Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Investment
Understanding Australias Competitive Position
September 2006
Final Report to Medicines Australia and Research Australia
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Disclaimer:
While The Allen Consulting Group endeavours to provide reliable analysis and believes the
material it presents is accurate, it will not be liable for any claim by any party acting on such
information.
The Allen Consulting Group 2005
ii
Contents
Executive summary
Investment drivers
10
Chapter 1
12
12
17
20
Chapter 2
25
25
28
29
35
38
Chapter 3
44
44
45
iii
Chapter 4
65
65
4.2 The likely impact of the Action Agenda on the status quo
66
66
72
80
Appendix A
81
81
83
85
Appendix B
References
87
iv
Executive summary
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most knowledge-intensive industries
in many ways it is the classic science-based industry with new products emerging
from research breakthroughs and general developments in scientific knowledge.
Maintaining a supply pipeline of innovative drugs is an imperative for longer-term
success.
The leading companies devote around 18 per cent of their turnover to R&D and
employ large numbers of highly qualified research staff. For example, in 2004
Pfizer, the worlds largest pharmaceuticals company, spent approximately $US7.7
billion on R&D out of revenues of $US50 billion. The industry accounts for a
significant proportion of total business R&D globally. The market capitalisation of
the leading companies is very large, placing these companies among the biggest in
the world by this measure.
In the main, the innovative pharmaceutical companies have tended to locate their
corporate R&D labs in North America and Western Europe. For a number of
reasons, clinical trials, where scale economies do not play such an important role as
they do with discovery research, are conducted in many locations.
Large scale manufacturing of active ingredients tends to be concentrated on a
relatively small number of highly capital-intensive plants. The output of these
plants is provided to formulation and packaging plants, which are more
geographically dispersed in their location and generally speaking, operate at
somewhat smaller volumes than actives plants.
Important changes in the global industry
Over the last decade there has been a process of consolidation and rationalisation
under way in the global pharmaceutical industry. Mergers and acquisitions among
the leading companies are likely to continue to be driven by the economic realities
of the high costs of R&D, shortening product life cycles and large marketing field
forces, and by the increasing difficulty of generating blockbuster drugs. More
recently, the biotechnology revolution, especially in genomics and proteomics, has
caused the leading innovative pharmaceutical companies to go outside their
corporate labs in search of new drug candidates. This has resulted in a rise in extramural R&D and the establishment of strategic alliances with small biotechnology
companies.
Generic drugs are becoming more important as large selling prescription drugs
come out of patent protection and governments around the world seek to contain
medical costs.
Reflecting the nature of the pharmaceutical industry, countries are competing
actively to attract investment in both R&D and manufacturing. Ireland and
Singapore in particular offer generous tax arrangements to attract major actives
manufacturing plants. Singapore is seeking to build up its biomedical research base
to attract R&D by the pharmaceutical companies.
The recent rise of biopharmaceuticals has also altered the research landscape and
opened a new field of competition in addition to traditional small molecule
The Allen Consulting Group
In industries in which there are many competing companies and R&D and patent
protection plays a limited role, investment decisions tend to be based on purely
economic factors. Companies will locate their R&D and production facilities
based on the consideration of economic factors, which loom large in determining
the rate of return expected from their investments, such as:
costs of production;
The literature on direct foreign investment suggests that the investing firm is
generally looking for one or a mix of three main types of advantages in making
foreign investment decisions:
access to markets.
Given that most developed countries, and many emerging countries, have low tariff
barriers, the need to invest in a particular country to access its market is much less
than it was in the past, although this consideration still plays a role in large
The Allen Consulting Group
emerging countries like China and India. Our focus in this report is on the first two
sources of advantage generally speaking, the worlds leading pharmaceutical
companies are able to access the Australian market without the need for local
production facilities.
Underlying the distinction between investments driven by the search for lower cost
locations (cost driven investments) and those driven by the search for specialised
resources (non-cost driven investments) is a difference between generalised and
specialised resources. The former are resources that can in principle be operated
equally well in a large number of countries. Specialised resources are by their
nature much more differentiated in terms of their quality and productivity and tend
to be much more country specific. Important examples for the innovative
pharmaceuticals companies are a high quality local science capability and a strong
clinical research base.
The importance of strategic factors in investment decisions
Just how important these kinds of factors are in practice is difficult to establish with
precision. On the other hand, it would be dangerous to assume they can be ignored
as they appear to influence perceptions held by the worlds leading innovative
pharmaceuticals companies about the attractiveness or otherwise of investing in
particular countries. For example, strategic factors clearly appear to have influenced
investment decisions in New Zealand, where its reimbursement scheme and small
market size have resulted in a significant reduction in pharmaceutical industry
2
activity. The influence of strategic factors can also be observed in Western Europe,
where rates of growth in R&D investment have slowed in Europe, with
reimbursement regimes cited as a significant contributing factor. This would
suggest that there is a nexus between the underlying economics of the prospective
project and other factors, such as market size and reimbursement schemes. As many
nations are competitive in economic terms, strategic factors become increasingly
important. Strategic factors can affect the general level of investment attention and
effort that a country receives from key decision makers within a firm and in some
cases may impact on decisions between competing investment locations.
The British Pharma Group is comprised of GSK and AstraZeneca, which represent a significant proportion of
the UK market. In 2004, these two companies invested 1.8 billion in R&D in the UK, out of a total global
R&D spend of 4.7 billion. This level of investment made The British Pharma Group companies the first and
second largest private sector contributors to R&D in the UK. As well as R&D, these companies also conduct a
significant amount of their manufacturing in the UK, generating exports worth 6.5 billion in 2004. Source:
British Pharma Group, 2005, The British Pharma Group (BPG) on Competitiveness and Investment Criteria.
Clarke, Lesley, 2005, Lessons from the Kiwi Model, Researched Medicines Industry Association of New
Zealand, Conference paper from The Future of the PBS, 24 August 2005, Sydney.
Faced with the reality that the leading innovative pharmaceutical companies
account for a very substantial part of R&D and manufacturing investment in the
industry, and understanding the basis upon which companies are thought to take
decisions, potential host governments have tended to take two kinds of action to
improve the prospects of attracting pharmaceutical investment.
First, reflecting the view that economic factors drive investment decisions, to
attract and retain investment, they have sought to use appropriate levers for
securing various types of investment. For example, with regard to attracting
discovery research investment, which is driven by the search for good ideas, host
countries have invested in their research related specialised resources and
capabilities that are most relevant to the interests of the pharmaceutical industry.
They have also in some cases offered generous R&D tax credits. To attract clinical
trials they have sought to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their
regulatory systems governing the conduct of such trials, and have sought to align
their clinical practice with world standards. To attract and retain manufacturing
investment, especially large scale investment in actives plants where cost drivers
predominate in importance, some governments have offered extremely generous
taxation arrangements.
Second, reflecting the view that strategic factors as well as economic factors
drive investment decisions, some countries have engaged with the innovative
pharmaceutical companies to strike balances between obtaining the lowest possible
price for pharmaceuticals and providing incentives for the development of
innovative drugs. Such incentives can come in the form of pricing behaviour, patent
life protection or direct subsidies for some products. Countries have also sought to
convey clear messages to the innovative pharmaceuticals companies at the highest
levels that they value their presence and will make every effort to understand their
investment drivers and take appropriate action to provide an attractive environment
for them beyond issues of pricing and remuneration.
The Australian situation
researchers.
An emerging set of bio-medical companies.
Manufacturing
A number of formulation and packaging manufacturing plants that are able
which can render commercialisation efforts more difficult and has in the
past limited some networking among Australian scientists.
Innovation gaps in infrastructure, funding and skills, in both medicinal
chemistry and biopharmaceutical R&D. These gaps are critical in that they
risk either the value of the idea being overlooked because it is perceived to
be too risky, or the intellectual property being purchased and
commercialised overseas, such that the benefits of the innovation are
captured by other parties.
Despite its considerable strengths, the global and domestic environments affecting
the pharmaceuticals industry mean that Australia is currently facing some major
challenges at key points in the value chain. Australias ability to tackle these
challenges will influence whether or not the Australian pharmaceuticals industry is
able to meet the goal in the Pharmaceuticals Industry Action Agenda of doubling its
share of the global industry by 2012.
Discovery Research
While Australia has a high quality biomedical research capability that punches
above its weight in terms of contributing to global biomedical research, there
are very considerable challenges in ensuring that it is well connected to the
requirements of the multinational pharmaceuticals companies. This includes in
the main the need to ensure that the infrastructure, funding and skills are
available for Australian researchers to progress their research to commercially
3
viable stages of development.
The influence of the PBS negative head office perceptions of Australia, risks
arising from monopsonistic power
Banscott Health Consulting Pty Ltd., 2005, Report of the Review of Access to Unapproved Therapeutic Goods,
22 February, p16.
This updated the 2001 survey conducted by the Lewin Group for the Pharmaceutical Industry Action Agenda.
See The Lewin Group, 2001, Analysis of Investment Decisions by the International Pharmaceutical Industry
and the Competitive Position of Australia, presented to the Pharmaceuticals Industry Action Agenda, Working
Group 2, Strategic Factors and Decision Making for Investment, December.
Figure ES.1
Much better
Better
Worse
Much worse
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Reform the PBS to send a strong, positive signal to industry and improve head
office perceptions of Australian market Several studies examining the link
between investment patterns of MNEs and reimbursement schemes have
shown that there is a discernable relationship between pricing arrangements
and pharmaceutical industry investment. Clear examples of reductions in
prices for patented products leading to reductions in industry investment
6
7
include New Zealand and Germany. Conversely, it has been argued that
Quebec stands out as a case where strong patent protection (via the 15-year
rule) has been rewarded with significant additional investment by the
8
pharmaceutical industry. Consultations with industry and the survey of
headquarter offices suggested that the current reimbursement arrangements in
Australia may already affecting industry decisions in the context of an
increasing adoption of pricing models (similar to the Australian PBS)
worldwide.
The strongest possible signal the Australian government could send to industry
would be to reform the pricing and listing environment for innovative
medicines to address the negative perceptions of the Australian market that
currently limit MNE interest in investing in Australia. This is in line with the
Action Agendas goal of raising the profile of the industry globally to increase
attention paid by MNEs. This reform would also support the National
Medicines Policy goal of fostering a vibrant medicines industry, and further
would result in coherence between Australias health policy actions and its
industrial policy aims.
Close the innovation gap and encouraging scale among researchers The
Action Agenda currently has a taskforce charged with bringing a mammalian
cell biopharmaceutical plant into Australia and the R&D Taskforce has also
been developing strategies for developing improved IP outcomes beyond the
skills of individual scientists. The Government should support all efforts to
bring this into the market if it is serious about developing Australia as a key
alliancing-opportunity region. In addition to these actions, to close the
innovation gap Government also needs to:
provide support for additional medicinal chemistry infrastructure and skills
development;
review current grant structures in light of adverse behaviours around patent
Data on company disinvestment is supplied in Chapter 2. See also Clarke, L., 2005, Lessons from the Kiwi
Model, Researched Medicines Industry Association of New Zealand, Conference paper from The Future of the
PBS, 24 August 2005, Sydney and the Boston Consulting Group, 2004, Pharmaceutical Companies and
Biotechnology Cluster Development: New Zealand Case Study.
Gilbert, J. and P. Rosenberg, 2005, Addressing the Innovation Divide, Annual Meeting 2004 Governors of the
World Economic Forum for Healthcare, 22 January, Davos.
The Quebec Department of Finance, Economics and Research, 2003, An application of the computable general
equilibrium model for Quebec: Impacts of the abolishment of the 15-year rule, Canada.
Address the current threats to clinical trials R&D The major threats to
Australias current strong clinical trials R&D track record are:
added regulatory requirements recommended in the Bansemer Report that
may delay trial completion times, such as those that may arise due to
separations of scientific and ethical evaluations;
lower cost competitors in trials and services, including Phase II and III
trials (where the majority of growth has been since the introduction of CTN
trials) and bio-informatics services; and
current reimbursement policies, which may reduce clinical trials activity
because companies will not want to conduct trials in countries where they
do not intend to apply for listing.
There are currently efforts underway to address existing inefficiencies as well
as potential future hurdles. These actions need to be supported. There should
not be any separation of scientific and ethics assessments and further, mutual
recognition of an accredited, lead HREC should become the model for
regulation of unapproved therapeutic goods in Australia. This should result in
lower average times to approval, without reducing the safety or ethicality of
trials. Moreover, it should result in a more consistent trials process.
In addition to the above efficiency improvements, the Government will need to
take action to address the growing impact of the disparity between labour costs
in Australia compared to other regional competitors such as India and China.
This may be accomplished through the successor program to the P3 scheme,
and should be a major consideration to the development of the design of this
industry program.
10
the provision of highly skilled and well paying jobs (the industry currently
employs around 36,000 people, at an average wage near double that of the
average wage for other manufacturing jobs), which in turn result in
productivity spillovers in other industries;
11
Chapter 1
Key players
Headquarters
Annual R&D
expenditure
Annual Sales
Pfizer
GlaxoSmithKline
London, UK
Novartis
Basel, Switzerland
Sanofi-Aventis
Paris, France
Merck & Co
AstraZeneca
London, UK
Bristol-Myers Squibb
Wyeth
Roche
Basel, Switzerland
10
11
Messinis, G., 2002, Working Paper No. 7: The Australian Pharmaceutical Industry in its Global Context, The
Centre for Strategic Economic Studies, Victoria University.
See for example, Gilbert, J. and P. Rosenberg, 2004, Addressing the Innovation Divide: Imbalanced
Innovation, Annual Meeting 2004 Governors of the World Economic Forum for Healthcare, Davos, 22
January.
German Association of Research Based Pharmaceutical Companies, www.vfa.de/en.
12
The fifty largest firms are responsible for approximately 83 per cent of total global
pharmaceuticals sales, and the ten largest companies (Table 1.1) account for
approximately 50 per cent of global sales.
Recent trends indicate that the larger companies are consolidating their strong
market position. For instance, sales growth for the top 50 companies was 12 per
12
cent between 2002 and 2003 compared to an industry average of nine per cent.
Relatedly, the last decade has also been a decade of mergers and acquisitions, in an
attempt to release operational efficiencies. Mergers and acquisitions activity rose
13
steadily from 292 deals in 1999 to 568 in 2003 and 703 in 2004.
