Rescued Document

torts & damages
INTRODUCTION
NAGUIAT V NLRC (National Organization of
Workingmen and Galang)
269 SCRA 565
PANGANIBAN; March 13, 1997
NATURE
Special civil action in the Supreme Court, certiorari
FACTS
- Clark Field Taxi, Inc. held a concessionaires contract
with the Army Air Force Exchange Services for the
operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base. Sergio
Naguiat was the president of CFTI while Antolin
Naguiat was its vice president.
Like Naguiat
Enterprises, Inc. which was a trading firm, it was also a
family-owned corporation.
- Respondents were employed by the CFTI as taxicab
drivers.
> They were required to pay a daily boundary fee of
US$26.50 (for those on duty from 1AM-12N) or
US$27 (for those on duty from 12N to 12 MN)
> Incidental expenses were maintained by the drivers
(including gasoline expenses).
> Drivers worked 3-4 times a week depending on the
availability of vehicles and earned no less than
US$15.00 a day. In excess of that amount, they had
to make cash deposits to the company which they
could withdraw every fifteen days.
- AAFES was dissolved because of the phase-out of the
military bases in Clark and the services of the
respondents were officially terminated on November
26, 1991.
- AAFES Taxi Drivers Association, the drivers union,
and CFTI held negotiations as regards separation
benefits. They arrived at an agreement that the
separated drivers would be given P500 for ever year as
severance pay. Most of the drivers accepted this but
some refused to do so.
- Those who did not accept the initial severance pay
disaffiliated themselves with drivers union and through
the National Organization of Workingmen, they filed a
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complaint against Sergio Naguiat under the name and

style Naguiat Enterprises, AAFES and AAFES union.
- The labor arbiter ordered the petitioner to pay the
drivers P1,200 for every year of service for
humanitarian consideration, setting aside the earlier
agreement between the CFTI and the drivers union. It
also rejected the idea that the CFTI was forced to close
it business due to great financial losses and lose
opportunity since at the time of its closure it was
profitably earning. The labor arbiter however did not
award separation pay because to impose a monetary
obligation to an employer whose profitable business
was abruptly shot (sic) shot down by force majeur
would be unfair and unjust.
- The NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter
after respondents appealed by granting separation pay
to the private respondents. It said that half of the
monthly salary should be US$120 which should be paid
in Philippine pesos. Naguiat Enterprieses should be
joined with Sergio and Antolin Naguiat as jointly and
severally liable.
Petitioners Claim:
- Petitioners claim that the cessation of the business was
due to the great financial losses and lost business
opportunity when Clark Air Base was phased out due to
the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement
and the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo.
- They admitted that CFTI had agreed with the drivers
union to grant the taxi drivers separation pay equivalent
to P500 for every year of service.
- They allege that Sergio and Antolin Naguiat were
denied due process beause the petitioners were not
furnished copies of the appeal to the NLRC.
- They also allege that NOWM cannot make legal
representation in behalf of the respondents because the
latter should be bound by the decision of the drivers
union.
Respondents Comments:
- The drivers alleged that they were employees of
Naguiat Enterprises although their individual
applications were approved by CFTI. They claimed to
have been assigned to Naguiat Enterprises after having
prof. casis
been hired by CFTO and that Naguia Enterprises
managed, controlled and supervised their employment.
- They averred that they should be entitled to separation
pay based on their latest daily earnings or US$15 for
working 16 days a month.
ISSUES
1. WON the NLRC acted in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in granting separation
pay
2. WON NOWM was authorized to represent the
private respondents
3. WON Naguiat Enterprieses, Sergio Naguiat and
Antolin Naguiat were liable
4. WON Sergio and Antolin Naguiat were denied due
process
HELD
1. NO, the NLRC did not act in excess of jurisdiction or
with abuse of discretion.
Ratio Findings of fact of administrative bodies and
quasi-judicial bodies are afforded great respect by the
Court and are binding except when there is a showing
of grave abuse of discretion or the decision was arrived
at arbitrarily.
Reasoning
- Respondents showed that their monthly take home pay
amounted to no less than $240 and this was not disputed
by petitioners.
- There is no record or evidence which shows that the
closure of the taxi business was brought about by great
financial losses no thanks to the Pinatubo eruption. It
was rather brought about by the closure of the military
bases.
- Art. 283 of the CC provides that separation pay shall
be equivalent to 1 month pay or at least month pay
for every year of service, whichever is higher. The
NLRC ruling was correct in terms of US$120 as the
computed separation pay.
2. Petitioners can no longer question the authority of
NOWM and are held in estoppel.
Reasoning
torts & damages

- NOWM was already representing the respondents
before the labor arbiter and the petitioners did not assail
their juridical personality then.
- Petitioners also acknowledged before the Court that
the taxi drivers are themselves parties in the case.
3. Naguiat Enterprises is not liable, Antolin Naguiat is
not personally liable whereas Sergio Naguiat is
solidarily liable.
- Re: Naguiat Enterprises liability
Reasoning
- The respondents were regular employees of CFTI who
received wages on a boundary basis. They offered no
evidence that Naguiat Enterprises managed, supervised
and controlled their employment.
They instead
submitted documents which had to do with CFTI, not
Naguiat Enterprises.
- Labor-only contractors are those where 1) the person
supplying workers to the employer does no have
substantial capital or investment in the form of tools or
machinery and 2) the workers recruited and placed by
such person are performing activities which are directly
related to the principal business of the employer.
- Independent contractors are those who exercise
independent employment, contracting to do a piece of
work according to their own methods without being
subject to the control of their employer except as to the
result of their work.
- Sergio Naguiat was a stockholder and director of
Naguiat Enterprises but, in supervising the taxi drivers
and determining their employment terms, he was
carrying out his responsibility as president of CFTI.
- Naguiat Enterprises was in the trading business while
CFTI was in the taxi business.
- The Constitution of the CFTI-AAFES Taxi Drivers
Association states that the members of the union are
employees of CFTI and for collective and bargaining
purposes, the employer is also CFTI.
- Re: Antolin Naguiats liability
Reasoning
- Although he carried the title of general manager, it has
not been shown that he had acted in such capacity.
- No evidence on the extent of his participation in the
management or operation of the business was proferred.
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- Re: Sergio Naguiats liability

Ratio A director or officer may be held solidarly liable
with a corporation by a specific provision of law
because a corporation, being a juridical entity, may act
only through its directors and officers. Obligations
incurred by them, acting as such corporation agents, are
not theirs but the direct accountabilities of the
corporation they represent. In the absence of definite
proof of who clearly are the officers of the corporation,
the assumption falls on the President of the corporation.
Reasoning
- In his capacity as President, Sergio Naguiat cannot be
exonerated.
- An employer is defined to be any person acting in the
interest of an employer, directly or indirectly.
- Case in point is A.C. Ransom Labor Union CCLU vs.
NLRC held that the identified employer A.C. Ransom
Corporation, being an artificial person, must have an
officer and in the absence of proof, the president is
assumed to be the head of the corporation.
- Both CFTI and Naguiat Enterprises were close family
corporations owned by the same family. To the extent
that stockholders are actively engaged in the
management or business affairs of a close corporation,
the stockholders shall be held to strict fiduciary duties
to each other and among themselves. Said stockholders
shall be liable for corporate torts unless the corporation
has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance.
> Nothing in the records indicate that CFTI obtained
reasonable adequate liability insurance.
> Jurisprudence is wanting in the definition of
corporate tort. Tort essentially consists in the
violation of a right given or the omission of a duty
imposed by law. Tort is a breach of legal duty.
> Art. 238 mandates the employer to grant separation
pay to employees in case of cessation of operations or
closure of the business not due to serious business
losses or financial reverses which is the condition on
this case.
4. There was no denial of due process.
Reasoning
- Even if the individual Naguiats were not impleaded as
parties of the complaint, they could still be held liable
because of jurisprudence (A.C. Ransom case).
- Both also voluntarily submitted themselves to the

jurisdiction of the labor arbiter when they filed a
position paper.
DISPOSITION The petition is partly granted. 1) CFTI
and Sergio Naguiat are ordered to pay jointly and
severally the individual respondents of US$120 for
every year of service and 2) Naguiat Enterprises and
Antolin Naguiat are absolved from liability.
BARREDO V GARCIA
BOCOBO; July 8, 1942
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- from CA, holding Fausto Barredo liable for damages
for death pf Faustino Garcia caused by negligence of
Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by Fausto
Barredo
- May 3, 1936 in road between Malabon and Navotas,
head-on collision between taxi of Malate Taxicab and
carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis thereby causing
overturning of the carretela and the eventual death of
Garcia, 16-yo boy and one of the passengers
- Fontanilla convicted in CFI and affirmed by CA and
separate civil action is reserved
- Parents of Garcia filed action against Barredo as sole
proprietor of Malate Taxicab as employer of Fontanilla
- CFI and CA awarded damages bec Fontanillas
negligence apparent as he was driving on the wrong
side of the road and at a high speed
> no proof he exercised diligence of a good father of the
family as Barredo is careless in employing (selection
and supervision) Fontanilla who had been caught
several times for violation of Automobile Law and
speeding
> CA applied A1903CC that makes inapplicable civil
liability arising from crime bec this is under obligations
arising from wrongful act or negligent acts or omissions
punishable by law
- Barredos defense is that his liability rests on RPC TF
liability only subsidiary and bec no civil action against
Fontanilla TF he too cannot be held responsible
torts & damages

ISSUE
WON parents of Garcia may bring separate civil action
against Barredo making him primarily liable and
directly responsible under A1903CC as employer of
Fontanilla
HELD
YES
- There are two actions available for parents of Garcia.
One is under the A100RPC wherein the employer is
only subsidiarily liable for the damages arising from the
crime thereby first exhausting the properties of
Fontanilla. The other action is under A1903CC (quasidelict or culpa aquiliana) wherein as the negligent
employer of Fontanilla, Barredo is held primarily liable
subject to proving that he exercising diligence of a good
father of the family. The parents simply took the action
under the Civil Code as it is more practical to get
damages from the employer bec he has more money to
give than Fontanilla who is yet to serve his sentence.
Obiter
Difference bet Crime and Quasi-delict
1) crimes public interest; quasi-delict only private
interest
2) Penal code punishes or corrects criminal acts; Civil
Code by means of indemnification merely repairs the
damage
3) delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts; crimes are
only punished if there is a penal law; quasi-delicts
include any kind of fault or negligence intervenes
NOTE: not all violations of penal law produce civil
responsibility
e.g. contravention of ordinances, violation of game
laws, infraction of rules of traffic when nobody is hurt
4) crime guilt beyond reasonable doubt; civil mere
preponderance of evidence
- Presumptions:
1) injury is caused by servant or employee, there
instantly arises presumption of negligence of master or
employer in selection, in supervision or both
2) presumption is juris tantum not juris et de jure TF
may be rebutted by proving exercise of diligence of a
good father of the family
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- basis of civil law liability: not respondent superior bu

the relationship of pater familias
- motor accidents need of stressing and accentuating
the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles
ELCANO V HILL
77 SCRA 98
BARREDO; May 26, 1977
NATURE
Appeal from an order of the CFI Quezon City
FACTS
- Reginald Hill, a minor yet married at the time of
occurrence, was criminally prosecuted for the killing of
Agapito Elcano (son of Pedro), and was acquitted for
lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.
- Pedro Elcano filed a complaint for recovery of
damages from Reginald and his father Atty Marvin. CFI
dismissed it.
ISSUES
1. WON the civil action for damages is barred by the
acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the
action for civil liability was not reversed
2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last par) of the CC can
be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the fact
that at the time of the occurrence, Reginald, though a
minor, living with and getting subsistence from his
father, was already legally married
HELD
1. NO
-The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has
not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
-Barredo v Garcia (dual charactercivil and criminal
of fault or negligence as a source of obligation):
"The above case is pertinent because it shows that the
same act may come under both the Penal Code and the
Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was
unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have
been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was
held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under
prof. casis
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that
it was the employer and not the employee who was
being sued."
"It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case
could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because
his negligence causing the death of the child was
punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear
instance of the same act of negligence being a proper
subject matter either of a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an
entirely separate and independent civil action for fault
or negligence under article 1402 of the Civil Code.
Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a
cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code
has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard
to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have
been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case aria
for which, after un a conviction, he could have been
sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
-Culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in
character or in violation of a penal law, whether
voluntary or negligent.
-ART 1162: "Obligations derived from quasi-delicts
shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title
XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special
laws." More precisely, Article 2177 of the new code
provides:
"ART 277. Responsibility for fault or negligence under
the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising front negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant."
- According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing
provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling,
is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the
exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The
former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter
is a 'culpa aquilian' or quasi-delict, of ancient origin,
having always had its own foundation and individuality,
separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction
between criminal negligence and 'culpa extracontractual' or 'cuasi-delito' has been sustained by
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained
as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an
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outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the
proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of
criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or
not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not
for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but
for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'.
But said article forestalls a double recovery,"
- Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to
literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same
argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that
upholds "the spirit that giveth life" rather than that
which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker
should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that me preliminary chapter on human
relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes
the separability and independence of liability in a civil
action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29
to 12) from the civil responsibility arising from crime
fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in
a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c),
Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, its
"more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and
justice, and more in harmony with modern progress", to
hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to
"fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
- Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality
only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary.
- Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia,
that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent
acts which may be punishable by law.
2. YES (but)
- Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. (However,
inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as
a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become
milling, subsidiary to that of his son.)
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- While it is true that parental authority is terminated

upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place
"by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however,
also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation
by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by
voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority
over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to
administer his property as though he was of age, but he
cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real
property without the consent of his father or mother, or
guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
- Under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by
article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company."
- In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald,
although married, was living with his father and getting
subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in
question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation
which is not unusual.
- It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa,
the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of
parents with their offending child under Article 2180 is
that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their
minor children in order to prevent them from causing
damage to third persons.
- On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399,
in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may
not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance
of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry
with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act
that can give rise to judicial litigation. And surely,
killing someone else invites judicial action.
CINCO V CANONOY
90 SCRA 369
prof. casis
Melencio-Herrera; May 31, 1979
NATURE
FACTS
- Cinco filed on Feb 25, 19701 a complaint for recovery
of damages on account of a vehicular accident
involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by
Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and
Carlos Pepito.
- Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the
driver Romeo Hilot arising from the same accident.
- At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private
respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending
the final determination of the criminal suit.
- The City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of
the civil case. Petitioners MFR having been denied, he
elevated the matter on Certiorari to the CFI Cebu.,
which in turn dismissed the petition.
Plaintiffs claims:
- it was the fault r negligence of the driver in the
operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which
caused the collision.
- Damages were sustained by petitioner because of the
collision
- There was a direct causal connection between the
damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of
private respondents.
- They observed due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees, particularly of Romeo Hilot.
ISSUE
WON there can be an independent civil action for
damage to property during the pendency of the criminal
action
HELD
YES
- Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil
case may proceed as a separate and independent civil
action, as specifically provided for in Art 2177 of the
Civil Code.
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- The separate and independent civil action for quasidelict is also clearly recognized in sec 2, Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court:
Sec 2. Independent civil action. In the cases
prvided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of
the Civil Code f the Philippines, an independent
civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case,
provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
- Petitioners cause of action is based on quasidelict. The concept of quasi-delict, as enunciated in
Art 2176 of the Civil Code, is so broad that in
includes not only injuries to persons but also
damage to property. It makes no distinction
between damage to persons on the one hand and
damage to property on the other. The word
damage is used in two concepts: the harm done
and reparation for the harm done. And with
respect to harm it is plain that it includes both
injuries to person and property since harm is not
limited to personal but also to property injuries.
DISPOSITION Writ of Certiorari granted.
BAKSH V CA (Gonzales)
219 SCRA 115
DAVIDE, JR; Feb.19, 1993
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari to review and set aside the CA
decision which affirmed in toto the RTCs decision
FACTS
- Private respondent Marilou Gonzales (MG)
filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh for the
alleged violation of their agreement to get
married.
**MGs allegations in the complaint:
- That she is a 22 yr. old Filipina, single, of
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good moral character and respected

reputation in her community.
- That Baksh is an Iranian citizen, residing
in Dagupan, and is an exchange student
taking up medicine at the Lyceum in
Dagupan.
- That Baksh later courted and proposed to
marry her. MG accepted his love on the
condition that they would get married. They
later agreed to get married at the end of
the school semester. Petitioner had visited
MGs parents to secure their approval of
the marriage. Baksh later forced MG to live
with him. A week before the filing of the
complaint, petitioner started maltreating
her even threatening to kill her and as a
result of such maltreatment, she sustained
injuries. A day before the filing of the
complaint, Baksh repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with
him anymore and that he is already married
to someone in Bacolod. She prayed for
payment for damages amounting to Php
45,000 plus additional costs.
- Baksh answered with a counterclaim,
admitting only the personal circumstances
of the parties in the complaint but denied
the rest of the allegations. He claimed that
he never proposed marriage to or agreed to
be married; neither sought the consent of
her parents nor forced her to live in his
apt.; did not maltreat her but only told her
to stop coming to his place after having
discovered that she stole his money and
passport. He also prayed for 25,000 as
moral damages plus misc. expenses.
- The RTC, applying Art. 21 CC decided in
favor of private respondent. Petitioner was
thus ordered to pay Php 20,000 as moral
damages and 3,000 pesos attys. fees plus
litigation expenses. Petitioner appealed this
decision to respondent CA, contending that
the trial court erred in not dismissing the
case for lack of factual and legal basis and
prof. casis
in ordering him to pay moral damages,
attys fees, etc.
- Respondent CA promulgated the challenged decision
affirming in toto the trial courts ruling which prompted
Baksh to file this petition for certiorari, raising the
single issue of WON Art. 21 applies to this case.
ISSUE
WON damages may be recovered for a breach of
promise to marry on the basis of Art.21 of the Civil
Code
HELD
1. YES
Ratio In a breach of promise to marry where the
woman is a victim of moral seduction, Art. 21 may be
applied.
Reasoning
- Where a mans promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device
to entice or inveigle to accept him and to obtain her
consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Art.21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential
however, that such injury should have been committed
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.
- In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was
the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations
of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her
surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live
with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would
keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage. In short, the
private respondent surrendered her virginity, the
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cherished possession of every single Filipina, not
because of lust but because of moral seduction. The
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction
punished under either Art.337 or Art.338 of the RPC
because the private respondent was above 18 years of
age at the time of the seduction.
- Moreover, it is the rule in this jurisdiction that
appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings
as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having
heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to
observe closely their deportment and manner of
testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked
facts of substance or value which, if considered, might
affect the result of the case. Petitioner has miserably
failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial
courts had overlooked any fact of substance or value
which could alter the result of the case.
**Obiter: on Torts and Quasi-delicts
- The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry
per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the
provisions that would have made it so. The reason
therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate
Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which
We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That
breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been
definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia.
The history of breach of promise suits in the United
States and in England has shown that no other action
lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women
and unscrupulous men...
- This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a
provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the
concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number
of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books.
- As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission has gone farther than the
sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law.
Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
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helpless, even though they have actually suffered

material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed
it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in
the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art.21 Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the
foregoing norm: 'A' seduces the nineteen-year old
daughter of 'X.' A promise of marriage either has not
been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes
pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as
the girl is above 18 yrs of age. Neither can any civil
action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been
committed, and although the girl and her family have
suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents
cannot bring any action for damages. But under the
proposed article, she and her parents would have such a
right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the foregoing
rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which
it is impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes.
- Art.2176 CC, which defines a quasi-delict, is limited
to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion
of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish
legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept
while torts is an Anglo-American or common law
concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana
because it includes not only negligence, but intentional
criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false
imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission
responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional
and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be
governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent
acts or omissions are to be covered by Art.2176 CC. In
between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts
which, in the absence of Art.21, would have been
beyond redress. Thus, Art.21 fills that vacuum. It is
even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of
prof. casis
the Civil Code, Art.21 has greatly broadened the scope
of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more
supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on
torts.
DISPOSITION finding no reversible error in the
challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED
PEOPLE V BALLESTEROS
285 SCRA 438
ROMERO; January 29, 1998
NATURE
An appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder, qualified by treachery.
FACTS
- evening of May 28, 1991, Carmelo Agliam, his halfbrother Eduardo Tolentino, Ronnel Tolentino, Vidal
Agliam, his brother Jerry Agliam, Robert Cacal,
Raymundo Bangi and Marcial Barid converged at a
carinderia owned by Ronnel Tolentino. They proceeded
to attend a dance but did not stay long because they
sensed some hostility from Cesar Galo and his
companions who were giving them dagger looks. In
order to avoid trouble, especially during the festivity,
they decided to head for home instead of reacting to the
perceived provocation of Galo and his companions.
- The group had barely left when their owner jeep was
fired upon from the rear. Vidal Agliam was able to jump
out from the jeep and landed just beside it, scurried to
the side of the road and hid in the ricefield. His
younger brother Jerry also managed to jump out, but
was shot in the stomach and died. HYPERLINK
"http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/ja
n1998/120921.htm" \l "_edn2" \o "" Carmelo Agliam,
Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino sustained injuries.
HYPERLINK
n1998/120921.htm" \l "_edn3" \o "" Eduardo Tolentino
was not even able to move from his seat and was hit
with a bullet which punctured his right kidney which
caused
his
death.
HYPERLINK
torts & damages

n1998/120921.htm" \l "_edn4" \o ""
- Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and Vidal
Agliam, warrants for the arrest of Ballesteros, Galo and
Bulusan were issued. - All pleaded not guilty. Paraffin
tests conducted on Galo and Ballesteros produced
positive results. Bulusan was not tested for nitrates.
- In his testimony, Galo claimed that he did not even
talk to Bulusan or any of his companions. Having been
found with gunpowder residue in his hands, Galo
attempted to exculpate himself from the results by
confessing that he had been a cigarette smoker for the
past ten years and had, in fact, just consumed eight
cigarette sticks prior to the test., and that his hand may
have been contaminated by a nitrogenous compound,
the source of which is urine. Lastly, he said that he was
not even present at the crime scene
- Ballesteros interposed the defense of alibi, that he
went to a nearby store to purchase some cigarettes. He
returned home and cleaned his garlic bulbs before
retiring at 9:00 oclock. The next morning, he busied
himself with some chores, which included fertilizing his
pepper plants with sulfate. He handled the fertilizers
without gloves. He said that he uses his left hand in
lighting cigarettes and he had no motive to kill the
victims.
HYPERLINK
n1998/120921.htm" \l "_edn6" \o ""
- Bulusan echoed the defense of alibi of Galo and
Ballesteros
- The trial court found the three accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, and
ordered them to pay jointly and solidarily:
1. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in
the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the
amount of P20,000.00, and actual damages in the
amount of P35,755.00, with interest;
2. The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino, Sr.,
compensatory damages in the amount of P50,000.00,
moral damages in the amount of P20,000.00, and actual
damages in the total amount of P61,785.00, with
interest;
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3. Carmelo Agliam, actual damages in the amount of

P2,003.40, and moral damages in the amount of
P10,000.00, with interest;
4. Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino,
moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00 each, with
interest.
5. The costs.
ISSUES
1. WON the trial court was correct in finding accusedappellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt
2. WON the Court correctly ruled in finding that the
offense was qualified by treachery
3. WON the Court was correct in the award of damages
to the heirs of the victims
HELD
1. YES
Ratio Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by
law to convict a person of a criminal charge. The doubt
to the benefit of which an accused is entitled in a
criminal trial is a reasonable doubt, not a whimsical or
fanciful doubt based on imagined but wholly
improbable possibilities and unsupported by evidence.
HYPERLINK
n1998/120921.htm" \l "_edn21" \o "" Reasonable doubt
is that engendered by an investigation of the whole
proof and inability, after such investigation, to let the
mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.
HYPERLINK
n1998/120921.htm" \l "_edn22" \o ""
Reasoning
- In their testimonies, Carmelo and Vidal Agliam both
described the area to be well illumined by the
moon. Considering the luminescence of the moon and
the proximity between them, the victims could
distinctly identify their assailants. Also, the constant
interaction between them through the years (in the
buying and selling of cattle and Bulusan was a
classmate of Vidal) would necessarily lead to familiarity
with each other such that, at the very least, one would
have been able to recognize the other easily
prof. casis
- That accused-appellants had no motive in perpetrating
the offense is irrelevant. Motive is the moving power
which impels one to action for a definite result. Intent,
on the other hand, is the purpose to use a particular
means to effect such result. HYPERLINK
n1998/120921.htm" \l "_edn11" \o "" HYPERLINK
n1998/120921.htm" \l "_edn12" \o "" The prosecution
need not prove motive on the part of the accused when
the latter has been positively identified as the author of
the
crime.
HYPERLINK
n1998/120921.htm" \l "_edn14" \o ""
- on their excuses regarding the source of the
gunpowder traces found on their hands: Experts
confirm the possibility that cigarettes, fertilizers and
urine may leave traces of nitrates, but these are minimal
and, unlike those found in gunpowder, may be washed
off with tap water.
- on the defense of alibi: for the defense of alibi to
prosper, the accused must prove, not only that he was at
some other place at the time of the commission of the
crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate
vicinity.
HYPERLINK
n1998/120921.htm" \l "_edn16" \o "" This accusedappellants failed to satisfactorily prove. Positive
identification prevails over denials and alibis.
- None of them attempted to corroborate their alibi
through the testimony of witnesses. In fact, they never
attempted to present as witnesses those who could have
testified to having seen them elsewhere on the night in
question.
2. YES
Ratio The requisites of treachery are twofold: (1) (t)hat
at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position
to defend himself; and (2) that the offender consciously
adopted the particular means, method or form of attack
employed
by
him.
HYPERLINK
n1998/120921.htm" \l "_edn24" \o ""
Reasoning
torts & damages

- Here, it is obvious that the accused-appellants had
sufficient opportunity to reflect on their heinous plan.
The facts show that the attack was well-planned and not
merely a result of the impulsiveness of the offenders.
Manifestations of their evil designs were already
apparent as early as the time of the dance. They were
well-armed and approached the homebound victims,
totally unaware of their presence, from behind. There
was no opportunity for the latter to defend themselves
3. YES
Ratio Damages may be defined as the pecuniary
compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury
sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary
consequences which the law imposes for the breach of
some duty or the violation of some right. HYPERLINK
n1998/120921.htm" \l "_edn27" \o "" Actual or
compensatory damages are those awarded in
satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury
sustained,
HYPERLINK
n1998/120921.htm" \l "_edn28" \o "" whereas moral
damages may be invoked when the complainant has
experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical
suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had
furthermore shown that these were the proximate result
of the offenders wrongful act or omission.
HYPERLINK
n1998/120921.htm" \l "_edn29" \o ""
Reasoning
- In granting actual or compensatory damages, the party
making a claim for such must present the best evidence
available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and the like,
HYPERLINK
n1998/120921.htm" \l "_edn30" \o "" as corroborated
by
his
testimony.
HYPERLINK
n1998/120921.htm" \l "_edn31" \o "" Here, the claim
for actual damages by the heirs of the victims is not
controverted, the same having been fully substantiated
by receipts accumulated by them and presented to the
court.
HYPERLINK
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- PAGE 77 -
n1998/120921.htm" \l "_edn32" \o "" Therefore, the
award of actual damages is proper. However, the order
granting compensatory damages to the heirs of Jerry
Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. must be amended.
Consistent with the policy of this Court, the amount of
P 50,000.00 is given to the heirs of the victims by way
of indemnity, and not as compensatory damages.
HYPERLINK
n1998/120921.htm" \l "_edn33" \o "" As regards moral
damages, the amount of psychological pain, damage
and injury caused to the heirs of the victims, although
inestimable,
HYPERLINK
n1998/120921.htm" \l "_edn34" \o ""
may be
determined by the trial court in its discretion. Hence,
we see no reason to disturb its findings as to this matter.
DISPOSITION The decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
CUSTODIO V CA (Heirs Of Mabasa)
253 SCRA 483
REGALADO; February 9, 1996
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA
FACTS
- The plaintiff-appellee Mabasa owns a parcel of land
with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at
Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro
Manila. As access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiff's
property, there are 2 possible passageways. The first
passageway is approximately one meter wide and is
about 20m distant from Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos
St. Such path is passing in between the row of houses of
defendants. The second passageway is about 3m in
width. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a
meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6m
in length, has to be traversed.
- When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there
were tenants occupying the remises and who were
acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However,
prof. casis
sometime in February, 1982, one of said tenants
vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went
to see the premises, he saw that there had been built an
adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower
in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by
defendants Santoses along their property which is also
along the first passageway. Defendant Morato
constructed her adobe fence and even extended said
fence in such a way that the entire passageway was
enclosed. And it was then that the remaining tenants of
said apartment vacated the area. Defendant Cristina
Santos testified that she constructed said fence because
there was an incident when her daughter was dragged
by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in
said apartment along the first passageway. She also
mentioned some other inconveniences of having at the
front of her house a pathway such as when some of the
tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and
windows. Some of their footwear were even lost.
- TC ordered (a) defendant-appellants Custodios and
Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access ingress
and egress, to the public street; (b) the plaintiff to pay
defendants Custodios and Santoses P8,000 as indemnity
for the permanent use of the passageway.
- Private respondents, went to CA raising the sole issue
of WON lower court erred in not awarding damages in
their favor. CA affirming TC judgment with
modification, awarding damages to plaintiffs (P65K as
actual damages, P30K as moral damages and P10K as
exemplary damages). Mfr denied. Hence this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON the grant of right of way to herein private
respondents is proper
2. WON CA erred in awarding damages to plaintiffappellee Mabasa
HELD
1. Ratio Whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an
appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain
from the appellate court any affirmative relief other
than what was granted in the decision of the lower court
Reasoning
torts & damages

- Petitioners are already barred from raising the same.
Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court
a quo granting private respondents the right of way,
hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the
adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment
of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety
of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.
2. YES
Ratio There is no cause of action for acts done by one
person (in this case, upon his own property) in a lawful
and proper manner, although such acts incidentally
cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such
damage or loss is damnum absque injuria.
Reasoning
[1] To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be
both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the
defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff
therefrom.
[2] Obiter: There is a material distinction between
damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in
those instances in which the loss or harm was not the
result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are
often called damnum absque injuria.
[3] In order that the law will give redress for an act
causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but
wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. The injury
must result from a breach of duty or a legal wrong.
[4] In this case, although there was damage, there was
no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private
respondents, petitioners could not be said to have
violated the principle of abuse of right (Art.21 CC)
[5] The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within
their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners,
hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to
enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations
than those established by law. It is within the right of
petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their
property (See Art.430 CC).
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DISPOSITION The appealed decision of CA is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the
trial court is REINSTATED.
THE CONCEPT OF QUASI-DELICT
GARCIA V FLORIDO
[CITATION]
ANTONIO; [DATE]
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Misamis Occidental, dismissing
petitioners' action for damages against respondents,
Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, "without
prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction
of the defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief
of Police of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte", and
from the order of said Court dated January 21, 1972,
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
FACTS
- On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia,
Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with
his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco,
bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car
with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated
by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by
respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a roundtrip from
Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of
attending a conference of chiefs of government
hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and
bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at
Zamboanga City.
- At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a
slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in
Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte,
said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No.
25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated
by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by
defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid
collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries
which necessitated their medical treatment and
hospitalization.
prof. casis
- Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the
passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving
their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless,
grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross
violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the
safety of the passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners,
German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester
Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent
Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an action
for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the private
respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU
car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision,
with prayer for preliminary attachment.
- The principal argument advanced by Mactan Inc. et. al
to in a motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no
cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days
before the filing of the present action for damages,
respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case
No. 4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief
of Police and that, with the filing of the aforesaid
criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent
thereto unless the criminal case has been finally
adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil
action is premature, because the liability of the
employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until
after final judgment has been rendered finding the
driver, Pedro Tumala, guilty of negligence; that Art. 33
of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art 33
applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or
homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the
driver.
- The lower court sustained Mactan Inc. et. Al. and
dismissed the complaint
ISSUES
1. WON the lower court erred in dismissing the
complaint for damages on the ground that since no
express reservation was made by the complainants, the
civil aspect of the criminal case would have to be
determined only after the termination of the criminal
case
torts & damages

2. WON the lower court erred in saying that the action
is not based on quasi-delict since the allegations of the
complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any
assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or
regulations and because of the prayer in the complaint
asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and
severally liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary
damages
.
HELD
1. YES
Ratio
An action based on quasi-delict may be
maintained independently from a criminal action. By
instituting a civil action based on a quasi-delict, a
complainant may be deemed to abandon his/her right to
press recovery for damages in the criminal case.
Reasoning
- In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners
never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the
Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much
less has the said criminal action been terminated either
by conviction or acquittal of said accused.
- It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the
present civil action for damages, petitioners have in
effect abandoned their right to press recovery for
damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to
recover them in the present civil case.
- As a result of this action of petitioners the civil
liability of private respondents to the former has ceased
to be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an
offended party loses his right to intervene in the
prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has
waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to
institute, but also when he has actually instituted the
civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in
the criminal case has disappeared.
- As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act
causing damages may produce a civil liability arising
from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa
extracontractual. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, having always had its own
foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of
the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil
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action based upon quasi-delict may proceed

independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal
negligence and regardless of the result of the latter.
Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with
reference to . . . Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code
is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for
these articles were drafted . . . and are intended to
constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in
what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which
is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized
amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of
the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation
required in the proviso."
- But in whatever way We view the institution of the
civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict
by petitioners, whether as one that should be governed
by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules
which require reservation by the injured party
considering that by the institution of the civil action
even before the commencement of the trial of the
criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed
their right to intervene therein, or one where
reservation to file the civil action need not be made,
for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the
Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the
failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him
from bringing the action, under the peculiar
circumstances of the case, We find no legal
justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.
2. YES, because the action in fact satisfies the elements
of quasi-delict.
Ratio An action shall be deemed to be based on a
quasi-delict when all the essential averments under
Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present,
namely:
a) act or omission of the private respondents;
b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due
care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by
respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of
the bus with the passenger car;
c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by
petitioners as a result of the collision;
prof. casis
d) existence of direct causal connection between the
damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of
private respondents; and
e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations
between the parties.
Reasoning
- The circumstance that the complaint alleged that
respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove
the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly negligent
and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and
without due regard to the safety of the passengers
aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature and
character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana.
The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the
failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the
interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners.
Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is
a clear indication of negligence. Since the same
negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal action
by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court
(Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action by
petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the
drivers' negligence in both complaints would
substantially be the same. It should be emphasized that
the same negligent act causing damages may produce a
civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the
Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict
or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the
New Civil Code. This distinction has been amply
explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et all (73 Phil. 607,
620-621).
- It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule
111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became
effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for
by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct
from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured
provided said party has reserved his right to institute it
separately, but it should be noted, however, that neither
Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit
when such reservation shall be made.
torts & damages

SEPARATE OPINION
BARREDO [concur]
- Article 2176 and 2177 definitely create a civil liability
distinct and different from the civil action arising from
the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal
Code. Since Civil Case No. 2850 is predicated on the
above civil code articles and not on the civil liability
imposed by the Revised Penal Code, I cannot see why a
reservation had to be made in the criminal case. As to
the specific mention of Article 2177 in Section 2 of the
Rule 111, it is my considered view that the latter
provision is inoperative, it being substantive in
character and is not within the power of the Supreme
Court to promulgate, and even if it were not substantive
but adjective, it cannot stand because of its
inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the
legislature superseding the Rules of 1940.
- Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case No. 2850
should be deemed as the reservation required, there
being no showing that prejudice could be caused by
doing so.
- Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing the
order of dismissal of the trial court in order that Civil
Case No. 2850 may proceed, subject to the limitation
mentioned in the last sentence of Article 2177 of the
Civil Code, which means that of the two possible
judgments, the injured party is entitled exclusively
to the bigger one.
ANDAMO V IAC (Missionaries Of Our Lady Of La
Salette, Inc)
191 SCRA 195
FERNAN; November 6, 1990
NATURE
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
FACTS
- Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo
are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga
(Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of
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private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La

Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
- Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths
and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were
constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded
petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown,
damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away
costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and
their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and
exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
- In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action
against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo
Mallillin, officers and directors of respondent
corporation, for destruction by means of inundation
under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
- On February 22, 1983, petitioners filed a civil case for
damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against respondent corporation.
Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections
on the land.
- On April 26, 1984, the trial court issued an order
suspending further hearings in the civil case until after
judgment in the related Criminal Case. And later on
dismissed the Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, as the
criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil
case was still unresolved.The decision was based on
Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which
provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from
the same offense may be instituted separately, but after
the criminal action has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action."
- Petitioners appealed from that order to the
Intermediate Appellate Court.
- On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court
affirmed the order of the trial court. A motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the
Appellate Court .
ISSUE
WON a corporation, which has built through its agents,
waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within
its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an
adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages
prof. casis
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can
proceed independently of the criminal case
HELD
Ratio YES. As held in In Azucena vs. Potenciano, in
quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent
of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177
of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion
than this, for to subordinate the civil action
contemplated in the said articles to the result of the
criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or
acquittal would render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in
Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter."
Reasoning
- A careful examination of the complaint shows that the
civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the
Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasidelict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the
plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or
some other person for whose acts he must respond; and
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault
or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff.
- The waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of
petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal
connection between the act of building these waterpaths
and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if
proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the
basis for the recovery of damages.
- In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, the Court applied
Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and
held that "any person who without due authority
constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or
communication between a creek or a lake and a river,
thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who,
like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the
payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the
injured party.
torts & damages
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- While the property involved in the cited case belonged

to the public domain and the property subject of the
instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that
petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that
petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain
damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the
complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the
petitioners, the act or omission of respondent
corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence,
and the causal connection between the act and the
damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation
between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict
or culpa aquiliana.
- It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not
without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code
provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use
thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third
person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON
LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have
mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each
must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not
to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
Although we recognize the right of an owner to build
structures on his land, such structures must be so
constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so
that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners
and can withstand the usual and expected forces of
nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an
adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can
claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
- Article 2176 1of the Civil Code imposes a civil
liability on a person for damage caused by his act or
omission constituting fault or negligence.
- Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or
negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is
actually charged also criminally), to recover damages

on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
- The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article
21772 of the Civil Code. According to the Report of the
Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at
first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary
when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal
law, while the latter is a distinct and independent
negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict,
of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation
and individuality, separate from criminal negligence.
Such distinction between criminal negligence and
"culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ...
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court
held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate
legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime
a distinction exists between the civil liability arising
from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or
culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil
Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the
criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case,
unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the
court has declared that the fact from which the civil
action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction
of the criminal liability would carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability.
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
TAYLOR V MANILA ELECTRIC

16 PHIL 8
CARSON; March 22, 1910
NATURE
2
prof. casis
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and
other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by
his father, his nearest relative.
FACTS
- The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the
operation of a street railway and an electric light system
in the city of Manila. The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at
the time when he received the injuries complained of,
15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more
mature than the average boy of his age, and having
considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.
- On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy
named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age,
crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the
purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the
defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder
for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr.
Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled
apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the
unusual interest which both seem to have taken in
machinery, spent some time in wandering about the
company's premises.
- After watching the operation of the travelling crane
used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked
across the open space in the neighborhood of the place
where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes
from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or
thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground.
They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting
charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a
considerable explosive power. they opened one of the
caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a
yellowish substance they got matches, and David held
the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the
contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less
serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys
proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap,
became frightened and started to run away, received a
slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and
wounded, and David was struck in the face by several
particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his
right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its
torts & damages

removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for
his wounds.
- The evidence does definitely and conclusively
disclose how the caps came to be on the defendant's
premises, nor how long they had been there when the
boys found them.
- No measures seems to have been adopted by the
defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from
entering and walking about its premises unattended,
when they felt disposed so to do.
- The trial court's decision, awarding damages to the
plaintiff, upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil
Code read together with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908
of that code.
ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by
contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and
omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or
negligence occurs.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission
causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so
done.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding
article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom
they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother,
is liable for the damages caused by the minors who
live with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise
are equally liable for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter may be employed or on account of their duties.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease
when the persons mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to avoid the damage.
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the
damage caused
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have
been cared for with due diligence, and for kindling of
explosive substances which may not have been
placed in a safe and proper place.
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- Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his

appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts proven
at the trial do not established the liability of the
defendant company under the provisions of these
articles.
ISSUE
WON the defendants negligence is the proximate cause
of plaintiff's injuries
HELD
NO
- We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of
this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the
caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate
cause of the injury received by the plaintiff.
- We agree with counsel for appellant that under the
Civil Code, as under the generally accepted doctrine in
the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that
under consideration, in order to establish his right to a
recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant
personally, or some person for whose acts it must
respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the
negligence and the damage.
- These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do
not admit of discussion, the real difficulty arising in the
application of these principles to the particular facts
developed in the case under consideration.
- It is clear that the accident could not have happened
and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the
point where they were found, or if their owner had
exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate
place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not
have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and
convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises,
and strolled around thereon without the express
permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up
and carried away the property of the defendant which
he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter
deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a
match to its contents.
prof. casis
- But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of
plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry upon
defendant company's premises, and the intervention of
his action between the negligent act of defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the
accident which resulted in his injury should not be held
to have contributed in any wise to the accident, which
should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's
negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place
where they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter
the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned
the injuries sustained by him.
- In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies
on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last
resort in the United States in the cases known as the
"Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based
thereon.
- As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84
U. S.), 657), wherein the principal question was
whether a railroad company was liable for in injury
received by an infant while upon its premises, from idle
curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, if such injury
was, under circumstances, attributable to the negligence
of the company), the principles on which these cases
turn are that "while a railroad company is not bound to
the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers who
are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to
passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt from
responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from
its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and that "the
conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged
by the same rule which governs that of adult. While it is
the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him
to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault
or negligence of another he must himself have been free
from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of
tender years. The care and caution required of a child is
according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is
to be determined in each case by the circumstances of
the case."
- The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs.
Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized
in several courts. But the doctrine of the case is
controlling in our jurisdiction.
torts & damages

- This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and
necessity, and neither is contention that a man has a
right to do what will with his own property or that
children should be kept under the care of their parents
or guardians, so as to prevent their entering on the
premises of others is of sufficient weight to put in
doubt.
- But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon
defendant's property without defendant's express
invitation or permission would not have relieved
defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there
by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such
injury were attributable to the negligence of the
defendant, we are of opinion that under all the
circumstances of this case the negligence of the
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises
was not the proximate cause of the injury received by
the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly
speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the
defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that
plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and
putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of
the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon
the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not
civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable
and Torpedo cases, that because of plaintiff's youth the
intervention of his action between the negligent act of
the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises and the explosion which resulted in his injury
should not be held to have contributed in any wise to
the accident; and it is because we can not agree with
this proposition, although we accept the doctrine of the
Turntable and Torpedo cases, that we have thought
proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at length
in this decision.
- In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident
was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both
mentally and physically than the average boy of his age;
he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn
P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after
the injury was incurred; and the record discloses
throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to
take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no
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room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness

stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap
with which he was amusing himself.
- True, he may not have known and probably did not
know the precise nature of the explosion which might
be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap,
and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries
which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less
dangerous explosion might be expected from his act,
and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly
produced the explosion. It would be going far to say
that "according to his maturity and capacity" he
exercised such and "care and caution" as might
reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or
anyone else should be held civilly responsible for
injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had
sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of
the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the
match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in
the sense that his age and his experience qualified him
to understand and appreciate the necessity for the
exercise of that degree of caution which would have
avoided the injury which resulted from his own
deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must
be held to have been the direct and immediate result of
his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be
true that these injuries would not have been incurred but
for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the
caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's
own act was the proximate and principal cause of the
accident which inflicted the injury.
TAYAG V ALCANTARA
98 SCRA 723
CONCEPCION; July 23, 1980
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari the order of CFI Tarlac
(dismissing petition for damages)
FACTS
- Pedro Tayag was riding a motorcycle when he was
bumped by a Philippine Rabbit Bus, driven by Romeo
prof. casis
Villa, which caused his instantaneous death. Pending
the criminal case against the driver, the heirs of Tayag
instituted a civil action to recover damages from the
company (Phil Rabbit Bus Inc) and the driver. In turn,
the company and driver filed a motion to suspend trial
of the civil case on the ground that the criminal case
was still pending. Judge Alcantara granted this motion.
- In the criminal case, the driver as acquitted based on
reasonable doubt. The company and driver then filed
for dismissal of the civil case on the ground that the
heirs do not have a cause of action because of the
acquittal. Judge Alcantara granted this and dismissed
the civil case.
ISSUE
WON Judge Alcantara correctly dismissed the civil case
on the ground of no cause of action due to the acquittal
of the driver
HELD
1. NO
Ratio The petitioners' cause of action being based on a
quasi-delict, the acquittal of the driver of the crime
charged is not a bar to the prosecution for damages
based on quasi-delict
Reasoning
- Art. 31, NCC provides: When the civil action is
based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter
- Evidently, this provision refers to a civil action based
on an obligation arising from quasi-delict. The
complaint itself shows that the claim was based on
quasi-delit, viz:
6. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lino, Inc., has
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its employees,
particularly defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan.
Otherwise, the accident in question which resulted in
the death of Pedro Tayag, Sr. and damage to his
property would not have occurred;
All the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action
are present:
torts & damages

(1) act or omission constituting fault /negligence on the
part of respondent
(2) damage caused by the said act or omission
(3) direct causal relation between the damage and the
act or omission and
(4) no preexisting contractual relation between the
parties.
Citing Elcano v Hill: a separate civil action lies against
the offender in a criminal act, WON he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that
offended party is not allowed to recover damages on
both scores
DISPOSITION petition granted. Order of CFI Tarlac
set aside, case REMANDED to lower court for further
proceedings.
SEPARATE OPINION
AQUINO [concur]
- I concur because petitioners' action for damages is
based on article 2177 of the Civil Code, under which
according to the Code Commission, "acquittal from an
accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability from
criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasidelict or culpa aquiliana".
Article 33 of the Civil Code also justifies the
petitioners' independent civil action for damages since
the term "physical injuries" therein embraces death
(Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).
- Moreover, the acquittal of Romeo Villa was based on
reasonable doubt. The petitioners, as plaintiffs in the
civil case, can amend their complaint and base their
action also on article 29 NCC which allows an
independent civil action for damages in case of acquittal
on the ground of reasonable doubt.
- The requirement in section 2, Rule III of the Rules of
Court that there should be a reservation in the criminal
cases of the right to institute an independent civil action
is contrary to law.
PEOPLE V LIGON
152 SCRA 419
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YAP; July 29, 1987

NATURE
Appeal from the judgment of the RTC Manila
FACTS
- February 17, 1986, RTC convicted Fernando Gabat, of
Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua where he robbed and killed Jose
Rosales y Ortiz, a seventeen-year old working student
who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He was
allegedly robbed of his cigarette box containing
cigarettes worth P300.00 more or less.
Rogelio
Ligon,the co-accused, was never apprehended and is
still at large.
- October 23, 1983 - at about 6:10 p.m. Gabat, was
riding in a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his
father and driven by the other accused, Ligon which
was coming from Espaa Street going towards the
direction of Quiapo. At the intersection of Quezon
Boulevard and Lerma Street before turning left towards
the underpass at C.M. Recto Avenue, they stopped.
While waiting, Gabat beckoned a cigarette vendor,
Rosales to buy some cigarettes from him. Rosales
approached the Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of
cigarettes. While this transaction was occurring, the
traffic light changed to green, and the Kombi driven by
Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved forward. As to what
precisely happened between Gabat and Rosales at
the crucial moment, and immediately thereafter, is
the subject of conflicting versions by the prosecution
and the defense. It is not controverted, however, that as
the Kombi continued to speed towards Quiapo, Rosales
clung to the window of the Kombi but apparently
lost his grip and fell down on the pavement. Rosales
was rushed by some bystanders to the Philippine
General Hospital, where he was treated for multiple
physical injuries and was confined thereat until his
death on October 30, 1983.
- Following close behind (about 3 meters) the Kombi at
the time of the incident was a taxicab driven by
Castillo. He was traveling on the same lane in a slightly
oblique position. The Kombi did not stop after the
victim fell down on the pavement near the foot of the
prof. casis
underpass, Castillo pursued it as it sped towards Roxas
Boulevard, beeping his horn to make the driver stop.
When they reached the Luneta near the Rizal
monument, Castillo saw an owner-type jeep with two
persons in it. He sought their assistance in chasing the
Kombi, telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao." The two
men in the jeep joined the chase and at the intersection
of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard, Castillo was able to
overtake the Kombi when the traffic light turned red.
He immediately blocked the Kombi while the jeep
pulled up right behind it. The two men on board the
jeep turned out to be police officers, Patrolmen
Leonardo Pugao and Peter Ignacio. They drew their
guns and told the driver, Rogelio Ligon, and his
companion, Fernando Gabat, to alight from the Kombi.
It was found out that there was a third person inside the
Kombi, a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping
at the rear seat.
- The three were all brought by the police officers to the
Western Police District and turned over to Pfc. Fermin
Payuan. The taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo, also
went along with them. Payuan also prepared a Traffic
Accident Report, dated October 23, 1983.6 Fernando
Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias were released early
morning the following day, but Rogelio Ligon was
detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's Office for
further investigation.
- December 6, 1983 - Investigating Fiscal Cantos, filed
an information against Rogelio Ligon charging him
with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence.
- October 31, 1983 - an autopsy was conducted by the
medico-legal officer of NBI which stated the cause of
death of Rosales as "pneumonia hypostatic, bilateral,
secondary to traumatic injuries of the head."
- June 28, 1984 - Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed another
information against Rogelio Ligon and Fernando Gabat
for Robbery with Homicide based on a Supplemental
Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo and a joint affidavit of
Armando Espino and Romeo Castil, cigarette vendors,
who allegedly witnessed the incident . These affidavits
were already prepared and merely sworn to before
Fiscal Cantos on January 17, 1984.
- prosecution tried to establish, through the sole
testimony of the taxicab driver that Gabat grabbed the
torts & damages

box of cigarettes from Rosales and pried loose the
latter's hand from the window of the Kombi, resulting
in the latter falling down and hitting the pavement.
- The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's
version, stating that there can be no doubt that Gabat
forcibly took or grabbed the cigarette box from Rosales
because, otherwise, there could be no reason for the
latter to run after the Kombi and hang on to its window.
The court also believed Castillo's testimony that Gabat
forcibly removed or pried off the right hand of Rosales
from the windowsill of the Kombi, otherwise, the latter
could not have fallen down, having already been able to
balance himself on the stepboard.
- On the other hand, the trial court dismissed as
incredible the testimony of Gabat that the cigarette
vendor placed the cigarette box on the windowsill of the
Kombi, holding it with his left hand, while he was
trying to get from his pocket the change for the 5peso
bill of Gabat. The court said that it is of common
knowledge that cigarette vendors plying their trade in
the streets do not let go of their cigarette box; no vendor
lets go of his precious box of cigarettes in order to
change a peso bill given by a customer.
ISSUE
WON the prosecutions set of facts should be given
credence
HELD
NO
- a careful review of the record shows that certain
material facts and circumstances had been overlooked
by the trial court which, if taken into account, would
alter the result of the case in that they would introduce
an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the
accused to acquittal.
- While the prosecution witness, Castillo, may be a
disinterested witness with no motive, according to the
court a quo, "other than to see that justice be done," his
testimony, even if not tainted with bias, is not entirely
free from doubt because his observation of the event
could have been faulty or mistaken. The taxicab which
Castillo was driving was lower in height compared to
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prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
the Kombi in which Gabat was riding-a fact admitted

by Castillo at the trial.
- Judicial notice may also be taken of the fact that the
rear windshield of the 1978 Volkswagon Kombi is on
the upper portion, occupying approximately one-third
(1/3) of the rear end of the vehicle, thus making it
visually difficult for Castillo to observe clearly what
transpired inside the Kombi at the front end where
Gabat was seated. These are circumstances which must
be taken into consideration in evaluating Castillo's
testimony as to what exactly happened between Gabat
and the cigarette vendor during that crucial moment
before the latter fell down. As the taxicab was right
behind the Kombi, following it at a distance of about
three meters, Castillo's line of vision was partially
obstructed by the back part of the Kombi. His testimony
that he saw Gabat grab the cigarette box from Rosales
and forcibly pry loose the latter's hand from the
windowsill of the Kombi is thus subject to a reasonable
doubt, specially considering that this occurrence
happened in just a matter of seconds, and both vehicles
during that time were moving fast in the traffic.
- Considering the above circumstances, the Court is not
convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of the
accused Fernando Gabat has been established beyond
reasonable doubt. In our view, the quantum of proof
necessary to sustain Gabat's conviction of so serious a
crime as robbery with homicide has not been met in this
case. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on reasonable
doubt.
- However, it does not follow that a person who is not
criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While
the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must
be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action
for damages.
- Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the
acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same
act or omission, has been explained by the Code
Commission as follows:
"The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a
criminal case also releases him from civil liability is
one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal

system. It has given rise to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a
reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt
of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch
as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal
offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability
cannot be demanded.
"This is one of those cases where confused thinking
leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such
reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation
between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and
to determine the logical result of the distinction. The
two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other,
One affects the social order and the other, private rights.
One is for the punishment or correction of the offender
while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by
the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so
different from each other that article 1813 of the present
(Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a
compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime;
but the public action for the imposition of the legal
penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and
proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or
fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnifying the complaining party, why should the
offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not
the invasion or violation of every private right to be
proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the
right of the aggrieved person any less private because
the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
DISPOSITION Appellant acquitted for the crime of
robbery and homicide, but sentenced to indemnify the
heirs of Jose Rosales y Ortiz.
PADILLA V CA (Vergara)
129 SCRA 558
GUTIERREZ; [date]
NATURE
Petition of rcertiorari to revies the decision of the Court
of Appeals
torts & damages

FACTS
- Petitioners, on or about February 8, 1964, went to the
public market to execute an alleged order of the Mayor
to clear the public market of stalls which were
considered as nuisance per se. The stall of one Antonio
Vergara was demolished pursuant to this order. In the
process however the stock in trade and certain furniture
of Vergara were lost and destroyed.
- The petitioners were found guilty of grave coercion
after trial at the CFI and were sentenced to five months
and one day imprisonment and ordered to pay fines.
- On appeal, the CA reversed the findings of the CFI
and acquitted the appellants based on reasonable doubt
but nonetheless ordered them to pay P9,600.00 as actual
damages. The decision of the CA was based on the fact
that the petitioners were charged with coercion when
they should have been more appropriately charged with
crime against person. Hence, the crime of grave
coercion was not proved in accordance with the law.
- The petitioner filed the appeal to the SC questioning
the grant of actual damages despite a no guilty verdict.
ISSUE
WON the CA committed a reversible error in requiring
the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the
complainants after acquitting them from the criminal
charge
HELD
NO
- The SC, quoting Section 3 (C) of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court and various jurisprudence including
PNB vs Catipon, De Guzman vs Alvia, held that
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in the final judgment that the facts
from which the civil action might arise did not exist. In
the case at bar, the judgment of not guilty was based on
reasonable doubt. Since the standard of proof to be used
in civil cases is preponderance of evidence, the court
express a finding that the defendants offenses are civil
in nature.
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- The Court also tackled the provision of Article 29 of

the Civil Code to clarify whether a separate civil action
is required when the accused in a criminal prosecution
is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The SC took the
position that the said provision merely emphasizes that
a civil action for damages is not precluded by an
acquittal for the same criminal act. The acquittal
extinguishes the criminal liability but not the civil
liability particularly if the finding is not guilty based on
reasonable ground.
CRUZ V CA (UMALI)
282 SCRA 188
FRANCISCO; 1997
NATURE
Civil action for damages in a medical malpractice suit.
FACTS
- Rowena Umali De Ocampo accompanied her
mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General
Hospital. Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was
examined by the petitioner who found a "myoma"
in her uterus, and scheduled her for a
hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991.
- Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the
evening of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be
operated on the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon. According to Rowena, she noticed that
the clinic was untidy and the window and the floor
were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant
for a rag to wipe the window and the floor with.
Because of the untidy state of the clinic, Rowena
tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with
the operation.
- The following day, Rowena asked the petitioner if
the operation could be postponed. The petitioner
called Lydia into her office and the two had a
conversation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the
petitioner told her that she must be operated on as
scheduled.
- Rowena and her other relatives waited outside
the operating room while Lydia underwent
prof. casis
operation. While they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went
out of the operating room and instructed them to
buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister
immediately bought. About one hour had passed
when Dr. Ercillo came out again this time to ask
them to buy blood for Lydia. They bought type "A"
blood and the same was brought by the attendant
into the operating room.
- After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner
informed them that the operation was finished. The
operating staff then went inside the petitioner's
clinic to take their snacks. Some thirty minutes
after, Lydia was brought out of the operating room
in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena
and the other relatives to buy additional blood for
Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not able to comply
with petitioner's order as there was no more type
"A" blood available in the blood bank.
- Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood
which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena then
noticed her mother, who was attached to an
oxygen tank, gasping for breath. Apparently the
oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband
together with the driver of the accused had to go to
the San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen.
Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen as
soon as it arrived.
- At around 10pm, she went into shock and her
blood pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable
condition necessitated her transfer to the San
Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected
to a respirator and further examined. The transfer
to the San Pablo City District Hospital was without
the prior consent of Rowena nor of the other
relatives present who found out about the intended
transfer only when an ambulance arrived to take
Lydia to the San Pablo District Hospital. Rowena
and her other relatives then boarded a tricycle and
followed the ambulance.
- Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District
Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating room
and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on
her because there was blood oozing from the
abdominal incision. The attending physicians
torts & damages

summoned Dr. Bartolome Angeles, head of the
Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the San
Pablo District Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles
arrived, Lydia was already in shock and possibly
dead as her blood pressure was already 0/0. While
petitioner was closing the abdominal wall, the
patient died. Her death certificate states "shock" as
the immediate cause of death and "Disseminated
Intravascular
Coagulation
(DIC)"
as
the
antecedent cause.
ISSUE
WON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a
judgment of conviction against the petitioner for
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide
HELD
NO
- The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1)
that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that
the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary;
(3) that it be without malice; (4) that material
damage results from the reckless imprudence; and
(5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the offender, taking into consideration
his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition, and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
- WON has committed an "inexcusable lack of
precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be
determined according to the standard of care
observed by other members of the profession in
good standing under similar circumstances
bearing in mind the advanced state of the
profession at the time of treatment or the present
state of medical science.
- For whether a physician or surgeon has
exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in
the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of
cases, a matter of expert opinion. The deference
of courts to the expert opinion of qualified
physicians stems from its realization that the latter
possess unusual technical skills which laymen in
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most instances are incapable of intelligently

evaluating. Expert testimony should have been
offered to prove that the circumstances cited by
the courts below are constitutive of conduct falling
below the standard of care employed by other
physicians in good standing when performing the
same operation. It must be remembered that when
the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in
the instant case, there is an inevitable presumption
that in proper cases he takes the necessary
precaution and employs the best of his knowledge
and skill in attending to his clients, unless the
contrary
is
sufficiently
established.
This
presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which
is so sadly lacking in the case at bench.
- Even without expert testimony, that petitioner was
recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties
as a surgeon, no cogent proof exists that any of
these circumstances caused petitioner's death.
Thus, the absence of the fourth element of
reckless imprudence: that the injury to the person
or property was a consequence of the reckless
imprudence.
- In litigations involving medical negligence, the
plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's
negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of
negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty
on the part of the surgeon as well as a casual
connection of such breach and the resulting death
of his patient.
PHIL. RABBIT V PEOPLE
[citation]
PANGANIBAN; April 14, 2004
NATURE
Petition for Review
FACTS
- Napoleon Macadangdang was found guilty and
convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and
damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years, and
prof. casis
to pay damages. But in the event the the accused
becoems insolvent, Phil. Rabbit will be held liable for
the civil liabilities. But admittedly, the accused jumped
bail and remained at large.
ISSUE
WON an employer, who dutifully participated in the
defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the
judgment of conviction independently of the accused
HELD
NO
- The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal
unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the
court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from
notice of the judgment against them. HYPERLINK
"http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/a
pr2004/147703.htm" \l "_ftn15" \o "" While at large,
they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are
deemed to have waived the appeal. In the case before
us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to
surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to
have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the
judgment against him has become final and executory.
- After a judgment has become final, vested rights are
acquired by the winning party. If the proper losing
party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, then the former has the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.
HYPERLINK
pr2004/147703.htm" \l "_ftn59" \o ""
- In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accusedemployee, it participated in the proceedings before the
RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was
deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to
appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.
HYPERLINK
pr2004/147703.htm" \l "_ftn60" \o "" In fact, it can be
said that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the
court, deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.
- On Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment:
torts & damages

- Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated
civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the
latters insolvency.
- To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed
in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify
or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent
court.
HYPERLINK
pr2004/147703.htm" \l "_ftn48" \o "" By the same
token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal
conviction of their employees without the latters
consent would also result in improperly amending,
nullifying or defeating the judgment.
- The decision convicting an employee in a criminal
case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not
only with regard to the formers civil liability, but also
with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer
cannot be separated from that of the employee.
HYPERLINK
pr2004/147703.htm" \l "_ftn17" \o ""
DISPOSITION Petition is hereby DENIED, and the
assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
CANGCO V MANILA RAILROAD CO
38 Phil 768
FISHER; October 14, 1918
NATURE
An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance disallowing the claim of the plaintiff for
P1,000 against the estate of the deceased James P.
McElroy.
FACTS
- Jose Cangco, was employed by Manila Railroad
Company as clerk. He lived in San Mateo, Rizal,
located upon the line of the defendant railroad
company; and in coming daily by train to the company's
office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a
pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to
ride upon the company's trains free of charge.
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- January 20, 1915, the plaintiff was returning home by

rail from his daily labors; and as the train drew up to the
station in San Mateo the plaintiff while making his exit
through the door, took his position upon the steps of the
coach.
- On the side of the train where passengers alight at the
San Mateo station there is a cement platform which
begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance
away from the company's office and extends along in
front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the
length of several coaches. As the train slowed down
another passenger, Emilio Zuniga, also an employee of
the railroad company, got off the same car, alighting
safely at the point where the platform begins to rise
from the level of the ground. When Jose Cangco
stepped off, one or both of his feet came in contact with
a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet
slipped from under him and he fell violently on the
platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and
was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm
was badly crushed and lacerated. After the plaintiff
alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly
six meters before it came to a full stop.
- The accident occurred on a dark night, and the train
station was lit dimly by a single light located some
distance away, objects on the platform where the
accident occurred were difficult to discern, especially to
a person emerging from a lighted car.
- The sack of melons on the platform is because it was
the customary season for harvesting these melons and a
large lot had been brought to the station for shipment to
the market. This row of sacks was so placed that there
was a space of only about two feet between the sacks of
melons and the edge of the platform; and it is clear that
the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot
alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he
stepped upon the platform. His statement that he failed
to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be
credited.
- The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an
unconscious condition, and with serious injuries. He
was immediately brought to a hospital where an
examination was made and his arm was amputated. The
plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a
prof. casis
second operation was performed and the member was
again amputated higher up near the shoulder. Expenses
reached the sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and
surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with
the process of his curation.
- August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the
CFI Manilato recover damages of the defendant
company, founding his action upon the negligence of
the servants and employees of the defendant in placing
the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving
them so placed as to be a menace to the security of
passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the
hearing in the CFI, the trial judge, found the facts
substantially as above stated, and although negligence
was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact
that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct
passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless,
the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in
alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded
from recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in
favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff
appealed.
ISSUE
WON there was contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff
HELD
NO
Ratio In determining the question of contributory
negligence in performing such act - that is to say,
whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are
circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the
passenger, and should be considered.
Reasoning
- The employees of the railroad company were guilty of
negligence in piling these sacks on the platform. Their
presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from
the train; and that they constituted an effective legal
cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It follows
that the defendant company is liable for the damage
unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own
contributory negligence.
torts & damages

- The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is
the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to
respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered
arises from the breach of that contract by reason of the
failure of defendant to exercise due care in its
performance.
- Its liability is direct and immediate, imposed by
article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by
proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and
supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not
applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only
to extra-contractual obligations
- In commenting upon article 1093, Manresa clearly
points out the difference between "culpa, substantive
and independent, which of itself constitutes the source
of an obligation between persons not formerly
connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an
"accident in the performance of an obligation already
existing . . .."
- In the Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. the
court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition
that article 1903 is not applicable to acts of negligence
which constitute the breach of a contract.
- Under the Spanish law, in cases imposed upon
employers with respect to damages due to the
negligence of their employees to persons to whom they
are not bound by contract, such is not based upon the
principle of respondent superior - but upon the principle
announced in article 1902 which imposes upon all
persons who by their fault or negligence, do injury to
another, the obligation of making good the damage
caused.
- The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is
always based upon a voluntary act or omission which,
without willful intent, but by mere negligence or
inattention, has caused damage to another. A master
who exercises all possible care in the selection of his
servant, taking into consideration the qualifications they
should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is
his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with
equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third
persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and
he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the
negligence of his servants, even within the scope of
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their employment, such third persons suffer damage.

