo
waited for three years to be deployed to Taiwan. His waiting was all for naught. Thus,
Panguelo decided to abort his application and demanded from Hu the return of the
amount he paid for the placement fee, but Hu could no longer return the money. 10
Also sometime in September 2001, Abril went to Brighturn to apply as a factory worker
in Taiwan. At Brighturn, Abril was entertained by Hu who oriented him on the necessary
requirements for application which included a valid passport, National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Clearance and ID pictures. After complying with the documentary
requirements, Abril was required by Hu to pay the placement fee to Genoves in the
amount of P44,000.00. As shown in Official Receipts dated 9 October 2001 and 26
October 2000, which were signed by Genoves, Abril paid the whole amount of
P44,000.00 as placement fee. Abril was assured by Hu that he would be deployed to
Taiwan by December 2001 which was subsequently reset to April 2002. Despite several
postponements, Abril was not able to leave the country. 11 cTSDAH
For his part, Orillano came to know of Brighturn thru Genoves. Orillano was interviewed
at Brighturn by a Taiwanese principal in October 2001. After the interview, Huinformed

Orillano to submit a medical certificate, NBI clearance and passport; and to pay the
requisite placement fee in the amount of P50,000.00. Believing that Hu could send him
abroad, Orillano faithfully complied with these requirements including the placement fee,
the payment of which was made to Genoves at Brighturn's office. Despite such payment,
however, Orillano was not able to leave the country. 12
Garcia suffered the same fate as her co-applicants. In April 2002, Garcia applied as
Electronic Operator at Brighturn wherein she was entertained by Hu who informed her
that Brighturn's license was suspended. Garcia was then referred by Hu to Best One
International (Best One), another recruitment agency likewise located in Malate, Manila.
While Garcia was told by Hu that the processing of her documents would be done at Best
One, the placement fee, however, should be paid at Brighturn. Accordingly, the amount
of P60,000.00 was paid by Garcia to Hu and Genoves as placement fee upon Hu's
instruction. Almost predictably, the promise of an employment abroad never came to
pass. 13
When Hu was not able to refund the amounts paid as placement fees upon demand,
private complainants went to NBI to file a complaint for illegal recruitment
against Hu and Genoves.
For her defense, Hu claimed that she was the President of Brighturn, a duly authorized
land-based recruitment agency. Brighturn had foreign principals in Taiwan who were
looking for skilled individuals willing to work in a foreign country. Hu alleged that
Brighturn had an established recruitment procedure wherein applicants were only
required to pay the corresponding placement fees after the POEA had already approved
their employment contracts. According to Hu, announcements were posted all over
Brighturn's premises warning job applicants to pay placement fees only to the cashier.
After the expiration of its license issued by the POEA on 18 December 1999, Brighturn
failed to pursue its application for renewal due its inability to post the required cash bond.
Brighturn was thus constrained to refer all pending applications to Best One. 14 IEcaHS
Hu admitted knowing the private complainants because these individuals went to her
office demanding the return of their placement fees by showing their official
receipts.Hu averred that when she examined such receipts, she found that private
complainants paid their placement fees to Riverland and not to Brighturn as shown in the
heading of the said receipts which bore the name and address of Riverland and its
proprietress, Genoves. Hu denied knowing Genoves. 15
On 4 January 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision 16 finding Hu guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Nenita Hu guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale under Section 6 and 7(b) ofRepublic Act No. 8042, and,
accordingly, sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, pay the fine of P500,000.00 and to indemnify private
complainants Paul Abril in the amount of P44,000.00, Joel Panguelo
in the amount of P50,000.00 and Evangeline Garcia in the amount
of P50,000.00.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision 17 dated 9 October 2007, confirmed the presence
of all the elements of illegal recruitment in large scale, and thereby affirmed the
conviction of Hu with the modification that the amount of actual damages awarded to
Garcia in the amount of P50,000.00 be deleted.
Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
FINDING HU GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE.
Hu was charged with and convicted by the trial court of the crime of Illegal Recruitment
in Large Scale, which conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court found that Hu made enticing, albeit empty promises, which moved private
complainants to part with their money and pay the placement fee. ADCTac
For its part, the Solicitor General joined the lower courts in finding that Hu was indeed
guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale. According to the Solicitor General, all the
elements of illegal recruitment in large scale had been established beyond reasonable
doubt. 18

We cannot sustain the conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale.

Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely: (1) the offender has
no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes any activity within the
meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13 (b) of the Labor
Code.19 Recruitment and placement is "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers; and includes referrals, contact
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a
fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement." 20
The crime becomes Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale when the foregoing two elements
concur, with the addition of a third element the recruiter committed the same against
three or more persons, individually or as group. 21
A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of
illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group. While it
is true that the law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial,
nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was
committed against three or more persons. 22
In the appreciation of evidence in criminal cases, it is a basic tenet that the prosecution
has the burden of proof in establishing the guilt of the accused for the offense with which
he is charged. Ei incumbit probation qui dicit non qui negat; i.e., "he who asserts, not he
who denies, must prove". The conviction of appellant must rest not on the weakness of
his defense, but on the strength of the prosecution's evidence. 23 SDIACc