The pharmaceutical value chain and traditional business model
The pharmaceutical industry pivots on innovation innovation that is costly, timeconsuming and highly regulated by authorities such as the Australian Therapeutic
Goods Administration (TGA) and the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). It
is one of the largest contributors to privately funded R&D in the world. Global
R&D expenditure in the pharmaceutical industry has been estimated at $57 billion
14
per annum, which represents a high proportion of re-investment of sales in R&D
activities. For instance, MNEs were estimated to reinvest 18 per cent of their sales
15
revenue into R&D in 2002.
According to conservative estimates, the average time from drug discovery to
market is estimated to be 16.5 years and the average cost of bringing a drug to
16
market is approximately $1 billion (Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1
Pre-clinical
Phase I
20-100
volunteers
10,000
Compounds
Regulatory
Review
Clinical Trials
Large Scale
Manufacture
Phase III
1,000-5,000
volunteers
1
Approved
Drug
250
Compounds
Phase II
100-500
volunteers
5 Compounds
5 Years
1.5 Years
6 Years
2 Years
2 Years
$1 billion
Source: PhRMA, 2005, Pharmaceutical Industry Profile 2005, From Laboratory to Patient: Pathways to
Biopharmaceutical Innovation, Washington DC, p 4-5.
12
13
14
15
16
13
In terms of drug discovery, only one in ten drug targets identified will be brought to
market, and of all drugs brought to market only two in five provide returns in
17
excess of their risk adjusted cost of capital. The drug development process
(clinical trials R&D) is marked by similarly high costs and even longer time
commitments. This presents such high barriers to entry that generally only large
MNEs can afford to develop compounds.
Historically, counter-balancing the risks and costs associated with development was
the potential for substantial revenues from so-called blockbuster drugs, or drugs
with annual sales of over US$500 million.
These factors the high costs and risks of product development, the potential for
blockbuster drug development, the requirements of international regulatory regimes
and need for collaboration among quality researchers over long periods of time
shaped the development within the pharmaceutical industry of a vertically
18
integrated, linear business model. The key features of the traditional
pharmaceutical business model were strategically located, centralised discovery
R&D facilities, a small number of large manufacturing plants, and globally
dispersed clinical trials and sales offices:
Clinical trials R&D The large R&D labs of MNEs have been
complemented by globally dispersed clinical trials. Factors influencing the
greater global dispersion of clinical trials were that they did not benefit from
the same economies of scale as discovery R&D, the requirement for
heterogenous populations for testing and the diversity of regulatory regimes
across jurisdictions.
Supplementing key needs along all points of the value chain were also
pharmaceutical services. Historically, the services sector provided inputs and
assistance to the industry from discovery R&D to the distribution of the final
product, with a focus on the latter stages of drug development and distribution.
Examples of services offered by the sector include marketing services; management
services; training and staff development services; transport and distribution
17
18
Rasmussen, B., 2003, Aspects of the Pharmaceutical Business Model: Implications for Australia, Draft
Working Paper No. 15, Final Draft, Pharmaceutical Industry Project Working Paper Series, Centre for
Strategic Economic Studies, Victoria University of Technology, p 2.
The Walter and Eliza Hall Institute, 2005, CRC IID submission, unreleased draft.
14
services; and architectural and engineering services, for example the designers and
builders of pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities.
Industry changes and the evolution of the pharmaceutical business model
Forecast
40
30
20
10
0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
This has forced the industry to rethink their approaches to all aspects of the
traditional business model (Figure 1.3).
19
The Boston Consulting Group, 2004, Rising to the Productivity Challenge: A Strategic Framework for
Biopharma, May.
15
Figure 1.3
Traditional
pharmaceutical
business model
Evolving
pharmaceutical
business model
Contract
Research
Orgs
Product
development
cycle
Product
development
cycle
Tool
companies
ONE INTEGRATED COMPANY
Contract
Manufactures
Testing
services
20
16
tend to contract this work out to an organisation that can more efficiently
complete the work. Companies will also locate the clinical trial in the most
cost-competitive site, provided there are sufficient medical research
capabilities available to conduct the work.
The changes in the industry resulting from the decline of the blockbuster business
model have been reflected in changing investment patterns. It has lead to the reality
that capital, in particular manufacturing and clinical trial investments, could in
principle be put in many locations globally. It has also facilitated a continued
consolidation of major, in-house discovery R&D investments in the US, in parallel
to some increasing opportunities for third party organisations to partner with large
pharmaceutical firms on some research.
1.2
There are approximately 120 locally and foreign owned companies participating in
the Australian pharmaceutical industry, which comprises both local and
multinational subsidiary organisations.
The majority of industry players in Australia are subsidiary organisations. The
multinational manufacturers with subsidiaries in Australia include Merck, Pfizer,
GSK, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Novartis. Local manufacturers include CSL
Limited, Institute for Drug Technology (IDT), Mayne, Sigma and Alphapharm.
Some of these firms have significant secondary manufacturing infrastructure in
Australia, while others specialise in clinical trials R&D. There is little large-scale
manufacturing of active ingredients apart from some alkaloid production by GSK
and Janssen-Cilag.
21
Department of Health, 2000, National Medicines Policy, Commonwealth of Australia, Publication Number
2654, p 4.
17
Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 2006, Biotech Business indicators. June.
According to Melbourne Universitys 2005 R&D and Intellectual Property Scoreboard, three pharmaceutical
companies were among the 10 largest spenders on R&D in 2003-04.
18
value chain, this report discusses these services as related to discovery R&D,
clinical trials R&D and manufacturing within the context of these primary
activities.
Australian responses to global trends
The changes in the global environment have had the greatest impact on the existing
manufacturing sector in Australia. For instance, the global consolidation of
secondary manufacturing plants has led to the closure of several manufacturing
plants in Australia as new investments or re-investments have been generally
located in countries offering more competitive tax incentives.
An exception to this trend has been GSKs investment in manufacturing, which has
increased by roughly $60 million over the past five years. GSK has two significant
manufacturing operations at Port Fairy and Boronia, which have very different
purposes. The Port Fairy plant specialises in producing active pharmaceutical
alkaloid products, including morphine and codeine, based on processing poppies
grown in Tasmania. The plant accounts for about one-quarter of the worlds
medicinal opiate requirements. The Boronia plant is a secondary manufacturing
facility, which formulates and packages a range of prescribed pharmaceuticals.
GSK at Boronia has developed a specialised and flexible workforce able to produce
a wide range of products in a very flexible way the products are exported to
many countries. Part of the expansion of the Boronia plant, which is now the 8th
biggest plant in the GSK world, is due to picking up production that was dropped
due to the closure of smaller scale, less economic plants elsewhere in Asia-Pacific.
Similarly, other firms with specialised manufacturing capabilities, such as CSLs
adjuvant manufacturing facilities and IDTs niche, small scale production
24
facilities, have been insulated from the same rationalisation of manufacturing
capacity observed by other players in the Australian market, who generally compete
with other international plants to supply global manufacturing requirements.
The general picture for R&D has been brighter than the manufacturing story.
Global trends towards growing numbers of alliances by pharmaceutical companies
with external organisations have resulted in some increased investment in discovery
R&D in Australia. The growth of, and alliances with, the Australian biotechnology
sector is perhaps the most significant example of Australia leveraging investments
from new global pharmaceutical industry trends. However, in Australia there has
been less interest in biotechnology alliances from the big pharmaceutical industry
25
participants than in other countries, and it is generally expected that the big
battalion R&D investments will remain offshore, particularly within the US.
Nevertheless, with the growth of genomics and proteomics, the biotechnology
sector could potentially see increased growth in investment in the Australian
pharmaceutical industry, albeit from a small base.
In the past several decades, the Australian Government has launched several
incentive programs to attract pharmaceutical industry investment. The first
incentive program to directly target the pharmaceutical industry was the Factor (f),
24
25
IDT has small scale production facilities for APIs for human and veterinary use, including production of
anticancer (cytotoxic) APIs; finished dosage forms for clinical trial use; highly toxic or active materials such as
cytotoxics and cephalosporins; small scale non-toxic materials; and viral vaccines.
Rasmussen, B., 2004, Alliance Opportunities for Aus Biotech, Working Paper no. 23, Pharmaceutical
Industry Project Working Paper Series, Centre for Strategic Economic Studies, Victoria University of
Technology.
19
which ran from 1988 to 1994, and was followed by the Pharmaceutical Industry
Investment Program (PIIP). Many industry participants credit these programs as the
catalyst for the current levels of involvement by their company within Australia.
The current P3 program was developed with a view to build on the lessons from
previous programs, and commits $150 million from 2000 to 2005 to support
incremental investment in R&D by the industry in Australia. Several
pharmaceutical companies have utilised the program to fund some R&D
investments within Australia since its commencement, however, critics have
questioned whether this has attracted additional investment or merely subsidised
activities that would have otherwise occurred. There were concerns that the
incremental nature of funding results in too little money being spread over too
many parties. In August 2006, after consultation with the industry, the Government
implemented changes to the P3 program to allow larger companies to apply for the
support of their R&D initiatives. Currently there is no incentive program in
26
Australia aimed at increasing manufacturing investment.
1.3
Beyond the direct contribution that the industry makes due to the scale of its
activities, the characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry allow it to produce long
term and profound economic benefits that go beyond the direct benefits associated
with industry investment and activity. As noted by the DITR, industries which are
highly innovative should be cultivated because they stimulate further economic
27
growth, over and above the production they entail. For example, it has been
estimated that the rate of return to Australia was between two and five times the
28
actual expenditure. The sources of this return to the Australian economy and the
range of spillovers from industry investment include:
increases in the supply of skilled R&D professionals, and the wider, flow-on
impacts of that labour in the economy;
increased demand for Australian research outcome from higher quality preclinical candidates;
26
27
28
20
Together, these serve to increase demand for Australian output. Taken together,
each of these impacts can contribute to Australia achieving the status of a first-tier
innovator nation.
Export opportunities
Australian firms with a higher degree of foreign ownership generally have a higher
29
than average export propensity. This can be attributed to the fact that companies
with a higher degree of foreign ownership are likely to have a more global or
outward focus, and are able to compete in the global market. This may be through
better understanding of international standards and best practice, access to markets,
or a knowledge of overseas supply networks. This is not to say that domestic firms
lack this knowledge. However, the costs of gathering this information for a firm
with a significant degree of foreign ownership is likely to be far less than for a fully
domestic firm.
Pharmaceuticals are Australias third largest elaborately transformed manufactured
export after automobiles and wine, totalling almost $2.6 billion annually. While
Australias exports of elaborately transformed manufactures represent a relatively
small part of Australias total exports of goods and services, they are significant as
they tend to embody significant inputs of R&D, design and engineering and other
knowledge-based elements where spillover benefits are likely to be important. The
production of such products is skill intensive and employees tend to be paid higher
than average wages. The competition worldwide to attract investments involving
the production of elaborately transformed manufactures reflects the value that is
placed on them by governments.
Moreover, there are significant reputation benefits to be gained from strong export
performance in elaborately transformed manufactures. Such exports tend to be seen
as a reflection of a nations innovative capacity and contribute to Australias
reputation as a modern, knowledge-based economy and society.
Improved living standards
30
Access Economics, 2004, The Benefits of Inward Foreign Direct Investment to the Australian Economy A
report for Invest Australia, Canberra, Canberra, p. 19.
Econtech, 2002, The Economic Contribution of the Australian Prescription Pharmaceutical Industry: Report
to APMA, quoted in Medicines and Health, 1(6), 1 June 2002.
21
32
33
Consultations with government experts indicated that Australia might have four times as many biotechs being
launched as in the US but that the majority of these would fail in Australia whereas firms in the US were far
more likely to succeed.
Department of Education Science and Training, 2003, Mapping Australian Science and Innovation,
Commonwealth of Australia, p 18.
http://backingaus.innovation.gov.au/, accessed September 2006.
22
Science and Innovation Committee points to the high priority given to science and
innovation issues by the Australian Government. The setting of National Research
Priorities exemplifies a trend to identify priorities to guide investment.
The states and territories, too, are taking an increasingly active role through the rollout of strategies and initiatives such as Queenslands Smart State, Victorias
Science, Technology and Innovation Initiative, New South Wales BioFirst Strategy
and Western Australias Innovate WA policy.
In contrast to public expenditure on R&D, Australias BERD as a share of GDP is
34
0.95 per cent, whereas the OECD average is 1.53 per cent in 2004-05. Moreover,
in 2004 Australia ranked 12th in the OECD, up from 16th in 2000, in the share of
gross expenditure on R&D undertaken by business (48.8 per cent) compared to the
35
OECD average of just under 62 per cent. Thus, attracting pharmaceutical
investment remains a significant opportunity for injecting commercial funding into
realising returns on public sector investments.
Contributing to Australia becoming a first-tier innovator nation
34
http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs@.nsf/39433889d406eeb9ca2570610019e9a5/bae5fb25d2121f6dca256
8a9001393ef!OpenDocument, accessed September 2006.
35
36
23
24
Chapter 2
market demand.
In practice, given the opening of markets around the world to international markets
trade, with the exception of gaining access to very large emerging countries and
markets such as China and India, investors tend to be driven either by the search for
low cost locations and/or accessing specialised resources and skills.
Typically investment decisions involve a mix of two kinds of resources:
specialised resources.
It should be noted that the discussions of investment patterns and decisions in each section of the value chain
could be easily expanded into their own respective analyses. Indeed, many studies have been completed that
focus in on only one narrow elements of the value chain. It is not possible for this report to provide the same
level of detail for every type of investment. The aim is to identify the drivers to a sufficient extent such that
levers for increasing general areas of investment can be identified.
25
investing company will look for ways of minimising cost including tax paid, which
from the investing companys point of view is a cost of doing business.
Fundamentally in the case of investments dominated by general resources, which
could, in principle, be located in many countries, the investments are cost driven.
The implication for governments wishing to attract such investments is that their
taxation systems need to be world competitive.
In the case of investments dominated by specialised resources, the investing
company will necessarily focus on characteristics such as the availability, quality
and productivity of specialised resources. While costs are important, unlike
investments dominated by general factors, costs are not the prime investment
driver. From the viewpoint of actual or potential host countries, investing and
building capability in the key specialised resources required by industry is central to
effective investment attraction and retention.