Article 1903 presumes negligence, but that presumption
is refutable.
- In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, an action is brought
upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the
defendant to respond for the damage caused by the
carelessness of his employee while acting within the
scope of his employment The Court, after citing the last
paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said: (1)
That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption
of law that there was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in the selection of the servant
or employee, or in supervision over him after the
selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may
be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer
shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection
and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieved from liability.
- Every legal obligation must of necessity be extracontractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation
has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual
duties which civilized society imposes upon its
members, or which arise from these relations, other than
contractual, of certain members of society to others,
generally embraced in the concept of status. The legal
rights of each member of society constitute the measure
of the corresponding legal duties, which the existence
of those rights imposes upon all other members of
society. The breach of these general duties whether due
to willful intent or to mere inattention, if productive of
injury, gives rise to an obligation to indemnify the
injured party. The fundamental distinction between
obligations of this character and those which arise from
contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of noncontractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act
or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris,
whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists
independently of the breach of the voluntary duty
assumed by the parties when entering into the
contractual relation.
prof. casis
- The railroad company's defense involves the
assumption that even granting that the negligent
conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon
the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation
to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its
trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury
suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory
negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to
a complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of
comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case, if
the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence,
no liability is imposed upon defendant, whereas if the
accident was caused by defendant's negligence and
plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury,
the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore,
important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of
negligence.
- The Court is of the opinion that the correct doctrine
relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's
work on Negligence:
"The test by which to determine whether the passenger
has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight
from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or
reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an
ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition
of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger
acted under the circumstances disclosed by the
evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care
which may or should be used by the prudent man
generally, but the care which a man of ordinary
prudence would use under similar circumstances, to
avoid injury."
- In considering the probability of contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff the following
circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform
was constructed upon a level higher than that of the
roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from
the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting
passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus
reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping
off. The cement platform also assured to the passenger a
stable and even surface on which to alight. The plaintiff
was possessed of the vigor and agility of young
manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to
torts & damages
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get off while the train was yet moving as the same act
would have been in an aged or feeble person. The place
was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff, as it was his daily
custom to get on and off the train at this station. There
could be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to
the length of the step which he was required to take or
the character of the platform where he was alighting. It
is the Courts conclusion that the conduct of the plaintiff
in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly
under way was not characterized by imprudence and
that therefore he was not guilty of contributory
negligence.
DISPOSITION The decision of the lower court is
reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for
the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both
instances.
speed, the driver lost control thereof, causing it to

swerve and to hit the bridge wall. The accident occurred
on the morning of March 22, 1953. Five of the
passengers were injured, including the respondent who
suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. He was
taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment,
and later was subjected to a series of operations; the
first on May 23, 1953, when wire loops were wound
around the broken bones and screwed into place; a
second, effected to insert a metal splint, and a third one
to remove such splint. At the time of the trial, it appears
that respondent had not yet recovered the use of his
right arm.
- The driver was charged with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a
plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly.
SEPARATE OPINION
ISSUE
WON the defendant is entitled to moral damages
MALCOLM, [dissent]
- With one sentence in the majority decision, we are of
full accord, namely, "It may be admitted that had
plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop
before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him
could not have occurred." With the general rule relative
to a passenger's contributory negligence, we are
likewise in full accord, namely, "An attempt to alight
from a moving train is negligence per se." Adding these
two points together, we have the logical result - the
Manila Railroad Co. should be absolved from the
complaint, and judgment affirmed.
FORES V MIRANDA
[citation]
REYES, J.B.L.; March 4, 1959
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals
FACTS
- Respondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney
driven by Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle was
descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of
HELD
NO.
Ratio Moral damages are not recoverable in damage
actions predicated on a breach of the contract of
transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the
new Civil Code, which provide as follows:
"ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
xxx
xxx
xxx
ART. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal
ground for awarding moral damages if the court should
find that, under the circumstance, such damages are
justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith."
Reasoning
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of
transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e.,
wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to
justify an award of moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered
included in the description term "analogous cases" used
in Art. 2219; not only because Art. 2220 specifically
prof. casis
provides for the damages that are caused by contractual
breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in Act.
2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where
there is a "preexisting contractual relation between the
parties."
"ART. 2176.
Whoever by act or omission caused
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pro-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provision of this Chapter."
- In sum the rule is:
Delict (breach of contract)
Gen. Rule: no moral damages
- Reason: the advantageous position of a party suing a
carrier for breach of the contract of transportation
explains, to some extent, the limitation imposed by the
new Code on the amount of the recovery. The action for
breach of contract imposes on the defendant carrier a
presumption of liability upon mere proof of injury to
the passenger; that latter is relieved from the duty to
establish the fault of the carrier, or of his employees,
and the burden is placed on the carrier to prove the it
was due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure
(Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil., 768 777).
Moreover, the carrier, unlike in suits for quasi-delict,
may not escape liability by proving that it has exercised
due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees
- Exception: with moral damages if:
0 defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith
1 result in the death of a passenger in which case
Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly
subject to the rule of Art. 2206, that entitles the
spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased
passenger to "demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased"
- The difference in conditions, defenses and proof, as
well as the codal concept of quasi-delict as essentially
extra contractual negligence, compel us to differentiate
between action ex contractu, and actions quasi ex
delicto, and prevent us from viewing the action for
breach of contract as simultaneously embodying an
action on tort.
torts & damages

DISPOSITION The decision of the Court of Appeals
is modified by eliminating the award of P5.000.00 by
way of moral damages
M.H. RAKES V THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND
PACIFIC COMPANY
7 Phil 359
TRACEY; January 23, 1907
NATURE
Action for damages
FACTS
- the plaintiff, Rakes, one of a group of 8 AfricanAmerican laborers in the employment of defendant,
Atlantic, was at work transporting iron rails from the
harbor in Manila. The men were hauling the rails on 2
hand cars, some behind or at it sides and some pulling
the cars in the front by a rope. At one point, the track
sagged, the tie broke, the car canted and the rails slid off
and caught the plaintiff who was walking by the cars
side, breaking his leg, which was later amputated at the
knee.
- the plaintiffs witness alleged that a noticeable
depression in the track had appeared after a typhoon.
This was reported to the foreman, Mckenna, but it had
not been proven that Atlantic inspected the track or had
any proper system of inspection. Also, there were no
side guards on the cars to keep the rails from slipping
off.
- However, the companys officers and 3 of the workers
testified that there was a general prohibition frequently
made known to all against walking by the side of cars.
As Rakes was walking along the cars side when the
accident occurred, he was found to have contributed in
some degree to the injury inflicted, although not as the
primary cause.
- Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through
negligence lies only in a criminal action against the
official directly responsible and that the employer be
held only subsidiarily liable.
ISSUES
1. WON Atlantic is only subsidiarily liable
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prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
2. WON there was contributory negligence on the part

of petitioner and if so, WON it bars him from recovery
HELD
1. NO
- By virtue of culpa contractual, Atlantic may be held
primarily liable as it failed in its duty to provide safe
appliances for the use of its employees. Petitioner need
not file charges with the foreman to claim damages
from Atlantic; a criminal action is not a requisite for the
enforcement of a civil action.
2. YES
- Petitioner had walked along the side of the car despite
a prohibition to do so by the foreman. However, the
contributory negligence of the party injured will not
defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant
might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence,
have avoided the consequences of the injured party's
negligence. Petitioners negligence contributed only to
his own injury and not to the principal occurrenceit
was merely an element to the damage caused upon him.
Had it been otherwise, parties being mutually in
fault, there can be no appointment of damages. The law
has no scales to determine in such cases whose
wrongdoing weighed most in the compound that
occasioned the mischief (Railroad v Norton). In this
case, petitioner may recover from the defendant, less a
sum deemed suitable equivalent for his own
imprudence.
- Damages are awarded to petitioner at Php5,000,
deducting Php 2,500, the amount fairly attributable to
his own negligence.
SEPARATE OPINION
WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent]
-the negligence of the defendant alone was insufficient
to cause the accidentit also required the negligence of
the plaintiff. Because of this, plaintiff should not be
afforded relief
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V CA
241 SCRA 671
VITUG; February 23, 1995
NATURE
Petition for review
FACTS
- In October 1986, Luis A. Luna applied for, and was
accorded, a FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far
East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at its Pasig
Branch. Upon his request, the bank also issued a
supplemental card to Clarita S. Luna.
- In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC
was forthwith informed. In order to replace the lost
card, Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of
this nature, the bank's internal security procedures and
policy would appear to be- to meanwhile so record the
lost card, along with the principal card, as a "Hot Card"
or "Cancelled Card" in its master file.
- On 06 October 1988, Luis tendered a despedida lunch
for a close friend, a Fil-Am, and another guest at the
Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel Intercon Manila.
To pay for the lunch, Luis presented his
FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who promptly
had it verified through a telephone call to the bank's
Credit Card Department. Since the card was not
honored, Luis was forced to pay in cash the bill
amounting to P588.13. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed
by this incident.
- In a letter, dated 11 Oct. 1988, Luis Luna, through
counsel, demanded from FEBTC the payment of
damages. Adrian V. Festejo, a VP of the bank, expressed
the bank's apologies to Luis in his letter which stated
that: In cases when a card is reported to our office as
lost, FAREASTCARD undertakes the necessary action
to avert its unauthorized use to protect its cardholders.
However, it failed to inform him about its security
policy. Furthermore, an overzealous employee of the
Bank's Credit Card Department did not consider the
possibility that it may have been him who was
presenting the card at that time (for which reason, the
unfortunate incident occurred).
- Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the Bahia
Rooftop Restaurant to assure the latter that Luis was a
"very valued clients" of FEBTC. William Anthony
King, F&B Manager of the Intercon, wrote back to say
torts & damages

that the credibility of Luis had never been "in question."
A copy of this reply was sent to Luis by Festejo.
- Still evidently feeling aggrieved, Luis filed a
complaint for damages with the RTC of Pasig against
FEBTC.
- On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig ordered FEBTC
to pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral
damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c)
P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
- On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court
affirmed the decision of the trial court.Its motion for
reconsideration having been denied by the appellate
court, FEBTC has come to this Court with this petition
for review.
ISSUE
WON the petitioner is entitled to moral and exemplary
damages
HELD
NO
- In culpa contractual, moral damages may be
recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted
in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract.
The Civil Code provides:
- Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal
find that, under the circumstances, such damages are
justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith.
- Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not
simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a contract of
carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of
death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is
presumed ) of the common carrier.
- Concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting
to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation.
Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the
appellate court, however, can sufficiently indicate any
deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to
private respondents. Neither could FEBTC's negligence
in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered
so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith.
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- Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional

design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or
moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of
negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a
state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or ill will.
- Article 21 states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury
the damage.
- Article 21 of the Code, it should be observed,
contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. Thus, even
if we are to assume that the provision could properly
relate to a breach of contract, its application can be
warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his
contractual obligation is so deliberate as to approximate
a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than
fraud or bad faith. Most importantly, Article 21 is a
mere declaration of a general principle in human
relations that clearly must, in any case, give way to the
specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code
authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa
contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or
bad faith.
- Fores vs. Miranda explained with great clarity the
predominance that we should give to Article 2220 in
contractual relations; we quote:
Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the
respondent, the same must be discarded. We have
repeatedly ruled that moral damages are not recoverable
in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract
of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of
the new Civil Code, which provide as follows:
- Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
xxx xxx xxx
- Art. 2220. Wilful injury to property may be a legal
find that, under the circumstances, such damages are
justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
prof. casis
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith.
- By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it
immediately becomes apparent that:
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of
transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e.,
wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to
justify an award of moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered
included in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used
in Art. 2219; not only because Art. 2220 specifically
provides for the damages that are caused contractual
breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in Art.
2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where
there is a "preexisitng contractual relations between the
parties."
- Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
The exception to the basic rule of damages now under
consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a
passenger, in which case Article 1764 makes the
common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art.
2206, that entitles the spouse, descendants and
ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of
the deceased. But the exceptional rule of Art. 1764
makes it all the more evident that where the injured
passenger does not die, moral damages are not
recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was
guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that the
mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se
constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith
on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is
no other evidence of such malice to support the award
of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. To award
moral damages for breach of contract, therefore,
without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the
defendant, as required by Art. 2220, would be to violate
the clear provisions of the law, and constitute
unwarranted judicial legislation.
torts & damages

xxx xxx xxx
- The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in
the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and
negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in
our law to be ignored (Arts. 1170-1172); their
consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code.
- Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the
damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith
is liable shall be those that are the natural and
probable consequences of the breach of the obligation,
and which the parties have foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted.
- In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude,
the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which
may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of
the obligation.
- It is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory
provision to the contrary, that this difference was in the
mind of the lawmakers when in Art. 2220 they limited
recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in
bad faith. It is true that negligence may be occasionally
so gross as to amount to malice; but the fact must be
shown in evidence, and a carrier's bad faith is not to be
lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract
was breached through negligence of the carrier's
employees.
- The Court has not in the process overlooked another
rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a
contract that might thereby permit the application of
applicable principles on tort even where there is a preexisting contract between the plaintiff and the defendant
This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private
respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the
act or omission complained of would constitute an
actionable tort independently of the contract. The test
(whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the
breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where,
without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an
act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable
tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually
bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict
provisions to the case. Here, private respondents'
damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual
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relationship; without such agreement, the act or

omission complained of cannot by itself be held to
stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent
actionable tort.
- Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are
intended to serve as an example or as correction for the
public good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated
or compensatory damages (Art. 2229, Civil Code. In
criminal offenses, exemplary damages are imposed
when the crime is committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances (Art. 2230, Civil Code). In
quasi-delicts, such damages are granted if the defendant
is shown to have been so guilty of gross negligence as
to approximate malice. In contracts and quasicontracts, the court may award exemplary damages if
the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner
(Art. 2232, Civil Code).
- Given the above premises and the factual
circumstances here obtaining, it would also be just as
arduous to sustain the exemplary damages granted by
the courts below.
- Nevertheless, the bank's failure, even perhaps
inadvertent, to honor its credit card issued to private
respondent Luis should entitle him to recover a measure
of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil
Code providing thusly:
- Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order
that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
- Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where
the court deems such recovery to be just and equitable
(Art. 2208, Civil Code). We see no issue of sound
discretion on the part of the appellate court in allowing
the award thereof by the trial court.
DISPOSITION The appealed decision is MODIFIED
by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages
to private respondents; in its stead, petitioner is ordered
to pay private respondent Luis A. Luna an amount of
P5,000.00 by way of nominal damages. In all other
respects, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
prof. casis
AIR FRANCE V CA (Carrascoso, Et. Al)
18 SCRA 155
SANCHEZ; September 28, 1966
NATURE
PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals.
FACTS
- Carrascoso, a civil engineer, left Manila for Lourdes
w/ 48 other Filipino pilgrims. Air France, through PAL,
issued plaintiff a first class round trip airplane ticket
from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,
Carrascoso traveled in first class but at Bangkok, the
Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to
vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento,
there was a 'white man', who, the Manager alleged,
had a 'better right' to the seat. When asked to vacate
his 'first class' seat, the plaintiff, as was to be
expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager
that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a
commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G.
Cuento, many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in
the tourist class; when they found out that Mr.
Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white
man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso
and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the
'white man; and plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class'
seat in the plane."
- both TC and CA decided in favor of Carrascoso
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the CA failed to make a complete findings of
fact on all the issues properly laid before it, and if such,
WON the Court could review the questions of fact
Substantive
2. WON Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat
he claims, as proved by written documents (tickets)
3. WON Carrascoso was entitled to moral damages,
when his action is planted upon breach of contract and
thus, there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith
which the CA allegedly failed to find
torts & damages

4. WON moral damages could be recovered from Air
France, granted that their employee was accused of the
tortuous act
5. WON damages are proper in a breach contract
6. WON the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso
regarding the account made by the air-carriers purser is
admissible in evidence as hearsay
7. WON Carrascoso was entitled to exemplary damages
8. WON Carrascoso was entitled to attorneys fees
9. WON the amounts awarded to Carrascoso was
excessive
HELD
1. NO, NO
Ratio A decision is not to be so clogged with details
such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long
as the decision of the Court of Appeals, contains the
necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it. is no error
for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific
finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the
defense"."The mere failure to specify (in the decision)
the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for
refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the
same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of
law and the Constitution"; "only questions of law may
be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of
the Court of Appeals.
Obiter.
- Constitution mandates that a judgment determining
the merits of the case shall state "clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based"
and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals
shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues
properly raised before".xxx The law, however, solely
insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts"
upon which the court's conclusion is drawn.
- FINDINGS OF FACT: "the written statement of the
ultimate facts as found by the court and essential to
support the decision and judgment rendered thereon".16
They consist of the court's "conclusions with respect to
the determinative facts in issue"
- QUESTION OF LAW: one which does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties
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2. YES, the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first

class ticket without any reservation whatever.
Ratio .A written document speaks a uniform language;
that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If
only to achieve stability in the relations between
passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so
issued is desirable.
Reasoning
- Petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the
true and complete intent and agreement of the parties;
that said respondent knew that he did not have
confirmed reservations for first class on any specific
flight, although he had tourist class protection; that,
accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no
guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that
such would depend upon the availability of first class
seats. However, CA held that Air France should know
whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or
not. The trial court also accepted as evidence the written
documents submitted by Carrasco and even the
testimony of the air-carriers employees attested that
indeed, Carrasco was issued a first class ticket.
- If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder
is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the
fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein
confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow
of the hands of an airline.
-Also, when Carrascoso was asked to confirm his seat
in Bangkok, he was granted the first class seat. If
there had been no seat, and if the white man had a
better right to the seat, then why did they confirm
Carrasco his seat?
3. YES
Ratio. It is (therefore) unnecessary to inquire as to
whether or not there is sufficient averment in the
complaint to justify an award for moral damages.
Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the
evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the
evidence is not even required.
Reasoning
- There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class
passage covering, amongst others, the BangkokTeheran leg; Second, said contract was breached when
prof. casis
petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at
Bangkok; and Third, there was bad faith when
petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his
first class accommodation berth "after he was already
seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason
of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments
and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
- Air France did not present evidence that the white
man made a prior reservation, nor proved that the
white man had better right over the seat; also, if
the managers actions could be justified, they should
have presented the manager to testify in court but they
did not do so
- The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from
enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he
imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from
his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to
go to the tourist class compartment-just to give way to
another passenger whose right thereto has not been
established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of
course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from
what is understood in law. For, "bad faith"
contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest
or ill will or for ulterior purposes
4. YES
- The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act
of its employees need not. be essayed. For the willful
malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his
employer, must answer.
5. YES
- Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso, is one attended
with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's. action as
we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion.
This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner-air
carrier-a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
(note: it was held that it was a case of quasi-delict even
though it was a breach of contract)
Ratio
A contract to transport passengers is quite
different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation.43 And is, because of the relation which an aircarrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly
torts & damages

with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of
the comforts and I advantages it offers. The contract of
air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended
with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the
carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an
action for damages.
Reasoning
- Passengers do not contract merely for transportation.
They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities
and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rude
or discourteous conduct on the part of employees
towards a passenger gives the latter an action for
damages against the carrier.
6. YES, if forms part of the res gestae
Ratio. Testimony of the entry does not come within the
proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is
admissible.
- alsoFrom a reading of the transcript just quoted,
when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling
occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The
excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then,
in this environment, are admissible as part of the res
gestae. For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement
and mental and physical condition of the declarant".
Reasoning
- Carrascoso testified that the purser of the air-carrier
made an entry in his notebooks reading "First class
passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against
his will, and that the captain refused to intervene". The
petitioner contents that it should not be admitted as
evidence, as it was only hearsay. However, the subject
of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Also,
the said entry was made outside the Philippines and by
an employee of petitioner. It would have been easy for
Air France to contradict Carrascosos testimony if they
had presented the purser.
7. YES
Ratio The Civil Code gives the Court ample power to
grant exemplary damages-in contracts and quasicontracts. The only condition is that defendant should
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have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,

oppressive, or malevolent manner".
Reasoning
- The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso
from his first class seat fits into this legal precept
8. YES
Ratio. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a
similar Judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can
be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and
equitable that attorneys' fees be given.\
9. NO
Ratio. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily
with the trial court. The dictates of good sense suggest
that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts
and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.
DISPOSITION
On balance, we, say that the
judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from
'reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the
same. Costs against petitioner.
PSBA V CA
[citation]
PADILLA; February 4, 1992
NATURE
Petition to review the decision of Court of Appeals.
FACTS
- A stabbing incident on August 30, 1985 which caused
the death of Carlitos Bautista on the premises of the
Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA)
prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the
Manila RTC. It was established that his assailants were
not members of the schools academic community but
were outsiders.
- The suit impleaded PSBA, its President, VP, Treasure,
Chief of Security and Assistant Chief of Security. It
sought to adjudge them liable for the victims death due
to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of
security precautions.
- Defendants (now petitioners) sought to have the suit
dismissed alleging that since they are presumably sued
under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states
no cause of action against them since academic
prof. casis
institutions, like PSBA, are beyond the ambit of that
rule.
- Respondent Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
And the MFR was similarly dealt with. Petitioners the
assailed the trial courts dispositions before the
respondent appellate court which affirmed the trial
courts ruling.
ISSUE
WON respondent court is correct in denying dismissal
of the case
HELD
Ratio Although a school may not be liable under Art.
2180 on quasi-delicts, it may still be liable under the
law on contracts.
Reasoning
- The case should be tried on its merits. But respondent
courts premise is incorrect. It is expressly mentioned in
Art. 2180 that the liability arises from acts done by
pupils or students of the institution. In this sense, PSBA
is not liable. But when an academic institution accepts
students for enrollment, the school makes itself
responsible in providing their students with an
atmosphere that is conducive for learning. Certainly, no
student can absorb the intricacies of physics or explore
the realm of arts when bullets are flying or where there
looms around the school premises a constant threat to
life and limb.
DISPOSITION the foregoing premises considered, the
petition is DENIED. The Court of origin is hereby
ordered to continue proceedings consistent wit this
ruling of the Court. Costs against the petitioners.
SYQUIA V CA (Mla Memorial Park)
217 SCRA 624
CAMPOS, JR.; January 27, 1993
NATURE
Petition for review of CA decision dismissing Syquia
familys complaint for damages against Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. (Mla Memorial)
torts & damages

FACTS
- Juan SYQUIA, father of the deceased Vicente Syquia,
authorized and instructed the defendant to inter the
remains of deceased.
- After about a month, preparatory to transferring the
remains to a newly purchased family plot also at the
same cemetery, the concrete vault encasing the coffin of
the deceased was removed from its niche underground.
As the concrete vault was being raised to the surface,
the Syquias discovered that the vault had a hole approx
3 in. in diameter near the bottom and it appeared that
water drained out of the hole.
- Pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal
Court of Paraaque, they caused the opening of the
concrete vault and discovered that:
(a) the interior walls showed evidence of total flooding;
(b) coffin was entirely damaged by water, filth and silt
causing the wooden parts to separate and to crack the
viewing glass panel located directly above the head and
torso of the deceased;
(c) entire lining of coffin, clothing of the deceased, and
the exposed parts of the deceased's remains were
damaged and soiled.
- SYQUIAS base their claim for damages against Mla
Memorial on either: (1) breach of its obligation to
deliver a defect-free concrete vault;
(2) gross negligence in failing to seal the concrete vault
(Art. 2176)
- Whatever kind of negligence it has committed, MLA
MEMORIAL is deemed to be liable for desecrating the
grave of the dead.
Trial Courts Ruling
- Contract between the parties did not guarantee that the
cement vault would be waterproof.
- No quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty
of any fault or negligence, and because there was a preexisting contractual relation between the Syquias and
Mla Memorial.
- The father himself, Juan Syquia, chose the gravesite
despite knowing that said area had to be constantly
sprinkled with water to keep the grass green and that
water would eventually seep through the vault.
- The act of boring a hole in the vault was necessary so
as to prevent the vault from floating away.
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prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
- CA affirmed judgment of dismissal; MFR was also

denied.
ISSUES
1. WON Mla Memorial breached its contract with
petitioners,
or alternatively
2. WON it can be liable for culpa aquiliana
HELD
1. NO
Ratio Parties are bound by the terms of their contract,
which is the law between them. A contracting party
cannot incur a liability more than what is expressly
specified in his undertaking. It cannot be extended by
implication, beyond the terms of the contract. (RCBC v
CA)
Reasoning
- They entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale
and Certificate of Perpetual Care." Mla Memorial
bound itself to provide the concrete box to be sent in the
interment.
- Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of MLA
MEMORIAL provides that: Every earth interment
shall be made enclosed in a concrete box, or in an outer
wall of stone, brick or concrete, the actual installment
of which shall be made by the employees of the
Association. Pursuant to this, a concrete vault was
installed and after the burial, the vault was covered by a
cement lid.
- Syquias claim that there was a breach of contract
because it was stated in the brochures that lot may hold
single or double internment underground in sealed
concrete vault."
- "Sealed" meant "closed." Standard dictionaries define
seal as any of various closures or fastenings that cannot
be opened without rupture and that serve as a check
against tampering or unauthorized opening.
- "Sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". When
the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as
to the intention of the contracting parties, then the literal
meaning of the stipulation shall control.
2. NO
Ratio Negligence is defined by law as the "omission of

that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of
the persons, of the time and of the place." In the
absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the
contrary, the diligence to be observed in the
performance of the obligation is that which is expected
of a good father of a family.
Reasoning
- Although a pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa
aquiliana, circumstances of the case do not show
negligence. The reason for the boring of the hole was
explained by Henry Flores, Interment Foreman, who
said that: When the vault was placed on the grave a
hole was placed on the vault so that water could come
into the vault because it was raining heavily then
because the vault has no hole the vault will float and the
grave would be filled with water.
- Private respondent has exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in preventing the accumulation
of water inside the vault which would have resulted in
the caving in of earth around the grave. Finding no
evidence of negligence, there is no reason to award
damages.
Dispositive CA decision affirmed in toto.
NEGLIGENCE
PICART V SMITH
[citation]
STREET; March 15, 1918
NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of La Union
FACTS
- On December 12, 1912, plaintiff was riding on his
pony over the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La
Union.
- Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant
approached from the opposite direction in an
automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve
miles per hour.
torts & damages

- As the defendant neared the bridge he saw the plaintiff
and blew his horn to give warning of his approach.
- He continued his course and after he had taken the
bridge, he gave two more successive blasts, as it
appeared to him that the man on horseback before him
was not observing the rule of the road.
- The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the
warning signals.
- However, given the novelty of the apparition and the
rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up
against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead
of going to the left.
- He did this because he thought he did not have
sufficient time to get over to the other side.
- As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it
toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for
the machine.
- In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman
would move to the other side.
- The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider
had made no sign for the automobile to stop.
- Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the
defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some
distance away or slowing down, continued to approach
directly toward the horse without diminution of speed.
- When he had gotten quite near, there being then no
possibility of the horse getting across to the other side,
the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the
right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing
where it as then standing; but in so doing the
automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal
that it became frightened and turned its body across the
bridge with its head toward the railing.
- In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the left hind
leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken.
- The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some
violence.
- As a result of its injuries the horse died.
- The plaintiff received contusions which caused
temporary unconsciousness and required medical
attention for several days.
- CFI absolved defendant from liability
- Hence, the appeal
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ISSUE
WON the defendant, in maneuvering his car in the
manner above described, was guilty of negligence that
would give rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done
HELD
YES
- As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the
right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass
over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the
center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that
this would not be done; and he must in a moment have
perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with
safety in front of the moving vehicle.
- In the nature of things this change of situation
occurred while the automobile was yet some distance
away; and from this moment it was no longer within the
power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by
going to a place of greater safety.
- The control of the situation had then passed entirely to
the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car
to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other
persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass
sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger
of collision.
- The defendant ran straight on until he was almost
upon the horse. He was, the court thinks, deceived into
doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet
exhibited fright.
- But in view of the known nature of horses, there was
an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was
unacquainted with automobiles, he might get excited
and jump under the conditions which here confronted
him.
- When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to
this danger, he was, in our opinion, negligent in the
eye of the law.
- The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have
prof. casis
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.
- The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to
be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
paterfamilias of the Roman law.
- The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. The law considers
what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in
the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
- The question as to what would constitute the conduct
of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be
always determined in the light of human experience and
in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
Could a prudent man, in the case under
consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course
actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor
to take precautions to guard against that harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring
of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
- Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for
determining the existence of negligence in a given case
is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a
prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would
have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing
conduct or guarding against its consequences.
- Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in
the present case, negligence is clearly established. A
prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant,
would have recognized that the course which he was
pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore
have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as
reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the
duty to guard against the threatened harm.
- The plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he
was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself
on the wrong side of the road. It will be noted however,
that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an
torts & damages

appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law
is that the person who has the last fair chance to
avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference
to the prior negligence of the other party.
DISPOSITION Appealed decision is reversed.
TAYLOR V MANILA RAILROAD
[citation]
CARSON; March 22, 1910
NATURE
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and
other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by
his father, his nearest relative.
FACTS
- The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the
operation of a street railway and an electric light system
in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the
eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within
the city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The
power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a
footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end
of the island.
- The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the same time when
he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age,
the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the
average boy of his age, and having considerable
aptitude and training in mechanics.
- On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy
named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age,
crossed the footbridge of the Isla del Provisor, for the
purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the
defendant, who had promised to make them a cylinder
for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr.
Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled
apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the
unusual interest which both seem to have taken in
machinery, spent some time in wandering about the
company's premises. The visit made on a Sunday
afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or spoke
to anyone after leaving the power house where they had
asked for Mr. Murphy.
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- After watching the operation of the traveling crane

used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked
across the open space in the neighborhood of the place
where the company dumped the cinders and ashes from
its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty
brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These
caps are approximately of the size and appearance of
small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two
long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged
by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the
explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in
themselves considerable explosive power. After some
discussion as to the ownership of caps, and their right to
take them, the boys picked up all they could find, hung
them of a stick, of which each took one end, and carried
them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a
little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and
all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys
then made a series of experiments with the caps. They
thrust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket
and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap
with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer,
but could not find one. They then opened one of the
caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a
yellowish substance they got matches, and David held
the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the
contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less
serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who, when the boys
proposed purring a match to the contents of the cap,
became frightened and started to run away, received a
slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and
wounded, and David was struck in the face by several
particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his
right eye to such an extent as to necessitate its removal
by the surgeons who were called in to care for his
wounds.
- The Defendant Companys defense that the caps were
under the duty of independent contractors deserves
scant consideration since these workers have been
under the supervision of one of the companys foremen.
- Plaintiff Taylor appears to have rested his case, as did
the trial judge his decision in plaintiff's favor, upon the
provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read
prof. casis
together with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908 of that
Code.
- "ART. 1089.
Obligations are created by law, by
contracts, by quasicontracts, and by illicit acts and
omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or
negligence occurs."
- "ART. 1902.
Any person who by an act or
omission causes damage to another when there is fault
or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so
done.
- "ART. 1903.
The obligation imposed by the
preceding article is demandable, not only for personal
acts and omission, but also for those of the persons for
whom they should be responsible.
- "The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother,
is liable for the damages caused by the minors who
alive with them.
xxx
xxx
xxx
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprises
are equally liable for the damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter may be employed or on account of their duties.
xxx
xxx
xxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when
the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid
the damage."
- "ART. 1908.The owners shall be also be liable for the
damages caused "1.
By
the
explosion
of
machines which may not have been cared for with due
diligence, and for kindling of explosive substance
which may not have been placed in a safe and proper
place."
- In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff
relied on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts
of last result in the United States in the cases known as
the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases
based thereon.In the typical cases, the question involved
has been whether a railroad company is liable for an
injury received by an infant of tender years, who from
mere idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement,
enters upon the railroad company's premises, at a place
where the railroad company's premises, at a place where
the railroad company knew, or had a good reason to
torts & damages

suppose, children who would likely to come, and there
found explosive signal torpedoes left exposed by the
railroad company's employees, one of which when
carried away by the visitor, exploded and injured him;
or where such infant found upon the premises a
dangerous machine, such as a turntable left in such
condition as to make it probable that children in playing
with it would be exposed to accident or injury
therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer injury
in playing with such machine.
In these, and in a great variety of similar cases, the great
weight of authority holds the owner of the premises
liable.
- As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout ( 17 Wall. (84
U.S.), 657), (wherein the principal question was
whether a railroad company was liable for an injury
received by an infant while upon its premises, from idle
curiosity, or for purposed of amusement, if such injury
was, under the circumstances, attributable to the
negligence of the company), the principles on which
these cases turn are that "while railroad company is not
bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere
strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it
owes to passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt
from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising
from its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and that
"the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be
judged by the same rule which governs that of an adult.
While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to
entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting
from the fault or negligence of another he must himself
have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard
to an infant of tender years. The care and caution
required of a child is according to his maturity and
capacity only, and this is to be determined in such case
by the circumstances of the case."
- The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs.
Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply
criticized in severally state courts, saying that (1) That
the owner of land is not liable to trespassers thereon for
injuries sustained by them, not due to his wanton or
willful acts; (2) that no exception to this rule exists in
favor of children who are injured by dangerous
machinery naturally calculated to attract them to the
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premises; (3) that an invitation of license to cross the

premises of another can not be predicated on the mere
fact that no steps have been taken to interfere with such
practice; (4) that there is no difference between children
and adults of an invitation or a license to enter upon
another's premises. However, after an exhaustive and
critical analysis and review of may of the adjudged
cases, both English and America, formally declared that
it adhered "to the principles announced in the case of
Railroad Co. vs. Stout." Chief Justice Cooley, voicing
the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan, in the
case of Powers vs. Marlow, said that: Children,
wherever they go, must be expected to act upon
childlike instincts and impulses; and others who are
chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward them
must calculate upon this, and take precautions
accordingly. If they leave exposed to the observation of
children anything which would be tempting to them,
and which they in their immature judgment might
naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play
with, they should expect that liberty to be taken."
- The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things
attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the
public are expressively or impliedly permitted to enter
to or upon which the owner knows or ought to know
children are likely to roam about for pastime and in
play, "must calculate upon this, and take precautions
accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises
can not be heard to say that because the child has
entered upon his premises without his express
permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes
no duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to
take reasonable precautions to prevent the child form
entering premises at a place where he knows or ought to
know that children are accustomed to roam about or to
which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to
attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license
to enter, and where the child does not enter under such
conditions the owner's failure to make reasonable
precaution to guard the child against the injury from
unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises
by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty, a negligent
omission, for which he may and should be held
responsible, if the child is actually injured, without
prof. casis
other fault on its part than that it had entered on the
premises of a stranger without his express invitation or
permission. To hold otherwise would be expose to all
the children in the community to unknown perils and
unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or
occupants of land upon which they might naturally and
reasonably be expected to enter.
ISSUE
1. WON the defendants negligence was the proximate
cause of the injuries, making the company liable
HELD
1. NO
- Just because the kids trespassed doesnt mean that the
company is not liable for anything bad that might
happen to them. However, we also have to look at the
proximate cause and the maturity of the plaintiff if it
was his negligence that contributed to the principal
occurrence of the tragedy. In the case at bar, the Court
said that it is of the opinion that under all the
circumstances of this case the negligence of the
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises
was not the proximate cause of the injury received by
the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly
speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the
defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that
plaintiff's action in cutting open the detonating cap and
putting a match to its contents was the proximate cause
of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted
upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore, is
not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
"While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that
entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting
from the fault or negligence of another he must himself
have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard
to an infant of tender years. The care and caution
required of a child is according to his maturity and
capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case
by the circumstance of the case."
- As regards the maturity of the child, this has to be
examined on a case-to-case basis. In the case at bar,
plaintiff at the time of the accident was wellgrown
youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically
torts & damages

than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a
cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical
draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and
the record discloses throughout that he was
exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence
of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his
denials on the witness stands, he well knew the
explosive character of the cap with which he was
amusing himself. The series of experiments made by
him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described
by the little girl who was present, admit of no other
explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use
of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a
stone or a hammer, and the final success of his
endeavors brought about by the applications of a match
to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew
what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable
doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion
might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little
girl, 9 years of age, who was with him at the time when
he put the match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and ran away.
- We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus
stated, the immediate cause of the explosion , the
accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was his own
act of putting a match to the contents of the cap, and
that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as
one of its determining factors, he can not recover."
DISPOSITION The petition is DISMISSED.
JARCO MARKETING CORP V CA (AGUILAR)
DAVIDE; December 21, 1999
FACTS
- Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of
Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners
Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the
store's branch manager, operations manager, and
supervisor, respectively. Private respondents are
spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar.
- On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2 nd
flr or Syvels Dept. Store. Criselda momentarily let go
of her daughters hand to sign her credit card slip at the
payment and verification counter. She suddenly felt a
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gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind

her and saw her daughter on the floor, pinned by the
gift-wrapping counter. Zhieneth was crying and
screaming for help. Criselda was able to ask people to
help her and bring her daughter to the hospital.
- She was operated on immediately at the hospital.
Gonzales, a former employee of Syvels Dept Store
who helped bring Zhieneth to the hospital, heard her tell
the doctor that she nothing. I did not come near the
counter and the counter just fell on me, when asked
what did you do? She died 14 days later, on the
hospital bed. She was 6 years old. The cause of her
death was attributed to the injuries she sustained.
- After the burial of their daughter, the Aguilars
demanded from the petitioners the reimbursement of
hospital and medical bills, and wake and funeral
expenses. Petitioners refused to pay. So the Aguilars
filed a complaint for damages wherein they sought the
payment of P157,522.86 for actual damages, P300,000
for moral damages, P20,000 for attorney's fees and an
unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary
damages.
- RTC for Jarco Marketing Corp, et al. RTC mfr for
the Aguilars. CA and CA mfr for the Aguilars.
- Jarco Mktg Corp, et als side:
Criselda
was
negligent in taking care of her daughter for allowing her
to roam freely. Zhieneth was guilty of contributory
negligence because she tried to climb the counter. The
counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong base
and was used without incident for the past 15 years. It
was deliberately placed at a corner to avoid such
accidents. The testimony of two former employees,
Gonzales and Guevarra, should not be believed because
he might have ill feelings towards petitioners. The
testimony of the present employees (that Zhieneth
climbed the counter so it fell) should instead be
believed.
- The Aguilars side:
While in the dept store,
Criselda never let go of her daughter except to sign the
credit card slip. Gonzales testified that the gift wrapping
counter was right beside the verification counter where
Criselda was signing. Both Gonzales and Guevarra
testified to the structural instability and shakiness of the
counter which is in the shape of and inverted L, with
prof. casis
a base smaller than the top. The protruding part of the
counter was at the costumer side. They both had
informed management (while they were still working
there) that the counter should be nailed to the floor. The
management did nothing.
ISSUE
1. WON the incident is accident or attributable to
negligence
2. If negligence, who was negligent?
HELD
1. NEGLIGENCE.
- An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which
no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is "a
fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event
happening without any human agency, or if happening
wholly or partly through human agency, an event which
under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the
person to whom it happens."
- On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection
of the interest of another person, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury."
- Accident and negligence are intrinsically
contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident
occurs when the person concerned is exercising
ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any
person and which could not have been prevented by any
means suggested by common prudence.
- The test in determining the existence of negligence is
enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v. Smith, thus:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary
prudent person would have used in the same situation?
If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
- Gonzales testimony about what Zhieneth said to the
doctor should be accepted because at the time she said
it, she was in so much pain and she answered right
torts & damages

away. This means she wasnt making it up. It is
axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or
suffering and statements made to a physician are
generally considered declarations and admissions. All
that is required for their admissibility as part of the res
gestae is that they be made or uttered under the
influence of a startling event before the declarant had
the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed
by the person who testified in court. Under the
circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for
ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme
pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her
life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales'
testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no
act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners
did, through their negligence or omission to secure or
make stable the counter's base.
2. JARCO MKTG, ET AL.
- Petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were
personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable
counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to
remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's
employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary
prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by
the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge
the due diligence required of a good father of a family.
No contributory negligence from Zhieneth
- The conclusive presumption favors children below
nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of
contributory negligence. In our jurisdiction, a person
under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to
have acted without discernment, and is, on that account,
exempt from criminal liability. The same presumption
and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a
case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of
age, unless it is shown that he has acted with
discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a
quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of
liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine
years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be
incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of
lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the
case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age
is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore, is
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that a child under nine years of age must be

conclusively presumed incapable of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. (Sangco)
- Even if we attribute contributory negligence to
ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the
counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept
petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and
sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old
could not have caused the counter to collapse. The
physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court
and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on
record reveal that it was not durable after all. Shaped
like an-inverted "L" the counter was heavy, huge, and
its top laden with formica. It protruded towards the
customer waiting area and its base was not secured.
No contributory negligence from Criselda
- CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any
contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on
to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand.
CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from
her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this
precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for
CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at time
ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she was
just a foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping
counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA.
The time and distance were both significant.
ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as
petitioners would want to impress upon us. She even
admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital
that she did not do anything; the counter just fell on her.
Disposition The instant petition is DENIED and the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED
MAGTIBAY V TIANGCO
74 Phil 756
BOCOBO; February 28, 1944
NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
Batangas
FACTS
prof. casis
- Defendant-appellant Tiangco, a minor under 18 years
of age, pleaded guilty to an information for homicide
through reckless negligence in that he had recklessly
driven an automobile and thereby caused the death of
Magtibay, of whom plaintiffs-appellees are the lawful
heirs. The Court of First Instance (CFI) Batangas found
Tiangco guilty as charged, but as he was under 18 years
of age, the sentence was suspended, and he was
committed to the care and custody of Atty. Abaya, until
Tiangco would reach his majority, subject to the
supervision of the Superintendent of Public Schools of
the Province. Subsequently, Abaya, in view of
Tiangcos good conduct recommended the dismissal of
the case. The CFI dismissed the criminal case, but
reserved such right as the heirs of the deceased might
have to recover damages in a civil action against said
Tiangco. Accordingly, the civil action in the instant case
was filed against defendant-appellant for damages in
the sum of P2,000 for the death of Magtibay. The CFI
gave judgment for plaintiffs for P2,000 as damages.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE
WON the suspension of the sentence under Art. 80 of
the RPC, after appellant had pleaded guilty, exonerated
him from the crime charged
HELD
NO
- The suspension of the sentence under Art.80 of the
Revised Penal Code, after appellant herein had pleaded
guilty, did not wipe out his guilt, but merely put off the
imposition of the corresponding penalty, in order to
give the delinquent minor a chance to be reformed.
When, therefore, after he had observed good conduct,
the criminal case was dismissed, this did not mean that
he was exonerated from the crime charged, but simply
that he would suffer no penalty. Nor did such dismissal
of the criminal case obliterate his civil liability for
damages. Liability of an infant for his torts is imposed
as a mode, not of punishment, but of compensation. If
property has been destroyed or other loss occasioned by
a wrongful act, it is just that the loss should upon the
estate of the wrongdoer rather than that of a guiltless
torts & damages

person, and that without reference to the question of
moral guilt. Consequently, for every tortuous act of
violence or other pure tort, the infant tort-feasor is liable
in a civil action to the injured person in the same
manner and to the same extent as an adult.
DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed.
DEL ROSARIO V MANILA ELECTRIC CO.
57 PHIL 478
STREET; November 5, 1932
FACTS
***This action was instituted by Julian del Rosario for
the purpose of recovering damages from Meralco for
the death of his son, Alberto, resulting from a shock
from a wire used by the defendant for the transmission
of electricity.
- Aug 4, 1930 2pm: a wire used by the defendant on
Dimas- Alang St for the purpose of conducting
electricity used in lighting the City of Manila and its
suburbs.
- Jose Noguera saw that the wire was burning and its
connections smoking. One of the ends of the wire fell to
the ground among some shrubbery close to the way.
- As soon as Noguera took cognizance of the trouble, he
stepped into a garage which was located nearby and
asked Jose Soco to telephone the Malabon station of
MERALCO that an electrical wire was burning at that
place.
- Soco transmitted the message at 2.25 p.m. and
received answer from the station to the effect that they
would send an inspector.
- At the time that message was sent the wire had not yet
parted, but from the testimony of Demetrio Bingao, one
of the witnesses for the defense, it is clear that the end
of the wire was on the ground shortly after 3 p.m.
- At 4 p. m. the neighborhood school was dismissed and
the children went home.
- Alberto del Rosario, 9 yrs old, who was a few paces
ahead of his classmates, Jose Salvador and Saturnino
Endrina, all members of the second grade in the public
school.
- As the three neared the place where the wire was
down, Saturnino made a motion as if it touch it.
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- Jose, who happened to be the son of an electrician,

knew never to touch a broken electrical wire (as his dad
told him so!)- stopped Saturnino- telling him that the
wire might be charged.
- Saturnino yielded to this admonition and stopped, but
Alberto, who was somewhat ahead, said, I have for
some time been in the habit of touching wires.
- Jose rejoined that he should into touch wires as they
carry a current, but Alberto, no doubt feeling that he
was challenged in the matter, put out his index finger
and touch the wire.
- He immediately fell face downwards, exclaiming "Ay!
madre".
- The end of the wire remained in contact with his body
which fell near the post.
- A crowd soon collected, and some one cut the wire
and disengaged the body. Upon being taken to St.
Luke's Hospital the child was pronounced dead.
- The wire was an ordinary number 6 triple braid
weather proof wire, such as is commonly used by the
defendant company for the purpose of conducting
electricity for lighting.
- The wire was cased in the usual covering, but this had
been burned off for some distance from the point where
the wire parted.
- The engineer of the company says that it was
customary for the company to make a special inspection
of these wires at least once in six months, and that all
of the company's inspectors were required in their
daily rounds to keep a lookout for trouble of this
kind.
- There is nothing in the record indicating any particular
cause for the parting of the wire.l
ISSUE
WON Manila Electric is liable
HELD
YES
Reasoning
- When notice was received at the Malabon station at
2.25 p. m., somebody should have been dispatched to
the scene of the trouble at once, or other measures taken
to guard the point of danger; but more than an 1
prof. casis
hours passed before anyone from MERALCO appeared
on the scene, and in the meantime Alberto had been
claimed as a victim.
- The mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of
Jose (8 yrs old), doesnt alter the case.
- But even supposing that contributory negligence could
in some measure be properly imputed to the deceased,
such negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right
of action in this case, not having been the determining
cause of the accident. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and
Pacific Co., 7 Phil., 359.)
- With respect to the amount of damages recoverable,
Julian is entitled to recover P250 for expenses incurred
in connection with the death and burial of the boy.
- Citing Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Company: Julian
should recover the sum of P1,000 as general damages
for loss of service.
Disposition judgment reversed
SEPARATE OPINION
ABAD SANTOS [concur in part and dissent in part]
- He concurs that MERALCO is held liable for the
death of Alberto, but dissents in so far as the decision
allows the recovery of the father of the sum of P1,250
only as damages. It should be P 2250.
- His reasoning: It is well settled in this jurisdiction that
an action will lie to recover damages for death caused
by the wrongful act. (Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil.,
821.)
- In criminal cases- indemnity to the heirs of the
deceased is equivalent to P1,000
- Whatever may be the reasons for the rule followed in
criminal cases, I am of the opinion that those reasons do
not obtain in fixing the amount of the damages
recoverable in the present case.
- The indemnity allowed in criminal case is merely
incidental to the main object sought, which is the
punishment of the guilty party.
- In a civil action, the principal object is the recovery
of damages for wrongful death; and where, as in this
case, the defendant is a corporation, not subject to
criminal prosecution for the act complained of, the
question assumes a vastly different aspect.
torts & damages

- There should be a distinction between the civil
liability of an ordinary person who, by wrongful act,
has caused the death of another; and the civil liability of
a corporation, organized primarily for profit, which has
caused the death of a person by failure to exercise due
care in the prosecution of its business.
- The liability of such a corporation for damages must
be regarded as a part of the risks which it assumes when
it undertakes to promote its own business; and just as it
is entitled to earn adequate profits from its business, so
it should be made adequately to compensate those who
have suffered damage by its negligence.
YLARDE V AQUINO
[citation]
GANCAYCO; July 29, 1988
NATURE
FACTS
- Soriano was principal.
Aquino was a
teacher.
The school was littered with
concrete blocks.
Teacher Banez started
burying them. Aquino gathered 18 male
pupils to help. He ordered them to dig.
Work was unfinished.
- Ff day, Aquino called 4 of the 18 to
continue. Aquino continued digging while
the pupils remained inside the pit throwing
out the loose soil. Aquino left the children
to level the loose soil and borrowed a key
from Banez. Aquino told the kids not to
touch the stone.
- 3 of the 4 kids jumped into the pit. The
remaining Abaga jumped on the concrete
block causing it to slide down. 2 were able
to escape but student Ylarde sustained
injuries. 3 days later he died.
Parents filed suit against Aquino and
Soriano. Lower court dismissed and CA
affirmed and said child Ylarde was
negligent.
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ISSUE
WON Aquino and Soriano can be held liable for
damages
HELD
- Principal Soriano cannot be held liable, being head of
academic school and not school of arts and trades, in
line with Amadora case and Art 2180 of Civil Code. It
is only the teacher who should answer for torts
committed by their students. Besides, Soriano did not
order the digging.
- Based on Article 2180, Aquino can be held liable.
However, petition is based on Article 2176. Did the
acts/omissions of Aquino cause the death of Ylarde?
Yes. He is liable for damages. The work required adult
laborers. He required the children to remain in the pit
after they finished digging. He ordered them to level
the soil when a huge stone was at brink of falling. He
went to another place and left the kids.
- Left by themselves, IT WAS BUT NATURAL FOR
THE CHILDREN TO PLAY AROUND. IN RULING
THAT YLARDE WAS IMPRUDENT, THE LOWER
COURT DID NOT CONSIDER HIS AGE AND
MATURITY. A MINOR SHOULD NOT BE HELD
TO THE SAME DEGREE OF CARE AS AN ADULT.
- Aquino also said the digging was part of Work
Education.
This is unacceptable.
Work is too
dangerous and it was not even in the lesson plan.
CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO V
PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORPORATION
[citation]
NATURE
Appeal from decision of the CFI
FACTS
- Cranston was the representative of the plaintiff in
Manila and plaintiff was the registered owner of the
motor schooner Gwendoline.
- Cranston decided to have the engine on the
Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a
prof. casis
crude oil burner. He had a conference with Quest, Phil.
Motors manager, who agreed to do the job, with the
understanding that payment should be made upon
completion of the work.
- The work was begun and conducted under the
supervision of Quest, chiefly by a mechanic whom
Quest took with him to the boat. Quest had the
assistance of the members of the crew of the
Gwendoline, who had been directed by Cranston to
place themselves under Quest's directions.
- Upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest
concluded that a new carburetor was needed and thus
installed a Zenith carburetor. The engine was tried with
gasoline and the result was satisfactory. The next
problem was to introduce into the carburetor the baser
fuel, consisting of a low grade of oil mixed with
distillate. A temporary tank to contain the mixture was
placed on deck above and at a short distance from the
compartment covering the engine. This tank was
connected with the carburetor by a piece of tubing,
which was apparently not well fitted at the point where
it was connected with the tank. The fuel mixture leaked
from the tank and dripped sown into the engine
compartment. The new fuel line and that already in use
between the gasoline tank and carburetor were so fixed
that it was possible to change from the gasoline fuel to
the mixed fuel. This arrangement enables the operator
to start the engine on gasoline and then, after the engine
had been operating for a few moments, to switch to the
new fuel supply.
- It was observed that the carburetor was flooding, and
that the gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely from
the lower part to the carburetor to the floor. This fact
was called to Quest's attention, but he said that, when
the engine had gotten to running well, the flooding
would disappear.
- The boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run. The
engine stopped a few times during the first part of the
course, owing to the use of an improper mixture of fuel.
In the course of the trial, Quest remained outside of the
engine compartment and occupied himself with making
distillate, with a view to ascertaining what proportion of
the two elements would give best results in the engine.
torts & damages

- As the boat was coming in from this run, the engine
stopped, and connection again had to be made with the
gasoline line to get a new start. After this had been done
the mechanic, or engineer, switched to the tube
connecting with the new mixture. A moment later a
back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused
a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly
the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a
mass of flames, which the members of the crew were
unable to subdue. The salvage from, the wreck, when
sold, brought only the sum of P150. The value of the
boat, before the accident occured, as the court found,
was P10,000.
- CFI gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff to recover
of the defendant the sum of P9,850, with interest at 6
per centum per annum from the date of the filing of the
complaint, until satisfaction of the judgment, with costs.
ISSUE
WON the loss of the boat is chargeable to the
negligence and lack of skill of Quest
HELD
YES
Ratio When a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional skill, he
will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit
the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the
particular work which he attempts to do.
Reasoning
- The temporary tank in which the mixture was
prepared was apparently at too great an elevation from
the carburetor, so that when the fuel line was opened,
the hydrostatic pressure in the carburetor was greater
than the delicate parts of the carburetor could sustain.
This was the cause of the flooding of the carburetor;
and the result was that; when the back fire occurred, the
external parts of the carburetor, already saturated with
gasoline, burst into flames, whence the fire was quickly
communicated to the highly inflammable material nearby. The leak along the pipe line and the flooding of the
carburetor had created a dangerous situation, which a
prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature,
would have taken precautions to avoid. The back fire
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- PAGE 77 -
may have been due either to the fact that the spark was
too advanced or the fuel improperly mixed.
- Proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in
fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it
does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of
similar work on boats. Possibly the dripping of the
mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the
carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate
impression of the danger of fire. Quest did not use the
skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily
expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was
here, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent
inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes
negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said
to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in
no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have
occured but for Quest's carelessness or lack of skill. The
test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental
in a sense, but whether Quest was free from blame.
- The trial judge seems to have proceeded on the idea
that, inasmuch as Quest had control of the Gwendoline
during the experimental run, the defendant corporation
was in the position of a bailee and that, as a
consequence, the burden of proof was on the defendant
to exculpate itself from responsibility by proving that
the accident was not due to the fault of Quest. As a rule
workmen who make repairs on a ship in its owner's
yard, or a mechanic who repairs a coach without taking
it to his shop, are not bailees, and their rights and
liabilities are determined by the general rules of law,
under their contract. The true bailee acquires possession
and what is usually spoken of as special property in the
chattel bailed. As a consequence of such possession and
special property, the bailee is given a lien for his
compensation. These ideas seem to be incompatible
with the situation now under consideration.
- This action was instituted about two years after the
accident had occured, and after Quest had ceased to be
manager and had gone back to the US. Upon these
facts, the defendant bases the contention that the action
should be considered stale. It is sufficient reply to say
that the action was brought within the period limited by
the statute of limitations and the situation is not one
where the defense of laches can be properly invoked.
prof. casis
DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from affirmed.
UNITED STATES V PINEDA
37 Phil 456
MALCOLM; January 22, 1918
NATURE
Appeal requiring a construction and an application, for
the first time, of the penal provisions of the Pharmacy
Law.
FACTS
- Santiago Pineda is a registered pharmacist of long
standing and the owner of a drug store located at Calle
Santo Cristo, Manila. Feliciano Santos, having some
sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription obtained
from Dr. Richardson, and which on other occasions
Santos had given to his horses with good results, at
Pineda's drug store for filling. The prescription read:
"clorato de potasa - 120 gramos - en seis papelitos de
20 gramos, para caballo." Under the supervision of
Pineda, the prescription was prepared and returned to
Santos in the form of six papers marked, "Botica Pineda
- Clorato potasa - 120.00 - en seis papeles - Para
caballo- Sto. Cristo , Binondo, Manila." Santos, under
the belief that he had purchased the potassium chlorate
which he had asked for, put two of the packages in
water and gave the doses to two of his sick horses.
Another package was mixed with water for another
horse, but was not used. The two horses, to which had
been given the preparation, died shortly afterwards.
Santos, thereupon, took the three remaining packages to
the Bureau of Science for examination. Drs. Pea and
Darjuan, of the Bureau of Science, found that the
packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium
chlorate. At the instance of Santos, the two chemists
also went to the drug store of the defendant and bought
potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to
be barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should be
noted, is a poison; potassium chlorate is not.) Dr.
Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on
the horses, and found that death was the result of
poisoning.
torts & damages

ISSUES
1. WON the lower court erred in admitting the
testimony of the chemist Pea and Darjuan as to their
purchase of potassium chlorate at the drug store of the
accused, which proved to be barium chlorate
2. WON the lower court erred in finding that the
substance sold by the accused to Feliciano Santos was
barium chlorate and not potassium chlorate
3. WON the lower court erred in finding that the
accused has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of an infraction of the Pharmacy Law, Act No.
597, section 17, as amended
HELD
1. NO
Ratio On the trial of a criminal case where the question
relates to the tendency of certain testimony to throw
light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct of
a particular person, there is a certain discretion on the
part of the trial judge which a court of errors will not
interfere with, unless it manifestly appear that the
testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the question
at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused.
Reasoning
- What appellant is relying on is the maxim res inter
alios acta. As a general rule, the evidence of other
offenses committed by a defendant is inadmissible. But
appellant has confused this maxim and this rule with
certain exceptions thereto. The effort is not to convict
the accused of a second offense. Nor is there an
attempt to draw the mind away from the point at issue
and thus to prejudice defendant's case. The purpose is
to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and to
fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more than
one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good
faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified and
fraudulent intent may even be established. It has been
said that there is no better evidence of negligence than
the frequency of accidents.
2. NO
Reasoning The proof demonstrates the contrary.
3. NO
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- PAGE 77 -
Ratio In view of the tremendous and imminent danger

to the public from the careless sale of poisons and
medicines, we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold
that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one
drug for another whether it be through negligence or
mistake.
Reasoning
- The care required must be commensurate with the
danger involved, and the skill employed must
correspond with the superior knowledge of the business
which the law demands.
- Turning to the law, certain points therein as bearing on
our present facts must be admitted. Thus, defendant is a
pharmacist. As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for
the quality of all drugs and poisons which he sells. And
finally it is provided that it shall be unlawful for him to
sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name." It
is the word "fraudulent" which has given the court
trouble. What did the Legislature intend to convey by
this restrictive adjective?
- Were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convict any
druggist of a violation of the law. The prosecution
would have to prove to a reasonable degree of certainty
that the druggist made a material representation; that it
was false; that when he made it he knew that it was
false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its
truth and as a positive assertion; that he made it with the
intention that it should be acted upon by the purchaser;
that the purchaser acted in reliance upon it, and that the
purchaser suffered injury. Such a construction with a
literal following of well-known principles on the
subject of fraud would strip the law of at least much of
its force. It would leave the innocent purchaser of
drugs, who must blindly trust in the good faith and
vigilance of the pharmacist, at the mercy of any
unscrupulous vendor. We should not, therefore, without
good reason so devitalize the law.
- The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the
purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor and the vendee
do not stand at arms length as in ordinary transactions.
An imperative duty is on the druggist to take
precautions to prevent death or serious injury to anyone
who relies on his absolute honesty and peculiar
prof. casis
learning. The nature of drugs is such that examination
would not avail the purchaser any thing. It would be
idle mockery for the customer to make an examination
of a compound of which he can know nothing.
Consequently, it must be that the druggist warrants that
he will deliver the drug called for.
- Remembering particularly the care and skill which are
expected of druggists, that in some jurisdictions they
are liable even for their mistake and in others have the
burden placed upon them to establish that they were not
negligent, it cannot be that the Philippine Legislature
intended to use the word "fraudulent" in all its
strictness. A plea of accident and mistake cannot excuse
for they cannot take place unless there be wanton and
criminal carelessness and neglect. How the misfortune
occurs is unimportant, if under all the circumstances the
fact of occurrence is attributable to the druggist as a
legal fault. Rather considering the responsibility for the
quality of drugs which the law imposes on druggists
and the position of the word "fraudulent" in
juxtaposition to "name," what is made unlawful is the
giving of a false name to the drug asked for. This view
is borne out by the Spanish translation, which we are
permitted to consult to explain the English text. In the
Spanish "supuesto" is used, and this word is certainly
not synonymous with "fraudulent." The usual badges of
fraud, falsity, deception, and injury must be present but not scienter.
Dispositive Judgment of the lower court, sentencing the
defendant to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs, is affirmed with the costs of this instance against
the appellant, without prejudice to any civil action
which may be instituted.
BPI V CA
216 SCRA 51
GUTIERREZ; November 26, 1992
FACTS
- In the afternoon of October 9, 1981, a person
purporting to be Eligia G. Fernando, who had a money
market placement as evidenced by a promissory note
with a maturity date of November 11, 1981 and a
torts & damages

maturity value of P2,462,243.19, called BPI's Money
Market Department. The caller wanted to preterminate
the placement, but Reginaldo Eustaquio, Dealer Trainee
in BPI's Money Market Department, told her "trading
time" was over for the day, which was a Friday, and
suggested that she call again the following week. The
promissory note the caller wanted to preterminate was a
roll-over of an earlier 50-day money market placement
that had matured on September 24, 1981.
- Later that afternoon, Eustaquio conveyed the request
for pretermination to the officer who before had
handled Eligia G. Fernando's account, Penelope Bulan,
but Eustaquio was left to attend to the pretermination
process.
- On October 12, 1981, the caller of the previous Friday
followed up with Eustaquio, merely by phone again, on
the pretermination of the placement. Although not
familiar with the voice of the real Eligia G. Fernando,
Eustaquio "made certain" that the caller was the real
Eligia G. Fernando by "verifying" that the details the
caller gave about the placement tallied with the details
in "the ledger/folder" of the account. Eustaquio knew
the real Eligia G. Fernando to be the Treasurer of
Philippine American Life Insurance Company
(Philamlife) since he was handling Philamlife's
corporate money market account. But neither Eustaquio
nor Bulan who originally handled Fernando's account,
nor anybody else at BPI, bothered to call up Fernando
at her Philamlife office to verify the request for
pretermination.
- Informed that the placement would yield less than the
maturity value because of its pretermination, the caller
insisted on the pretermination just the same and asked
that two checks be issued for the proceeds, one for
P1,800,000.00 and the second for the balance, and that
the checks be delivered to her office at Philamlife.
Eustaquio, thus, proceeded to prepare the "purchase
order slip" for the requested pretermination as required
by office procedure, and from his desk, the papers,
following the processing route, passed through the
position analyst, securities clerk, verifier clerk and
documentation clerk, before the two cashier's checks,
nos. 021759 and 021760 for P1,800,000.00 and
P613,215.16, respectively, both payable to Eligia G.
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- PAGE 77 -
Fernando, covering the preterminated placement, were

prepared. The two cashier's checks, together with the
papers consisting of the money market placement was
to be preterminated and the promissory note (No.
35623) to be preterminated, were sent to Gerlanda E. de
Castro and Celestino Sampiton, Jr., Manager and
Administrative Assistant, respectively, in BPI's Treasury
Operations Department, both authorized signatories for
BPI, who signed the two checks that very morning.
Thereafter, the checks went to the dispatcher for
delivery.
- Later in the same morning, however, the same caller
changed the delivery instructions; instead of the checks
being delivered to her office at Philamlife, she would
herself pick up the checks or send her niece, Rosemarie
Fernando, to pick them up. Eustaquio then told her that
if it were her niece who was going to get the checks, her
niece would have to being a written authorization from
her to pick up the checks. This telephone conversation
ended with the caller's statement that "definitely" it
would be her niece, Rosemarie Fernando, who would
pick up the checks. Thus, Eustaquio had to hurriedly go
to the dispatcher, Bernardo Laderas, to tell him of the
new delivery instructions for the checks; in fact, he
changed the delivery instruction on the purchase order
slip, writing thereon "Rosemarie Fernando release only
with authority to pick up.
- It was, in fact Rosemarie Fernando who got the two
checks from the dispatcher, as shown by the delivery
receipt. As it turned out, the same person impersonated
both Eligia G. Fernando and Rosemarie Fernando.
Although the checks represented the termination
proceeds of Eligia G. Fernando's placement, not just a
roll-over of the placement, the dispatcher failed to get
or to require the surrender of the promissory note
evidencing the placement. There is also no showing that
Eligia G. Fernando's purported signature on the letter
requesting the pretermination and the latter authorizing
Rosemarie Fernando to pick up the two checks, both of
which letters were presumably handed to the dispatcher
by Rosemarie Fernando, was compared or verified with
Eligia G. Fernando's signature in BPI's file. Such
purported signature has been established to be forged
although it has a "close similarity" to the real signature
prof. casis
of Eligia G. Fernando. In the afternoon of October 13,
1981, a woman who represented herself to be Eligia G.
Fernando applied at China Banking Corporation's Head
Office for the opening of a current account. She was
accompanied and introduced to Emily Sylianco Cuaso,
Cash Supervisor, by Antonio Concepcion whom Cuaso
knew to have opened, earlier that year, an account upon
the introduction of Valentin Co, a long-standing "valued
client" of CBC. What Cuaso indicated in the application
form, however, was that the new client was introduced
by Valentin Co, and with her initials on the form
signifying her approval, she referred the application to
the New Accounts Section for processing. As finally
proceeds, the application form shows the signature of
"Eligia G. Fernando", "her" date of birth, sex, civil
status, nationality, occupation ("business woman"), tax
account number, and initial deposit of P10,000.00. This
final approval of the new current account is indicated
on the application form by the initials of Regina G. Dy,
Cashier, who did not interview the new client but
affixed her initials on the application form after
reviewing it.
- On October 14, 1981, the woman holding herself out
as Eligia G. Fernando deposited the two checks in
controversy with Current Account No. 126310-3. Her
endorsement on the two checks was found to conform
with the depositor's specimen signature. CBC's guaranty
of prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement was
then stamped on the two checks, which CBC forthwith
sent to clearing and which BPI cleared on the same day.
- Two days after, withdrawals began on Current
Account No. 26310-3: On October 16, 1981, by means
of Check No. 240005 dated the same day for
P1,000,000.00, payable to "cash", which the woman
holding herself out as Eligia G. Fernando encashed over
the counter, and Check No. 240003 dated October 15,
1981 for P48,500.00, payable to "cash" which was
received through clearing from PNB Pasay Branch; on
October 19, 1981, by means of Check No. 240006 dated
the same day for P1,000,000.00, payable to "cash,"
which the woman identifying herself as Eligia G.
Fernando encashed over the counter; on October 22,
1981, by means of Check No. 240007 dated the same
day for P370,000.00, payable to "cash" which the
torts & damages

woman herself also encashed over the counter; and on
November 4, 1981, by means of Check No. 240001
dated November 3, 1981 for P4,100.00, payable to
"cash," which was received through clearing from Far
East Bank. The last withdrawal on November 4, 1981
left Current Account No. 26310-3 with a balance of
only P571.61.
- On November 11, 1981, the maturity date of Eligia G.
Fernado's money market placement with BPI, the real
Eligia G. Fernando went to BPI for the roll-over of her
placement. She disclaimed having preterminated her
placement on October 12, 1981. She executed an
affidavit stating that while she was the payee of the two
checks in controversy, she never received nor endorsed
them and that her purported signature on the back of the
checks was not hers but forged. With her surrender of
the original of the promissory note (No. 35623 with
maturity value of P2,462,243.19) evidencing the
placement which matured that day, BPI issued her a
new promissory note (No. 40314 with maturity date of
December 23, 1981 and maturity value of
P2,500.266.77) to evidence a roll-over of the
placement.
- On November 12, 1981, supported by Eligia G.
Fernando's affidavit, BPI returned the two checks in
controversy to CBC for the reason "Payee's
endorsement forged". CBC, in turn, returned the checks
for reason "Beyond Clearing Time". These incidents led
to the filing of this case with the Arbitration Committee.
- The Arbitration Committee ruled in favor of BPI and
ordered CBC to pay the former the amount of
P1,206,607.58 with interest thereon at 12% per annum
from August 12, 1983.
- However, upon CBCs motion for reconsideration, the
Board of Directors of the PCHC reversed the
Arbitration Committee's decision and dismissed the
complaint of BPI while ordering it to pay CBC the sum
of P1,206,607.58.
- BPI then filed a petition for review with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati who dismissed said petition but
modified the award by including a provision for
attorneys fees in favor of CBC, among others.
- The court of appeals affirmed the trial courts
decision.
A2010
- PAGE 77 -
ISSUES
1. WON the collecting bank has absolute liability on a
warranty of the validity of all prior endorsements
stamped at the back of the checks
2. In the event that the payee's signature is forged,
WON the drawer/drawee bank (in this case BPI) may
claim reimbursement from the collecting bank which
earlier paid the proceeds of the checks after the same
checks were cleared
HELD
1. NO
- BPI contends that respondent CBC's clear warranty
that "all prior endorsements and/or lack of
endorsements guaranteed" stamped at the back of the
checks was an unrestrictive clearing guaranty that all
prior endorsements in the checks are genuine. Under
this premise petitioner BPI asserts that the presenting or
collecting bank, respondent CBC, had an unquestioned
liability when it turned out that the payee's signature on
the checks were forged. With these circumstances,
petitioner BPI maintains that considerations of relative
negligence become totally irrelevant.
- In presenting the checks for clearing and for payment,
the collecting bank made an express guarantee on the
validity of "all prior endorsements." Thus, stamped at
the back of the checks are the clear warranty: ALL
PRIOR ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF
ENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED. Without such
warranty, the drawee bank would not have paid on the
checks. No amount of legal jargon can reverse the clear
meaning of the warranty. As the warranty has proven to
be false and inaccurate, the defendant is liable for any
damage arising out of the falsity of its representation.
- Apropos the matter of forgery in endorsements, this
Court has emphasized that the collecting bank or last
endorser generally suffers the loss because it has the
duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior
endorsements considering that the act of presenting the
check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that the
party making the presentment has done its duty to
ascertain the genuineness of the endorsements. If the
drawee-bank discovers that the signature of the payee
prof. casis
was forged after it has paid the amount of the check to
the holder thereof, it can recover the amount paid from
the collecting bank. However, the point that comes
uppermost is whether the drawee bank was negligent in
failing to discover the alteration or the forgery.
- The general rule under Section 23 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law is to the effect that a forged signature
is "wholly inoperative", and payment made "through or
under such signature" is ineffectual or does not
discharge the instrument. The exception to this rule is
when the party relying in the forgery is "precluded from
setting up the forgery or want of authority. In this
jurisdiction we recognize negligence of the party
invoking forgery as an exception to the general rule.
- In the present petition the payee's names in the checks
were forged. Following the general rule, the checks are
"wholly inoperative" and of no effect. However, the
underlying circumstances of the case show that the
general rule on forgery is not applicable. The issue as to
who between the parties should bear the loss in the
payment of the forged checks necessities the
determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties
involved in the controversy in relation to the forged
checks.
- The records show that petitioner BPI as drawee bank
and respondent CBC as representing or collecting bank
were both negligent resulting in the encashment of the
forged checks.
- The Arbitration Committee in its decision analyzed the
negligence of the employees of petitioner BPI involved
in the processing of the pre-termination of Eligia G.
Fernando's money market placement and in the issuance
and delivery of the subject checks in this wise: a) The
impostor could have been readily unmasked by a mere
telephone call, which nobody in BPI bothered to make
to Eligia G. Fernando, a vice-president of Philamlife; b)
The officer who used to handle Eligia G. Fernando's
account did not do anything about the account's pretermination; c) Again no verification appears to have
been made on Eligia G. Fernando's purported signature
on the letter requesting the pre-termination and the
letter authorizing her niece to pick-up the checks, yet,
her signature was in BPI's file; and d) Another step that
could have foiled the fraud, but which BPI neglected to
torts & damages

take, was requiring before the two checks in
controversy were delivered, the surrender of the
promissory note evidencing the money market
placement that was supposedly pre-terminated. The
Arbitration Committee, however, belittled petitioner
BPI's negligence compared to that of respondent CBC
which it declared as graver and the proximate cause of
the loss of the subject checks to the impostor who
impersonated Eligia G. Fernando.
- The PCHC Board of Directors, however, stated that
these withdrawals, without any further showing that
the CBC employees had actual knowledge of the
infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts (Sec.
56, Negotiable Instruments Law) that their action in
accepting their checks for deposit and allowing the
withdrawals against the same amounted to bad faith
cannot be considered as basis for holding CBC liable.
- Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of
pesos. By the very nature of their work the degree of
responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of
their employees and officials is far greater than those of
ordinary clerks and employees. For obvious reasons, the
banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of
diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
- In the present case, there is no question that the banks
were negligent in the selection and supervision of their
employees. The Arbitration Committee, the PCHC
Board of Directors and the lower court, however
disagree in the evaluation of the degree of negligence of
the banks. While the Arbitration Committee declared
the negligence of respondent CBC graver, the PCHC
Board of Directors and the lower courts declared that
petitioner BPI's negligence was graver. To the extent
that the degree of negligence is equated to the
proximate cause of the loss, we rule that the issue as to
whose negligence is graver is relevant. No matter how
many justifications both banks present to avoid
responsibility, they cannot erase the fact that they were
both guilty in not exercising extraordinary diligence in
the selection and supervision of their employees.
2. NO
- The next issue hinges on whose negligence was the
proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by
A2010
- PAGE 77 -
an impostor. Petitioner BPI insists that the doctrine of

last clear chance should have been applied considering
the circumstances of this case. Under this doctrine,
where both parties were negligent and such negligence
were not contemporaneous, the person who has the last
fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do
so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
- Applying these principles, petitioner BPI's reliance on
the doctrine of last clear chance to clear it from liability
is not well-taken. CBC had no prior notice of the fraud
perpetrated by BPI's employees on the pretermination
of Eligia G. Fernando's money market placement.
Moreover, Fernando is not a depositor of CBC. Hence,
a comparison of the signature of Eligia G. Fernando
with that of the impostor Eligia G. Fernando, which
respondent CBC did, could not have resulted in the
discovery of the fraud. Hence, respondent CBC had no
way to discover the fraud at all. In fact the records fail
to show that respondent CBC had knowledge, actual or
implied, of the fraud perpetrated by the impostor and
the employees of BPI.
- BPI further argues that the acts and omissions of
respondent CBC are the cause "that set into motion the
actual and continuous sequence of events that produced
the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred." Petitioner BPI anchors its argument on its
stance that there was "a gap, a hiatus, an interval
between the issuance and delivery of said checks by
petitioner BPI to the impostor and their actual payment
of CBC to the impostor. Petitioner BPI points out that
the gap of one (1) day that elapsed from its issuance and
delivery of the checks to the impostor is material on the
issue of proximate cause. At this stage, according to
petitioner BPI, there was yet no loss and the impostor
could have decided to desist from completing the same
plan and could have held to the checks without
negotiating them.
- Petitioner BPI's contention that CBC alone should
bear the loss must fail. The gap of one (1) day between
the issuance and delivery of the checks bearing the
impostor's name as payee and the impostor's negotiating
the said forged checks by opening an account and
depositing the same with respondent CBC is not
prof. casis
controlling. It is not unnatural or unexpected that after
taking the risk of impersonating Eligia G. Fernando
with the connivance of BPI's employees, the impostor
would complete her deception by encashing the forged
checks. There is therefore, greater reason to rule that the
proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by
an impostor was due to the negligence of petitioner BPI.
This finding, notwithstanding, we are not inclined to
rule that petitioner BPI must solely bear the loss of
P2,413,215.16, the total amount of the two (2) forged
checks. Due care on the part of CBC could have
prevented any loss.
- The Court cannot ignore the fact that the CBC
employees closed their eyes to the suspicious
circumstances of huge over-the-counter withdrawals
made immediately after the account was opened. The
opening of the account itself was accompanied by
inexplicable acts clearly showing negligence. And while
we do not apply the last clear chance doctrine as
controlling in this case, still the CBC employees had
ample opportunity to avoid the harm which befell both
CBC and BPI. They let the opportunity slip by when the
ordinary prudence expected of bank employees would
have sufficed to seize it.
- Both banks were negligent in the selection and
supervision of their employees resulting in the
encashment of the forged checks by an impostor. Both
banks were not able to overcome the presumption of
negligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. It was the gross negligence of the
employees of both banks which resulted in the fraud
and the subsequent loss. While it is true that petitioner
BPI's negligence may have been the proximate cause of
the loss, respondent CBC's negligence contributed
equally to the success of the impostor in encashing the
proceeds of the forged checks. Under these
circumstances, we apply Article 2179 of the Civil Code
to the effect that while respondent CBC may recover its
losses, such losses are subject to mitigation by the
courts.
Disposition The questioned Decision and Resolution
are MODIFIED. BPI shall be responsible for 60% while
CBC shall share 40% of the loss of P2,413,215.16
torts & damages