Page |
44

In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that illegal
recruitment was committed against three or more persons. What we have uncovered upon
careful scrutiny of the records was the fact that illegal recruitment was committed against
only one person; that is, against Garcia alone. Illegal recruitment cannot successfully
attach to the allegations of Panguelo, Abril and Orillano, since they testified that
they accomplished their pre-employment requirements through Brighturn from
June 2001 up to October of the same year, 24 a period wherein Brighturn's license
to engage in recruitment and placement was still in full force and effect. 25
While there were six private complainants in this case, four of whom were presented
during the trial, the prosecution, nonetheless, failed to establish that Hu engaged in illegal
recruitment acts against at least three of these complainants. In offenses in which the
number of victims is essential, such as in the present petition, failure of the prosecution to
prove by convincing evidence that the offense is committed against the minimum number
of persons required by law is fatal to its cause of action. Underscoring the significance of
the number of victims was the disquisition of Justice Florenz Regalado in People v.
Ortiz-Miyake: 26
It is evident that in illegal recruitment cases, the number of
persons victimized is determinative. Where illegal recruitment
is committed against a lone victim, the accused may be
convicted of simple illegal recruitment which is punishable with
a lower penalty under Article 39(c) 27 of the Labor Code.
Corollarily, where the offense is committed against three or more
persons, it is qualified to illegal recruitment in large scale which
provides a higher penalty under Article 39(a) 28 of the same Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Regrettably, we cannot affirm the conviction of Hu for the offense of illegal recruitment
in large scale. While we strongly condemn the pervasive proliferation of illegal job
recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to obtain employment
abroad, nevertheless, we find the pieces of evidence insufficient to prove the guilt
of Hubeyond reasonable doubt. It is unfortunate that the prosecution evidence did not
pass the test of reasonable doubt, since the testimonies of its witnesses unveil a
contradicting inference that the recruitment of Panguelo, Abril and Orillano was
undertaken by Hu with the required authority from the POEA. cASTED
Failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of Hu beyond reasonable doubt does not
absolve her of her civil obligation to return the money she collected from private
complaints Panguelo, Abril and Orillano, plus legal interest in accordance with our ruling
in Domagsang v. Court of Appeals. 29 There, the prosecution failed to sufficiently
establish a case to warrant a conviction, but clearly proved a just debt owed to the private
complainant. Thus, the accused was ordered to pay the face value of the check with 12%
legal interest per annum, reckoned from the filing of the information until the finality of
the judgment. It is well settled that acquittal based on reasonable doubt does not preclude
an award for civil damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the
accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist. Thus, civil liability is not extinguished where the acquittal is
based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, since only preponderance of evidence is

required in civil cases. There appears to be no sound reason to require that a separate
action be still filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already
been established in the criminal proceedings. 30 In the present case, the prosecution
explicitly proved that private complainants parted with substantial amounts of money
upon the prodding and enticement of Hu on the false pretense that she had the capacity to
deploy them for employment abroad. In the end, private complainants were not able to
Page |
leave for work abroad or get their money back.
Neither does her acquittal herein exempt Hu from subsequent criminal prosecution for
estafa 31 provided that deceit, which is an essential element of estafa, be proven by the
prosecution. 32 Apparently, Hu deluded private complainants into believing that she had
the capacity to send them abroad for employment. Through this hoax, she was able to
convince private complainants to surrender their money to her in the vain hope, as it
turned out, of securing employment abroad.
This leaves us a case of simple illegal recruitment committed against Garcia.
Garcia testified that she applied for employment in Taiwan for the position of Electronic
Operator thru Brighturn in April 2002. Due to the alleged suspension of Brighturn's
license, Hu referred her to a neighboring agency (Best One), but Hu continued collecting
placement fees from her. IaHSCc
The act of referral, which means the act of passing along or forwarding an applicant after
an initial interview to a selected employer, placement or bureau, is included in
recruitment. 33 Undoubtedly, the act of Hu in referring Garcia to another recruitment
agency squarely fell within the purview of recruitment that was undertaken by Hu after
her authority to recruit and place workers already expired on 17 December 2001.
Failure of Garcia to present proof of payment is irrelevant. The absence of receipts in the
case of illegal recruitment does not warrant the acquittal of the appellant and is not fatal
to the prosecution's case. As long as the prosecution is able to establish through credible
and testimonial evidence, as in the case at bar, that the appellant had engaged in illegal
recruitment, a conviction for the offense can be very well justified. 34
Irrefragably, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Hu of the
charge of illegal recruitment against Garcia when the former referred the latter to another
agency without the license or authority to do so. The trial court gave full credence to the
testimony of Garcia, which unmistakably demonstrated how Hu successfully enticed her
to part with a considerable amount of money in exchange for an employment abroad
which was never realized. This finding was adopted by the appellate court, considering
that that the trial court was in the best position to ascertain credibility issues, having
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during trial.
Aptly, the bare denials of Hu have no probative value when ranged against the
affirmative declarations of Garcia, even if the latter failed to present receipts for the
payments she had made. In People v. Villas, 35 this Court affirmed the conviction of the
appellant for illegal recruitment even if private complaints were not able to present any
receipt that they paid appellant anything, thus: ETHIDa

45

Neither is there merit in the contention of the defense that appellant

should be exonerated for failure of the prosecution to present any
receipt proving that private complainants paid her anything. The
defense argues that a receipt is the best evidence to prove delivery
of money and the absence thereof shows that no payment was made.
This argument is not novel. The Court has previously ruled that the
absence of receipts evidencing payment does not defeat a criminal
prosecution for illegal recruitment. In People vs. Pabalan [262
SCRA 574, 30 September 1996], this Court ruled:
". . . the absence of receipts in a criminal case for illegal
recruitment does not warrant the acquittal of the accused
and is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. As long as
the witnesses had positively shown through their
respective testimonies that the accused is the one involved
in the prohibited recruitment, he may be convicted of the
offense despite the want of receipts.

"The Statute of Frauds and the rules of evidence do not

require the presentation of receipts in order to prove the
existence of recruitment agreement and the procurement of
fees in illegal recruitment cases. The amounts may
consequently be proved by the testimony of witnesses."
The private complainants have convincingly testified that the
accused enticed them to apply and, in actual fact, received payments
from them. And to these testimonies, the trial court accorded
credence. On the other hand, appellant has not shown any reason to
justify a modification or reversal of the trial court's finding.
Our ruling in People v. Villas 36 that the absence of receipts in illegal recruitment case
does not warrant the acquittal of the accused has been reiterated in several cases. 37 We
are not unaware of the proliferation of these scheming illegal recruiters who cunningly
rob Filipino workers, desperate to work abroad, of their money in exchange of empty
promises. This Court cannot be drawn to the ingenious ploy of these illegal recruiters in
withholding receipts from their victims in their vain attempt to evade liability.
In fine, the Court will have to discard the conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale
meted out by the RTC, since only one applicant abroad was recruited by Hu without
license and authority from the POEA. Accordingly, Hu should be held responsible for
simple illegal recruitment only. Hu's unsuccessful indictment for illegal recruitment in
large scale, however, does not discharge her from her civil obligation to return the
placement fees paid by private complainants. DHcEAa
Under Section 7 (a) of Republic Act No. 8042, 38 simple illegal recruitment is punishable
by imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve

years and a fine of not less than two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more
than five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that if the offense is punishable by
a special law, as in this case, the court shall impose on the accused an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the said
law and the minimum of which shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the Page |
same. Accordingly, a penalty of eight (8) to twelve (12) years of imprisonment should be 46
meted out to Hu. In addition, a fine in the amount of P500,000.00; and indemnity to
private complainants Abril in the amount of P44,000.00, Panguelo in the amount of
P50,000.00, Garcia in the amount of P60,000.00 and Orillano in the amount of
P50,000.00, with 12% legal interest per annum, reckoned from the filing of the
information until the finality of the judgment is imposed.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CR.-H.C. No. 02243 affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant Nenita B. Hu for
the offense of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and sentencing her to life imprisonment
is hereby VACATED. A new Decision is hereby entered convicting the accusedappellant of the offense of Simple Illegal Recruitment committed against private
complainant Evangeline Garcia. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
eight (8) years to twelve (12) years of imprisonment. She is ordered to pay a fine in the
amount of P500,000.00 and to indemnify private complainant Evangeline Garcia in the
amount of P60,000.00, with 12% interest per annum, reckoned from the filing of the
information until the finality of the judgment.
Accused-appellant Nenita B. Hu is likewise ordered to indemnify private complainants
Paul Abril in the amount of P44,000.00, Joel Panguelo in the amount of P50,000.00, and
Eric Orillano in the amount of P50,000.00, with 12% interest per annum, as reckoned
above. aTADCE
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Hu, G.R. No. 182232, October 06, 2008)

[G.R. No. 176169. November 14, 2008.]

ROSARIO NASI-VILLAR, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

SO ORDERED. 8
THE

This is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner
Rosario Nasi-Villar assailing the Decision 2 dated 27 June 2005 and Resolution 3 dated
28 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals. This case originated from an
Information 4 for Illegal Recruitment as defined under Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8042 5filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Davao del Sur on 5
October 1998 for acts committed by petitioner and one Dolores Placa in or about January
1993. The Information reads: cDCSTA
That on [sic] or about the month of [January 1993], in the
Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the aforenamed
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping one another through fraudulent representation and deceitful
machination, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and
feloniously recruit Nila Panilag for employment abroad[,] demand
and receive the amount of P6,500.00 Philippine Currency [sic] as
placement fee[,] the said accused being a non-licensee or non-holder
of authority to engage in the recruitment of workers abroad to the
damage and prejudice of the herein offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
On 3 July 2002, after due trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 18, Digos City,
Davao del Sur found the evidence presented by the prosecution to be more credible than
that presented by the defense and thus held petitioner liable for the offense of illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code, as amended. 7 The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds
accused
ROSARIO NASI-VILLAR GUILTY
BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of Illegal Recruitment and, in accordance
with the penalty set forth under the Labor Code, as amended, said
accused is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from FOUR YEARS as minimum to FIVE YEARS as maximum.
On the civil aspect of the case, there being no substantial proof
presented to justify a grant of civil damages, this Court makes no
pronouncement thereon.
With respect to accused Ma. Dolores Placa, who is still at large, the
records of this case are hereby sent to the archives to be retrieved in
the event that said accused would be apprehended. Issue an alias
warrant of arrest for the apprehension of said accused.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals raising as sole issue the alleged error by the
trial court in finding her guilty of illegal recruitment on the basis of the trial court's
appreciation of the evidence presented by the prosecution. aDcETC
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 June 2005, 9 following the principle that Page |
an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review, noted that the
47
criminal acts alleged to have been committed happened sometime in 1993. However,
R.A. No. 8042, under which petitioner was charged, was approved only on 7 June 1995
and took effect on 15 July 1995. Thus, the Court of Appeals declared that petitioner
should have been charged under the Labor Code, in particular Art. 13 (b) thereof, and not
under R.A. No. 8042. Accordingly, it made its findings on the basis of the provisions of
the Labor Code and found petitioner liable under Art. 38, in relation to Art. 13 (b), and
Art. 39 of the Labor Code. The appellate court affirmed with modification the decision of
the RTC, decreeing in the dispositive portion, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial
Region, Br. 18, City of Digos, Province of Davao del Sur, finding
Rosario Nasi-Villar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Illegal Recruitment is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
Rosario Nasi-Villar isORDERED to pay Nila Panilag the sum of
P10,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED. 10
On 28 November 2006, the appellate court denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. 11
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider that R.A. No. 8042
cannot be given retroactive effect and that the decision of the RTC constitutes a violation
of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law. Since R.A. No. 8042 did not
yet exist in January 1993 when the crime was allegedly committed, petitioner argues that
law cannot be used as the basis of filing a criminal action for illegal recruitment. What
was applicable in 1993 is the Labor Code, where under Art. 38, in relation to Art. 39, the
violation of the Code is penalized with imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor
more than eight (8) years or a fine of not less than P20,000.00 and not more than
P100,000.00 or both. On the other hand, Sec. 7 (c) of R.A. No. 8042 penalizes illegal
recruitment with a penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day
but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine not less than P200,000.00 nor more than
P500,000.00. Thus, the penalty of imprisonment provided in the Labor Code was raised
or increased by R.A. No. 8042. Petitioner concludes that the charge and conviction of an
offense carrying a penalty higher than that provided by the law at the time of its
commission constitutes a violation of the prohibition against ex post facto law and the
retroactive application of R.A. No. 8042. aCTHDA