There will be a class of investments that will involve a mix of general and
specialised resources where the investing company will have to carry out a decision
making process which gives appropriate weight to both sets of resources.
Investment decisions will be driven by a mix of cost and non-cost factors.
The importance of strategic factors in investment decisions
In January 2000, Lundbeck withdrew its antidepressant product from the New
Zealand market, blaming PHARMAC's policies for its withdrawal.
38
Company activity supplied by Medicines Australia, 29 November 2005. See also Clarke, L., 2005, Lessons
from the Kiwi Model, Researched Medicines Industry Association of New Zealand, Conference paper from
The Future of the PBS, 24 August 2005, Sydney and the Boston Consulting Group, 2004, Pharmaceutical
Companies and Biotechnology Cluster Development: New Zealand Case Study.
26
Eli Lilly announced in 1999 that will no longer include New Zealand in global
research programs on new medicines.
The influence of strategic factors can also be observed in Western Europe, where
many governments have introduced reference pricing systems that doubled the price
disparity between its prices and the US prices between 1992 and 2004. Rates of
growth in R&D investment have slowed in Europe, with many companies moving
R&D to the US. Part of this may be attributed to the US outperforming Europe in
terms of drug development productivity, but several studies have also identified
reimbursement regimes as a contributing factor. A study into the German
pharmaceutical industry estimates that price controls lead to a $3 billion decrease in
R&D spending and a $900 million loss in additional innovation spending that this
39
R&D activity would have stimulated. The importance of strategic factors was also
clearly articulated by the British Pharma Group in their 2005 submission to the UK
government:
Location decisions are increasingly taken from the perspective of their effect on the overall
40
competitiveness of the global firm.
Considering the potential upside for countries that are perceived to support
innovation, evidence can also arguably be observed to show a positive correlation
between increased price protection of patented products and industry investment. In
2003, the Quebec Government commissioned an economic study of the general
41
equilibrium impacts that would arise from the abolition of the 15-year rule that
42
governs patented pharmaceuticals in that region. The study showed that since the
introduction of the 15-year rule in 1994, investment in Quebec had grown to
43
outpace other provinces in Canada. The study also showed that a reduction in
investment by pharmaceutical companies of $150 million would have a negative
impact on the government budgets, as reductions in economic activity would more
than outweigh an assumed reduction in pharmaceutical prices of 1.4 per cent.
Together, this would suggest that for some investments there is a nexus between the
underlying economics of the prospective project and other factors, such as market
39
40
41
42
43
Gilbert, J. and P. Rosenberg, 2005, Addressing the Innovation Divide, Annual Meeting 2004 Governors of the
World Economic Forum for Healthcare, 22 January, Davos.
The British Pharma Group is comprised of GSK and AstraZeneca, which represent a significant proportion of
the UK market. In 2004, these two companies invested 1.8 billion in R&D in the UK, out of a total global
R&D spend of 4.7 billion. This level of investment made The British Pharma Group companies the first and
second largest private sector contributors to R&D in the UK. As well as R&D, these companies also conduct a
significant amount of their manufacturing in the UK, generating exports worth 6.5 billion in 2004. Source:
British Pharma Group, 2005, The British Pharma Group (BPG) on Competitiveness and Investment Criteria.
The 15-year rule delays the entry of generic drugs onto the Quebecs Formulary (analogous to PBS listing).
This effectively grants additional protection to foreign-owned multinational drug companies beyond the patent
prescribed by the Canadian Patent Act.
The Quebec Department of Finance, Economics and Research, 2003, An application of the computable general
equilibrium model for Quebec: Impacts of the abolishment of the 15-year rule, Canada.
It should be noted however that other incentives, such as R&D tax credits and other schemes, may also have
impacted on growth rates of investment in Quebec and Canada more generally.
27
size and reimbursement schemes. In practice, strategic factors are likely to show
themselves in general judgements by the investing companies about whether the
business environment in a potential host company is or is not welcoming. A lot of
investment promotion effort by nations is in fact devoted to demonstrating that they
have a welcoming attitude to foreign investment. This is likely in turn to affect the
investment attention a country receives and it may also impact on final decisions
taken between competition investment locations.
2.2
to broadly categorise these investments by the mix of resources they use and
hence the primary investment drivers that apply to them.
Marketing
Discovery R&D
investments
Re-investments
in infrastructure
and services
centres
Flagship infrastructure
investments
(actives plants,
biological centres)
28
many firms also invest in strategic geographic locations to either build a brand
presence (such as within an emerging market) or to their citizenship profile.
Such factors, however, drive only a small share of total industry R&D
spending.
Clinical trial R&D investments Clinical trial R&D investments are also
driven by established track records and capabilities of scientists as the quality
of the data must be high in order for the trials to be of any use to the firm.
However given the number of locations that meet basic capability
requirements, cost-effectiveness is also a strong dimension to this decision.
2.3
While the rate of spending is set to grow steadily the pattern of this spending is
expected to change. As more and more small-molecule treatments for diseases
affecting large cohorts have been brought to market in the past several decades, it
has been argued that all of the low hanging fruit opportunities were realised. Thus
while spending on R&D nearly doubled from 1996 to 2003, the number of new
medicines approved has nearly halved, falling from 62 per annum in 1996 to 35 per
45
annum in 2003.
This has left the industry grappling for breakthroughs, which has been realised, in
part, with the mapping of the human genome. However due to the complexity of the
genome, the pace of innovation has not been as rapid as expected. Moreover, the
population sizes for drug candidates were shrinking as technology improved, as
44
45
The Economist, 2005, 'Pharmaceutical Industry Survey', The Economist, 16 June 2005.
Rasmussen, B., 2004, Alliance Opportunities in Biotech, Working Paper No 23, Pharmaceutical Industry
Project Working Paper Series, Centre for Strategic Economic Studies, Victoria University of Technology, p 2.
29
were exclusivity periods, with more and more fast followers entering the market.
This fostered the gradual collapse of the blockbuster drug model.
46
The slow down in product development, attenuating product life cycles and
shrinking market sizes has brought all pharmaceutical companies under intense
pressure to optimise their R&D efficiency and productivity, to streamline the
development process and to minimise total R&D expenditure. The result of this has
47
been a narrowing of product lines under development as well as an increasing
degree of discovery R&D alliance and in-licensing arrangements. Pharmaceutical
companies have also been increasingly outsourcing R&D services that support the
48
R&D and pre-clinical processes.
Generally, collaboration will arise between a smaller firm and a large
pharmaceutical company where:
the smaller firm possesses a scientific technique that will better help the
pharmaceutical company in its own research;
the smaller firm can help the pharmaceutical company better target their
molecules; or
From 1990 to 1996 the rate of all alliances between big pharmaceutical companies,
biotech firms and universities grew by 22.7 per cent per annum. However, this trend
49
slowed from 1996 to 2001, to 3.1 per cent per annum. It is generally held that
while in-licensing will remain a dominant trend in pharmaceutical R&D research,
that the pharmaceutical companies will still put the greatest focus on their own inhouse research. The reasons are straight-forward: this allows for greater control
over the research; larger firms are generally able to recruit the best talent; and their
intimate knowledge of their own track record and areas of expertise makes it
difficult for external parties to compete against the internal pipeline. It is estimated
that if the ratio of in-house to in-licensed research was 90:10 in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, that in 2010 the ratio will migrate to 70:30.
Requirements for third party researchers to progress research to later stages of
development
46
47
48
49
50
50
The first is a push factor: in the US, the University of Rochester patented a
method of treatment using non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs)
Emerging competition in the US from so-called follower drugs is estimated to have cut exclusivity periods
from on average around four years in during the 1980s to less than one year during the 1990s. PhRMA, 2001,
Pharmaceutical Industry Profile 2001, PhRMA, Washington DC.
For example Eli Lilly in the 1990s narrowed its R&D focus from eight to five therapeutic areas. See
Rasmussen, B., 2003, Aspects of the Pharmaceutical Business Model: Implications for Australia, Draft
Working Paper No. 15, Final Draft, Pharmaceutical Industry Project Working Paper Series, Centre for
Strategic Economic Studies, Victoria University of Technology, p 2.
See Aoris Nova, Advance Consulting and Evaluation and BioAccent, 2003, Australias Preclinical and Scaleup Manufacturing Capabilities A Comparative Analysis, prepared for the Department of Industry, Tourism
and Resources, Canberra.
Rasmussen, B., 2003, Aspects of the Pharmaceutical Business Model: Implications for Australia, Draft
Working Paper No 15, Centre for Strategic Economic Studies, p 5.
US Patent No. 6,048,850 Claim 1.
30
that selectively inhibited Cox-2 but not Cox-1 activity. Pfizer went on to
51
develop the compound Celebrex, which it patented. Rochester sued for
royalty payments of 10 per cent of the $3 billion in annual sales. However on
March 5 2003 a US district court ruled that the compound was where the value
lay, and invalidated the patent:
Quoting from Fiers v. Revel, Judge Larimer reiterated that an inadequate patent
description that merely identifies a plan to accomplish an intended result is an attempt to
pre-empt the future before it has arrived. Such a patent fails to comply with the
requirements of the federal statutes concerning issuance of patents and therefore must be
52
held invalid.
Therefore the likelihood that researchers will reap commercial returns on their
innovations is unlikely unless they are able to participate in the later stages of
the compounds development.
This need is seen in several categories of research, including both small molecule
development and biopharmaceuticals development.
US-centric focus of core R&D investments
51
52
53
The University of Rochester v G.D. Searle & Co, Inc, No. 00-CV-6161L, 2003 US Dist. LEXIS 3030 (WDNY
Mar. 5, 2003).
Shuster, M. J., H. Su, and S. Blaug, 2003, Protecting Rights to Early Stage Technology, Nature
Biotechnology, 21(6): 702.
It should be noted that the influence of this factor varies considerably from country to country.
31
Figure 2.2
Some studies have suggested that this trend is also in part a function of
reimbursement and pricing schemes in Europe. These studies have argued that
while the track records of European firms are excellent, pharmaceutical companies
have sought to invest in nations where there is a coherence between price
protection on innovative goods and support for R&D activities.
Drivers of discovery R&D investment
55
The Lewin Group, 2001, Analysis of Investment Decisions by the International Pharmaceutical Industry and
the Competitive Position of Australia, presented to the Pharmaceuticals Industry Action Agenda Working
Group 2 Strategic Factors and Decision Making for Investment, December.
Due to some changes in survey methodology, including the sample size, caution should be used when
comparing to the previous survey results. For example, the smaller sample size will result a larger variance
than in the previous survey (where variance in statistical terms means the range within which we would expect
the true mean to lie). Generics companies were not included in the above survey sample.
32
56
development costs are spent on failures, it becomes clear that the capabilities of
researchers to efficiently identify high value drug targets or candidates is the
primary criteria by which investment decisions are made. This means that regions
with strong performance records will likely continue to attract the majority of
investment capital in the short to medium term.
In this way the survey results explain current patterns of investment, which is that
the majority of R&D investment continues to flow into large in-house laboratories
in the US and Western Europe. The legacy of major R&D investments in the US
and Western Europe near company headquarters (dictated by the traditional
business model) is that these centres have developed strong track records in terms
57
of research productivity, due to the ability to continually refresh departments with
talented researchers and the build-up of efficient research infrastructure to support
the innovation process. In short, it would appear that pharmaceutical companies
continue to be confident in their ability to attract the best talent and to run the most
productive research labs in the world.
Figure 2.3
High Importance
Average Importance
Low Importance
Ge
Pri
aph
and
ez
ues
tim
iss
ture
one
ive
ent
inc
truc
and
nt
me
nce
ista
e
urs
ic d
imb
es
ssu
nt
me
fras
s in
rce
iron
sou
ry i
g re
ato
n re
ogr
cin
gul
ma
Re
Hu
env
ost
al C
tion
tion
era
a
Tax
Op
However, there will be a rise in some networking with external sources, due to the
currently high number of drug candidates in the pipeline originating from small
56
57
Walter and Eliza Hall Institute, 2005, CRC IID submission, unreleased draft.
Productivity is measured in terms of the value per drug identified, drug development efficiency, and the cost of
failure.
33
58
biotech firms (67 per cent). Again, the central driver of discovery R&D is the
search for quality innovations. Therefore, in terms of external investment in
discovery R&D, this too is driven by research capabilities and skills availability,
and competition may arise between internal pipelines and extra-mural research. The
R&D capital will follow the value. Because of the long lead times involved with
drug development, external scientists will likely need to collaborate with
researchers at the large pharmaceutical companies, and thus the funding will be
spread across the parties involved.
Other factors also influence the R&D investment decision, especially external
partnering options. One of these factors is the IP regulatory environment. Uncertain
IP regulations and applications will serve as a large deterrent against investment.
While there is not currently a high correlation between quality research bases and
poor IP regulations, some developing countries have been building their IP profiles
in the hopes of attracting some R&D investment within their borders. This is
evidenced perhaps best by R&D investment patterns in China and India. India,
which introduced global benchmark IP legislation on 1 January 2005, is
characterised as a potential R&D investment location, whereas China is seen as a
no-go investment location due to its poor IP environment.
Taxation of R&D investments and government support for R&D will also influence
some capital flows, and become significant in the longer term investment horizon.
As noted by the British Pharma Group in their submission to the UK Government
on Competitiveness and Investment Criteria:
Availability of scientific research skills and infrastructure, together with a high quality research
base are the most important factors in influencing such investment decisions. However, other
issues such as financial incentives or a low tax climate and the attractiveness of the local
59
market will be decisive in a choice between two locations with the necessary science base.
A competitive, stable tax policy has the potential to be an effective tool for
promoting innovation and investment activity in a region, especially as regulatory
barriers fall and nations become more economically integrated. It is particularly true
for MNEs. Many nations with high quality research bases also offer significant
incentives to secure additional R&D investments (See Box 2.1) with the aim to
expand their capacity for innovation and potential for larger investments in the
future. Ireland and Singapore provide outstanding examples of some of the
incentives on offer. The strategy of providing R&D taxation incentives clearly
requires a long-run investment horizon on the part of the government given the lag
between investments in synergies and the productivity of institutions.
Box 2.1
58
59
The Boston Consulting Group, 2004, Rising to the Productivity Challenge: A Strategic Framework for
Biopharma, May, p 6.