E.M. WRIGHT V MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. &
LIGHT CO.
28 Phil 122
MORELAND; October 1, 1914
NATURE
An action to recover damages for injuries sustained in
an accident
FACTS
- Defendant Manila Electric is a corporation engaged in
operating an electric street railway
- Plaintiffs residence in Caloocan fronts on the street
along which defendants tracks run. To enter his
premises from the street, plaintiff must cross
defendants tracks.
- One night, plaintiff drove home in a calesa and, in
crossing the tracks to enter his premises, the horse
stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, throwing the
plaintiff from the vehicle and causing injuries
- At the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks, the
rails were above-gruond, and the ties upon which the
rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their
depth out of the ground, making the tops of the rails
some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the street.
- It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in
maintaining its tracks, but defendant claims the plaintiff
was also negligent in that he was so intoxicated, and
such intoxication was the primary cause of the accident
- Trial court held that both parties were negligent, but
that plaintiffs negligence was not as great as
defendants, awarded plaintiff P1,000.
ISSUE
WON the negligence of plaintiff contributed to the
principal occurrence or only to his own injury. (If
the former, he cannot recover; if the latter, the trial court
was correct in apportioning damages)
HELD
NO
Ratio
Intoxication in itself is not
negligence. It is but a circumstance to be
considered with the other evidence tending
A2010
- PAGE 77 -
to prove negligence.
Reasoning
- Intoxication in itself is not negligence, and no facts,
other than the fact that Wright was intoxicated, are
stated which warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff
was negligent. The conclusion that if he had been sober
he would not have been injured is not warranted by the
facts as found. It is impossible to say that a sober man
would not have fallen from the vehicle under the
conditions described.
- A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the
rails but a portion of the ties themselves aboveground,
stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling,
the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as
to break a wheel, might be sufficient to throw a person
from the vehicle no matter what his condition; and to
conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober man
would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to
draw a conclusion which enters the realm of speculation
and guesswork.
DISPOSITION Plaintiff not negligent. No facts to
merit a higher award of damages to plaintiff.
US V BAGGAY
20 PHIL 142
TORRES; September 1, 1911
NATURE
Appeal by the defendant from the judgment rendered on
April 28, 1910, whereby he was declared exempt from
criminal liability but was obliged to indemnify the heirs
if the murdered woman, Bil-liingan, in the sum of
P1,000, to pay the costs in the case and to be confined
in an institution for the insane until further order of the
court.
FACTS
- About the 4th of October, 1909, several persons were
assembled in the defendant's house in the township of
Penarrubia, Abra, Province of Ilocos Sur, for the
purpose of holding a song service called "buni"
according to the Tinguian custom, when he, the nonChristian Baggay, without provocation suddenly
attacked the woman Bil-liingan with a bolo, inflicting a
prof. casis
serious wound on her head from which she expired
immediately; and with the same bolo he like wise
inflicted various wounds on the women named
Calabayan, Agueng, Quisamay, Calapini, and on his
own mother, named Dioalan.
- For this reason the provincial fiscal filed a complaint
in the court of Ilocos Sur, dated February 15, charging
the non-Christian Baggay, jr., with murder, because of
the violent death of the woman Bil-liingan. This cause
was instituted separately from the other, No. 1109, for
lesiones. After trial and proof that the defendant was
suffering from mental aberration, the judge on April 28
rendered the judgment cited above, whereupon the
defendant's counsel appealed to this court.
ISSUE
WON an insane person, exempt from criminal liability
can still be civilly liable
HELD
YES
Ratio Civil liability accompanies criminal liability,
because every person liable criminally for a crime or
misdemeanor is also liable for reparation of damage and
for indemnification of the harm done, but there may be
civil liability because of acts ordinarily punishable,
although the law has declared their perpetrators exempt
from criminal liability.
Reasoning
- Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in
spite of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable
condition of his deranged mind, is still reasonably and
justly liable with his property for the consequences of
his acts, even though they be performed unwittingly, for
the reason that his fellows ought not to suffer for the
disastrous results of his harmful acts more than is
necessary, in spite of his unfortunate condition. Law
and society are under obligation to protect him during
his illness and so when he is declared to be liable with
his property for reparation and indemnification, he is
still entitled to the benefit of what is necessary for his
decent maintenance, but this protection does not
exclude liability for damage caused to those who may
torts & damages

have the misfortune to suffer the consequences of his
acts.
- Article 17 of the Penal Code states:
Every person criminally liable for a crime or
misdemeanor is also civilly liable.
- Article 18 of the same code says:
The exemption from criminal liability declared in
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, and 10 of article 8 does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced, subject to the following:
(1) In cases 1, 2, and 3, the persons who are civilly
liable for acts committed by a lunatic or imbecile, or
a person under 9 years of age, or over this age and
under 15, who has not acted with the exercise of
judgment, are those who have them under their
authority, legal guardianship or power, unless they
prove that there was no blame or negligence on their
part.
Should there be no person having them under his
authority, legal guardian, or power, if such person be
insolvent, the said lunatics, imbeciles, or minors shall
answer with their own property, excepting that part
which is exempted for their support in accordance
with the civil law.
DISPOSITION Therefore, the judgment appealed
from being in accordance with law, affirmation thereof
is proper, and it is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the appellant.
AMEDO V RIO
[citation]
CONCEPCION; May 24, 1954
FACTS
- This case was instituted on October 18, 1950. In her
original complaint, plaintiff Elena Amedo sought to
collect from defendant Rio y Olabarrieta, Inc., the sum
of P2,038.40 as compensation for the death of her son,
Filomeno Managuit, who worked for the defendant as a
seaman of the M/S Pilar II. The main allegation of said
original complaint was:
That on May 27, 1949 at about 11:30 o'clock in the
morning, while the deceased Filomeno Managuit was
on board M/S "Pilar II" as such seaman, he jumped into
A2010
- PAGE 77 -
the water to retrieve a 2-peso bill belonging to him, and

as a consequence of which, he was drowned.
- this however was dismissed due to lack of a cause of
action which defendant filed stating that the allegation
does not show that the death of plaintiff's son was due
to an "accident arising out of and in the course of
employment,".
- she was allowed to file an amended complaint which
was remanded to the trial court.
- her amended complaint stated: That on May 27,
1949, at or about 11:30 o'clock in the morning while the
said Filomeno Managuit was in the course of his
employment, performing his duties as such ordinary
seaman on defendant's M/S "Pilar II", which was
anchored then about 1 1/2 miles from the seashore of
Arceli Dumarang, Palawan, his two-peso bill was
blown by the breeze into the sea and in his effort to
retrieve the same from the waters he was drowned.
ISSUE
WON Amedo could claim compensation from employer
Rio
HELD
NO
- Plaintiffs basis for appeal is the Workmens
Compensation Act. Sections 2 and 4 of which:
Sec. 2. Grounds for compensation. When any
employee receives a personal injury from any accident
arising out of and in the course of the employment, or
contracts any illness directly caused by such
employment, or the result of the nature of such
employment, his employer shall pay compensation in
the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified.
Sec. 4. Injuries not covered. Compensation shall not
be allowed for injuries caused (1) by the voluntary
intent of the employee to inflict such injury upon
himself or another person; (2) by drunkenness on the
part of the laborer who had the accident; (3) by
notorious negligence of the same.
- from these provisions three conditions are essential to
hold an employer liable. These are: (1) the accident
must arise out of the employment; (2) it must happen in
the course of the employment; and (3) it must not be
caused by the "notorious negligence" of the employee.
prof. casis
Point in question is whether the accident was committed
under these 3 conditions
- "The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause
of the accident and are descriptive of its character,
while the words `in the course of' refer to the time,
place, and circumstances under which the accident takes
place
- it may be conceded that the death of Filomeno took
place "in the course of" his employment, in that it
happened at the "time" when, and at the "place" whereaccording to the amended complaint-he was working.
However, the accident which produced this tragic result
did not "arise out of" his employment. The blowing of
his 2-peso bill may have grown out of, or arisen from,
his employment. It was the result of a risk peculiar to
his work as a seaman or incidental to such work. But,
his death was the consequence of his decision to jump
into the water to retrieve said bill. The hazardous nature
of this act was not due specially to the nature of his
employment. It was a risk to which any person on board
the M/S Pilar II, such as a passenger thereof or an
ordinary visitor, would have been exposed had he,
likewise, jumped into the sea, as Filomeno had.
- was the accident caused by Filomenos notorious
negligence?
- "notorious negligence" has been held to be tantamount
to "gross negligence", which, in turn, has been defined
as follows:
- By gross negligence is meant "such entire want of care
as to raise a presumption that the person in fault is
conscious of the probable consequences of carelessness,
and is indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury to
person or property of others." (Wall vs. Cameron [1882]
6 Colo., 275; see, also, The Law Governing Labor
Disputes in the Philippines by Francisco, 2nd ed., p.
877.)
- It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea, one
mile and a half from the seashore of Arceli, Dumarang,
Palawan, Filomeno failed to exercise "even slight care
and diligence," that he displayed a "reckless disregard
of the safety" of his person, that he could not have been
but conscious of the probable consequences" of his
carelessness and that he was "indifferent, or worse, to
the danger of injury.
torts & damages

- case provides for other jurisprudence which describe
instances of gross negligence attributable to employee
(see case).
- this is distinguishable from cases wherein the act done
is not dangerous per se such as when an employee drops
a cigarette on the pavement and picks it up. So, also, if,
while Filomeno Managuit was working, his 2-peso bill
merely fell from his pocket, and as he picked up the bill
from the floor something accidentally fell upon him and
injured him, he would surely be entitled to
compensation, his act being obviously innocent.
- since the act done by Filomeno was dangerous, his
accident could be attributed to his gross negligence.
MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS V
WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION
99 PHIL 48
BENGZON; June 30, 1956
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of
a decision of the WCC
FACTS
- A truck driven by Procopio Macunat,
belonging to Marinduque, turned over
and hit a coconut tree resulting in
the death of Pedro Mamador and injury
to the other laborers.
- Macunat was prosecuted, convicted
and was sentenced to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased. He has paid
nothing, however, to the latter.
Deceaseds
wife
now
seeks
compensation by Marinduque as the
employer.
ISSUE
1.
WON Mamador has a right to
compensation by Marinduque
2.
WON
there
was
notorious
negligence by the deceased for having
violated the employers prohibition
to ride haulage trucks
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- PAGE 77 -
HELD
1. YES
Petitioner
alleges
that
the
criminal case sentencing Macunat to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased
was a suit for damages against a
third person, thereby having the
effect of releasing the employer from
liability.
- The criminal case, however, was not
a suit for damages against third
persons because the heirs did not
intervene therein and they have not
received the indemnity ordered by the
court.
- At any rate, even if the case was
against a third person, the court
already decided in Nava vs. Inchausti
that
criminal
prosection
of
the
"other person" does not affect the
liability of the employer.
- Petitioner also contends that the
amicable settlement entered into by
Mamador's widow and Macunat barred
the
widow's
claim
against
the
employer because she has already
elected one of the remedies.
- This contention cannot be sustained
because what the widow waived was the
offender's criminal proscution and
not all civil action for damages.
2. NO
- Mere riding on a haulage truck or
stealing
a
ride
thereon
is
not
negligence, ordinarily. It couldn't
be, because transportation by truck
is not dangerous per se.
- Although the employer prohibited
its employees to ride the haulage
trucks,
its
violation
does
not
prof. casis
constitute negligence per se, but it
may be an evidence of negligence.
- Under the circumstance, however, it
cannot be declared negligence because
the proibition had nothing to do with
the personal safety of the riders.
- Notorious negligence means the same
as gross negligence which implies
"conscious
indifferenece
to
consequences", "pursuing a course of
conduct which would naturally and
probably result in injury".
Disposition
Award for compensation
by WCC affirmed
LAYUGAN V IAC
167 SCRA 363
SARMIENTO; November 14, 1968
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of IAC decision
FACTS
- Plaintiff Pedro Layugan testified that while in
Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, he and a companion were
repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked
along the right side of the National Highway.
Defendant's truck driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano
bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was
injured and hospitalized. Due to said injuries, his left
leg was amputated so he had to use crutches to walk.
- Defendant Godofredo Isidro admitted his ownership
of the vehicle involved in the accident driven by Daniel
Serrano. Defendant said that the plaintiff was merely a
bystander, not a truck helper being a brother-in-law law
of the driver of said truck; that the truck allegedly being
repaired was parked, occupying almost half of the right
lane towards Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, right after the
curve; that the proximate cause of the incident was the
failure of the driver of the parked truck in installing the
early warning device,
- Daniel Serrano, defendant driver, said that he knew
the responsibilities of a driver; that before leaving, he
checked the truck. The truck owner used to instruct him
to be careful in driving. He bumped the truck being
torts & damages

repaired by Pedro Layugan, plaintiff, while the same
was at a stop position. From the evidence presented, it
has been established clearly that the injuries sustained
by the plaintiff was caused by defendant's driver, Daniel
Serrano. Serrano also testified that, When I was a few
meters away, I saw the truck which was loaded with
round logs. I stepped on my foot brakes but it did not
function with my many attempts. I have (sic) found out
later that the fluid pipe on the rear right was cut that's
why the breaks did not function.
- Plaintiff points to the negligence of the defendant
driver while Isidro points to the driver of parked truck
as negligent, and says that absent such proof of care, it
would, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, evoke the
presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of
the parked cargo truck as well as his helper, the
petitioner herein, who was fixing the flat tire of the said
truck.
ISSUES
1. WON defendant driver Serrano was negligent
2. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this
case
HELD
1 NO
- (Procedural) Ratio Findings of fact are entitled to
great respect and will not ordinarily be disturbed by this
Court unless it falls down under the exceptions
provided by the Court to merit review of the facts.
Reasoning
- This is a question of fact. But this case is an exception
since: 1) the finding are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise, or conjecture; 2) the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, 3) the judgment is based
on misapprehension of facts; 4) CA findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; 5) the said findings
of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; and 6) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the absence of evidence and are contradicted on record.
Hence, SC entertained review of the factual question.
- (Substantive) Ratio The test by which to determine the
existence of negligence in a particular case may be
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stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged

negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.
Reasoning
[1] Negligence defined. Negligence is the omission to
do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do
[2] Applying the definition and the test, it is clear that
the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been
established by clear and convincing evidence. Whether
cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the
shoulder of the road is immaterial taking into account
the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene
lamp placed 3-4m from the back of the truck. But
despite this warning, the Isuzu truck driven by Serrano,
still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a
direct consequence of such accident Layugan sustained
injuries on his left forearm and left foot.
2. NO
Note that for our purposes this was not raised as an
issue in this case. Therefore this only Obiter Dicta. But
as far as were concerned and relevant to our discussion
in the outline, I formulated it in an issue-type. This is
what the Court actually said in the case to prove its just
obiter, and its relevant to the main issue on negligence:
At this juncture, it may be enlightening and helpful in
the proper resolution of the issue of negligence to
examine the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur.
Obiter
[1] What is the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur? Two
ways to put it:
(a) This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which
causes injury is shown to be under the management of
the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation
by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of
care, and
prof. casis
(b) According to Blacks Law dictionary, Res ipsa
loquitur. The thing speaks for itself Rebuttable
presumption or inference that defendant was negligent,
which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing
injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the
accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in
absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of
evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer
may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened
provided character of accident and circumstances
attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of
negligence it would not have occurred and that thing
which caused injury is shown to have been under
management and control of alleged wrongdoer.
[2] In our jurisdiction, and the way we apply it in cases,
particularly in the law of negligence: Res ipsa loquitur
as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence
which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine
is not a rule of substantive law but merely a mode of
proof or a mere procedural convenience. The doctrine
merely determines and regulates what shall be prima
facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of
plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care.
The doctrine can be invoked when and only when,
under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available. So, it is inapplicable
where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents
evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is
the cause of the injury, or where theres direct evidence
as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts
and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly
appear. And once the actual cause of injury is
established beyond controversy, no presumptions will
be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable
when the circumstances show that no inference of
defendant's liability can reasonably be made, whatever
the source of the evidence.
In this case it is inapplicable because it was established
by clear and convincing evidence the negligence of the
defendant driver.
Disposition Petition GRANTED with costs against
private respondents.
torts & damages

RAMOS V CA
[citation]
KAPUNAN; December 29, 1999
NATURE
Petition For Certiorari
FACTS
- In the case at bar, the Court is called upon to rule
whether a surgeon, an anesthesiologist and a hospital
should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose
condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy.
- Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was a robust woman except
for occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains
allegedly caused by the presence of a stone in her gall
bladder she was as normal as any other woman.
Because the discomforts somehow interfered with her
normal ways, she sought professional advice. She was
advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a
stone in her gall bladdershe underwent a series of
examinations which included blood and urine tests
which indicated she was fit for surgery. She and her
husband Rogelio met for the first time Dr. Orlino
Hozaka, one of the defendants in this case, on June 10,
1985. They agreed that their date at the operating table
at the De Los Santos Medical Center, would be on June
17, 1985 at 9:00 A.M.. Dr. Hosaka decided that she
should undergo a cholecystectomy operation after
examining the documents presented to him. Rogelio E.
Ramos, however, asked Dr. Hosaka to look for a good
anesthesiologist. Dr. Hosaka, in turn, assured Rogelio
that he will get a good anesthesiologist. She was
admitted in the hospital and was with her sister-in-law,
Herminda Cruz, who was the Dean of the College of
Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, was also there
for moral support. After praying, she was given
injections. At the operating room, Herminda saw about
two or three nurses and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, the other
defendant, who was to administer anesthesia. Although
not a member of the hospital staff, Herminda introduced
herself as Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol
Medical Center who was to provide moral support to
the patient, to them. Herminda was allowed to stay
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inside the operating room.

- Hours later at about 12:15 P.M., Herminda Cruz, who
was inside the operating room with the patient, heard
somebody say that Dr. Hosaka is already here. She
then saw people inside the operating room moving,
doing this and that, [and] preparing the patient for the
operation. As she held the hand of Erlinda Ramos, she
then saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient.
She thereafter heard Dr. Gutierrez say, ang hirap maintubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki
ang tiyan (id., p. 17). Because of the remarks of Dra.
Gutierrez, she focused her attention on what Dr.
Gutierrez was doing. She thereafter noticed bluish
discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of the
hapless Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka approached her.
She then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone
to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. After Dr.
Calderon arrived at the operating room, she saw this
anesthesiologist trying to intubate the patient. The
patients nailbed became bluish and the patient was
placed in a trendelenburg position. Immediately
thereafter, she went out of the operating room, and she
told Rogelio E. Ramos that something wrong was x x
x happening. Dr. Calderon was then able to intubate
the patient.
- Herminda Cruz immediately rushed back, and saw
that the patient was still in trendelenburg position. At
almost 3:00 P.M. of that fateful day, she saw the patient
taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU).
- Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka were also asked by the
hospital to explain what happened to the patient. The
doctors explained that the patient had bronchospasm.
Erlinda Ramos stayed for about four months in the
hospital, she incurred hospital bills amounting to
P93,542.25. She has been in a comatose condition.
After being discharged from the hospital, she has been
staying in their residence, still needing constant medical
attention, with her husband Rogelio incurring a monthly
expense ranging from P8,000.00 to P10,000.00. She
was also diagnosed to be suffering from diffuse
cerebral parenchymal damage.
- Petitioners filed a civil case for damages with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against herein
private respondents alleging negligence in the
prof. casis
management and care of Erlinda Ramos.
- During the trial, both parties presented evidence as to
the possible cause of Erlindas injury.
Plaintiff
presented the testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz and
Dr. Mariano Gavino to prove that the damage sustained
by Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain
caused by the faulty management of her airway by
private respondents during the anesthesia phase. On the
other hand, private respondents primarily relied on the
expert testimony of Dr. Eduardo Jamora, a
pulmonologist, to the effect that the cause of brain
damage was Erlindas allergic reaction to the anesthetic
agent, Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal).
- Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners. Court of Appeals reversed.
- The decision of the Court of Appeals was received on
9 June 1995 by petitioner Rogelio Ramos who was
mistakenly addressed as Atty. Rogelio Ramos. No
copy of the decision, however, was sent nor received by
the Coronel Law Office, then counsel on record of
petitioners. Rogelio referred the decision of the
appellate court to a new lawyer, Atty. Ligsay, only on
20 June 1995, or four (4) days before the expiration of
the reglementary period for filing a motion for
reconsideration. On the same day, Atty. Ligsay, filed
with the appellate court a motion for extension of time
to file a motion for reconsideration. The motion for
reconsideration was submitted on 4 July 1995.
However, the appellate court denied the motion for
extension of time in its Resolution dated 25 July 1995.
Meanwhile petitioners engaged the services of another
counsel, Atty. Sillano, to replace Atty. Ligsay. Atty.
Sillano filed on 7 August 1995 a motion to admit the
motion for reconsideration contending that the period to
file the appropriate pleading on the assailed decision
had not yet commenced to run as the Division Clerk of
Court of the Court of Appeals had not yet served a copy
thereof to the counsel on record.
Despite this
explanation, the appellate court still denied the motion
to admit the motion for reconsideration of petitioners in
its Resolution, dated 29 March 1996, primarily on the
ground that the fifteen-day (15) period for filing a
motion for reconsideration had already expired.
- A copy of the above resolution was received by Atty.
torts & damages

Sillano on 11 April 1996. The next day, or on 12 April
1996, Atty. Sillano filed before this Court a motion for
extension of time to file the present petition for
certiorari under Rule 45. The Court granted the motion
for extension of time and gave petitioners additional
thirty (30) days after the expiration of the fifteen-day
(15) period counted from the receipt of the resolution of
the Court of Appeals within which to submit the
petition. The due date fell on 27 May 1996. The
petition was filed on 9 May 1996, well within the
extended period given by the Court.
ISSUES
1. WON it should be dismissed for being filed later than
allowable 15 day period for the filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration
2. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable
3. WON the Court of Appeals erred in finding that
private respondents were not negligent in the care of
Erlinda during the anesthesia phase of the operation
and, if in the affirmative, whether the alleged
negligence was the proximate cause of Erlindas
comatose condition. Corollary thereto, we shall also
determine if the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the
testimonies of the witnesses for the private respondents
4. What is the cost for the damages
HELD
1. NO
- A careful review of the records reveals that the reason
behind the delay in filing the motion for reconsideration
is attributable to the fact that the decision of the Court
of Appeals was not sent to then counsel on record of
petitioners, the Coronel Law Office. In fact, a copy of
the decision of the appellate court was instead sent to
and received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos on 9 June
1995 wherein he was mistakenly addressed as Atty.
Rogelio Ramos. Based on the other communications
received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos, the appellate
court apparently mistook him for the counsel on record.
Thus, no copy of the decision of the appellate court was
furnished to the counsel on record. Petitioner, not being
a lawyer and unaware of the prescriptive period for
filing a motion for reconsideration, referred the same to
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a legal counsel only on 20 June 1995.

- It is elementary that when a party is represented by
counsel, all notices should be sent to the partys lawyer
at his given address. With a few exceptions, notice to a
litigant without notice to his counsel on record is no
notice at all. In the present case, since a copy of the
decision of the appellate court was not sent to the
counsel on record of petitioner, there can be no
sufficient notice to speak of. Hence, the delay in the
filing of the motion for reconsideration cannot be taken
against petitioner. Moreover, since the Court of
Appeals already issued a second Resolution, dated 29
March 1996, which superseded the earlier resolution
issued on 25 July 1995, and denied the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner, we believe that the receipt
of the former should be considered in determining the
timeliness of the filing of the present petition. Based on
this, the petition before us was submitted on time.
2. YES
- We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in
the case at bar. As will hereinafter be explained, the
damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a
scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for the
application of res ipsa loquitur.
- Considering that a sound and unaffected member of
the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed while the
patient is unconscious and under the immediate and
exclusive control of the physicians, we hold that a
practical administration of justice dictates the
application of res ipsa loquitur. Upon these facts and
under these circumstances the Court would be able to
say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation,
if negligence attended the management and care of the
patient. Moreover, the liability of the physicians and
the hospital in this case is not predicated upon an
alleged failure to secure the desired results of an
operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in the diagnosis
or treatment as in fact no operation or treatment was
ever performed on Erlinda. Thus, upon all these initial
determination a case is made out for the application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
- Nonetheless, in holding that res ipsa loquitur is
available to the present case we are not saying that the
doctrine is applicable in any and all cases where injury
prof. casis
occurs to a patient while under anesthesia, or to any and
all anesthesia cases. Each case must be viewed in its
own light and scrutinized in order to be within the res
ipsa loquitur coverage.
- Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally
means the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.
The phrase res ipsa loquitur is a maxim for the rule
that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with
the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference
or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a
plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a question of
fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Where
the thing which caused the injury complained of is
shown to be under the management of the defendant or
his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have its
management or control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by
the defendant, that the accident arose from or was
caused by the defendants want of care.
- The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a
recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common
knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain
types of occurrences may justify an inference of
negligence on the part of the person who controls the
instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of
some explanation by the defendant who is charged with
negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of
ordinary human experience and on the basis of such
experience or common knowledge, negligence may be
deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself.
Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with
the doctrine of common knowledge.
- However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is
not a rule of substantive law and, as such, does not
create or constitute an independent or separate ground
of liability. Instead, it is considered as merely
evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule. It is
regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere procedural
convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and
relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific
proof of negligence. In other words, mere invocation
and application of the doctrine does not dispense with
the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a
torts & damages

step in the process of such proof, permitting the plaintiff
to present along with the proof of the accident, enough
of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine,
creating an inference or presumption of negligence, and
to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going
forward with the proof. Still, before resort to the
doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must
be satisfactorily shown:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of someones negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which
would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
- In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the
control of the instrumentality which caused the
damage. Such element of control must be shown to be
within the dominion of the defendant. In order to have
the benefit of the rule, a plaintiff, in addition to proving
injury or damage, must show a situation where it is
applicable, and must establish that the essential
elements of the doctrine were present in a particular
incident.
- In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the
court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon
proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of
expert testimony, where the court from its fund of
common knowledge can determine the proper standard
of care. Where common knowledge and experience
teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to
the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference
of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without
medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show
not only what occurred but how and why it occurred.
When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient
must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or
omission complained of and the injury sustained while
under the custody and management of the defendant
without need to produce expert medical testimony to
establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa
loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under
usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can
obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
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- It does not automatically apply to all cases of medical

negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof
to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the
ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or
ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to
be cautiously applied, depending upon the
circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to
situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able
to say, as a matter of common knowledge and
observation, that the consequences of professional care
were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if
due care had been exercised. A distinction must be
made between the failure to secure results, and the
occurrence of something more unusual and not
ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered
followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that
particular practice. It must be conceded that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in
a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the
merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The
physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to
explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or
why any particular scientific treatment did not produce
the desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not
available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is
that the desired result of an operation or treatment was
not accomplished. The real question, therefore, is
whether or not in the process of the operation any
extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the
routine performance occurred which is beyond the
regular scope of customary professional activity in such
operations, which, if unexplained would themselves
reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent
cause or causes of the untoward consequence. If there
was such extraneous interventions, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called
upon to explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation,
if he could.
3. YES
- The CA commited a reversible error. Private
respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of
negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their
negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous
condition.
prof. casis
- Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient.
In the case at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez admitted
that she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the
operation itself, on 17 June 1985. Before this date, no
prior consultations with, or pre-operative evaluation of
Erlinda was done by her. Until the day of the operation,
respondent Dra. Gutierrez was unaware of the
physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. She was
likewise not properly informed of the possible
difficulties she would face during the administration of
anesthesia to Erlinda. Respondent Dra. Gutierrez act
of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour
before the scheduled operative procedure was,
therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and
professional irresponsibility. The measures cautioning
prudence and vigilance in dealing with human lives lie
at the core of the physicians centuries-old Hippocratic
Oath. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is,
therefore, a clear indicia of her negligence.
- Private respondents repeatedly hammered the view
that the cerebral anoxia which led to Erlindas coma
was due to bronchospasm mediated by her allergic
response to the drug, Thiopental Sodium, introduced
into her system. Towards this end, they presented Dr.
Jamora, a Fellow of the Philippine College of
Physicians and Diplomate of the Philippine Specialty
Board of Internal Medicine, who advanced private
respondents' theory that the oxygen deprivation which
led to anoxic encephalopathy, was due to an
unpredictable drug reaction to the short-acting
barbiturate. We find the theory of private respondents
unacceptable.
- First of all, Dr. Jamora cannot be considered an
authority in the field of anesthesiology simply because
he is not an anesthesiologist. Since Dr. Jamora is a
pulmonologist, he could not have been capable of
properly enlightening the court about anesthesia
practice and procedure and their complications. Dr.
Jamora is likewise not an allergologist and could not
therefore properly advance expert opinion on allergicmediated processes.
Moreover, he is not a
pharmacologist and, as such, could not have been
capable, as an expert would, of explaining to the court
the pharmacologic and toxic effects of the supposed
torts & damages

culprit, Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal).
- An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced
bronchospasm properly falls within the fields of
anesthesia, internal medicine-allergy, and clinical
pharmacology. The resulting anoxic encephalopathy
belongs to the field of neurology. On the basis of the
foregoing transcript, in which the pulmonologist
himself admitted that he could not testify about the drug
with medical authority, it is clear that the appellate court
erred in giving weight to Dr. Jamoras testimony as an
expert in the administration of Thiopental Sodium.
- Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. An injury or
damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to
act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case,
that the act or omission played a substantial part in
bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage;
and that the injury or damage was either a direct result
or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or
omission. It is the dominant, moving or producing
cause.
- Respondent Dr. Hosakas negligence can be found in
his failure to exercise the proper authority (as the
captain of the operative team) in not determining if
his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia
protocols. In fact, no evidence on record exists to show
that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra.
Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Furthermore,
it does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had
scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at
the same time as Erlindas cholecystectomy, and was in
fact over three hours late for the latters operation.
Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with
his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.
This indicates that he was remiss in his professional
duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares equal
responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlindas
condition.
- We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital in
this particular incident. The unique practice (among
private hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with
attending and visiting consultants, who are allegedly
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not hospital employees, presents problems in

apportioning responsibility for negligence in medical
malpractice cases. However, the difficulty is only more
apparent than real.
- In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control
in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct
of their work within the hospital premises. Doctors
who apply for consultant slots, visiting or attending,
are required to submit proof of completion of residency,
their educational qualifications; generally, evidence of
accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate),
evidence of fellowship in most cases, and references.
These requirements are carefully scrutinized by
members of the hospital administration or by a review
committee set up by the hospital who either accept or
reject the application. This is particularly true with
respondent hospital.
- After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or
attending consultant, he is normally required to attend
clinico-pathological conferences, conduct bedside
rounds for clerks, interns and residents, moderate grand
rounds and patient audits and perform other tasks and
responsibilities, for the privilege of being able to
maintain a clinic in the hospital, and/or for the privilege
of admitting patients into the hospital. In addition to
these, the physicians performance as a specialist is
generally evaluated by a peer review committee on the
basis of mortality and morbidity statistics, and feedback
from patients, nurses, interns and residents.
A
consultant remiss in his duties, or a consultant who
regularly falls short of the minimum standards
acceptable to the hospital or its peer review committee,
is normally politely terminated.
- In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and
exercise real control over their attending and visiting
consultant staff.
While consultants are not,
technically employees, a point which respondent
hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the
patients condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and
the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important
hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with
the exception of the payment of wages. In assessing
whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control
test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the
prof. casis
foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an
employer-employee relationship in effect exists
between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians. This being the case, the question now arises
as to whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily
liable with respondent doctors for petitioners condition.
- The basis for holding an employer solidarily
responsible for the negligence of its employee is found
in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a
person accountable not only for his own acts but also
for those of others based on the formers responsibility
under a relationship of patria potestas. Such
responsibility ceases when the persons or entity
concerned prove that they have observed the diligence
of a good father of the family to prevent damage. In
other words, while the burden of proving negligence
rests on the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the
burden shifts to the respondents (parent, guardian,
teacher or employer) who should prove that they
observed the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
- In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a
general denial of its responsibility over respondent
physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to
adduce evidence with regard to the degree of
supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In
neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar
nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge
its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180.
Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is
consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians
for Erlindas condition.
- Upon these disquisitions we hold that private
respondents are solidarily liable for damages under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
4. Given these considerations, the amount of actual
damages recoverable in suits arising from negligence
should at least reflect the correct minimum cost of
proper care, not the cost of the care the family is usually
compelled to undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy.
torts & damages

- Art. 2199. - Except as provided by law or by
stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has
duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual
or compensatory damages.
- Our rules on actual or compensatory damages
generally assume that at the time of litigation, the injury
suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has
been completed and that the cost can be liquidated.
However, these provisions neglect to take into account
those situations, as in this case, where the resulting
injury might be continuing and possible future
complications directly arising from the injury, while
certain to occur, are difficult to predict.
- In these cases, the amount of damages which should
be awarded, if they are to adequately and correctly
respond to the injury caused, should be one which
compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up
to the time of trial; and one which would meet
pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could
not, from the nature of the case, be made with certainty.
In other words, temperate damages can and should be
awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in
instances where the injury is chronic and continuing.
And because of the unique nature of such cases, no
incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate
damages are provided for. The reason is that these
damages cover two distinct phases.
- As it would not be equitable - and certainly not in the
best interests of the administration of justice - for the
victim in such cases to constantly come before the
courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the
compensatory damages previously awarded - temperate
damages are appropriate.
The amount given as
temperate damages, though to a certain extent
speculative, should take into account the cost of proper
care.
- In the instant case, petitioners were able to provide
only home-based nursing care for a comatose patient
who has remained in that condition for over a decade.
Having premised our award for compensatory damages
on the amount provided by petitioners at the onset of
litigation, it would be now much more in step with the
interests of justice if the value awarded for temperate
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damages would allow petitioners to provide optimal

care for their loved one in a facility which generally
specializes in such care. They should not be compelled
by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at
home without the aid of professionals, for anything less
would be grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances,
an award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would
therefore be reasonable.
- Meanwhile, the actual physical, emotional and
financial cost of the care of petitioner would be
virtually impossible to quantify. Even the temperate
damages herein awarded would be inadequate if
petitioners condition remains unchanged for the next
ten years.
- The husband and the children, all petitioners in this
case, will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of
the patients illness, knowing any hope of recovery is
close to nil. They have fashioned their daily lives
around the nursing care of petitioner, altering their long
term goals to take into account their life with a
comatose patient. They, not the respondents, are
charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the
victim. The familys moral injury and suffering in this
case is clearly a real one. For the foregoing reasons, an
award of P2,000,000.00 in moral damages would be
appropriate.
- Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the
amount of P100,000.00 are hereby awarded.
Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we
are of the opinion that attorneys fees valued at
P100,000.00 are likewise proper.
DISPOSITION the decision and resolution of the
appellate court appealed from are hereby modified so as
to award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against
private respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as
actual damages computed as of the date of
promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment
of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda
Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2)
P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as
temperate damages; 4) P100,000.00 each as exemplary
damages and attorneys fees; and, 5) the costs of the
suit.
prof. casis
BATIQUIN V CA (Villegas)
258 SCRA 334
DAVIDE; July 5, 1996
NATURE
Appeals
FACTS
- Mrs. Villegas submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal
care as the latter's private patient sometime before
September 21, 1988. In the morning of September 21,
1988 Dr. Batiquin, along with other physicians and
nurses, performed a caesarian operation on Mrs.
Villegas and successfully delivered the latters baby.
- After leaving the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to
suffer abdominal pains and complained of being
feverish. She also gradually lost her appetite, so she
consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who
prescribed for her certain medicines. However, the
pains still kept recurring. She then consulted Dr. Ma.
Salud Kho. After examining her, Dr Kho suggested that
Mrs. Villegas submit to another surgery.
- When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas
she found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian
cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out
pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of
rubber material on the right side of the uterus,
embedded on the ovarian cyst. The piece of rubber
appeared to be a part of a rubber glove. This was the
cause of all of the infection of the ovaries and
consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs.
Villegas
- The piece of rubber allegedly found was not presented
in court, and Dr. Kho testified that she sent it to a
pathologist in Cebu City for examination. Aside from
Dr. Kho's testimony, the evidence which mentioned the
piece of rubber are a Medical Certificate, HYPERLINK
"http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/j
ul1996/118231.htm" \l "_edn10" \o "" a Progress
Record,
HYPERLINK
ul1996/118231.htm" \l "_edn11" \o "" an Anesthesia
Record,
HYPERLINK
torts & damages

ul1996/118231.htm" \l "_edn12" \o "" a Nurse's
Record,
HYPERLINK
ul1996/118231.htm" \l "_edn13" \o "" and a Physician's
Discharge Summary. The trial court, however, regarded
these documentary evidence as mere hearsay, "there
being no showing that the person or persons who
prepared them are deceased or unable to testify on the
facts therein stated
- There was also doubts as to the whereabouts of the
piece of rubber, as 2 versions arose from Dr. Khos
testimony: 1) that it was sent to the Pathologist in Cebu
as testified to in Court by Dr. Kho and (2) that Dr. Kho
threw it away as told by her to Defendant. The failure of
the Plaintiffs to reconcile these two different versions
served only to weaken their claim against Defendant
Batiquin. The trial court ruled in favor of the
defendants. The CA reversed the decision.
ISSUES
Procedural
WON the court can review questions of fact
Substantive
WON Dr. Batiquin is liable
HELD
Procedural
YES
- While the rule is that only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari, there are
exceptions, among which are when the factual findings
of the trial court and the appellate court conflict, when
the appealed decision is clearly contradicted by the
evidence on record, or when the appellate court
misapprehended the facts
Substantive
- The focal point of the appeal is Dr. Khos testimony.
There were inconsistencies within her own testimony,
which led to the different decision of the RTC and CA.
The CA was correct in saying that the trial court erred
when it isolated the disputed portion of Dr. Khos
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prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
testimony and did not consider it with other portions of

Dr. Khos testimony. Also, the phrase relied upon by the
trial court does not negate the fact that Dr. Kho saw a
piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas'
abdomen, and that she sent it to a laboratory and then to
Cebu City for examination by a pathologist.
Furthermore, Dr. Kho's knowledge of the piece of
rubber could not be based on other than first hand
knowledge for, as she asserted before the trial court.
- It is also worth noting that the trial court paid heed to
Dr. Batiquins testimony, that there was neither any tear
on Dr. Batiquin's gloves after the operation nor blood
smears on her hands upon removing her gloves. But the
trial court failed to recognized that these were mere
denials or negative testimonies. Well-settled is the rule
that positive testimony is stronger than negative
testimony.
- While the petitioners claim that contradictions and
falsities punctured Dr. Kho's testimony, a reading of the
said testimony reveals no such infirmity and establishes
Dr. Kho as a credible witness. Dr. Kho was frank
throughout her turn on the witness stand. Furthermore,
no motive to state any untruth was ever imputed against
Dr. Kho, leaving her trustworthiness unimpaired.
HYPERLINK
ul1996/118231.htm" \l "_edn34" \o "" The trial court's
following declaration shows that while it was critical of
the lack of care with which Dr. Kho handled the piece
of rubber, it was not prepared to doubt Dr. Kho's
credibility, thus only supporting out appraisal of Dr.
Kho's trustworthiness.
- Considering that we have assessed Dr. Kho to be a
credible witness, her positive testimony prevails over
the negative testimony in favor of the petitioners. As
such, the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore.
- This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which
causes injury is shown to be under the management of
the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation
by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of
care."
- In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the

doctrine are present. First, the entire proceedings of the
cesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr.
Batiquin. In this light, the private respondents were
bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the
exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into
private respondent Villegas' body, which, needless to
say, does not occur unless through the intervention of
negligence. Second, since aside from the cesarean
section, private respondent Villegas underwent no other
operation which could have caused the offending piece
of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that
such could only have been a by-product of the cesarean
section performed by Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in
this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of
negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for
negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private
respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse
effects thereof
DISPOSITION Decision affirmed
D.M. CONSUNJI V CA
KAPUNAN; April 20, 2001
NATURE
Appeal from CA affirming decision of RTC ordering
defendant D.M. Consunji, Inc. to pay damages to
plaintiff Maria J. Juego
FACTS
- At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a
construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14
floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his
death. Investigation disclosed that while victim Jose A.
Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo
were performing their work on board a steel platform
with plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its
four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when
suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to
connect the chain block with the platform came loose
causing the whole platform assembly and the victim to
fall down to the basement of the elevator core of the
torts & damages

building under construction, save his 2 companions who
luckily jumped out for safety.
- On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in
the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against D.M.
Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other
defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits
from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC
rendered a decision in favor of the widow. On appeal by
D. M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC in toto.
ISSUES
1. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable
to prove petitioners negligence
2. WON respondent is precluded from recovering
damages under the Civil Code
HELD
1. YES
Ratio As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence. It is based in
part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows
the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of
ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such
knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof
of the happening of the accident in order to establish
negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and
it applies where evidence is absent or not readily
available, provided the following requisites are present:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the
injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a
building to the basement while performing work in a
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construction site unless someone is negligent; thus, the

first requisite is present. As explained earlier, the
construction site with all its paraphernalia and human
resources that likely caused the injury is under the
exclusive control and management of appellant; thus,
the second requisite is also present. No contributory
negligence was attributed to the appellees deceased
husband; thus, the last requisite is also present. A
reasonable presumption or inference of appellants
negligence arises. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite
any evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of
negligence arising from the application of res ipsa
loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the
incident.
2. NO
Ratio Claimants may invoke either the Workmens
Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code,
subject to the consequence that the choice of one
remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance
of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude
a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy.
The exception is where a claimant who has already
been paid under the Workmens Compensation Act may
still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis
of supervening facts or developments occurring after he
opted for the first remedy. The choice of a party
between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by
election. Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic
to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of
its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and
intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the
evidence. There is no showing that private respondent
knew of the remedies available to her when the claim
before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private
respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights.
DISPOSITION The case is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether
the award decreed in its decision is more than that of
the ECC, whereupon payments already made to private
respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be
deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision
of the CA is AFFIRMED.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V REMONQUILLO
prof. casis
99 PHIL 117
MONTEMAYOR; May 18, 1956
NATURE
Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals.
FACTS
- August 22, 1950: Efren Magno went to the house of
Antonio Pealoza, hid stepbrother, on Rodriguez
Lanuza St, Manila, to repair a leaking media agua.
The media agua was just below the window of the
third story.
- Standing on said media agua, Magno received from
his son thru the window a 3x6 galvanized iron sheet to
cover the leaking portion. The lower end of the iron
sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the
Manila Electric Company parallel to the media agua
and 2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution.
- his widow and children filed suit to recover damages
from the company. Trial court rendered judgment in
their favor. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
- The electric wire in question was an exposed,
uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles pm
the street and carrying a charge of 3600 volts. It was
installed there some two years ago before Pealozas
house was constructed. During the construction of said
house a similar incident took place, with less tragic
consequences. The owner of the house complained to
defendant about the danger which the wire presented,
and defendant moved one end of the wire farther from
the house by means of a brace, but left the other end
where it was.
- Regulations of the City required that all wires be kept
three feet from the building.
- There was no insulation that could have rendered it
safe, because there is no insulation material in
commercial use for such kind of wire (according to
appellant, and this was not refuted).
Petitioners Claim
- Owner of the house exceeded the limit for the
construction of the media agua (17% more).
Respondents Comment
torts & damages

Owner was given final permit despite the excess of the
media agua.
ISSUE
WON Manila Electric is guilty of negligence.
HELD
NO
- It was the victim who was guilty of negligence
Ratio the liability of electric companies for damages or
personal injury is governed by the rules of negligence,
nevertheless such companies are not insurers of the
safety of the public.
Reasoning
- The death of Magno was primarily caused by his own
negligence, and in some measure by the too close
proximity of the media agua to the electric wire of the
company by reason of the violation of the original
permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of
said illegal construction of the media agua. Had the
house owner followed the terms of the permit given him
by the city for the construction of his
media agua, the distance from the wires to the edge of
said media agua would have been 3ft and 11 3/8
inches.
- The company cannot be expected to be always on the
lookout for any illegal construction which reduces the
distance between its wires and said construction, and to
change the installation of its wires so as to preserve said
distance.
- The violation of the permit for the construction was
not the direct cause of the accident. It merely
contributed to it. The real cause of the accident or death
was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. It is
to be presumed that due to his age and experience he
was qualified to do so. He had training and experience
for the job. He could not have been entirely a stranger
to electric wires and the danger lurking in them.
- To hold the defendant liable in damages for the death
of Magno, such supposed negligence of the company
must have been the proximate and principal cause of the
accident.
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Disposition The appealed decision of the CA is

reversed, and complaint against the Company
dismissed.
BERNARDO V LEGASPI
29 Phil 12
MORELAND; December 23, 1914
NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila
dismissing the complaint on the merits filed
in an action to recover damages for injuries
FACTS
- Due to a collision between the respective
automobiles of Bernardo and Legaspi, the
former filed an action to recover damages
for injuries sustained by his car which he
alleged were by reason of Legaspi's
negligence in causing said collision.
Legaspi, on the other hand, filed a crosscomplaint alleging it was Bernardo's fault.
He also asks for damages.
- The lower court found upon the evidence
that both the plaintiff and the defendant
were
negligent
in
handling
their
automobiles and that said negligence was of
such a character and extent on the part of
both as to prevent either from recovering.
ISSUE
WON the parties may recover damages
HELD
1. NO
- Where two automobiles, going in opposite
directions, collide on turning a street
corner, and it appears from the evidence
and is found by the trial court that the
drivers thereof were equally negligent and
contributed equally to the principal
occurrence as determining causes thereof,
neither can recover of the other for
damages suffered.
prof. casis
BERNAL V HOUSE
54 PHIL 327
MALCOLM; January 30, 1930
FACTS
0 Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion
Bernal went to Tacloban, Leyte to attend the procession
of Holy Friday.
1 After the procession, they, accompanied by two other
persons, passed along a public street named Gran
Capitan.
2 The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in
advance of her mother and her friends.
3 While in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric
& Ice Plant, Ltd., an automobile appeared on which
frightened the child. She turned to run, but fell into the
street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this
gutter or ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V.
House.
4 When the mother and her companions reached the
child, they found her face downward in the hot water.
5 The girl was taken to the provincial hospital. Despite
his efforts, the child died that same night.
6 It was certified that the cause of death was "Burns,
3rd Degree, whole Body", and that the contributory
causes were "Congestion of the Brain and visceras of
the chest & abdomen.
7 The defense was that the hot water was permitted to
flow down the side of the street Gran Captain with the
knowledge and consent of the authorities; that the cause
of death was other than the hot water; and that in the
death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and
negligence.
8 The trial judge, however, after examination of the
evidence presented by the defendants, failed to sustain
their theory of the case, except as to the last mentioned
special defense. He nevertheless was led to order the
dismissal of the action because of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiffs.
ISSUE
WON the action should be dismissed due to the
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs
torts & damages
HELD
NO
- The death of the child was the result of fault and
negligence in permitting hot water to flow through the
public streets, there to endanger the lives of passers-by
who were unfortunately enough to fall into it
- The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on
the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening
when the religious procession was held.
- There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to
run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one
could foresee the coincidence of an automobile
appearing and of a frightened child running and falling
into a ditch filled with hot water.
- The doctrines announced in the much debated case of
Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil.,
359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must
again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the
child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a
bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only
result in reduction of the damages.
DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from was in part be
reversed and in the court of origin another judgment
was issued in favor of Fortunata Enverso and against
J.V. House for the amount of P1,000, and for the costs
of both instances.
SEPARATE OPINION
ROMUALDEZ [dissent]
- Even taking the finding that the defendant by its
negligence helped to bring about the accident which
resulted in the death of the child Purificacion Bernal,
plaintiff, by negligence, contributed to that most
regrettable result.
- Judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION V
CHATTO
210 SCRA 18
DAVIDE JR.; June 16, 1992
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FACTS
- Plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old
daughter, Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie
"Mother Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by
defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation.
- Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the
ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was
plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued.
- Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under
the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out
to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital
where they were confined and treated for one (1) day.
- The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital.
Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from
June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from
June 5 to 11.
- Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and
dizziness, plaintiff went to Illinois, USA in July 1982
for further treatment. She was treated at the Cook
County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the
U.S. for about three (3) months during which time she
had to return to the Cook County Hospital five (5) or,
six (6) times.
- Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the
collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to
force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not
suffer from any structural or construction defect.
- The trial court awarded actual or compensatory and
moral damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs.
- Respondent Court found the appeal later filed to be
without merit.
- Its motion for reconsideration of the decision having
been denied by the respondent Court, petitioner filed
the petition in the SC.
ISSUE
WON the collapse of the ceiling was caused by force
majeur
HELD
NO
- Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the
theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even
prof. casis
founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus
Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason
why the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a
defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was
indeed caused by force majeure. That Mr. Ong could
not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure.
- Definitions of force majeure as cited in Pons y
Compaia vs. La Compaia Maritima:
1. Blackstone, in his Commentaries on English Law:
Inevitable accident or casualty; an accident produced by
any physical cause which is irresistible; such as
lightning. tempest, perils of the sea, inundation, or
earthquake; the sudden illness or death of a person.
2. Escriche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y
Jurisprudenci,:
The event which we could neither foresee nor resist; as
for example, the lightning stroke, hail, inundation,
hurricane, public enemy, attack by robbers; Vis major
est, says Cayo, ea quae consilio humano neque
provideri neque vitari potest. Accident and mitigating
circumstances.
3. Bouvier: Any accident due to natural cause, directly
exclusively without human intervention, such as could
not have been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains
and care reasonably to have been expected.
4. Corkburn, chief justice, in a well considered English
case, said that were a captain uses all the known means
to which prudent and experienced captains ordinarily
have recourse, he does all that can be reasonably
required of him; and if, under such circumstances, he is
overpowered by storm or other natural agency, he is
within the rule which gives immunity from the effects
of such vis major. The term generally applies, broadly
speaking, to natural accidents, such as those caused by
lightning, earthquake, tempests, public enemy ,etc.
-The real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the
cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct
the investigation or that he isincompetent. He is not an
engineer, but an architect who had not even passed the
government's examination.
- Verily, post-incident investigation cannot be
considered as material to the present proceedings. What
is significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed
by the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to
torts & damages

construction defects. There was no evidence offered to
overturn this finding.
- The building was constructed barely 4 years prior to
the accident in question. It was not shown that any of
the causes denominates as force majeure obtained
immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the
ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered
if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in
keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed
by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate
inspection of the premises before the date of the
accident.
- That the structural designs and plans of the building
were duly approved by the City Engineer and the
building permits and certificate of occupancy were
issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in
the construction, especially as regards the ceiling,
considering that no testimony was offered to prove that
it was ever inspected at all.
- It is settled that:
The owner or proprietor of a place of public
amusement impliedly warrants that the premises,
appliances and amusement devices are safe for the
purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine
being subject to no other exception or qualification
than that he does not contract against unknown
defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable
means.
- This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that:
Where a patron of a theater or other place of public
amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the
injury is wholly and exclusively under the control
and management of the defendant, and the accident
is such as in the ordinary course of events would
not have happened if proper care had been
exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or
permits of an inference of negligence on the part of
the defendant.
- That presumption or inference was not overcome by
the petitioner.
- Even assuming that the cause of the collapse was due
to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable because
it was guilty of negligence, which the trial court
denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's
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definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force

majeure for one to be exempt from any liability because
of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should not
have been guilty of negligence.
Disposition Judgment was denying the instant petition
with costs against petitioner.
PLDT V CA (SPS ESTEBAN)
REGALADO; September 29, 1989
[CITATION]
NATURE
Petition for certiorari to review the resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
FACTS
- July 30, 1968 Jeep of Esteban spouses ran over a
mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the
installation of its underground conduit system. The
complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban
failed to notice the open trench which was left
uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the
lack of any warning light or signs.
- Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her
arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her
cheek, while the respondent husband suffered cut lips.
In addition, the windshield of the jeep was shattered.
- PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention
that the injuries sustained by respondent spouses were
the result of their own negligence and that the entity
which should be held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte
and Company, an independent contractor which
undertook the said construction work.
- TC ruled in favor of Esteban spouses whereas the CA
reversed the ruling.
ISSUE
WON the Esteban spouses can claim damages from
PLDT
HELD
NO
prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
Ratio A person claiming damages for the negligence of

another has the burden of proving the existence of such
fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts
constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively
established by competent evidence.
Reasoning
- The accident was due to the lack of diligence of
respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to
negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT.
> Jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson
Street. If it had remained on that inside lane, it would
not have hit the accident mound
> That plaintiffs jeep was on the inside lane before it
swerved to hit the ACCIDENT MOUND could have
been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street
to the south of the ACCIDEN MOUND.
> Plaintiffs jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an
hour as plaintiff husband claimed. At that speed, he
could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck
the ACCIDENT MOUND.
> If the accident did not happen because the jeep was
running quite fast on the inside lane and for some
reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right
and had to climb over the ACCIDENT MOUND,
then plaintiff husband had not exercised the deligence
of a good father of a family to avoid the accident.
- The above findings clearly show that the negligence of
respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory
to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very
cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its
determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to
recover damages.
Disposition resolutions of respondent CA, dated March
11, 1990 and September 3, 1980, are hereby SET
ASIDE, Its original decision, promulgated on
September 25, 1979, is hereby REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED.
GENOBIAGON V CA (PEOPLE OF THE PHILS)
178 SCRA 422
GRIO-AQUINO; October 22, 1957
NATURE
torts & damages

Petition for review of the CAs decision affirming the
conviction of the petitioner of the crime of homicide
thru reckless imprudence.
FACTS
- On Dec 31, 1959, at about 7:30 PM, a rig driven by
Genobiagon bumped an old woman who was crossing
the street. The appellant's rig was following another at a
distance of two meters. The old woman started to cross
when the first rig was approaching her, but as
appellant's vehicle was going so fast not only because
of the steep down-grade of the road, but also because he
was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him, the
appellant's rig bumped the old woman, who fell at the
middle of the road. The appellant continued to drive on,
but a by-stander Mangyao saw the incident and shouted
at the appellant to stop. He ran after appellant when the
latter refused to stop. Overtaking the appellant,
Mangyao asked him why he bumped the old woman
and his answer was, 'it was the old woman that bumped
him.' The appellant went back to the place where the
old woman was struck by his rig. The old woman was
unconscious. She was then loaded in a jeep and brought
to the hospital where she died 3 hours later.
- Genobiagon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence. CA affirmed
- Genobiagon claims CA erred in not finding that the
reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate
cause of the accident which led to her death
ISSUES
WON contributory negligence can be used as defense
by Genobiagon
HELD
NO
- The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if
any, does not exonerate the accused.
- "The defense of contributory negligence does not
apply in criminal cases committed through reckless
imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of
another to evade the effects of his own negligence
(People vs. Orbeta, CA-G.R. No. 321, March 29,
1947)." (People vs. Quiones, 44 O.G. 1520)
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Disposition the appealed decision is affirmed with

modification as to the civil liability of the petitioner
which is hereby increased to P30,000. Costs against
petitioner.
RAKES V ATLANTIC
[CITATION]
[PONENTE]
NATURE
Action for damages
FACTS
- The plaintiff, Rakes, one of a group of 8 AfricanAmerican laborers in the employment of defendant,
Atlantic, was at work transporting iron rails from the
harbor in Manila. The men were hauling the rails on 2
hand cars, some behind or at it sides and some pulling
the cars in the front by a rope. At one point, the track
sagged, the tie broke, the car canted and the rails slid off
and caught the plaintiff who was walking by the cars
side, breaking his leg, which was later amputated at the
knee.
- The plaintiffs witness alleged that a noticeable
depression in the track had appeared after a typhoon.
This was reported to the foreman, Mckenna, but it had
not been proven that Atlantic inspected the track or had
any proper system of inspection. Also, there were no
side guards on the cars to keep the rails from slipping
off.
- However, the companys officers and 3 of the workers
testified that there was a general prohibition frequently
made known to all against walking by the side of cars.
As Rakes was walking along the cars side when the
accident occurred, he was found to have contributed in
some degree to the injury inflicted, although not as the
primary cause.
- Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through
negligence lies only in a criminal action against the
official directly responsible and that the employer be
held only subsidiarily liable.
ISSUE
prof. casis
WON there was contributory negligence on the part of
petitioner
HELD
YES
- Petitioner had walked along the side of the car despite
a prohibition to do so by the foreman.
-The negligence of the injured person contributing to
his injury but not being one of the determining causes
of the principal accident, does not operate as a bar to
recovery, but only in reduction of his damages. Each
party is chargeable with damages in proportion to his
fault.
- Trial court assessed that damages to plaintiff amount
to PhP5,000. SC deducted PhP2,500, the amount fairly
attributable to his own negligence.
SEPARATE OPINION
WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent]
- the negligence of the defendant alone was insufficient
to cause the accidentit also required the negligence of
the plaintiff. Because of this, plaintiff should not be
afforded relief
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE V CA
(ROMMELS MARKETING CORP.)
269 SCRA 695
HERMOSISIMA JR; March 14, 1997
NATURE
Petition for review challenging the CA decision
affirming the RTC decision in a civil case
FACTS
- the case stems from a complaint filed by Rommels
Marketing Corporation (RMC) to recover from the
former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) the sum of
P304,979.74 representing various deposits it had made
in its current account with the bank but which were not
credited, and were instead deposited to the account of
one Bienvenido Cotas, allegedly due to the gross and
inexcusable negligence of the petitioner bank.
torts & damages

ISSUE
What is the proximate cause of the loss, to the tune of
P304,979.74, suffered by the private respondent RMC
petitioner bank's negligence or that of private
respondent's?
HELD
- The proximate cause of the loss was the negligent act
of the bank, thru its teller Ms. Azucena Mabayad, in
validating the deposit slips, both original and duplicate,
presented by Ms. Yabut to Ms. Mabayad,
notwithstanding the fact that one of the deposit slips
was not completely accomplished.
Ratio Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter
Reasoning
- There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff.
- In the case at bench, there is no dispute as to the
damage suffered by the private respondent. Negligence
is the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable
man would do.
- Test by which to determine the existence of negligence
in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of
the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The
existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. The law considers
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what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in

the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
- Applying the above test, it appears that the bank's
teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in
validating, officially stamping and signing all the
deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut,
despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not
completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed
procedure of the bank with respect to the proper
validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate, as
testified to by Ms. Mabayad herself.
- The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily
required by the bank in accepting deposits should not
relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility. The odd
circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one
vital information that of the name of the account
holder should have already put Ms. Mabayad on
guard. Rather than readily validating the incomplete
duplicate copy, she should have proceeded more
cautiously by being more probing as to the true reason
why the name of the account holder in the duplicate slip
was left blank while that in the original was filled up.
She should not have been so naive in accepting hook,
line and sinker the too shallow excuse of Ms. Irene
Yabut to the effect that since the duplicate copy was
only for her personal record, she would simply fill up
the blank space later on. 11 A "reasonable man of
ordinary prudence" 12 would not have given credence to
such explanation and would have insisted that the space
left blank be filled up as a condition for validation.
Unfortunately, this was not how bank teller Mabayad
proceeded thus resulting in huge losses to the private
respondent.
- Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms.
Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its
lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms.
Mabayad. In the testimony of Mr. Romeo Bonifacio,
then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner, to
the effect that, while he ordered the investigation of the
incident, he never came to know that blank deposit slips
were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation
procedures.
prof. casis
- It was in fact only when he testified in this case in
February, 1983, or after the lapse of more than seven (7)
years counted from the period when the funds in
question were deposited in plaintiff's accounts (May,
1975 to July, 1976) that bank manager Bonifacio
admittedly became aware of the practice of his teller
Mabayad of validating blank deposit slips.
Undoubtedly, this is gross, wanton, and inexcusable
negligence in the appellant bank's supervision of its
employees.
- It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad,
coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the
selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was
the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private
respondent, and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to
a dishonest employee, as insisted by the petitioners.
- Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each
case upon mixed considerations of logic, common
sense, policy and precedent. Bank of the Phil. Islands v.
Court of Appeals, 17 defines proximate cause as "that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. . . ." In this case, absent the act of Ms.
Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete
duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut
would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her
fraudulent scheme with impunity.
- LAST CLEAR CHANCE: under the doctrine of "last
clear chance" (also referred to, at times as "supervening
negligence" or as "discovered peril"), petitioner bank
was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence,
states that where both parties are negligent, but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that
of the other, or when it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the
incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to
avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is
chargeable with the consequences thereof. The rule
would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a
person does not preclude the recovery of damages for
the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against
liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last
fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by
torts & damages

the exercise of due diligence. Here, assuming that
private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting
cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter
with the opportunity to defraud the company, as
advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that
the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear
opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client,
simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed
validation procedure.
- In the case of banks, the degree of diligence required
is more than that of a good father of a family.
Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship
with their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the
accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care.
- The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be denied
that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent
in not checking its monthly statements of account. Had
it done so, the company would have been alerted to the
series of frauds being committed against RMC by its
secretary. The damage would definitely not have
ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly
Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little vigilance in
their financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts
to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the
damages that may be awarded to the private respondent
23
under A2179 CC, to wit:
. . . When the plaintiff's own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was
only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause
of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care,
the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
In view of this, we believe that the demands of
substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damage
on a 60-40 ratio. Thus, 40% of the damage awarded by
the respondent appellate court, except the award of
P25,000.00 attorney's fees, shall be borne by private
respondent RMC; only the balance of 60% needs to be
paid by the petitioners. The award of attorney's fees
shall be borne exclusively by the petitioner.
Disposition the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals is modified by reducing the amount of actual
damages private respondent is entitled to by 40%.
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Petitioners may recover from Ms. Azucena Mabayad

the amount they would pay the private respondent.
Private respondent shall have recourse against Ms. Irene
Yabut. In all other respects, the appellate court's
decision is AFFIRMED.
SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA [dissent]
- It seems that an innocent bank teller is being unduly
burdened with what should fall on Ms. Irene Yabut,
RMC's own employee, who should have been charged
with estafa or estafa through falsification of private
document. Why is RMC insulating Ms. Irene Yabut
from liability when in fact she orchestrated the entire
fraud on RMC, her employer?
- Going back to Yabut's modus operandi, it is not
disputed that each time Yabut would transact business
with PBC's tellers, she would accomplish two (2) copies
of the current account deposit slip. PBC's deposit slip,
as issued in 1975, had two parts. The upper part was
called the depositor's stub and the lower part was called
the bank copy. Both parts were detachable from each
other. The deposit slip was prepared and signed by the
depositor or his representative, who indicated therein
the current account number to which the deposit was to
be credited, the name of the depositor or current
account holder, the date of the deposit, and the amount
of the deposit either in cash or in checks.
- Since Yabut deposited money in cash, the usual bank
procedure then was for the teller to count whether the
cash deposit tallied with the amount written down by
the depositor in the deposit slip. If it did, then the teller
proceeded to verify whether the current account number
matched with the current account name as written in the
deposit slip.
- In the earlier days before the age of full
computerization, a bank normally maintained a ledger
which served as a repository of accounts to which
debits and credits resulting from transactions with the
bank were posted from books of original entry. Thus, it
was only after the transaction was posted in the ledger
that the teller proceeded to machine validate the deposit
slip and then affix his signature or initial to serve as
proof of the completed transaction.
prof. casis
- It should be noted that the teller validated the
depositor's stub in the upper portion and the bank copy
on the lower portion on both the original and duplicate
copies of the deposit slips presented by Yabut. The
teller, however, detached the validated depositor's stub
on the original deposit slip and allowed Yabut to retain
the whole validated duplicate deposit slip that bore the
same account number as the original deposit slip, but
with the account name purposely left blank by Yabut,
on the assumption that it would serve no other purpose
but for a personal record to complement the original
validated depositor's stub.
- Thus, when Yabut wrote the name of RMC on the
blank account name on the validated duplicate copy of
the deposit slip, tampered with its account number, and
superimposed RMC's account number, said act only
served to cover-up the loss already caused by her to
RMC, or after the deposit slip was validated by the
teller in favor of Yabut's husband. Stated otherwise,
when there is a clear evidence of tampering with any of
the material entries in a deposit slip, the genuineness
and due execution of the document become an issue in
resolving whether or not the transaction had been fair
and regular and whether the ordinary course of business
had been followed by the bank.
- The legal or proximate cause of RMC's loss was when
Yabut, its employee, deposited the money of RMC in
her husband's name and account number instead of that
of RMC, the rightful owner of such deposited funds.
Precisely, it was the criminal act of Yabut that directly
caused damage to RMC, her employer, not the
validation of the deposit slip by the teller as the deposit
slip was made out by Yabut in her husband's name and
to his account.
- LAST CLEAR CHANCE: As for the doctrine of "last
clear chance," it is my considered view that the doctrine
assumes that the negligence of the defendant was
subsequent to the negligence of the plaintiff and the
same must be the proximate cause of the injury. In
short, there must be a last and a clear chance, not a last
possible chance, to avoid the accident or injury. It must
have been a chance as would have enabled a reasonably
prudent man in like position to have acted effectively to
avoid the injury and the resulting damage to himself.
torts & damages