In its Comment 12 dated 7 September 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
argues that the Court of Appeals' conviction of petitioner under the Labor Code is correct.
While conceding that there was an erroneous designation of the law violated by
petitioner, the OSG stresses that the designation of the offense in the Information is not
determinative of the nature and character of the crime charged against her but the acts
alleged in the Information. The allegations in the Information clearly charge petitioner
with illegal recruitment as defined in Art. 38, in relation to Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code,
and penalized under Art. 39 (c) of the same Code. The evidence on record substantiates
the charge to a moral certainty. Thus, while there was an erroneous specification of the
law violated by petitioner in the Information, the CA was correct in affirming the RTC's
imposition of the penalty for simple illegal recruitment under the Labor Code, the OSG
concludes.
The petition is denied. We find no reversible error in the decision arrived at by the Court
of Appeals.
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 13 we held that the real nature of the crime charged is
determined, not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the law alleged to have been violated these being conclusions of law
but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. What controls is not
the designation but the description of the offense charged. From a legal point of view,
and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what the technical name of the
crime of which he stands charged is. If the accused performed the acts alleged in the body
of the information, in the manner stated, then he ought to be punished and punished
adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime which those acts constitute. 14
In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had
performed the acts constituting the offense defined in Art. 38, in relation to Art. 13 (b)
and punished by Art. 39 of the Labor Code, as alleged in the body of the Information. To
prove illegal recruitment, two elements must be shown, namely: (1) the person charged
with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities, or any of the activities
enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code, as amended; and (2) said person does not
have a license or authority to do so. 15 Art. 13 (b) defines "recruitment and placement" as
"any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising, or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided that any person or
entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons, is considered engaged in recruitment and placement." The trial court found these
two elements had been proven in the case at bar. Petitioner has not offered any argument
or proof that countervails such findings. HCITDc
The basic rule is that a criminal act is punishable under the law in force at the time of its
commission. Thus, petitioner can only be charged and found guilty under the Labor Code
which was in force in 1993 when the acts attributed to her were committed. Petitioner
was charged in 1998 under an Information that erroneously designated the offense as
covered by R.A. No. 8042, but alleged in its body acts which are punishable under the
Labor Code. As it was proven that petitioner had committed the acts she was charged
with, she was properly convicted under the Labor Code, and not under R.A. No. 8042.

There is no violation of the prohibition against ex post facto law nor a retroactive
application of R.A. No. 8042, as alleged by petitioner. An ex post facto law is one which,
among others, aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed or
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when committed. 16 Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature,
nonetheless have provisions defining offenses and prescribing penalties for their violation
Page |
operate prospectively. Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are
48
favorable to the accused. 17

R.A. No. 8042 amended pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and gave a new
definition of the crime of illegal recruitment and provided for its higher penalty. There is
no indication in R.A. No. 8042 that said law, including the penalties provided therein,
would take effect retroactively. A law can never be considered ex post facto as long as it
operates prospectively since its strictures would cover only offenses committed after and
not before its enactment. 18 Neither did the trial court nor the appellate court give R.A.
No. 8042 a retroactive application since both courts passed upon petitioner's case only
under the aegis of the Labor Code. The proceedings before the trial court and the
appellate court did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto law nor involved a
retroactive application of R.A. No. 8042 in any way.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 27 June 2005 and
Resolution dated 28 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. DTAcIa
SO ORDERED.
||| (Nasi-Villar v. People, G.R. No. 176169, November 14, 2008)

[G.R. Nos. 182978-79. April 7, 2009.]

BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND
PROMOTION,
INC., petitioner, vs. SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA (for
and in behalf of their daughter, Jasmin G. Cuaresma), WHITE FALCON
SERVICES, INC. and JAIME ORTIZ (President, White Falcon Services,
Inc.), respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 184298-99. April 7, 2009.]

The said person was brought to the Emergency Room of the

hospital; time 12.20 P.M. and she was unconscious, blue, no pulse,
no respiration and the first aid esd undertaken but without success.
3.Diagnosis and Opinion: Halt in blood circulation respiratory
system and brain damage due to an apparent poisoning which is
under investigation. 4
Name: Jasmin Cuaresma
Sex: Female
Marital Status: SingleNationality: Philipino (sic)

SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf of their

daughter, Jasmin G. Cuaresma), petitioners, vs. WHITE FALCON
SERVICES,
INC.
and
BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND
PROMOTION, INC., respondents.

These consolidated petitions assail the Amended Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
dated May 14, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80619 and CA-G.R. SP No. 81030 finding White
Falcon Services, Inc. and Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. solidarily liable
to indemnify spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma the amount of US$4,686.73 in actual
damages with interest. HTAEIS
On January 6, 1997, Jasmin Cuaresma (Jasmin) was deployed by
Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. 2 (Becmen) to serve as assistant nurse in
Al-Birk Hospital in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), for a contract duration of three
years, with a corresponding salary of US$247.00 per month.
Over a year later, she died allegedly of poisoning.
Jessie Fajardo, a co-worker of Jasmin, narrated that on June 21, 1998, Jasmin was found
dead by a female cleaner lying on the floor inside her dormitory room with her mouth
foaming and smelling of poison. 3
Based on the police report and the medical report of the examining physician of the AlBirk Hospital, who conducted an autopsy of Jasmin's body, the likely cause of her death
was poisoning. Thus:
According to letter No. 199, dated 27.2.1419H, issued by Al-Birk
Police Station, for examining the corpse of Jasmin Cuaresma, 12.20
P.M. 27.2.1419H, Sunday, at Al-Birk Hospital.
1.The Police Report on the Death
2.The Medical Diagnosis
Sex: Female Age: 25 years Relg: Christian

Religion: ChristianProfession: Nurse

Address: Al-Birk Genrl. HospitalBirth Place: The Philippines
On 27.2.1419H, Dr. Tariq Abdulminnem and Dr. Ashoki Komar,
both have examined the dead body of Jasmin Cuaresma, at 12.20
P.M., Sunday, 22.2.14189H, and the result was:
1.Report of the Police on the death
2.Medical Examination: Blue skin and paleness on the
Extrimes (sic), total halt to blood circulation and respiratory system
and brain damage. There were no external injuries. Likely
poisoning by taking poisonous substance, yet not determined.
There was a bad smell in the mouth and unknown to
us. 5 (Emphasis supplied)
Jasmin's body was repatriated to Manila on September 3, 1998. The following day, the
City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City conducted an autopsy and the resulting medical
report indicated that Jasmin died under violent circumstances, and not poisoning as
originally found by the KSA examining physician. The City Health Officer found that
Jasmin had abrasions at her inner lip and gums; lacerated wounds and abrasions on her
left and right ears; lacerated wounds and hematoma (contusions) on her elbows; abrasions
and hematoma on her thigh and legs; intra-muscular hemorrhage at the anterior chest; rib
fracture; puncture wounds; and abrasions on the labia minora of the vaginal area. 6
On March 11, 1999, Jasmin's remains were exhumed and examined by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The toxicology report of the NBI, however, tested
negative for non-volatile, metallic poison and insecticides. 7
Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas), Jasmin's parents and her surviving heirs,
received from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) the following
amounts: P50,000.00 for death benefits; P50,000.00 for loss of life; P20,000.00 for
funeral expenses; and P10,000.00 for medical reimbursement.
On November 22, 1999, the Cuaresmas filed a complaint against Becmen and its
principal in the KSA, Rajab & Silsilah Company (Rajab), claiming death and insurance
benefits, as well as moral and exemplary damages for Jasmin's death. 8 acAIES