The British Pharma Group, 2005, The British Pharma Group (BPG) on Competitiveness and Investment
Criteria, prepared by GSK and AstraZeneca.
34
a very low and attractive company tax regime (the corporation tax rate is now 12.5 per
cent);
the provision of generous tax credits of 20 per cent on business R&D moreover,
combined with the ability to deduct R&D expenditure from company trading profits, the
overall tax subsidy for R&D can be as high as 32.5 per cent of the expenditure on
R&D; and
a linking of the higher education system and regional technical colleges to provide the
skills needed to support emerging industries.
Singapore
Again, like Ireland, Singapore provided low company tax rates to companies it wished to
attract to locate in Singapore the basic corporate tax rate is now 22 per cent and is
due to fall to 20 per cent next year. Similarly, the Singapore Government provides
generous R&D tax incentives and other forms of assistance for business R&D. It is doing
this through a 200 per cent tax deduction on R&D expenditure access to the R&D tax
deduction involves registration and negotiation with the EDB. In addition to the tax
concession, other government agencies, principally A*STAR, provide other support, for
example the Jurong Town Corporation runs business parks, incubators and science
parks across Singapore. The Government has also established a fund equivalent to
$A857 million to assist such companies in setting up their facilities, with a similar amount
to assist smaller start-ups and to support joint ventures between local and foreign
bioscience companies. Singapore currently invests over 2.5 per cent of GDP in
biosciences.
Source: The Allen Consulting Group.
Clinical trial R&D is defined as all testing from Phase I onwards, with Phase I
involving testing on healthy human volunteers, Phase II involving small scale
testing on patients, and Phase III large scale testing on patients. At this point the
research body has developed the drug such that it is able to supply to the
The Allen Consulting Group
35
Perhaps the most obvious trend in clinical trial R&D is the need for more data as
pharmaceutical companies are under greater scrutiny today to ensure the safety and
efficacy of their products, and as technology drives changes and complexities in the
way that trials need to be conducted. As target patient populations become more
precise, the nature of the trial becomes more complicated. Additionally, today
regulatory authorities apply higher levels of rigor in their investigations of different
aspects of the effects of the drug. The objectives of the trials have become more
robust and more complex with the increasing sophistication of the regulatory
authorities and requirements. There is also pressure arising out the threat of
litigation by consumers that have suffered potentially fatal side-effects of the
60
therapy, in light of recent drug withdrawals from the market.
International harmonisation of good clinical practice (GCP)
Over the past decade there has been sustained progress towards the global
harmonisation of regulatory requirements for medicines through the International
Harmonisation on Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for
Human Use (ICH). As such, many countries have been adding regulatory oversight
to clinical trials that are in line with the ICH. For example, in the UK in the past, all
Phase I trials were not subject to regulation by the regulatory authority, however,
these will be subject to regulation going forward. Similarly Australia is considering
requiring TGA verification where it did not before.
This has the effect of reducing differences between nations in terms of quality
outcomes, especially in developing regions that have historically been characterised
as significantly lagging behind North American, European and Australian clinical
trial quality.
Outsourcing
61
Medications called Cox-2 inhibitors, part of a class of drugs called NSAIDs, were designed to relieve pain as
effectively as other common painkillers (e.g. ibuprofen) but without the risk of ulcers or gastrointestinal
bleeding, a side effect of many NSAIDs.
These drugs quickly became extremely popular, however, several research studies have raised concerns about
their safety, particularly for heart patients. On 30 September 2004, rofecoxib (Mercks Vioxx) was voluntarily
withdrawn from the market after studies found that the drug was linked to an increased risk of heart attack and
stroke. These side effects were noticed 18 months after drug therapy began.
Although the drug was voluntarily withdrawn, legal action was taken against Merck that resulted in ruling that
it must pay $US253 million ($A337 million) to the family of a man who died after taking its Vioxx painkiller
(however under Texas law punitive damages are capped). The ruling sent Merck shares 7.7 per cent lower,
cutting $US5.2 billion from its market value on 21 August 2005. For more information on the voluntary recall
of Vioxx see the US FDA website at vioxxQA.htm.
Aoris Nova, 2003, Advance Consulting and Evaluation and BioAccent, 2003, Australias Preclinical and
Scale-up Manufacturing Capabilities A Comparative Analysis, prepared for the Department of Industry,
Tourism and Resources, Canberra.
36
companies having to rely on contracting for all their pre-clinical trial needs. It is
also driven by an increasing focus on cost controls that has lead to greater
outsourcing of complex, resource-draining trials.
Global integration of trials
An increased focus on cost has also fostered a rising trend over the last several
decades towards international integration of trials, with different phases being
conducted in the locations that best meet the benchmark criteria. It has also led to
an increasing consideration of low-cost locations such as India, as it is increasingly
able to demonstrate cost-effective quality outcomes and derives benefits from
British colonial legacies such as a relatively high proportion of English speakers
and higher education graduates. Growth in CRO services in India is currently 100
per cent per annum, albeit from a very small base only one per cent of annual
62
global clinical development budget is currently conducted there.
Drivers of clinical trial R&D investment
The key base level benchmark criteria for investment in clinical trial R&D are the
following:
Speed of trials The speed with which trials can be adequately completed is a
key driver of investment, as the faster a drug is brought to market, the greater
the duration of patent protection enjoyed in the market. This directly impacts
on revenues to the firm, and has become increasingly important with the rise of
generic drugs, which fiercely compete on price once a product is off-patent.
Speed of trials is also correlated with cost, as labour represents the largest cost
component in the trials. Reducing the time to completion then reduces the total
costs of drug development. Speed is determined by the ability to recruit
patients, the time required to meet ethics submission requirements at specific
sites, and the regulatory approval process (such as TGA approval to conduct
trials).
Costs of trials The costs of trials are a function of the costs involved with
recruiting patients, the costs to set up sufficient trial sites, investigator fees, the
effort to acquire ethics and regulatory process approval, and the time to trial
completion. Nations with low investigator fees per patient, relatively speedy
patient recruitment records, and streamlined regulations present a competitive
location for clinical trial R&D.
These are the benchmark criteria required of clinical trial R&D locations.
Increasingly, many locations, including India and Eastern European countries, are
equally competitive according to these criteria. In this way, pharmaceutical
companies have more freedom to be strategic in their choice of locations. The
62
Varawalla, N., 2005, Poised for Growth: The Indian CRO Industry, Contract Services Europe, April.
37
upshot is that many companies will begin to make investment decisions according
to other criteria. For example the impetus to locate clinical trials within a country is
dramatically reduced if the firm does not expect to list within that country once the
trials are complete. The reasons for this include a desire not to dash the hopes of
patients that they might be able to take advantage of a new innovative drug, as well
as a desire to reinforce coherence between R&D investment and patent price
protection.
2.5
Generally speaking, world scale actives plants require investments in the hundreds
of millions of dollars and the decision to locate them are cost driven, where costs
include the taxation provisions to which they are subject. Historically, large scale
primary manufacturing plants were historically located near corporate headquarters.
However, today, actives plants can in principle be operated equally well in a large
number of countries and, driven by the search for lower costs, including taxation
costs, are being located in the most cost effective operating sites. The reason that
actives plants can be located in a number of possible places is that the operation is
capital intensive; the knowledge of how to operate the plant is codified; and the
inputs of skilled labour required are relatively small.
Secondary manufacturing plants, on the other hand, tend to require less investment
and relatively more labour input to operate than actives plants. Cost
competitiveness is important, but it is not the only factor that drives the investment
decision on location. Historically, smaller secondary plants were more dispersed
internationally, with companies attempting to capture cost efficiencies by locating
formulation plants close to markets. Australia has not attracted large scale actives
plants, but it does have a number of secondary manufacturing facilities reflecting
the somewhat different drivers of investment in primary and secondary
manufacturing facilities. However, as its pharmaceutical companies have been
under pressure to reduce costs there have been successive rounds of rationalisation
of secondary manufacturing facilities that have affected the viability of such plants
in Australia.
Biopharmaceutical and niche manufacturing plants similarly tend to be smaller in
scale compared with actives plants, and require a comparatively larger amount of
63
KPMG, 2004, The CEOs Guide to International Business Costs, Pharmaceuticals Industry International
Comparison, available at www.competitivealternatives.com.
38
The shifting economics of drug development has perhaps been observed most
dramatically within the manufacturing sector where firms have placed a redoubled
emphasis on efficiency. In an effort to tighten cost controls and realise greater
economies of scale, manufacturing operations have been rationalised worldwide.
This process has been hastened by a flurry of mergers and acquisitions within the
industry since the early 1990s, as firms have sought to release operational synergies
by joining up asset bases.
This trend has been observed for large and small scale actives plants as well as
secondary manufacturing facilities. However, because secondary plants and small
scale actives production (see contract manufacturing below) tend to require greater
specialisation of skills and systems to operate economically, some of these plants
have been able to continue to operate and in some cases even expand. This is also
true in cases where a plant is unique within the companys asset structure.
Oftentimes it is cheaper to expand the existing plant than relocate the facilities to a
new location. Therefore some manufacturing facilities with distinguishing features
such as a concentration of skilled resources or specialised outputs (i.e. that do not
face competition from other parts of the organisation) might be insulated to a large
extent from this rationalisation trend.
Given the advent of genomics and proteomics research commercialisation in the
past decade, biopharmaceutical plants are only beginning to be constructed and
therefore are in a period of expansion in total world capacity.
Strengthening regional powers
China and India with their large populations and commitment to rapid economic
growth and higher living standards both have potentially very large domestic
markets for pharmaceuticals. For example, China is expected to be the fifth largest
market for pharmaceuticals in the world by 2010 and the second largest market
behind the US by 2020 with sales revenues of $US 60 billion. At this stage access
to the Chinese and Indian markets is still subject to impediments not present in
developed country markets. Against that background, there is considerable
incentive for the leading pharmaceuticals companies to establish plants in these
64
countries to meet the growing domestic demand.
The low labour costs available in China and India, other things being equal, provide
an additional incentive to locate manufacturing operations in these countries. To
this stage China accounts for a small share of global production but this is expected
to rise. India already has significant generic drug production capability. China and
India also have many well educated people and in time can be expected to also be
active competitors to attract investment in R&D.
64
For example, Pfizer has recently invested US$50 million in plants in China. For more information see Einhorn,
B., 2004, Go East, Big Pharma, BusinessWeek, 13 December.
39
Incentive competition
Several countries have been vying for greater manufacturing bases within their
borders by offering significant tax credits and holidays to companies. As the total
number of primary and secondary manufacturing plants has been decreased, the
stakes have risen. Aggressive nations have included: Ireland, Taiwan, Puerto Rico,
Canada, Singapore (See Box 2.2), as well as several US states.
Box 2.2
Contract manufacturing
For some product lines, demand is too lumpy or insufficient for pharmaceutical
companies to cost-effectively manufacture the product. Where economies of scale
are lacking, and costs are high to produce a certain line, pharmaceutical companies
have been outsourcing some lines to other firms. Currently, more than 50 per cent
of all pharmaceutical manufacturing is contracted. This is a low margin component
of the value chain, as competition for contract manufacturing is fierce worldwide.
Drivers of manufacturing investment
40
Figure 2.4
High Importance
Average Importance
Low Importance
aph
nce
ista
one
ez
tim
ues
iss
and
ent
em
ture
ruc
ive
ent
inc
ast
nd
infr
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nd
me
sa
es
urs
ic d
imb
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Ge
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Sufficient and stable supply of skilled workers Given the R&D intense
nature of pharmaceutical manufacturing and the need for quality in the
product, the skills of the plant employees are paramount. Poor quality products
risk litigation or goodwill and market share losses.
41
investment in manufacturing infrastructure is (and has been) the bottom line figure
of the project. Firms tend to locate manufacturing on the basis of costcompetitiveness first and foremost.
The situation is more complex as concerns secondary, biophamaceutical and small
scale contract manufacturing which, although capital intensive, has a higher input
of skilled people reflecting the complexity of the manufacturing process in terms of
dealing flexibly with a large range of products produced in varying volumes. In the
case of these plants, which are more dispersed geographically than primary
manufacturing plants, in addition to cost drivers, investment decisions also take
account of factors such as:
logistics considerations that is, how the plant will align with the rest of the
firms operations including supply of products to a number of markets with
varying labelling and other requirements.
42
Table 2.1
THE INVESTMENT CLIMATE FOR THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AMONGST AUSTRALIA'S COMPETITORS (2005)
Country
Average
corporate
tax rate
Ireland
12.5 per
cent
Singapore
22 per cent
36 per cent
United
States
40 per cent
Spain
35 per cent
Spain has several grants programs for pharmaceutical R&D including the PROFIT
and Profarma II program.
The biomedical research fund provides direct funding for over 11,000 researchers
from a combination of public and private sources.
43
Chapter 3
CLINICAL TRIALS
LARGE SCALE
ACTIVES
MANUFACTURING
- Excellent biomedical
- Excellent biomedical
- Excellent biomedical
research base
research base
DRUG DISCOVERY
SECONDARY AND
SMALL SCALE
MANUFACTURING
(biopharmaceutical)
Strengths
research base
- Geography (virtual
- Heterogenous
regulation
regulation
lab opportunities)
population
- Recognised
capabilities
Weaknesses/Threats
- Lack of track record
- Complex,
- Non-competitive tax
- Non-competitive tax
- Insufficient scale,
some research
duplicative ethics
incentives
incentives
synergies
- Gaps in infrastructure
committee processes
- Distance from
- Potential regulatory
headquarters
- Insufficient scale,
changes (Bansemer
- Pricing Environment
synergies
report)
- Distance from
- Pricing Environment
headquarters
- Potential threats
- Pricing environment
44
The survey of MNE head offices highlights the negative overall perception of
Australia at pharmaceutical headquarters (Figure 3.2). In the 2001 survey Australia
was ranked as a worse investment environment than the US, UK and Singapore,
and as About the same or worse than the EU. This is consistent with the updated
results. Also similar to the 2001 study, Australia is seen as better to much better
65
66
67
68
The Productivity Commission, 2003, Evaluation of the Pharmaceutical Industry Investment Program, p. 3.10.
See for example, Verband Forschender, 2004, The Pharmaceutical Industry in Germany: 2004 Statistics.
See for example, the Illinois i-SaveRx program.