- In the case at bar, the bank was not remiss in its duty
of sending monthly bank statements to private
respondent RMC so that any error or discrepancy in the
entries therein could be brought to the bank's attention
at the earliest opportunity. Private respondent failed to
examine these bank statements not because it was
prevented by some cause in not doing so, but because it
was purposely negligent as it admitted that it does not
normally check bank statements given by banks.
- It was private respondent who had the last and clear
chance to prevent any further misappropriation by
Yabut had it only reviewed the status of its current
accounts on the bank statements sent to it monthly or
regularly. Since a sizable amount of cash was entrusted
to Yabut, private respondent should, at least, have taken
ordinary care of its concerns, as what the law presumes.
Its negligence, therefore, is not contributory but the
immediate and proximate cause of its injury.
JUNTILLA V FONTANAR
136 SCRA 624
GUITERREZ JR; May 31, 1985
NATURE
Petition to review the decision of CFI of Cebu
FACTS
- Petitioner Roberto Juntilla was sitting a the front seat
of a jeepney (driven by one Berfol Camoro, registered
under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar, but actually
owned by Fernando Banzon) when its right rear tire
exploded causing it to turn turtle. Plaintiff was thrown
out of the vehicle and lost consciousness upon landing
on the ground. When he came back to his senses, he
found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm,
injuries on his left arm, right thigh and on his back and
also found this Omega wrist watch was lost. He went
to Danao city and upon arrival there he entered the City
Hospital to attend to his injuries and asked his father-inlaw to go to site of the accident to look for his watch
but the watch was nowhere to be found.
- Petitioner then filed a civil case for breach of contract
with damages before the City Court of Cebu against
Fontanar, Banzon, and Camoro, who filed their answer,
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alleging that the accident was beyond their control

taking into account that the tire that exploded was
newly bought and slightly used at the time it blew up.
- City Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner.
The respondents then appealed to the CFI of Cebu,
which reversed the judgment upon a finding that the
accident in question was due to a fortuitous event.
Petitioners MFR was denied, hence this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON the CFI erred in absolving the carrier from any
liability upon a finding that the tire blow out is a
fortuitous event
2. WON the accident was due to a fortuitous event
HELD
1. YES
- The CFI relied on the ruling of the CA in Rodriguez v
Red Line Transportation Co., that a tire blow-out does
not constitute negligence unless the tire was already old
and should not have been used at all. This conclusion
is based on a misapprehension of overall facts. In La
Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. v De Jesus, et al, We
held that, not only are the rulings of the CA in
Rodriguez v Red Line Trans. Co. not binding on this
Court but they were also based on considerations quite
different from those that obtain in the case at bar. In
the case at bar, there are specific acts of negligence on
the part of the respondents. The records show that the
passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a ditch
immediately after its right rear tire exploded. The
evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was running
at a very fast speed before the accident. We agree with
the observation of the petitioner that a public utility jeep
running at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a
ditch when its right rear tire blows up. There is also
evidence to show that the passenger jeepney was
overloaded at the time of the accident. The petitioner
stated that there were 3 passengers in the front seat and
14 in the rear.
- While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still
good because the grooves of the tire were still visible,
this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a
fortuitous event. No evidence was presented to show
prof. casis
that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or
that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to
compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents.
The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been
caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire
coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and
speeding at the time of the accident.
2. NO
Ratio A caso fortuito (fortuitous event) presents the
following essential characteristics:
1. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply
with his obligation, must be independent of the human
will
2. It must be impossible to foresee the even which
constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it
must be impossible to avoid
3. The occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner
4. The obligor (debtor) must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to
the creditor
Reasoning
- In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence was not independent of the
human will. The accident was caused either through the
negligence of the driver or because of mechanical
defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach their
drivers not to overload their vehicles not to exceed safe
and legal speed limits and to know the correct measures
to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of
passengers at all times.
- Relative to the contingency of mechanical defects, we
held in Necesito, et al. v. Paras, et al, that: The
preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine
that a passenger is entitled to recover damages from a
carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an
appliance purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it
appears that the defect would have been discovered by
the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which
under the circumstances was incumbent upon it. with
regard to inspection and application of the necessary
tests. For the purposes of this doctrine, the manufacturer
torts & damages

is considered as being in law the agent or servant of the
carrier, as far as regards the work of constructing the
appliance. According to this theory, the good repute of
the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from
liability.
- It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of a common
carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage, and by
entering into the said contract, it binds itself to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person, with a due regard for all the circumstances. The
records show that this obligation was not met by the
respondents.
Disposition Decision appealed from is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Decision of City Court is REINSTATED
HERNANDEZ V COMMISSION ON AUDIT
179 SCRA 39
CRUZ; November 6, 1989
NATURE
A petition to reverse Commission on Audits denial of
relief
FACTS
- Teodoro M. Hernandez was the officer-in-charge and
special disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach Project
of the Philippine Tourism Authority in Cavite. He went
to the main office in Manila to encash 2 checks
covering the wages of the employees and the operating
expenses of the Project. He estimated that the money
would be available by 10am and that he would be back
in Ternate by about 2pm of the same day. However, the
processing of the checks was completed only at 3pm.
The petitioner decided nevertheless to encash them
because the Project employees would be waiting for
their pay the following day. And so, he collected the
cash value of the checks. The petitioner had two
choices: (1) return to Cavite that same afternoon and
arrive there in the early evening; or (2) take the money
with him to his house in Marilao, Bulacan, spend the
night there, and leave for Ternate the following
morning. He opted for the second, thinking it the safer
one. He took a passenger jeep bound for his house in
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Bulacan. It was while the vehicle was along EDSA that

two persons with knives boarded and forcibly took the
money he was carrying. Hernandez, after the initial
shock, immediately followed in desperate pursuit. He
caught up with Virgilio Alvarez and overcame him after
a scuffle. Alvarez was subsequently charged with
robbery and pleaded guilty. But the hold-upper who
escaped is still at large and the stolen money he took
with him has not been recovered.
- the petitioner, invoking the foregoing facts, filed a
request for relief from money accountability under
Section 638 of the Revised Administrative Code.3
- however, the Commission on Audit, through then
Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, jr. denied the
petitioner's request, observing inter alia:
In the instant case, the loss of the P10,175.00 under the
accountability of Mr. Hernandez can be attributed to
his negligence because had he brought the cash
proceeds of the checks (replenishment fund) to the
Beach Park in Ternate immediately after encashment
for safekeeping in his office, which is the normal
procedure in the handling of public funds, the loss of
said cash thru robbery could have been aborted.
- In the petition at bar, Hernandez claims that the
respondent COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in
denying him relief and in holding him negligent for the
loss of the stolen money. He avers he has done only
what any reasonable man would have done and should
not be held accountable for a fortuitous event over
which he had no control.
- On his decision to take the money home that afternoon
instead of returning directly to Ternate, he says that the
first course was more prudent as he saw it, if only
because his home in Marilao was much nearer than his
office in Ternate; that the likelihood of robbery during
the time in question was stronger in Ternate than in
Marilao; that what happened was a fortuitous event that
3
Section 638. Credit for loss occurring in transit or due to casualty Notice to Auditor. When a loss
of government funds or property occurs while the same is in transit or is caused by fire, theft, or other
casualty, the officer accountable therefor or having custody thereof shall immediately notify the Auditor
General, or the provincial auditor, according as a matter is within the original jurisdiction of the one or
the other, and within thirty days or such longer period as the Auditor, or provincial auditor, may in the
particular case allow, shall present his application for relief, with the available evidence in support
thereof. An officer who fails to comply with this requirement shall not be relieved of liability or allowed
credit for any such loss in the settlement of his accounts.
prof. casis
could not have reasonably been foreseen, especially on
that busy highway.
- then Solicitor-General argued that Hernandez was
negligent in the safekeeping of the stolen funds. Later,
however, his successor sided with the petitioner,
agreeing that Hernandez had not committed any
negligence or, assuming he was guilty of contributory
negligence, had made up for it with his efforts to
retrieve the money and his capture of one of the
robbers, who was eventually convicted.
- COA insists that the petitioner should not be relieved
from his money accountability because it was his own
negligence that led to the loss of the cash he had sought
to take not to Ternate but to Marilao. Its contention is
that the petitioner should not have encashed the checks
as the hour was already late and he knew he could not
return to Ternate before nightfall. The memo concludes
that in deciding to take the money with him to Marilao
after imprudently withdrawing it from the main office,
the petitioner was assuming a risk from which he
cannot now be excused after the loss of the money as a
result of the robbery to which it was unreasonably
exposed.
ISSUE
WON petitioners acts are so tainted with negligence or
recklessness as to justify the denial of the petitioner's
request for relief from accountability for the stolen
money
HELD
NO
- This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by
the said provisions, something that could not have been
reasonably foreseen although it could have happened,
and did. For most of us, all we can rely on is a reasoned
conjecture of what might happen, based on common
sense and our own experiences, or our intuition, if you
will, and without any mystic ability to peer into the
future. So it was with the petitioner.
torts & damages

- It is true that the petitioner miscalculated, but the
Court feels he should not be blamed for that. The
decision he made seemed logical at that time and was
one that could be expected of a reasonable and prudent
person.
Disposition The petitioner is entitled to be relieved
from accountability for the money forcibly taken from
him. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED.
GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION V
CHATTO
210 SCRA 18
DAVIDE JR; June 16, 1992
NATURE
Petition for Review
FACTS
- In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 Gloria E. Chatto, and
her 15-year old daughter, Lina Delza E. Chatto went to
see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater,
owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation.
They bought balcony tickets but even then were unable
to find seats considering the number of people
patronizing the movie. Hardly ten (10) minutes after
entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed.
The theater was plunged into darkness and
pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs
managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as
they were able to get out to the street they walked the
nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and
treated for one (1) day.
- The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital.
Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from
June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from
June 5 to 11. Per Medico Legal Certificate (Exh, "C")
issued by Dr. Ernesto G. Brion, plaintiff Lina Delza
Chatto suffered the following injuries:
- Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the
collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to
force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not
suffer from any structural or construction defect.
ISSUES
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- PAGE 77 -
1. WON Jesus Lim Ongs investigation maybe given

weight in the trial
2. WON the collapse was due to force majeure
HELD
1. NO
- there was no authoritative investigation conducted by
impartial civil and structural engineers on the cause of
the collapse of the theater's ceiling, Jesus Lim Ong is
not an engineer, He is a graduate of architecture from
the St. Louie University in Baguio City. It does not
appear he has passed the government examination for
architects. In fine, the ignorance of Mr. Ong about the
cause of the collapse of the ceiling of their theater
cannot be equated, as an act, of God. To sustain that
proposition is to introduce sacrilege in our
jurisprudence.
2. NO
- Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the
theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even
founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus
Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason
why the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a
defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was
indeed caused by force majeure. It could not have
collapsed without a cause. That Mr. Ong could not offer
any explanation does not imply force majeure.
Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the
collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. To Our
mind, the real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain
the cause or reason is that either he did not actually
conduct the investigation or that he is, as the respondent
Court impliedly held, incompetent. He is not an
engineer, but an architect who had not even passed the
government's examination. Verily, post-incident
investigation cannot be considered as material to the
present proceedings. What is significant is the finding
of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent Court, that
the collapse was due to construction defects. There was
no evidence offered to overturn this finding. The
building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to
the accident in question. It was not shown that any of
the causes denominates as force majeure obtained
immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the
prof. casis
ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered
if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in
keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed
by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate
inspection of the premises before the date of the
accident. His answers to the leading questions on
inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said.
inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. That
the structural designs and plans of the building were
duly approved by the City Engineer and the building
permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not
at all prove that there were no defects in the
construction, especially as regards the ceiling,
considering that no testimony was offered to prove that
it was ever inspected at all.
- It is settled that - The owner or proprietor of a place of
public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises,
appliances and amusement devices are safe for the
purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being
subject to no other exception or qualification than that
he does not contract against unknown defects not
discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means.
- This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that Where a patron of a theater or other place of public
amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the
injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and
management of the defendant, and the accident is such
as in the ordinary course of events would not have
happened if proper care had been exercised, its
occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an
inference of negligence on the part of the defendant.
Disposition judgment is hereby rendered DENYING
the instant petition with costs against petitioner.
SERVANDO V PHILIPPINE STEAM
NAVIGATION CO
117 SCRA 832
ESCOLIN; 1982
NATURE
This appeal, originally brought to the Court of Appeals,
seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Cases Nos. 7354
and 7428, declaring appellant Philippine Steam
torts & damages

Navigation liable for damages for the loss of the
appellees' cargoes as a result of a fire which gutted the
Bureau of Customs' warehouse in Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental.
FACTS
- On November 6, 1963, appellees Clara Uy Bico and
Amparo Servando loaded on board the appellant's
vessel for carriage from Manila to Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental several cargoes (cavans of rice, colored
papers, toys etc) as evidenced by the corresponding
bills of lading issued by the appellant. Upon arrival of
the vessel at Pulupandan, in the morning of November
18, 1963, the cargoes were discharged, complete and in
good order, unto the warehouse of the Bureau of
Customs. At about 2:00 in the afternoon of the same
day, said warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown
origin, destroying appellees' cargoes. Before the fire,
however, appellee Uy Bico was able to take delivery of
907 cavans of rice Appellees' claims for the value of
said goods were rejected by the appellant.
- On the bases of the foregoing facts, the lower court
rendered a decision, ordering Philippine Steam to pay
for damages. The court a quo held that the delivery of
the shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau
of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article
1736; and since the burning of the warehouse occurred
before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to
the appellees, the loss is chargeable against the
appellant.
Philippine Steam on the other hand relies on the
following:
Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or
damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless such
loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. Nor
shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage caused
by force majeure, dangers or accidents of the sea or
other waters; war; public enemies; . . . fire . ...
ISSUE
WON the above stipulation validly limits the liability of
the shipowner in this case
HELD
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- PAGE 77 -
YES
Ratio The parties may stipulate anything in the contract
for so long as the stipulation is not contrary to law,
morals, public policy. The stipulation which merely
iterates the principle of caso fortuito is for all intents
and purposes valid.
Reasoning
- We sustain the validity of the above stipulation; there
is nothing therein that is contrary to law, morals or
public policy.
- Appellees would contend that the above stipulation
does not bind them because it was printed in fine letters
on the back-of the bills of lading; and that they did not
sign the same. This argument overlooks the
pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs. Court of
Appeals, promulgated June 29, 1979, 3 where the Court
held that while it may be true that petitioner had not
signed the plane ticket , he is nevertheless bound by the
provisions thereof. 'Such provisions have been held to
be a part of the contract of carriage, and valid and
binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's
lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation'. It is what
is known as a contract of 'adhesion', in regards which it
has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one
party imposes a ready made form of contract on the
other, as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are contracts
not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the
contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he
adheres, he gives his consent." (Tolentino, Civil Code,
Vol. IV, 1962 Ed., p. 462, citing Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, Lawyer's Journal, Jan. 31, 1951, p. 49).
- Besides, the agreement contained in the above quoted
Clause 14 is a mere iteration of the basic principle of
law written in Article 1 1 7 4 of the Civil Code 4 Thus,
where fortuitous event or force majeure is the
immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor
is exempt from liability for non-performance. The
Partidas, the antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil
Code, defines 'caso fortuito' as 'an event that takes place
by accident and could not have been foreseen.
4
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
prof. casis
Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected
fire, shipwreck, violence of robbers.'
- In its dissertation of the phrase 'caso fortuito' the
Enciclopedia Juridicada Espanola 5 says: "In a legal
sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a
'caso fortuito' presents the following essential
characteristics: (1) the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to
comply with his obligation, must be independent of the
human will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the
event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito', or if it can be
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the
occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner;
and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation
in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the
creditor." In the case at bar, the burning of the customs
warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened
independently of the will of the appellant. The latter
could not have foreseen the event.
- There is nothing in the record to show that appellant
carrier ,incurred in delay in the performance of its
obligation. It appears that appellant had not only
notified appellees of the arrival of their shipment, but
had demanded that the same be withdrawn. In fact,
pursuant to such demand, appellee Uy Bico had taken
delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of the
warehouse.
Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with
negligence. The storage of the goods in the Customs
warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the appellees
was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and
consent. Since the warehouse belonged to and was
maintained by the government, it would be unfair to
impute negligence to the appellant, the latter having no
control whatsoever over the same.
Disposition judgment appealed from is hereby set
aside.
SEPARATE OPINION
AQUINO [concur]
- I concur. Under article 1738 of the Civil Code "the
extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues
torts & damages

to be operative even during the time the goods are
stored in the warehouse of the carrier at the place of
destination, until the consignee has been advised of the
arrival of the goods and has had reasonable opportunity
thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of
them".
- From the time the goods in question were deposited in
the Bureau of Customs' warehouse in the morning of
their arrival up to two o' clock in the afternoon of the
same day, when the warehouse was burned, Amparo C.
Servando and Clara Uy Bico, the consignees, had
reasonable opportunity to remove the goods. Clara had
removed more than one-half of the rice consigned to
her. Moreover, the shipping company had no more
control and responsibility over the goods after they
were deposited in the customs warehouse by the arrastre
and stevedoring operator. No amount of extraordinary
diligence on the part of the carrier could have prevented
the loss of the goods by fire which was of accidental
origin.
NATIONAL POWER CORP V CA (RAYO ET AL)
DAVIDE JR; May 21, 1993
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court
FACTS
- When the water level in the Angat dam went beyond
the allowable limit at the height of typhoon Kading
NPC opened three of the dams spillways to release the
excess water in the dam. This however caused the
inundation of the banks of the Angat river which caused
persons and animals to drown and properties to be
washed away.
- The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent
release by the defendants of water through the spillways
of the Angst Dam (Hydroelectric Plant).
Plaintiffs claim:
- NPC operated and maintained a multi-purpose
hydroelectric plant in the Angat River
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- despite the defendants' knowledge of the impending

entry of typhoon "Kading," they failed to exercise due
diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam
- when the said water level went beyond the maximum
allowable limit at the height of the typhoon, the
defendants suddenly, negligently and recklessly opened
three (3) of the dam's spillways, thereby releasing a
large amount of water which inundated the banks of the
Angat River causing the death of members of the
household of the plaintiffs, together with their animals
Respondents comments:
- NPC exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the
operation and maintenance of the hydroelectric plant
- NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the
selection of its employees
- written notices were sent to the different
municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein
about the impending release of a large volume of water
with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advising them
to take the necessary Precautions
- the water released during the typhoon was needed to
prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater
damage to people and property
- in spite of the precautions undertaken and the
diligence exercised, they could still not contain or
control the flood that resulted
- the damages incurred by the private respondents were
caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in
the nature and character of damnum absque injuria.
ISSUES
1. WON NPC was guilty of negligence
2. WON (applying the ruling of NAkpil & Sons v. CA)
NPC is liable given that the inundation was caused by
force majeure
HELD
1. YES
- A similar case entitled National Power Corporation, et
al. vs, Court of Appeals, et al.," involving the very same
incident subject of the instant petition. The court there
declared that the proximate cause of the loss and
damage sustained by the plaintiffs therein--who were
similarly situated as the private respondents herein-was
the negligence of the petitioners,
prof. casis
- on the basis of its meticulous analysis and evaluation
of the evidence a dduced by the parties in the cases
subject of CA-G.R. CV Nos. 27290-93, public
respondent found as conclusively established that
indeed, the petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and
evident lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence in
the management and operation of Angat Dam," and that
"the extent of the opening of the spillways, and the
magnitude of the water released, are all but products of
defendants-appellees headlessness, slovenliness, and
carelessness."and that the 24 October 1978 'early
warning notice" supposedly sent to the affected
municipalities, the same notice involved in the case at
bar, was insufficient.
2. YES
- given that NPC is guilty of negligence. Juan F. Nakipil
& Sons vs. Court of Appeals is still good law as far as
the concurrent liability of an obligor in the case of force
majeure is concerned.
- In the Nakpil case it was held that "To exempt the
obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil
Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an 'act of
God,' the following must concur: (a) the cause of the
breach of the obligation must be independent of the will
of the debtor, (b) the event must be either unforeseeable
or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render
it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from
any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the
creditor. Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous
event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding
fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in
any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided
for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in
loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.
- The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine
strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned
exclusively by the violence of nature and all human
agencies are, to be excluded from creating or entering
into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the
cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part
the result of the participation of man whether it be from
active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the
whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, and
torts & damages

removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. (1
Corpus Juris, pp. 1174-1175).
Disposition Petition dismissed.
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE V CA
PURISIMA; July 10, 1998
NATURE
Petition for review seeking to set aside the
Decision promulgated on July 31, 1996, and
Resolution dated September 12, 1996 of the Court
of Appeals in Juanita de Jesus vda. de Dimaano,
et al. vs. Southeastern College, Inc., which
reduced the moral damages awarded below from
P1,000,000.00 to P200,000.00. The Resolution
under attack denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
FACTS
- Private respondents are owners of a house at
326 College Road, Pasay City, while petitioner
owns a four-storey school building along the same
College Road. On October 11, 1989, at about 6:30
in the morning, a powerful typhoon Saling hit
Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the
roof of petitioners building was partly ripped off
and blown away, landing on and destroying
portions of the roofing of private respondents
house. After the typhoon had passed, an ocular
inspection of the destroyed buildings was
conducted by a team of engineers headed by the
city building official, Engr. Jesus L. Reyna.
Pertinent aspects of the latters Report i[5] dated
October 18, 1989 stated, as follows:
5. One of the factors that may have led to this
calamitous event is the formation of the buildings in
the area and the general direction of the wind.
Situated in the peripheral lot is an almost U-shaped
formation of 4-storey building. Thus, with the strong
winds having a westerly direction, the general
formation of the buildings becomes a big funnel-like
structure, the one situated along College Road,
receiving the heaviest impact of the strong winds.
Hence, there are portions of the roofing, those
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located on both ends of the building, which remained

intact after the storm.
6. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason
for the dislodging of the roofings structural trusses is
the improper anchorage of the said trusses to the roof
beams. The 1/2 diameter steel bars embedded on
the concrete roof beams which serve as truss
anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to the trusses.
Still, there are other steel bars which were not even
bent to the trusses, thus, those trusses are not
anchored at all to the roof beams.
- It then recommended that to avoid any further
loss and damage to lives, limbs and property of
persons living in the vicinity, the fourth floor of
subject school building be declared as a
structural hazard.
- In their Complaintii[6] before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, for damages
based on culpa aquiliana, private respondents
alleged that the damage to their house rendered
the same uninhabitable, forcing them to stay
temporarily in others houses. And so they sought
to recover from petitioner P117,116.00, as actual
damages, P1,000,000.00, as moral damages,
P300,000.00, as exemplary damages and
P100,000.00, for and as attorneys fees; plus
costs.
- In its Answer, petitioner averred that subject
school building had withstood several devastating
typhoons and other calamities in the past, without
its roofing or any portion thereof giving way; that it
has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it
that said school building, which houses school
children, faculty members, and employees, is in
tip-top condition; and furthermore, typhoon
Saling was an act of God and therefore beyond
human control such that petitioner cannot be
answerable for the damages wrought thereby,
absent any negligence on its part.
- The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals gave
credence to the ocular inspection made by the city
engineer. Thus, this appeal.
ISSUES
prof. casis
WON the damage on the roof of the building of
private respondents resulting from the impact of
the falling portions of the school buildings roof
ripped off by the strong winds of typhoon Saling,
was, within legal contemplation, due to fortuitous
event
HELD
YES
- Petitioner cannot be held liable for the damages
suffered by the private respondents. This
conclusion finds support in Article 1174 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
Art 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the
law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation,
or when the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for
those events which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, were inevitable.
- The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso
fortuito is found in the Partidas which defines it as
an event which takes place by accident and could
not have been foreseen.iii[9] Escriche elaborates it
as an unexpected event or act of God which could
neither be foreseen nor resisted. Civilist Arturo M.
Tolentino adds that [f]ortuitous events may be
produced by two general causes: (1) by nature,
such as earthquakes, storms, floods, epidemics,
fires, etc. and (2) by the act of man, such as an
armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental
prohibitions, robbery, etc.iv
- In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a
person from liability, it is necessary that he be free
from any previous negligence or misconduct by
reason of which the loss may have been
occasioned.. An act of God cannot be invoked for
the protection of a person who has been guilty of
gross negligence in not trying to forestall its
possible adverse consequences. When a persons
negligence concurs with an act of God in
producing damage or injury to another, such
person is not exempt from liability by showing that
the immediate or proximate cause of the damage
or injury was a fortuitous event. When the effect is
found to be partly the result of the participation of
torts & damages

man whether it be from active intervention, or
neglect, or failure to act the whole occurrence is
hereby humanized, and removed from the rules
applicable to acts of God.
- After a thorough study and evaluation of the
evidence on record, this Court believes otherwise,
notwithstanding the general rule that factual
findings by the trial court, especially when affirmed
by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive
upon this Court. After a careful scrutiny of the
records and the pleadings submitted by the
parties, we find exception to this rule and hold that
the lower courts misappreciated the evidence
proffered.
- There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a
fortuitous event, a natural occurrence which may
be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any
amount of foresight, diligence or care. In order to
be exempt from liability arising from any adverse
consequence engendered thereby, there should
have been no human participation amounting to a
negligent act. In other words, the person seeking
exoneration from liability must not be guilty of
negligence.
Negligence,
as
commonly
understood, is conduct which naturally or
reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others.
It may be the failure to observe that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand,v[17] or the omission to
do something which a prudent and reasonable
man, guided by considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do.
From these premises, we proceed to determine
whether petitioner was negligent, such that if it
were not, the damage caused to private
respondents house could have been avoided?
- At the outset, it bears emphasizing that a person
claiming damages for the negligence of another
has the burden of proving the existence of fault or
negligence causative of his injury or loss. The
facts constitutive of negligence must be
affirmatively established by competent evidence, vi
[19]
not merely by presumptions and conclusions
without basis in fact. Private respondents, in
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prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
establishing the culpability of petitioner, merely

relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a
team which made an ocular inspection of
petitioners school building after the typhoon. As
the term imparts, an ocular inspection is one by
means of actual sight or viewing. vii[20] What is visual
to the eye though, is not always reflective of the
real cause behind. For instance, one who hears a
gunshot and then sees a wounded person, cannot
always definitely conclude that a third person shot
the victim. It could have been self-inflicted or
caused accidentally by a stray bullet.
The
relationship of cause and effect must be clearly
shown.
- In the present case, other than the said ocular
inspection, no investigation was conducted to
determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of
petitioners school building. Private respondents
did not even show that the plans, specifications
and design of said school building were deficient
and defective.
Neither did they prove any
substantial deviation from the approved plans and
specifications.
Nor
did they conclusively
establish that the construction of such building was
basically flawed.
- Moreover, the city building official, who has been
in the city government service since 1974,
admitted in open court that no complaint regarding
any defect on the same structure has ever been
lodged before his office prior to the institution of
the case at bench. It is a matter of judicial notice
that typhoons are common occurrences in this
country. If subject school buildings roofing was
not firmly anchored to its trusses, obviously, it
could not have withstood long years and several
typhoons even stronger than Saling.
- In light of the foregoing, we find no clear and
convincing evidence to sustain the judgment of the
appellate court. We thus hold that petitioner has
not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the
construction and maintenance of its school
building in question and that typhoon Saling was
the proximate cause of the damage suffered by
private respondents house.
AFIALDA V HISOLE
85 Phil 67
REYES; November 29, 1949
NATURE
Appeal from judgment of CFI Iloilo
FACTS
- This is an action for damages arising from injury
caused by an animal. Loreto Afialda was the caretaker
of the carabaos of spouses Hisole. While tending the
animals, he was gored by one of them and later died as
consequence of his injuries. The action was filed by
the sister of Loreto, and contended that the mishap was
due neither to Loretos own fault nor to force majeure.
- She uses Art.1905, CC (now Art.2183 5) as ground for
the liability:
The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the
same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if
such animal should escape from him or stray away.
This liability shall cease only in case the damage
should arise from force majeure or from the fault of
the person who may have suffered it.
- Spouses moved for dismissal for lack of cause of
action, which the CFI granted. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE
WON the owner of the animal is liable when the
damage is caused to its caretaker (as opposed to a
stranger)
HELD
1. NO
Ratio It was the caretaker's business to try to prevent
the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone,
including himself. And being injured by the animal
under those circumstances was one of the risks of the
occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for
which he must take the consequences.
Reasoning
5
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the
damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in
case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered
damage.
torts & damages

- The lower court took the view that under the
abovequoted provision of the CC, the owner of an
animal is answerable only for damages caused to a
stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of
the animal the owner would be liable of fault under
article 1902 only if he had been negligent or at the same
code.
- Claiming that the lower court was in error, plaintiff
contends that art. 1905 does not distinguish between
damage caused to a stranger and damage caused to the
caretaker and makes the owner liable whether or not he
has been negligent or at fault.
- The distinction (between stranger and caretaker) is
important. For the statute names the possessor or user of
the animal as the person liable for any damages it may
cause and this for the obvious reason that the possessor
or user has the custody and control of the animal and is
therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing
damage.
- In the present case, the animal was in the custody and
under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his
work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business
to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or
damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured
by the animal under those circumstances was one of the
risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily
assumed and for which he must take the consequences.
- On the other hand, if action is to be based on Art.
1902, it is essential that there be fault or negligence on
the part of the defendants as owners of the animal that
caused the damage. But the complaint contains no
allegation on those points.
- In a decision of the Spanish SC, cited by Manresa, the
death of an employee who was bitten by a feline which
his master had asked him to take to his establishment
was by said tribunal declared to be a veritable accident
of labor which should come under the labor laws
rather than under article 1905, CC. The present action,
however, is not brought under labor laws in effect, but
under Art.1905.
Disposition Judgment AFFIRMED.
ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY V CA
(LUIS ET AL)
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- PAGE 77 -
179 SCRA 5
PARAS; November 6, 1989
FACTS
- 5- 6AM June 29, 1967 - strong typhoon "Gening" in
Ilocos Norte brought floods and heavy rain. Isabel Lao
Juan, (Nana Belen) went to her store, Five Sisters
Emporium, to look after the merchandise to see if they
were damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood, Juan
suddenly screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the
water. Her companions, two girls (sales girlls)
attempted to help, but were afraid because they saw an
electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snakelike fashion in the water. Yabes, the son-in law, upon
hearing the electrocution of his mother-in-law, passed
by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask
Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off
the electric current. The body was recovered about two
meters from an electric post.
- 4AM June 29, 1967- Engineer Juan, Power Plant
Engineer of NPC at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant,
noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which
indicated such abnormalities as grounded or shortcircuited lines.
- 6-6:30AM June 29, 1967- he set out of the Laoag NPC
Compound on an inspection and saw grounded and
disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging from the
posts to the ground. When he went to INELCO office,
he could not see any INELCO lineman.
- Engr. Juan attempted to resuscitate Nana Belen but his
efforts proved futile. Rigor mortis was setting in. On the
left palm of the deceased, there was a hollow wound. In
the afternoon, the dangling wire was no longer there.
- Dr. Castro examined the body and noted that the skin
was grayish or cyanotic, which indicated death by
electrocution. On the left palm, the doctor found an
"electrically charged wound" or a first degree burn.
About the base of the thumb on the left hand was a
burned wound. The cause of' death was ,'circulatory
shock electrocution"
- In defense and exculpation, INELCO presented the
testimonies of its officers and employees, which sought
to prove that (1) on and even before June 29, 1967 the
electric service system of the INELCO in the whole
prof. casis
franchise area did not suffer from any defect that might
constitute a hazard to life and property. (2) The service
lines and devices had been newly-installed prior to the
date in question. (3) Also, safety devices were installed
to prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to
property in case of natural calamities such as floods,
typhoons, fire and others. (4) 12 linesmen are charged
with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of
the areas respectively assigned to them. (5) They also
presented own medical expert and said that cyanosis
could not have been the noted 3 hours after the death
because it is only manifest in live persons. (6) Lastly,
the deceased could have died simply either by drowning
or by electrocution due to negligence attributable only
to herself and not to INELCO because of the
installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire
from the main house to the iron gate and fence of steel
matting, thus, charging the latter with electric current
whenever the switch is on. The switch must have been
left on, hence, causing the deceased's electrocution
when she tried to open her gate that early morning of
June 29, 1967
- CFI: awarded P25,000 moral damages; P45,000 attys
fees
- CA: P30,229.45 in actual damages (i.e., P12,000 for
the victim's death and P18,229.45 for funeral expenses);
P50,000 in compensatory damages, computed in
accordance with the formula set in the Villa-Rey Transit
case (31 SCRA 511) with the base of P15,000 as
average annual income of the deceased; P10,000 in
exemplary damages; P3,000 attorney's fees
ISSUE
WON the legal principle of "assumption of risk" bars
private respondents from collecting damages from
INELCO
HELD
NO
Ratio The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon
by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is
imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which
impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof
and brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by the
torts & damages

salesgirls, the deceased went to the Five Star Emporium
"to see to it that the goods were not flooded." As such,
shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect
her property from the floods by imputing upon her the
unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of
personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that
a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when
he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide
by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist
or if the life or property of another is in peril, or when
he seeks to rescue his endangered property. Clearly, an
emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a
source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending
loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal
incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right
to be without regard to INELCOs consent as she was
on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private
respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from
recovering damages as a result of the death caused by
INELCOs negligence
Reasoning
- INELCO can be exonerated from liability since
typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it is
true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of
God for which no person may be held responsible, it
was not said eventuality which directly caused the
victim's death. It was through the intervention of
petitioner's negligence that death took place.
- In times of calamities such as the one which occurred
in Laoag City on the night of June 28 until the early
hours of June 29, 1967, extraordinary diligence requires
a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent
or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or
limb. The evidence does not show that defendant did
that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there were
no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor
even manning its office.
- INELCO was negligent in seeing that no harm is done
to the general public"... considering that electricity is an
agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required
of electric companies must be commensurate with or
proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this
high degree of diligence and care extends to every place
where persons have a right to be" The negligence of
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petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve

itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death
was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of
God combines or concurs with the negligence of the
defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if
the injury would not have resulted but for his own
negligent conduct or omission"
Disposition
CA decision, except for the slight
modification that actual damages be increased to
P48,229.45, is AFFIRMED.
RAMOS V PEPSI COLA
19 SCRA 289
1967
NATURE
Appeal from a CA decision
FACTS
- The facts with regard the accident that Andres
Bonifacio caused is not in the case. The Court limited
its ruling on the decision of the CA to absolve defendant
Pepsi Cola from liability under Article 2180 6 of the
Civil Code. There was, however, a finding that
Bonifacio was in fact negligent.
- The petiton for appeal questioned the testimony of one
Anasco with regard the process and procedures
followed by Pepsi in the hiring and supervision of its
drivers. The SC ruled that the issue brought before it
with regard the credibility of Anasco is one of fact and
not of law. It went on to stay that the CA is a better
judge of the facts.
ISSUE
WON Pepsi Cola is liable under the doctrine of
vicarious liability
HELD
6
prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible,
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
The responsibility treated of this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
NO
- The Court ruled that based on the evidence and
testimonies presented during the trial, Pepsi Cola
exercised the due diligence of a good father in the
hiring and supervision of its drivers. This being the
case, the Company is relieved of any responsibility
from the accident.
Reasoning
- In its ruling, the court citing its ruling on Bahia as
follows:
From this article (2180) two things are apparent:
(1) that when an injury is caused by the negligence of
a
servant or employee there instantly arise a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the employer or master either n the selection
of the servant or employee, or in the supervision over
him after the selection, or both, and
(2) that they presumption is juris tantum ( so much or
so little of law) and not juris et de jure (of law and
from law), and consequently may be rebutted .
- It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in the selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of the family, the presumption is overcome
and he is relieved from liability.
- It was shown in this case that Pesi Cola did not merely
satisfy itself that Bonifacio possessed a drivers license.
A background check was done and he was required to
submit various clearances, previous experience, and
medical records. He was also made to undergo both
theoretical and practical driving tests prior to being
hired as driver. In terms of the aspect of supervision,
the petitioners raised no questions. Given this, the
proof called for under Article 2180 to show diligence of
a good father of a family has been met.
Disposition Decision of the CA is affirmed.
METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP V CA
(CUSTODIA)
223 SCRA 521
REGALADO; June 21, 1993
FACTS
torts & damages

- At about six o'clock in the morning of August 28,
1979, plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio boarded as a
paying passenger a public utility jeepney, then driven
by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his codefendant Victorino Lamayo, bound for her work,
where she then worked as a machine operator earning
P16.25 a day.
- While the jeepney was travelling at a fast clip along
DBP Avenue, Bicutan, Taguig, another fast moving
vehicle, a Metro Manila Transit Corp. (MMTC) bus
driven by defendant Godofredo C. Leonardo was
negotiating Honeydew Road, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro
Manila bound for its terminal at Bicutan.
- As both vehicles approached the intersection of DBP
Avenue and Honeydew Road they failed to slow down
and slacken their speed; neither did they blow their
horns to warn approaching vehicles. As a consequence,
a collision between them occurred, the passenger
jeepney ramming the left side portion of the MMTC
bus. The collision impact caused plaintiff-appellant
Nenita Custodio to hit the front windshield of the
passenger jeepney and (she) was thrown out therefrom,
falling onto the pavement unconscious with serious
physical injuries.
- She was brought to the Medical City Hospital where
she regained consciousness only after one (1) week.
Thereat, she was confined for twenty-four (24) days,
and as a consequence, she was unable to work for three
and one half months (31/2).
- A complaint for damages was filed by herein private
respondent, who being then a minor was assisted by her
parents, against all of therein named defendants
following their refusal to pay the expenses incurred by
the former as a result of the collision.
- Said defendants denied all the material allegations in
the complaint and pointed an accusing finger at each
other as being the party at fault. Further, herein
petitioner MMTC, a government-owned corporation
and one of the defendants in the court a quo, along with
its driver, Godofredo Leonardo, contrarily averred in its
answer with cross-claim and counterclaim that the
MMTC bus was driven in a prudent and careful manner
by driver Leonardo and that it was the passenger
jeepney which was driven recklessly considering that it
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hit the left middle portion of the MMTC bus, and that it
was defendant Lamayo, the owner of the jeepney and
employer of driver Calebag, who failed to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees
and should thus be held solidarily liable for damages
caused to the MMTC bus through the fault and
negligence of its employees.
- Defendant Victorino Lamayo alleged that the damages
suffered by therein plaintiff should be borne by
defendants MMTC and its driver, Godofredo Leonardo,
because the latter's negligence was the sole and
proximate cause of the accident and that MMTC failed
to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees.
ISSUES
1. WON the oral testimonies of witnesses even without
the presentation documentary evidence, prove that
driver Leonardo had complied with all the hiring and
clearance requirements and had undergone all trainings,
tests and examinations preparatory to actual
employment, and that said positive testimonies spell out
the rigid procedure for screening of job applicants and
the supervision of its employees in the field
2. WON petitioner exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees
HELD
1. While there is no rule which requires that testimonial
evidence, to hold sway, must be corroborated by
documentary evidence, or even subject evidence for that
matter, inasmuch as the witnesses' testimonies dwelt on
mere generalities, we cannot consider the same as
sufficiently persuasive proof that there was observance
of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees.
- Petitioner's attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris
familias in the selection and supervision of employees
through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to
buttress the same with any other evidence, object or
documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased
nature of the testimony.
- It is procedurally required for each party in a case to
prove his own affirmative assertion by the degree of
prof. casis
evidence required by law. The party, whether plaintiff or
defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has
the burden of presenting at the trial such amount of
evidence required by law to obtain a favorable
judgment. It is entirely within each of the parties
discretion, consonant with the theory of the case it or he
seeks to advance and subject to such procedural strategy
followed thereby, to present all available evidence at its
or his disposal in the manner which may be deemed
necessary and beneficial to prove its or his position,
provided only that the same shall measure up to the
quantum of evidence required by law. In making proof
in its or his case, it is paramount that the best and most
complete evidence be formally entered.
- Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a
family has been observed by petitioner is a matter of
proof which under the circumstances in the case at bar
has not been clearly established. It is not felt by the
Court that there is enough evidence on record as would
overturn the presumption of negligence, and for failure
to submit all evidence within its control, assuming the
putative existence thereof, petitioner MMTC must
suffer the consequences of its own inaction and
indifference.
2. In any event, we do not find the evidence presented
by petitioner sufficiently convincing to prove the
diligence of a good father of a family, which for an
employer doctrinally translates into its observance of
due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees but which mandate, to use an oft-quoted
phrase, is more often honored in the breach than in the
observance.
- Petitioner attempted to essay in detail the company's
procedure for screening job applicants and supervising
its employees in the field, through the testimonies of
Milagros Garbo, as its training officer, and Christian
Bautista, as its transport supervisor, both of whom
naturally and expectedly testified for MMTC.
- Their statements strike us as both presumptuous and in
the nature of petitio principii, couched in generalities
and shorn of any supporting evidence to boost their
verity.
- The case at bar is clearly within the coverage of
Article 2176 and 2177, in relation to Article 2180, of
torts & damages

the Civil Code provisions on quasi-delicts as all the
elements thereof are present, to wit: (1) damages
suffered by the plaintiff, (2) fault or negligence of the
defendant or some other person for whose act he must
respond, and (3) the connection of cause and effect
between fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by plaintiff. It is to be noted that
petitioner was originally sued as employer of driver
Leonardo under Article 2180.
- Article 2180 applicable only where there is an
employer-employee relationship, although it is not
necessary that the employer be engaged in business or
industry. Employer is liable for torts committed by his
employees within the scope of their assigned tasks. But,
it is necessary first to establish the employment
relationship. Once this is done, the plaintiff must show,
to hold the employer liable, that the employee was
acting within the scope of his assigned task when the
tort complained of was committed. It is only then that
the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to
interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of employees. The diligence of a good
father of a family required to be observed by employers
to prevent damages under Article 2180 refers to due
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees
in order to protect the public.
- With the allegation and subsequent proof of
negligence against the defendant driver and of an
employer-employee relation between him and his codefendant MMTC in this instance, the case in
undoubtedly based on a quasi-delict under Article 2180.
When the employee causes damage due to his own
negligence while performing his own duties, there
arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is
negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the
diligence of a good father of a family. For failure to
rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the
selection and supervision of employees, the employer is
likewise responsible for damages, the basis of the
liability being the relationship of pater familias or on
the employer's own negligence.
- Due diligence in the supervision of employees
includes the formulation of suitable rules and
regulations for the guidance of employees and the
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- PAGE 77 -
prof. casis
issuance of proper instructions intended for the

protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his or its employees and
the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon
employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to
ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the
business of and beneficial to their employer.
- In order that the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees may be deemed
sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily
invoke the existence of said company guidelines and
policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of
the employee gives rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the
burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in
the selection of employees but also in the actual
supervision of their work.
- Finally, we believe that respondent court acted in the
exercise of sound discretion when it affirmed the trial
court's award, without requiring the payment of interest
thereon as an item of damages just because of delay in
the determination thereof, especially since private
respondent did not specifically pray therefor in her
complaint. Article 2211 of the Civil Code provides that
in quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages may
be awarded in the discretion of the court, and not as a
matter of right.
employees of Trans-Asia. The Kramers instituted a

Complaint for damages against the private respondent
before Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay
City. Trans-Asia filed a motion seeking the dismissal of
the Complaint on the ground of prescription. He argued
that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, the
prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for
damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime
collision is four years. He maintained that the
petitioners should have filed their Complaint within
four years from the date when their cause of action
accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime
collision took place, and that accordingly, the
Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond
the four-year prescriptive period.
Petitioners claim:
- that maritime collisions have peculiarities and
characteristics which only persons with special skill,
training and experience like the members of the Board
of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve
- that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled
by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of
action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date when
the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of
the M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and that the
four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the
Civil Code should be computed from the said date.
KRAMER VS CA (TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING

LINES)
178 SCRA 289
GANCAYCO; October 13, 1989
ISSUE
WON a Complaint for damages instituted by the
petitioners against the private respondent arising from a
marine collision is barred by presciption
FACTS
- The F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by Ernesto
Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way
from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near
Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured
in a collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia
Philippines owned byTrans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc.
As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea
sank, taking with it its fish catch.
- The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea
and its fish catch was due to the negligence of the
HELD
YES
- Under A1146 CC, an action based upon a quasidelict must be instituted within four (4) years. The
prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict
is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia, this Court ruled
that in an action for damages arising from the collision
of two (2) trucks, the action being based on a quasidelict, the four (4) year prescriptive period must be
counted from the day of the collision.
torts & damages

- In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans
Administration, this Court held: The right of action
accrues when there exists a cause of action, which
consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of
defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the
right of the plaintiff ... It is only when the last element
occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a
cause of action has arisen. From the foregoing ruling, it
is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted
when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the
time of the commission of an act or omission violative
of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the
cause of action arises. It is therefore clear that in this
action for damages arising from the collision of 2
vessels the 4 year prescriptive period must be counted
from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need
not wait for a determination by an administrative body
like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was
caused by the fault or negligence of the other party
before he can file an action for damages. Immediately
after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief
from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of
the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel.
Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the
action of petitioner has prescribed. The collision
occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages
was filed in court only on May 30, 1 985, was beyond
the 4 year prescriptive period.
Disposition petition is dismissed.
ALLIED BANKING V CA (YUJUICO)
178 SCRA 526
GANCAYCO; October 13, 1989
NATURE
Petition seeking the reversal of the decision of CA in
"Joselito Z. Yujuico vs. Hon. Domingo D. Panis, RTC
Judge of Manila and Allied Banking Corp.,"1 and the
resolution
denying
petitioner's
motion
for
reconsideration of the said decision.
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- PAGE 77 -
FACTS
- Mar 25, 1977 - Respondent Yujuico, a ranking officer
in General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) and
a member of the family owning control of the said
bank, obtained a loan from the said institution in the
amount of 500K. Private respondent issued a
promissory note in favor of GENBANK.
- March 25, 1977 the Monetary Board of the Central
Bank issued a resolution forbidding GENBANK from
doing business in the Phil. It was followed by another
resolution ordering the liquidation of GENBANK.
- In the Memorandum of Agreement between Allied
Banking Corp (Allied) and Amulfo Aurellano as
liquidator of GENBANK, Allied acquired all the assets
and assumed the liabilityies of GENBANK, including
the receivable due from Yujuico.
- Yujuico failed to comply with his obligation
prompting Allied to file a complaint for the
collection of a sum of money before the CFI
Manila (now RTC).
- First case: CA affirmed RTC decision in a
special
proceeding
finding
that
the
liquidation of GENBANK was made in bad
faith. This decision declared as null and
void the liquidation of GENBANK. It was
then that Yujuico filed the third party
complaint to transfer liability for the default
imputed against him by the petitioner to the
proposed third-party7 defendants because
of their tortious acts which prevented him
from performing his obligations.
- Second and current proceeding (1987) Yujuico filed
a motion to admit Ammended/Supplemental Answer
and a Third Party Complaint to impead the Central
Bank and Aurellano as third-party defendants. The
complaint alleged that by reason of the tortuous
interference by the CB with the affairs of GENBANK,
he was prevented from performing his obligation such
that he should not be held liable thereon. RTC Judge
Mintu denied the third-party complaint but admitted the
7
A third-party complaint is a procedural device whereby a "third-party" who is neither a party nor privy
to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the case with leave of court, by the
defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party defendant a right for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the plaintiffs claim. The third party
complaint is independent of, separate and distinct from the plaintiffs complaint.
prof. casis
amended/supplemental answer. The case was re-raffled
where presiding Judge Panis reiterated the order made
by Judge Mintu. Both parties filed for motions of partial
reconsideration, which were both denied.
- CA, in a petition for certiorari questioning the denied
motions, rendered a decision nullifying the RTC order.
The RTC judge was found to be in grave abuse of
discretion and was ordered to admit the third-party
complaint.
- Petitioner claims that the cause of action alleged in the
third-party complaint has already prescribed. Being
founded on what was termed as "tortious interference,"
petitioner asserts that under the CC on quasi-delict" the
action against third-party defendants should have been
filed within four (4) years from the date the cause of
action accrued. On the theory that the cause of action
accrued on March 25, 1977, the date when the
Monetary Board ordered GENBANK to desist from
doing business in the Philippines, petitioner maintains
that the claim should have been filed at the latest on
March 25, 1981. On the other hand, private respondent
relies on the "Doctrine of Relations" or "Relations Back
Doctrine" to support his claim that the cause of action
as against the proposed third-party defendant accrued
only on December 12,1986 when the decision in CA
(first case)became final and executory. It is contended
that while the third party complaint was filed only on
June 17,1987, it must be deemed to have been instituted
on February 7, 1979 when the complaint in the case was
filed.
ISSUE
1. WON there was ground to admit the third-party
complaint
2. WON the cause of action under the third-party
complaint prescribed
HELD
1. YES
- The first instance is allowable and should be allowed
if it will help in clarifying in a single proceeding the
multifarious issues involved arising from a single
transaction.
torts & damages

- The judgment of the CA in its first decision is the
substantive basis of private respondent's proposed thirdparty complaint. There is merit in private respondent's
position that if held liable on the promissory note, they
are seeking, by means of the third-party complaint, to
transfer unto the third-party defendants liability on the
note by reason of the illegal liquidation of GENBANK
which was the basis for the assignment of the
promissory note. If there was any confusion at all on the
ground/s alleged in the third-party complaint, it was the
claim of third-party plaintiff for other damages in
addition to any amount which he may be called upon to
pay under the original complaint. While these
allegations in the proposed third-party complaint may
cause delay in the disposition of the main suit, it cannot
be outrightly asserted that it would not serve any
purpose.
- The tests to determine whether the claim for indemnity
in a third-party claim is "in respect of plaintiff 's claim"
are: (a) whether it arises out of the same transaction on
which the plaintiff's claim is based, or whether the
third-party's claim, although arising out of another or
different contract or transaction, is connected with the
plaintiffs claim; (b) whether the third-party defendant
would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant for all
or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original
defendant, although the third-party defendant's liability
arises out of another transaction; or (c) whether the
third-party defendant may assert any defense which the
third-party plaintiff has, or may have against plaintiffs
claim. (Capayas v CFI Albay)
The claim of third-party plaintiff, private respondent
herein, can be accommodated under tests (a) and (b)
abovementioned.
2. YES
- The action for damages instituted by private
respondent arising from the quasidelict or alleged
"tortious interference" should be filed within four 4
years from the day the cause of action accrued.
- It is from the date of the act or omission violative of
the right of a party when the cause of action arises and
it is from this date that the prescriptive period must be
reckoned. (Espaol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans
Admistration)
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- PAGE 77 -
- While the third party complaint in this case may be

admitted as above discussed, since the cause of action
accrued on March 25, 1980 when the Monetary Board
ordered the GENBANK to desist from doing business
in the Philippines while the third party complaint was
filed only on June 17, 1987, consequently, the action
has prescribed. The third party complaint should not be
admitted.
Disposition petition is GRANTED. The decision of
CA denying the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner are hereby reversed and set aside and
declared null and void, and another judgment is hereby
rendered sustaining the orders of the RTC denying the
admission of the third party complaint
CAUSATION
BATACLAN V MEDINA
102 PHIL 181
MONTEMAYOR; October 22, 1957
FACTS
- Juan Bataclan rode Bus No. 30 of the Medina
Transportation, driven by Saylon, shortly after
midnight. While the bus was running very fast on a
highway, one of the front tires burst. The bus fell into a
canal and turned turtle. Four passengers could not get
out, including Bataclan. It appeared that gasoline began
to leak from the overturned bus. Ten men came to help.
One of them carried a torch and when he approached
the bus, a fierce fire started, burning the four passengers
trapped inside.
- The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate
cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning
of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus,
including himself and his co-passengers who were
unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started,
Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical
injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages
were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical
injuries suffered by him.
ISSUES
prof. casis
What is the proximate cause of death of the four
passengers?
HELD
The proximate cause of death is the overturning of the
bus.
- see definition of proximate cause under A1
- It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus
overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing
him physical injuries, "If through some event,
unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set
on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after
looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is
burned to death, one might still contend that the
proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the
overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case and
under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do
not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the
death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this
for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on
'Its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the
gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected;
that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in
response to the call for help, made not only by the
passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark
(about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a
light with them; and coming as they did from a rural
area where lanterns and flashlights were not available,
they had to use a torch, the most handy and available;
and what was more natural than that said rescuers
should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to
extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from
them. In other words, the coming of the men with the
torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of
the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help. What is more,
the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to
the negligence of the carrier, through its driver and its
conductor. According to the witnesses, the driver and
the conductor were on the road walking back and forth.
They, or at least, the driver should and must have
known that in the position in which the overturned bus
was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the
torts & damages

gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus,
this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled,
specially over a large area, can be smelt and detected
-even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the
conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken
steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch
too near the bus.
-(I guess this case says, if not for the overturning of the
bus then the leak and the fire wouldnt have
happened)
FERNANDO V CA (City of Davao)
208 SCRA 714
MEDIALDEA; May 8, 1992
NATURE
FACTS
- Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public
Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of
Property for the re-emptying of the septic tank of
Agdao. Invitations to bid for cleaning out the tanks
were issued, which was won by Bascon. However,
before the date they were to work, one of the bidders,
Bertulano, and four other companions including an
Alberto Fernando were found dead inside the septic
tank. The City Engineers office, upon investigation,
found that the men entered without clearance or consent
of the market master. They apparently did the reemptying as the tank was nearly empty. The autopsy
showed that the victims died of asphyxia caused by lack
of oxygen supply in the body. Their lungs had burst due
to their intake of toxic sulfide gas produced from the
waste matter in said tank.
*Di nakalagay sa case, pero mukhang kinasuhan ni
Sofia Fernando yung Davao City for negligence in a
previous case dahil namatay yung asawa nya
- Upon dismissal of the case by the TC, petitioners
appealed to then IAC (now CA) which set aside the
judgment and rendered a new one, granting the families
of the deceased men P30k each in compensatory
damages, P20k each as moral damages and P10k for
attorneys fees.
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- PAGE 77 -
- Both parties filed their separate MFRs; the CA

rendered an amended decision granting Davao Citys
MFR, dismissing the case. Hence this petition.
ISSUES
1. WON Davao City is guilty of negligence
2. WON such negligence is the proximate cause of the
deaths of the victims
HELD
1. NO
- Although public respondent had been remiss in its
duty to re-empty the tank annually (for almost 20
years), such negligence was not a continuing one. Upon
learning from the market master about the need to clean
said tank, it immediately responded by issuing
invitations to bid for such service. Public respondent
lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the
situation. Also, public respondents failure to empty the
tank had not caused any sanitary accidents despite its
proximity to several homes and the public market as it
was covered in lead and was air-tight. In fact, the public
toilet connected to it was used several times daily all
those years, and all those people have remained
unscathed which is ironically evidenced by the
petitioners witnesses. The only indication that the tank
was full was when water began to leak, and even then
no reports of casualties from gas poising emerged.
- Petitioners in fussing over the lack of ventilation in the
tanks backfired as their witnesses were no experts.
Neither did they present competent evidence to
corroborate their testimonies and rebut the city
government engineer Alindadas testimony that safety
requirements for the tank had been complied with.
- The Court also does not agree with petitioners
contention that warning signs of noxious gas should be
placed around the area of the toilets and septic tank. As
defined in Art 694 of the NCC, they are not nuisances
per se which would necessitate warning signs for the
protection of the public.
- Petitioners contention that the market master should
have been supervising the area of the tank is also
untenable. Work on the tank was still forthcoming since
the awarding to the winning bidder was yet to be made
prof. casis
by the Committee on Awardshence, there was
nothing to supervise.
2. NO
- Proximate cause is defined as that cause which in
natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. To
be entitled to damages, one must prove under Art 2179
of the NCC that the defendants negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury. A test for such a
relationship is given in Taylor v Manila Electric
Railroad and Light Co. which states that a distinction
must be made between the accident and the injury,
between the event itself, without which there could
have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not
entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his
own proper hurt.
- A toxic gas leakage could only have happened by
opening the tanks cover. The accident is thus of the
victims own doingan ordinarily prudent person
should be aware of the attended risks of cleaning out the
tank. This was especially true for the victim, Bertulano,
since he was an old hand to septic services and is
expected to know the hazards of the job. The victims
failure to take precautionary measures for their safety
was the proximate cause of the accident.
- When a person holds himself out as being competent
to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held
liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and
skill required in what he attempts to do. As the CA
observed, the victims would not have died, had they not
opened the tank which they were not authorized to open
in the first place. They find it illogical that the septic
tank which had been around since the 50s would be the
proximate cause of an accident which occurred only 20
years later, especially since no other deaths or injuries
related to the tank had ever occurred.
Disposition
amended decision of the CA is
AFFIRMED
URBANO V IAC
157 SCRA 1
GUTIERREZ JR; January 7, 1988
torts & damages

NATURE
Petition to review the decision of the then IAC
FACTS
ON oct. 23, 1980, Marcelo Javier was hacked by the
Filomeno Urbano using a bolo. As a result of which,
Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right
palm.
On November 14, 1981, which was the 22nd day after
the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very
serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier
had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo
Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that
the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus
toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in
Javier's palm which could have been infected by
tetanus. On November 15, 1980, Javier died in the
hospital.
- In an information, Urbano was charged with the
crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal
Court of Dagupan City.
- The trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. The
lower courts held that Javier's death was the natural and
logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. He was
sentenced accordingly.
- The then IAC affirmed the conviction of Urbano on
appeal.
- Appellant alleges that the proximate cause of the
victim's death was due to his own negligence in going
back to work without his wound being properly healed,
and that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals
in the first week of November, 1980. He states that the
proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due
to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no
tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with
tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm
and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands
exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus
germs.
ISSUE
WON there was an efficient intervening cause from the
time Javier was wounded until his death which would
exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death
HELD
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- PAGE 77 -
YES.
- The case involves the application of Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal
liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended ..."
Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally
responsible for acts committed by him in violation of
law and for all the natural and logical consequences
resulting therefrom."
- The record is clear that - The evidence on record
does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by
Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the
infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms
that the wound, which was already healing at the time
Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment,
somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to
when the wound was infected is not clear from the
record.
- PROXIMATE CAUSE "that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately
or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor,
the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom."
- The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time
between injury and the appearance of unmistakable
symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80
percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days.
A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and
when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the
mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
prof. casis
- Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as
restlessness, irritability, and headache are encountered
occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints
are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and
difficulty swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives
way to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty
opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest
manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the
familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles
are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and
sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The
intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite
variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local
signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury.
In the vast majority, however, most muscles are
involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms
encountered depend upon the major muscle groups
affected.
- Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of
the first symptom, an interval referred to as the onset
time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short
onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms
are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli
arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and
causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of
muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both
painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses,
minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and
longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency.
Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic
contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent
adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to
irreversible central nervous system damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period
of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6
days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is
absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild.
Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter
incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked,
dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but
ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The
criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation
time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe
trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged,
torts & damages

generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of
Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005;
Emphasis supplied)
- Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus
found inside a man's body depends on the incubation
period of the disease.
- In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised
wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo
which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took
place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on
November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of
tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following
day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the
appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the
time, it is more medically probable that Javier should
have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus
because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd
day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days
after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset
time should have been more than six days. Javier,
however, died on the second day from the onset time.
The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's
wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of
tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected
with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the
circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound
could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but
not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the
direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the
accused caused the victim's death must convince a
rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that
the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
- Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the
wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent
infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with
A2010
- PAGE 77 -
tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's

death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
- A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an
action if such remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the instances
which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause
DISPOSITION :. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of
the crime of homicide.
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. (CARBONEL)
VS. IAC (DIONISIO)
148 SCRA 353
FELICIANO, MARCH 10, 1987
NATURE
Petition for review
FACTS
-About 1:30 am, Leonardo Dionisio (DIONISIO) was
driving home (he lived in Bangkal, Makati) from
cocktails/dinner meeting with his boss where he had
taken a shot or two of liquor. He had just crossed the
intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Sts.
At Bangkal, Makati (not far from his home) and was
proceeding down General Lacuna Street without
headlights when he hit a dump truck owned by Phoenix
Construction Inc. (PHOENIX), which was parked on
the right hand side of General Lacuna Street
(DIONISIOs lane). The dump truck was parked askew
in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly
blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no
lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector
devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear.
prof. casis
The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven
home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel
(CARBONEL), its regular driver, with the permission
of his employer PHOENIX, in view of work scheduled
to be carried out early the following morning,
DIONISIO claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by
swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his
car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the
collision, DIONISIO suffered some physical injuries
including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous
breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
DIONISIOs claim: the legal and proximate cause of his
injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel
had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his
employer Phoenix
PHOENIX + CARBONELs claim: the proximate cause
of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in
driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the
influence of liquor, without his headlights on and
without a curfew pass; if there was negligence in the
manner in which the dump truck was parked, that
negligence was merely a "passive and static condition"
and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness
constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative
of the accident and the injuries he sustained.
TC: in favor of Dionisio, awarded damages in favor of
Dionisio
IAC: in favor of Dionisio, reduced the damages
awarded
ISSUES
Factual issues: (court discussed this to administer
substantial justice without remanding the case to the
lower court since both TC and IAC did not consider
defenses set by petitioners)
1. WON private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass
valid and effective for that eventful night
2. WON Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just
before the collision with the dump truck;
3. WON Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's
headlights before contact with the dump truck
4. WON Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the
accident.
Substantial Issues:
torts & damages

5. WON the legal and proximate cause of the accident
and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent
manner in which the dump truck was parked
a. WON the drivers negligence was merely a "passive
and static condition" and that Dionisio's negligence
was an "efficient intervening cause," and that
consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded
as the legal and proximate cause of the accident
rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel
b. WON the court, based on the last clear chance
doctrine, should hold Dionisio alone responsible for
his accident
6. WON Phoenix has successfully proven that they
exercised due care in the selection and supervision of
the dump truck driver
7. WON the amount of damages awarded should be
modified
HELD
FACTUAL
1. NO. none was found with Dionisio. He was not able
to produce any curfew pass during the trial. (It is
important to determine if he had a curfew pass to shed
light to the 2nd and 3rd factual issues)
-Testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who had taken
DIONISIO to Makati Med testified that none was found
with Dionisio. Although Dionisio offered a certification
attesting that he did have a valid curfew pass, the
certification did not specify any serial number or date or
period of effectivity of the supposed curfew pass.
2. YES. Testimony of Patrolman Cuyno attesting that
people gathered at the scene of the accident told him
that Dionisios Car was MOVING FAST and that he
DID NOT have its HEADLIGTS ON.
Ratio. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno is admissible
not under the official records exception to the hearsay
rule but rather as part of the res gestae. Testimonial
evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule
consists of excited utterances made on the occasion of
an occurrence or event sufficiently startling in nature so
as to render inoperative the normal reflective thought
processes of the observer and hence made as a
spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event, and not
the result of reflective thought.
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- PAGE 77 -
-Dionisio claimed that he was traveling at 30kph and

had just crossed the intersection of General Santos and
General Lacuna Streets and had started to accelerate
when his headlights failed just before the collision took
place. He also asserts that Patrolman Cuynos testimony
was hearsay and did not fall within any of the
recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule since the facts
he testified to were not acquired by him through official
information and had not been given by the informants
pursuant to any duty to do so.
-BUT: an automobile speeding down a street and
suddenly smashing into a stationary object in the dead
of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke
spontaneous, rather than reflective, reactions from
observers who happened to be around at that time. The
testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible
as part of the res gestae and should have been
considered by the trial court. Clearly, substantial weight
should have been ascribed to such testimony, even
though it did not, as it could not, have purported to
describe quantitatively the precise velocity at which
Dionisio was travelling just before impact with the
Phoenix dump truck.
3. YES. Phoenixs theory more credible than Dionisios.
DIONISIO S CLAIM: he had his headlights on but that,
at the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if
convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although
he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright"
split seconds before contact with the dump truck
PHOENIXs CLAIM: Dionisio purposely shut off his
headlights even before he reached the intersection so as
not to be detected by the police in the police precinct
which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far
away from the intersection (less than 200m away).
4. NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE
ANYTHING.
EVIDENCE PRESENTED: Patrolman Cuyno attested
that Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken
to Makati med + Dionisio admitted he had taken a shot
or two
- not enough evidence to show how much liquor
Dionisio had in fact taken and the effects of that upon
his physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental
prof. casis
alertness. "One shot or two" of hard liquor may affect
different people differently.
SUBSTANTIAL
5. YES. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump
track was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the
truck driver's negligence. Private respondent Dionisio's
negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate
and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck
driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such
damages are subject to mitigation by the courts
a. NO. Besides, this argument had no validity under our
jurisdiction and even in the United States, the
distinctions between" cause" and "condition" have
already been "almost entirely discredited.
- the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive
and static condition" was rather an indispensable and
efficient cause; Dionisio's negligence, although later in
point of time than the truck driver's negligence and
therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient
intervening or independent cause. The petitioner
truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio
and others similarly situated not to impose upon them
the very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's
negligence was not of an independent and
overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of
causation in fact between the improper parking of the
dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris
vinculum of liability.
FROM PROF. PROSSER AND KEETON: "Cause and
condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish
between the active "cause" of the harm and the
existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated
If the defendant has created only a passive static
condition which made the damage possible, the
defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact
of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary
antecedents which have played an important part in
producing the result, it is quite impossible to distinguish
between active forces and passive situations,
particularly since, as is invariably the case the latter
am the result of other active forces which have gone
before. The defendant who spills gasoline about the
torts & damages

premises creates a "condition," but the act may be
culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark
ignites the gasoline, the condition has done quite as
much to bring about the fire as the spark; and since that
is the very risk which the defendant has created, the
defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse
of a considerable time during which the "condition"
remains static will not necessarily affect liability; one
who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to
another who falls into it a month afterward. "Cause"
and "condition" still find occasional mention in the
decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely
discredited So far as it has any validity at all, it must
refer to the type of case where the forces set in
operation by the defendant have come to rest in a
position of apparent safety. and some new force
intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the
distinction between "cause" and "condition" which
is important, but the nature of the risk and the
character of the intervening cause."
"Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening
cause is one which in ordinary human experience is
reasonably to be anticipated, or one which the
defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular
circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among
other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or
the defendant may be negligent only for that reason
Thus one who sets a fire may be required to foresee that
an ordinary, usual and customary wind arising later will
spread it beyond the defendant's own property, and
therefore to take precautions to prevent that event. The
person who leaves the combustible or explosive
material exposed in a public place may foresee the risk
of fire from some independent source. x x x In all of
these cases there is an intervening cause combining
with the defendant's conduct to produce the result and
in each case the defendant's negligence consists in
failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk.
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from
liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and
important part of the risk, to which the defendant has
subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass.
Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of
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- PAGE 77 -
the original risk, and hence of the defendant's

negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that
intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will
not supersede the defendant's responsibility.
Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required
to anticipate the usual weather of the vicinity, including
all ordinary forces of nature such as usual wind or rain,
or snow or frost or fog or even lightning; that one who
leaves an obstruction on the road or a railroad track
should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it; x
x x.
The risk created by the defendant may include the
intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others. x x
x [T]he standard of reasonable conduct may require
the defendant to protect the plaintiff against 'that
occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary
incidents of human life, and therefore to be
anticipated.' Thus, a defendant who blocks the
sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street
where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy
traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by
a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and one
who parks an automobile on the highway without lights
at night is not relieved of responsibility when another
negligently drives into it - - "
b. NO. The last clear chance doctrine of the common
law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs.
Smith but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what
extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role,
if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has
to play in a jurisdiction where the common law
concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar
to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as
it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
-The relative location in the continuum of time of the
plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or
omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may
be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance
are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each
party and the character and gravity of the risks created
by such act or omission for the rest of the community.
prof. casis
ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE: The
historical function of that doctrine in the common law
was to mitigate the harshness of another common law
doctrine or rule-that of contributory negligence. The
common law rule of contributory negligence prevented
any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also
negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was
relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant. The common law notion of
last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a
plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty
and failed to do so.
6. NO. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its
track driver to bring the dump truck to his home
whenever there was work to be done early the following
morning, when coupled with the failure to show any
effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in
which the dump truck is parked when away from
company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa
in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.
7. YES. Taking into account the comparative
negligence ot DIONISIO and the petitioners, the
demands of substantial justice are satisfied by
allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. As
to the other awards of damages, sustain.
20% of the damages awarded by the respondent
appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees
and costs, shall be home by private respondent
Dionisio; only the balance of 800% needs to be paid by
petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be
solidarily liable therefor to the former. The award of
exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs
shall be home exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix
is of course entitled to reimbursement from
Carbonel.
Disposition. WHEREFORE, the decision of the
respondent appellate court is modified by reducing the
aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of
expected income and moral damages private respondent
torts & damages

Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
PILIPINAS BANK V CA (REYES)
234 SCRA 435
PUNO; July 25, 1994
NATURE
- Petition for review of CA decision
FACTS
- FLORENCIO REYES issued two postdated checks.
These are for WINNER INDUSTRIAL CORP. in
amount of P21T due Oct.10, 1979 and for Vicente TUI
in amount of P11.4T due Oct.12.
- To cover the face value of the checks, he requested
PCIB Money Shop's manager to effect the withdrawal
of P32T from his savings account and have it deposited
with his current account with PILIPINAS BANK.
- PILIPINAS BANKS Current Account Bookkeeper
made an error in depositing the amount: he thought it
was for a certain FLORENCIO AMADOR. He, thus,
posted the deposit in the latter's account not noticing
that the depositor's surname in the deposit slip was
REYES.
- On Oct.11, the Oct.10 check in favor of WINNER
INDUSTRIAL was presented for payment. Since the
ledger of Florencio REYES indicated that his account
had only a balance of P4,078.43, it was dishonored and
the payee was advised to try it for next clearing.
- It was redeposited but was again dishonored. The
same thing happened to the Oct.12 check. The payee
then demanded a cash payment of the checks face
value which REYES did if only to save his name.
- Furious, he immediately proceeded to the bank and
urged an immediate verification of his account. That
was only when they noticed the error.
RTC: ordered petitioner to pay P200T compensatory
damages, P100T moral damages, P25T attorneys fees,
as well as costs of suit.
CA: modified amount to just P50T moral damages and
P25T attorneys fees and costs of suit.
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ISSUE
WON Art.21798 of NCC is applicable
HELD
NO
- For it to apply, it must be established that private
respondent's own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury.
Definition of Proximate Cause: "any cause which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the result
complained of and without which would not have
occurred and from which it ought to have been foreseen
or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case
that the injury complained of or some similar injury,
would result therefrom as a natural and probable
consequence."
Reasoning The proximate cause of the injury is the
negligence of petitioner's employee in erroneously
posting the cash deposit of private respondent in the
name of another depositor who had a similar first
name.
- The bank employee is deemed to have failed to
exercise the degree of care required in the performance
of his duties.
Dispositive Petition denied.
QUEZON CITY V DACARA
PANGANIBAN; JUNE 15, 2005
NATURE
Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
-On February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M., Fulgencio
Dacara, Jr., owner of 87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan,
while driving the said vehicle, rammed into a pile of
earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon
City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City
government.
8
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,
he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
prof. casis
-As a result, Dacara, Jr. allegedly sustained bodily
injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it
turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.
-Indemnification was sought from the city government,
which however, yielded negative results.
-Fulgencio P. Dacara, for and in behalf of his minor son,
filed a Complaint for damages against Quezon City and
Engr. Ramir Tiamzon.
-Defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident but
alleged that the subject diggings was provided with a
mound of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic
paint with sticks placed before or after it which was
visible during the incident.
-In short, defendants claimed that they exercised due
care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary
measures to avoid accident, and that the reason why
Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings was
precisely because of the latters negligence and failure
to exercise due care.
-RTC ruled in favor of Dacara, ordering the defendants
to indemnify the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand
pesos as actual/compensatory damages, P10,000.00 as
moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P10,000.00 as attorneys fees and other costs of suit.
-Upon appeal, CA agreed with the RTCs finding that
petitioners negligence was the proximate cause of the
damage suffered by respondent.
-Hence, this Petition
ISSUES
1. WON petitioners negligence is the
proximate cause of the incident
2. WON moral damages are recoverable
3. WON exemplary damages and attorneys
fees are recoverable
HELD
1. Yes.
-Proximate cause is defined as any cause that
produces injury in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, such that the result would not have occurred
otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the
torts & damages

facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of
logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
-What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is a
factual issue that this Court cannot pass upon, absent
any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment by
the lower courts or an ample showing that they lacked
any basis for their conclusions.
-The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their
factual ascertainment that petitioners negligence was
the proximate cause of the accident bars us from
supplanting their findings and substituting these with
our own.
-That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate
cause of the accident was aptly discussed in the lower
courts finding:
Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the
accident of February 28, 1988 which caused almost the
life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his car
turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth from a
digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik
Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade
or sign perhaps which could have served as an adequate
warning to motorists especially during the thick of the
night where darkness is pervasive. Contrary to the
testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there
were signs, gasera which was buried so that its light
could not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none
was ever presented to stress the point that sufficient and
adequate precautionary signs were placed. If indeed
signs were placed thereat, how then could it be
explained that according to the report even of the
policeman, none was found at the scene of the accident.
-The provisions of Article 21899 of the New Civil
Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city
government relative to the maintenance of roads and
bridges since it exercises the control and supervision
over the same. Failure of the defendant to comply with
the statutory provision is tantamount to negligence
which renders the City government liable
-Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. was
driving at the speed of 60 kilometers per hour (kph)
when he met the accident. This speed was allegedly
9
. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered
by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other public works under their control or supervision.
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- PAGE 77 -
well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on

city streets with light traffic, as provided under the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code Thus, petitioners
assert that Fulgencio Jr., having violated a traffic
regulation, should be presumed negligent pursuant to
-These matters were, however, not raised by petitioners
at any time during the trial. It is evident from the
records that they brought up for the first time in their
Motion for Reconsideration.
-It is too late in the day for them to raise this new issue.
To consider their belatedly raised arguments at this
stage of the proceedings would trample on the basic
principles of fair play, justice, and due process.
-Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts findings,
which are amply substantiated by the evidence on
record, clearly point to petitioners negligence as the
proximate cause of the damages suffered by
respondents car. No adequate reason has been given to
overturn this factual conclusion.
2. No.
-To award moral damages, a court must be satisfied
with proof of the following requisites: (1) an injury-whether physical, mental, or psychological--clearly
sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act or omission
factually established; (3) a wrongful act or omission of
the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury
sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages
predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219.
-Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to
be recovered for quasi-delicts, provided that the act or
omission caused physical injuries. There can be no
recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-delict
resulted in physical injury.
-In the present case, the Complaint alleged that
respondents son Fulgencio Jr. sustained physical
injuries.
-It is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the
appellate courts, however, that no other evidence (such
as a medical certificate or proof of medical expenses)
was presented to prove Fulgencio Jr.s bare assertion of
physical injury. Thus, there was no credible proof that
would justify an award of moral damages based on
Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code.
prof. casis
-Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are
designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury
unjustly inflicted on a person.
-Well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be
awarded in the absence of proof of physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, or similar injury. The award of moral
damages must be solidly anchored on a definite
showing that respondent actually experienced
emotional and mental sufferings.
3. Yes.
-Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of
right; they can be awarded only after claimants have
shown their entitlement to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages.
-In the case before us, respondent sufficiently proved
before the courts a quo that petitioners negligence was
the proximate cause of the incident, thereby establishing
his right to actual or compensatory damages. He has
adduced adequate proof to justify his claim for the
damages caused his car.
-Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases
of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be recovered
if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
-Gross negligence means such utter want of care as to
raise a presumption that the persons at fault must have
been conscious of the probable consequences of their
carelessness, and that they must have nevertheless been
indifferent (or worse) to the danger of injury to the
person or property of others. The negligence must
amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of persons
or property.
-Such a circumstance obtains in the instant case.
-The facts of the case show a complete disregard by
petitioners of any adverse consequence of their failure
to install even a single warning device at the area under
renovation.
-Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary
damages may be imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good. The award of these
torts & damages

damages is meant to be a deterrent to socially
deleterious actions.
Dispositive
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with
the modification that the award of moral damages is
deleted.
GABETO V. ARANETA
42 Phil 252. October 17, 1921 Street
Facts:
Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a
carromata near Plaza Gay, in the City of Iloilo, with a
view to going to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma in the
same City. When the driver of the carromata had turned
his horse and started in the direction indicated, the
defendant, Agaton Araneta, stepped out into the street,
and laying his hands on the reins, stopped the horse, at
the same time protesting to the driver that he himself
had called this carromata first. The driver, one Julio
Pagnaya, replied to the effect that he had not heard or
seen the call of Araneta, and that he had taken up the
two passengers then in the carromata as the first who
had offered employment. At or about the same time
Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the
horse from the control of Agaton Araneta, in order that
the vehicle might pass on. Owing, however, to the
looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the
rottenness of the material of which it was made, the bit
came out of the horse's mouth; and it became necessary
for the driver to get out, which he did, in order to fix the
bridle. The horse was then pulled over to near the curb,
by one or the other it makes no difference which
and Pagnaya tried to fix the bridle.
While he was thus engaged, the horse, being
free from the control of the bit, became disturbed and
moved forward, in doing which he pulled one of the
wheels of the carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed
Julio Pagnaya over. After going a few yards further the
side of the carromata struck a police telephone box
which was fixed to a post on the sidewalk, upon which
the box came down with a crash and frightened the
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prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
horse to such an extent that he set out at full speed up

the street.
Meanwhile one of the passengers, to wit.
Basilio Ilano, had alighted while the carromata was as
yet alongside the sidewalk; but the other, Proceso
Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and after
the runaway horse had proceeded up the street to a point
in front of the Mission Hospital, the said Gayetano
jumped or fell from the rig, and in so doing received
injuries from which he soon died.
This action was brought by Consolacion
Gabeto, in her own right as widow of Proceso
Gayetano, and as guardian ad litem of the three
children, Conchita Gayetano, Rosita Gayetano, and
Fermin Gayetano, for the purpose of recovering
damages incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the death
of the said Proceso Gayetano, supposedly caused by the
wrongful act of the defendant Agaton Araneta.
Judge awarded damages to the widow to which
decision Araneta appealed.
Issue: WON the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta
in the middle of the street was too remote from the
accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal
or proximate cause thereof
Held: NO. The evidence indicates that the bridle was
old, and the leather of which it was made was probably
so weak as to be easily broken. it was Julio who jerked
the rein, thereby causing the bit to come out of the
horse's mouth; and Julio, after alighting, led the horse
over to the curb, and proceeded to fix the bridle; and
that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off,
when the horse, feeling himself free from control,
started to go away.
Disposition: Judgment is REVERSED.
URBANO
V
IAC
(PEOPLE
PHILIPPINES)
157 SCRA 1
GUTIERREZ; January 7, 1988
OF
THE
Nature : This is a petition to review the decision of the

then Intermediate Appellate Court
Facts:When Filomeno Urbano found the place where
he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the
irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed he went
to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier
admitted that he was the one responsible for what
happened. Urbano then got angry and demanded that
Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them
ensued. Urbano hacked Javier hitting him on the right
palm of his hand . Javier who was then unarmed ran
away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who
hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the
back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said
leg.
On November 14,1980, Javier was rushed to the
Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition.
Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr.
Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier
found that the latter's serious condition was caused by
tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing
wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected
by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 Javier died in the hospital.
Appellants claim:
-there was an efficient cause which supervened from the
time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death
-the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to
his own negligence in going back to work without his
wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went to
catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of
November, 1980
- Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks
he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants
with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful
elements like tetanus germs.
ISSUE:
WON there was an efficient intervening cause from the
time Javier was wounded until his death which would
exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death
HELD:
torts & damages

Yes. The medical findings lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus
was an efficient intervening cause later or between the
time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the
crime.
Reasoning:
-The case involves the application of Article 4 10 of the
Revised Penal Code.
-The evidence on record does not clearly show that the
wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at
the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence
merely confirms that the wound, which was already
healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the
fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus
However, as to when the wound was infected is not
clear from the record.
-In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181),
we adopted the following definition of proximate cause:
"x x x A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is
found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American
Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffsappellants in their
brief. It is as follows:
"x x x 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by setting other events
in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom.' (at pp. 185186)
10
Art. 4. Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended x x x." Pursuant to this provision "an
accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting therefrom
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- PAGE 77 -
-The court looked into the nature of tetanus to

determine the cause
-Medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found
inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of
the disease.
- Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right
palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in
hacking him. This incident took place on October 23,
1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he
suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and
muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980,
he died.
If,therefore,the wound of Javier inflicted by the
appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the
time, it is more medically probable that Javier should
have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus
because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd
day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days
after the infliction of the wound.
-Therefore, the onset time should have been more than
six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from
the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at
the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant,
the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet
present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been
infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's
death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2
or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The
medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility that the
infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the
direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas,
supra)
As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remaquillo, et al.
(99 Phil. 118).
"'A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of
an action if such remote cause did nothing more than
prof. casis
defective condition sets into operation the
circumstances, which result in injury because of the
prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause. '(45 C.J. pp. 931932)." (at p. 125)
FAR EAST SHIPPING CO V CA (PPA)
297 SCRA 30
REGALADO; October 1, 1998
NATURE
Review on certiorari the CA decision affirming TC
decision holding FESC and Gavino solidarily liable
FACTS
- On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under
the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated by the
Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the
Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at
about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. The vessel was
assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its
berthing space. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by
the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing
of the vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by
the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) to
conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the
vessel to Berth No. 4.
- Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage
and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of
the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a
briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of
the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from
the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila
International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was
ideal for docking maneuvers.
- When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church
by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier,
torts & damages

Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel
was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino
ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the
orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left
anchor, with 2 shackles, were dropped. However, the
anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the
vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between
the crew members. A brief conference ensued between
Kavankov and the crew members. When Gavino
inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov
assured Gavino that there was nothing to it.
- After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold,
he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was
then on the pier apron noticed that the vessel was
approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed
that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter
gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and
additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the
vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing
considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained
damage too. Kavankov filed his sea protest. Gavino
submitted his report to the Chief Pilot who referred the
report to the Philippine Ports Authority. Abellana
likewise submitted his report of the incident.
- The rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the
Philippine Ports Authority the
amount
of
P1,126,132.25.
PERTINENT RULES on PILOTAGE
- The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage
District which is under compulsory pilotage pursuant to
Section 8, Article III of Philippine Ports Authority
Administrative Order No. 03-85:
SEC. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service. For
entering a harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing
through rivers or straits within a pilotage district, as
well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or
shifting from one berth or another, every vessel
engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under
compulsory pilotage.
- In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties
and responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the
master have been specified by the same regulation:
SEC. 11. Control of vessels and liability for
damage. On compulsory pilotage grounds, the
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Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be

responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to
life and property at ports due to his negligence or
fault. He can only be absolved from liability if the
accident is caused by force majeure or natural
calamities provided he has exercised prudence and
extra diligence to prevent or minimize damage.
The Master shall retain overall command of the
vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can
countermand or overrule the order or command of the
Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any damage
caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by
reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall
be the responsibility and liability of the registered
owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to
recourse against said Master
Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel
or its pilots shall be determined by competent
authority in appropriate proceedings in the light of
the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
SEC. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or
Pilots' Association. The duties and responsibilities
of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows:
xxx
xxx
xxx
f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction
of a vessel from the time he assumes his work as a
pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed
safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility
shall cease at the moment the Master neglects or
refuses to carry out his order.
- Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued
twenty years earlier likewise provided in Chapter I
thereof for the responsibilities of pilots:
Par. XXXIX. A Pilot shall be held responsible
for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes
control thereof until he leaves it anchored free from
shoal; Provided, That his responsibility shall cease at
the moment the master neglects or refuses to carry
out his instructions.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Par. XLIV. Pilots shall properly and safely
secure or anchor vessels under their control when
requested to do so by the master of such vessels.
prof. casis
ISSUE
WON both the pilot and the master were negligent
HELD
YES.
- The SC started by saying that in a collision between a
stationary object and a moving object, there is a
presumption of fault against the moving object (based
on common sense and logic). It then went on to
determine who between the pilot and the master was
negligent.
PILOT
- A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified,
and licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or
in certain waters. He is an expert whos supposed to
know the seabed, etc. that a master of a ship may not
know because the pilot is familiar with the port. He is
charged to perform his duties with extraordinary care
because the safety of people and property on the vessel
and on the dock are at stake.
- Capt. Gavino was found to be negligent. The court
found that his reaction time (4 minutes) to the anchor
not holding ground and the vessel still going too fast
was too slow. As an expert he shouldve been reacting
quickly to any such happenings.
MASTER
- In compulsory pilotage, the pilot momentarily
becomes the master of the vessel. The master, however
may intervene or countermand the pilot if he deems
there is danger to the vessel because of the
incompetence of the pilot or if the pilot is drunk.
- Based on Capt. Kavankovs testimony, he never
sensed the any danger even when the anchor didnt hold
and they were approaching the dock too fast. He blindly
trusted the pilot. This is negligence on his part. He was
right beside the pilot during the docking, so he could
see and hear everything that the pilot was seeing and
hearing.
- The masters negligence translates to unseaworthiness
of the vessel, and in turn means negligence on the part
of FESC.
CONCURRENT TORTFEASORS
- As a general rule, that negligence in order to render a
person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It
torts & damages

is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or
more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the
proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where
several causes combine to produce injuries, person is
not relieved from liability because he is responsible for
only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence
of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have resulted to as
great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to
the person injured. It is no defense to one of the
concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have
resulted from his negligence alone, without the
negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent
tortfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury are
concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which
the injury would not have happened, the injury may be
attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may
be had against any or all of the responsible persons
although under the circumstances of the case, it may
appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the
duty owed by them to the injured person was not the
same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate
cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence
of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the
entire result and is liable as though his acts were the
sole cause of the injury.
- There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors
whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable
for the total damage. Where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more
persons, although acting independently, are in
combination the direct and proximate cause of a single
injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in
what proportion each contributed to the injury and
either of them is responsible for the whole injury.
Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or
damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors
and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under
Disposition Petition denied. CA affirmed. Capt. Gavino
and FESC are solidarily liable.
SABIDO AND LAGUNDA V CUSTODIO, ET AL
17 SCRA 1088
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CONCEPCION; August 31, 1966

NATURE
Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals
FACTS
In Barrio Halang, , two trucks, one driven by Mudales
and belonging to Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company, and
the other driven by Lagunda and owned by Prospero
Sabido, going in opposite directions met each other in a
road curve. Custodia, LTB bus passenger who was
riding on the running board as truck was full of
passengers, was sideswiped by the truck driven by
Lagunda. As a result, Custodio was injured and died.
To avoid any liability, Lagunda and Sabido throw all the
blame on Mudales. However, Makabuhay, widoy of
Custodio, testified that the 6 x 6 truck was running fast
when it met the LTB Bus. And Lagunda had time and
opportunity to avoid the mishap if he had been
sufficiently careful and cautious because the two trucks
never collided with each other. By simply swerving to
the right side of the road, the 6 x 6 truck could have
avoided hitting Custodio.
The sideswiping of the deceased and his two fellow
passengers took place on broad daylight at about 9:30 in
the morning of June 9, 1955 when the LTB bus with full
load to passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of a
bumpy and sliding downward a slope, whereas the six
by six truck was climbing up with no cargoes or
passengers on board but for three helpers, owner Sabido
and driver Lagunda (tsn. 308-309, Mendoza). LTB
passengers had testified to the effect that the 6 x 6 cargo
truck was running at a fast rate of speed. Driver
Lagunda admitted that three passengers rode on the
running board of the bus when his vehicle was still at a
distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus. Despite the
presence of a shallow canal on the right side of the road
which he could pass over with ease, Lagunda did not
avert the accident simply because to use his own
language the canal "is not a passage of trucks.
prof. casis
Based upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of
Laguna and the Court of Appeals concluded that the
Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. hereinafter referred to as
the carrier and its driver Mudales (none of whom has
appealed), had violated the contract of carriage with
Agripino Custodio, whereas petitioners Sabido and
Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict, by reason of
which all of them were held solidarity liable.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioners were guilty of negligence
2. WON petitioners should be held solidarily liable with
the carrier and its driver
HELD
1. YES. The views of the Court of Appeals on the speed
of the truck and its location at the time of the accident
are in the nature of findings of fact, which we cannot
disturb in a petition for review by certiorari, such as the
one at bar. At any rate, the correctness of said findings
is borne out by the very testimony of petitioner
Lagunda to the effect that he saw the passengers riding
on the running board of the bus while the same was still
five or seven meters away from the truck driven by him.
Indeed, the distance between the two vehicles was such
that he could have avoided sideswiping said passengers
if his truck were not running at a great speed.
Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is
independent, in its execution, of the negligence of the
truck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are
the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio.
In fact, the negligence of the first two would not have
produced this result without the negligence of
petitioners' herein. What is more, petitioners' negligence
was the last, in point of time, for Custodio was on the
running board of the carrier's bus sometime before
petitioners' truck came from the opposite direction, so
that, in this sense, petitioners' truck had the last clear
chance.
2. YES. Where the carrier bus and its driver were
clearly guilty of contributory negligence for having
allowed a passenger to ride on the running board of the
torts & damages

bus, and where the driver of the other vehicle was also
guilty of contributory negligence, because that vehicle
was running at a considerable speed despite the fact that
it was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being
close to its right side of the road, it was driven on its
middle portion thereof and so near the passenger bus
coming from the opposite as to sideswipe a passenger
on its running board, the owners of the two vehicles are
liable solidarily for the death of the passenger, although
the liability of one arises from a breach of contract,
whereas that of the other springs from a quasi-delict.
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omission of two or more persons, although acting
independently of each other, are, in combination, the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third
person, and it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury, either is
responsible for the whole injury, even though his act
alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the
same damage might have resulted from the acts of the
other tort-feasor.
Dispositive Judgment affirmed.
VDA. DE BATACLAN VS. MEDINA
102 PHIL 181
MONTEMAYOR; October 22, 1957
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Cavite
FACTS
- Shortly after midnight, a bus of the Medina
Transportation, operated by its owner defendant
Mariano Medina under a certificate of public
convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its
way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur,
Conrado Saylon. There were about 18 passengers,
including the driver and conductor.
- At about 2am, while the bus was running within the
jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst
and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal
or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle.
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- the three passengers Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan

and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva,
could not get out of the overturned bus.
- Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up
to the road, heard groans and moans from inside the
bus. Calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in
the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten
men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of
bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with
petroleum. These men presumably approach the
overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire
started, burning and all but consuming the bus,
including the 4 passengers trapped inside it. It would
appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to
leak and escape from the gasoline tank.
- That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed
passengers inside the bus were removed and duly
identified that of Bataclan. His widow, Salud Villanueva
brought the present suit to recover from Mariano
Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150.
- the CFI awarded P1,000 plus P600 as attorney's fee,
plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried
by Bataclan
ISSUES
1. WON there was negligence on the part of the
defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon, thus
making him liable.
2. WON the the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather,
the fire that burned the bus.
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio There is evidence to show that at the time of the
blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of
the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according
to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the
defense, from the point where one of the front tires
burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zigzaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The
chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the
brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the
velocity at which the bus must have been running, its

momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters
before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.
Reasoning Our new Civil Code amply provides for the
responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and
their goods.11
2. YES
Ratio Tthe proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground
to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
Reasoning under the circumstances obtaining in the
case, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause
was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that
when the vehicle turned not only on its side but
completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from
the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the
coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response
to the call for help, made not only by the passengers,
but most probably, by the driver and the conductor
themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in
the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with
them, and coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what
was more natural than that said rescuers should
innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and
effect the rescue requested from them. Neither the
driver nor the conductor would appear to have
cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to
bring the lighted torch too near the bus.
- According to the evidence, one of the passengers who,
because of the injuries suffered by her, was
hospitalized, and while in the hospital, she was visited
11
ART. 1733
ART. 1755
ART. 1759
ART. 1763
torts & damages

by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of
his visit, she overheard him speaking to one of his bus
inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the
bus changed immediately because they were already
old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the
driver to change the said tires, but that the driver did not
follow his instructions. If this be true, it goes to prove
that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken
the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his
passengers
- The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate
cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning
of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus,
including himself and his co-passengers who were
unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started,
Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical
injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so
damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the
physical injuries suffered by him.
- In the public interest the prosecution of said erring
driver should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of
justice, but for the promotion of the safety of
passengers on public utility buses.
Note: This case was under the heading but for. I
dont know if the italicized phrases are pertinent,
but these were the only ones that contained but
for.
DISPOSITION
In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the
damages awarded by the trial court are increased to
P6,000 and P800, for the death of Bataclan and for the
attorney's fees, respectively.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC v. IAC &
CASIANO PASCUA, ET AL.,
189 SCRA 158
MEDIALDEA/August 30, 1990
NATURE: CERTIORARI
FACTS:
- This case is for recovery of damages for the 3 jeepney
passengers who died as a result of the collision between
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the Phil. Rabbits bus driven by Tomas delos Reyes and

the jeepney driven by Tranquilino Manalo.
- Other passengers of the jeepney sustained physical
injuries.
- It was said that upon reaching a certain barrio, the
jeepneys right rear wheel detached which caused it to
run in an unbalanced position.
-Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result of which, the
jeepney which was then running on the eastern lane (its
right of way) made a U-turn, invading and eventually
stopping on the western lane of the road in such a
manner that the jeepney's front faced the south (from
where it came) and its rear faced the north (towards
where it was going).
-The jeepney practically occupied and blocked the
greater portion of the western lane, which is the right of
way of vehicles coming from the north, among which
was Bus No. 753 of Rabbit
- Almost at the time when the jeepney made a sudden
U-turn and encroached on the western lane of the
highway, or after stopping for a couple of minutes, the
bus bumped from behind the right rear portion of the
jeepney which resulted in the said deaths and injuries.
- At the time and in the vicinity of the accident, there
were no vehicles following the jeepney, neither were
there oncoming vehicles except the bus. The weather
condition of that day was fair.
- A criminal complaint against the two drivers for
Multiple Homicide.
- Manalo was eventually convicted and was imprisoned.
The case against delos Reyes was dismissed for lack of
sufficient evidence.
***As regards the damages.
- Three cases were filed and in all 3 the spouses
(owners of the jeepney) Mangune and Carreon,
(jeepney driver)Manalo, Rabbit and (Rabbits
driver)delos Reyes were all impleaded as defendants.
- Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses
Mangune and Carreon and Manalo on their contractual
liability.
- As against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs based
their suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict.
prof. casis
- Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. (the
insurer of the jeepney) was also impleaded as additional
defendant in the civil case filed by the Pascuas.
- Damages sought to be claimed in the 3 cases were for
medical expenses, burial expenses, loss of wages, for
exemplary damages, moral damages and attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation.
- Rabbit filed a cross-claim for attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation.
- On the other hand, spouses Mangune and Carreon
filed a cross-claim for the repair of the jeepney and for
its non-use during the period of repairs.
- TC: found the couple and Manalo to be NEGLIGENT
and held that there was a breach of the contract of
carriage with their passengers; ordered them to pay the
damages. Filriters was jointly and severally liable as it
was the jeepneys insurer. Rabbit was to be paid by the
jeepney party for actual damages.
- IAC reversed this ruling in the sense that it found
delos Reyes to be negligent; ordered to pay jointly
and severally with Rabbit the plaintiffs; Applied
primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance, (2)
the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of
another vehicle guilty and the cause of the
accident unless contradicted by other evidence,
and (3) the substantial factor test to conclude that
delos Reyes was negligent.
ISSUE: WON THE JEEPNEY OWNERS AND ITS
DRIVER ARE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES AND
DEATH SUFFERED BY THE PASSENGERS OF THE
JEEPNEY
HELD: YES. BUT ONLY THE SPOUSES AND
FILRITERS ARE LIABLE.
REASONING:
TC WAS CORRECT IN APPRECIATING THE FF
FACTS
CONCERNING
MANALOS
NEGLIGENCE.
(1) That the unrebutted testimony of his passenger
Caridad Pascua that the Mangune jeepney was
"running fast" that his passengers cautioned driver
Manalo to slow down but did not heed the warning
torts & damages

(2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of Police
Investigator Tacpal of the San Manuel (Tarlac)
Police who found that the tracks of the jeepney ran
on the Eastern shoulder (outside the concrete
paved road) until it returned to the concrete road at
a sharp angle, crossing the Eastern lane and the
(imaginary) center line and encroaching fully into
the western lane where the collision took place as
evidenced by the point of impact;
(3) The observation of witness Police Corporal
Cacalda also of the San Manuel Police that the
path of the jeepney they found on the road \was
shown by skid marks which he described as
"scratches on the road caused by the iron of the
jeep, after its wheel was removed;"
(4) His conviction for the crime of Multiple
Homicide and Multiple Serious Physical Injuries
with Damage to Property thru Reckless
Imprudence by the CFI of Tarlac, as a result of the
collision, and his commitment to prison and
service of his sentence
(5) The application of the doctrine of res-ipsa
loquitar attesting to the circumstance that the
collision occured on the right of way of the Phil.
Rabbit Bus.
SC:
-The principle about "the last clear" chance would
call for application in a suit between the owners
and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not
arise where a passenger demands responsibility
from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt
the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners
on the ground that the other driver was likewise
guilty of negligence. (Anuran, et al. v. Buo et al.)
-On the presumption that drivers who bump the
rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the
accident, unless contradicted by other evidence:
would have been correct were it not for the
undisputed fact that the U-turn made by the
jeepney was abrupt. Delos Reyes could not have
anticipated the sudden U-turn executed by
Manalo.
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***With regard to the substantial factor test:

- The IAC held that
. . . It is the rule under the substantial
factor test that if the actor's conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about harm to
another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw
nor should have foreseen the extent of the
harm or the manner in which it occurred does
not prevent him from being liable (Restatement,
Torts, 2d).
Here, We find defendant bus running at a
fast speed when the accident occurred and did not
even make the slightest effort to avoid the
accident, . . . . The bus driver's conduct is thus a
substantial factor in bringing about harm to the
passengers of the jeepney, not only because he
was driving fast and did not even attempt to avoid
the mishap but also because it was the bus which
was the physical force which brought about the
injury and death to the passengers of the jeepney.
-The speed of the bus was even calculated by the
IAC. But the SC was not convinced. It cannot be
said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed
when the accident occurred because the speed of
80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming such
calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed
limit allowed in highways.
- Delos Reyes cannot be faulted for not having
avoided the collision because as was shown, the
jeepney left a skid mark of about 45 meters,
measured from the time its right rear wheel was
detached up to the point of collision.
- Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more
or less 50 kph at the time of the accident. Using
this speed, delos Reyes covered the distance of
45 meters in 3.24 seconds. If We adopt the speed
of 80 kilometers per hour, delos Reyes would have
covered that distance in only 2.025 seconds.
Verily, he had little time to react to the situation.
- To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to
ask too much from him. Aside from the time
element involved, there were no options available
to him.
prof. casis
- Also, It was shown by the pictures that driver
delos Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the right
attempt to avoid hitting the Mangune's jeepney.
That it was not successful in fully clearing the
Mangune jeepney as its (Rabbit's) left front hit said
jeepney must have been due to limitations of
space and time.
- That delos Reyes of the Rabbit bus could also
have swerved to its left (eastern lane) to avoid
bumping the Mangune jeepney which was then on
the western lane: Under such a situation, he would
run the greater risk of running smack in the
Mangune jeepney either head on or broadside as
the jeepney then was abruptly making a U-turn.
-SC: The proximate cause of the accident was
the negligence of Manalo and spouses
Mangune and Carreon. They all failed to
exercise the precautions that are needed
precisely pro hac vice.
- In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger
dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this
disputable presumption may only be overcome by
evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and
1756 of the New Civil Code 2 or that the death or
injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous
event 3 (Lasam v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657).
- To escape liability, defendants Mangune and
Carreon offered to show thru their witness Natalio
Navarro, an alleged mechanic, that he periodically
checks and maintains the jeepney of said
defendants, the last on Dec. 23, the day before the
collision, which included the tightening of the bolts.
This notwithstanding the right rear wheel of the
vehicle was detached while in transit. As to the
cause thereof no evidence was offered. Said
defendant did not even attempt to explain, much
less establish, it to be one caused by a caso
fortuito. . . .
-In any event, "[i]n an action for damages against
the carrier for his failure to safely carry his
passenger to his destination, an accident caused
either by defects in the automobile or through the
torts & damages
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negligence of its driver, is not a caso fortuito which

would avoid the carriers liability for damages (Son
v. Cebu Autobus Company, 94 Phil. 892 citing
Lasam, et al. v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657; Necesito,
etc. v. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75).
***On the sole liability of the Jeepney Owners
(excluding Manalo)
-the contract of carriage is between the carrier and
the passenger, and in the event of contractual
liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible
therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be
due to the negligence of his driver (Viluan v. CA, et
al., April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742).
- if the driver is to be held jointly and severally
liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier's
liability personal, contradictory to the explicit
provision of A 2181 of the NCC.
DISPOSITION:
TC
S
DECISION
WAS
REINSTATED
and
AFFIRMED
BUT
MODIFICATION THAT ONLY THE COUPLE AND
THE FILRITERS GUARANTY ASSURANCE CORP.
INC WERE LIABLE. AFFIRMED TOO THE
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BUT MODIFIED THE
INDEMNITY FOR LOSS OF LIFE FROM 3K (AS
PER A1746 TO A2206 NCC) TO 30K.
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION
(DIONISIO)
148 SCRA 353
FELICIANO; Mar 10, 1987
INC
IAC
Nature:
Petition to review the decision of the IAC
Facts:
0 at about 1:30 am on November 15 1975, Leonardo
Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-anddinner meeting with his boss. Dionisio had taken "a
shot or two" of liquor.
1 Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just
crossed an intersection when his car headlights (in his
- PAGE 77 -
allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his

headlights on "bright" and saw a Ford dump truck
about 21/2meters away from his car.
2 The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name
of Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked
on the right hand side of the street (i.e., on the right
hand side of a person facing in the same direction
toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing
the oncoming traffic. It was parked askew (not
parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick
out onto the street, partly blocking the way of
oncoming traffic. There were no lights or any socalled "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere
near the dump truck, front or rear.
3 The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven
home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular
driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix,
in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the
following morning.
4 Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by
car smashed into the dump truck.
5 As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some
physical injuries including some permanent facial
scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold
bridge dentures.
6 Trial court ruled in favor of Dionisio. IAC affirmed
the lower courts ruling, with modification on award
of damages.
Petitionerscomments
7 the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his
own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the
accident, while under the influence of liquor, without
his headlights on and without a curfew pass.
8 if there was negligence in the manner in which the
dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a
"passive and static condition" and that private
respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an
intervening, efficient cause determinative of the
accident and the injuries he sustained. (NOTE: this
was the contention of petitioners which SC noted in is
decision)
Private respondents comments
prof. casis
9 the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the
negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the
dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix
Issue:
WON the proximate cause of the accident was
Dionisios negligence (driving faster than he should
have, and without headlights) or the negligence of the
driver in parking the truck.
Held:
10
it is the drivers negligence. (see previous
digest)
11
ON CAUSE v CONDITION (under IV A 3c,
page 5 of outline)
12
petitioners' arguments are drawn from a
reading of some of the older cases in various
jurisdictions in the United States. These arguments,
however, do not have any validity in this jurisdiction.
13
Even in the United States, the distinctions
between" cause" and "condition" have already been
"almost entirely discredited." Professors Prosser and
Keeton make this quite clear:
Many courts have sought to distinguish
between the active "cause" of the harm and the
existing "conditions" upon which that cause
operated. If the defendant has created only a
passive static condition which made the
damage possible, the defendant is said not to
be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is
concerned, in the sense of necessary
antecedents which have played an important
part in producing the result, it is quite
impossible to distinguish between active forces
and passive situations, particularly since, as is
invariably the case the latter (is) the result of
other active forces which have gone before.
The defendant who spills gasoline about the
premises creates a "condition," but the act may
be culpable because of the danger of fire.
When a spark ignites the gasoline, the
condition has done quite as much to bring
about the fire as the spark; and since that is the
very risk which the defendant has created, the
torts & damages

defendant will not escape responsibility. Even
the lapse of a considerable time during which
the "condition" remains static will not
necessarily affect liability; one who digs a
trench in the highway may still be liable to
another who falls into it a month afterward.
"Cause" and "condition" still find occasional
mention in the decisions; but the distinction is
now almost entirely discredited. So far as it
has any validity at all, it must refer to the type
of case where the forces set in operation by the
defendant have come to rest in a position of
apparent safety, and some new force
intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the
distinction between "cause" and "condition"
which is important, but the nature of the risk
and the character of the intervening cause."
14
the truck driver's negligence, far from being a
"passive and static condition", was an indispensable
and efficient cause. The collision would not have
occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew
without any warning lights or reflector devices. The
improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down
that street and for having so created this risk, the
truck driver must be held responsible.
Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time
than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to
the accident, was not an efficient intervening or
independent cause. What the petitioners describe as an
"intervening cause" was only a foreseeable consequence
of the risk created by the truck drivers negligence
MANILA ELECTRIC v REMOQUILLO
99 PHIL 117
MONTEMAYOR; May 18, 1956
NATURE
Review by certiorari of a CA decision
FACTS
- Efren Magno went to his stepbrothers 3-story house
to fix a leaking media agua, (downspout). He climbed
up to the media agua which was just below the 3rd floor
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window and stood on it to receive a galvanized iron

sheet through the said window. After grabbing hold of
the sheet, he turned around and a portion of the iron
sheet he was holding came into contact with an electric
wire of Manila Electric Company (the Company) strung
2.5 ft parallel to the edge of the media agua,
electrocuting him and killing him.
- His widow and children filed a suit to recover
damages from the company and the TC rendered
judgment in their favor. The Company appealed to the
CA, which affirmed the judgment. It is this CA decision
the Company now seeks to appeal.
ISSUE
WON the Companys negligence in the installation and
maintenance of its wires was the proximate cause of the
death
HELD
No. It merely provided the condition from which the
cause arose (it set the stage for the cause of the injury to
occur).
Ratio A prior and remote cause (which furnishes the
condition or gives rise to the occasion by which an
injury was made possible) cannot be the basis of an
action if a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient
cause of the injury intervenes between such prior and
remote cause and the injury.
If no danger existed in the condition except because
of the independent cause, such condition was not the
circumstances which result in injury because of the
condition is the proximate cause.
Reasoning We fail to see how the Company could be
held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence.
To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause
of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently
a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act
of Magno in turning around and swinging the
galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution,
such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to
prof. casis
avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the
latter's length of 6 feet.
- The real cause of the accident or death was the
reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. When he
was called by his stepbrother to repair the media agua
just below the third story window, it is to be presumed
that due to his age and experience he was qualified to
do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had
had training and experience for the job. So, he could not
have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the
danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the instant
case, his training and experience failed him, and
forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-ft iron
sheet with both hands and at arms length, evidently
without looking, and throwing all prudence and
discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his
arms with the motion of his body, thereby causing his
own electrocution.
Disposition CA decision reversed. Complaint against
company dismissed
RODRIGUEZA
V.
MANILA
COMPANY
RAILROAD
NATURE
Appeal from judgment of CFI
FACTS
Rodrigueza et al seek damages fr fire
kindled by sparks fr a locomotive engine.
The fire was communicated to four houses
nearby. All of these houses were of light
construction, except that of Rodrigueza
which was of strong materials. Plaintiffs
say that the company failed to supervise
their employees properly and was negligent
in allowing locomotive to operate without
smokestack protection for arresting sparks.
They also say that the sparks were
produced by an inferior fuel used by the
company Bataan coal.
Defense said Rodiguezas house stood
partly within limits of land owned by
torts & damages

company.
Rodrigueza didnt mind the
warnings from the company. His houses
materials included nipa and cogon, this
indicates contributory negligence on his
part.
Trial
judge
decided
against
Manila
Railroad, which appealed.
ISSUE
WON damage was caused by Rodriguezas contributory
negligence
HELD
Yes.
- Manila Railroads defense is not a bar to recovery by
the other plaintiffs.
- There was no proof that Rodrigueza unlawfully
intruded upon companys property. His house was there
before the railroad companys property. He may be at
risk for fire, but should not bear loss if the fire resulted
from the companys negligence.
- The PROXIMATE AND ONLY CAUSE of the
damage was the negligent act of the company. That
Rodriguezas house was near was an ANTECEDENT
CONDITION but that cant be imputed to him as
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE because that
condition was not created by himself and because his
house remained by the toleration and consent of
company and because even if the house was improperly
there, company had no right to negligently destroy it.
The company could have removed the house through its
power of eminent domain.
MCKEE v IAC, TAYAG
211 SCRA 517
DAVIDE; July 16, 1992
NATURE
Appeal from decision of the IAC
FACTS
- A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck
owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben
Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The
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collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh

McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to
George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and
Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
- When the northbound Ford Escort was about 10
meters away from the southern approach of the bridge,
two boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road
and into the lane of the car. Jose Koh blew the horn of
the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the
truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car,
applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to
his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the
truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck,
which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.
- Two civil cases were filed on Jan 31, 1977.
- On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben
Galang with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries
and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court.
- Judge Capulong found Galang guilty of the criminal
charge and ordered him to pay damages. Galang
appealed to IAC. IAC affirmed decision.
- Judge Castaneda dismissed the 2 civil cases and
awarded private respondents moral damages and
exemplary damages, and attorneys fee. Petitioners
appealed to IAC. In its consolidated decision of the civil
cases, it reversed the ruling of the trial court and
ordered the defendants to pay damages. The decision is
anchored principally on the findings that it was
Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which
caused the accident. The appellate court further said that
the law presumes negligence on the part of the
defendants, as employers of Galang, in the selection and
supervision of the latter; it was further asserted that
these defendants did not allege in their Answers the
defense of having exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in selecting and supervising the said
employee.
- In an MFR, the decision for the consolidated civil
cases was reversed. Hence this petition.
ISSUES
prof. casis
WON respondent Court's findings in its challenged
resolution are supported by evidence or are based on
mere speculations, conjectures and presumptions.
HELD
YES
- Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of
Appeals may be set aside when such findings are not
supported by the evidence or when the trial court failed
to consider the material facts which would have led to a
conclusion different from what was stated in its
judgment.
- The respondent Court held that the fact that the car
improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the
collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the
presumption that the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was
negligent. On the basis of this presumed negligence,
IAC immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's
negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause
of the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the
evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the
car swerved into the truck's lane because as it
approached the southern end of the bridge, two boys
darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the
lane of the car.
- Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do
- The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty
of negligence.
- Using the test, no negligence can be imputed to Jose
Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would
have tried to avoid running over the two boys by
swerving the car away from where they were even if
this would mean entering the opposite lane.
- Moreover, under what is known as the emergency
rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act without time to consider
torts & damages

the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails
to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about
by his own negligence.
- Assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it
cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate
cause of the collision. Proximate cause has been defined
as: that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred; the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately
or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor,
the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that
an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.
- Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at
all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it
cannot be said that the same caused the eventual
injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a
sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the
truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy.
The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not
have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the
emergency signals given by the former to slow down
and give the car an opportunity to go back into its
proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to
the far right of the road, which was the proper
precautionary measure under the given circumstances,
the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car.
- The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the
records. He himself said that his truck was running at
30 miles (48 km) per hour along the bridge while the
maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30
kph. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person
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driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of

the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
- Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of
last clear chance finds application here. Last clear
chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that
the contributory negligence of the party injured will not
defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the
defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the consequences of the
negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the
person who had the last clear chance to avoid the
mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences thereof.
- Last clear chance: The doctrine is that the negligence
of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of the defendant where it appears that the
defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence,
might have avoided injurious consequences to the
plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. The
doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a
person's own acts may have placed him in a position of
peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled
to recovery. a person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding
the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third
person imputed to the opponent is considered in law
solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.
The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent
defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even
to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing
himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiff's peril, or
according to some authorities, should have been aware
of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact
an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an
accident.
- As employers of the truck driver, the private
respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages.
The presumption that they are negligent flows from the
negligence of their employee. That presumption,
however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their
only possible defense is that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage. The answers of the private respondents in the
prof. casis
civil cases did not interpose this defense. Neither did
they attempt to prove it.
On the separate civil and criminal actions
- The civil cases, which were for the recovery of civil
liability arising from a quasi-delict under Article 2176
in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, were filed
ahead of criminal case. They were eventually
consolidated for joint trial. The records do not indicate
any attempt on the part of the parties, and it may
therefore be reasonably concluded that none was made,
to consolidate criminal case with the civil cases, or
vice-versa.
- Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which seeks
to avoid a multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression
and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets to
simplify the work of the trial court, or in short, attain
justice with the least expense to the parties litigants,
would have easily sustained a consolidation, thereby
preventing the unseeming, if no ludicrous, spectacle of
two judges appreciating, according to their respective
orientation, perception and perhaps even prejudice, the
same facts differently, and thereafter rendering
conflicting decisions. Such was what happened in this
case.
- The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a
quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. In the case of independent civil actions under the
new Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether
acquittal or conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to
the civil action. What remains to be the most important
consideration as to why the decision in the criminal
case should not be considered in this appeal is the fact
that private respondents were not parties therein.
Dispositive Petition granted. Assailed decision set aside
while its original is REINSTATED, subject to the
modification that the indemnity for death is increased
from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the death of
Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee
TEAGUE VS. FERNANDEZ
51 SCRA 181
MAKALINTAL; June 4, 1973
torts & damages

FACTS
- The Realistic Institute, owned and operated by
Mercedes M. Teague, was a vocational school for hair
and beauty culture situated on the second floor of the
Gil-Armi Building, a two-storey, semi-concrete edifice
located at the comer of Quezon Boulevard and Soler
Street, Quiapo, Manila. The second floor was
unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400 square
meters, and although it had only one stairway, of about
1.50 meters in width, it had eight windows, each of
which was provided with two fire-escape ladders, and
the presence of each of the fire exits was indicated on
the wall.
- In the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke out
in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters
away from the institute. Soler Street lay between that
store and the institute. Upon seeing the fire, some of the
students in the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!'
and thereafter, a panic ensued. Four instructresses and
six assistant instructresses of the institute were present
and they, together with the registrar, tried to calm down
the students, who numbered about 180 at the time,
telling them not to be afraid because the Gil-Armi
Building would not get burned as it is made of concrete,
and that the fire was anyway, across the street. They
told the students not to rush out but just to go down the
stairway two by two, or to use the fire-escapes. The
panic, however, could not be subdued and the students
kept on rushing and pushing their way through the
stairs, thereby causing stampede. No part of the GilArmi Building caught fire. But, after the panic was
over, four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, sister
of plaintiffs, were found dead and several others injured
on account of the stampede.
- The CFI of Manila found for the defendant and
dismissed the case. The plaintiffs appealed to the CA,
which by a divided vote of 3 to 2 (a special division of
five members having been constituted) rendered a
judgment of reversal and sentenced the defendant to pay
damages to the plaintiffs in the sum of P11,000, plus
interest at the legal rate from the date the complaint was
filed.
- The CA declared that Teague was negligent and that
such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of
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Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based

primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491
of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not
been complied with in connection with the construction
and use of the Gil-Armi building. This provision reads
as follows:
"Sec. 491. Fireproof partitions, exits and stairways - All
buildings and separate sections of buildings or buildings
otherwise known as accessorias having less than three
stories, having one or more persons domiciled therein
either temporarily or permanently, and all public or
quasipublic buildings having less than three stories,
such as hospitals, sanitarium, schools, reformatories,
places of human detention, assembly halls, clubs,
restaurants or panciterias, and the like, shall be provided
with at least two unobstructed stairways of not less than
one meter and twenty centimeters in width and an
inclination of not less than forty degrees from the
perpendicular, in case of large buildings more than two
stairways shall likewise be provided when required by
the chief of the fire department, said stairways shall be
placed as far apart as possible."
The alleged violation of the ordinance consisted is that
the second storey of the building had only one
stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2
meters each, although at the time of the fire the owner
of the building had a second stairway under
construction.
ISSUES
1. WON Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the
City of Manila refers only to public buildings and hence
did not apply to the Gil-Armi building which was of
private ownership
2. WON the ordinance devolved upon the owners of the
building and therefore it is they and not the petitioner,
who is a mere lessee, who should be liable for the
violation
3. WON the failure to comply with the requirement of
the ordinance was the proximate cause of the death of
Lourdes Fernandez
HELD
1. NO.
prof. casis
Ratio it is not ownership which determines the
character of buildings subject to its requirements, but
rather the use or the purpose for which a particular
building, is utilized.
Reasoning Thus the same may be privately owned, but
if it is devoted to any one of the purposes mentioned in
the ordinance - for instance as a school, which the
Realistic Institute precisely was - then the building is
within the coverage of the ordinance. Indeed the
requirement that such a building should have two (2)
separate stairways instead of only one (1) has no
relevance or reasonable relation to the fact of
ownership, but does have such relation to the use or
purpose for which the building is devoted.
2. NO.
Reasoning It was the use of the building for school
purposes which brought the same within the coverage
of the ordinance; and it was the petitioner and not the
owners who were responsible for such use.
3. YES.
Ratio The violation of a statute or ordinance is not
rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the
intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the
accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the
very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended
to prevent.
Reasoning The proximate legal cause is that acting first
and producing the injury, either immediately or by
settling other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain immediately affecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground
to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result there from.
[Citing Bataclan v Medina]
- The petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted
in the death of Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1)
violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a neighboring place;
(3) shouts of "Fire!, Fire!"; (4) panic in the Institute; (5)
stampede; and (6) injuries and death. The violation of
torts & damages

the ordinance, it is argued, was only a remote cause,
and cannot be the basis of liability since there
intervened a number of independent causes which
produced the injury complained of.
- A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of
an action if such remote cause did nothing more than
circumstances which result in injury because of the
condition is the proximate cause. [Citing MERALCO v
Remoquillo]
- According to the petitioner "the events of fire, panic
and stampede were independent causes with no causal
connection at all with the violation of the ordinance."
The weakness in the argument springs from a faulty
juxtaposition of the events which formed a chain and
resulted in the injury. It is true that the petitioner's noncompliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of
and prior to the other events in point of time, in the
sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the
building. But the violation was a continuing one, since
the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to
prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger
to the occupants of the building. That situation was
undue overcrowding in case it should become necessary
to evacuate the building, which, it could be reasonably
foreseen, was bound to happen under emergency
conditions if there was only one stairway available. It is
true that in this particular case there would have been
no overcrowding in the single stairway if there had not
been a fire in the neighborhood which caused the
students to panic and rush headlong for the stairs in
order to go down. But it was precisely such
contingencies or events that the authors of the ordinance
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had in mind, for under normal conditions one stairway

would be adequate for the occupants of the building.
- To consider the violation of the ordinance as the
proximate cause of the injury does not portray the
situation in its true perspective; it would be more
accurate to say that the overcrowding at the stairway
was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what
the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there
be two stairways instead of only one. Under the
doctrine of the cases cited by the respondents, the
principle of proximate cause applies to such violation.
Dispositive Decision appealed from is affirmed.
PICART V SMITH
STREET; March 15, 1918
NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of La Union
FACTS
0 On December 12, 1912, plaintiff was riding on
his pony over the Carlatan Bridge, at San
Fernando, La Union.
1 Before he had gotten half way across, the
defendant approached from the opposite direction
in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or
twelve miles per hour.
2 As the defendant neared the bridge he saw the
plaintiff and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach.
3 He continued his course and after he had taken
the bridge, he gave two more successive blasts, as
it appeared to him that the man on horseback
before him was not observing the rule of the road.
4 The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and
heard the warning signals.
5
However, given the novelty of the apparition
and the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony
closely up against the railing on the right side of
the bridge instead of going to the left.
6 He did this because he thought he did not have
sufficient time to get over to the other side.
prof. casis
7 As the automobile approached, the defendant
guided it toward his left, that being the proper side
of the road for the machine.
8 In so doing the defendant assumed that the
horseman would move to the other side.
9 The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and
the rider had made no sign for the automobile to
stop.
10 Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the
defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet
some distance away or slowing down, continued to
approach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed.
11 When he had gotten quite near, there being
then no possibility of the horse getting across to the
other side, the defendant quickly turned his car
sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse
alongside of the railing where it as then standing;
but in so doing the automobile passed in such close
proximity to the animal that it became frightened
and turned its body across the bridge with its head
toward the railing.
12 In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the
left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb
was broken.
13 The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with
some violence.
14 As a result of its injuries the horse died.
15 The plaintiff received contusions which caused
temporary unconsciousness and required medical
attention for several days.
16 CFI absolved defendant from liability
17 Hence, the appeal
ISSUE
WON the defendant, in maneuvering his car in the
manner above described, was guilty of negligence that
would give rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done
Ratio: The person who has the last fair chance to
avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference
to the prior negligence of the other part.
torts & damages

HELD
Yes.
As the defendant started across the bridge, he
had the right to assume that the horse and the rider
would pass over to the proper side; but as he
moved toward the center of the bridge it was
demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be
done; and he must in a moment have perceived that
it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in
front of the moving vehicle.
In the nature of things this change of situation
occurred while the automobile was yet some
distance away; and from this moment it was no
longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape
being run down by going to a place of greater
safety.
The control of the situation had then passed
entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either
to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that
there were no other persons on the bridge, to take
the other side and pass sufficiently far away from
the horse to avoid the danger of collision.
The defendant ran straight on until he was
almost upon the horse. He was, the court thinks,
deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse
had not yet exhibited fright.
But in view of the known nature of horses,
there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in
question was unacquainted with automobiles, he
might get excited and jump under the conditions
which here confronted him.
When the defendant exposed the horse and
rider to this danger, he was, in our opinion,
negligent in the eye of the law.
The test by which to determine the existence
of negligence in a particular case may be stated
as follows: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence.
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- PAGE 77 -
The law here in effect adopts the standard

supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct
of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law.
The existence of negligence in a given case is
not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him.
The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability
by that.
The question as to what would constitute the
conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must
of course be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the facts involved
in the particular case. Could a prudent man, in the
case under consideration, foresee harm as a result
of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the
duty of the actor to take precautions to guard
against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this
prevision, is always necessary before negligence
can be held to exist.
Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for
determining the existence of negligence in a given
case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a
prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would
have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing
conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the
defendant in the present case, negligence is clearly
established. A prudent man, placed in the position
of the defendant, would have recognized that the
course which he was pursuing was fraught with
risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the
horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of
that course. Under these circumstances the law
imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against
the threatened harm.
The plaintiff himself was not free from fault,
for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in
planting himself on the wrong side of the road. It
will be noted however, that the negligent acts of the
two parties were not contemporaneous, since the
prof. casis
negligence of the defendant succeeded the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable
interval. Under these circumstances the law is that
the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable
with the consequences, without reference to the
prior negligence of the other party.
Dispositive: Appealed decision is reversed.
BUSTAMANTE V CA (DEL
MONTESIANO)
193 SCRA 603
MEDIALDEA; February 6, 1991
PILAR
AND
NATURE: petition for certiorari to review decision of

CA
FACTS: a truck and a passenger bus sideswept each
other, causing the deaths of the passengers of the bus.
This is the way the collision happened:
The bus, driven by Susulin, was traversing an inclined
road when the driver saw from 30 meters away an
approaching truck (driven by Montesiano), going very
fast and the front wheels wiggling. The bus driver also
observed that the truck was heading towards his lane.
Not minding this circumstance due to his belief that the
truck driver was merely joking, Susulin shifted from 4th
to 3rd gear in order to give more power and speed to the
bus, which was ascending the inclined part of the road,
in order to overtake a Kubota hand tractor being pushed
by a person along the shoulder of the highway. While
the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing the
hand tractor and the truck was approaching the bus, the
two vehicles sideswiped each other at each other's left
side.
The heirs of the victims filed for damages. The RTC
awarded damages, saying that the negligent acts of both
drivers were the cause of the accident, thus their
liability must be solidary. The driver and owner of the
truck appealed to the CA, which was denied at first, but
was granted on MFR, absolving the defendants based
on the doctrine of last clear chance, saying that the bus
driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident,
torts & damages

and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the
same.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA was correct in absolving the driver and
owner of the truck (answered by WON CA correctly
applied the doctrine of last clear chance)
HELD:
1. NO
Ratio: The doctrine of last clear chance applies only
between the negligent parties. It does not apply in a
case wherein a victim (who is an outsider to the cause
of the accident) demands liability from the negligent
parties.
Reasoning: The doctrine of last clear chance, stated
broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant
where it appears that the defendant, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding
the plaintiffs negligence. In other words, the doctrine
of last clear chance means that even though a person's
own acts may have placed him in a position of peril,
and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to
recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who
has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his
opponent or that of a third person imputed to the
opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident (Sangco).
A negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent
plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly
negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the
plaintiff's peril, or according to some authorities, should
have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due
case, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the
plaintiff to avoid an accident (Am. Jur).
As against 3rd persons, a negligent actor cant defend by
saying that another had negligently failed to take action
which would have avoided injury.
A2010
prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
Disposition: Petition GRANTED. Defendants Del Pilar

and Montesiano ordered to pay damages with other
defendants
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC V
(DIONISIO)
148 SCRA 353
FELICIANO; March 10, 1987
NATURE
PETITION for review of the decision of the IAC
sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the

selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.
- CFI: in favor of Dionisio
- IAC: affirmed TC but modified amounts
IAC
FACTS
- 130AM 15 November 1975 - Leonardo Dionisio,
driving his Volkswagen car, was on his way home to
Makati from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his
boss where had taken "a shot or two" of liquor.
Crossing the intersection of General Lacuna and
General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from
his home, when his car headlights (in his allegation)
suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright"
and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some
21/2meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned
and registered by Phoenix Construction Inc. was parked
askew (partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic) on
the right hand side of General Lacuna Street facing the
oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called
"early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the
dump truck. The dump truck had earlier that evening
been driven home by Carbonel, its regular driver.
Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by
car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the
collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries
including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous
breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
- Dionisio commenced an action for damages claiming
that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was
the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the
dump truck. Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the
proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own
recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident,
while under the influence of liquor, without his
headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also
ISSUE
(obiter) WON last clear chance doctrine should be
applied therefore exculpating Phoenix from paying any
damages
HELD
NO
- We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence
was "only contributory," that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck
driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such
damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article
2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Obiter
- Phoenix and Carbonel also ask us to apply what they
refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The theory
here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck
driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had
the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and
hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to
take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries
alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the common
law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs.
Smith but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what
extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The historical function of that doctrine in
the common law was to mitigate the harshness of
another common law doctrine or rule-that of
contributory negligence. The common law rule of
contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all
by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the
plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared
with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The
common law notion of last clear chance permitted
courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been
negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear
chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so.
Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the
torts & damages

common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a
jurisdiction where the common law concept of
contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery
by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in
A2179 CC
- Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear
chance" that may be extracted from its common law
matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases
in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe
so. Under A2179, the task of a court, in technical terms,
is to determine whose negligence-the plaintiff's or the
defendant's-was the legal or proximate cause of the
injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an
exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners
seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or
"intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in
the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the
defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of
the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of
more fundamental importance are the nature of the
negligent act or omission of each party and the
character and gravity of the risks created by such act or
omission for the rest of the community. The petitioners
urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer)
should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior
negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act
with that increased diligence which had become
necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the
truck driver's own wrongful act or omission, To accept
this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the
fundamental principle of law that a man must respond
for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent
act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to
reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to
allocate them among the members of society. To accept
the petitioners' proposition must tend to weaken the
very bonds of society.
Disposition CA decision is modified by reducing the
aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of
expected income and moral damages Dionisio is
entitled to by 20% of such amount
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE v CA
(LIPANA)
A2010
- PAGE 77 -
269 SCRA 695

HERMOSISIMA; March 14, 1997
Nature:
Petition to review decision of CA
Facts:
- Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC), represented
by its President and General Manager Romeo Lipana,
filed a complaint to recover from the former Philippine
Bank of Commerce (PBC), now absorbed by the
Philippine Commercial International Bank, P304,
979.74 representing various deposits RMC made in its
current account with said bank. The amount was not
credited to RMCs account but was instead deposited to
the account of one Bienvenido Cotas.
- RMC maintained two separate current accounts with
the Pasig Branch of PBC in connection with its business
of selling appliances.
- From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, petitioner Romeo
Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form
of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene
Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the
current accounts of RMC with PBC. It turned out,
however, that these deposits, on all occasions, were not
credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited
to Account No. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband,
Bienvenido Cotas who likewise maintains an account
with the same bank.
- During this period, petitioner bank had been regularly
furnishing private respondent with monthly statements
showing its current accounts balances. Unfortunately, it
had never been the practice of Romeo Lipana to check
these monthly statements of account reposing complete
trust and confidence on petitioner bank.
-Irene Yabut would accomplish two copies of the
deposit slip, an original and a duplicate. The original
showed the name of her husband as depositor and his
current account number. On the duplicate copy was
written the account number of her husband but the
name of the account holder was left blank. PBC's teller,
Azucena Mabayad, would, however, validate and stamp
both the original and the duplicate of these deposit slips
retaining only the original copy despite the lack of
prof. casis
information on the duplicate slip. The second copy was
kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. After
validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC
in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change
the account number written thereon, which is that of her
husband's, and make it appear to be RMC's account
number. With the daily remittance records also prepared
by Ms. Yabut and submitted to private respondent RMC
together with the validated duplicate slips with the
latter's name and account number, she made her
company believe that all the while the amounts she
deposited were being credited to its account when, in
truth and in fact, they were being deposited by her and
credited by the petitioner bank in the account of Cotas.
- Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC
demanded from petitioner bank the return of its money,
but as its demand went unheeded, it filed a collection
suit before RTC Pasig, which found petitioner bank
negligent and ordered the bank and Mabayad to pay
RMC jointly and severally P304,979.72, plus damages,
attornets fees and costs of suit.
- CA affirmed, but modified the award of damages.
Issue:
Whether the proximate cause of the loss, to the tune of
P304,979.74, suffered by the private respondent RMC
is petitioner bank's negligence or that of private
respondent's.
Held:
It was the negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad,
coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the
selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was
the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private
respondent.
- There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
- Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
torts & damages

do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would do.
- Picart v. Smith. The test by which to determine the
existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect
adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the
imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the
Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case
is not determined by reference to the personal judgment
of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that.
- the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent
in validating, officially stamping and signing all the
deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut,
despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not
completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed
procedure of the bank with respect to the proper
validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate.
- Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms.
Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its
lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms.
Mabayad.
- Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each
case upon mixed considerations of logic, common
sense, policy and precedent. Proximate cause is "that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. . . ." In this case, absent the act of Ms.
Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete
duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut
would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her
fraudulent scheme with impunity.
- Furthermore, under the doctrine of "last clear
chance" (also referred to, at times as "supervening
negligence" or as "discovered peril"), petitioner bank
was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence,
states that where both parties are negligent, but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that
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- PAGE 77 -
of the other, or when it is impossible to determine

whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the
incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to
avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is
chargeable with the consequences thereof. Stated
differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery
of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a
defense against liability sought by another, if the latter,
who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Here,
assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in
entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing
the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company,
as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied
that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear
opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client,
simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed
validation
procedure.
- While it is true that had private respondent checked
the monthly statements of account sent by the petitioner
bank to RMC, the latter would have discovered the loss
early on, such cannot be used by the petitioners to
escape liability. This omission on the part of the private
respondent does not change the fact that were it not for
the wanton and reckless negligence of the petitioners'
employee in validating the incomplete duplicate deposit
slips presented by Ms. Irene Yabut, the loss would not
have occurred. Considering, however, that the fraud
was committed in a span of more than one (1) year
covering various deposits, common human experience
dictates that the same would not have been possible
without any form of collusion between Ms. Yabut and
bank teller Mabayad. Ms. Mabayad was negligent in the
performance of her duties as bank teller nonetheless.
- it cannot be denied that private respondent was
likewise negligent in not checking its monthly
statements of account. Had it done so, the company
would have been alerted to the series of frauds being
committed against RMC by its secretary. The damage
would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount
if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised
even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. This
omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence
prof. casis
which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded
to the private respondent under Article 2179 of the New
Civil Code
Disposition CA decision modified. The demands of
substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damage
on a 60-40 ratio. Thus, 40% of the damage awarded by
the respondent appellate court, except the award of
P25,000.00 attorney's fees, shall be borne by private
respondent RMC; only the balance of 60% needs to be
paid by the petitioners. The award of attorney's fees
shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners.
PADILLA [dissent]
- the doctrine of "last clear chance" assumes that the
negligence of the defendant was subsequent to the
negligence of the plaintiff and the same must be the
proximate cause of the injury. In short, there must be a
last and a clear chance, not a last possible chance, to
avoid the accident or injury. It must have been a chance
as would have enabled a reasonably prudent man in like
position to have acted effectively to avoid the injury
and the resulting damage to himself.
- the bank was not remiss in its duty of sending monthly
bank statements to private respondent RMC so that any
error or discrepancy in the entries therein could be
brought to the bank's attention at the earliest
opportunity. Private respondent failed to examine these
bank statements not because it was prevented by some
cause in not doing so, but because it was purposely
negligent as it admitted that it does not normally check
bank statements given by banks. It was private
respondent who had the last and clear chance to prevent
any further misappropriation by Yabut had it only
reviewed the status of its current accounts on the bank
statement sent to it monthly or regularly. Since a sizable
amount of cash was entrusted to Yabut, private
respondent should, at least, have taken care of its
concerns, as what the law presumes. Its negligence,
therefore, is not contributory but the immediate and
proximate cause of its injury.
GLAN PEOPLES LUMBER AND HARDWARE V
IAC (VDA. DE CALIBO and kids)
torts & damages