Page |
49

In their complaint, the Cuaresmas claim that Jasmin's death was work-related, having
occurred at the employer's premises; 9 that under Jasmin's contract with Becmen, she is
entitled to "iqama insurance" coverage; that Jasmin is entitled to compensatory damages
in the amount of US$103,740.00, which is the sum total of her monthly salary of
US$247.00 per month under her employment contract, multiplied by 35 years (or the
remaining years of her productive life had death not supervened at age 25, assuming that
she lived and would have retired at age 60).
The Cuaresmas assert that as a result of Jasmin's death under mysterious circumstances,
they suffered sleepless nights and mental anguish. The situation, they claim, was
aggravated by findings in the autopsy and exhumation reports which evidently show that
a grave injustice has been committed against them and their daughter, for which those
responsible should likewise be made to pay moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees.
In their position paper, Becmen and Rajab insist that Jasmin committed suicide, citing a
prior unsuccessful suicide attempt sometime in March or April 1998 and relying on the
medical report of the examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital. They likewise deny
liability because the Cuaresmas already recovered death and other benefits totaling
P130,000.00 from the OWWA. They insist that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to "iqama
insurance" because this refers to the "issuance" not insurance of iqama, or
residency/work permit required in the KSA. On the issue of moral and exemplary
damages, they claim that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to the same because they have
not acted with fraud, nor have they been in bad faith in handling Jasmin's case.
While the case was pending, Becmen filed a manifestation and motion for substitution
alleging that Rajab terminated their agency relationship and had appointed White Falcon
Services, Inc. (White Falcon) as its new recruitment agent in the Philippines. Thus, White
Falcon was impleaded as respondent as well, and it adopted and reiterated Becmen's
arguments in the position paper it subsequently filed.
On February 28, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision 10 dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit. Giving weight to the medical report of the Al-Birk Hospital
finding that Jasmin died of poisoning, the Labor Arbiter concluded that Jasmin
committed suicide. In any case, Jasmin's death was not service-connected, nor was it
shown that it occurred while she was on duty; besides, her parents have received all
corresponding benefits they were entitled to under the law. In regard to damages, the
Labor Arbiter found no legal basis to warrant a grant thereof.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (Commission) reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. Relying on the findings of the City Health Officer of
Cabanatuan City and the NBI as contained in their autopsy and toxicology report,
respectively, the Commission, via its November 22, 2002 Resolution 11 declared that,
based on substantial evidence adduced, Jasmin was the victim of compensable workconnected criminal aggression. It disregarded the Al-Birk Hospital attending physician's
report as well as the KSA police report, finding the same to be inconclusive. It declared
that Jasmin's death was the result of an "accident" occurring within the employer's
premises that is attributable to her employment, or to the conditions under which she
lived, and thus arose out of and in the course of her employment as nurse. Thus, the

Cuaresmas are entitled to actual damages in the form of Jasmin's lost earnings, including
future earnings, in the total amount of US$113,000.00. The Commission, however,
dismissed all other claims in the complaint.
Becmen, Rajab and White Falcon moved for reconsideration, whereupon the Commission
issued its October 9, 2003 Resolution 12 reducing the award of US$113,000.00 as actual
damages to US$80,000.00. 13 The NLRC likewise declared Becmen and White Falcon as Page |
solidarily liable for payment of the award.
50
Becmen and White Falcon brought separate petitions for certiorari to the Court of
Appeals. 14 On June 28, 2006, the appellate court rendered its Decision, 15 the
dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the subject petitions are DENIED but in the
execution of the decision, it should first be enforced against White
Falcon Services and then against Becmen Services when it is
already impossible, impractical and futile to go against it (White
Falcon).
SO ORDERED. 16
The appellate court affirmed the NLRC's findings that Jasmin's death was compensable,
the same having occurred at the dormitory, which was contractually provided by the
employer. Thus her death should be considered to have occurred within the employer's
premises, arising out of and in the course of her employment.
Becmen and White Falcon moved for reconsideration. On May 14, 2008, the appellate
court rendered the assailed Amended Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, as
follows: HAcaCS
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are GRANTED.
Accordingly, the award of US$80,000.00 in actual damages is
hereby reduced to US$4,686.73 plus interest at the legal rate
computed from the time it became due until fully paid. Petitioners
are hereby adjudged jointly and solidarily liable with the employer
for the monetary awards with Becmen Service Exporter and
Promotions, Inc. having a right of reimbursement from White
Falcon Services, Inc.
SO ORDERED. 17
In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals found that although Jasmin's death was
compensable, however, there is no evidentiary basis to support an award of actual
damages in the amount of US$80,000.00. Nor may lost earnings be collected, because the
same may be charged only against the perpetrator of the crime or quasi-delict. Instead,
the appellate court held that Jasmin's beneficiaries should be entitled only to the sum
equivalent of the remainder of her 36-month employment contract, or her monthly salary
of US$247.00 multiplied by nineteen (19) months, with legal interest.