See for example, Clarke, L., 2005, Lessons from the Kiwi Model, Researched Medicines Industry Association
of New Zealand, Conference paper from The Future of the PBS, 24 August 2005, Sydney.
45
than New Zealand. Today Australia is seen as worse to about the same as
69
Canada.
Figure 3.2
Much better
Better
Worse
Much worse
lia
lia
stra
stra
Au
Au
lia
lia
stra
stra
Au
Au
lia
lia
stra
stra
Au
Au
ed
ed
par
par
com
com
ed
ed
par
par
com
com
ed
ed
par
par
com
com
ew
to N
d
lan
Zea
ore
gap
da
EU
UK
Sin
US
ana
to C
he
to t
he
he
to t
to t
he
to t
These perceptions would appear to reflect the strategic climate for investment. Thus
New Zealand, which is a small market that has not had a strong industry presence in
the past and is generally characterised as a hostile operating environment as a result
of recent changes to its reimbursement schemes, received lower scores in terms of
average performance. By contrast the US is seen as a strongly positive location for
investment reflecting its long record of strong productivity along the value chain as
well as its importance in terms of overall market size and growth. Similar to the US,
Singapore is on average perceived to be an excellent investment climate. This likely
reflects the significant and ongoing industry incentives that Singapore has offered
the industry in both R&D and manufacturing.
Consultations with industry indicated that this overall negative perception of
Australia as an investment location by global company headquarters is in the main
due to the negative messages generated as a result of the reimbursement
69
The 2001 Pharmaceutical Industry Action Agenda survey conducted by the Lewin Group did not poll opinions
on comparisons with Canada.
46
If this situation were to occur, this would significantly impact on the viability of the
71
industry more generally; like the US experience with the vaccine industry during
the latter half of the 21st century, the long run effect would be an increase in
72
industry consolidation.
To the extent that Australia is viewed to materially contribute to this long run risk
of untenable price reductions for the industry (due to global pricing considerations,
parallel import concerns and the export of its reimbursement schemes overseas),
Australia is in danger of being characterised by local and head office managers as a
location where investment should be limited wherever alternatives exist.
70
71
72
Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice, 2004, Improving Health Care: A Dose of
Competition, Washington D.C., Chapter 7.
This adopts a static view of the future, and does not take into consideration responses by governments and
other players to an increase in industry concentration.
From the consumers perspective, this situation would create significant risks. It may lead to some adverse
outcomes for consumers including the full withdrawal of production of a product. As noted by the Committee
on the Evaluation of Vaccine Purchase Financing in the United States Board on Health Care Services (Institute
of Medicine, National Academies of Science): The rate of exit from the vaccine industry raises two chief
concerns. The most immediate of these is the lack of backup capacity should a manufacturer experience
production problems or other disruptions. When Wyeth opted out of the production of DTaP in 2000, for
example, the suddenness of the firms withdrawal left competing firms unable to fill the gap, resulting in a 2year shortage of the vaccine. Production efforts by other companies to compensate for such a supply disruption
can take well over a year. Longer-term concerns include the potential for the exercise of market power by the
remaining firms and the potential for the total loss of supply of a vaccine product. See the Committee on the
Evaluation of Vaccine Purchase Financing in the United States Board on Health Care Services (Institute of
Medicine, National Academies of Science), 2003, Financing Vaccines in the 21st Century: Assuring Access
and Availability, National Academies of Science Press, Chapter 5.
47
48
Figure 3.3
Taxation
environment
and incentives
Human
resources and
infrastructure
Regulatory
Issues
Pricing and
reimbursement
Excellent
Good
Average
Poor
Very Poor
ad
s to
ls
ent
sem
bur
tica
eim
ceu
ls
of r
rma
pha
tica
ility
ceu
tab
ma
dic
har
pre
ces
t ac
rke
ma
of p
and
ing
ncy
ctio
ces
tor
sec
nce
pro
up
plia
om
Pc
val
tart
nce
ent
em
ista
ture
re
ctu
stru
ass
rov
mp
ch
ruc
ear
ast
res
infr
nfra
ys
pro
rote
GC
Pp
pric
are
nsp
Bro
Tra
stic
of I
ity,
f ap
log
al i
leg
hno
yo
tec
enc
ual
lQ
our
me
Do
Rig
Tria
edi
bio
and
cal
try
el
dus
onn
, in
ers
rch
edi
sea
e re
dp
iom
kille
in b
of s
f th
nce
nce
yo
fina
ive
Exp
Act
IT,
alit
Qu
elle
Exc
nts
ty i
nne
rso
tivi
f pe
duc
ts o
pro
ns
gra
sio
es
ces
ntiv
ility
nce
ilab
er i
Ava
Oth
con
ts
and
cos
ble
atio
sts
cos
tax
tor
rate
ax
Dt
rpo
iga
f co
ted
ma
rela
nsu
and
f co
eo
est
R&
Co
Inv
ltur
Cu
st o
lary
Sa
Co
Given that the major driver of R&D investments in discovery research and clinical
trials is the quality of the researchers, the above survey indicates that Australia is
well positioned to offer innovative ideas and quality clinical research. The latter is
also supported by head office perceptions of a strong regulatory environment,
which is of key importance to clinical trial work. However the survey also indicates
that Australia is not perceived to offer significant cost advantages over competing
nations, scoring only average in terms of operational costs. This could offset some
of the strengths in the research base, as could pricing and reimbursement issues in
cases where investment decisions might be governed to a certain extent by strategic
considerations.
Following on from the survey results, Figure 3.4 summarises Australias strengths,
weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) with respect to discovery R&D
investments as assessed through academic and private industry research, industry
consultations and the survey results. The remainder of the section discusses these
dimensions in depth.
49
Figure 3.4
Effective IP
protection
Geography
(virtual lab
opportunities)
Opportunities
Increased
alliances
between local
firms and intl
firms
Weaknesses
Lack of
Funding
recognised
gaps
track record,
syngeries
Pricing
environment
Market
factors
Threats
Competing
tax
incentives
FTA
amendments
Funding
gaps
Developing
nations in the
region
Strengths
Excellence in basic medical research and IP protections
Australia has a broad human capital base to underpin science and innovation, with
education and training systems providing a wide range of skills. Relative to its size,
Australias overall contribution to the development of scientific knowledge is
among the largest of all countries.
In 2002, Australia contributed 2.88 per cent of the worlds output of research
publications (including in the sciences, social sciences and humanities), up from 2.3
per cent in 1988, and further was reported to have 1.9 per cent of the worlds most
73
highly cited scientists. Importantly, the areas of Australian science with the
greatest research publication output are the medical and health sciences (which
accounted for about one-third of the papers published in 1996-2000), and the
biological sciences (about 20 per cent of publications). Figure 3.5 shows the
number of publication by field of research.
In 2003, Access Economics reported that the annual 74
rates of return to Australian
health R&D were up to $5 for every $1 spent on R&D.
The 2004 Grant Review recognized that the overall Australian investment in health
and medical research (HMR) increased to $1.7 billion in 2001, with the
Commonwealth Government investing around $800 million, and the NHMRC
distributing around $225 million of this amount. The HMR investment has grown at
around 10% per annum since 1993, and probably exceeded $2 billion in 2003.
In the 2006-06 Federal Budget, the Government announced that they will provide
$500 million over four years to increase investment in health and medical research.
73
74
Department of Education Science and Training, 2003, Mapping Australian Science and Innovation,
Commonwealth of Australia.
Access Economics, 2003, Exceptional Returns the Value of Investing in Health R&D in Australia, Prepared for
the Australian Society for Medical Research. Canberra, September, p1.
50
This funding will enable the provision of additional research grants through the
National Health and Medical Research Council.
The Government also committed to provide $170 million over nine years (including
$99.3 million from 2010-11 to 2014-15) to establish an Australian Health and
Medical Research Fellowship Scheme to attract and retain leading researchers,
through the National Health and Medical Research Council. This is a long-term
commitment from the Government to develop and enhance research capacity and
maintain Australia's world class reputation.
Figure 3.5
Source: Department of Education, Science and Training, 2002, National Science Indicators Database,
2002 edition. Note: Includes all NSI publications in the sciences, social sciences, and arts and
humanities.
Australia also has an effective and enforceable IP protection framework, the major
features of which are comparable to those of other industrialised economies and
75
conform to worlds best practice.
Weaknesses
Size and Scale
The need for critical mass is recognised in every competing market. For example, in
the US, investments in critical mass include San Diegos CONNECT, Arizonas
Brain Imaging and Alzheimers Research Centre, and New Yorks Oncology and
Cancer Research Centre. Similarly, Singapores Biomedical Research Council
(BMRC) has a five year budget of $A1.14 billion to develop a number of institutes
in order to attract the best international talent to its Biopolis.
Despite some notable successes with incubator models, such as NeuroSciences
76
Victoria, the Australian biotech and biopharmaceutical industries are characterised
75
Over the past several years, changes have been introduced to effect closer alignment with the systems of our
international trading partners, helping Australia to secure 10th position in the World Competitiveness
Institutes global survey of patent and copyright infrastructure. The Australian system is the best in the AsiaPacific region and outperforms countries such as the United Kingdom, France and Norway. See DEST, 2003,
Mapping Australian Science and Innovation, Commonwealth of Australia, p 12.
51
as small scale, fragmented, lacking funding, and lacking the required business
knowledge and savvy to bring products to market. Facilitating consolidation of
research, where appropriate, might usefully unlock some of the strengths in the
Australian research base.
Innovation gap: funding and skills
the investment falls outside the government grant programs and philanthropic
investment criteria, with the research generally being held to be too
commercial; and
the investment falls outside industry or venture capital interests, as the research
is held to be too risky. Moreover, due to the general lack of size and scale of
many Australian institutions, venture capitalists tend to require substantial
warranties that would not be required in other countries, namely the US.
Together this substantially limits the availability of seed funding to institutes and
growing biomedical and biotech companies, and has fostered the creation of the socalled innovation gap. Some researchers blame short-termism on behalf of
funding organisations, others claim these activities fail to capture research attention
and funding because they are perceived to be boring areas of research. However,
given that pharmaceutical companies tend to consider pre-compound research to be
early stage research, it is critical that this gap is bridged.
Opportunities
Growing biotech sectors
The number of biotechnology companies grew from almost none in 1981-82 to 420
77
in 2005. A diverse research base with strengths in particular fields has been an
important factor in this growth along with government support at Commonwealth,
78
state and territory levels. There has, and will continue to be, a payout for risk
relationship between these smaller companies. For early phase, risky research the
payout might be comparatively small as a percentage of the potential final revenue.
The more developed the drug, the greater the payout. For Phase I, II, III drugs the
payout to the institute increases. Thus to the extent that Australian firms are able to
better develop their ideas, they will secure a higher share of any eventual
76
77
78
Neurosciences Victoria, created as a scaled consortium of the University of Melbourne, Howard Florey
Institute, Monash University, and the National Stroke Research Institute, has secured funding of $60.85
million in government and industry contracts. These contracts, secured in association with the successful bid
for a Major National Research Facility now known as the National Neurosciences Facility, attracted industry
investment of $32.5 million. Investments by industry included: $25 million from Schering; $5 million from
Prana; and $0.75 million from GSK. Other examples of successful collaborations between Australian
institutions include The Peter MacCallum Cancer Centre and Pfizer, the CRC for Chronic and Inflammatory
Disease and AstraZeneca.
Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 2006, Biotech Business indicators, June.
Hopper, K., and L. Thorburn, 2002, 2002 Bio-Industry Review: Australia and New Zealand, Aoris Nova and
Advance Consulting and Evaluation Pty Ltd, Sydney.
52
Australia is often described to punch above its weight in medical research, and yet
its track record in terms of revenue from commercialisation is relatively poor. This
has been characterised by several studies, including the Department of Education,
Science and Trainings (DEST) 2003 Mapping Australian Science and Innovation
report on Australias innovation capabilities, as due in large part to a lack of
awareness/desire by researchers to secure IP rights for their work prior to
publishing. Clearly the incentive structure inside universities and institutes drive
researchers to publish their work as opposed to seeking commercial development.
This leads to a publish and perish in the commercial sphere phenomenon. If
researchers were able to secure IP ownership of their ideas, they would begin to see
another flow of funds into the university. This could help fund the purchase of new
equipment and the early stages of additional research.
The answer is not generally perceived to be additional research offices. If these
organisations are under-funded or not sufficiently networked within key markets,
such as the US (where relationship facilitation is needed), which Australian
organisations of this type generally have been, these organisations are seen as
hindrance rather than a help. Other models, such as the research-developer model,
where an individual scours local markets for ideas to channel back to headquarter
decision making teams, was generally perceived to be a more efficient and favoured
model by industry and researchers alike.
Threats
Skills shortages
China and India have been increasingly representing a viable investment location
for not only manufacturing but also R&D. In the past the key features of these
locations were cheap, unskilled labour and a rather unsophisticated regulatory
environment. In recent times these jurisdictions have been building profiles for
greater skilled labour. India in particular boasts 500,000 physicians trained by a
medical education system inherited from the British and 800,000 post graduate
79
scientists. These countries also represent strategic opportunities for R&D
investment because of the massive market growth. As more persons within these
countries become wealthier and adopt increasingly Western lifestyles, they are
79
Varawalla, N., 2005, Poised for Growth: The Indian CRO Industry, Contract Services Europe, April, available
at http://cse.adv100.com/cse/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=159695&pageID=4.
53
While Australia has been historically known for its robust IP protection framework,
recent legislation enacted following the execution of amendments to the USAustralia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) may present significant costs to originator
pharmaceutical manufacturers and could potentially have a further chilling effect
on R&D investments in Australia.
The amendments to the US-Australia FTA were intended to prevent the emergence
80
of evergreening patents in Australia, as is commonly observed in the US. It was
argued by some groups that without the amendments, new legislative provisions
created by the FTA would make it more difficult for generic drugs to be brought to
the Australian market (PBS). However this ignored that to date no evergreening
case had been identified in Australia and it also did not take into account
differences in the intellectual property laws in Australia and the US. As noted by IP
Australia, these additional amendments to sanction evergreening were unnecessary:
In relation to evergreening, [the FTA would not] make any changes to the type of inventions
for which patent protection can be obtained. Under the terms of the AUSFTA, Australia will
not be required to make any changes to our existing patent extension regime patent owners
will not be able to extend the term of their patents beyond what they can do under existing
arrangements. Therefore it is hard 81to see how the FTA will have the effect that is being
suggested [delayed generic drug entry].