GR No.70493
NARVASA; May 18, 1989
NATURE
Petition for certiorari praying for a reversal of the
judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court which, it
is claimed, ignored or ran counter to the established
facts.
FACTS
- Engineer Orlando T. Calibo, Agripino Roranes, and
Maximo Patos were on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan
Consolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel,
as it approached from the South Lizada Bridge going
towards the direction of Davao City at about 1:45 in the
afternoon of July 4,1979. At about that time, the cargo
track, loaded with cement bags, GI sheets, plywood,
driven by defendant Paul Zacarias y Infants, coming
from the opposite direction of Davao City and bound
for Glan, South Cotabato, had just crossed said bridge.
At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the cargo
truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which
Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos
sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. As a
result of the impact, the left side of the truck was
slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep,
including its fender and hood, was extensively
damaged. After the impact, the jeep fell and rested on
its right side on the asphalted road a few meters to the
rear of the truck, while the truck stopped on its wheels
on the road.
- On November 27, 1979, the instant case for damages
was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the
late Engineer Calibo who are residents of Tagbilaran
City against the driver and owners of the cargo truck.
- Trial Court dismissed the complaint (and
defendants' counterclaim) "for insufficiency of
evidence." The circumstances leading to the conclusion
just mentioned:
1. Moments before its collission with the truck being
operated by Zacarias, the jeep of the deceased Calibo
was "zigzagging."
2. Unlike Zacarias who readily submitted himself to
investigation by the police, Calibo's companions who
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- PAGE 77 -
suffered injuries on account of the collision, refused to

be so investigated or give statements to the police
officers. This, plus Roranes' waiver of the right to
institute criminal proceedings against Zacarias, and the
fact that indeed no criminal case was ever instituted in
Court against Zacarias, were "telling indications that
they did not attribute the happening to defendant
Zacarias' negligence or fault."
3. Roranes' testimony, given in plaintiffs' behalf, was
"not as clear and detailed as that of Zacarias," and was
"uncertain and even contradicted by the physical facts
and the police investigators Dimaano and Esparcia."
4. That there were skid marks left by the truck's tires at
the scene, and none by the jeep, demonstrates that the
driver of the truck had applied the brakes and the jeep's
driver had not; and that the jeep had on impact fallen on
its right side is indication that it was running at high
speed.
5. Even if it be considered that there was some
antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias shortly
before the collision, in that he had caused his truck to
run some 25 centimeters to the left of the center of the
road, Engr. Calibo had the last clear chance of avoiding
the accident because he still had ample room in his own
lane to steer clear of the truck, or he could simply have
braked to a full stop.
- IAC reversed TC. It found Zacarias to be negligent
on the basis of the following circumstances, to wit:
1) "the truck driven by defendant Zacarias occupied the
lane of the jeep when the collision occurred,' and
although Zacarias saw the jeep from a distance of about
150 meters, he "did not drive his truck back to his lane
in order to avoid collision with the oncoming jeep . . .;"
what is worse, "the truck driver suddenly applied his
brakes even as he knew that he was still within the lane
of the jeep;" had both vehicles stayed in their respective
lanes, the collision would never have occurred, they
would have passed "along side each other safely;"
2) Zacarias had no license at the time; what he handed
to Pfc. Esparcia, on the latter's demand, was the 'driver's
license of his co-driver Leonardo Baricuatro;"
3) the waiver of the right to file criminal charges against
Zacarias should not be taken against "plaintiffs"
prof. casis
Roranes and Patos who had the right, under the law, to
opt merely to bring a civil suit.
ISSUES
WON respondent court is correct in reversing the
decision of trial court.
HELD
NO.
Ratio The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as
valid and complete a defense to accident liability.
(Picart v Smith)
Reasoning Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found,
had had a full view of each other's vehicle from a
distance of one hundred fifty meters. Both vehicles
were travelling at a speed of approximately thirty
kilometers per hour. The private respondents have
admitted that the truck was already at a full stop when
the jeep plowed into it. And they have not seen fit to
deny or impugn petitioners' imputation that they also
admitted the truck had been brought to a stop while the
jeep was still thirty meters away. From these facts the
logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep
had what judicial doctrine has appropriately called
the last clear chance to avoid the accident, while still
at that distance of thirty meters from the truck, by
stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the
truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do while
running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In
those circumstances, his duty was to seize that
opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a
supposed right to expect, as the Appellate Court would
have it, the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path.
-Picart v Smith:
The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. Seeing an
automobile ahead he improperly pulled his horse over
to the railing on the right. The driver of the automobile,
however guided his car toward the plaintiff without
diminution of speed until he was only few feet away.
He then turned to the right but passed so closely to the
horse that the latter being frightened, jumped around
and was killed by the passing car. . . . .
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not
free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the
torts & damages

road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was
also negligent; and in such case the problem always is
to discover which agent is immediately and directly
responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of
the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the
negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence
of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last
fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do
so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
Dispositive WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of
the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby
REVERSED, and the complaint against herein
petitioners in Civil Case No. 3283 of the Court of First
Instance of Bohol, Branch IV, is DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Voting Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC v CAR
BASCOS BAESA
179 SCRA 384
CORTES J.: November 1989
FACTS:
At about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of June 12, 1981,
the spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their
children Harold Jim, Marceline and Maricar, together
with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Ico with their son
Erwin Ico and seven other persons, were aboard a
passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at Malalam
River, Ilagan, Isabela, to celebrate the fifth wedding
anniversary of Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa.
Upon reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right
and proceeded to MaIalam, River at a speed of about 20
kph. While they were proceeding towards Malalam
River, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on its
regular route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney's
lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with it.
- David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa
and their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa,
died while the rest of the passengers suffered injuries.
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- PAGE 77 -
The jeepney was extensively damaged. After the

accident the driver of the PANTRANCO Bus, Ambrosio
Ramirez, boarded a car and proceeded to Santiago,
Isabela. From that time on up to the present, Ramirez
has never been seen and has apparently remained in
hiding.
- Maricar Baesa through her guardian Francisca O.
Bascos and Fe O. Ico for herself and for her minor
children, filed separate actions for damages arising from
quasi-delict against PANTRANCO. Other victims
settled with Bus Company.
-PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the late David
Ico's alleged negligence as the proximate cause of the
accident, invoked the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its driver, Ambrosio
Ramirez
-TC ruled against PANTRANCO and ordered them to
pay damages.
-Pantranco appealed the decision. Appeal dismissed for
lack of merit
ISSUE:
WON PANTRANCO is liable for damages.
HELD: YES
-Petitioner claims that under the circumstances of the
case, it was the driver of the passenger jeepney who had
the last clear chance to avoid the collision and was
therefore negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable
care and competence his then existing opportunity to
avoid the harm.
-petitioner claims that the original negligence of its
driver was not the proximate cause of the accident and
that the sole proximate cause was the supervening
negligence of the jeepney driver David Ico in failing to
avoid the accident
- The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means
that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of defendant where it
appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences
to claimant notwithstanding his negligence.
-The doctrine applies only in a situation where the
plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence
but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid
the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable
prof. casis
for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding
the prior negligence of the plaintiff
- The above contention of petitioner is manifestly
devoid of merit. Contrary to the petitioner's contention,
the doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application
in this case
- Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the doctrine of
"last clear chance" finds no application in this case. For
the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show
that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to
avert the accident was aware of the existence of the
peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been
aware of it
- In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney
driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When
he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was
encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve
the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he
must have assumed that the bus driver will return the
bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney
approaching from the opposite direction.
- Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals found that at the time of the accident the
Pantranco bus was speeding towards Manila. At the
time David Ico must have realized that the bus was not
returning to its own lane, it was already too late to
swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent an accident.
- This Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine
"can never apply where the party charged is required to
act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided
by the application of all means at hand after the peril is
or should have been discovered"
- Petitioner likewise insists that David Ico was negligent
in failing to observe Section 43 (c), Article III Chapter
IV of Republic Act No. 4136** which provides that the
driver of a vehicle entering a through highway or a stop
intersection shall yield the right of way to all vehicles
approaching in either direction on such through
highway.
-Petitioner's misplaced reliance on the aforesaid law is
readily apparent in this case. The cited law itself
provides that it applies only to vehicles entering a
through highway or a stop intersection. At the time of
torts & damages

the accident, the jeepney had already crossed the
intersection and was on its way to Malalam River
-On the issue of its liability as an employer, petitioner
claims that it had observed the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage, conformably to
the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
-When an injury is caused by the negligence of an
employee, there instantly arises a presumption that the
employer has been negligent either in the selection of
his employees or in the supervision over their acts.
Although this presumption is only a disputable
presumption which could be overcome by proof of
diligence of a good father of a family, this Court
believes that the evidence submitted by the defendant to
show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family iti the case of Ramirez, as a company driver is
far from sufficient
ANURAN V BUO
17 SCRA 224
BENGZON, May 20, 1966
NATURE: Petition for Review by certiorari of CA
decision.
FACTS
- On January 12, 1958, a passenger jeepney was parked
on the road to Taal, Batangas. Buo, driver of said
jeepney stopped his vehicle in order to allow one of his
passengers to alight. But he parked his jeepney in such
a way that of its width (the left wheels) was on the
asphalted pavement of the road and the other half, on
the right shoulder of the said road. A motor truck
speeding along, negligently bumped it from behind,
which such violence that three of its passengers died,
even as 2 other passengers suffered injuries that
required their confinement at the Provincial Hospital for
many days.
- Suits were instituted by the representatives of the dead
and the injured, to recover consequently damages
against the drivers and the owners of the trucks and also
against the driver and the owners of the jeepney.
- CFI Batangas absolved the driver of the jeepney and
its owners, but it required the truck driver and the
owners o make compensation. Plaintiffs appealed to the
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- PAGE 77 -
CA insisting that the driver and the owners of the

jeepney should also be made liable for damages.
ISSUE
WON the driver and owners of the jeepney should also
be made liable.
HELD
YES. An error of law was committed in releasing the
jeepney from liability. It must be remembered that the
obligation of the carrier to transport its passengers
safely is such that the New Civil Code requires utmost
diligence from the carriers (Art. 1755) who are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they have observed
extraordinary diligence (Art. 1756). In this instance,
this legal presumption of negligence is confirmed by the
CAs finding that jeepney driver in question was at fault
in parking the vehicle improperly. It must follow that
the driver and the owners of the jeepney must
answer for injuries to its passengers.
Obiter on Application of Principle of Last Clear
Chance: The principle about the last clear chance
applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of the
two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a
passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to
enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be
inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the
jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other
driver was likewise guilty of negligence. This principle
does not apply in this case.
DISPOSITION: Judgment modified.
CANLAS V, CA
Purisima; February 28, 2000
Nature
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Facts
-Sometime in August, 1982, Osmundo S. Canlas, and
Vicente Maosca, decided to venture in business and to
raise the capital needed therefor. The former then
executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing the
latter to mortgage two parcels of land situated in San
Dionisio, (BF Homes) Paranaque, Metro Manila, each
prof. casis
lot with semi-concrete residential house in the name of
the SPS Canlas. Osmundo Canlas agreed to sell the said
parcels of land to Vicente Maosca, for and in
consideration of P850,000.00, P500,000.00 of which
payable within one week, and the balance of
P350,000.00 to serve as his (Osmundo's) investment in
the business. Thus, Osmundo Canlas delivered to
Vicente Maosca the transfer certificates of title of the
parcels of land involved. Vicente Maosca, as his part
of the transaction, issued two postdated checks in favor
of Osmundo Canlas in the amounts of P40,000.00 and
P460,000.00, respectively, but it turned out that the
check covering the bigger amount was not sufficiently
funded.
-On September 3, 1982, Vicente Maosca was able to
mortgage the same parcels of land for P100,000.00 to a
certain Attorney Manuel Magno, with the help of
impostors who misrepresented themselves as the
spouses, Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. On
September 29, 1982, private respondent Vicente
Maosca was granted a loan by the respondent Asian
Savings Bank (ASB) in the amount of P500,000.00,
with the use of subject parcels of land as security, and
with the involvement of the same impostors who again
introduced themselves as the Canlas spouses. When the
loan it extended was not paid, respondent bank
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage.
-On January 15, 1983, Osmundo Canlas wrote a letter
informing the respondent bank that the execution of
subject mortgage over the two parcels of land in
question was without their (Canlas spouses) authority,
and request that steps be taken to annul and/or revoke
the questioned mortgage. On January 18, 1983,
petitioner Osmundo Canlas also wrote the office of
Sheriff Maximo O. Contreras, asking that the auction
sale scheduled on February 3, 1983 be cancelled or held
in abeyance. But respondents Maximo C. Contreras and
Asian Savings Bank refused to heed petitioner Canlas'
stance and proceeded with the scheduled auction sale.
-Consequently, on February 3, 1983 the herein
petitioners instituted the present case for annulment of
deed of real estate mortgage with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; and on
May 23, 1983, the trial court issued an Order restraining
torts & damages

the respondent sheriff from issuing the corresponding
Certificate of Sheriff's Sale.For failure to file his
answer, despite several motions for extension of time
for the filing thereof, Vicente Maosca was declared in
default. Lower court a quo came out with a decision
annulling subject deed of mortgage and disposing.
Asian Savings Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals
and CA reversed the lower court decision.
Issue/s and Held
WON CA erred in holding that the mortgage is valid
Settled is the rule that a contract of mortgage must
be constituted only by the absolute owner on the
property mortgaged; a mortgage, constituted by an
impostor is void. Considering that it was established
indubitably that the contract of mortgage sued upon
was entered into and signed by impostors who
misrepresented themselves as the spouses Osmundo
Canlas and Angelina Canlas, the Court is of the
ineluctible conclusion and finding that subject
contract of mortgage is a complete nullity.
WON ASB must incur the resulting loss
Yes. The doctrine of last clear chance is applicable,
the respondent bank must suffer the resulting loss.
In essence, the doctrine of last clear chance is to the
effect that where both parties are negligent but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of
time than that of the other, or where it is impossible
to determine whose fault or negligence brought
about the occurrence of the incident, the one who
had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable
with the consequences arising therefrom. Stated
differently, the rule is that the antecedent negligence
of a person does not preclude recovery of damages
caused by the supervening negligence of the latter,
who had the last fair chance to prevent the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
In the case under consideration, from the evidence on
hand it can be gleaned unerringly that respondent bank
did not observe the requisite diligence in ascertaining or
verifying the real identity of the couple who introduced
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- PAGE 77 -
themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and

Angelina Canlas. It is worthy to note that not even a
single identification card was exhibited by the said
impostors to show their true identity; and yet, the bank
acted on their representations simply on the basis of the
residence certificates bearing signatures which tended
to match the signatures affixed on a previous deed of
mortgage to a certain Atty. Magno, covering the same
parcels of land in question.
Applying Art. 1173 It could be said that the degree of
diligence required of banks is more than that of a good
father of a family in keeping with their responsibility to
exercise the necessary care and prudence in dealing
even on a registered or titled property. The business of a
bank is affected with public interest, holding in trust the
money of the depositors, which bank deposits the bank
should guard against loss due to negligence or bad faith,
by reason of which the bank would be denied the
protective mantle of the land registration law, accorded
only to purchasers or mortgagees for value and in good
faith.
Evidently, the efforts exerted by the bank to verify the
identity of the couple posing as Osmundo Canlas and
Angelina Canlas fell short of the responsibility of the
bank to observe more than the diligence of a good
father of a family. The negligence of respondent bank
was magnified by the fact that the previous deed of
mortgage (which was used as the basis for checking the
genuineness of the signatures of the supposed Canlas
spouses) did not bear the tax account number of the
spouses, as well as the Community Tax Certificate of
Angelina Canlas. But such fact notwithstanding, the
bank did not require the impostors to submit additional
proof of their true identity.
For not observing the degree of diligence required of
banking institutions, whose business is impressed with
public interest, respondent Asian Savings Bank has to
bear the loss sued upon.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated September 30,
1993, in CA-G.R. CV No. 25242 SET ASIDE. The
prof. casis
Decision of Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City in Civil Case No. M-028 is hereby
REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt
CONSOLIDATED BANK V CA (L.C.DIAZ AND
CO.)
GR No. 138569
CARPIO; September 11, 2003
NATURE
Review of the decision of the CA
FACTS
- LC Diaz is a professional partnership engaged in
accounting. On 14 August 1991, LC diaz, thru its
cashier, instructed their messenger, Calapre, to deposit
money in Solidbank. Calapre then deposited in
Solidbank. Since the transaction took time and Calapre
had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied
Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. When he
came back, the teller told him that somebody else got
the passbook. The next day, it was learned that 300k
was withdrawn from the account.
- An information for estafa was filed against one of their
messengers (Ilagan) and one Roscoe Verdazola. LC
Diaz demanded SolidBank the return of their money.
The latter refused and a case for recovery of a sum of
money was filed against them
- TC applied rules on savings account written on the
passbook. The rules state that possession of this book
shall raise the presumption of ownership and any
payment or payments made by the bank upon the
production of the said book and entry therein of the
withdrawal shall have the same effect as if made to the
depositor
personally.
HYPERLINK
"http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/s
ep2003/138569.htm" \l "_ftn9" \o "" Also, they applied
the rule that the holder of the passport is presumed the
owner. It was also held that Solidbank did not have any
participation in the custody and care of the passbook
and as such, their act was not the proximate cause of the
loss. The proximate cause was LC Diaz negligence.
torts & damages

- CA revered. It ruled that Solidbanks negligence was
the proximate cause. It applied the provision on the CC
on quasi delicts and found that the requisite elements
were present. They found that the teller made no inquiry
upon the withdrawal of 300k. The teller could have
called up LC Diaz since the amount being drawn was
significant. The appellate court ruled that while L.C.
Diaz was also negligent in entrusting its deposits to its
messenger and its messenger in leaving the passbook
with the teller, Solidbank could not escape liability
because of the doctrine of last clear chance.
Solidbank could have averted the injury suffered by
L.C. Diaz had it called up L.C. Diaz to verify the
withdrawal.
ISSUES
WON Solidbank was liable
HELD
- For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to
negligence, or culpa contractual, the bank is liable to its
depositor.
- When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbanks
tellers during withdrawals, the law imposes on
Solidbank and its tellers an even higher degree of
diligence in safeguarding the passbook. Likewise,
Solidbanks tellers must exercise a high degree of
diligence in insuring that they return the passbook only
to the depositor or his authorized representative
- In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a
breach of contract, there is a presumption that the
defendant was at fault or negligent. The burden is on
the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or
negligent. Solidbank failed to discharge this burden.
(they could have presented the teller to whom the
passbook was left, but they didnt)
- L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in
the hands of the impostor. Solidbank was in possession
of the passbook while it was processing the deposit.
After completion of the transaction, Solidbank had the
contractual obligation to return the passbook only to
Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz.
SolidBanks negligence in returning the passbook was
the proximate cause.
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- PAGE 77 -
- The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both

parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence
caused the loss, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is
chargeable
with
the
loss.
HYPERLINK
ep2003/138569.htm" \l "_ftn29" \o ""
Stated
differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff
does not preclude him from recovering damages caused
by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who
had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm
by the exercise of due diligence. HYPERLINK
ep2003/138569.htm" \l "_ftn30" \o ""
- We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to
the present case. Solidbank is liable for breach of
contract due to negligence in the performance of its
contractual obligation to L.C. Diaz. This is a case of
culpa contractual, where neither the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to
avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from
liability.
HYPERLINK
ep2003/138569.htm" \l "_ftn31" \o ""
Such
contributory negligence or last clear chance by the
plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of
damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the
defendant from his breach of contract.
DISPOSITIVE
Decision affirmed, modification only to damages
ENGADA V CA
QUISUMBING, J.: June 20, 2003
NATURE
Petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision
HYPERLINK
un2003/140698.htm" \l "_ftn1" \o "" of the CA which
affirmed with modification the judgment HYPERLINK
prof. casis
un2003/140698.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o "" of the RTC of
Iloilo City
FACTS
- On November 29, 1989, at about 1:30 in the
afternoon, Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota
Tamaraw jeepney bound for Iloilo City. On board was
Sheila Seyan, the registered owner of the Tamaraw. The
Tamaraw passengers allegedly saw from the opposite
direction a speeding Isuzu pick-up, driven by petitioner
Rogelio Engada. When it was just a few meters away
from the Tamaraw, the Isuzu pick-ups right signal light
flashed, at the same time, it swerved to its left,
encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and headed
towards a head-on collision course with it. Seyan
shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up. Iran swerved to his
left but the pick-up also swerved to its right. Thus, the
pick-up collided with the Tamaraw, hitting the latter at
its right front passenger side. The impact caused the
head and chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from its
body. Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and
landed on a ricefield. Seyan incurred P130,000 in
medical expenses. The Toyota Tamaraw jeepney ended
up in the junk heap. Its total loss was computed at
P80,000.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioners negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident
HELD
1. YES. Ratio It is a settled rule that a driver
abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of
overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has
the duty to see to it that the road is clear and he should
not proceed if he cannot do so in safety. For failing to
observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on
drivers of vehicles abandoning their lane, petitioner
must be held liable. Iran could not be faulted when in
his attempt to avoid the pick-up, he swerved to his left.
Petitioners acts had put Iran in an emergency situation
which forced him to act quickly. An individual who
suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is
required to act without much time to consider the best
torts & damages

means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to
undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was
brought by his own negligence.
Reasoning The doctrine of last clear chance states that a
person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of
avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts
of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible
for the consequences of the accident. HYPERLINK
un2003/140698.htm" \l "_ftn19" \o "" But what has
been shown is the presence of an emergency and the
proper application of the emergency rule. There was no
clear chance to speak of. Iran swerved to the left only to
avoid petitioners pick-up, which was already on a head
to head position going against Irans Tamaraw jeepney
immediately before the vehicles collided. No
convincing proof was adduced by petitioner that Iran
could have avoided a head-on collision.
A2010
- Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies,

as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia
broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death,
was a complication of rabies
- Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages,
alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the
possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually
killed their daughter.
- Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu sustained the defendants. IAC found that the
Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and
so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil
Code for the injuries caused by the dog.
- On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court
finds that the link between the dog bites and the
certified cause of death has been satisfactorily
established.
STRICT LIABILITY
Petitioners Claim
The Vestils are liable for the death of Theness, since
they own the dog that bit her.
Respondents Comments
The dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that
it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had
witnessed it bite Theness.
VESTIL V IAC (UY)

179 SCRA 47
CRUZ; December 6, 1989
ISSUE
WON the Vestils are liable for the damage caused by
the dog.
NATURE
Petition to reinstate the decision of the Appellate Court.
HELD
Ratio The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the
Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the
presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of
the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural
equity and on the principle of social interest that he who
possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service
must answer for the damage which such animal may
cause.
Reasoning
ART. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever
may make use of the same is responsible for the damage
which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost.
This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage
Dispositive
The appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
FACTS
- July 29, 1975: Theness was bitten by a dog while she
was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house
of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil.
She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where
she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the
forehead. She was discharged after nine days but was
re-admitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva."
The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died.
The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia.
prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
should come from force majeure or from the fault of the

person who has suffered damage.
- While it is true that she is not really the owner of the
house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate,
there is no doubt that she and her husband were its
possessors at the time of the incident in question.
- There is evidence showing that she and her family
regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly.
- Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies,
as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia
broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death,
was a complication of rabies. The Court finds that the
link between the dog bites and the certified cause of
death has been satisfactorily established.
- It does not matter that the dog was tame and was
merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law
does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even
tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the
alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness
was only three years old at the time she was attacked
and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have
done to the animal.
- Obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code
is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack
of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal
causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on
the principle of social interest that he who possesses
animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer
for the damage which such animal may cause.
DISPOSITION
The Court approves the time.
DINGCONG vs. KANAAN
72 Phil. 14; G.R. No. L-47033
AVANCEA; April 25, 1941
NATURE
Petition for certiorari assailing the decision
of the CA
FACTS
-The brothers Loreto and Jose Dingcong
rented the house of Emilia Saenz (in Jose
torts & damages

Ma. Basa Street of the City of Iloilo) and
established the Central Hotel. Among the
hotel's guests is Francisco Echevarria,
paying P30 a month, and occupying room
no. 10 of said hotel. Kanaan, on the other
hand, occupies the ground floor of the hotel
and established his "American Bazaar"
dedicated to the purchase and sale of
articles and merchandise.
-Around 11pm of 19 September 1933,
Echevarria, when retiring to bed, carelessly
left the faucet open that with only an
ordinary basin without drainage. That time,
the pipes of the hotel were under repair;
the water run off the pipes and spilled to
the ground, wetting the articles and
merchandise of the "American Bazaar,"
causing a loss which the CFI sets at
P1,089.61.
-The Kanaans (Halim, Nasri and Michael),
representing the establishment "American
Bazaar," thereafter filed this complaint for
damages against Loreto Dingcong, Jose
Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria.
-CFI held Francisco Echevarria liable, and
acquitted Jose Dingcong. CA reversed and
declared
Jose
Dingcong
responsible,
sentencing him to pay the plaintiffs
damages.
ISSUE
WON
Jose
Dingcong
and Francisco
Echevarria are liable for damages
HELD
YES.
-Francisco Echevarria, the hotel guest, is
liable for being the one who directly, by his
negligence in leaving open the faucet,
caused the water to spill to the ground and
wet the articles and merchandise of the
plaintiffs.
-Jose Dingcong, being a co-renter and
manager of the hotel, with complete
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prof. casis
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possession of the house, must also be

responsible for the damages caused. He
failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family to prevent these
damages, despite his power and authority
to cause the repair of the pipes.
Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed,
with the costs against apellant.
AFABLE V SINGER
COMPANY
58 PHIL 14
VICKERS; March 6, 1933
SEWING
MACHINE
NATURE
Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila
FACTS
- Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the
Singer Sewing Machine Company in the district of San
Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of the City of
Manila, and he was supposed to be residing in his
district according to the records of the company.
- One Sunday afternoon, Leopoldo Madlangbayan
while riding a bicycle was run over and fatally injured
at the corner of O'Donnel and Zurbaran streets in the
City of Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay.
- It appears that Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora
Alonso St. in Manila without notifying the company,
and that at the time of his death he was returning home
after making some collections in San Francisco del
Monte.
- According to the practice of the company, if collectors
made collections on Sunday they were required to
deliver the amount collected to the company the next
morning.
- The widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan
brought an action to recover from the defendant
corporation under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act.
No. 3812, P100 for burial expenses and P1,745.12 for
compensation.
- Plaintiffs' complaint was subsequently amended, and
they sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act
No. 3428 fifty per cent of P16.78 for 208 weeks of

P1,745.12 plus P100 for burial expenses.
- Defendant as special defenses alleged that Leopoldo
Madlangbayan at the time that he sustained the injuries
resulting in his death was violating an ordinance of the
City of Manila which prohibits work on Sunday; and
that Act No. 3428, as amended, is unconstitutional and
void because it denies the defendant the equal
protection of the law, and impairs the obligation of the
contract between the defendant and Leopoldo
Madlangbayan, and deprives the Courts of First
Instance of their probate jurisdiction over the estate of
deceased persons and nullifies Chapters XXIX, XXX,
XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII, and XXXIV of the Civil Code
Procedure and related articles of the Civil Code.
ISSUE
WON the employer is liable to pay the employees
heirs.
RULING
NO.
- As the deceased Leopoldo Madlangbayan was killed
on November 16, 1930 and Act No. 3812 was not
approved until December 8, 1930, it is apparent that the
law which is applicable is Act No. 3428, section 23 of
which reads as follows:
When any employee receives a personal injury
from any accident due to in the pursuance of the
employment, or contracts any illness directly
caused by such employment or the result of the
nature of such employment, his employer shall pay
compensation in the sums and to the persons
hereinafter specified.
- The accident which caused the death of the employee
was not due to and in pursuance of his employment.
- At the time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo
Madlangbayan was not in the pursuance of his
employment with the defendant corporation, but was on
his way home after he had finished his work for the day
and had left the territory where he was authorized to
take collections for the defendant.
- The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental
injuries which might happen to an employee while in
torts & damages

the course of the employment", and as a general rule an
employee is not entitled to recover from personal
injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him
while going to or returning from his place of
employment, because such an accident does no arise out
of and in the course of his employment.
- The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in
section 2 of Act No. 3428 was changed in Act No. 3812
to "arising out of and in the course of". Discussing this
phrase, the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of
Mueller Construction Co. vs. Industrial Board, said:
The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or
cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its
character, while the words "in the course of" refer
to the time, place, and circumstances under which
the accident takes place. By the use of these words
it was not the intention of the legislature to make
the employer an insurer against all accidental
injuries which might happen to an employee while
in the course of the employment, but only for such
injuries arising from or growing out of the risks
peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of
the workman's employment of incidental to such
employment, and accidents in which it is possible
to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which
the employee is exposed in a special degree by
reason of such employment. Risks to which all
persons similarly situated are equally exposed and
not traceable in some special degree to the
particular employment are excluded.
- If the deceased had been killed while going from
house to house in San Francisco del Monte in the
pursuance of his employment, the plaintiffs would
undoubtedly have the right, prima facie, to recover.
- In the case at bar the deceased was going from work in
his own conveyance.
- Furthermore, it appears that the deceased had never
notified the defendant corporation of his removal from
San Francisco del Monte of Manila, and that the
company did not know that he was living in Manila on
the day of the accident; that the defendant company did
not require its employees to work on Sunday, or furnish
or require its agents to use bicycles.
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prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
- These are additional reasons for holding that the

accident was not due to and pursuance of the
employment of the deceased. If the deceased saw fit to
change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to
Manila and to make use a bicycle in going back and
forth, he did so at his own risk, as the defendant
company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to
use one; and if he made collections on Sunday, he did
not do so in pursuance of his employment, and his
employer is not liable for any injury sustained by him.
DISPOSITION The decision appealed from was
affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS
(GERONIMO)
227 SCRA 292
DAVIDE, JR.; October 18, 1993
PHILS
CA
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals
FACTS
- Lydia Geronimo was engaged in the business of
selling food and drinks to children in the Kindergarten
Wonderland Canteen located in Dagupan.
- August 12, 1989 - A group of parents complained that
they found fibrous material in the bottles of Coke and
Sprite that their children bought from Geronimos store.
Geronimo examined her stock of softdrinks and found
that there were indeed fibrous materials in the unopened
soda bottles. She brought the bottles to the Department
of Health office in their region and was informed that
the soda samples she sent were adulterated.
- Because of this, Geronimos sales plummeted with her
regular sales of 10 cases day dwindling to about 2 or 3
cases. Her losses amounted to P200 to P300 a day
which later on forced her to close down her business on
December 12, 1989.
- She demanded payment of damages from plaintiff
Coca-Cola but the latter did not accede to her demands.
- The trial court ruled in favor of Coca-Cola, stating that
the complaint was based on a contract and not a quasi-
delict because of pre-existing relation between the

parties. Thus the complaint should have been filed
within 6 months from the delivery of the thing sold.
- The trial court however annulled the questioned orders
of the RTC and directed it to conduct further
proceedings in the civil case. According to the CA:
the allegations in the complaint plainly show that it is
an action for damages arising from respondents act of
recklessly and negligently manufacturing adulterated
food items intended to be sol for public consumption.
It also noted that the availability of an action for breach
of warranty does not bar an action for torts in a sale of
defective goods.
Petitioners Claim:
- Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies
and prescription.
- Since the complaint is for breach of warranty (under
A1561, CC), it should have been brought within 6
months from the delivery of the goods.
- Geronimo alleges that her complaint is one for
damages which does not involve an administrative
action.
- Her cause of action is based on an injury to plaintiffs
right which can be brought within 4 years (based on
A1146, CC).
ISSUE
WON the complaint is founded on a quasi-delict and
pursuant to A1146(12), CC, the action prescribes in 4
years
HELD
YES
Reasoning
- The vendees remedies against a vendor with respect
to the warranties against hidden defects or
encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to
those prescribed in A1567. The vendee may also ask
for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or
fraud in which case the ordinary rule on obligations
shall be applicable.
torts & damages

- Under American law, the liabilities of the
manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may
be based on negligence, breach of warranty, tort or
other grounds.
DISPOSITION The instant petition is denied for lack
of merit.
GILCHRIST v CUDDY
29 Phil 542
TRENT; February 18, 1915
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- PAGE 77 -
requires as a condition precedent to the liability of the

tortfeasor that he must know the identity of a person to
whom he causes damage. No such knowledge is
required in order that the injured party may recover for
the damages suffered.
- Tek Hua filed an injunction and an action for

nullification of the contracts between Trendsetter and
DC Chuan. The lower Court ruled in favor of Tek Hua.
The CA, on appeal, upheld the trial court. Both the trial
court and the CA awarded legal fees only.
DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed
ISSUE
- WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference
of contract
SON PING BUN vs CA (Tek Hua)

GR No. 120554
Quisumbing; September 21, 1999
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the CFI
FACTS
-Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar. Gilchrist
was the owner of a theatre in Iloilo. They entered into a
contract whereby Cuddy leased to Gilchrist the
Zigomar for exhibition in his theatre for a week for
P125.
- Cuddy returned the money already paid by Gilchrist
days before the delivery date so that he can lease the
film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga instead and receive P350
for the film for the same period.
- Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against
Cuddy, Espejo and Zaldarriaga. He also prayed for
damages against Espejo and Zaldarriaga for interfering
with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy.
ISSUE
WON Espejo and Zaldarriaga is liable for interfering
with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not
knowing at the time the identity of the parties
HELD
YES
- Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with
the contract and causing its breach. This liability arises
from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations
to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist.
- Article 1902 of the Civil Code provides that a person
who, by act or omission causes damage to another when
there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to pay for
the damage done. There is nothing in this article which
prof. casis
NATURE
Appeal on certiorari for review of CA decision
FACTS
- In 1963, Tek hua Trading, through its Managing
Director So Pek Giok, entered into a lease agreement
with D.C. Chuan covering four stalls in Binondo. The
contracts were initially for one year but after expiry of
the same, they continued on a month to month basis. In
1976, Tek Hua was dissolved with the original members
forming a new corporation, Tek Hua Enterprises with
Manuel Tiong as one of the incorporators.
- So Ping Bun, on the death of his grandfather, So Pek
Giok, occupied the same stalls under the business name,
Trendsetter Marketing.
- In 1989, the lessor, DC Chuan sent a letter to Tek Hua
advising it of a 25% increase in rent effective
September 1, 1989. A further rent increase of 30%
effective January 1, 1990 was implemented. Enclosed
in both letters were new lease contracts for signing.
While the letters contained a statement that the leases
will be terminated if the contracts were not signed, the
same were not rescinded.
- In 1991, Tiong wrote a letter to So Ping Bun asking
him to vacate the four stalls as the same were going to
be used by them. Instead of vacating the stalls, So was
able to secure lease agreements from DC Chuan.
HELD- Yes. A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is

respect for the property of others, and a cause of action
ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful
interference by one party of the enjoyment of the other
of his private property. In the case at bar, petitioner,
Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts
in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived
respondent of the latters property right.
Reasoning- Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from
injury, and damges are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. One becomes liable in
an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of
anothers interest in the private use and enjoyment of
asset if
a) the other has property rights and privileges
with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with;
b) the invasion is substantial;
c) the defendants conduct is a legal cause of
the invasion;
d) the invasion is either intentional and
unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under the
general negligence
rules.
- On the other hand, the elemts of tort interference are
a) existence of a valid contract
b) knowledge on the part of the third party of
its existence
torts & damages

c) interference of the third party is without
legal justification or
excuse
- Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek
Hua and DC Chuan, Tek Hua in fact had property rights
over the leased stalls. The action of Trendsetter in
asking DC Chuan to execute the contracts in their favor
was unlawful interference.
- The SC handled the question of whether the
interference may be justified considering that So acted
solely for the purpose of furthering his own financial or
economic interest. It stated that it is sufficient that the
impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest
rather than in wrongful motives to conclude that So was
not a malicious interferer. Nothing on the record
imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on the
part of So. Hence the lack of malice precludes the
award of damages.
- The provision in the Civil Code with regard tortuous
interference is Article 1314 which states that any third
party who induces another to violate his contract shall
be liable for damages to the other contracting party.
The Court ratiocinated that the recovery of legal fees is
in the concept of actual or compensatory damages as
provided in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. In this
casse, due to defendants action of interference, plaintiff
was forced to seek relief through the Court snd thereby
incur expenses to protect his interests. The Court,
however, found the award exorbitant. It was reduced to
Pesos 100,000.00
Disposition
Petition denied. CA decision affirmed subject to the
modified award of attorneys fees.
GUILATCO v CITY OF DAGUPAN
171 SCRA 382
SARMIENTO; Mar 21, 1989
Nature:
Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of CA
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- PAGE 77 -
Facts:
0 on July 25, 1978, Florentina Guilatco, a court
interpreter, accidentally fell into a manhole while she
was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk
at Perez Blvd. Her right leg was fractured, due to
which she was hospitalized, operated on, and
confined.
1 She averred that she suffered mental and physical
pain, and that she has difficulty in locomotion. She
has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter (at
the time of filing of complaint) and thus lost income.
She also lost weight, and she is no longer her former
jovial self. Moreover, she has been unable to perform
her religious, social, and other activities which she
used to do prior to the incident.
2 Police confirmed existence of the manhole, which
was partially covered by a concrete flower pot by
leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long by 1 feet wide
or 42 cm wide by 75 cm long by 150 cm deep.
3 City Engineer of Dagupan Alfredo Tangco admitted
that the manhole is owned by the National
Government and the sidewalk on which they are
found along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the
National Government. He said that he supervises the
maintenance of said manholes and sees to it that they
are properly covered, and the job is specifically done
by his subordinates.
4 Trial court ordered the city to pay Guilatco actual,
moral and exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees.
CA reversed the lower courts ruling on the ground
that no evidence was presented to prove that City of
Dagupan had control or supervision over Perez Blvd.
5 City contends that Perez Blvd is a national road that
is not under the control or supervision of the City of
Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city.
Issue
WON control or supervision over a national road by the
City of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to
answer for damages in accordance with article 2189
CC.
Held
prof. casis
YES
6 The liability of private corporations for damages
arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the
defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil
Code as follows:
Article
2189.
Provinces,
cities
and
municipalities shall be liable for damages for
the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person
by reason of the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other
public works under their control or
supervision.
7 It is not even necessary for the defective road or
street to belong to the province, city or municipality
for liability to attach. The article only requires that
either control or supervision is exercised over the
defective road or street.
8 In this case, control or supervision is provided for in
the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the
City Engineer.
9 The charter only lays down general rules regulating
that liability of the city. On the other hand, article
2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from
defective streets, public buildings and other public
works.
On Damages awarded
10
Actual damages of P10000 reduced to proven
expenses of P8053.65. The trial court should not have
rounded off the amount. The court can not rely on
speculation, conjecture or guess work as to the
amount.
11
Moral damages of P150000 is excessive and is
reduced to P20000. Guilatcos handicap was not
permanent and disabled her only during her treatment
which lasted for one year.
12
Exemplary damages of P50000 reduced to
P10000.
13
Award of P7420 as lost income for one year,
plus P450 bonus remain the same
14
P3000 as attorneys fees remain the same
Disposition Petition granted. CA decision reversed and
set aside, decision of trial court reinstated with
modification.
torts & damages

PERSONS LIABLE
WORCESTER v OCAMPO
22 PHIL 42
Johnson; Feb. 27, 1912
NATURE
FACTS
- Plaintiff Dean Worcester, member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the
Interior of the Insular Government commenced an
action against defendants Ocampo, Kalaw, Santos,
Reyes, Aguilar, Liquete, Palma, Arellano, Jose,
Lichauco, Barretto and Cansipit (owners, directors,
writers, editors and administrators of a certain
newspaper known as El Renacimiento or Muling
Pagsilang) for the purpose of recovering damages
resulting from an alleged libelous publication.
- The editorial Birds of Prey was alleged to have
incited the Filipino people into believing that plaintiff
was a vile despot and a corrupt person, unworthy of the
position which he held. The said editorial alluded to
him as an eagle that surprises and devours, a vulture
that gorges himself on dead and rotten meat, an owl that
affects a petulant omniscience, and a vampire that sucks
the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless.
- After hearing the evidence adduced during trial, the
judge of the CFI rendered judgment in favor of
petitioner, holding all the defendants (except for Reyes,
Aguilar and Liquete who were found to be editors but in
a subordinate position and found to have merely acted
under the direction of their superiors) liable jointly and
severally for sustained damages on account of
petitioners wounded feelings, mental suffering and
injuries to his standing and reputation in the sum of
P35,000 as well as P25,000 as punitive damages.
- This judgment prompted defendants to appeal to the
SC, claiming that the CFI committed several errors in
rendering said judgment among which was that the
lower court committed an error in rendering a judgment
jointly and severally against the defendants.
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- PAGE 77 -
ISSUE
WON the defendants, regardless of their participation in
the commission of the actual tort, may be held jointly
and severally liable as joint tortfeasors
HELD
YES.
Ratio Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who
command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission
of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for
their benefit.
Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the
tort which they commit. They are each liable as
principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as
if they had performed the wrongful act themselves.
***If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff
or person injured, has his election to sue all or some of
the parties jointly, or one of them separately, because
tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual.
Reasoning Defendants fail to recognize that the basis of
the present action is a tort. They fail to recognize the
universal doctrine that each joint tortfeasor is not only
individually liable for the tort in which he participates,
but is also jointly liable with his tortfeasors. The
defendants might have been sued separately for the
commission of the tort. They might have sued jointly
and severally, as they were. It is not necessary that the
cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act. **note:
Ponente used examples of torts as held under common
law** (In a case of assault and battery committed by
various persons, under the common law, all are
principals). So also is the person who counsels, aids, or
assists in any way the commission of a wrong. Under
the common law, he who aided, assisted or counseled,
in any way the commission of a crime, was as much a
principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual
tort.
- Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the
tort which they commit. The person injured may sue all
of them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for
the whole damage caused by all, and altogether jointly
liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one
prof. casis
sued alone, that the others who participated in the
wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants; nor
is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort
was insignificant as compared with that of the others.
- The courts during the trial may find that some of the
alleged joint tortfeasors are liable and that others are not
liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence
while condemning others of the alleged tort. And this is
true even though they are charged jointly and severally.
However, in this case, the lower court, committed no
error in rendering a joint and several judgment against
the defendants. As recognized by Section 6 of Act 277
of the Philippine Commission: Every author, editor, or
proprietor * * * is chargeable with the publication of
any words in any part * * * or number of each
newspaper, as fully as if he were the author of the same.
Disposition Judgment of the lower court modified.
Ocampo, Kalaw, Palma, Arellano, Jose, Lichauco,
Barretto, and Cansipit held jointly and severally liable
for the sum of P25, 000 with interest at 6%. Santos
absolved from any liability.
ARELLANO, C.J. and MAPA, J. [concurring]
- We concur, except with reference to the liability
imposed upon Lichauco. The real owner and founder,
Ocampo, explicitly stated that the other so-called
founders subscribed and paid sums of money to aid the
paper but as to Lichauco, he offered to contribute, but
did not carry out his offer and in fact paid nothing. It is
incomprehensible how one could claim the right or title
to share the earnings or profits of a company when he
had put no capital into it, neither is it comprehensible
how one could share in the losses thereof, and still less
incur liability for damages on account of some act of
the said company, an unrestricted liability to the extent
of all his property, as though he were a regular general
partner when he was not such.
TORRES [dissenting in part]
- I concur in regard to the defendants Ocampo and
Kalaw, but dissent as regards Palma, Arellano, Jose,
Lichauco, Barretto, and Cansipit for they had neither
direct nor indirect participation in the act that gave rise
to the present suit for damages, nor were they owners or
torts & damages

proprietors of the newspaper, its press or other
equipment. They were donors who merely contributed a
sum of money, as a genuine gift, for the purpose of
founding, editing, and issuing the said newspaper, it is
improper to deduce that the contributors formed a
company of either a civil or commercial nature.
- After Ocampo had accepted the various amounts
proffered, the donors ceased to be the owners of and
surrendered all right to the money donated and to the
objects that were acquired therewith. Therefore they can
not incur, jointly and severally with the director and
manager.
CHAPMAN V UNDERWOOD
27 Phil 374
MORELAND; March 28, 1914
NATURE
Appeal from the judgment of trial court finding for the
defendant
FACTS
- The plaintiff-appellant, Chapman, desired to board a
certain "San Marcelino" car coming from Sta. Ana and
bound for Manila. Being told by his friend that the car
was approaching, he immediately, and somewhat
hurriedly, passed into the street for the purpose of
signaling and boarding the car. The car was a closed
one, the entrance being from the front or the rear
platform. Plaintiff attempted to board the front platform
but, seeing that he could not reach it without extra
exertion, stopped beside the car, facing toward the rear
platform, and waited for it to come abreast of him in
order to board. While in this position he was struck
from behind and run over by the defendant's
(Underwood) automobile.
- The defendant entered Calle Herran at Calle
Peafrancia in his automobile driven by his chauffeur, a
competent driver. A street car bound from Manila to
Sta. Ana being immediately in front of him, he followed
along behind it. Just before reaching the scene of the
accident the street car which was following took the
switch (there was a single-track street-car line running
along Calle Herran, with occasional switches to allow
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prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
cars to meet and pass each other)- that is, went off the
main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside of
the main track. Thereupon the defendant either kept
straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to the
right. The car which the plaintiff intended to board was
on the main line and bound in an opposite direction to
that in which the defendant was going. When the front
of the "San Marcelino" car was almost in front of the
defendant's automobile, defendant's driver suddenly
went to the right and struck and ran over the plaintiff.
- The judgment of the trial court was for defendant.
ISSUE
WON Underwood is responsible for the negligence of
his driver.
HELD
NO.
Ratio An owner who sits in his automobile or other
vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation
of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he
has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to
direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself
responsible for such acts. On the other hand, if the
driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the
owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the
act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the
criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although
present herein at5 the time the act was committed, is not
responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefore. The
act complained of must be continued in the presence or
the owner for such a length of time that the owner by
his acquiescence, makes his drivers act his own.
Reasoning Defendant's driver was guilty of negligence
in running upon and over the plaintiff. He was passing
an oncoming car upon the wrong side.
- The plaintiff needed only to watch for cars coming
from his right, as they were the only ones under the law
permitted to pass upon that side of the street car.
- in the case of Johnson vs. David, the driver does not
fall within the list of persons in Art.1903 of the Civil
Code for whose acts the defendant would be
responsible.
Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle

was not present at the time the alleged negligent acts
were committed by the driver, the same rule applies
where the owner is present, unless the negligent act of
the driver are continued for such a length of time as to
give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe
them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom.
- it appears with fair clearness that the interval between
the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the
happening of the accident was so small as not to be
sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the
driver.
DISPOSITION
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
CAEDO V YU KHE THAI
GR NO. L-20392
MAKALINTAL; December 18, 1968
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the CFI of Iloilo
FACTS
- Bernardo is the driver of Yu Khe Thai. He was driving
the latters Cadillac along highway 54. On the other
side of the road, Caedo was driving his Mercury car. He
was with his family.
- A carretela was in front of the Cadillac. Bernardo did
not see the carretela from afar. When he approached the
carritela, he decided to overtake it even though he had
already seen the car of the Caedos approaching from
the opposite lane. As he did so the curved end of his
car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the
rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along as
the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it
collided with the oncoming vehicle.
- The Caedos were injured. They filed a suit for
recovery of damages against Bernardo and Yu Khe
Thai. The CFI ruled in favor of the Caedos and held
Bernardo and Yu solidarily liable.
ISSUES
torts & damages

WON Yu Khe Thai should be held solidarily liable as
Bernardos employer
HELD
No.
- Bernardo had no record of any traffic violation. No
negligence of having employed him maybe imputed to
his master.
- Negligence on the employers part, if any, must be
sought in the immediate setting,, that is, in his failure to
detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only
gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient
time to act upon it.
- No negligence can be imputed. The car was running at
a reasonable speed. The road was wide and open. There
was no reason for Yu to be specially alert. He had
reason to rely on the skill of his driver. The time
element was such that there was no reasonable
opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved
and warn the driver accordingly.
- The law does not require that a person must possess a
certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the
mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic
rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his
intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his
omission to do that which the evidence of his own
senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the
accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a
minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that
appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may
appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another
DISPOSITIVE
Decision modified. Yu Khe Thai is free from liability
CAEDO v. YU KHE THAI
GR No. L-20392
MAKALINTAL; December 18, 1968
FACTS
- Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from
his home in Quezon City to the airport, where his son
Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro.
With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three
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daughters. Coming from the opposite direction was the

Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael
Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his
Paraaque home to Wack Wack.
- The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds,
considering the condition of the road and the absence of
traffic the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour,
and the Cadillac at approximately 48 to 56 kilometers.
Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a
distance. Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the same
direction, was a caretella owned by a certain Pedro
Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse by
means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical
post on the right side and held at the other end by
Pedro's son, Julian Bautista.
- Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the
rig when he saw it in front of him, only eight meters
away. This is the first clear indication of his negligence.
The carretela was provided with two lights, one on
each side, and they should have given him sufficient
warning to take the necessary precautions. And even if
he did not notice the lights, as he claimed later on at the
trial, the carretela should anyway have been visible to
him from afar if he had been careful, as it must have
been in the beam of his headlights for a considerable
while.
- In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own
lane from the opposite direction. Bernardo, instead of
slowing down or stopping altogether behind the
carretela until that lane was clear, veered to the left in
order to pass. As he did so the curved end of his car's
right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left
wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car
skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it collided
with the oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo had seen
the Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened his speed,
judged the distances in relation to the carretela and
concluded that the Cadillac would wait behind.
Bernardo, however, decided to take a gamble beat
the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with
the carretela, or else squeeze in between them in any
case. It was a risky maneuver either way, and the risk
should have been quite obvious.
prof. casis
- It was already too late to apply the brakes when
Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of
him, and so he had to swerve to the left in spite of the
presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it
was, the clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side
was insufficient. Its rear bumper, as already stated,
caught the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose.
Caedo, confronted with the unexpected situation, tried
to avoid the collision at the last moment by going
farther to the right, but was unsuccessful. The
photographs taken at the scene show that the right
wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the
road at the moment of impact.
ISSUE
1. WON defendant Rafael Bernardo is liable for the
accident.
2. If YES, WON his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai,
is solidarily liable with him.
HELD
1. YES. There is no doubt at all that the collision was
directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and
that he must be held liable for the damages suffered by
the plaintiffs.
2. NO. If the causative factor was the driver's
negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is
likewise held liable if he could have prevented the
mishap by the exercise of due diligence.
- The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not
respondent superior but rather the relationship of
paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the
negligence of the servant, if known to the master and
susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own
negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent
injury or damage.
- The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of
the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily
subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and
inflexible standard of diligence as are professional
drivers.
- The law does not require that a person must possess a
certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the
torts & damages

mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic
rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his
intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his
omission to do that which the evidence of his own
senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the
accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a
minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that
appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may
appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another.
Were the law to require a uniform standard of
perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by
car owners who, by -their very inadequacies, have real
need of drivers' services, would be effectively
proscribed.
- Rafael Bernardo had no record of violation of traffic
laws and regulations. No negligence for having
employed him at all may be imputed to his master.
Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be
sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of
the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver
from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear
notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon
it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed.
The car was not running at an unreasonable speed. The
road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early
morning. There was no reason for the car owner to be in
any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the
skill and experience of his driver. The time element was
such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu
Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the
driver accordingly.
DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from is modified
in the sense of declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe
Thai free from liability, and is otherwise affirmed with
respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with costs against
the latter.
SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO and
DANTE CAPUNO
G.R. No. L-10068-70 June 29, 1957
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS
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prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of

double homicide through reckless imprudence for the
death of Isidoro Caperia and Amado Ticzon on March
31, 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of the
deceased Isidoro Caperia, reserved her right to bring a
separate civil action for damages against the accused.
After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime
charged and, on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision. Dante Capuno was only fifteen (15) years
old when he committed the crime.
In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the
present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante
Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of
P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperia.
Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be
held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperia, he is Dante
Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of
the accident, the former was not under the control,
supervision and custody of the latter. This defense was
sustained by the lower court and, as a consequence, it
only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages
claimed in the complaint. From this decision, plaintiff
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the case was
certified to the Supreme Court on the ground that the
appeal only involves questions of law.
It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy
Scouts Organization and a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of
San Pablo and on March 31, 1949 he attended a parade
in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction
of the city school's supervisor. From the school Dante,
with other students, boarded a jeep and when the same
started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it
while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone
far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its
passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperia, died
as a consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno,
father of Dante, was not with his son at the time of the
accident, nor did he know that his son was going to
attend a parade. He only came to know it when his son
told him after the accident that he attended the parade

upon instruction of his teacher.
Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable
for the damages in question jointly and severally with
his son Dante because at the time the latter committed
the negligent act which resulted in the death of the
victim, he was a minor and was then living with his
father, and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the
civil liability of the father is evident. And so, plaintiff
contends, the lower court erred in relieving the father
from liability.
ISSUE
Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly
liable, jointly and severally with his son Dante, for
damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperia
caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.
RULING
YES.12
RATIO
Parents shall be liable for the tortious conduct of their
minor children living with them although at the time of
the tort, the children were under the direct control or
supervision of an academic institution. (THIS IS A
LANDMARK DOCTRINE, WHICH WAS LATER
MODIFIED BY J CRUZ IN AMADORA VS. COURT
OF APPEALS)
REASONING
The provision Teachers or directors of arts and
trades are liable for any damages caused by their
pupils or apprentices while they are under their
12
The case involves an interpretation of Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5,
(schools liability versus parental liability) which provides:
"ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal
acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the
minor children who live with them.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody."
torts & damages

custody", only applies to an institution of arts and
trades and not to any academic educational institution.
Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular
activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose
Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor.
And it was in connection with that parade that Dante
boarded a jeep with some companions and while
driving it, the accident occurred. In the circumstances, it
is clear that neither the head of that school, nor the city
school's supervisor, could be held liable for the
negligent act of Dante because he was not then a
student of an institution of arts and trades as provided
for by law.
The civil liability which the law impose upon the father,
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for
any damages that may be caused by the minor children
who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary
consequence of the parental authority they exercise over
them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of
supporting them, keeping them in their company,
educating them and instructing them in proportion to
their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the
"right to correct and punish them in moderation"
(Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only
way by which they can relieve themselves of this
liability is if they prove that they exercised all the
damage (Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil
Code). This defendants failed to prove.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified in
the sense that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante
Capuno shall pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the
sum of P2,959.00 as damages, and the costs of action.
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- PAGE 77 -
substantial difference is there between them in so far as

concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their
pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an
academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching
that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of
third persons, so long as they are in a position to
exercise authority and supervision over the pupil. In my
opinion, in the phrase "teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades" used in Art. 1903 of
the old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades" does not
qualify "teachers" but only "heads of establishments".
The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent
terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian and
French Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the
presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa
in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed
to have incurred in the exercise of their authority, it
would seem clear that where the parent places the child
under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter,
and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the
torts committed while under his custody, for the very
reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with
the discipline of the school nor with the authority and
supervision of the teacher while the child is under
instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no
responsibility.
I submit that the father should not be held liable for a
tort that he was in no way able to prevent, and which he
had every right to assume the school authorities would
avoid. Having proved that he entrusted his child to the
custody of school authorities that were competent to
exercise vigilance over him, the father has rebutted the
presumption of Art. 1903 and the burden of proof
shifted to the claimant to show actual negligence on the
part of the parent in order to render him liable.
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:

Padilla and Reyes, A., JJ., concur.
I believe we should affirm the judgment relieving the
father of liability. I can see no sound reason for
limiting Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code to teachers of
arts and trades and not to academic ones. What
SALEN V. BALCE
FUELLAS V. CADANO
prof. casis
Nature: Appeal from the Decision of the Trial Court
making defendant therein, now appellant Agapito
Fuellas, the father of the minor who caused the injuries
to Pepito Cadano, also a minor, liable under Art. 2180
of the new Civil Code for damages.
Facts: Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of
defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas, were both 13
years old, on September 16, 1954. They were
classmates at St. Mary's High School, Dansalan City.
They had a quarrel that lead to Pepitos injury, his right
arm was broken after Rico pushed him on the ground.
It is contended that in the decision of the Court
of Appeals, the petitioner-appellant was ordered to pay
damages for the deliberate injury caused by his son; that
the said court held the petitioner liable pursuant to par.
2 of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, in connection with Art.
2176 of the same Code; that according to the last
article, the act of the minor must be one wherein "fault
or negligence" is present; and that there being no fault
or negligence on the part of petitioner-appellant's minor
son, but deliberate intent, the above mentioned articles
are not applicable, for the existence of deliberate intent
in the commission of an act negatives the presence of
fault or negligence in its commission. Appellant,
therefore, submits that the appellate Court erred in
holding him liable for damages for the deliberate
criminal act of his minor son.
Issue: WON the father is liable civilly for the criminal
act of his son?
Held: Yes. In an earlier case (Exconde vs. Capuno, et
al., G.R. No. L-10132, prom. June 29, 1957), holding
the defendants jointly and severally liable with his
minor son Dante for damages, arising from the criminal
act committed by the latter, this tribunal gave the
following reasons for the rule:
The civil liability which the law imposes
upon the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, for any damages that
may be caused by the minor children who
live with them, is obvious. This is a
necessary consequence of the parental
authority they exercise over them which
torts & damages
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imposes upon the parents the "duty of

supporting them, keeping them in their
company, educating them in proportion to
their means", while on the other hand, gives
them the "right to correct and punish them
in moderation" (Arts. 134 and 135, Spanish
Civil Code). The only way by which they
can relieve themselves of this liability is if
they prove that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage (Art. 1903, last
paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This,
defendants failed to prove.
In another case, Salen and Salbanera vs. Jose Balce, the
defendant Balce was the father of a minor Gumersindo
Balce, below 18 years of age who was living with him.
Gumersindo was found guilty of homicide for having
killed Carlos Salen, minor son of plaintiffs. The trial
court rendered judgment dismissing the case, stating
that the civil liability of the minor son of defendant
arising from his criminal liability must be determined
under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and not
under Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code. In reversing the
decision, this tribunal held:
It is true that under Art. 101 of the Revised
Penal Code, a father is made civilly liable for
the acts committed by his son only if the latter
is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age,
or over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acts
without discernment, unless it appears that
there is no fault or negligence on his part. This
is because a son who commits the act under
any of those conditions is by law exempt from
criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2
and 3, Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to
leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach
certain civil liability to the person who has the
delinquent minor under his legal authority or
control. But a minor over 15 who acts with
discernment is not exempt from criminal
liability, for which reason the Code is silent as
to the subsidiary liability of his parents should
he stand convicted. In that case, resort should
be had to the general law which is our Civil

Code.
The particular law that governs this case is
Article 2180, the pertinent portion of which
provides: "The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company."
To hold that this provision does not apply to
the instant case because it only covers
obligations which arise from quasi-delicts
and not obligations which arise from
criminal offenses, would result in the
absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother
may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage
caused by his or her son, no liability would
attach if the damage is caused with criminal
intent. Verily, the void apparently exists in
the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this
particular provision of our Civil Code, as
may be gleaned from some recent decisions
of this Court which cover equal or identical
cases.
prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of

Appeals on the basis of the evidence submitted therein
by both parties, independently of the criminal case. And
responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176
upon which the action in the present case was instituted,
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from fault of negligence under the Penal Code
(Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind the
law as heretofore stated, any discussion as to the
minor's criminal responsibility is of no moment.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is dismissed, the
decision appealed from is affirmed
GUTIERREZ VS GUTIERREZ
MALCOLM; September 23, 1931
Nature:
an action brought by the plaintiff in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against the five defendants, to
recover damages in the amount of P10,000, for physical

injuries suffered as a result of an automobile accident.
Facts:
A passenger truck and an automobile of private
ownership collided while attempting to pass each other
on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the
municipality of Las Pias, Province of Rizal. The truck
was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, and was
owned by Saturnino Cortez. The automobile was being
operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age,
and was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr.
and Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez. At the time of the collision,
the father was not in the car, but the mother, together
will several other members of the Gutierrez family,
seven in all, were accommodated therein. Narcisso
Gutierrez was a passenger of the bus. He had a fracture
on his right leg.
It was conceded that the collision was caused
by negligence pure and simple. But, Narcisso Gutierrez
blames both the bus and the car while the truck blames
the car and the car in turn blames the truck.
the youth Bonifacio was in incompetent
chauffeur, that he was driving at an excessive rate of
speed, and that, on approaching the bridge and the
truck, he lost his head and so contributed by his
negligence to the accident. The guaranty given by the
father at the time the son was granted a license to
operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for
the acts of his son. Based on these facts, pursuant to the
provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father
alone and not the minor or the mother, would be liable
for the damages caused by the minor.
Issue:
0
1
WON the father of Bonifacio (car) is liable.

WON the owner of the truck is liable.
Held:
0
Yes. In the United States, it is uniformly held
that the head of a house, the owner of an automobile,
who maintains it for the general use of his family is
liable for its negligent operation by one of his children,
whom he designates or permits to run it, where the car
torts & damages

is occupied and being used at the time of the injury for
the pleasure of other members of the owner's family
than the child driving it. The theory of the law is that
the running of the machine by a child to carry other
members of the family is within the scope of the
owner's business, so that he is liable for the negligence
of the child because of the relationship of master and
servant.
1
Yes. The liability of Saturnino Cortez, the
owner of the truck, and of his chauffeur Abelardo
Velasco rests on a different basis, namely, that of
contract. The reason for this conclusion reaches to the
findings of the trial court concerning the position of the
truck on the bridge, the speed in operating the machine,
and the lack of care employed by the chauffeur. In its
broader aspects, the case is one of two drivers
approaching a narrow bridge from opposite directions,
with neither being willing to slow up and give the right
of way to the other, with the inevitable result of a
collision and an accident
Disposition
In consonance with the foregoing rulings, the judgment
appealed from will be modified, and the plaintiff will
have judgment in his favor against the defendants
Manuel Gutierrez, Abelardo Velasco, and Saturnino
Cortez, jointly and severally, for the sum of P5,000, and
the costs of both instances.
RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA)
135 SCRA 242
ABAD SANTOS; February 28, 1985
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prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
interest from date of the decision, and attorneys fees of

P50,000 (no interest mentioned). (Note: father and son
solidarily liable for damages.)
The Dela Rosas appealed in the CA, which affirmed in
toto the RTC. In a MFR filed by the Dela Rosas, the CA
modified the decision, this time reducing the unearned
income to P450,000. Both parties filed separate
petitions for review in the SC.
Petition of the Dela Rosas was denied for lack of merit.
The instant petition is the one filed by Lunas,
contending that the CA erred in reducing the award for
unearned income, and that the award for attys fees
should include legal interest.
Pending the decision, the SC came out with a resolution
ordering the Dela Rosas, in the interest of justice (since
the death took place in 1970, and 15 years after the
process of litigation is still not over), to pay the Lunas
P450,000 for unearned net earnings, P12,000
compensatory damages, P50,000 for loss of
companionship, all with legal interest, and attys fees of
P50,000, within 30 days.
The Dela Rosas failed to pay the amounts, saying that
they had no cash money. The writ of execution
produced only a nominal amount. In the meantime, Luis
is already of age, married, with 2 kids, and living in
Spain but only causally employed (His compensation
is hardly enough to support his family. He has no assets
of his own as yet).
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA erred in reducing the unearned income
2. WON the award for attys fees should have legal
interest
In coming out with the life expectancy, RTC considered

the age and health of the deceased. However, the CA
modified this by factoring in the engagement of Luna
in car racing, thus lowering the life expectancy to only
10 years.
WRT to the gross income, RTC considered the various
positions the deceased held at the time of his death, and
the trend of his earnings over the span of his last few
years, thus coming up with a potential gross income of
P75,000. However, the CA increased the annual
personal expenses to P30,000, due to the escalating
gasoline expenses, thus lowering the net annual
unearned income to P45,000.
CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car racing
reduced the life expectancy. There is nothing on record
that supports the claim that the car racing was a
dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life
expectancy. That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing
is the correct statement but then go-kart racing cannot
be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are
extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only
slightly larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled
conveyances. It was error on the part of the CA to have
disturbed the determination of the RTC which it had
previously affirmed.
Also, it was an error to increase the expenses without
increasing the gross income. It stands to reason that if
his annual personal expenses should increase because of
the escalating price of gas which is a key expenditure
in Roberto R. Luna's social standing [a statement
which lacks complete basis], it would not be
unreasonable to suppose that his income would also
increase considering the manifold sources thereof
NATURE: Petition to review a decision of CA

FACTS: Roberto Luna, a businessman, was killed in a
vehicular collision (between Luna, driving a gokart, and
Luis dela Rosa, 13 years old, driving a Toyota car
without a license) at a gokart practice area.
Heirs of Luna brought a suit for damages against Luis
and his father, which the CFI ruled in favor of the
Lunas, awarding P1,650,000 as unearned net earnings
of Luna, P12,000 compensatory damages, and P50,000
for loss of his companionship (come on!!), with legal
HELD:
1. YES
Ratio: The reduction of the award of net unearned
earnings had no basis, thus is void.
Reasoning: the RTC based its computation of the net
unearned earnings on 2 factors: life expectancy of the
deceased of another 30 years, and an annual net income
of P55,000 (P75,000 gross income less P20,000
personal expenses).
2. YES
Ratio: The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept
of damages in a quasi-delict case and under the
circumstances, interest as part thereof may be
adjudicated at the discretion of the court.
(The attys fees should accrue interest from the date of
filing of the compliant.)
Obiter:
torts & damages

The Dela Rosas invoke the ruling in Elcano v Hilll,
where the court held that A2180 applied to Atty. Hill
nothwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of his
son, but since the son had attained majority, as a matter
of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill became merely
subsidiarily to that of his son. The Dela Rosas now
invoke that the father should also be held only
subsidiarily.
To this contention, the court is unwilling to apply
equity instead of strict law because to do so will not
serve the ends of justice. Luis is abroad and beyond the
reach of Philippine Courts. Also, he has no property in
the Phils or elsewhere.
Disposition: resolution of CA SET ASIDE, reinstating
the earlier decision with slight modification regarding
the award of attys fees.
LIBI V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
(SPS GOTIONG)
214 SCRA 16
REGALADO; September 18,1992
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court.
FACTS
- respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie
Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident
which took place and from which she died on January
14,1979, was an 18-year old first year commerce
student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City;
while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a
minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his
aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same event
on the same date.
- More than 2 years before their deaths, Julie Ann
Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until
December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up with Wendell
after she found him to be sadistic and irresponsible.
- January, 1979 - Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with
demands for reconciliation but the Julie refused,
prompting him to resort to threats against her. In order
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to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best

friend, Malou Alfonso
- January 14,1979 - Julie and Wendell died from a
single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm
licensed under Cresencio Libi, father of Wendell
- both set of parents came up with versions of the story
Gotiongs:
> Wendell caused her death by shooting her and
thereafter turning the gun on himself to commit suicide
Libis:
> an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have
displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a
narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics
Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell's death and
then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and
thereby avoid identification
- CFI Cebu: Gotiongs filed civil case against the
parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the
latter's vicarious liability under A2180 CC. CFI
dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of the
evidence.
- IAC: CFI decision set aside and found Libis
subsidiarily liable
ISSUE
WON A2180 CC is applicable in making Libis liable
for vicarious liability
HELD
YES
Ratio The diligence of a good father of a family
required by law in a parent and child relationship
consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and
supervision of the child. Had the defendants-appellees
been diligent in supervising the activities of their son,
Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his reach, they
could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann
Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under A2180
CC.
Reasoning
- undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the
absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at
the point of entry of the bullet. It should be emphasized,
however, that this is not the only circumstance to be
prof. casis
taken into account in the determination of whether it
was suicide or not as the body was cleaned already in
the funeral parlor
- Amelita Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her
husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a
safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom.
Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety
deposit box and Amelita's key is always in her bag, all
of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never
seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She
admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun
was no longer in the safety deposit box. We,
accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that
petitioner spouses had really been exercising the
diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking
the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold
thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box
was negligently left lying around or he had free access
to the bag of his mother where the other key was.
- A2180': The subsidiary liability of parents for
damages caused by their minor children imposed by
A2180 CC covers obligations wising from both quasidelicts and criminal offenses.'
- BUT Liability is not subsidiary BUT primary
> if the liability of the parents for crimes and QDs of
their minor children is subsidiary, they they can neither
invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense
that they acted with the diligence of a good father of the
family to prevent damages. But if the liability id direct
and primary, the diligence would constitute a valid
substantial defense. HENCE, LIABILITY OF
PARENTS FOR QDS OF THEIR MINOR KIDS AS
CONTEMPLATED IN A2180 ID PRIMARY NOT
SUBSIDIARY
> applying A2194 (solidary liability of joint tortfeasors)
the parent is also solidarily liable with the child. THE
LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR FELONIES IS
LIKEWISE PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY. A101
RPC SAYS SO
> RULES:
+ for civil liability from crimes committed by minors
under the legal authority and control or who live in the
company of the parents: PRIMARY
torts & damages

= premised on A101 RPC fot damages ex delicto by
kids 9 or under or 9-15 but without discernment
= premised on A2180 CC for kids 9-15 with
discernment or 15-21 (now 18)
+ liability effected against father or mother? BOTH
PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE
PARENTAL AUHTORITY OVER THE MINOR
= youth welfare code
= FC: responsibility of parents
+ for civil liability arising from QDs committed by
minors: same rules in A2180 and A2182
Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the
assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED
TAMARGO vs CA (Rubio, Bundoc)
209 SCRA 518
Feliciano, J; 1992
NATURE
Appeal for review of CA decision
FACTS
- On October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then aged
ten, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing
injuries which resulted in her death. He was charged
with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide but was
acquitted and exempted from criminal liability ob the
ground that he had acted without discernment. The
adopting and natural parents of Jennifer filed a civil
complaint for damages against the parents of Bundoc.
- The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are not the
indispensable party in the action as their son adopted by
the spouses Rapisura on November 18, 1982 via an
adoption decree granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur. The
trial Court agreed with the respondents and dismissed
the complaint.
- The case contained procedural questions which were
raised in the appeal. The SC however decided to hear
the appeal based on substantial justice.
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- PAGE 77 -
ISSUE
- WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable party to
the tort action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
HELD- Yes. The Court held that parental authority did not
retroactively transfer to and vested in the adopting
parents at the time the shooting incident occurred. The
adopting parents had no actual or physical custody of
Adelberto at the time of the incident as they were then
in the US were they live. To do so and hold them liable
for the tortious act when be unfair and unconscionable.
Reasoning- The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on
quasi-delict against him under Article 2176. However,
because of his minority, the provision of Article 2180
would be applicable. Article 2180 reads the obligation
imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible The father and,
incase of his death or incapacity, the mother are
responsible for the damages caused by the children who
live in their company The responsibility treated of in
this Article shall cease when the person herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage.
- The principle of parental liability is designated as
vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed liability
under the Anglo-American tort law. Thus, under this
doctrine, a person is not only liable for torts committed
by him also torts committed by others with whom he
has a certain relationship and for whom he is
responsibility. Thus parental liability is made a natural
or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities
of the parents which include the instructing, controlling,
and disciplining of the child. The presumption under
law is that when a child under their care commits a
tortuous act the parents were negligent in the
performance of these duties and responsibilities. As
stated, sufficient proof can be presented to overcome
this presumption.
prof. casis
Disposition
Petition granted. Decision set aside.
MERCADO v. COURT OF APPEALS AND
QUISUMBING
L-14342
LABRADOR; May 30, 1960
NATURE
This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of
Appeals
FACTS
- Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the son
of his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L.
Quisumbing, while Augusto Mercado is the son of
defendant-appellee Ciriaco L. Mercado, Manuel
Quisumbing, Jr. and Augusto Mercado were classmates
in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon, Quezon
City.
- A "pitogo", which figures prominently in this case,
may be described as an empty nutshell used by children
as a piggy bank. On February 22, 1956, Augusto
Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled over a
"pitogo". As a result, Augusto wounded Manuel, Jr. on
the right cheek with a piece of razor.
ISSUES
1. WON the teacher or head of the school should be
held responsible instead of the of the father since the
incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent
occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time)
2. WON the moral damages fixed at P2,000 are
excessive.
HELD
1. NO. The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, upon which petitioner rests his claim that the
school where his son was studying should be made
liable, is as follows:
ART. 2180. . . .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of
arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or
torts & damages

apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.
- It would be seem that the clause "so long as they
remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where
the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the
control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes
those of the parents. In these circumstances the control
or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil
would pass from the father and mother to the teacher;
and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil.
- Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the
pupils appear to go to school during school hours and
go back to their homes with their parents after school is
over. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of
Article 2180 does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of
said article, which makes father or mother responsible
for the damages caused by their minor children.
2. YES. It is possible that the Court of Appeals may
have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or
guilty, of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries, within
the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219. Even if we
assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a
quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages, yet the
facts found by said court indicate that Augusto's
resentment, which motivated the assault, was
occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried to
intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to
get "his pitogo from Renato." It is, therefore, apparent
that the proximate cause of the injury caused to
Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or negligence
for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get
the pitogo from another boy. (Art. 2179, Civil Code.)
After considering all the facts as found by the Court of
Appeals, we find that none of the cases mentioned in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which authorizes the
grant of moral damages, was shown to have existed.
Consequently, the grant of moral damages is not
justified.
PALISOC VS. BRILLANTES
41 SCRA 548
TEEHANKEE; October 4, 1971
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- PAGE 77 -
NATURE
An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law
from a decision of the CFI Manila.
FACTS
- Palisoc spouses as parents of their 16-year old son,
Dominador Palisoc, and a student in automotive
mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute filed the
action below for damages arising from the death of their
son at the hands of a fellow student, defendant Virgilio
L. Daffon, at the laboratory room of the said Institute.
- the deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant
Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates, and one afternoon,
they, together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz
were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor.
At that time the classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz
and Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine
while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at
them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc
was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark
Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in
retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face,
which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach.
Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but
Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until
Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him
to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted.
First aid was administered to him but he was not
revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He
never regained consciousness; finally he died.
- Defendants were: Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time
when the incident occurred was a member of the Board
of Directors of the institute; Teodosio Valenton, the
president thereof; Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of
the class to which the deceased belonged; and Virgilio
L. Daffon, a fellow student of the deceased.
- At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a
single proprietorship, but lately, it was duly
incorporated.
- the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the
quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
- The trial court, however, absolved from liability the
three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical
Institute, in this wise:
prof. casis
In the opinion of the Court, this article(art.2180) of the
Code is not applicable to the case at bar, since this
contemplates the situation where the control or
influence of the teachers and heads of school
establishments over the conduct and actions by the
pupil supersedes those of the parents...The clause "so
long as they remain in their custody" contemplated a
situation where the pupil lives and boards with the
teacher, such that the control or influence on the pupil
supersedes those of the parents...There is no evidence
that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his
teacher or the other defendant officials of the school.
ISSUE
WON the school officials are jointly and severally
liable as tortfeasors with Daffon.
HELD
a. YES (head and teacher of the Manila Technical
Institute, Valenton and Quibulue, respectively)
Ratio The rationale of such liability of school heads and
teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and
students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that
they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and
students, in loco parentis and are called upon to
"exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the
child." In the law of torts, the governing principle is that
the protective custody of the school heads and teachers
is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and
hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the
school itself to provide proper supervision of the
students' activities during the whole time that they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time, as well
as to take the necessary precautions to protect the
students in their custody from dangers and hazards that
would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that
some student themselves may inflict willfully or
through negligence on their fellow students.
Reasoning
- The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly
on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs. Court of Appeals,
that "(I)t would seem that the clause "so long as they
remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where
the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the
torts & damages

control, direction and influence. It is true that under the
law abovequoted, teachers or directors of arts and trades
are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody, but this
provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades
and not to any academic educational institution"
- phrase used in the cited article "so long as (the
students) remain in their custody" means the protective
and supervisory custody that the school and its heads
and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as
long as they are at attendance in the school, including
recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires
that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who
commits the tortious act must live and board in the
school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the
dicta in Mercado on which it relied, must now be
deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.
- At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they
relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with
the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by
"(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage." In the light of the
factual findings of the lower court's decision, said
defendants failed to prove such exemption from
liability.
b. NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the school's
board of directors and the school) itself cannot be held
similarly liable, since it has not been properly
impleaded as party defendant
- the school had been incorporated since and therefore
the school itself, as thus incorporated, should have been
brought in as party defendant.
DISPOSITION
The judgment appealed from is modified so as to
provide as follows: .
1. Sentencing the Daffon, Valenton and Quibulue jointly
and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased
Dominador Palisoc (a) P12,000.00 for the death of
Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and
compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral,
damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of earning power and
(e) P2,000.00 f
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prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
or attorney's fee, plus the costs of this action in both

instances; 2. absolving defendant Antonio C. Brillantes
from the complaint; and 3. dismissing defendants'
counterclaims. .
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:
-I would like to clarify that the argument of the
dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility of
teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should
be limited to pupils who are minors is not in accord
with the plain text of the law.
- Examination of the article shows that where the
responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts
during minority, the article expressly so provides, as in
the case of the parents and of the guardians. It is natural
to expect that if the law had intended to similarly
restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of
persons enumerated in the article, it would have
expressly so stated. The fact that it has not done so
indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to
the case of persons under age. Further, it is not without
significance that
- finally, that while in the case of parents and guardians,
their authority and supervision over the children and
wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age,
the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist
regardless of the age of the latter.
MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting:
- I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down
by this Court in Mercado v. Court of Appeals. I think it
is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results,
considering the size of the enrollment in many of our
educational institutions, academic and non-academic, as
well as the temper, attitudes and often destructive
activism of the students, to hold their teachers and/or
the administrative heads of the schools directly liable
for torts committed by them.
- It would demand responsibility without commensurate
authority, rendering teachers and school heads open to
damage suits for causes beyond their power to control.
- one other factor constrains me to dissent. The opinion
of the majority states: "Here, the parents of the student
at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since
Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic

incident." Note that for parental responsibility to arise
the children must be minors who live in their
company...it stands to reason that (1) the clause "so long
as they remain in their custody" as used in reference to
teachers and school heads should be equated with the
phrase "who live in their company" as used in reference
to parents; and (2) that just as parents are not
responsible for damages caused by their children who
are no longer minors, so should teachers and school
heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of
their students in the same age category.
AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSERECOLLETOS)
160 SCRA 315
CRUZ; April 15, 1988
Facts:
It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to
graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes. Alfredo
went to the school to submit his Report in Physic.
While they were in the auditorium of their school,
hewas shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon.
ISSUE:
WON Art 2180 is applicable.
Held:
Yes. Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools, academic or
non-academic. Teachers are liable for acts of their
student except where the school is technical in nature
(arts and trade establishment) in which case the head
thereof shall be answerable.
There is really no substantial difference distinction
between the academic and non-academic schools in so
far as torts committed by their students are concerned.
The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over
the student under their control and supervision,
whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching.
x x x x The distinction no longer obtains at present. x
xx
torts & damages

The student is in the custody of the school authorities as
long as he is under the control and influence of the
school and within its premises, whether the semester
has not ended, or has ended or has not yet begun. The
term custody signifies that the student is within the
control and influence of the school authorities. The
teacher in charge is the one designated by the dean,
principal, or other administrative superior to exercise
supervision over the pupils or students in the specific
classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not
necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher is
physically present and in a position to prevent it.
Thus, for injuries caused by the student, the teacher and
not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was
committed within the premises of the school at any time
when its authority could be validly exercised over him.
In any event, the school may be held to answer for the
acts of its teacher or the head thereof under the general
principle of respondent superior, but it may exculpate
itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the
diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. Such defense they
had taken necessary precautions to prevent the injury
complained of and thus be exonerated from liability
imposed by Art 2180.
Basis of teachers vicarious liability is, as such, they
acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents). However
teachers are not expected to have the same measure of
responsibility as that imposed on parent for their
influence over the child is not equal in degree. x x x
The parent can instill more lasting discipline more
lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so
should be held to a greater accountability than the
teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child.
As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent
nor the school remised in the discharged of their duties,
they were exonerated of liability.
(Note the court view on increasing students activism
likely causing violence resulting to injuries, in or out of
the school premises J. Guttierez, Jr concurringly said
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prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
many student x x x view some teachers as part of the

bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on
behavior deportment and other non-academic matters is
not only resented but actively rejected. It seems most
unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris
tantum of negligence for acts of students even under
circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no
in loco parentis relationship.
The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case
has outlived its purpose. The court cannot make law, it
can only apply the law with its imperfections. However
the court can suggest that such a law should be
amended or repealed.
PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY)
160 SCRA 785
PARAS; April 25, 1988
NATURE
Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that
judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order
dismissing the complaint as against the respondent
school and denying the reconsideration of the
questioned order of dismissal.
FACTS
- A group of students walking inside Araneta University
were accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim
students led by Abdul Karin Madidis alias Teng.
Petitioner (Reynaldo) was subsequently stabbed by
Teng requiring him to be hospitalized and to undergo
surgery.
- Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng
and Arante University based on Art 2190 CC
- Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the
provision only applies to vocational schools and not to
academic institutions. They also claim that the civil
liability in this case arose from a crime, which they did
not commit. Since it was a civil case, respondent school
claims that a demand should have been made by the
plaintiff rendering it premature to bring an action for
damages against respondent school. MTD was granted
by the CA.
- Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal.