Becmen filed the instant petition for review on certiorari (G.R. Nos. 182978-79). The
Cuaresmas, on the other hand, moved for a reconsideration of the amended decision, but
it was denied. They are now before us via G.R. Nos. 184298-99.
On October 6, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 184298-99 with G.R.
Nos. 182978-79.
In G.R. Nos. 182978-79, Becmen raises the following issues for our resolution:
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
GAVE MORE CREDENCE AND WEIGHT TO THE AUTOPSY
REPORT CONDUCTED BY THE CABANATUAN CITY
HEALTH OFFICE THAN THE MEDICAL AND POLICE
REPORTS ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH OF
KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND AL-BIRK HOSPITAL.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ON
THE BASIS OF THE POSITION PAPERS AND ANNEXES
THERETO INCLUDING THE AUTOPSY REPORT, IT
CONCLUDED THAT THE DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA
WAS CAUSED BY CRIMINAL AGGRESSION.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
HELD THAT THE DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA WAS
COMPENSABLE PURSUANT TO THE RULING OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN TALLER VS. YNCHAUSTI, G.R. NO.
35741, DECEMBER 20, 1932, WHICH IT FOUND TO BE STILL
GOOD LAW.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
HELD BECMEN LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF JASMIN
CUARESMA NOTWITHSTANDING ITS ADMISSIONS THAT
"IQAMA INSURANCE" WAS A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR
SINCE "IQAMA" IS NOT AN INSURANCE.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT THE DEATH OF JASMIN WAS WORK
RELATED.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
HELD BECMEN LIABLE TO JASMIN'S BENEFICIARIES FOR
THE REMAINDER OF HER 36-MONTH CONTRACT
COMPUTED IN THIS MANNER: MONTHLY SALARY OF
US$246.67 MULTIPLIED BY 19 MONTHS, THE REMAINDER
OF THE TERM OF JASMIN'S EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, IS
EQUAL TO US$4,686.73.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
HELD BECMEN LIABLE TO PAY INTEREST AT THE LEGAL
RATE FROM THE TIME IT WAS DUE UNTIL FULLY PAID.

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT

HELD BECMEN AND WHITE FALCON JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY
LIABLE
WITH
THE
EMPLOYER
NOTWITHSTANDING THE ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITY
EXECUTED BY WHITE FALCON IN FAVOR OF BECMEN.
On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 184298-99, the Cuaresmas raise the following issues:
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING
THE PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE CONSIDERED
GENERAL LAW DESPITE THE CASE BEING COVERED
BY E.O. 247, R.A. 8042 AND LABOR CODE CONSIDERED AS
SPECIAL LAWS. DCIEac
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
APPLYING THE DECEASED'S FUTURE EARNINGS WHICH
IS (AN) INHERENT FACTOR IN THE COMPUTATION OF
DEATH BENEFITS OF OVERSEAS FILIPINO CONTRACT
WORKERS.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN
REDUCING THE DEATH BENEFITS AWARDED BY NLRC
CONSIDERED FINDINGS OF FACT THAT CANNOT BE
DISTURBED THROUGH CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF
THE RULES OF COURT.
The issue for resolution is whether the Cuaresmas are entitled to monetary claims, by
way of benefits and damages, for the death of their daughter Jasmin.
The terms and conditions of Jasmin's 1996 Employment Agreement which she and her
employer Rajab freely entered into constitute the law between them. As a rule,
stipulations in an employment contract not contrary to statutes, public policy, public
order or morals have the force of law between the contracting parties. 18 An examination
of said employment agreement shows that it provides for no other monetary or other
benefits/privileges than the following:
1.1,300 rials (or US$247.00) monthly salary;
2.Free air tickets to KSA at the start of her contract and to the
Philippines at the end thereof, as well as for her vacation at
the end of each twenty four-monthservice;
3.Transportation to and from work;
4.Free living accommodations;
5.Free medical treatment, except for optical and dental operations,
plastic surgery charges and lenses, and medical treatment
obtained outside of KSA;

Page |
51

6.Entry visa fees will be shared equally between her and her
employer, but the exit/re-entry visa fees, fees for Iqama
issuance, renewal, replacement, passport renewal,
sponsorship transfer and other liabilities shall be borne by
her;
7.Thirty days paid vacation leave with round trip tickets to Manila
after twenty four-months of continuous service;
8.Eight days public holidays per year;
9.The indemnity benefit due her at the end of her service will be
calculated as per labor laws of KSA.
Thus, the agreement does not include provisions for insurance, or for accident, death or
other benefits that the Cuaresmas seek to recover, and which the labor tribunals and
appellate court granted variably in the guise of compensatory damages.
However, the absence of provisions for social security and other benefits does not make
Jasmin's employment contract infirm. Under KSA law, her foreign employer is not
obliged to provide her these benefits; and neither is Jasmin entitled to minimum wage
unless of course the KSA labor laws have been amended to the opposite effect, or that a
bilateral wage agreement has been entered into.
Our next inquiry is, should Jasmin's death be considered as work-connected and thus
compensable? The evidence indicates that it is not. At the time of her death, she was not
on duty, or else evidence to the contrary would have been adduced. Neither was she
within hospital premises at the time. Instead, she was at her dormitory room on personal
time when she died. Neither has it been shown, nor does the evidence suggest, that at the
time she died, Jasmin was performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental to her
employment as nurse, because she was at her dormitory room. It is reasonable to suppose
that all her work is performed at the Al-Birk Hospital, and not at her dormitory room.
We cannot expect that the foreign employer should ensure her safety even while she is
not on duty. It is not fair to require employers to answer even for their employees'
personal time away from work, which the latter are free to spend of their own choosing.
Whether they choose to spend their free time in the pursuit of safe or perilous
undertakings, in the company of friends or strangers, lovers or enemies, this is not one
area which their employers should be made accountable for. While we have emphasized
the need to observe official work time strictly, 19 what an employee does on free time is
beyond the employer's sphere of inquiry. aHcDEC
While the "employer's premises" may be defined very broadly not only to include
premises owned by it, but also premises it leases, hires, supplies or uses, 20 we are not
prepared to rule that the dormitory wherein Jasmin stayed should constitute employer's
premises as would allow a finding that death or injury therein is considered to have been
incurred or sustained in the course of or arose out of her employment. There are certainly
exceptions, 21 but they do not appear to apply here. Moreover, a complete determination
would have to depend on the unique circumstances obtaining and the overall factual
environment of the case, which are here lacking.