Despite this, the amendments were adopted. Provisions in sections 26C and 26D of
the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 were the legislative outcomes of the FTA
amendments. Under these provisions pharmaceutical patent holders risk heavy
82
penalties when seeking to enforce patent rights.
The impact of these provisions upon patent enforcement decisions by
pharmaceutical patent holders and upon MNE head office perceptions of Australias
pharmaceutical specific IP framework is yet to be determined. To the extent that
this risk is realised, this could have unintended consequences for R&D investment
in Australia.
3.4
Clinical trials account for nearly half (42 per cent) of all R&D spending in
83
Australia, or approximately 2.15 per cent of turnover each year ($229 million).
This is higher as a percentage of total R&D spend than in the US, where clinical
80
81
82
83
Evergreening refers to the practice whereby patent holders, in order to extend their monopoly, wait until near
the end of an original patent term to progressively file a series of patents in an attempt to extent the patent term
(keeping generics off the market).
Heath, I., 2004, Examining the Impact of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) on
Intellectual Property, Recent Developments in Protecting and Commercialising Intellectual Property 10 and 11
August 2004, IP Australia, Director General.
The maximum penalty is $10,000,000. See Section 26C, Therapeutic Goods Act 1989.
Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 2003, Australias Preclinical and Scale-Up Manufacturing
Capabilities, A Comparative Analysis, December.
54
84
trials R&D accounts for roughly 34 per cent of all R&D spend. In Australia
approximately 550 trials of therapeutic products are conducted each year at roughly
1,800 trial sites nationwide. This compares to roughly 1,600 trials per year in the
UK and 1,500 trials per annum in France. Figure 3.6 summarises the following
SWOT analysis of Australias position as an investment location for clinical trial
R&D.
Figure 3.6
Weaknesses
Inefficient
system for
multi-site
trials
Heterogenous
population
Recognised
capability
internationally
Opportunities
Capture
increasing
number of
trials
Cost relative
to regional
neighbors
Average time
to completion
Threats
Lower cost
developing
nations in
the region
Regulations
delaying trial
completions
Pricing
environment
Strengths
Quality of trials, medical researchers
As shown in the survey results of headquarter perceptions (See Figure 3.3), the
quality of Australias medical researchers, clinical trials and good clinical practice
(GCP) compliance is currently perceived to be good to excellent. Thus the survey
would indicate that Australia is perceived to be a strong candidate for quality
clinical trial work.
Although it is difficult to establish Australias rank within the international context
of clinical trial research, it is generally held that Australia currently plays an
important role globally. A Centre for Medicines Research International survey in
1997 asked the top 20 MNE pharmaceutical companies where they routinely
conducted clinical trials. Australia ranked fourth behind Europe, the US and
85
Canada. Similarly, a 2003 benchmark study of global clinical trials by Proscribe,
with the support of Medicines Australia, showed that Australia was well regarded in
terms of quality outcomes: approximately half of the companies surveyed ranked
Australia in the top third of places in which to conduct trials in terms of
84
85
Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 2001, Discussion Paper, Pharmaceuticals Industry Action
Agenda, September, p 19. Note that this is based on 1993-94 relativities and should be treated to understand
orders of magnitude namely that clinical trials R&D is relatively large in Australia compared to other
countries.
The Bansemer Report, 2005, Report of the Review of Access to Unapproved Therapeutic Goods, Banscott
Health Consulting, p 41.
55
performance, and one third of all companies surveyed ranked Australia in the top
ten per cent of places to conduct trials in terms of performance.
Australia offers FDA accredited sites, cGMP and GLP facilities as well as centres
of clinical research excellence such as the University of Melbournes Centre for
Clinical Research Excellence in Infectious Diseases. The Proscribe FACTS report
demonstrated that Australia offers a wide availability of clinical trial coordinators at
trial sites, with the proportion of clinical trial coordinators at trial sites in Australia
86
nearly double that of Europe (nearly 100 per cent of sites). The availability of
coordinators at every site ensures consistency and quality in the trial results.
Australia is also well known for a rapid uptake of IT innovations and
communications infrastructure that foster efficiencies in trials globally.
Comparatively low labour costs
Historically, Australia has been positioned as not only a location with a quality
research base, but also as a relatively cost-effective location for trials. For example:
The 2003 FACTS study revealed that investigator fees per patient in Australia
were roughly half those in the US and Canada. Australias relative cost
advantage was also shown to exist in all therapeutic areas and across all trial
phases.
Nevertheless, industry has indicated that costs have been converging towards
European levels, and that Australia should not remain complacent in maintaining its
position as a cost effective location.
Speed of regulatory assessment and notification
The steps through which a company must proceed in order to gain approval for a
clinical trial are:
scientific assessment;
ethical assessment;
87
88
Wooley, K. and M. Wooley, 2003, Clinical Trials in Australia: Finding out the FACTS, Good Clinical
Practice Journal, 10(5), p 2.
KPMG, 2004, The CEOs Guide to International Business Costs, Clinical Research Industry International
Comparison, available at www.competitivealternatives.com.
Wooley, K. and M. Wooley, 2003, Clinical Trials in Australia: Finding out the FACTS, Good Clinical
Practice Journal, 10(5), p 2.
56
The tyranny of distance has in some ways worked in Australias favour with respect
to clinical trials. Its close proximity to the Asian Pacific region combined with its
English speaking researchers and reverse seasonality to the Northern Hemisphere
makes it an excellent complementary base for trial studies. Some industry experts
pointed to time zone differences as an edge in some virtual trials. Moreover, unlike
New Zealand, it has a comparatively large, heterogenous population and ethnic subpopulations which makes it a viable location for investigating western lifestyle
diseases.
Weaknesses
Duplicative ethics committee processes
The number of multi-site clinical trials has been rising steadily since the early
1990s with the introduction of the CTN scheme. This has had several effects.
First, the Bansemer Report has stated that it has increased the volume of work
placed on the Human Research Ethics Committees (HRECs) that currently
provide scientific and ethical approval to sponsors seeking to conduct clinical
trials.
Relatedly, it has also made transparent the significant inefficiencies arising out
of the current needs to get approval from each ethics committee for each site.
The disunity among the various ethics committees wastes resources, results in
different conditions being imposed on the trial at different sites, and decreases the
competitiveness of Australia internationally by raising the transaction costs of trials
and delaying the time to market. Delays in the time to market cut into the
pharmaceutical companys exclusivity periods and therefore reduce the revenue
they can expect to realise. Concerns about inefficiencies in the current trials process
expressed by industry were summarised by Novo Nordisk in its submission to the
Bansemer Review committee:
For phase I and phase II trials where only one centre is involved these [ethics committee
issues] are not too burdensome. The main delaying factor is the time and effort taken to
submit packages to each and every Ethics Committee (usually with different requirements for
format and content)
and then for each Ethics Committee to fully review the clinical trial and
90
provide clearance.
Industry and several states have recommended that a centralised ethics committee
procedure be instituted for multi-centre trials whereby mutual recognition could be
introduced. This centralised, streamlined process would introduce a system where
the Ethics Committee for the Principal Investigator would provide clearance and
89
90
Wooley, K. and M. Wooley, 2003, Clinical Trials in Australia: Finding out the FACTS, Good Clinical
Practice Journal, 10(5), p 3.
The Bansemer Report, 2005, Report of the Review of Access to Unapproved Therapeutic Goods, Banscott
Health Consulting, p 41.
57
that would be adopted by all other centres without need for a review. This was
recommended by the Bansemer report as well:
Cooperation at both federal and State and Territory level is seen as necessary to achieve
a
91
streamlined ethical and scientific review, as well as monitoring function of clinical trials.
This reform of the ethics committee processes should also encompass other
weaknesses in the operation of HRECs, such as eliminating the use of different
forms and procedures to reduce duplication of effort and an unnecessary increase in
92
cost and variation across committees.
Patient recruitment: variations across therapeutic areas and trial phases
The second opportunity for Australia is to improve its recruitment rates, particularly
through improved site selection and increased public awareness about the need for
and value of clinical trial participation. As noted by the FACTS study:
91
92
93
The Bansemer Report, 2005, Report of the Review of Access to Unapproved Therapeutic Goods, Banscott
Health Consulting, p 13.
The Bansemer Report, 2005, Report of the Review of Access to Unapproved Therapeutic Goods, Banscott
Health Consulting, p 30-31.
The Grant Committee, 2004, Sustaining the Virtuous Cycle: For a Healthy Competitive Australia, Investment
Review of Health and Medical Research, Final Report, Canberra, December,
58
[Australia needs to develop initiatives to] focus on improving the way potential clinical trial
patients are identified (in compliance with privacy regulations) and will facilitate a more
strategic approach for site selection. There will always be a need to conduct certain trials in
major teaching hospitals in urban areas. However there are also clinical trials that may be better
suited to sites
that are currently under-used in Australia, namely regional, private and primary
94
care sites.
This will mitigate the impact of Australias small population, especially in terms of
competition with developing country locations.
Threats
Bansemer Report recommendations
95
Wooley, K. and M. Wooley, 2003, Clinical Trials in Australia: Finding out the FACTS, Good Clinical
Practice Journal, 10(5), p 3.
The Bansemer Report, 2005, Report of the Review of Access to Unapproved Therapeutic Goods, Banscott
Health Consulting, p 39.
59
Reimbursement considerations
If firms are not planning to launch in Australia, the incentive to hold clinical trials is
dramatically diminished. If in the next 5-10 years firms plan not to launch some
new drugs in Australia, due to global pricing considerations, then there will be a
gradual, lagged decline in the number of clinical trials here. Industry identified the
need to avoid potential patient backlash that could arise were trials to be held within
Australia and then patients not granted access to the drug following the trial
periods. Overall, it could also mean delayed access for Australians to new therapies
as off-patent manufacturers will be required to wait for patent periods to lapse
96
before potentially bringing an alternative into the market. The impetus to list in
Australia could also be diminished by increasing restrictions on usage: in the past,
sponsors were in effect guaranteed large volumes for listing on the PBS but
increasing restrictions mean that the volumes expected from listing on the PBS may
not be sufficient to justify the costs. This could in the future adversely impact
Australias position as a clinical trial location.
3.5
Recent mergers and acquisition in Australia can represent both an opportunity and a
threat for the Australian operations of these companies. On the one hand, with the
potential closure of small-scale plants in the Asia-Pacific region there is an
opportunity for expanded production in Australia. However, at some stage there
could be a risk that global rationalisation could go further and jeopardise the future
of Australian operations, especially with emerging low cost destinations, such as
China and India. Industry is generally predicting a decline of existing
manufacturing plant capacity, and point to the risk that Australia could have a
substantially diminished manufacturing presence in 10 years time.
96
Note that a drug may still not be brought to Australia if there is not a market for the product.
60
Figure 3.7
Taxation
environment
and incentives
Human
resources and
infrastructure
Regulatory
Issues
Pricing and
reimbursement
Excellent
Good
Average
Poor
Very Poor
ad
nsp
Bro
Tra
ma
ls
on
niti
cog
g re
urin
ent
act
sem
nuf
bur
tica
ma
eim
ceu
of r
rma
pha
ility
ls
MP
tica
s, G
ceu
tab
ma
dic
s to
pre
ces
t ac
and
har
ent
ces
pro
eem
agr
of p
try
ing
ncy
rke
are
pric
oun
ces
ent
pm
elo
dev
nce
ista
ass
ent
em
try
ets
dus
rov
ark
nt m
el
orta
imp
onn
and
val
ing
pro
pro
f ap
rol
oc
stic
ry t
me
unt
Do
Co
yo
rain
nd
in
cha
of t
ea
ers
mp
, in
ty i
nts
tivi
gra
duc
ing
pro
nne
ise
rso
rem
uts
inp
lud
dp
inc
kille
arg
ply
ont
enc
yc
edi
alit
Qu
Exp
ility
to l
sup
ity
of s
es
and
ng
turi
atio
ntiv
ility
ilab
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lled
Ava
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Pro
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nce
tax
ts
sts
fac
cos
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go
anu
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61
Figure 3.8
Weaknesses
Pricing
environment
Reputation
for quality
goods
Opportunities
Potential small
scale biopharm;
niche; contract
manfuacturing
Disconnect
between
States and
Cmwth
Ops
costs
Threats
Competing tax
incentives for
biopharm, actives
and secondary
manufacture
Strengths
Quality labour
97
New South Wales Department of State and Regional Development. Key Industries: Booming biotechnology
and pharmaceuticals sector available at www.business.nsw.au.
62
The industry has a reputation for producing high quality and safe products as a
result of Australias high levels of regulatory oversight of the pharmaceuticals
industry. During discussions with industry stakeholders, it was noted that some
customers in less developed countries prefer higher-priced Australian-made
products to cheaper products produced in their home country, as these were
perceived as being unsafe. This trend is likely to grow as living standards rise in
these countries and customers become more sophisticated in purchasing decisions.
Regions where Australias regulatory system is a competitive advantage are Asia,
the Middle East and parts of Europe where Australian TGA-approved products
receive faster approvals. In terms of the USA market, access will be difficult for
domestic companies as regulatory arrangements in the USA are more onerous.
Weaknesses
Ageing technology without incentive for re-investment
Some of Australias current manufacturing plants are comparatively old, and are
likely to face a phase out over time unless new investments are made. For example,
one pharmaceutical company consulted for this study reported that it had recently
closed three manufacturing plants in Australia. The closure of the plants were a
result of:
The Smithfield infant formulation plant was replaced with facilities in Singapore.
Opportunities
Niche, secondary and contract manufacturing
NICHE MANUFACTURING
In discussions with industry stakeholders, there was a general view that sustainable
export manufacturing opportunities are likely to be found in those areas in which firms
have effective niche market strategies.
Niche market strategies require:
63
is greater where the firms concerned are part of a supporting cluster of related firms and
institutions. This is demonstrated by the GSK Asthma Centre for Excellence, which is a
niche operation within the global firm and works in collaboration with the Asthma CRC as
well. Other examples include:
GlaxoSmithKline extracts opiates from poppies at a facility in Port Fairy for morphine
production;
The unique skill sets present in the industry also provide opportunities for
companies to target niche patient markets. In particular, the Pharmaceuticals
Industry Action Agenda notes that small-scale firms with short manufacturing runs
who have the flexibility to change rapidly between products will be best placed to
98
service niche markets.