Motion was denied due to insufficient justification to
disturb ruling.
ISSUE
WON the Art 2180 CC13 applies to academic
institutions
HELD
It is unnecessary to answer the issue. What the
petitioner wants to know is WON the school or the
university itself is liable. The answer is no since the
provision speaks of teachers or heads
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
YLARDE
vs.
GANCAYCO; 1988 July 29
AQUINO
NATURE
FACTS
Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal
of the Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent
Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. At that time, the
school was littered with several concrete blocks which
were remnants of the old school shop that was
destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge
stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren,
another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez stated
burying them all by himself.
Deciding to help his colleague, private respondent
Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils,
aged ten to eleven. Being their teacher-in-charge, he
ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in
order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried.
The work was left unfinished. The following day, also
after classes, private respondent Aquino called four of
the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging.
13
"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody."
torts & damages

These four pupils ---- Reynaldo Alonso, Fransico
Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, dug until
the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters
deep. At this point, private respondent Aquino alone
continued digging while the pupils remained inside the
pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about
by the digging.
When the depth was right enough to accommodate the
concrete block, private respondent Aquino and his four
pupils got out of the hole. Then, said private respondent
left the children to level the loose soil around the open
hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty
meters away. Private respondent wanted to borrow from
Banez the key to the school workroom where he could
get some rope. Before leaving, private respondent
Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch the
stone."
A2010
WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article

2180 of the Civil Code, both private respondents can be
held liable for damages.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter."
On the other hand, the applicable provision of Article
2180 states:
"Art. 2180. . . .
xxx
A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left,

three of the four kids, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde,
playfully jumped into the pit. Then, without any
warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top of
the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the
opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble
out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for
Ylarde, the concrete block caught him before he could
get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing position.
As a result thereof, Ylarde sustained injuries and died
three (3) days later.
Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for
damages against both private respondents Aquino and
Soriano. The lower court dismissed the complaint on
the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the
pupils is in line with their course called Work
Education; (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person; and (3) that the
demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless
imprudence.
ISSUE
xxx
prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
xxx
"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and

trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in
their custody."
HELD
Only Aquino, the teacher, is liable.
Ratio: As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot
be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde,
he being the head of an academic school and not a
school of arts and trades.
Reasoning:
This is in line with the Courts ruling in Amadora vs.
Court of Appeals, wherein this Court thoroughly
discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an
academic school who should be answerable for torts
committed by their students. This Court went on to say
that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of
the school who can be held liable.
Ratio: Private respondent Aquino can be held liable
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-incharge of the children for being negligent in his
supervision over them and his failure to take the
necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their

persons.
Reasoning:
(1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual
laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to
eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete
stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task;
(2) required the children to remain inside the pit even
after they had finished digging, knowing that the huge
block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or
kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the
perilous area;
(3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation
when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the
brink of falling;
(4) went to a place where he would not be able to check
on the children's safety; and (5) left the children close to
the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.
(6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent, it is
evident that the lower court did not consider his age and
maturity. This should not be the case. The degree of
care required to be exercised must vary with the
capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A
minor should not be held to the same degree of care as
an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to
the average conduct of persons of his age and
experience. The standard of conduct to which a child
must conform for his own protection is that degree of
care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age,
capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under
the same or similar circumstances. Bearing this in
mind, We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless
imprudence.
DISPOSITION
Granted.
SALVOSA v. IAC (CASTRO)
166 SCRA 274
PADILLA, J.: October 5, 1988
FACTS
Jimmy Abon, a commerce student of Baguio Colleges
Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the
torts & damages

BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted
of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro,
a student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977,
at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF. BCF
is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the
ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP.
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for
damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto C.
Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa
(President and Chairman of the Board of BCF), Jesus
Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF), Libertad D.
Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and
Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges
Foundation Inc. as party defendants.
After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision, (1)
sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin
Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc., jointly
and severally, to pay private respondents, as heirs of
Napoleon Castro; (2) absolving the other defendants;
and (3) dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack
of
merit.
ISSUE
WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with
Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of
Jimmy B. Abon.
HELD
NO. Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been
"at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF,
when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore,
petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be
held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages
resulting from his acts.
Ratio:
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades are hable for "damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in
their custody." The rationale of such liability is that so
long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher,
the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as
to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise
A2010
prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the

[student]." Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180
'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means
the protective and supervisory custody that the school
and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and
students for as long as they are at attendance in the
school, including recess time."
Reasoning:
a. The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the
CA. According to the CA, while it is true that Abon
was not attending any class or school function at the
time of the shooting incident, which was at about 8
o'clock in the evening; but considering that Abon was
employed as an armorer and property custodian of the
BCF ROTC unit, he must have been attending night
classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just
about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. The
time interval is safely within the "recess time" that the
trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case,
supra. In line with the case of Palisoc, 17 a student not
"at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess"
thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the
phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a
situation of temporary adjournment of school activities
where the student still remains within call of his mentor
and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the
area within which the school activity is conducted.
Recess by its nature does not include dismissal.
Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the
premises of a school without more does not constitute
"attending school" or being in the "protective and
supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in
the law.
b. Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to be working in the
armory with definite instructions from his superior, the
ROTC Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
ST.
FRANCIS
CA(Castillo/Cadiz)
194 SCRA 340
Paras, J.: Feb. 25, 1991
HIGH
SCHOOL
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the CA
FACTS
-Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student at St.
Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan
Beach, Quezon. His parents didnt allow him to go due
to short notice but directed him to bring food to the
teachers for the picnic and go straight home. However,
he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later
drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher.
-his parents filed a complaint against St. Francis HS,
represented by its principal, Illumin, and several
teachers for damages incurred from the death of their
son, contending that it occurred due to petitioners
failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of
the family. The TC found against the teachers as they
had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters
in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim.
Also, the male teachers who were to watch over the
kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking.
The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the
teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the
picnic which was not school sanctioned, and as the
latter had her own class to supervise then and was not
actually invited.
-Both parties appealed to the CA. On the issue of the
liability of St. Francis HS and the Illumin, the CA held
that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together
with the 1st, 4th, and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180. They
cannot escape liability simply because it wasnt an
extra-curricular activity of the HS. From the
evidence, it was shown that the principal had known of
the picnic from its planning stage and merely
acquiesced to the holding of the event. As such, under
Article 2180, both are jointly and severally liable w/ the
teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of
the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption
of negligence on the part of the owner/manager (St.
Francis and the principal). Petitioners contend that the
victims parents failed to prove by evidence that they
didnt give their son consent to join the picnic. The
Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the
existence of their liability. Also, 2 of the teachers who
arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability
as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and
torts & damages

thus could not be said to have participated in the
negligence attributed to the other teachers. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE
(1) WON there was negligence attributable to the
defendants
(2) WON Art. 2180, in relation to 2176 is applicable
(3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is
proper
HELD
(1) NO. Petitioners are neither guilty of their own
negligence or the negligence of people under them. At
the outset, it should be noted that the victims parents
allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a
mental and physical cross examination.
-Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the
picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it. If
the CAs findings are to be upheld, employers will be
forever exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed
to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of
their employees even if such acts or omissions are
committed while they are not in the performance of
their duties.
-No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the
presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised
diligence of a good father of the family. In fact, 2 P.E.
teachers were invited as they were scout masters and
had knowledge in First Aid and swimming. Life savers
were brought in the event of such an accident. The
records also show that the 2 P.E. teachers did all that
was humanly possible to save the victim.
(2) NO. The CA erred in applying Art. 2180,
particularly par 4. For an employer to be held liable for
the negligence of his employee, the act or omission
which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred
while an employee was in the performance of his
assigned task. In the case at bar, the teachers were not in
actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a
purely private affair and not a school sanctioned
activity.
(3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had
exercised the diligence required of them, no moral or
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- PAGE 77 -
exemplary damages under Art. 2177 may be awarded in

favor of respondent spouses.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision
is SET ASIDE
PSBA v CA (BENITEZ/BAUTISTA)
205 SCRA 729
Padilla, J.: Feb. 4, 1992
FACTS
-Carlitos Bautista, enrolled in the 3 rd year commerce
course of PSBA, was stabbed and killed while on
campus by assailants who were from outside the
schools academic community. This prompted his
parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w/ Judge
Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA
and its corporate officers, alleging negligence,
recklessness and lack of security precautions, means
and methods before, during and after the attack of the
victim.
-PSBA sought to dismiss the case, alleging that since
they were presumably sued under Art 2180, there was
no cause of action since academic institutions are not
subject to the said provision.
-A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were
denied by the TC, yielding the same results upon appeal
with the CA. Hence this petition.
ISSUES
(1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176
and 2180
HELD
(1) NO. Because the circumstances of the present case
evince a contractual relation between the parties, the
rules on quasi-delict do not really govern; but the court
has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still
exist even when there is a contract.
-Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroad: the mere fact
that a person is bound to another by contract does not
relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such
person. When such a contractual relation exists the
obligor may break the contract under such conditions
that the same act which constitutes a breach of the
prof. casis
contract would have constituted the source of an extracontractual obligation had no contract existed between
the parties
-Using the test in Cangco, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua non to PSBAs liability; hence, any
finding of negligence would generally give rise to a
breach of contractual obligation only.
-When an academic institution accepts a student for
enrollment, a contract is established between them,
resulting in a bilateral obligation. The school is obliged
to provide the student with an education, along with a
safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of
imparting knowledge. In turn, the student abides by the
schools academic requirements and observes its rules
and regulations. However, a school cannot be an insurer
for its students against all risks; one can only expect it
to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature
of the obligation and corresponding to the
circumstances of persons, time and place.
- In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to
whether the contract was breached due to PSBAs
negligence in providing proper security measures. At
this stage, the proceedings have yet to commence on the
substance of the private respondents complaint and the
record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC
can determine.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of
origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings
consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs against
the petitioners.
SOLIMAN, JR. V JUDGE TUAZON
209 SCAR 47
FELICIANO, J; May 18, 1992
NATURE
Civil complaint for damages
FACTS
- On August 13, 1982, while the plaintiff Maximo
Soliman, Jr., a student of the defendant Republic
Central Colleges (RCC), was in the campus premises
thereof, the defendant, Jimmy Solomon, who was then
in the premises of said school performing his duties as
security guard under the employment of defendant R.L.
torts & damages

Security Agency, Inc., without any provocation, shot the
plaintiff on the abdomen. The plaintiff was confined in
a hospital, and as per doctor's opinion, he may not be
able to attend to his regular classes and will be
incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a
duration of from three to four months. Petitioner,
represented by his guardian, filed a civil complaint for
damages against RCC, RL Security Agency and
Solomon,
- RCC filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the
complaint stated no cause of action against it. It argued
that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained
by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the
employer of the security guard Solomon, and hence was
not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon. It
further argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph, of the
Civil Code did not apply, since said paragraph holds
teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, while security guard Jimmy Solomon
was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the school.
- Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCCs
motion to dismiss. Petitioners MFR was denied,
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles
2180, as well as those of Articles 349, 350 and 352 of
the Civil Code
2. WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis
in law, for the injury sustained by petitioner
HELD
1. NO
- Under Art. 2180, the obligation to respond for
damage inflicted by one against another by fault or
negligence exists not only for one's own act or
omission, but also for acts or omissions of a person for
whom one is by law responsible. Among the persons
held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of
another person are the following:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helper, acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former
are not engaged in any business or industry.
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- PAGE 77 -
xxx
xxx
xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils, their students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
- The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for
holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of
security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman, Jr.
RCC was not the employer of Solomon. The employer
of Solomon was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while
the school was the client of the latter. It is settled that
where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and
assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards, the
agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen.
Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the
security guards attaches to the employer agency, and
not to the clients of such agency. There being no
employer-employee relationship between RCC and
Solomon, petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability
upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon.
- Since there is no question that Solomon was not a
pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges, he
being in fact an employee of the R.L. Security Agency
Inc., the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180
of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing
liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon.
- The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil
Code invoked by petitioner are as follows:
Art. 349.
The following persons shall exercise
substitute parental authority:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(2) Teachers and professors;
xxx
xxx
xxx
(4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to
apprentices;
xxx
xxx
xxx
Art. 350. The persons named in the preceding article
shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct
of the child.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Art. 352.
The relations between teacher and pupil,
professor and student are fixed by government
regulations and those of each school or institution. In no
case shall corporal punishment be countenanced. The
prof. casis
teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities
of the heart and mind of the pupil or student."
- In Palisoc v. Brillantes, the Court held the owner and
president of a school of arts and trades known as the
Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for
the death of Palisoc, a student of that Institute, which
resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon, another
student of the Institute. It will be seen that the facts of
Palisoc v. Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th
paragraph of Article 2180, quoted above; but those facts
are entirely different from the facts existing in the
instant case.
- Persons exercising substitute parental authority are
made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third
person by the child or person subject to such substitute
parental authority. In the instant case, Solomon who
committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to
petitioner, was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the
Republic Central Colleges; the school had no substitute
parental authority over Solomon.
2. YES
- In the case of PSBA v CA, the Court held that Article
2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a
student had been injured by one who was an outsider or
by one over whom the school did not exercise any
custody or control or supervision. At the same time,
however, the court stressed that an implied contract may
be held to be established between a school which
accepts students for enrollment, on the one hand, and
the students who are enrolled, on the other hand, which
contract results in obligations for both parties. It held:
When an academic institution accepts students for
enrollment, there is established a contract between
them, resulting in bilateral obligations which parties
are bound to comply with. For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education
that would presumably suffice to equip him with the
necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or
a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants
to abide by the school's academic requirements and
observe its rules and regulations.Institutions of learning
must also meet the implicit or 'built-in' obligation of
providing their students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking
torts & damages

of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can
absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics
or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when
bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or
where there looms around the school premises a
constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school
must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain
peace and order within the campus premises and to
prevent the breakdown thereof.
- It was also pointed out in said case that: "In the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however,
there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between
school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's
negligence in providing proper security measures. This
would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if
there be a finding of negligence, the same could give
rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only.
Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the
school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact,
that negligence becomes material only because of the
contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In
other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine
qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the
school cannot exist independently of the contract,
unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances
set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
- In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the
school's motion to dismiss the complaint against it, and
both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial court's
order. In the case at bar, the court a quo granted the
motion to dismiss filed by RCC, upon the assumption
that petitioner's cause of action was based, and could
have been based, only on Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
As PSBA, however, states, acts which are tortious or
allegedly tortious in character may at the same time
constitute breach of a contractual or other legal
obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious error
when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause
of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should not have
granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have, in
the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts
constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex
lege on the part of RCC.
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- PAGE 77 -
Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition, to

treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer,
and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting
the motion to dismiss the case.This case is
REMANDED to the court a quo for further
proceedings.
ST. MARYS ACADEMY VS. CARPITANOS
PARDO, February 6, 2002
NATURE
Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution
denying MFR
FACTS
(this case was already assigned in PFR)
-Sherwin Carpitanos, together with James Daniel II
(then 15, driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in
possession and was driving the jeep, Grandson of
Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and other
companions were on their way to an enrollment drive
for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle.
It was found out that the steering wheel guide was
detached. Carpitanos sued the school, James Daniel II,
his parents, and Vivencio Villanueva.
-TC: absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II, held
parents and school liable
-CA: school liable under A218 and 219, FC, finding
that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the
vehicle without a teacher accompanying them.
ISSUE (regarding liability of St. Marys Academy)
WON St. Marys Academy should be held liable for
death of Sherwin Carpitanos, and therefore, liable for
damages
HELD
NO. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy
was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the
remote cause and the injury, there intervened the
negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Ratio. For the school to be liable, it must be shown that
the injury for which recovery is sought must be the
prof. casis
legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the
connection between the negligence and the injury must
be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
intervening efficient causes.
Reasoning. The Carpitanos failed to prove that the
negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the
death of the victim.
-The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of
James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of
Vivencio Villanueva.
-Respondents did not present any evidence to show that
the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence
of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of
James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded.
-There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed
the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched
Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep,
and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to
drive the jeep.
-Liability for the accident, whether caused by the
negligence of the minor driver or mechanical
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep,
must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The
negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a
remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause
and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the
minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep.Considering that the negligence of the
minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was
an event over which petitioner St. Marys Academy had
no control, and which was the proximate cause of the
accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death
resulting from such accident.
- It is not the school, but the registered owner of the
vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for
the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
Disposition. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and
SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18]
and that of the trial court.[19] The Court remands the
case to the trial court for determination of the liability
of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Marys
Academy, Dipolog City. No costs. SO ORDERED.
torts & damages
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prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
(this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue!)

PHIL RABBIT BUS
FORWARDERS
63 SCRA 231
AQUINO; March 25, 1975
LINES
driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by

some persons in order to start its engine.
-The Magsaysay Blvd. runs perpendicular to Gomez St.
and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the
general direction of the said Gomez Street.
-As the bus was pushed, its engine started thereby the
bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at
the time when Ramon A. Acuesta who was still riding
on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus.
-As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly
and suddenly, its running motion was also enhanced by
the said functioning engine, thereby the subject bus
bumped on the victim Ramon A. Acuesta who, as a
result thereof fell and, thereafter, was run over by the
said bus.
Petitioners Version
-Manilhig, in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City,
warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few
rounds within the city proper of Calbayog.
-While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising
along Gomez Street, the victim, who was biking
towards the same direction as the bus, suddenly
overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of
the road.
-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as
Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn, the
victim was bumped from behind and run over by the
bus.
-Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees, including petitioner
Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had
undergone months of rigid training before he was hired.
-Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of
the victim in overtaking two tricycles, without taking
precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear,
which caused the death of the victim
**Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents
-Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court, and denied MFR
-Hence, this appeal
PHIL-AM
NATURE
Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision
FACTS
- PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix
PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an
action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against
PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, Inc., its manager
BALINGIT and the driver, PINEDA.
- It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight
TRUCK, owned by Phil-Am, along the natl highway at
Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the BUS
driven by Pangalangan, owned by Phil Rabbit.
Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged
and could not be used for 79 days. This deprived the
company of earnings of about P8,600.
- Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was
that Balingit was not Pineda's employer. Balingit
moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on
the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had
no cause of action against him.
- CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on
the ground that he was not the manager of an
establishment contemplated in Art.2180 CC.
- In the appeal, the bus company also argued that PhilAm is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out
of its capital stock with a par value of P41,200, Balingit
and his wife had subscribed P40T. This implied that the
veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that PhilAm and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one
and the same civil personality. But this was not alleged
in their complaint.*
ISSUE
WON the terms "employers" and "owners and
managers of an establishment or enterprise" used in Art.
2180 NCC (Art.1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a
corporation owning a truck
HELD
NO
Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of
Establishments: Art.2180 uses the term "manager"
("director" in the Spanish version) to mean
"employer.
- Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no
tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on
Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.,
in connection with the vehicular accident because he
himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente
of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
* This issue was not raised in the lower court so it
would be unfair to allow them to do so now. The case
has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in
the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a
personality separate and distinct from that of the
Balingit spouses.
Dispositive
Lower courts order of dismissal is
AFFIRMED.
PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA)
273 SCRA 562
DAVIDE; June 17, 1997
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA
FACTS
-Civil Case No. 373 was an action against herein
petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon
A. Acuesta
-Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were
guilty of gross negligence, recklessness, violation of
traffic rules and regulations, abandonment of victim,
and attempt to escape from a crime
Private Respondents Version
-In the early morning of March 24, 1990, about 6:00
oclock, the victim Ramon A. Acuesta was riding in his
easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street
-On the Magsaysay Blvd., defendant Philtranco Service
Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No. 4025
ISSUE
(limited to that involved in the outline)
torts & damages

WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with
Manilhig for damages
HELD
Yes.
-Civil Case No. 373 is an action for damages based on
quasi-delict under Article 217614 and 218015 of the Civil
Code against petitioner Manilhig and his employer,
petitioner Philtranco, respectively.
-We have consistently held that the liability of the
registered owner of a public service vehicle, like
petitioner Philtranco, for damages arising from the
tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint
and several or solidary with the driver. As to
solidarity, Article 2194 expressly provides: the
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable
for a quasi-delict is solidary.
-Since the employer's liability is primary, direct and
solidary, its only recourse if the judgment for damages
is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its
employee who committed the fault or negligence which
gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Article
2181 of the Civil Code provides: Whoever pays for the
damage caused by his dependents or employees may
recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in
satisfaction of the claim.
Disposition
Appealed decision is affirmed. (with regard to this
issue)
CASTILEX V. VASQUEZ
14
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter
15
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxxxxxxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
xxxxxxxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
xxxxxxxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage
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Dec. 21, 1999. Davide

Facts: At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo
So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around
Fuente Osmea Rotunda. He was traveling counterclockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but
without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also
only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time.
Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager
of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered
owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no.
GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad drove the
said company car out of a parking lot but instead of
going around the Osmea rotunda he made a short cut
against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his
route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and
the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing
severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle
and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital
and later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. Vasquez died at
the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. It was there that Abad
signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party
(Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital
bills, professional fees and other incidental charges
Vasquez may incur.
After the police authorities had conducted the
investigation of the accident, a Criminal Case was filed
against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for
failure to prosecute. So, the present action for damages
was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So
Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez,
against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial
Corporation. In the same action, Cebu Doctor's Hospital
intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical
expense given to Romeo So Vasquez.
Issue: WON an employer may be held vicariously
liable for the death resulting from the negligent
operation by a managerial employee of a companyissued vehicle.
Held: Castilez is absolved from any liability. The
negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance.
prof. casis
Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but
claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries
and subsequent death caused by ABAD.
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article
2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances
where the employer is not engaged in business or
industry. Since it is engaged in the business of
manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not
covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph
should apply. Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth
paragraph is not accurate. The phrase "even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry"
found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to
mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be
engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the
negligence of his employee who is acting within the
scope of his assigned task.
A distinction must be made between the two
provisions to determine what is applicable. Both
provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to
owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise;
and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general,
whether or not engaged in any business or industry. The
fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees
committed either in the service of the branches or on the
occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph
encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within
the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an
expansion of the former in both employer coverage and
acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or
not the employer is engaged in a business or industry,
are covered so long as they were acting within the scope
of their assigned task, even though committed neither in
the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their
functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear
different hats. They perform functions which are
beyond their office, title or designation but which,
nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.This court
has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the
employer was engaged in a business or industry such as
truck operators and banks. The Court of Appeals
cannot, therefore, be faulted in applying the said
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case.
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or
torts & damages

not engaged in any business or industry, an employer is
liable for the torts committed by employees within the
scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to
establish the employer-employee relationship; once this
is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer
liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of
his assigned task when the tort complained of was
committed. It is only then that the employer may find it
necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the employee.
It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production
Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort
occurrence. As to whether he was acting within the
scope of his assigned task is a question of fact, which
the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the
affirmative.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the
rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
entitled to great respect, and even finality at times. This
rule is, however, subject to exceptions such as when the
conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures. Such exception obtain in the present case
to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the
Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving
petitioner's vehicle he was acting within the scope of his
duties as a manager.
On the issue of whether the private
respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD
was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks,
ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness,
testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving a
company-issued vehicle, registered under the name of
petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he
had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after
having done overtime work for the petitioner. No
absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will
furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether
at a given moment, an employee is engaged in his
employer's business in the operation of a motor vehicle,
so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the
employee's action or inaction; but rather, the result
varies with each state of facts. The court a quo and the
Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving
by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the
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scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and

circumstances. The SC does not agree. The mere fact
that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of
the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge
petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of
said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the
vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. It
used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the
employer's liability for the injuries inflicted by the
negligence of an employee in the use of an employer's
motor vehicle:
I.
Operation of Employer's Motor
Vehicle in Going to or from Meals
It has been held that an employee who uses his
employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place
where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a
meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his
employment in the absence of evidence of some special
business benefit to the employer. Evidence that by using
the employer's vehicle to go to and from meals, an
employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so
devote more time to the performance of his duties
supports the findings that an employee is acting within
the scope of his employment while so driving the
vehicle.
II.
Operation of Employer's Vehicle in
Going to or from Work
In the same vein, traveling to and from the
place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or
concern of the employee, and not a part of his services
to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special
benefit to the employer other than the mere
performance of the services available at the place where
he is needed, the employee is not acting within the
scope of his employment even though he uses his
employer's motor vehicle. 14 cda
The employer may, however, be liable where
he derives some special benefit from having the
employee drive home in the employer's vehicle as when
the employer benefits from having the employee at
work earlier and, presumably, spending more time at his
actual duties. Where the employee's duties require him
to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or
hours of work, or to go to and from his home to various
prof. casis
outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him
with a vehicle to use in his work, the courts have
frequently applied what has been called the "special
errand" or "roving commission" rule, under which it can
be found that the employee continues in the service of
his employer until he actually reaches home. However,
even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the
scope of his employment in going to or from work in
his employer's vehicle, the employer is not liable for his
negligence where at the time of the accident, the
employee has left the direct route to his work or back
home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.
III.
Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside
Regular Working Hours
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to
an employee for the latter's personal use outside of
regular working hours is generally not liable for the
employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the
period of permissive use, even where the employer
contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle
will be used by the employee for personal as well as
business purposes and there is some incidental benefit
to the employer. Even where the employee's personal
purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and
he has started the return trip to his house where the
vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not
resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable
for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle
during the return trip.
The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are
applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the
doctrine of respondeat superior, not on the principle of
bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault or
negligence of the employee is conclusive on his
employer as in American law or jurisprudence, or
merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of
negligence on the part of the employer as in ours, it is
indispensable that the employee was acting in his
employer's business or within the scope of his assigned
task. ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was
carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his
duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It
was then about 2:00 a.m., way beyond the normal
working hours. ABAD's working day had ended; his
torts & damages

overtime work had already been completed. His being
at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a
"haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and
addicts," had no connection to petitioner's business;
neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager.
Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal
purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the
perks attached to his position.
FILAMER V IAC
212 SCRA 637
GUTIERREZ SR; August 17, 1992
NATURE
Motion for Reconsideration
FACTS
- Funtecha is a scholar of FCI. He is also employed as a
janitor. The president of FCI is Agustin Masa. Agustin
has a son, Allan, who is the school bus (bus na jeepney)
driver. Allan lives with his dad. Funtecha also lives in
the presidents house free of charge while a student at
FCI.
- It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to
bring the kids home, then go back to the school, then go
home in the school jeep. He is allowed to bring home
the jeep because in the morning hes supposed to fetch
the kids and bring them to school.
- One night, Funtecha wanted to drive home. He has a
student license. After a dangerous curb, and seeing that
the road was clear, Allan let Funtecha drive. Then there
was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with
glaring lights. Funtecha swerved right and hit the
pedestrian Kapunan. Kapunan was walking in his lane
in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung
tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians). The jeep had
only one functioning headlight that night.
- TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan. SC reversed,
saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by
Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an
authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be
directly and primarily answerable.
ISSUE
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WON the employer of the janitor driving the school

jeep can be held liable
HELD
YES
- Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the
school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside
is an act in furtherance of the interest of the
petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that he drive
home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students
in the morning of the next school day.
- It is indubitable under the circumstances that the
school president had knowledge that the jeep was
routinely driven home for the said purpose. Moreover, it
is not improbable that the school president also had
knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student
driver's license and his desire to undergo driving lessons
during the time that he was not in his classrooms.
- In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home
in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely
was not, having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for
the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own"
but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was
intended by the petitioner school. The act of Funtecha
in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and
in behalf of his employer for which act the petitionerschool cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it
was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The
clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for
purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an
employer, includes any act done by an employee, in
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the
account of the employer at the time of the infliction of
the injury or damage. Even if somehow, the employee
driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act,
the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer
is determined by answering the question of whether or
not the servant was at the time of the accident
performing any act in furtherance of his master's
business.
- Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI. He need
not have an official appointment for a driver's position
in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for
his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act
prof. casis
of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit
of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not
the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his
janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the
burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that
there was negligence on its part either in the selection of
a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him.
The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having
exercised the required diligence of a good father of a
family over its employees Funtecha and Allan. There
were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the
school jeep by persons other than the driver. There was
thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its
employees with regard to the use of the jeep.
- The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages
for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which
Funtecha drove the vehicle. In the absence of evidence
that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision of its employees,
the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or
omissions of its employees. The liability of the
employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary.
However, the employer shall have recourse against the
negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to
the heirs of the plaintiff.
NPC v CA (PHESCO INC.)
294 CRA 209
ROMERO; August 14, 1998
NATURE
FACTS
- On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four dump trucks
owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left
Marawi City bound for Iligan City. Unfortunately,
enroute to its destination, one of the trucks driven by
Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a
Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the death of
three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as
physical injuries to seventeen other passengers.
- The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages
against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a
torts & damages

contractor of NPC with the main duty of supplying
workers and technicians for the latter's projects, but in
this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks).
- The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of
any liability. PHESCO appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which reversed the trial court's judgment
absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay
damages.
ISSUE
WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba, driver of the
dump truck, which should be solidarily liable for the
damages to the victims
HELD
YES
- In the provisions of the "Memorandum of
Understanding" entered into by PHESCO and NPC, we
are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in "labor
only" contracting. In a "labor only" contract, the person
acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or
intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the
workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if
they had been directly employed by him. Finding that a
contractor was a "labor-only" contractor is equivalent to
a finding that an employer-employee relationship
existed between the owner (principal contractor) and
the "labor-only" contractor, including the latter's
workers.
- Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides:
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former
are not engaged in any business or industry."
- In this regard, NPC's liability is direct, primary and
solidary with PHESCO and the driver. Of course, NPC,
if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it, shall have
recourse against PHESCO and the driver who
committed the negligence which gave rise to the action.
DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed.
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO
ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the
A2010
prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
Late NICANOR NAVIDAD

SECURITY AGENCY
VITUG, J/February 6, 2003
397 SCRA 75
&
PRUDENT
NATURE: APPEAL from CAs DECISION

- 14 Oct 1993, about 730pm, Nicanor Navidad,
then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after
purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the
fare).
- While Navidad was standing on the platform near
the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security
guard assigned to the area approached Navidad.
- A misunderstanding or an altercation between the
two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight.
- No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate
how the fight started or who, between the two,
delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on
the LRT tracks.
- At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT
train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was
coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train,
and he was killed instantaneously.
- Marjorie Navidad (Nicanors widow), along with
their children, filed a complaint for damages
against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the
LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro
Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband.
- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against
Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and
Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and
averred that it had exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its security guards.
- The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence
while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting
evidence, filed a demurrer contending that
Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was
negligent in his assigned task.
- TC: Rendered in favor of the Navidads and
against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin
ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the
plaintiffs the following:
"a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00; 2)
Compensatory damages of P443,520.00; 3)
Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the

sum of P50,000.00; b) Moral damages of
P50,000.00; c) Attorneys fees of P20,000; d)
Costs of suit.
- TC: dismissed complaint against defendants
LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit.
-Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals.
- CA: exonerated Prudent from any liability for the
death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the
LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for
the following amounts:
a) P44,830.00 as actual damages; b) P50,000.00
as nominal damages; c) P50,000.00 as moral
damages; d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the
death of the deceased; and e) P20,000.00 as and
for attorneys fees.
-CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not
have then as yet boarded the train, a contract of
carriage theretofore had already existed when the
victim entered the place where passengers were
supposed to be after paying the fare and getting
the corresponding token therefor. In exempting
Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there
was nothing to link the security agency to the
death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to
show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the
victim and the evidence merely established the
fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having
been hit by the train owned and managed by the
LRTA and operated at the time by Roman. The
appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to
present expert evidence to establish the fact that
the application of emergency brakes could not
have stopped the train.
- CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
in its resolution of 10 October 2000.
ISSUES:
WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS
LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR
NAVIDAD, JR.
WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT
RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA
torts & damages

AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF
NAVIDAD
LRTAs CLAIMS:
-Escartins assault upon Navidad, which caused
the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a
stranger that could not have been foreseen or
prevented.
- NO employer-employee relationship between
Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had
testified being an employee of Metro Transit and
not of the LRTA.
Navidads Contention:
- A contract of carriage was deemed created from
the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT
station and entered the premises of the latter,
entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection
under a contractual relation, and that the appellate
court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable
for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise
extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common
carrier.
HELD:
1. NO. The foundation of LRTAs liability is the
contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify
the victim arises from the breach of that contract
by reason of its failure to exercise the high
diligence required of the common carrier. In the
discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety
of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its
own employees or avail itself of the services of an
outsider or an independent firm to undertake the
task. In either case, the common carrier is not
relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of
carriage.
- PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for
tort under the provisions of Article 2176
HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/feb2003/gr
_145804_2003.html" \l "fnt12#fnt12" 12 and related
provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180,
HYPERLINK
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_145804_2003.html" \l "fnt13#fnt13" of the Civil

Code. (But there wasnt any evidence shown that
linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this
case- SC) The premise, however, for the
employers liability is negligence or fault on the
part of the employee.
- Once such fault is established, the employer can
then be made liable on the basis of the
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed
to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection and supervision of its employees. The
liability is primary and can only be negated by
showing due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee, a factual matter that
has not been shown.
- A contractual obligation can be breached by tort
and when the same act or omission causes the
injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the
other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 HYPERLINK
_145804_2003.html" \l "fnt14#fnt14" 14 of the Civil
Code can well apply.
- In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a
contract, where tort is that which breaches the
contract. Stated differently, when an act which
constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability
had no contract existed between the parties, the
contract can be said to have been breached by
tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
2. YES.
There is no showing that Rodolfo Roman himself is
guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must
also be absolved from liability as Prudent is.
Needless to say, the contractual tie between the
LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation
between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can
be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.
REASONING:
- Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common
carrier, both from the nature of its business and for
reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty
prof. casis
of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the
safety of passengers.
- The Civil Code, governing the liability of a
common carrier for death of or injury to its
passengers, provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound
to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or
injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles
1733 and 1755."
"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable
for the death of or injuries to passengers through
the negligence or willful acts of the formers
employees, although such employees may have
acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carriers.
"This liability of the common carriers does
not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employees."
"Article 1763. A common carrier is
responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of the willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers, if the common
carriers employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission."
-The law requires common carriers to carry
passengers safely using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons with due regard for all
circumstances.
- Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety
to its passengers so obligates it not only during the
course of the trip but for so long as the passengers
are within its premises and where they ought to be
in pursuance to the contract of carriage
torts & damages

- The statutory provisions render a common carrier
liable for death of or injury to passengers (a)
through the negligence or wilful acts of its
employees or b) on account of wilful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers if
the common carriers employees through the
exercise of due diligence could have prevented or
stopped the act or omission.
- In case of such death or injury, a carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or been negligent,
and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is
relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or
negligence of the carrier or of its employees and
the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the
injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force
majeure. In the absence of satisfactory explanation
by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which
LRTA and Roman, according to the CA, have
failed to show, the presumption would be that it
has been at fault, an exception from the general
rule that negligence must be proved.
DISPOSITION: CAS DECISION AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of
nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner
Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs.
______________
HYPERLINK
_145804_2003.html" \l "rnt12#rnt12" Art. 2176.
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
HYPERLINK
_145804_2003.html" \l "rnt13#rnt13" 13 Art. 2180.
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
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The father and, in case of his death or incapacity,

the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their
company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the
minors or incapacitated persons who are under
their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on
the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused
by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it
acts through a special agent, but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom
the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
HYPERLINK
_145804_2003.html" \l "rnt14#rnt14" Art. 2194.
The responsibility of two or more persons who are
liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
MCKEE V IAC (TAYAG & MANALO)
221 SCRA 517
Davide, Jr.; July 16, 1992
NATURE
- Petition to review the resolution of the CA
FACTS
prof. casis
- On January 8, 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along
MacArthur Highway, Pampanga, a head-on-collision
took place between an International cargo truck,
Loadstar, owned by private respondents, Jaime Tayag
and Rosalina Manalo, and driven by Ruben Galang, and
a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The collision
resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim McKee and
Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George McKee,
Christopher McKee and Araceli McKee, all passengers
of the Ford Escort.
- Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck,
which was loaded with 200 cavans of rice weighing
about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from
Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was
bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand,
was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando.
When the northbound car was about 10 meters away
from the southern approach of the bridge, 2 boys
suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into
the lane of the car. The boys were moving back and
forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other
side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car,
swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he
then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the
brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane.
Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck.
The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which
was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.
- Please see first Mckee digest for details on the
collision.
- Civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were
filed as a result of a vehicular accident.
ISSUE
WON the owners of the cargo truck (Tayag and
Manalo) are liable for the resulting damages
HELD
YES
- The Court rules that it was the truck driver's
negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the
collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the
collision. As employers of the truck driver, Manalo and
Tayag are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages.
The presumption that they are negligent flows from the
torts & damages

negligence of their employee. That presumption,
however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their
only possible defense is that they exercised all the
damage. Article 2180 reads as follows:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.
The diligence of a good father referred to means the
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.
- The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases
Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense.
Neither did they attempt to prove it.
VALENZUELA v CA (LI and ALEXANDER
COMMERCIAL, INC.)
253 SCRA 303
KAPUNAN; February 7, 1996
NATURE
FACTS
- Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving when she
realized she had a flat tire. She parked along the
sidewalk of Aurora Blvd., put on her emergency lights,
alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the
trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her
car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix
the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a car driven
by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of
defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc.
- Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the
windshield of the car of the defendant, which was
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destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled

out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was
severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some
skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She
was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and
was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. She filed a
claim for damages against defendant.
- Lis alibi was that he was driving at 55kph when he
was suddenly confronted with a speeding car coming
from the opposite direction. He instinctively swerved to
the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle,
and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see because
it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or
early warning device, and the area was poorly lighted.
Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that
plaintiff was the one who was reckless or negligent.
-RTC found Li and Alexander solidarily liable. CA
absolved Alexander.
ISSUE
1. WON Li was grossly negligent in driving the
company issued car
2. WON Valenzuela was guilty of contributory
negligence
3. WON Alexander Commercial is liable as Lis
employer
HELD
1. YES
- The average motorist alert to road conditions will have
no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the
speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility
of the street, and the road conditions on a principal
metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li
would have had ample time to react to the changing
conditions of the road if he were alert as every driver
should be to those conditions. Driving exacts a more
than usual toll on the senses. Physiological "fight or
flight"
mechanisms are at work, provided such
mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol,
exhaustion, drowsiness, etc. Li's failure to react in a
manner which would have avoided the accident could
therefore have been only due to either or both of the
two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast" speed
prof. casis
as testified by one of the witneses; and 2) that he was
under the influence of alcohol. Either factor working
independently
would
have
diminished
his
responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he
would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela's
car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly
apply his brakes.
- Li was, therefore, negligent in driving his companyissued Mitsubishi Lancer
2. NO
- Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm
he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which
he is required to conform for his own protection. Under
the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs.
Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds
himself in a situation of danger and is required to act
without much time to consider the best means that may
be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty
of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution,
unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence.
- While the emergency rule applies to those cases in
which reflective thought or the opportunity to
adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the
conduct which is required of an individual in such cases
is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the
event which absolutely negates thoroughful care, but by
the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman
driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a
rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point
which is both convenient for her to do so and which is
not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to
run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or
turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely
find no one to help her.
- Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct
which creates an undue risk of harm to others. It is the
failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.
3. YES
torts & damages

- Since important business transactions and decisions
may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and
under all kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited
use of a company car therefore principally serves the
business and goodwill of a company and only
incidentally the private purposes of the individual who
actually uses the car, the managerial employee or
company sales agent. As such, in providing for a
company car for business use and/or for the purpose of
furthering the company's image, a company owes a
responsibility to the public to see to it that the
managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts
virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able
to use the company issue capably and responsibly.
In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not
demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of the family in
entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were
made as to whether or not the company took the steps
necessary to determine or ascertain the driving
proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and
unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able
to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should
be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to
Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater
familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with
the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela during the accident.
DISPOSITION Judgment of RTC reinstated.
MERRITT v GOVERNMENT
34 Phil 311
TRENT; March 31, 1916
NATURE
Appeal from decision of the CFI
FACTS
- E. Merritt, riding on a motorcycle, was hit by the
General Hospital ambulance, which turned suddenly
and unexpectedly to Taft Avenue without sounding any
whistle or horn, in contravention of an ordinance and
the Motor Vehicle Act.
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- Plaintiff was so severely injured. His leg showed a

contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that
made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the
fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable
readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves.
The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light
weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. This
latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff
had to do any difficult mental labor, especially when he
attempted to use his money for mathematical
calculations.
- Witnesses testified that plaintiffs physical and mental
condition before the accident was excellent. He was one
of the best contractors of wooden buildings. He could
not now earn even a half of the income that he had
secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of
his efficiency. He had to dissolve a partnership that he
had with an engineer and give up a contract for the
construction of a building.
- Trial court held that the collision was due solely on the
negligence of the chauffeur and awarded the plaintiff
the sum of P14, 741.
- Act No. 2457 was enacted. It states that E. Merritt is
hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila against the Government
of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle
and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to
determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which
Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision,
and the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is
hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on
the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to
defendant said Government at the same.
ISSUES
WON the government is liable for the damages
resulting from a tort committed by an agent or
employee of the government
HELD
NO
prof. casis
Ratio The State is only liable for the acts of its agents,
officers and employees when they act as special agents
within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903.
Reasoning
- In the United States the rule is that the state is not
liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents
whom it employs, except when expressly made so by
legislative enactment. The Government does not
undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the
officers or agents whom it employs, since that would
involve it in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be
subversive of the public interest.
- As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting
individuals to sue the state where the cause of action
arises out of either fort or contract, the rule is stated in
36 Cyc., 915, thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its
immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in
his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to
enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to
the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense.
- Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through
a special agent, but not when the damage should
have been caused by the official to whom properly
it pertained to do the act performed, in which case
the provisions of the preceding article shall be
applicable.
- The obligation to indemnify for damages which a third
person causes to another by his fault or negligence is
based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15,
Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault
or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the
third party who caused the damage. It follows therefrom
that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not
responsible for the damages suffered by private
individuals in consequence of acts performed by its
employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining
to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence
can be presumed on the part of the state in the
torts & damages

organization of branches of public service and in the
appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must
presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in
order that each branch of service serves the general
weal an that of private persons interested in its
operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore,
no relations of a private nature governed by the civil
law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a
judicial person capable of acquiring rights and
contracting obligations.
- The Civil Code in chap 2, title 16, book 4, regulates
the obligations which arise out of fault or negligence;
and whereas in the first article thereof. No. 1902, where
the general principle is laid down that where a person
who by an act or omission causes damage to another
through fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair
the damage so done, reference is made to acts or
omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly
cause the damage, the following articles refers to this
persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those
who maintain fixed relations of authority and
superiority over the authors of the damage, because the
law presumes that in consequence of such relations the
evil caused by their own fault or negligence is
imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to
proof, however, because, as held in the last paragraph of
article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons
ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove
that they employed all the diligence of a good father of
a family to avoid the damage, and among these persons,
called upon to answer in a direct and not a subsidiary
manner, are found, in addition to the mother or the
father in a proper case, guardians and owners or
directors of an establishment or enterprise, the state, but
not always, except when it acts through the agency of a
special agent, doubtless because and only in this case,
the fault or negligence, which is the original basis of
this kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with the
state.
- Although in some cases the state might by virtue of
the general principle set forth in article 1902 respond
for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties
by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence
are made by branches of the central administration
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acting in the name and representation of the state itself

and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the
exercise of its executive powers, yet said article is not
applicable in the case of damages said to have been
occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official,
acting in the exercise of his powers, in proceedings to
enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing
by the owner of the property which they hold in
sublease.
- The responsibility of the state is limited by article
1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent
(one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his
office if he is a special official) so that in representation
of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof,
he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does
not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of
the acting administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions which are inherent
in and naturally pertain to his office and which are
regulated by law and the regulations.
- The responsibility of the state is limited to that which
it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by
a definite order or commission to perform some act or
charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to
the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or
omissions imputable to a public official charged with
some administrative or technical office who can be held
to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by
the law of civil responsibility.
- The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not such an agent within the meaning of
paragraph 5 of article 1903
On the computation of damages
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741
and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a)
P5,000, the award awarded for permanent injuries, and
(b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of
wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated
from pursuing his occupation. We find nothing in the
record which would justify us in increasing the amount
of the first. As to the second, the record shows, and the
trial court so found, that the plaintiff's services as a
contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court,
prof. casis
however, limited the time to 2months and 21 days,
which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital.
In this we think there was error, because it was clearly
established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated
for a period of 6 months. The mere fact that he
remained in the hospital only 2 months and 21 days
while the remainder of the 6 months was spent in his
home, would not prevent recovery for the whole time.
We, therefore, find that the amount of damages
sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part,
is P18,075.
Dispositive Judgment appealed from reversed. Whether
the Government intends to make itself legally liable for
the amount of damages above set forth, which the
plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of
one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by
appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called
upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the
Legislature and not with the courts.
ROSETE v AUDITOR GENERAL
81 Phil 453
FERIA; August 31, 1948
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the Insular Auditor
FACTS
- Jose Panlilio ignited his lighter near a drum into which
gasoline was being drained causing fire in the
warehouse of Emergency Control Administration (ECA,
a government agency).
- The fire destroyed the building owned by the
petitioner, thereby giving rise to this claim for damages
against Panlilio for his negligence and the officers of
ECA for storing gasoline in said warehouse contrary to
the provisions of ordinances of the City of Manila
(ordinance requires a license for storing flammable
substances, which ECA didnt have).
- Insular Auditor dismissed the claim hence this appeal.
ISSUE
WON the government is liable for the damages
torts & damages

HELD
NO
- Art. 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
Art. 1903. The obligation imposed in the
preceding article is enforceable not only for
personal acts and omission but also for those
persons for whom another is responsible.
xx
The state is liable in this sense when it acts
through a special agent, but not when the
damage should have been caused by the
official to whom it properly pertained to do the
act performed, in which case the provisions of
the preceding article shall be applicable.
- In the case of Merritt v. Government, the court held
the following:
The state is not responsible for
the damage suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its
employees in the discharge of the functions
pertaining to their office n relations of a
private nature governed by the civil law can
arise except in a case where the state acts as a
juridical person capable of acquiring rights and
contracting obligations.
xx
That the responsibility of the state
is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it
acts through a special agent (and a special
agent, in the sense in which these words are
employed, is one who receives a definite and
fixed order by the commission, foreign to the
exercise of duties of his office if he is a special
official) so that in representation of the state
and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he
executes the trust confided to him.
- There being no showing that whatever negligence may
be imputed to the ECA or its officers, was done by a
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special agent, because the officers of the ECA did not

act as special agents of the government within the
above defined meaning of that wod in Article 1903 of
the Civil Code in storing gasoline in the warehouse of
ECA, the government is not responsible for damages
caused through such negligence.
- Although there is an act (Act No. 327) authorizing the
filing of claims against the government with the Insular
Auditor, and appeal by private persons or entities from
the latters decision to the Supreme Court, it does not
make any and all claims against the government
allowable, and the latter responsible for all claims.
DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is affirmed.
MENDOZA V. DE LEON
FONTANILLA V MALIAMAN and NATIONAL
IRRIGATION ADMINSITRATION
194 SCRA 486
PARAS; February 27, 1991
NATURE
Resolution
FACTS
0
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
maintains that it does not perform solely and primarily
proprietary functions, but is an agency of the
government tasked with governmental functions, and is
therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its driver
Garcia, who was not its special agent.
0
NIA believes this bases this on:
0
PD 552 amended some provisions
of RA 3601 (the law which created the NIA)
1
The case of Angat River Irrigation
System v. Angat River Workers Union
1
Angat Case: Although the majority opinion
declares that the Angat System, like the NIA, exercised
a governmental function because the nature of its
powers and functions does not show that it was
intended to bring to the Government any special
corporate benefit or pecuniary profit, a strong
dissenting opinion held that Angat River system is a
prof. casis
government entity exercising proprietary functions.
2
The Angat dissenting opinion:
3
Alegre protested the announced termination of
his employment. He argued that although his contract
did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17,
1976, since his services were necessary and desirable
in the usual business of his employer, and his
employment had lasted for five years, he had acquired
the status of regular employee and could not be
removed except for valid cause.
4
The employment contract of 1971 was
executed when the Labor Code of the Philippines had
not yet been promulgated, which came into effect some
3 years after the perfection of the contract.
ISSUE
WON the NIR is a government agency with a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the government,
thereby opening it up to the possibility that it may be
held liable for the damages caused by its driver, who
was not its special agent
HELD YES
Reasoning the functions of government have been
classified into governmental or constituent and
proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the
exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory;
the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary
functions and thus considered as optional.
The National Irrigation Administration was not created
for purposes of local government. While it may be true
that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the
government aimed at promoting public interest and
public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA
essentially and purely a "government-function"
corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of
"constructing,
improving,
rehabilitating,
and
administering all national irrigation systems in the
Philippines, including all communal and pump
irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the
community as a whole are largely benefited by the
services the agency renders, but these functions are only
torts & damages

incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is
the irrigation of lands.
NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate
personality separate and distinct from the government,
thus is governed by the Corporation Law. Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 3601 provides:
Sec. 1. Name and Domicile A body corporate is
hereby created which shall be known as the National
Irrigation Administration. . . . which shall be organized
immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have
its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and
shall have representatives in all provinces, for the
proper conduct of its business. (Emphasis for
emphasis).
Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552 provides
that:
(b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the
water from all irrigation systems constructed by or
under its administration, such fees or administration
charges as may be necessary to cover the cost of
operation, maintenance and insurance, and to recover
the cost of construction within a reasonable period of
time to the extent consistent with government policy; to
recover funds or portions thereof expended for the
construction and/or rehabilitation of communal
irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a special
fund for irrigation development under section 2 hereof;
Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be
preferred liens first, upon the land benefited, and then
on the crops raised thereon, which liens shall have
preference over all other liens except for taxes on the
land, and such preferred liens shall not be removed until
all fees or administration charges are paid or the
property is levied upon and sold by the National
Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. . . .
The same section also provides that NIA may sue and
be sued in court.
It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate
powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors. Section
2, subsection (f):
(f) . . . and to transact such business, as are directly or
indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the
attainment of the above powers and objectives,
including the power to establish and maintain
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subsidiaries, and in general, to exercise all the powers

of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as
they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
DISPOSITION
We conclude that the National
Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a
juridical personality separate and distinct from the
government. It is not a mere agency of the government
but a corporate body performing proprietary functions.
Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused
by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special
agent.
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated
January 26, 1990 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. The
decision of this Court in G.R. No. 55963 and G.R. No.
61045 dated December 1, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED.
DISSENTING: PADILLA: to say that NIA has opened
itself to suit is one thing; to say that it is liable for
damages arising from tort committed by its employees,
is still another thing.
The state or a government agency performing
governmental functions may be held liable for tort
committed by its employees only when it acts through a
special agent.
CITY OF MANILA V TEOTICA
22 SCRA 267
CONCEPCION; January 29, 1968
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
FACTS
- Genaro N. Teotico, an accountant, was at the corner of
the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, waiting
for a jeep. After waiting 5 mins, he hailed a jeep that
came to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to
board the jeep, and took a few steps, he fell inside a
manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head
hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and
causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid.
As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision,
several persons came to his assistance and pulled him
out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the
prof. casis
Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were
treated, after which he was taken home. In addition to
the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico
suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm,
the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on
the right infra-patella region. These injuries and the
allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections
administered to him in the hospital, required further
medical treatment by a private practitioner.
- Teotico filed with CFI Manila, a complaint which was,
subsequently, amended for damages against the City of
Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city
treasurer and chief of police.
- Defense pointed out that because of the lucrative scrap
iron business then prevailing, stealing of iron catchbasin
covers was rampant; that the Office of the City
Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from
theft of said iron covers; that in order to prevent such
thefts, the city government has changed the position and
layout of catchbasins in the City by constructing them
under the sidewalks with concrete cement covers and
openings on the side of the gutter; and that these
changes had been undertaken by the city from time to
time whenever funds were available.
- CFI Manila sustained the theory of the defendants
and dismissed the amended complaint, without costs.
- This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned,
which was sentenced to pay damages in the
aggregate sum of P6,750.00. Hence, this appeal by the
City of Manila.
- The first issue raised by the Manila is whether the
present case is governed by Section 4 of RA 409
(Charter of the City of Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or
injuries to persons or property arising from the failure
of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city
officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any
other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said
Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which provides:
torts & damages
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Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable

for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any
person by reason of defective conditions of road,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision.
- Manila maintains that the former provision should
prevail over the latter, because RA 409, is a special law,
intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the
Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire
Philippines.
Dispositive WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from

should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
City of Manila.
Voting Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.
ISSUES
WON City of Manila should be held liable for the
damages suffered by Teotica.
FACTS:
-An employee of the Ace ADVERTISING Company
was sent to the States to pursue studies in
television. When asked about the expenses of the
trip, respondent answered that these were not
shouldered by the company and instead by other
parties
-while abroad, he continued to receive his salaries
in the form of vouchers ordered and signed by
respondent Joya. The petitioner signed three of
these checks. The others were signed by either
the respondent, or Vicente Araneta (company
treasurer) who put up part of the bill connected
with Taylor's trip and also handed him letters for
delivery in the United States. The Ace Advertising
disbursed P5,043.20, all told, on account of
Taylor's travel and studies
-the Ace Advertising filed a complaint with the court
of first instance of Manila against the respondent
for recovery of the total sum disbursed to Taylor,
alleging that the trip was made without its
knowledge,
authority
or
ratification.
The
respondent, in his answer, denied the charge and
claimed that the trip was nonetheless ratified by
the company's board of directors, and that in any
event under the by-laws he had the discretion, as
general manager, to authorize the trip which was
for the company's benefit
-Joya also filed a 3rd party complaint against the
two Aranetas proving that they were involved in
sending Taylor abroad
-trial court rendered judgment ordering the
respondent to pay the Ace Advertising "the sum of
HELD
YES.
Ratio RA 409,sec.4 refers to liability arising from
negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof,
whereas Article 2189, CC governs liability due to
"defective streets," in particular. Since the present
action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a
road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
Reasoning The assertion to the effect that said Avenue
is a national highway was made, for the first time, in its
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court
of Appeals. At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil
Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or streets
belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is
that the province, city or municipality have either
"control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if
P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway,
this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its
"control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under
Republic Act 409.
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P.
Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of
the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of
negligence, in connection with the maintenance of said
road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in
the affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said
Court thereon are not subject to our review.
ARANETA v JOYA
57 SCRA 59
CASTRO J.: May 24, 1974
prof. casis
P5,043.20 with interest at the legal rate from
August 23, 1954 until full payment. 3rd party
complaint dismissed
-CA affirmed however dismissal of 3rd party
complaint was reversed stating that Taylor's trip
had been neither authorized nor ratified by the
company
-CA noted that based on the facts, both petitioners
knew and through their acts showed that they
approved of the trip. were also privy to the
unauthorized disbursement of the corporate
moneys jointly with the appellant; what had
happened was in truth and in fact a venture by
them given their stamp of approval; and as it was
an unauthorized act of expenditure of corporate
funds, and it was these three without whose acts
the same could not have happened, the juridical
situation was a simple quasi-delict by them
committed upon the corporation, for which solidary
liability should have been imposed upon all in the
first place
ISSUE:
WON petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict
HELD: Yes
- The petitioner's assertion that he signed the
questioned payroll checks in good faith has not
been substantiated, he in particular not having
testified or offered testimony to prove such claim.
Upon the contrary, in spite of his being a vicepresident and director of the Ace Advertising, the
petitioner remained passive, throughout the period
of Taylor's stay abroad, concerning the
unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds for
the latter. This plus the fact that he even approved
thrice payroll checks for the payment of Taylor's
salary, demonstrate quite distinctly that the
petitioner neglected to perform his duties properly,
to the damage of the firm of which he was an
officer.
-The fact that he was occupying a contractual
position at the Ace Advertising is of no moment.
torts & damages

The existence of a contract between the parties,
as has been repeatedly held by this Court,
constitutes no bar to the commission of a tort by
one against the other and the consequent recovery
of damages
TORTS WITH INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION
LIM v DE LEON
G.R. No. L-22554
MARTIN; August 29, 1975
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the CFI
FACTS
- Plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto
Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN
RAFAEL". A year later or on April 9, 1962 Alberto
Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale
Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from
him.
- After conducting a preliminary investigation, Fiscal
Francisco Ponce de Leon, in his capacity as Acting
Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, filed with the Court of
First Instance of Palawan the corresponding information
for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon Persons
against Jikil Taha.
- June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon
being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac,
Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan
requesting him to direct the detachment commander in
Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor
launch.
- Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the
Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch,
explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party,
plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court
from taking custody of the same. Upon order of the
Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando
Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balabac,
Palawan, seized the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL"
from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it.
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- Plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim pleaded with Orlando

Maddela to return the motor launch but the latter
refused. Likewise, Jikil Taha through his counsel made
representations with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the
seized property to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim but
Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused, on the ground that the
same was the subject of a criminal offense.
xxx
"(9)The rights to be secure in one's person,
house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
xxx
"The indemnity shall include moral damages.
Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated."
ISSUES
1. WON defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had
the power to order the seizure of the motor launch in
question without a warrant of search and seizure even if
the same was admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime
2. WON defendants-appellees are civilly liable to
plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly suffered by
them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was
unlawful
"ART. 2219.Moral damages may be recovered

in the following and analogous cases:
xxx
"(6)Illegal search;
xxx
"(1)Acts and action referred to in Articles 21,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 36."
HELD
1. NO
- Defendant-appellees admitted that when Orlando
Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim and
impounded the motor launch he was not armed with a
search warrant; that he effected the seizure of the motor
launch in the absence of and without the consent of
Delfin Lim. There can be no question that without the
proper search warrant, no public official has the right to
enter the premises of another without his consent for the
purpose of search and seizure. And since in the present
case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch
without a warrant, they have violated the constitutional
right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable
search and seizure.
2. YES
- Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their claim for damages
on Articles 32 and 2219 of the New Civil Code which
provide in part as follows:
"ART. 32.Any public officer or employee, or
any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person
shall be liable to the latter for damages.
- Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose

constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is
entitled to actual and moral damages from the public
officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition,
exemplary damages may also be awarded.
DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is hereby
reversed and another one entered declaring the seizure
illegal and ordering defendant-appellee Fiscal Francisco
Ponce de Leon to pay to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim
the sum of P3,000.00 as actual damages, plus P1,000.00
moral damages, and, in addition, P750.00 for attorney's
fees.
ABERCA V VER
G.R. No. L-69866
YAP; April 15, 1988
NATURE: Petition for certiorari
FACTS
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and
seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties
of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force
Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to
conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communistterrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing
torts & damages

reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro
Manila,"
Plaintiffs allegations: That complying with said order
of Ver, elements of the TFM raided several places,
employing in most cases defectively issued judicial
search warrants; that during these raids, certain
members of the raiding party confiscated a number of
purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that
plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued
by the courts; that for some period after their arrest,
they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that
plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to
silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated
them employed threats, tortures and other forms of
violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory
information or confessions and in order to punish them;
that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were
part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly
extract information and incriminatory statements from
plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said
plans being previously known to and sanctioned by
defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages of
P39,030; moral damages of at least P150K each or a
total of P3M; exemplary damages of at least P150K
each or a total of P3M; and attorney's fees not less than
P200K.
Respondents contentions: A motion to dismiss was
filed by defendants, through their counsel, then SolGen. Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs may
not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of
their detention in the guise of a damage suit because the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2)
assuming that the courts can entertain the present
action, defendants are immune from liability for acts
done in the performance of their official duties; and (3)
the complaint states no cause of action against the
defendants.
ISSUES
1. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal
searches conducted by military personnel and other
violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution.
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2. WON a superior officer under the notion of

respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly
and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose
constitutional rights and liberties have been violated.
3. WON trial court correct in dismissing the complaint
with respect to (dome of the) plaintiffs on the basis of
the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file MFR of the
court's resolution granting the respondent's motion to
dismiss
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio: The suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and
cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention and other violations of their constitutional
rights. The suspension does not render valid an
otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended
is merely the right of the individual to seek release from
detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy
means of obtaining his liberty.
Reasoning: [a] The purpose Art. 32 CC is to provide a
sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms
enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no
man may seek to violate those sacred rights with
impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and
political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield
to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is
necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights
and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to
the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling
power. [b] The invocation of the doctrine of state
immunity from suit totally misplaced. It cannot be
construed as a blanket license or a roving commission
untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard
or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the
individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the
Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law
of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or
military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times. [c]
Art. 32 of CC which renders any public officer or
employee or any private individual liable in damages
for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of
another does not exempt the respondents from
responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability
prof. casis
under the said article, provided their acts or omissions
do not constitute a violation of the RPC or other penal
statute. [d] Even assuming that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends
petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest
and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their
rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because
of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings,
the violation of their right to remain silent and to
counsel and their right to protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture
and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
2. NO
Ratio: Although the doctrine of respondent superior is
applicable to the case, as contended by respondents, the
decisive factor in this case is the language of Art. 32
CC. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person
'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of
the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it
is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible)
who must answer for damages under Art. 32; the person
indirectly responsible has also to answer for the
damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party
Reasoning: [a] The doctrine of respondent superior has
been generally limited in its application to principal and
agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and
employee) relationship. No such relationship exists
between superior officers of the military and their
subordinates. But in this case, Art. 32 governs. [b] By
this provision, the principle of accountability of public
officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning
and acquires a larger dimension. A superior have to
answer for the transgressions of his subordinates against
the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the
citizen. Hence, Art. 32 of CC makes the persons who
are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the
transgression joint tortfeasors. [c] To determine the
sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged
in the complaint, and no others, should be considered.
For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint. [d] So, under the above principles, it is
difficult to justify the TCs dismissal for lack of cause
of action the complaint against all the defendants,
torts & damages

except Maj.Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba. The
complaint contained allegations against all the
defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be
sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against
all of them under Art. 32 of CC.
3. NO.
The body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the
motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. And this
must have been also the understanding of defendants'
counsel himself for when he filed his comment on the
motion, he furnished copies thereof, not just to the
lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of
plaintiffs In filing the motion to set aside the resolution,
the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiff.
They needed no specific authority to do that. The
authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a
party can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged
by the adverse party or the party concerned, which was
never done in this case.
DISPOSITION: Petition granted. Case remanded to
the respondent court for further proceedings.
SEPARATE OPINION:
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
- The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all
persons, be they public officers or employees, or
members of the military or police force or private
individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat,
violate or in any manner impede or impair the
constitutional rights and civil liberties of another
person, stand liable and may be sued in court for
damages as provided in Art. 32 of CC.
- The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the
civil action for damages filed in the court below by
petitioners-plaintiffs for illegal searches conducted by
military personnel and other violations of their
constitutional rights and liberties. At the same time it
rejects the automatic application of the principle of
respondent superior or command responsibility that
would hold a superior officer jointly and severally
accountable for damages, including moral and
exemplary, with his subordinates who committed such
transgressions. However, the judgment gives the caveat
that a superior officer must not abdicate his duty to
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properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk

of being held responsible for gross negligence and of
being held under the cited provision of the Civil Code
as indirectly and solidarily accountable with the
tortfeasor.
MHP GARMENTS, INC. vs. CA
PUNO; 22 September 1994
Nature
- Petition for Certiorari
Facts
-MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts
of the Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and
distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies,
badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum
Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the
authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the
prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout
uniforms and other scouting supplies."
-Sometime in October 1983, MHP received information
that private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol
Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy
Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority.
De Guzman, an employee of petitioner corporation, was
tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to
make a report of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). De
Guzman, Peafiel, and two (2) other constabulary men
of the Reaction Force Battalion went to the stores of
respondents at the Marikina Public Market. Without any
warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts pants,
dresses, and suits on display at respondents' stalls. The
seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private
respondents. The items were then turned over by
Captain Peafiel to petitioner corporation for
safekeeping. A criminal complaint for unfair
competition was then filed against private respondents.
After a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal
of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private
respondents. He also ordered the return of the seized
items which was not immediately returned despite
demands. Private respondents had to go personally to
petitioners' place of business to recover their goods.
prof. casis
Even then, not all the seized items were turned. The
other items returned were of inferior quality. Private
respondent then filed a Civil Case against the
petitioners for sums of money and damages. The trial
court ruled for the private respondents. The decision
was appealed to the respondent court. It affirmed the
decision with modification
MHP filed a petition for certiorari before the SC.
Issue/s and Held
WON the search and seizure was legal
No. The evidence did not justify the warrantless search
and seizure of private respondents' goods. Petitioner
corporation received information that private
respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and
paraphernalia in October 1983. The specific date and
time are not established in the evidence adduced by the
parties. De Guzman then made a surveillance of the
stores of private respondents. They reported to the
Philippine Constabulary and on October 25, 1983, the
raid was made on the stores of private respondents and
the supposed illicit goods were seized. The progression
of time between the receipt of the information and the
raid of the stores of private respondents shows there
was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding
party to apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the
sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and
seized the goods of private respondents. In doing so,
they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the
seizure would be proved to violate the right of private
respondents against unreasonable search and seizure.
The search and seizure were clearly illegal. There was
no probable cause for the seizure. Probable cause for a
search has been defined as "such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched."
These facts and circumstances were not in any way
shown by the petitioners to justify their warrantless
search and seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary
investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed
their complaint for unfair competition and later ordered
the return of the seized goods.
torts & damages

WON MHP Garments is liable
Yes. The omission will not exculpate petitioners. The
respondent court correctly granted damages to private
respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in
transgressing the right of private respondents against
unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated
the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum
Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all
illegal sources of scouting supplies. The raid was
conducted with the active participation of their
employee. Larry de Guzman who did not lift a finger to
stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By
standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was
liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. So
with the petitioner corporation which even received for
safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC
raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender
them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its
complaint for unfair competition. Secondly, Letter of
Instruction No. 1299 already directs all law
enforcement agencies of the Republic of the
Philippines, to apprehend immediately unauthorized
manufacturers and distributors of Scout paraphernalia,
upon proper application by the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the Philippines for
warrant of arrest and/or search warrant with a judge, or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law; and to impound the said paraphernalia to be used
as evidence in court or other appropriate administrative
body it orders the immediate and strict compliance with
the Instructions which the petitioners miserably failed
to do. And thirdly, they should have filed a third-party
complaint against the raiding team for contribution or
any other relief, in respect of respondents' claim for
Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. Again, they
did not.
WON an award for moral damages should be
awarded
Yes. It is consistently ruled that moral damages are not
awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate
the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered.
Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon,
op. cit., moral damages can be awarded in the case at
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prof. casis
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bench. There can be no doubt that petitioners must have

suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and wounded
feelings due the tortious raid caused by petitioners.
Private respondents' avowals of embarrassment and
humiliation during the seizure of their merchandise
were supported by their testimonies.
The wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the
award of exemplary damages. It will also serve as a
stern reminder to all and sundry that the constitutional
protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a
virile reality and not a mere burst of rhetoric. The all
encompassing protection extends against intrusions
directly done both by government and indirectly by
private entities.
Disposition
IN VIEW WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We impose a
SIX PERCENT (6%) interest from January 9, 1987 on
the TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) for the
unreturned twenty-six (26) pieces of girl scouts items
and a TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu of
SIX PERCENT (6%), on the said amount upon finality
of this Decision until the payment thereof. Costs against
petitioners.
MARCIA V CA (PAJE)
205 PHIL 147
RELOVA; January 27, 1983
NATURE
Petition for certiorari
FACTS
- Paje is a driver of a Victory Liner Bus
- His bus collided with the jeep driven by Clemente
Marcia, causing the latters death and physical injuries
to herein petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap
- Paje was charged with homicide and serious physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence. A civil case was also
instituted against him by herein petitioners for reckless
imprudence and negligence in driving the passenger
bus.
- He was convicted in the criminal case in the RTC.