But, did Jasmin commit suicide? Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon vehemently insist that
she did; thus, her heirs may not claim benefits or damages based on criminal aggression.
On the other hand, the Cuaresmas do not believe so.
The Court cannot subscribe to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide while halfway into
her employment contract. It is beyond human comprehension that a 25-year-old Filipina,
in the prime of her life and working abroad with a chance at making a decent living with Page |
a high-paying job which she could not find in her own country, would simply commit 52
suicide for no compelling reason.
The Saudi police and autopsy reports which state that Jasmin is a likely/or
apparent victim of poisoning are patently inconclusive. They are thus unreliable as
evidence.
On the contrary, the autopsy report of the Cabanatuan City Health Officer and the
exhumation report of the NBI categorically and unqualifiedly show that Jasmin sustained
external and internal injuries, specifically abrasions at her inner lip and gums;
lacerated wounds and abrasions on her left and right ears; lacerated wounds and
hematoma (contusions) on her elbows; abrasions and hematoma on her thigh and
legs; intra-muscular hemorrhage at the anterior chest; a fractured rib; puncture
wounds; and abrasions on the labia minora of the vaginal area. The NBI toxicology
report came up negative on the presence of poison.
All these show that Jasmin was manhandled and possibly raped prior to her death.
Even if we were to agree with the Saudi police and autopsy reports that indicate Jasmin
was poisoned to death, we do not believe that it was self-induced. If ever Jasmin was
poisoned, the assailants who beat her up and possibly raped her are certainly
responsible therefor.
We are not exactly ignorant of what goes on with our OFWs. Nor is the rest of the world
blind to the realities of life being suffered by migrant workers in the hands of some
foreign employers. It is inconceivable that our Filipina women would seek employment
abroad and face uncertainty in a foreign land, only to commit suicide for unexplained
reasons. Deciding to leave their family, loved ones, and the comfort and safety of home,
to work in a strange land requires unrivaled strength and courage. Indeed, many of our
women OFWs who are unfortunate to end up with undesirable employers have been there
more times than they care to, beaten up and broken in body yet they have remained
strong in mind, refusing to give up the will to live. Raped, burned with cigarettes, kicked
in the chest with sharp high-heeled shoes, starved for days or even weeks, stabbed, slaved
with incessant work, locked in their rooms, forced to serve their masters naked, grossly
debased, dehumanized and insulted, their spirits fought on and they lived for the day that
they would once again be reunited with their families and loved ones. Their bodies
surrendered, but their will to survive remained strong.
It is surprising, therefore, that Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon should insist on suicide,
without even lifting a finger to help solve the mystery of Jasmin's death. Being in the
business of sending OFWs to work abroad, Becmen and White Falcon should know what
happens to some of our OFWs. It is impossible for them to be completely unaware that
cruelties and inhumanities are inflicted on OFWs who are unfortunate to be employed by

vicious employers, or upon those who work in communities or environments where they
are liable to become victims of crime. By now they should know that our women OFWs
do not readily succumb to the temptation of killing themselves even when assaulted,
abused, starved, debased and, worst, raped.
Indeed, what we have seen is Rajab and Becmen's revolting scheme of conveniently
avoiding responsibility by clinging to the absurd theory that Jasmin took her own life.
Abandoning their legal, moral and social obligation (as employer and recruiter) to assist
Jasmin's family in obtaining justice for her death, they immediately gave up on Jasmin's
case, which has remained under investigation as the autopsy and police reports
themselves indicate. Instead of taking the cudgels for Jasmin, who had no relative or
representative in the KSA who would naturally demand and seek an investigation of her
case, Rajab and Becmen chose to take the most convenient route to avoiding and denying
liability, by casting Jasmin's fate to oblivion. It appears from the record that to this date,
no follow up of Jasmin's case was ever made at all by them, and they seem to have
expediently treated Jasmin's death as a closed case. Despite being given the lead via the
autopsy and toxicology reports of the Philippine authorities, they failed and refused to act
and pursue justice for Jasmin's sake and to restore honor to her name. IcEACH
Indeed, their nonchalant and uncaring attitude may be seen from how Jasmin's remains
were repatriated. No official representative from Rajab or Becmen was kind enough to
make personal representations with Jasmin's parents, if only to extend their condolences
or sympathies; instead, a mere colleague, nurse Jessie Fajardo, was designated to
accompany Jasmin's body home.
Of all life's tragedies, the death of one's own child must be the most painful for a parent.
Not knowing why or how Jasmin's life was snuffed out makes the pain doubly unbearable
for Jasmin's parents, and further aggravated by Rajab, Becmen, and White Falcon's
baseless insistence and accusation that it was a self-inflicted death, a mortal sin by any
religious standard.
Thus we categorically hold, based on the evidence; the actual experiences of our OFWs;
and the resilient and courageous spirit of the Filipina that transcends the vilest
desecration of her physical self, that Jasmin did not commit suicide but a victim of
murderous aggression.
Rajab, Becmen, and White Falcon's indifference to Jasmin's case has caused
unfathomable pain and suffering upon her parents. They have turned away from their
moral obligation, as employer and recruiter and as entities laden with social and civic
obligations in society, to pursue justice for and in behalf of Jasmin, her parents and those
she left behind. Possessed with the resources to determine the truth and to pursue justice,
they chose to stand idly for the sake of convenience and in order that they may avoid
pecuniary liability, turning a blind eye to the Philippine authorities' autopsy and
toxicology reports instead of taking action upon them as leads in pursuing justice for
Jasmin's death. They have placed their own financial and corporate interests above their
moral and social obligations, and chose to secure and insulate themselves from the
perceived responsibility of having to answer for and indemnify Jasmin's heirs for her
death.