Threats
International incentives
98
99
Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 2001, Local Priority Global Partner, Pharmaceuticals
Industry Action Agenda, Canberra, p 38.
Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 2001, Local Priority Global Partner, Pharmaceuticals
Industry Action Agenda, Canberra, p 17, 36 and 38.
64
Chapter 4
Analysing Australias competitive position has shown that despite its many
strengths, Australia currently faces major threats at all points of the value chain:
Australias historical advantage in clinical trials and until quite recently, strong
growth in performing clinical trials, is under threat from more cost-competitive
locations in the Asia Pacific region. Domestically, clinical trial activity is also
under a potential regulatory threat that might introduce further costs and delays
to trials in Australia.
Australia also battles against negative perceptions within MNE head offices
due to its reimbursement policies, which are reported by local and international
management to create a lack of interest in investment opportunities here. This
is a weakness to the environment that exacerbates all of the other threats facing
Australian activity levels and investment growth potential.
65
4.2
raise the profile of the industry globally to increase attention paid by MNEs.
These are excellent high level strategies for growing the industry. However,
considering the global context and current drivers of investment, at best the current
major actions implemented will result in only marginal improvements to industry
investment in Australia. The Action Agenda has not introduced major changes to
the environment that influences R&D and manufacturing decisions that would be
competitive by world standards. Moreover, its initiatives have arguably not
impacting on R&D investment patterns above what would have been invested in the
absence of the scheme. While it has proposed some changes to improve the R&D
environment, these changes will likely only result in minor differences over the
longer term, at which point the international drivers of investment will likely have
again shifted.
4.3
Australia requires several major interventions above and beyond those proposed by
the Action Agenda if it is serious about lifting its performance in the
pharmaceutical industry investment game.
Reform the PBS to send a strong, positive signal to headquarter offices and
increase attention paid to Australian market
66
Australia (through the PBS) creates a negative impression of the Australian market
and makes it harder to secure investment from the MNE.
Figure 4.1
Squeaky Wheels
Major markets
Internal success
stories, or markets
with highly vocal
managers
Examples
Ireland, Singapore
Potenial impact
of reimbursement
policy reform
Little to no attention
paid to market due
to poor internal cues
Examples
US, Europe
Low Attention
Markets
Honeypots
LIttle or no visibility
Examples
Australia, New
Zealand
Little to no attention
given to market on basis
of poor external cues
(global market factors)
Examples
India, China
Attention given to
market on basis of
strong external cues
(global market factors)
Source: The Allen Consulting Group adaptation of London Business Schools Sources of Global
Attention framework, see, Birkinshaw, J., and C. Bouquet, 2005, Getting the Attention You Need:
Strategies for the Australian Subsidiary, London Business School in association with CEO Forum.
67
engaging with industry prior to any major shift in policy. Other actions, such as the
Pharmaceutical Industry Action Agenda, which has created a forum for long term
partnership and dialogue between Government and industry, are clearly useful
strategies for reducing the impact of negative messaging and for laying the
foundation for future collaboration.
Close the innovation gap and encourage scale among researchers
The need, for example, to provide for funding for proof-of-concept pre-clinical
research in medicinal chemistry is also particularly important when one considers
100
that small molecules are the leading type of drug under development currently.
Despite this, there is a perceived risk among researchers that this will be ignored
because it is boring research. This is in contrast to biopharmaceuticals, which
were characterised as enjoying relatively greater bandwidth because this science is
perceived to be cutting edge.
In addition to funding infrastructure gaps, there is also a need for States to be
vigilant in terms of identifying opportunities for feasible research consolidation, as
with NeuroSciences Victoria. Encouraging projects of this nature will release
operational synergies, through the use of commercialisation offices within these
scaled organisations. Continued fragmentation in the research base will destroy
value in the Australian research environment.
100
Aoris Nova, Advance Consulting and Evaluation and BioAccent, 2003, Australias Preclinical and Scale-up
Manufacturing Capabilities A Comparative Analysis, prepared for the Department of Industry, Tourism and
Resources, Canberra.
68
The payoff to Australia would be the realisation of greater royalties (Table 4.1) for
its research community, as well as second round effects of increased interest due to
an improving productivity record and relationship building. It would also reduce the
high failure rates observed for Australian start-up firms, spurring stronger growth
among its small, young biotech and biopharmaceutical sector.
Table 4.1
Discovery
nil
Preclinical
4%
Phase I
10%
Phase II
15%
Phase III
25%
Source: UBS Warburg, 2001, CMR Company Reports, quoted in Department of Industry, Tourism and
Resources, 2001, Action Agenda Local Priority Global Partner, Pharmaceutical Industry Action
Agenda, Canberra, p 33.
The potential threat to clinical trials growth represents a potential blind spot in the
original Action Agendas plan. This is reflective perhaps of the rapid changes
happening in industry. Many experts believed Australias position within the
clinical trials market was relatively secure only a few years ago, however, with
Indias recent introduction of IP legislation in 2005 and other recent regional
changes, Australias position is increasingly under threat. Threats identified in
Chapter 3 included:
lower cost competitors in trials and services, including Phase II and III trials
(where the majority of growth has been since the introduction of CTN trials)
and bio-informatics services; and
reimbursement policies.
These are material threats to the Action Agendas goals that were perhaps not all
well understood at the time of the Agendas creation.
The Action Agenda has rightly recognised that inefficiencies in ethics committee
processes will increasingly reduce Australias current competitive advantage in
clinical trials. In addition to streamlining the approvals process, it will also need to
ensure that additional regulatory hurdles are not introduced, such as a requirement
for greater use of the CTX scheme or the requirement for pharmaceutical
companies to gain scientific approval for trials by the TGA instead of within the
ethics committees. According to industry, this will likely dramatically reduce the
number of trials conducted in Australia. There are current efforts underway to
address current inefficiencies as well as potential future hurdles. These actions need
to be supported:
The Allen Consulting Group
69
there should not be any separation of scientific and ethics assessments; and
mutual recognition of an accredited, lead HREC should become the model for
regulation of unapproved therapeutic goods in Australia.
This should result in lower average times to approval, without reducing the safety
or ethicality of trials. Moreover, it should result in a more consistent trials process.
In addition to the above efficiency improvements, however, several other actions
must be taken in order to increase Australias share of the global clinical trials
market ten-fold by 2012. The Government will need to address delays created by
the current ethics committee processes. It will also need to address the disparity
between labour costs in Australia compared to other regional competitors such as
India and China. This may be accomplished through the successor program to the
P3 scheme, and should be a major consideration to the development of the design of
this industry program.
Without these changes, it is likely that clinical trials activity will come under severe
competition in the future. This will result in a dramatic reduction of the R&D
intensity of Australias pharmaceutical industry, as clinical trials activity accounts
for the majority (43 per cent) of all R&D investment in Australia. The removal of
these threats is required to keep the industry on its path to Australias share of the
global industry by 2012.
Develop competitive incentives for R&D and manufacturing investments
101
Clearly the P3 was aimed at attracting R&D investments, nevertheless it remains the effectively the only major
incentive scheme available to the industry at the time of this report.
70
The MNE subsidiaries in Canada offer similar range of asset portfolios that
is to say, it is not a purely marketing/sales region but also has some
manufacturing and a growing base of local firm-MNE R&D alliances.
Canada also has a Federal system of government, with States and Territories
providing their own incentives on top of and often in conjunction with Federal
schemes.
Canada has recognised, like Australia, the need for a coordinated, long term
strategy for attracting high value-add, R&D intensive industries to its
economic base. It has pursued a multi-tiered approach of tax incentives, grant
schemes and local institution aid.
Key differences between Australia and Canada are its proximity to the US market,
and the nature of incentives provided to the MNEs. However, the rise of Asia
Pacific powers such as Singapore and Taiwan broadly indicate that distance from
the US and European markets are not insurmountable obstacles. Thus it becomes
clear that the key difference is really its ability to offer incentives.
With regard to attracting R&D investments, the Canadian Government offers
102
uncapped SR&ED tax credits of 20 per cent to large companies on all R&D
103
expenditure and 35 per cent to Canadian Controlled Private Corporations
(CCPCs). CCPCs are also offered the credits irrespective of the firms profit or loss
position in the year, and this may be carried forward for 10 years; Canada has
104
sought to extend this access to other firms. This compares favourably to
Australias capped program, which only provides incentives on incremental R&D.
Furthermore, there are other attractive schemes provided. Provinces within Canada
also offer other tax credits, such as for example the Quebec R&D tax credit, which
is also refundable in full for all participants regardless of a loss position. There are
also price response mechanisms in some provinces where investment over a
102
103
104
Large companies are defined as firms having capital assets in excess of $15 million or $500,000 in taxable
income. Thus MNE pharmaceuticals are classified as large companies.
Canada is not alone in this approach. Several other countries provide R&D tax concessions to all investing
companies (that is, not restricted to firms where the IP is held within that country) on all R&D expenditure, not
on an incremental amount above some base level. For example, the UK provides a flat 7.5 per cent rebate on
R&D expenditure. However, it should also be noted this is a highly complicated program to administer.
See Warda. J, 2003, Extending Access to SR&ED Tax Credits An International Comparative Analysis,
Information Technology Association of Canada, December.
71
threshold unlocks price freezes on products. Moreover, there are other flexible co105
investment options also on offer to secure other large scale investments.
These R&D strategies have met with success. Canada accounted for 10 per cent of
all new global medicines discovered in 2001 despite its small population and sales
figures, and reported an R&D intensity equivalent to the global average of 17.7 per
cent.
There is clearly a need for Australia to consider whether the suite of its incentive
programs is optimising the amount of investment it might potentially attract. Some
options for future government incentive and support programs for the
pharmaceutical industry that should be considered at the conclusion of P3 could be:
an R&D tax concession with the beneficial ownership rule not applicable to
106
pharmaceutical R&D (the ring fenced model from the PIIP review);
The critical requirement for this to happen is for the Government to change its
perception of the revenue impact of incentives. Currently, any foregone taxation
revenue is seen as a cost to Government. However importantly, without the
incentive the additional investment will not occur at all. The Government must
consider whether the forgone revenue that would have been generated through the
immediate activity being subsidised, as well as from the other activity generated in
other industries, would be smaller than this perceived cost.
4.4
The payoffs from the above interventions will provide step change improvements in
investment outcomes for Australia, which will result in long run, multiplying
benefits throughout the economy. To understand the opportunity costs of not
pursuing decisive action, this section maps the payoffs for each intervention
identified above.
105
106
See Government of Canada, 2004, Achieving Excellence: Investing in People, Knowledge and Opportunity;
Government of Canada, 2002, The Canadian Pharmaceutical Industry: 2002 Innovation Profile; Warda. J,
2003, Extending Access to SR&ED Tax Credits An International Comparative Analysis, Information
Technology Association of Canada, December.
The Productivity Commission, 2003, Evaluation of the Pharmaceutical Industry Investment Program:
Research Report, Commonwealth of Australia, p. 7.6.
72
The potential payoff from increased funding for local researchers to develop their
innovations to compound status would be largely captured by the researchers
themselves. Improvements in funding supplies and commercialisation abilities
would see researchers able to move from the prospect of either watching the project
fall over due to insufficient funding, or owning none of the IP rights if the
107
innovation is commercialised by a different group, to the prospect of being able to
realise a substantial profit from their research of, on average, 10 per cent royalties.
The prospects for success, and potential total payouts for the sector, increase with
the number of additional partnerships that can be formed (Table 4.2).
Table 4.2
Probability
of 1
success
Probability
of 2
successes
Probability
of 3
successes
Royalties for
(Phase I)
success
No new
alliances
0%
0%
0%
nil
1 new alliance
formed
15%
0%
0%
10% of successful
project value
2 new alliances
formed
27.8%
2.3%
0%
10% of successful
project(s) value
3 new alliances
formed
40.2%
6.3%
0.3%
10% of successful
project(s) value
Source: The Allen Consulting Group. Based on risk return profile assumed for Phase I project status (15
per cent probability of success, royalties of 10 per cent) as reported in Department of Industry, Tourism
and Resources, 2001, Action Agenda Local Priority Global Partner, Pharmaceutical Industry Action
Agenda, Canberra, p 33.
This issue has been recognised by some research organisations. For example, The
Walter and Eliza Hall Institute, recognising the need for additional development in
order for its products to be attractive to external organisations like Big Pharma,
created the Biotechnology Centre at La Trobe Universitys R&D Park aimed at
developing drug targets into compounds. The Centre provides facilities for high
throughput chemical screening, medicinal chemistry, gene mapping and
genotyping, monoclonal antibody production and mouse genetics. The high
throughput chemical screening facility was established with the assistance of a
Bio21 STI grant from the Victorian Government and is the only facility of its type
in Australia. This initiative has proved successful in attracting investment, with The
Walter and Eliza Hall Institute forming alliances with AMRAD, Merck, GSK and
Pfizer as a result.
More broadly, the potential increase in the number of alliances would have wide
ranging flow-on benefits for the sector and Australia more widely. Figure 4.2 shows
some of these potential downstream effects.
107
See Box 3.2s discussion of Rochester University v. Pfizer, where it was ruled that the university was not
entitled to payments because the value was determined to lay in the compound, not the target.
73
Figure 4.2
SUCCESSIVE ROUND PAYOFFS (AND PAYOFF RELATIONSHIPS) OF CLOSING THE INNOVATION GAP
The payoffs from removing all threats to clinical trial growth will likely be the
realisation of the Action Agendas goal to double Australias share of the global
industry by 2012 (Figure 4.3). Without the removal of these threats, it is likely that
the goal will not be realised.
The Allen Consulting Group
74
Figure 4.3
Were Australia to introduce incentive schemes more on par with world standards in
terms of its overall scale and scheme structure, such as with those programs
available in Canada, the payoffs to Australia could be substantial. Depending on the
number and type of programs introduced, these could result in the realisation of a
major manufacturing plant in the next five to ten years, significant additional R&D
investment, and the retainment of the current manufacturing base. On top of these
industry benefits, this would also result in a number of flow on benefits to the
community in the form of increased exports, a growing pool of scientific and
commercial skills, rising employment levels, productivity increases, and an
improved return on public sector investments in medical research.