Under Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. 8042), or the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, 22 the State shall, at all times, uphold the dignity of its citizens
whether in country or overseas, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in
particular. 23 The State shall provide adequate and timely social, economic and legal
services to Filipino migrant workers. 24 The rights and interest of distressed 25 overseas
Filipinos, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular, documented or
Page |
undocumented, are adequately protected and safeguarded. 26
Becmen and White Falcon, as licensed local recruitment agencies, miserably failed to
abide by the provisions of R.A. 8042. Recruitment agencies are expected to extend
assistance to their deployed OFWs, especially those in distress. Instead, they abandoned
Jasmin's case and allowed it to remain unsolved to further their interests and avoid
anticipated liability which parents or relatives of Jasmin would certainly exact from them.
They willfully refused to protect and tend to the welfare of the deceased Jasmin, treating
her case as just one of those unsolved crimes that is not worth wasting their time and
resources on. The evidence does not even show that Becmen and Rajab lifted a finger to
provide legal representation and seek an investigation of Jasmin's case. Worst of all, they
unnecessarily trampled upon the person and dignity of Jasmin by standing pat on the
argument that Jasmin committed suicide, which is a grave accusation given its unChristian nature.
We cannot reasonably expect that Jasmin's parents should be the ones to actively pursue a
just resolution of her case in the KSA, unless they are provided with the finances to
undertake this herculean task. Sadly, Becmen and Rajab did not lend any assistance at all
in this respect. The most Jasmin's parents can do is to coordinate with Philippine
authorities as mandated under R.A. 8042, obtain free legal assistance and secure the aid
of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Labor and Employment, the
POEA and the OWWA in trying to solve the case or obtain relief, in accordance with
Section 23 27 of R.A. 8042. To our mind, the Cuaresmas did all that was within their
power, short of actually flying to the KSA. Indeed, the Cuaresmas went even further. To
the best of their abilities and capacities, they ventured to investigate Jasmin's case on
their own: they caused another autopsy on Jasmin's remains as soon as it arrived to
inquire into the true cause of her death. Beyond that, they subjected themselves to the
painful and distressful experience of exhuming Jasmin's remains in order to obtain
another autopsy for the sole purpose of determining whether or not their daughter was
poisoned. Their quest for the truth and justice is equally to be expected of all loving
parents. All this time, Rajab and Becmen instead of extending their full cooperation to
the Cuaresma family merely sat on their laurels in seeming unconcern.
In Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC, 28 a seaman who was being
repatriated after his employment contract expired, failed to make his Bangkok to Manila
connecting flight as he began to wander the streets of Bangkok aimlessly. He was shot to
death by Thai police four days after, on account of running amuck with a knife in hand
and threatening to harm anybody within sight. The employer, sued for death and other
benefits as well as damages, interposed as defense the provision in the seafarer agreement
which provides that "no compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury,
incapacity, disability or death resulting from a willful act on his own life by the seaman."
The Court rejected the defense on the view, among others, that the recruitment agency
should have observed some precautionary measures and should not have allowed the

53

seaman, who was later on found to be mentally ill, to travel home alone, and its failure to
do so rendered it liable for the seaman's death. We ruled therein that HCEcAa
The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to
provide a companion for a returning employee, but it cannot deny
that it was expressly tasked by its agreement to assure the safe
return of said worker. The uncaring attitude displayed by
petitioners who, knowing fully well that its employee had been
suffering from some mental disorder, nevertheless still allowed
him to travel home alone, is appalling to say the least. Such
attitude harks back to another time when the landed gentry
practically owned the serfs, and disposed of them when the
latter had grown old, sick or otherwise lost their
usefulness. 29(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, more than just recruiting and deploying OFWs to their foreign principals,
recruitment agencies have equally significant responsibilities. In a foreign land where
OFWs are likely to encounter uneven if not discriminatory treatment from the foreign
government, and certainly a delayed access to language interpretation, legal aid, and the
Philippine consulate, the recruitment agencies should be the first to come to the rescue of
our distressed OFWs since they know the employers and the addresses where they are
deployed or stationed. Upon them lies the primary obligation to protect the rights and
ensure the welfare of our OFWs, whether distressed or not. Who else is in a better
position, if not these recruitment agencies, to render immediate aid to their deployed
OFWs abroad?
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. Article 21 of the Code states that any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. And, lastly, Article 24 requires that in
all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on
account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or
other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.

Clearly, Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon's acts and omissions are against public policy
because they undermine and subvert the interest and general welfare of our OFWs
abroad, who are entitled to full protection under the law. They set an awful example of
how foreign employers and recruitment agencies should treat and act with respect to their
distressed employees and workers abroad. Their shabby and callous treatment of Jasmin's
case; their uncaring attitude; their unjustified failure and refusal to assist in the
determination of the true circumstances surrounding her mysterious death, and instead
finding satisfaction in the unreasonable insistence that she committed suicide just so they
can conveniently avoid pecuniary liability; placing their own corporate interests above of
the welfare of their employee's all these are contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy, and constitute taking advantage of the poor employee and her family's

ignorance, helplessness, indigence and lack of power and resources to seek the truth and
obtain justice for the death of a loved one.
Giving in handily to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide, and adamantly insisting on it
just to protect Rajab and Becmen's material interest despite evidence to the contrary
is against the moral law and runs contrary to the good custom of not denouncing one's
fellowmen for alleged grave wrongdoings that undermine their good name and honor. 30 Page |
Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle
of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary
notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in keeping with the basic public policy of the
State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers
and employers. This ruling is likewise rendered imperative by Article 17 of the Civil
Code which states that laws which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. 31
The relations between capital and labor are so impressed with public interest, 32 and
neither shall act oppressively against the other, or impair the interest or convenience of
the public. 33 In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be
construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer. 34
The grant of moral damages to the employee by reason of misconduct on the part of the
employer is sanctioned by Article 2219 (10) 35 of the Civil Code, which allows recovery
of such damages in actions referred to in Article 21. 36
Thus, in view of the foregoing, the Court holds that the Cuaresmas are entitled to moral
damages, which Becmen and White Falcon are jointly and solidarily liable to pay,
together with exemplary damages for wanton and oppressive behavior, and by way of
example for the public good.
Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based
employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment. This
joint and solidary liability imposed by law against recruitment agencies and foreign
employers is meant to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment
of what is due him. 37 If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the
corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be
jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims
and damages. 38 DAEcIS
White Falcon's assumption of Becmen's liability does not automatically result in
Becmen's freedom or release from liability. This has been ruled in ABD Overseas
Manpower Corporation v. NLRC. 39 Instead, both Becmen and White Falcon should be
held liable solidarily, without prejudice to each having the right to be reimbursed under
the provision of the Civil Code that whoever pays for another may demand from the
debtor what he has paid. 40
WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2008 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 80619 and CA-G.R. SP No. 81030 is SET ASIDE. Rajab & Silsilah

54

Company, White Falcon Services, Inc., Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.,
and their corporate directors and officers are found jointly and solidarily liable and
ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of Jasmin Cuaresma, spouses Simplicio and Mila
Cuaresma, the following amounts:
1)TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P2,500,000.00) as moral damages;
2)TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P2,500,000.00) as exemplary damages;
3)Attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total
monetary award; and,
4)Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. v. Spouses Cuaresma, G.R. Nos.
182978-79, 184298-99, April 07, 2009)

Page |
55