The Allen Consulting Group
75
Using the Canadian example as a potential base case for what might be achievable
in Australia, and discounting its achievements by roughly 50 per cent to account for
second-mover disadvantages and distance impacts, it is possible to map a scenario
of the potential benefits going forward. With this assumed as a base case, Australia
could potentially see:
Figure 4.4 maps these downstream benefits of the increased investment, which are
discussed further below.
Figure 4.4
76
In the above benefit scenario it was assumed that if a competitive R&D taxation
incentive program were introduced, Australia could see an improvement in the
overall re-investment of turnover in R&D activities of perhaps nine per cent. This
order of improvement was calculated based on evidence that in Canada
approximately 80 per cent of all R&D spend is in clinical trials, and 20 per cent in
discovery R&D, resulting approximately 14.5 per cent of all turnover being
reinvested in clinical trials R&D and 3.5 per cent being reinvested in discovery
R&D. Data from 1993-94 indicates that clinical trials R&D accounted for 43 per
cent of all R&D spending and discovery R&D accounted for roughly 34 per cent of
all spending Australia. Assuming that this relationship has held constant to 2005,
2.15 per cent of all turnover would be re-invested in clinical trial R&D, and 1.7 per
cent of all turnover would be re-invested in discovery R&D. Currently, this implies
that of the five per cent of turnover ($520 million) roughly re-invested in R&D,
approximately $229 million is allocated towards clinical trial R&D and $177
million towards discovery R&D.
If Australia were to introduce competitive incentives for R&D (which should be
different to the incentive offered to increase capital outlays, similar to the coordinated approach adopted by Canada), it may reasonably boost its spending on
clinical trials to 7 per cent of turnover, and its discovery R&D spend to 3 per cent of
turnover over a five year period. Assuming current Asia Pacific rates of growth in
108
turnover continue to 2012, and Australian firms are able to match growth in the
region, then turnover would be expected to rise to $23 billion in 2012. If Australia
were able to induce higher rates of clinical trial and discovery R&D investment
through more competitive incentives, this would result in an additional $299
million on discovery R&D ($690 million in expenditure on discovery R&D in
total), and an additional $1.1 billion on clinical trials ($1.6 billion in expenditure on
discovery R&D in total) in 2012 above what might be expected in the absence of a
competitive incentive.
There would also be additional flow on effects, in terms of skills transfer, improved
productivity and increased employment. Although skills and productivity
improvements are hard to measure, there could be an expected commensurate
increase in the number of jobs. Currently 36,000 persons are employed in the
industry; the additional increase in investment would represent a near doubling of
total R&D investment, which assuming current ratios of employees to R&D
spending, would imply an increase of employment of an additional 26,280
109
persons.
From the manufacturing perspective, if a competitive program targeting
manufacturing in addition to an R&D-focused program were introduced, the size of
the impact would depend on the number of projects won. However, as shown in the
above Figure 4.4, there would be many first and second round effects flowing from
additional manufacturing investments. For example, major first round impacts
would be step increases in exports and GDP levels. Because the number of
investments will depend on the nature of the capital outlay incentive program, it
108
109
From 2002 to 2003, turnover in the Asia Pacific region, including Australia, increased by 12 per cent. Forecast
data was unavailable. An alternative forecast based on regression analysis may indicate a different pattern of
growth. See IBISWorld, 2005, Medicinal and Pharmaceutical Product Manufacturing in Australia,
IBISWorld.
Note that to estimate the precise impacts a more complex model would need to be developed, or CGE analysis
could be performed. The aim of this discussion is to show that there is a positive relationship between
increases in investment (shock) and employment levels, and that the result could potentially be significant.
77
was necessary to consider a range of possibilities. Table 4.3 shows a range of step
change increases in exports as a result of manufacturing investments from between
110
$100 million to $400 million. This improvement in export performance would
flow to increases in GDP and government revenue, as well as to increased attention
by MNEs.
Table 4.3
$100 million
$39 million
$200 million
$78 million
$300 million
$117 million
$400 million
$156 million
Source: The Allen Consulting Group, regression analysis calculated using data from IBISWorld, 2005,
Medicinal and Pharmaceutical Product Manufacturing in Australia, IBISWorld.
While a stand-alone case exists for reform to PBS arrangements, a spillover benefit
of such reform would be the improvement of prospects for development of the
pharmaceutical industry in Australia. PBS reforms could improve international
perceptions of the attractiveness of the Australian market and could also improve
the prospects for investment being made into industry activity in Australia. While
not in and of itself a panacea, enhancing perceptions of the market would certainly
remove a current obstacle to industry growth in Australia.
This is supported by the Quebec experience, where the benefits to the economy
resulting from increased investment were shown to be substantial, and to outweigh
the potential savings that might be realised through a 1.4 per cent price cut in
111
pharmaceuticals prices.
110
111
The potential responses in exports were estimated by regressing past changes in manufacturing employment
and exports against changes in manufacturing investment levels for the years 1999 and 2004.
Clearly there are a number of other determinants likely to impact on export performance. The above analysis
has been used to show a rough, positive relationship between manufacturing investment and export
performance. To run a robust regression analysis would require a substantial amount of data to be marshalled,
much of which is not publicly available. The regression analysis would need to investigate for bias in the errors
and potential other determinants of export performance. Where multiple determinants of export performance
were identified, the analysis would need to test for causality, interdependence, multi-collinearity and
heteroskedasticity, among other issues, to ensure the rigor of the final data.
The Quebec Department of Finance, Economics and Research, 2003, An application of the computable general
equilibrium model for Quebec: Impacts of the abolishment of the 15-year rule, Canada.
78
Figure 4.5
speedier product launches and greater access of drugs delivered to public as the
medical field will be across breakthrough treatments due to their interaction
with MNEs on clinical trials;
Current policy settings and implemented actions under the Action Agenda will not
be sufficient to deliver step-change improvements in pharmaceutical industry
investment levels in Australia. The Action Agenda has set out a commendable
vision for the industry, however, without some additional changes to the current
operating environment, levels of investment will improve only marginally.
The four proposed interventions are not the only improvements that could be made
to improve industry activity levels in Australia. However, on balance, these
represent the highest return interventions available, and would result in significant
net benefit outcomes for Australia. It is difficult to quantify some of these benefits,
however, rough calculations using historical relationships show that the effects of
increased investment on employment, wages, household income, consumption,
exports, GDP and other socio-economic variables are positive and in some cases
significant. It is clear that industry and Government have the opportunity to
increase investment and the benefits flowing from that investment; they must now,
under the auspices of the Action Agenda, seize this opportunity.
80
Appendix A
114
Phase I of the Factor (f) program commenced in 1988 and ran until 1995. The
115
government set aside $198 million to this phase of the program. A second phase
commenced in 1992 and ran until 1999 that committed a further $820 million to the
112
113
114
115
Button, J. and Blewett, N., 1987, Joint Media Statement: Policies For The Development OF The
Pharmaceutical Industry, Ministerial Press Release Number 115/87, 13 September.
The Industry Commission, 1996, The Pharmaceutical Industry: Industry Commission Inquiry Report, The
Commonwealth of Australia, p. 96.
The Industry Commission, 1996, The Pharmaceutical Industry: Industry Commission Inquiry Report, The
Commonwealth of Australia, p. 103.
The Industry Commission, 1996, The Pharmaceutical Industry: Industry Commission Inquiry Report, The
Commonwealth of Australia.
81
Factor (f) scheme. A total of $948 million was spent on both phases of the Factor
116
(f) program. There were a total of ten participants in Phase I and eleven in Phase
II. In return for the Governments investmentthe industry underwrote a total of
117
$5,900.4 million in production value-added and R&D expenditure. Factor (f) was
the largest item of specific sector outlays to the manufacturing industry of its time,
118
representing 87 per cent of all such expenditures.
In reviewing the program, the Industry Commission among others, suggested that
the program had produced significant benefits through increasing pharmaceutical
industry activity over and above what otherwise would have occurred. Several
companies reported that the program was a direct contributor to their decision to
invest in Australia and that it improved the perception of Australia as an
environment for industry activity. Notably, some companies who unsuccessfully
applied for Factor (f) funding, such as Eli Lilly, reported that the scheme improved
perceptions of Australia as a favourable environment for investment to the extent
119
that their investment in manufacturing and R&D increased as a result. It was
suggested that the Factor (f) program may have induced more activity than would
120
have occurred in the absence of price suppression.
The major criticism of Factor (f) was the strict eligibility criteria applied to
participants. To be eligible for the scheme, companies had to increase their local
activity in both R&D and manufacturing. This excluded some key companies from
participation who could have made some key investments in the local industry.
Another criticism of the Factor (f) was its relatively short duration that is not
reflective of the considerable time necessary to bring a product through discovery,
development and manufacture. The high-risk nature of the industry requires greater
certainty of funding for a longer period than other research-intensive industries with
shorter development and production times, such as the computer software industry.
A final criticism related to the fact that Factor (f) only benefited a small number of
companies when it was intended to compensate the entire industry for the reduced
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activity caused by price suppression.
The Pharmaceutical Industry Investment Program
Following the success of the Factor (f) program and in recognition of continued
pharmaceutical price suppression in Australia, the Commonwealth Government
introduced the Pharmaceutical Industry Investment Program (PIIP). Again the
primary objective of the program was to contain the adverse effects of price
suppression on pharmaceutical industry activity.
116
117
118
119
120
121
Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 2002, Pharmaceutical Industry Action Agenda Local Priority
Global Partner, p. 24.
Department of Industry Tourism and Resources, 2001, Pharmaceuticals Industry Action Agenda: Local
Priority Global Partner, Commonwealth of Australia, Commonwealth of Australia.
The Industry Commission, 1996, The Pharmaceutical Industry: Industry Commission Inquiry Report, The
Commonwealth of Australia, p. 127.
The Industry Commission, 1996, The Pharmaceutical Industry: Industry Commission Inquiry Report, The
Commonwealth of Australia, p. 124.
The Industry Commission, 1996, The Pharmaceutical Industry: Industry Commission Inquiry Report, The
Commonwealth of Australia, p. 291.
Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 2002, Pharmaceutical Industry Action Agenda Local Priority
Global Partner, p. 26
82
This scheme committed $300 million over five years to increase pharmaceutical
122
industry investment. The scheme was of a considerably smaller scale than the
Factor (f) and this can be partially attributed to the continuing benefits of
investment associated with Factor (f) program. The PIIP had nine participants who
collectively committed to $1.5 billion in production value-added and R&D and
123
created 1,000 jobs over the life of the program.
Participants that committed to increasing investment or activity in value-added
manufacturing and/or R&D would be awarded with price increases on nominated
124
pharmaceuticals that they supplied through the PBS. The guiding principle of the
PIIP was to increase both R&D and value-added manufacturing in areas of
international competitiveness and strategic importance. Applicants had to establish
the way in which their commitments were in line with these guiding principles.
The Productivity Commission, in their review of the PIIP, concluded that the
benefits of the PIIP did indeed outweigh the costs and that there was a strong case
for government intervention to stimulate pharmaceutical industry investment.
Investments in both manufacturing and R&D occurred over and above a base case
where no incentives were provided. Similar criticisms were levelled at the PIIP as
were levelled at Factor (f). The short duration of the program and the small number
125
of participants were again a cause for concern. The Productivity Commission in
its review of the PIIP questioned whether the Factor (f) and PIIP programs were the
best vehicles for industry subsidy and suggested that increasing the availability of
other programs, in particular the R&D tax concession, should be an option for
future industry subsidisation.
A.2
Current incentives
The PIIP concluded on 30 June 2004 and was immediately replaced with the
Pharmaceutical Partnerships Program or P3. The government acknowledged that
large pharmaceutical companies could not access other government support
programs, such as the R&D tax concession, and P3 is intended to remedy this
problem.
P3 is a five-year program that is designed to increase pharmaceutical industry
R&D. The government has committed $150 million over five years to the scheme.
A new round of funding commences each year under P3 and companies are able to
decide the length of time that they participate in the program. Eleven companies
participated in the first round of funding and seven in the second. The Government
made an announcement in August 2006 in relation to the third funding round which
covers the period 20062009. The announcement allows larger companies to apply
for support for their R&D activities. Participants in the P3 program have to be
involved in the pharmaceutical industry but do not have to be suppliers of
122
123
124
125
Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 2002, Pharmaceutical Industry Action Agenda Local Priority
Global Partner, p. 24.
Department of Industry Tourism and Resources, 2001, Pharmaceuticals Industry Action Agenda: Local
Priority Global Partner, Commonwealth of Australia, Commonwealth of Australia.
The Productivity Commission, 2003, Evaluation of the Pharmaceutical Industry Investment Program: Research
Report, Commonwealth of Australia.
Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 2002, Pharmaceutical Industry Action Agenda Local Priority
Global Partner, p. 26.
83
127
84
Future incentives?
Two key issues that impact on the effectiveness of incentive programs are scale and
duration.
Duration The five-year duration of the program is not reflective of the long
pharmaceutical development timeline. If an incentive program were to attract
substantial pharmaceutical investment over and above what would occur in a
business as usual scenario then these two crucial issues with current programs
would need to be addressed.
Another primary concern is the current design of P3 program and the way that R&D
is rewarded. The current P3 program provides a reimbursement for pharmaceutical
R&D over a base level. An alternative that has been suggested by some in the
pharmaceutical industry and the Productivity Commission in its review of PIIP is an
incentive program that is not incremental in its design, but rather based on specific
criteria. Tax breaks or Government co-contribution on every dollar of eligible
pharmaceutical R&D expenditure may be one alternative, such as that on offer in
Canada or Ireland. This could result in a program similar to the current 125 per cent
R&D tax concession but perhaps more closely tailored to the pharmaceutical
industrys specific needs.
85
and some improved incentive program for R&D, which might take the form of:
an R&D tax concession with the beneficial ownership rule not applicable to
128
pharmaceutical R&D (the ring fenced model from the PIIP review) ;
an incentive program of a larger scale than P3 that combines the most effective
elements of Factor (f), the PIIP and P3; and/or
128
The Productivity Commission, 2003, Evaluation of the Pharmaceutical Industry Investment Program:
Research Report, Commonwealth of Australia, p. 7.6.
86
Appendix B
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87
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