However, he was acquitted in the CA. The CA ruled
that criminal negligence is wanting and that Paje was
not even guilty of civil negligence, for the case was of
pure accident.
- The defendants presented the copy of said criminal
case to the court handling the civil case against them.
The civil case was dismissed.
ISSUES
WON the acquittal in the criminal case would result to a
dismissal in the civil case
HELD
YES
- The acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge
will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless
the court declares in the judgment that the fact from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
- Petitioner also relies on Art 33 CC. However, the said
article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were
alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they
were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent
civil action for damages may be instituted in connection
therewith. Otherwise stated, unless the act from which
the civil liability arises is declared to be non-existent in
the final judgment, the extinction of the criminal
liability will not carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability
DISPOSITIVE
Decision affirmed
MADEJA V CARO
ABAD SANTOS, J.: December 21, 1983
NATURE
Petition which seeks to set aside the order of the
respondent judge granting the defendant's motion to
dismiss
FACTS
torts & damages
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- PAGE 77 -
- Dr. Eva A. Japzon is accused of homicide through

reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after
an appendectomy. The complaining witness is the
widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The
information states that: "The offended party Carmen L.
Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action
for damages."
- The criminal case still pending, Madeja sued Dr.
Japzon for damages in the same court. She alleged that
her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr.
Japzon. The respondent judge granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss which invoked Section 3 (a) of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court which reads: "Sec. 3. Other
civil actions arising from offenses. - In all cases not
included in the preceding section the following rules
shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising
from the same offense may be instituted separately, but
after the criminal action has been commenced the civil
action can not be instituted until final judgment has
been rendered in the criminal action.". . .
Obiter - There are at least two things about Art. 33 of

the Civil Code which are worth noting, namely:
1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be
instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest from the
provision which uses the expressions "criminal action"
and "criminal prosecution."
Tolentino says: "While the State is the complainant in
the criminal case, the injured individual is the one most
concerned because it is he who has suffered directly. He
should be permitted to demand reparation for the wrong
which peculiarly affects him."
2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic
sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in
the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical
injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted
homicide.
ISSUES
1. WON an independent civil action may be filed during
the pendency of the criminal case
ARAFILES v PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC

CARPIO MORALES, J., March 25, 2004
HELD
1. YES. Ratio Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the
applicable provision. The two enactments are quoted
hereinbelow:
"Sec, 2. Independent civil action. - an independent
civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party
during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the
right is reserved as required in the preceding section.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. "
- "Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence."
Dispositive
Petition is GRANTED; the order dismissing Civil Case
No. 141 is SET ASIDE
NATURE
Petition for review of CA Deci
FACTS
(Consti II Case)
-Respondent Morales wrote an article for Peoples
Journal Tonight based on the sworn statement in the
police blotter and interview of Emelita Despuig where
Despuig alleged that Arafiles raped her the month
before then attempted to rape her the night she filed a
complaint. Morales attempted to contact Arafiles but
since the latters office was still closed at that time (past
12mn he works for NIAS-PAGASA), he was not able
to do so.
-About a year following the published article, Arafiles
filed action for damages based on the alleged grossly
malicious and overly sensationalized report by
Morales which cast aspersions on his character, being
the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was
depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist.
prof. casis
-RTC: in favor of Arafiles
-CA: in favor of Morales, et. al. based on doctrine of
fair comment
ISSUE
WON the CA erred in holding that the publication of
the news item was not attended with malice to thus free
respondents of liability for damages
HELD
NO. Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a
good name and reputation, but we do not consider that
the respondents, under the circumstances of this case,
had violated said right or abused the freedom of the
press.
Ratio. The newspapers should be given such leeway
and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and
effectively perform their important role in our
democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters
and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines;
and consistently with good faith and reasonable care,
they should not be held to account, to a point of
suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the
choice of words.
Reasoning. First discussed applicable provisions (A33,
19, 21 NCC): Article 33 contemplates a civil action for
the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to
the purely criminal aspect of the case. A civil action
for libel under this article shall be instituted and
prosecuted to final judgment and proved by
preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely
independent of the institution, pendency or result of the
criminal action because it is governed by the provisions
of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal
Code governing the criminal offense charged and the
civil liability arising therefrom.
-then discussed how to determine if a published work is
libelous: In actions for damages for libel, it is
axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain
libelous material must be examined and viewed as a
whole.
-then discussed the petitioners allegation that the news
item as a malicious sensationalization failed: even
though the police blotter only shows 1 count of
torts & damages

abduction and rape, respondent was present when
Emelita executed her sworn-statement where she
reported an abduction with rape and an abduction
incident (where no rape occurred, but was about to
happen) so respondents article was not maliciously
sensationalized. The presentation of the news item
subject of petitioners complaint may have been in a
sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal.
Respondents could of course have been more
circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and
first seven paragraphs of the news item give the
impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually
committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. The
succeeding paragraphs (in which petitioner and
complainant Emelita were eventually identified)
sufficiently convey to the readers, however, that the
narration of events was only an account of what Emelita
had reported at the police headquarters.
-then mentioned doctrine: The newspapers should be
given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to
courageously and effectively perform their important
role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories,
press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with
their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and
reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to
a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or
imperfection in the choice of words.
Disposition. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DENIED. SO ORDERED
MVRS V ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL
G.R. No. 135306
BELLOSILLO; January 28, 2003
NATURE
Petition to review decision of CA
FACTS
- The ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHIL
(IDCP), a local federation of more than 70 Muslim
religious orgs, and some individual Muslims filed in the
RTC Manila a complaint for damages in their own
behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim
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prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS,

et.al.
- Complaint alleged that what was published in
BULGAR was insulting and damaging to the Muslims;
that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the
Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance
but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and
disparage the Muslims and Islam; that on account of
these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the
Muslims in the Phil but the entire Muslim world, esp.
every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries.
- MVRS claimed it was merely an expression of
belief/opinion and was published without malice. Also,
it did not mention respondents as object of the article,
hence, were not entitled to damages.
RTC dismissed: plaintiffs failed to establish their cause
of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the
article were not specifically identified.
CA reversed: it was "clear from the disputed article
that the defamation was directed to all adherents of
Islamic faith.
ISSUE
1. WON elements of libel exist
2. WON the cause of action should rise from an
intentional tortuous act causing mental distress
HELD
1. NO.
Reasoning Defamation means the offense of injuring a
person's character, fame or reputation through false and
malicious statements. Words which are merely insulting
are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere
words of general abuse however opprobrious, illnatured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not
constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the
absence of an allegation for special damages.
2. NO.
The cause of action is libel.
Ratio Action arising from an intentional tortuous act
causing mental distress cannot be sustained in this case,
for such action is personal in nature, and since no
particular individual was identified in the disputed
article, such cause of action cannot be sustained.
Torts with independent civil action: DEFAMATION

An "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature;
it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the
injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal
attacks on his character.
- The purported damage caused by the published article
falls under principle of relational harm - which includes
harm to social relationships in the community in the
form of defamation; as distinguished from the principle
of reactive harm - which includes injuries to individual
emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of
emotional distress. The present case falls within the
application of the relational harm principle of tort
actions for defamation.
- To recover for this the plaintiff must show that: (a)
conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless
disregard of plaintiff; (b) conduct was extreme and
outrageous; (c) causal connection between defendant's
conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) the
plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe.
- Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must
prove more than mere worry, anxiety, embarrassment,
or anger. (AmJur)
Disposition Petition granted. Decision reversed.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG [concur]
- The present controversy stems from a civil action for
damages and not from a criminal complaint. CC
recognizes the possibility of such a civil action either
pursuant to Art 26, par. 4, to the effect that although it
may not constitute a criminal offense, vexing or
humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs
xxx can give rise to a cause of action for damages, or
to Art. 33 which provides that in case of defamation, a
civil complaint for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal case, may be brought by the
injured party.
- In the present case, the article relates to the entire
Muslim population and not just to the IDCP or to any of
the individual respondents. There is no direct reference
or allusion to the federation or any of its members, or to
any of the individual complainants. Respondents
torts & damages

scarcely can claim having been singled out for social
censure pointedly resulting in damages.
CARPIO [dissent]
- I dissent not because the newspaper article in question
is libelous, but because it constitutes an intentional
tortious act causing mental distress to those whom
private respondent IDCP represents.
- Both RTC and CA found the article insulting and
humiliating to Muslims, causing wounded feelings and
mental anguish to believers of Islam. This finding of
fact establishes that petitioners have inflicted on private
respondents an intentional wrongful act - humiliating
persons because of their religious beliefs.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ [dissent]
- Focal point of claim for damages: insult caused by the
article that the Muslims worship the pig as their God
which is absolutely contrary to their basic belief as
Muslims that there is only one God, and, that the
greatest sin in Islam is to worship things or persons
other than Allah.
- The article is not only an imputation of irreligious
conduct but also a downright misrepresentation of the
religious beliefs of Muslims. Liability for libel does not
depend on the intention of the defamer, but on the fact
of defamation.
SALTA V DE VEYRA
202 Phil 527
DE CASTRO; September 30, 1982
FACTS
- Two cases involving the same issue disposed of by
two judges in a manner directly in opposition of each
other. For a uniform ruling that would authoritatively
settle this regrettable conflict of opinion, the two cases
have been consolidated for a single decision.
- Salta was an employee of the PNB assigned as
Manager of the Malolos' branch. His duty was to grant
loans, or only to recommend the granting of loans,
depending on the amount of the loan applied for.
- In disregard of the pertinent rules, regulations and
policies of the respondent bank, Salta indiscriminately
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prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
granted certain loans mentioned in the complaints filed

by PNB, in manner characterized by negligence, fraud
and manifest partiality, and upon securities not
commensurate with the amount of the loans.
- PNB filed two civil actions to recover losses the bank
suffered (Civil Case No. 79583, Civil Case No. 88343).
With this the bank filed a criminal action against Salta,
for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.
- Salta was acquitted in the criminal case, and filed
Motions to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases. It is
in the resolution of the motions to dismiss that Judges
de Veyra and Purisima of the CFI of Manila took
diametrically opposing views, the former denying the
motion, the latter granting it.
ISSUE
WON a decision of acquittal in a criminal case operates
to dismiss a separate civil action filed on the basis of
the same facts as alleged in the criminal case (AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act).
HELD
NO.
Ratio The civil action permitted therein to be filed
separately from the criminal action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless
of the result of the latter." Acquittal in the criminal case
will not be an obstacle for the civil case to prosper
unless in the criminal case the Court makes a finding
that even civilly, the accused would not be liable.
Reasoning
ART 33.
In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may
be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution,
and
shall
require
only
a
preponderance of evidence.
- The filing in this case of a civil action separate from
the criminal action is fully warranted under the
provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code. The
criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense the
main element of which is fraud, one of the kinds of

crime mentioned in the aforecited provision. Based on
the same acts for which the criminal action was filed,
the civil actions very clearly alleged fraud and
negligence as having given rise to the cause of action
averred in the complaints.
- The offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a
nature, unlike other offenses not mentioned, that they
may be made the subject of a separate civil action
because of the distinct separability of their respective
juridical cause or basis of action. This is clearly
illustrated in the case of swindling, a specie of an
offense committed by means of fraud, where the civil
case may be filed separately and proceed independently
of the criminal case, regardless of the result of the latter.
- That there was fraud committed by the defendant in
granting the aforesaid loans which rendered him liable
for his acts, which fraud is positively and easily
identifiable in the manner and scheme aforementioned.
- JUSTICE JBL REYES: in the case of an
independent civil actions under the Civil Code, the
result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or
conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to the civil
action. This seems to be the spirit of the law when it
decided to make these actions `entirely separate and
distinct' from the criminal action. Hence in these cases,
I think Rule 107 Sec. 1(d) does not apply.
- It is significant to note that under Article 31 [11] of the
New Civil Code, it is made clear that the civil action
permitted therein to be filed separately from the
criminal action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings "regardless of the result of the
latter."
DISPOSITION
The decision of Justice De Veyra is affirmed.
PRUDENTIAL BANK V IAC (Philippine
Rayon Mills & Anacleto Chi)
216 SCRA 257
DAVIDE, JR.; G.R. No. 74886 December 8,
1992
NATURE
torts & damages

Petition for review of the decision of IAC,
which affirmed in toto the decision of CFI
Quezon City in a civil action instituted by
the petitioner for the recovery of a sum of
money representing the amount paid by it
to the Nissho Company Ltd. of Japan for
textile
machinery
imported
by
the
Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc., represented by
co-defendant Anacleto R. Chi.
FACTS
-August 8, 1962: Philippine Rayon Mills,
Inc. entered into a contract with Nissho Co.,
Ltd. of Japan for the importation of textile
machineries under a five-year deferred
payment plan. To effect payment for said
machineries, Phil. Rayon applied for and
was granted a commercial letter of credit
with the Prudential Bank and Trust
Company in favor of Nissho. Against this
letter of credit, drafts were drawn and
issued by Nissho, which were all paid by
the
Prudential
Bank
through
its
correspondent in Japan, the Bank of Tokyo,
Ltd. As indicated on their faces, two of
these drafts were accepted by the Phil
Rayon through its president, Anacleto R.
Chi, while the others were not.
-Upon arrival of the machineries, the
Prudential Bank indorsed the shipping
documents to the Phil Rayon which
accepted delivery of the same. To enable
the Phil Rayon to take delivery of the
machineries,
it
executed,
by
prior
arrangement with the Prudential Bank, a
trust receipt which was signed by Anacleto
R. Chi in his capacity as president of Phil
Rayon.
-At the back of the trust receipt is a printed
form to be accomplished by two sureties
who, by the very terms and conditions
thereof, were to be jointly and severally
liable to the Prudential Bank should the Phil
Rayon fail to pay the total amount or any
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- PAGE 77 -
portion of the drafts issued by Nissho and

paid for by Prudential Bank. The Phil Rayon
was able to take delivery of the textile
machineries and installed the same at its
factory site at 69 Obudan Street, Quezon
City.
-Sometime in 1967, the Phil Rayon ceased
business operation. On December 29, 1969,
Phil Rayon's factory was leased by
Yupangco Cotton Mills for an annual rental
of P200,000.00. The lease was renewed on
January 3, 1973. On January 5, 1974, all the
textile machineries in the Phil Rayon's
factory were sold to AIC Development
Corporation for P300,000.00.
-The obligation of the Phil Rayon arising
from the letter of credit and the trust
receipt remained unpaid and unliquidated.
Repeated formal demands for the payment
of the said trust receipt yielded no result
Hence, the present action for the collection
of the principal amount of P956,384.95 was
filed on October 3, 1974 against the Phil
Rayon and Anacleto R. Chi.
Defendants Defenses lack of cause of
action; prescription; laches
Lower Courts Ruling Both the CFI and
the IAC ruled that Philippine Rayon could
be held liable for the two (2) drafts because
only these appear to have been accepted by
the latter after due presentment. The
liability for the remaining ten (10) drafts
did not arise because the same were not
presented for acceptance. In short, both
courts concluded that acceptance of the
drafts
by
Philippine
Rayon
was
indispensable to make the latter liable
thereon.
ISSUES:
1. Whether presentment for acceptance of
the drafts was indispensable to make
Philippine Rayon liable thereon;
prof. casis
2. Whether Philippine Rayon is liable on the
basis of the trust receipt;
3. Whether private respondent Chi is jointly
and severally liable with Philippine Rayon
for the obligation sought to be enforced
3a. If not, WON he may be considered a
guarantor
3b. If he is a guarantor, WON the case
should have been dismissed on the ground
of lack of cause of action as there was no
prior exhaustion of Philippine Rayon's
properties.
HELD:
1. NO. Presentment for acceptance is
necessary only in the cases expressly
provided for in Section 143 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL). The
parties herein agree, and the trial court
explicitly ruled, that the subject, drafts are
sight drafts which do not require
presentment for acceptance. They are,
pursuant to Section 7 of the NIL, payable
on demand. And even if these were not
sight
drafts,
thereby
necessitating
acceptance, it would be the petitioner
and not Philippine Rayon which had to
accept the same for the latter was not the
drawee.
2. YES.
-And although it is true that the petitioner
commenced a criminal action for the
violation of the Trust Receipts Law, no legal
obstacle prevented it from enforcing the
civil liability arising out of the trust, receipt
in a separate civil action. Under Section 13
of the Trust Receipts Law, the failure of an
entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the
sale of goods, documents or instruments
covered by a trust receipt to the extent of
the amount owing to the entruster or as
appear in the trust receipt or to return said
goods, documents or instruments if they
were not sold or disposed of in accordance
torts & damages

with the terms of the trust receipt shall
constitute the crime of estafa, punishable
under the provisions of Art.315, par. 1(b) of
the RPC.
-Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a
civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured
party in cases of defamation, fraud and
physical injuries. Estafa falls under
fraud.
3. NO. Private respondent Chi's signature in
the dorsal portion of the trust receipt did
not bind him solidarily with Philippine
Rayon.
3a. YES. SCs own reading of the
questioned solidary guaranty clause yields
the conclusion that the obligation of Chi is
only that of a guarantor.
Reasoning Last sentence of the clause
speaks of waiver of exhaustion, which,
nevertheless, is ineffective in this case
because the space therein for the party
whose property may not be exhausted was
not filled up.
-The clause "we jointly and severally agree
and undertake" refers to the undertaking of
the two (2) parties who are to sign it or to
the liability existing between themselves. It
does not refer to the undertaking between
either one or both of them on the one hand
and the petitioner on the other with respect
to the liability described under the trust
receipt. Elsewise stated, their liability is not
divisible as between them, i.e., it can be
enforced to its full extent against any one of
them.
-Any doubt as to the import, or true intent
of the solidary guaranty clause should be
resolved against the petitioner since the
trust receipt, together with the questioned
solidary guaranty clause, is a contract of
adhesion which must be strictly construed
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- PAGE 77 -
against the party responsible for its

preparation.
-By his signing, Chi became the sole
guarantor. The attestation by witnesses and
the acknowledgement before a notary
public are not required by law to make a
party liable on the instrument. Contracts
shall be obligatory in whatever form they
may have been entered into, provided all
the essential requisites for their validity are
present; however, when the law requires
that a contract be in some form in order
that it may be valid or enforceable, or that
it be proved in a certain way, that
requirement is absolute and indispensable.
With respect to a guaranty, which is a
promise to answer for the debt or default of
another, the law merely requires that it, or
some note or memorandum thereof, be in
writing.
Otherwise,
it
would
be
unenforceable unless ratified. While the
acknowledgement of a surety before a
notary public is required to make the same
a public document, under Article 1358 of
the Civil Code, a contract of guaranty does
not have to appear in a public document.
-Reading Section 13 of PD No. 115: It is
clear that if the violation or offense is
committed by a corporation, partnership,
association or other juridical entities, the
penalty of imprisonment shall be imposed
upon the directors, officers, employees or
other
officials
or
persons
therein
responsible for the offense. However, it is
these
corporations,
partnerships,
associations, etc, which are made liable for
the civil liability arising from the criminal
offense.
-Since that violation of a trust receipt
constitutes fraud under Article 33 of
the Civil Code, petitioner was acting
well within its rights in filing an
independent civil action to enforce the
prof. casis
civil liability arising therefrom against
Philippine Rayon.
3b. NO. Excussion is not a condition sine
qua non for the institution of an action
against a guarantor. There was nothing
procedurally objectionable in impleading
private respondent Chi as a co-defendant in
the civil case for the collection of a sum of
money. As a matter of fact, Section 6, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court on permissive
joinder of parties explicitly allows it.
-This is the equity rule relating to
multifariousness. It is based on trial
convenience and is designed to permit the
joinder of plaintiffs or defendants whenever
there is a common question of law or fact. It
will save the parties unnecessary work,
trouble and expense.
-However, Chi's liability is limited to the
principal obligation in the trust receipt plus
all the accessories thereof including judicial
costs; with respect to the latter, he shall
only be liable for those costs incurred after
being judicially required to pay. Interest
and damages, being accessories of the
principal obligation, should also be paid;
these, however, shall run only from the date
of the filing of the complaint. Attorney's
fees may even be allowed in appropriate
cases.
Disposition Petition granted. Philippine
Rayon Mills, Inc. declared liable on the 12
drafts in question and on the trust receipt.
Private respondent Anacleto R. Chi
declared secondarily liable on the trust
receipt.
CAPUNO V PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY
OF THE PHILIPPINES
MAKALINTAL; April 30, 1965
FACTS
- The case arose from a vehicular collision.
torts & damages

- Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by
Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno.
- The collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his
passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina
Paras.
- Elordi was charged with triple homicide through
reckless imprudence in the CFI of Pampanga. The
information was subsequently amended to include
claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims.
- While the criminal case was pending, the Intestate
Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil
action, also for damages, in the CFI of Tarlac against
the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and
Jon Elordi.
- Included in the complaint was a claim for indemnity
in the sum of P2,623.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to
the heirs of Capuno under the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
-In the criminal case both the heirs of Capuno and the
Estate of were represented by their respective counsel
as private prosecutors: Attorney Ricardo Y. Navarro and
Attorneys Jose W. Diokno and Augusto M. Ilagan.
- In view of the filing of the civil action the accused Jon
Elordi moved to strike out the appearances of these
private prosecutors in the criminal case. Grounds for the
motion were (1) that as the Capuno heirs were
concerned, they no longer had any interest to protect in
the criminal case since they had already claimed and
received compensation for the death of their decedent;
and (2) that on the part of the Estate of Buan its right to
intervene in said case had been abated by the civil
action.
-The appearance and intervention of Attorneys Diokno
and Ilagan was disallowed by the Court and that of
Attorney Navarro was disallowed in an amending order.
No appeal was taken from either of the two orders.
- The parties in the civil case entered into a
"Compromise and Settlement." For P290,000.00 the
Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages, including
the claim for reimbursement of the sum of P2,623.00
previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the
Workmen's Compensation Act."
- The Court approved the compromise and accordingly
dismissed the case.
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- PAGE 77 -
- At that time the criminal case was still pending;

judgment was rendered wherein the accused Elordi was
acquitted of the charges against him. Prior thereto,
herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages
against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the
Philippines and Jon Elordi.
- This is the action which, upon appellees' motion, was
dismissed by the Court a quo in its order of February
29, 1960, from which order the present appeal has been
taken.
- The grounds upon which appellees based their motion
for dismissal and which the Court found to be "well
taken" were; (1) that the action had already prescribed;
and (2) that appellees had been released from
appellants' claim for damages by virtue of the payment
to the latter of the sum of P2,623.00 by the Buan Estate
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, which sum, in
turn, was sought to be recovered by the said Estate from
appellees in Civil Case No. 838 but finally settled by
them in their compromise.
ISSUE
WON the action had already prescribed.
RULING
YES.
- There can be no doubt that the present action is one
for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict, which
action must be instituted within four (4) years (Article
1146, Civil Code).
- Appellants originally sought to enforce their claim exdelicto, that is, under the provisions of the Penal Code,
when they intervened in the criminal case against Jon
Elordi. The information therein, it may be recalled, was
amended precisely to include an allegation concerning
damages suffered by the heirs of the victims of the
accident for which Elordi was being prosecuted.
- But appellants' intervention was subsequently
disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's
order to the effect.
- And when they commenced the civil action on
September 26, 1958 the criminal case was still pending,
showing that appellants then chose to pursue the
remedy afforded by the Civil Code, for otherwise that
prof. casis
action would have been premature and in any event
would have been concluded by the subsequent
judgment of acquittal in the criminal case.
- In filing the civil action as they did appellants
correctly considered it as entirely independent of the
criminal action, pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the
Civil Code, which read:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
- The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes
bodily injuries causing death. In other words, the civil
action for damages could have been commenced by
appellants immediately upon the death of their
decedent, Cipriano Capuno, and the same would not
have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for
homicide through reckless imprudence. But the
complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958,
or after the lapse of more than five years.
- The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants'
contention that the four-year period of prescription in
this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal
action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither
waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute
it separately. Such reservation was not then necessary;
without having made it they could file as in fact they
did a separate civil action even during the pendency
of the criminal case; and consequently, as held in
Paulan v. Sarabia, supra, "the institution of a criminal
action cannot have the effect of interrupting the
institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict."
- As to whether or not Rule 111, Section 2, of the
Revised Rules of Court which requires the reservation
of the right to institute a separate and independent civil
action in the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33,
torts & damages

34, and 2177 of the Civil Code affects the question of
prescription, the said rule does not apply in the present
case.
DISPOSTIION The order appealed from was affirmed,
without costs.
CORPUS V PAJE
28 SCRA 1062
CAPISTRANO; July 31, 1969
NATURE
Direct appeal from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal
FACTS
- December 23, 1956 Felardo Paje was driving a
Victory Liner bus. It collided with a jeepney driven by
Clemente Marcia in Lubao, Pampanga. As a result of
the collision, Marcia died while two other people were
physically injured.
- An information for homicide and double serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed
against Paje. Marcias heirs reserved their right to
institute a separate civil action against Paje. Paje was
later found guilty on November 7, 1960.
- November 21, 1961 Pending Pajes appeal, the
window and children of Marcia instituted the separate
civil action for damages arising from the accident
against Paje and Victory Liner, praying that the
defendants be jointly and severally liable.
- November 9, 1962 Paje was acquitted by the
appellate court, saying that the collision was purely an
accident.
- December 29, 1962 Paje filed a motion to dismiss
the civil action on the ground that his acquittal barred
the said action but the motion was denied.
Petitioners Claim
> The petitioners claim that the Lower Court erred in
acquitting Paje and that his acquittal was a bar to the
civil action. Quoting Chantangco vs. Abaroai: It is
true that one of the plaintiffs in the present case
reserved whatever right he may have had to bring a civil
action. This was obviously of no avail, inasmuch as
A2010
prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
there resulted a judgment for the defendant, and the

plain inference from the foregoing is that a verdict of
acquittal must carry with it exemption from civil
responsibility.
> At the pre-trial of the civil case, the defendants asked
the court to rule on their special defense that plaintiffs'
cause of action based upon a quasi-delict had prescribed
considering that the complaint was brought four years
and eleven months after the collision and that according
to Article 1144 of the Civil Code an action based upon a
quasi-delict must be instituted within four years. The
lower court ruled that the action had already prescribed.
ISSUE
WON the civil action against Paje can still prosper
despite his acquittal
HELD
NO
Ratio Criminal negligence, that is, reckless imprudence,
is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of
the Civil Code which authorizes the institution of an
independent civil action, that is, of an entirely separate
and distinct civil action for damages, which shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and
shall be proved only by a preponderance of evidence.
Thearticle mentions only the crimes of defamation,
fraud, (estafa) and physical injuries.
Reasoning
- Although in the case of Dyogi vs. Yatco this Court
held that the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33
of the Civil Code includes homicide, it is to be borne in
mind that the charge against Felardo Paje was for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, and not for
homicide and physical injuries.
- In People vs. Buan, the Court ruled that the offense
of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the
negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.
- Homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence comes under the general rule that the
acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar

to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act
notwithstanding that the injured party reserved.
- With regard to the issue of prescription, the Court
ruled that the action had indeed prescribed because the
prescription period was pegged at 4 years (A1146, CC)
and began to run on the day the quasi-delict was
committed.
Disposition PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order
appealed from is affirmed, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
MADEJA V CARO
211 PHIL 469
ABAD SANTOS; December 21, 1983
NATURE
Petition seeking to set aside the order of the CFI
dismissing the civil case against Japzon
FACTS
- DR. EVA A. JAPZON was accused of homicide
through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto
Madeja after an appendectomy.
- In the information, the offended party Carmen L.
Madeja reserved her right to file a separate civil action
for damages
- The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja
sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages, alleging that her
husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr.
Japzon.
- The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the
respondent judge granted on the basis of Section 3(a) of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court16
ISSUE
WON a civil action for damages may be instituted
pending the resolution of a criminal case
HELD
16
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the preceding section
the following rules shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may
be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be
instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. ...
torts & damages

YES
- Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to
Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision.
A
- Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured
provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111,
Rules of Court.)
- Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
(Civil Code,)
Obiter
- There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil
Code which are worth noting, namely:
1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be
instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest from the
provision which uses the expressions "criminal
action" and "criminal prosecution."
2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a
generic sense. It is not the crime of physical
injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It
includes not only physical injuries but
consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.
- The Article in question uses the words 'defamation',
'fraud' and 'physical injuries.' Defamation and fraud are
used in their ordinary sense because there are no
specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using
these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that
these two terms defamation and fraud must have been
used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the
laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With
this in mind, it is evident that the terms 'physical
injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense
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prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is

difficult to believe that the Code Commission would
have used terms in the same article-some in their
general and another in its technical sense.
- In other words, the term 'physical injuries' should be
understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of
physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter
are general terms.
- In any case the Code Commission recommended that
the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the
civil action for assault and battery in American Law,
and this recommendation must hove been accepted by
the Legislature when it approved the article intact as
recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil
action for the bodily harm received by the complainant
similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the
Code Commission states, the civil action should lie
whether the offense committed is that of physical
injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide,
or even death" **(end of obiter)
- Corpus vs. Paje, which states that reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in
Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. Of
eleven justices only nine took part in the decision
and four of them merely concurred in the result.
Disposition Petition is granted; the order dismissing
Civil Case No. 141 is hereby set aside.
DULAY V CA (SAFEGUARD, SUPERGUARD)
243 SCRA 220
BIDIN; April 3, 1995
FACTS
- Benigno Torzuela, , a security guard on duty at the
"Big Bang sa Alabang," and Atty. Napoleon Dulay had
an altercation. Torzuela shot and killed Atty. Dulay.
- Maria Benita Dulay, widow of Dulay, filed an action
for damages against Torzuela and Safeguard
Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (SAFEGUARD)
and/or Superguard Security Corp. (SUPERGUARD),
alleged employers of defendant Torzuela.
Respondent:
> that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the
scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of
shooting was committed w/ deliberate intent (dolo), the

civil liability is governed by Art 100 of the RPC.
> that a complaint for damages based on negligence
under Art 2176 (the one filed by petitioners) cannot lie,
since the civil liability under Art 2176 applies only to
quasi-offenses under Art 365 of the RPC.
> that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature
considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal
case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's
subsidiary liability.
> that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only
to injuries intentionally committed (Marcia v CA)
Petitioner
> the incident resulting in the death of Dulay was due to
the concurring negligence of the defendants. Torzuela's
wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to
him
by
defendant
SAFEGUARD
and/or
SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury, while the negligence of defendant
SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its
having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father
of a family in the supervision and control of its
employee to avoid the injury.
> that their cause of action against the private
respondents is based on their liability under Article
2180
> that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of negligence
but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary,
citing Andamo v. IAC. Thus, Torzuela's act of shooting
Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Art
2176
> that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also
actionable under Art 3317
and Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court18
ISSUE
WON civil action can proceed independently of the
criminal action
17
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence
18
Rule 111.Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently - In the cases provided for in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil-action which has
been reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal
action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
torts & damages
A2010
- PAGE 77 -
Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila

HELD
YES
- Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
"Sec 1.
Institution of criminal and civil actions.
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity
under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of
the accused."
- It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil
action before the prosecution in the criminal action
presents evidence is even far better than a compliance
with the requirement of an express reservation. This is
precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case.
- The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has
already been construed to include bodily injuries
causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co;
Carandang v. Santiago). It is not the crime of physical
injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes
not only physical injuries but also consummated,
frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro).
- Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no
independent civil action may be filed under Article 33
where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it
must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in
the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with
reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia
was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in
this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
INTENTIONAL TORTS
VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS
100 PHIL 186
FELIX; October 31, 1956
NATURE
FACTS
- Since the start of Commercial Air Line, Incs (CALI)
operations, its fuel needs were all supplied by Shell
Company of the P.I., Ltd, (Shell). Desmond Fitzgerald,
Shells Credit Manager was in charge of collecting
payment. Any extensions of term of payment, however,
had to be decided by Stephen Crawford and later by
Wildred Wooding
- As of August 1948, Shells books showed a balance of
P170,162.58 in its favor for goods it sold and delivered
to CALI. Shell had reasons to believe that the financial
condition of Shell was far from being satisfactory.
Alfonso Sycip, CALIs President of Board of Directors,
offered to Fitzgerald CALIs Douglas C-54 plane,
which was then in California. The offer was declined by
Crawford.
- Aug 6, 1948, management of CALI informally
convened its principal creditors in a luncheon, and
informed them that CALI was in a state of insolvency
and had to stop operation. Alexander Sycip, Secretary
of the Board of Directors of CALI, explained the
memorandum agreement executed by CALI with Phil
Air Lines Inc on Aug 4, regarding the proposed sale to
PAL of the aviation equipment of CALI. Alfredo
Velayo, Auditor of CALI, discussed the balance sheets
of CALI. The balance sheet made mention of the
Douglas C-54 plane.
- There was a general understanding among all creditors
present on the desirability of consummating the sale in
favor of PAL. Then followed a discussion on the
payment of claims of creditors and the preferences
claimed for the accounts due to employees, the
Government, and the National Airports Corp. The other
creditors disputed such contention of preference. No
understanding was reached on the matter of preference
of payment and it was then generally agreed that the
matter be further studied by a working committee to be
formed. Mr. Fitzgerald of Shell, Atty. Agcaoili of
National Airports Corp., and Atty. Alexander Sycip
were appointed to the working committee.
- Those present in the meeting were of the unanimous
opinion that it would be advantageous not to present
prof. casis
suits against CALI but to strive for a fair pro-rata
division of its assets. The management of CALI
announced that in case of non-agreement of the
creditors, it would file insolvency proceedings.
- Aug 9, 1948, working committee discussed methods
of achieving objectives, which were to preserve the
assets of CALI and to study the way of making a fair
division of all the assets among the creditors. However,
negotiation on the division of assets was left pending.
- On the same day (Aug 9), Shell effected a telegraphic
transfer of all its credit against CALI to the American
Corporation Shell Oil Co., Inc., assigning its credit
amounting to $79,440. This was followed on Aug 10 by
a deed of assignment of credit amounting to
$85,081.29.
- Aug 12, 1948 American Shell Oil Co filed a complaint
against CALI in the Superior Court of the State of
California, USA, for the collection of assigned credit of
$79,440, and a writ of attachment was applied for and
issued against a C-54 plane. Sept 17, 1948 an amended
complaint was filed to recover assigned credit of
$85,081.29 and a supplemental attachment for a higher
sum against the C-54 plane, plus miscellaneous
personal properties.
- Unaware of Shells assignment of credit, CALI on
Aug 12, 1948 approved the memorandum agreement of
sale to PAL, and noted that the Board had been trying
to reach an agreement with creditors to prevent
insolvency proceedings, but so far no definite
agreement had been reached.
- First week of Sept 1948, National Airports Corp
learned of Shells action in the US and hastened to file
its own complaint with attachment against CALI in the
CFI of Manila.
- Oct 7, 1948 CALI filed a petition for voluntary
insolvency. An order of insolvency was issued by the
court on the same day. Mr. Alfredo Velayo was
appointed Assignee in the proceedings.
- Velayo instituted case against Shell for the purpose of
securing writ of injunction restraining Shell from
prosecuting against CALI, and as an alternative, that
Shell be ordered to pay damages double the value of the
plane if the case in the US will defeat the procurement
of CALI of its plane.
torts & damages

- Dec 22, 1948, Court denied petition because whether
the conveyance of Shells credit was fraudulent or not,
the Phil court would not be in a position to enforce its
orders as against the American corporation Shell Oil
Co., Inc., which is outside the jurisdiction of the Phils.
- Plaintiff confined his action to the recovery of
damages against Shell. Lower court dismissed the case.
Defendants Comments
> Assignment of credit in favor of American Shell was
for valuable consideration and made in accordance with
established commercial practices
> It has no interest in the case instituted by American
Shell, as they are separate and distinct corporations.
> Fitzgerald was merely invited to the luncheonmeeting, without knowing the purpose for which it was
called. Fitzgerald could not have officially represented
Shell because authority resides on Crawford.
ISSUES
1. WON Shell Co., of the P.I. Ltd, taking advantage of
its knowledge of the existence of CALIs airplane C-54
at California, USA, acted in bad faith and betrayed the
confidence and trust of other creditors of CALI present
in said meeting by affecting a hasty telegraphic transfer
of its credit to the American corporation Shell Oil
Company, Inc., thus defeating the purpose of the
informal meetings of CALIs principal creditors and
depriving the plaintiff of the means of obtaining the
plane, or its value, to the detriment and prejudice of
other CALI creditors who were consequently deprived
of their share in the distribution of said value
2. WON by reason of said betrayal of confidence and
trust, Shell may be made to answer for the damages,
and if so, the amount of such damages
HELD
1. YES, Shell acted in bad faith.
- It is evident that Shell, upon learning the precarious
economic situation of CALI and that will all
probability, it could not get much of its outstanding
credit because of the preferred claims of other creditors,
entirely disregarded all moral inhibitory tenets.
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- PAGE 77 -
- The telegraphic transfer made without knowledge and

at the back of other creditors of CALI may be a shrewd
and surprise move that enabled Shell to collect almost
all if not the entire amount of its credit, but the Court of
Justice (SC) cannot countenance such attitude at all, and
much less from a foreign corporation to the detriment of
Philippine Government and local business.
- Shells transfer of credit would have been justified
only if Fitzgerald had declined to take part in the
working committee and frankly and honestly informed
the other creditors present that he had no authority to
bind his principal and that the latter was to be left free
to collect its credit from CALI by whatever means his
principal deemed wise and were available to it. But
then, such information would have dissolved all
attempts to come to an amicable conciliation and would
have precipitated the filing of CALIs voluntary
insolvency proceedings and nullified the intended
transfer of Shells credit to American Shell.
2. YES, Shell must answer for damages.
- Section 37 of the Insolvency Law states
Sec 37. If any person, before the assignment is made,
having notice of the commencement of the
proceedings in insolvency, or having reason to
believe that insolvency proceedings are about to be
commenced, embezzles or disposes of ay money,
goods, chattels, or effects of the insolvent, he is
chargeable therewith, and liable to an action by the
assignee for double the value of the property sought
to be embezzled or disposed of, to be received for the
benefit of the insolvent estate.
- There are doubts, however, as to the applicability of
this provision, as it is contented that what Shell really
disposed of was its own credit and not CALIs property,
although this was practically the effect and result of the
scheme. The same result, however, may be achieved in
applying the provisions of the Civil Code.
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides
Art 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith.
prof. casis
- While Art 19 contains a mere declaration of principles,
such declaration is implemented by Article 21 of the
Civil Code, which states
Art 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
- Code Commission on Article 21: (it) would vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
provide for specifically in the statutes. (It) is a prudent
earnest of justice in the face of the impossibility of
enumerating, one by one, all wrongs which cause
damage.
- If Article 23 of Civil Code goes as far as to provide
that Even if an act or event causing damage to
anothers property was not due to the fault or
negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for
indemnity if through the act or event he was
benefited., with much more reason that Shell should be
liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith
and with betrayal of confidence.
- Anent the argument that Civil Code provisions cannot
be applicable as they came into effect only on Aug 30,
1950, Art 2252 of Civil Code provides by implication
that when new provisions of the Code does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the old legislation, they may be given
retroactive effect. Shell did not have any vested or
acquired right to betray confidence of CALI or of its
creditors. Moreover, according to Art 2254 of Civil
Code, no vested or acquired right can arise from acts
or omissions which are against the law or which
infringe upon the right of others.
Disposition Shell is liable to pay plaintiff, for the
benefit of CALI and its creditors, compensatory
damages a sum equivalent to the value of the plane at
the time Shell assigned its credit to American Shell, and
another equal sum as exemplary damages.
VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS
RESOLUTION
100 PHIL 207
FELIX; July 30, 1957
torts & damages
A2010
QUISUMBING; October 8, 1998

Defendant-appellees contentions
- It is not guilty of bad faith, it having done nothing but
to protect legitimately its own interest or credit against
the bad faith of its debtor, the insolvent CALI, under the
control of the latters president Alfonso Sycip
- The transfer of credit to its sister corporation in the US
did not prejudice the Government, because its claims
were fully paid, not caused any loss or injury to other
creditors, except the entities and groups controlled by
Alfonso Sycip.
It is not liable for exemplary damages because the
provisions of the new Civil Code on the matter are not
applicable to this case
- Plaintiff-appellant has no cause of action against it and
is not the real party in interest
- Plaintiffs right of action was based and prosecuted in
the lower court under the provisions of the Insolvency
Law and consequently he is stopped from pursuing
another theory and is not entitled to damages under the
provisions of the new Civil Code.
HELD
- The facts on which Court based its conclusion that
Shell acted in bad faith are not and cannot be denied or
contradicted by defendant.
- There is no sensible reason for disturbing the finding
that Shell is liable for exemplary damages. The amount
of the award, however, may be modified.
- According to the Civil Code, exemplary or corrective
damages are imposed by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages, and that the
amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved,
for it is left to the sound discretion of the Court.
- Majority of the Court is of the opinion that the value
of the C-54 plane might result too high, and that
exemplary damages should not be left to speculation but
properly determined by a certain and fixed amount. The
amount of exemplary damages is thus modified, and
fixed at P25,000.
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V CA (MORADA)
297 SCRA 469
prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
NATURE
Petition for certiorari to annul and set aside CA
resolution and decision
FACTS
- Private respondent Milagros Morada was a flight
attendant of Petitioner Company. During a stop-over in
Jakarta, she went to a disco with 2 of her fellow crew
members Thamer and Allah (both surnamed AlGazzawi) and had breakfast in their hotel room. While
there, Allah left and Thamer attempted to rape her. She
was saved by hotel security personnel who heard her
cries for help. She later filed a case against them. The
two were arrested and detained by Jakarta police. When
Morada returned to Jeddah (the base of operations of
petitioner), she was asked to go to Jakarta to arrange for
the release of the two men. She proceeded to Jakarta but
she refused to cooperate. She was eventually allowed to
return to Jeddah but barred from Jakarta flights. The
Indonesian authorities eventually deported the 2 men,
through the intercession of the Saudi govt., after 2
weeks of detention. They were put back in service while
respondent Morada was transferred to Manila.
- 2 years later, she was asked by her superiors to see Mr.
Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of Saudia, in Jeddah.
When they met, he brought her to the police station
where her passport was taken and she was questioned
about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy merely stood as the
police put pressure on her to drop the case against the
two men. Not until she agreed to do so did the police
return her passport and allowed her to catch a later
flight out of Jeddah.
- A year and a half later, she was again asked to go to
Jeddah to see Miniewy. When she did, a certain Khalid
of Saudia brought her to a Saudi court where she was
asked to sign a document written in Arabic. She was
told that it was necessary to close the case against
Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, she signed a
document to appear before the court a week later.
When the date of appearance came, she complied but
only after being assured by Saudias Manila manager
that the investigation was routinary and posed no
danger to her. She was brought before the court and was
interrogated by a Saudi judge and let go, however, just
as she was about to board a plane home, she was told
that she had been forbidden to take flight. She was later
told to remain in Jeddah and her passport was again
confiscated. A few days later, she was again brought
before the same court where the Saudi judge, to her
astonishment and shock, sentenced her to 5 months
imprisonment and 286 lashes. Only then did she realize
that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer
and Allah for what happened in Jakarta. The court
found her guilty of adultery; going to a disco, dancing
and listening to music in violation of Islamic laws; and
socializing with the male crew, in contravention of
Islamic tradition.
- Facing conviction, she sought help from her employer,
petitioner Saudia but she was denied assistance of any
kind. She asked the Phil. Embassy to help her. Because
she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah
dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave
Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, she
was terminated from the service by Saudia without
being informed of the cause.
- She then filed a complaint for damages against Saudia
and Mr. Al-Balawi, its country manager. Saudia filed a
motion to dismiss raising the issues of lack of cause of
action and lack of jurisdiction. The RTC denied the
motion to dismiss by Saudia, as well as the subsequent
MFR. Saudia then filed petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction and/or TRO with the CA. The
CA issued a TRO prohibiting respondent judge from
conducting any proceeding unless otherwise directed.
The CA, however, in another resolution, denied
Saudias prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction. Saudia then filed to the SC this instant
petition. However, during the pendency of this petition,
respondent CA rendered a decision that the Philippines
is an appropriate forum considering that the Amended
Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Art.21
CC, thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent
Court.
ISSUES
torts & damages

1. WON Morada had a cause of action
2. Which law should govern (Phil. Law or Saudi Law)
HELD
1. YES
- She aptly predicated her cause of action on Art.19 and
Art.21 of the CC. As held in PNB v CA, the aforecited
provisions on human relations were intended to expand
the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold no. of moral
specifically provide in the statutes. Although Art.19
merely declares a principle of law, Art.21 gives flesh to
its provisions.
Reasoning
- After a careful study of the pleadings, We are
convinced that there is reasonable basis for private
respondents assertion that although she was already
working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on
the pretense that she would merely testify in an
investigation of the charges she made against the two
crew members for the attack on her person. As it turned
out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious
charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic
laws and tradition.
- There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim
that in handing over or turning over the person of
private respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may
have acted beyond its duties as employer. Petitioners
purported act contributed to and amplified or even
proximately caused additional humiliation, misery and
suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby
allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and
prosecution of private respondent under the guise of
petitioners authority as employer, taking advantage of
the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As
purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged
conviction and imprisonment of Morada was wrongful.
But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted
upon her person and reputation, for which petitioner
could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or
redress for the wrongs done, once duly proven.
2. Philippine Law
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Ratio Choice of law rules invariably consist of a factual

relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and
a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs
of the res, the place of celebration, the place of
performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
Reasoning
- Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is
one involving torts, the connecting factor or point of
contact could be the place or places where the tortious
conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the
torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the
Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place
where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is
because it is in the Philippines where petitioner
allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina
residing and working here. According to her, she had
honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise
of its rights and in the performance of its duties, act
with justice, give her due and observe honesty and good
faith. Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she
claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury
allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment.
For in our view, what is important here is the place
where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged
injury to the person, reputation, social standing and
human rights of complainant, had lodged according
to the private respondent. All told, it is not without basis
to identify the Phil. as the situs of the alleged tort.
- In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort
liability, We find here an occasion to apply the State of
the most significant relationship rule, which should be
appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of
the case. In applying said principle to determine the
State which has the most significant relationship, the
following contacts are to be taken into account and
evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue: (A) the place where the
injury occurred; (B) the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred; (C) the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties, and; (D) the place where the relationship,
if any, between the parties is centered.
prof. casis
- As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that
the over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Phils.
There is likewise no question that private respondent is
a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a
resident foreign corporation engaged in international air
carriage business here. Thus, the relationship between
the parties was centered here.
Disposition petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. Civil
case entitled Milagros Morada v Saudi Arabia
Airlines REMANDED to RTC
GLOBE MACKAY V CA
176 SCRA 778
CORTES; August 25, 1989
NATURE
An appeal from the decision of CA
FACTS
- Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed
by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation as a purchasing agent and administrative
assistant to the engineering operations manager.
- GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases
and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost
several thousands of pesos.
According to private respondent it was he who actually
discovered the anomalies and reported them to his
immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to
petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the
Executive VP and General Manager of GLOBE
MACKAY.
- one day after Tobias made the report, Hendry
confronted him by stating that he was the number one
suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced
leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his
table drawers open, and to leave the office keys.
- when Tobias returned to work after the forced leave,
Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a
"swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie
detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen
of his handwriting, signature, and initials for
examination by the police investigators to determine his
complicity in the anomalies.
torts & damages

- the Manila police investigators cleared Tobias of
participation in the anomalies.
- Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a
private investigator who submitted a report finding
Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that
further investigation was still to be conducted.
- Nevertheless, Hendry issued a memo suspending
Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of criminal
charges against him.
- the Police Chief Document Examiner, after
investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged
anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory
crime report reiterating his previous finding that the
handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the
checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent
transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie detector
tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.
- Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating
Tobias from the anomalies petitioners filed a complaint
for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents, later amended to just estafa.
- Subsequently five other criminal complaints were
filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa while
the fifth was for of Art.290 of' RPC (Discovering
Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence).
- All of the 6 criminal complaints were dismissed by the
fiscal.
- In the meantime, Tobias received a notice from
petitioners that his employment has been terminated.
Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal.
- Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from
the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision
and dismissed the complaint. Tobias appealed the
Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the
President.
- Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the
Republic Telephone Company. However, petitioner
Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a
letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by
GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
- Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on
alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive
acts of petitioners.
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- PAGE 77 -
- Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify

during the hearings.
- The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Tobias by
ordering petitioners to pay him P80,000.00 as actual
damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00
as exemplary damages, P30,000.00 as attorney's fees,
and costs.
- CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
ISSUE
WON petitioners are liable for damages to private
respondent
HELD
YES
Ratio Art.19, known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which must be observed not only in
the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance
of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act
with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe
honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise,
the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must
be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
Reasoning
- One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil
Code is the codification of "some basic principles that
are to be observed for the rightful relationship between
human beings and for the stability of the social order."
Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in
Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
- But while Art.19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance
prof. casis
of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
- Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a
violation of law, provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
- However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they
did not violate any provision of law since they were
merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private
respondent. This does not, however, leave private
respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil
Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
the damage.
- In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of
rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can
be applied. The question of whether or not the principle
of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in
damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other
applicable provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case.
- the Court, after examining the record and considering
certain significant circumstances, finds that all
petitioners have indeed abused the right that they
invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for
which the latter must now be indemnified.
- An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee
has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking
the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation
and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness
and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be
expected from such employer. But the high-handed
treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly
uncalled for.
- The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern
of harassment during the investigations of Tobias
transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already
ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an
employee should not be confused with the manner in
torts & damages

which the right is exercised and the effects flowing
therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the
employer is liable for damages to the employee.
- Several other tortious acts were committed by
petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination
from work: Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by
telling him to just confess or else the company would
file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in
jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be
trusted."
- The threat unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the
various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand,
the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's
earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook" and
"swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal
dignity
- The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the
writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October
1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by
GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Tobias remained
unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further
damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be
held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of
the Civil Code.
- Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners
of six criminal complaints against Tobias. While sound
principles of justice and public policy dictate that
persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of
wrongs and vindication of their rights, the right to
institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised
maliciously and in bad faith. Considering the haste in
which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that
they were filed during the pendency of the illegal
dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by
Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed
notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating
Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed
against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual
dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other
conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by
malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints
against Tobias.
- It must be underscored that petitioners have been
guilty of committing several actionable tortious acts.
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- PAGE 77 -
Considering the extent of the damage wrought on

Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to petitioners'
contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias
was reasonable under the circumstances.
- Petitioners still insist that the award of damages was
improper, invoking the principle of damnum absque
injuria. It is argued that "[t]he only probable actual
damage that private respondent could have suffered was
a direct result of his having been dismissed from his
employment, which was a valid and legal act of the
defendants-appellants. According to the principle of
damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not
constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a
legal wrong is not actionable. This principle finds no
application in this case. It bears repeating that even
granting that petitioners might have had the right to
dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which
that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for
which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover,
the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in
connection with the abusive manner in which he was
dismissed but was also the result of several other quasidelictual acts committed by petitioners.
- Petitioners next question the award of moral damages.
However, the Court has already ruled that moral
damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in
Article 21 of said Code.
- Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned
by petitioners. The nature of the wrongful acts shown to
have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is
sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to
the latter.
Disposition petition is hereby DENIED and the
decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
ALBENSON V CA
BIDIN; January 11, 1993
NATURE
Petition assailing the decision of respondent CA which
modified the judgment of the RTC and ordered
prof. casis
petitioner to pay private respondent moral damages and
attorney's fees.
FACTS
- Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered
to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. the mild steel plates
which the latter ordered. As part payment thereof,
Albenson was given a check in the amount of P2,575.00
and drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks.
When presented for payment, the check was dishonored
for the reason "Account Closed."
- From the records of the SEC, Albenson discovered
that the president of Guaranteed, the recipient of the
unpaid mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio S. Baltao."
Upon further inquiry, Albenson was informed by the
Ministry of Trade and Industry that E.L. Woodworks, a
single proprietorship business, was registered in the
name of one "Eugenio Baltao". In addition, upon
verification with the drawee bank, Albenson was
advised that the signature appearing on the subject
check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao." After
obtaining the foregoing information, Albenson made an
extrajudicial demand upon private respondent Eugenio
S. Baltao to replace and/or make good the dishonored
check. However, private respondent has a namesake, his
son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a business
establishment, E.L. Woodworks, with the very same
business address as Guaranteed.
- Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an
information against Eugenio S. Baltao for Violation of
BP 22. In filing said information, Fiscal Sumaway
claimed that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao
opportunity to submit controverting evidence, but the
latter failed to do so and therefore, was deemed to have
waived his right. Baltao, claiming ignorance of the
complaint against him, immediately filed with the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation.
Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal reversed the
finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respondent
Baltao. He found that the signature on the check is not
the signature of Eugenio S. Baltao.
- Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case
against him, respondent Baltao filed before the RTC a
complaint for damages against herein petitioners
torts & damages

Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and
Benjamin Mendiona, its employee. In its decision, the
lower court observed that "the check is drawn against
the account of "E.L. Woodworks," not of Guaranteed
Industries of which plaintiff used to be President.
Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had ceased
to exist as a corporation since 1975. . . The possibility is
that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III, a
son of plaintiff, that the defendants may have been
dealing with . . ."
ISSUE
WON private respondent's cause of action is not one
based on malicious prosecution but one for abuse of
rights under Article 21 of the CC
HELD
NO
Ratio The question of whether or not the principle of
abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in damages
under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision
of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. The
elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the
following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the
general sanction for all other provisions of law which
do not especially provide for their own sanction. Thus,
anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the
exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to
another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered
thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores,
and has the following elements: 1) There is an act
which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good
custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done
with intent to injure. There is a common element under
Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be
intentional.
Reasoning
- Petitioners could not be said to have violated the
principle of abuse of right. What prompted petitioners
to file the case for violation of BP 22 against private
respondent was their failure to collect the amountdue on
a bounced check which they honestly believed was
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issued to them by private respondent. Private

respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of
mistaken identity at first hand. In the absence of a
wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral
damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result
of an action does not per se make the action wrongful
and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the
law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the
right to litigate. Considering that Guaranteed, which
received the goods in payment of which the bouncing
check was issued is owned by respondent, petitioner
acted in good faith and probable cause in filing the
complaint before the provincial fiscal. The presence of
probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the
absence of malice.
Disposition petition is GRANTED and the decision of
the CA is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
AMONOY V GUTIERREZ
351 SCRA 731
PANGANIBAN; 2001
FACTS
- Amonoy was the counsel of therein Francisca Catolos,
Agnes Catolos, Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso
Formilda. He won the case for them and charged
P27600 as attorneys fees. As they were not able to pay,
his clients executed real estate mortgages on their lands
and the house thereon. Asuncion Pasamba died on 24
February 1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passed away on
2 July 1969. Among the heirs of the latter was his
daughter, plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez.
- Because his attorneys fees thus secured by the two
lots were not paid, on 21 January 1970 Amonoy filed
for their foreclosure before the CFI of Pasig, Rizal. The
heirs opposed, contending that the attorneys fees
charged were unconscionable and that the agreed sum
was only P11,695.92. But on 28 September 1972
judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring
the heirs to pay within 90 days the P27,600.00 secured
by the mortgage, P11,880.00 as value of the harvests,
and P9,645.00 as another round of attorneys fees.
Failing in that, the two (2) lots would be sold at public
auction.
prof. casis
- They failed to pay. On 6 February 1973, the said lots
were foreclosed. Amonoy was the highest bidder in the
foreclosure sale. The heirs sought the annulment of the
auction sale. The case was dismissed by the CFI on 7
November 1977, and this was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals on 22 July 1981. Thereafter, the CFI on 25 July
1985 issued a Writ of Possession and pursuant to which
a notice to vacate was made on 26 August 1985. On
Amonoys motion of 24 April 1986, the Orders of 25
April 1986 and 6 May 1986 were issued for the
demolition of structures in the said lots, including
the house of the Gutierrez spouses.
- The Gutierrez spouses sought a restraining order from
the Supreme Court, which was granted by the same.
Upon a judgment on merits later on, Amonoy was
ordered to return said properties to the rightful owners.
But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the
above-mentioned Decision, respondents house had
already been destroyed, supposedly in accordance with
a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court.
- Thus, a Complaint for damages in connection with the
destruction of their house was filed by respondents
against petitioner before the RTC on December 15,
1989. In its January 27, 1993 Decision, the RTC
dismissed respondents suit. On appeal, the CA set
aside the lower courts ruling and ordered petitioner to
pay respondents P250,000 as actual damages.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was also denied. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE
WON Amonoy may properly invoke damnum absque
injuria in this case since at the time of the demolition he
had color of authority over said properties
HELD
NO
Ratio Damnum absque injuria may not be invoked by a
person who claims to exercise a right but does so in an
abusive manner violative of Article 19 of the Civil
Code. Indeed, in the availment of ones rights, one must
Reasoning
- Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing that he
is not liable for the demolition of respondents house.
torts & damages

He maintains that he was merely acting in accordance
with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC.
- We reject this submission. Damnum absque injuria
finds no application to this case.True, petitioner
commenced the demolition of respondents house on
May 30, 1986 under the authority of a Writ of
Demolition issued by the RTC. But the records show
that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining
the demolition of respondents house, was issued by the
Supreme Court on June 2, 1986. The CA also found,
based on the Certificate of Service of the Supreme
Court process server, that a copy of the TRO was served
on petitioner himself on June 4, 1986.
- Petitioner, however, did not heed the TRO of this
Court. We agree with the CA that he unlawfully
pursued the demolition of respondents house well until
the middle of 1987. Although the acts of petitioner
may have been legally justified at the outset, their
continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to
an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions
were tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on
completing the demolition, respondents would not have
suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the
RTC. Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of a
right, but an invalid exercise of a right that had been
suspended when he received the TRO from this Court
on June 4, 1986. By then, he was no longer entitled to
proceed with the demolition.
- A commentator on this topic explains:
The exercise of a right ends when the right
disappears, and it disappears when it is abused,
especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a
right without the spirit of justice which gives it life, is
repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It
cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he
unnecessarily prejudices another x x x. Over and
above the specific precepts of positive law are the
supreme norms of justice x x x; and he who violates
them violates the law. For this reason, it is not
permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others.
- Article 19, known to contain what is commonly
certain standards which may be observed not only in the
exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of
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ones duties. These standards are the following: to act

honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes
the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their
exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself
legal because recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with norms enshrined in Article 19 and results
in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible
UE V JADER
325 SCRA 804
YNARES-SANTIAGO; February 17, 2000
FACTS
- Jader was enrolled in the UE College of Law from
1984 up to 1988. He failed to take the regular final
examination in Practice Court I for which he was given
an incomplete grade .He enrolled for the second
semester as fourth year law student .He filed an
application for the removal of the incomplete grade but
got a grade of five (5).
- In the mean time, his name appeared in the Tentative
List of Candidates for graduation with an annotation
regarding his deficiencies. His name also appeared in
the invitation for the graduation as one of the candidates
for graduation. At the foot of the list of the names of the
candidates there appeared however an annotation saying
that it was a tentative list and that degrees will be
conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily
complete requirements as stated in the University
Bulletin . Jader attended the graduation and brought his
family with him. He thereafter prepared himself for the
bar examination. He took a leave of absence without
pay from his job and enrolled at the pre-bar review
class. Jader later learned of the deficiency and he
dropped his review class and was not able to take the
bar examination.
Consequently, he sued UE for damages.
prof. casis
- UE denied liability arguing that it never led
respondent to believe that he completed the
requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his
name was included in the tentative list of graduating
students.
- TC rendered judgment in favor of the Jader and
ordered UE to pay Jader P35,470.00
- CA Affirmed and added an award of P50,000.00 for
moral damages
- UE elevated the case to this Court on a petition for
review arguing that it has no liability to respondent
Romeo A. Jader, considering that the proximate and
immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by the
latter arose out of his own negligence in not verifying
from the professor concerned the result of his removal
exam.
ISSUE
WON an educational institution may be held liable for
damages for misleading a student into believing that the
latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation
when such is not the case
HELD
YES
- UE had a contractual obligation to inform his students
as to whether or not they have met all the requirements
for the conferment of a degree. Thus, UE in belatedly
informing respondent of the result of the removal
examination, particularly at a time when he had already
commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said
to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith
must be sufficiently established for a successful
prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for
abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from
taking undue advantage of another, even though the
forms and technicalities of the law, together with the
absence of all information or belief of facts, would
render the transaction unconscientious. HYPERLINK
"http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/f
eb2000/132344.html" \l "_ftn5" \o ""
torts & damages

- Considering that the institution of learning involved
herein is a university which is engaged in legal
education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in
its students, more specifically the principle of good
dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil
Code which states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully
or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
- Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.
HYPERLINK
eb2000/132344.html" \l "_ftn8" \o "" - In civilized
society, men must be able to assume that others will do
them no intended injury that others will commit no
internal aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen,
when they act affirmatively will do so with due care
which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of
the community exacts and that those with whom they
deal in the general course of society will act in good
faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is
justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society.
HYPERLINK
eb2000/132344.html" \l "_ftn9" \o "" Schools and
professors cannot just take students for granted and be
indifferent to them, for without the latter, the former are
useless.
- Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the
students of their academic status and not wait for the
latter to inquire from the former. The conscious
indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the
person/persons who may be affected by his act or
omission can support a claim for damages.
HYPERLINK
eb2000/132344.html" \l "_ftn10" \o "" Want of care to
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- PAGE 77 -
the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled

with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally
calculated to produce them would make the erring party
liable.
HYPERLINK
eb2000/132344.html" \l "_ftn11" \o "" Petitioner ought
to have known that time was of the essence in the
performance of its obligation to inform respondent of
his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will
not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is
precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an
LL.B. graduate. It failed to act seasonably. Petitioner
cannot just give out its students grades at any time
because a student has to comply with certain deadlines
set by the Supreme Court on the submission of
requirements for taking the bar. Petitioners liability
arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of
the result of an examination and in misleading the latter
into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for
the course.
- Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to
justify its own negligence that led to the delayed relay
of information to respondent. When one of two
innocent parties must suffer, he through whose agency
the loss occurred must bear it. HYPERLINK
eb2000/132344.html" \l "_ftn13" \o "" The modern
tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases
where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not
illicit.
HYPERLINK
eb2000/132344.html" \l "_ftn14" \o "" If mere fault or
negligence in ones acts can make him liable for
damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason
should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person
should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate
exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence
and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence
or abuse.
GARCIANO V CA
212 SCRA 436
GRIO-AQUINO; August 10, 1992
prof. casis
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint
for damages filed by the petitioner against
the private respondents.
FACTS
- The petitioner was hired to teach during
the 1981-82 school year in the Immaculate
Concepcion Institute in the Island of
Camotes. On January 13, 1982, or before
the school year ended, she applied for an
indefinite leave of absence because her
daughter was taking her to Austria where
her
daughter
was
employed.
The
application was recommended for approval
by the school principal, Emerito O. Labajo,
and approved by the President of the
school's Board of Directors.
- On June 1, 1982, Emerito Labajo
addressed a letter to the petitioner through
her husband, Sotero Garciano (for she was
still abroad), informing her of the decision
of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, the school's founder,
concurred in by the president of the ParentTeachers Association and the school faculty,
to terminate her services as a member of
the teaching staff because of: (1) the
absence of any written contract of
employment between her and the school
due to her refusal to sign one; and (2) the
difficulty of getting a substitute for her on a
temporary basis as no one would accept the
position without a written contract. Upon
her return from Austria in the later part of
June, 1982, she received the letter
informing her that her services at the
Immaculate Concepcion Institute had been
terminated. She made inquiries from the
school about the matter and, on July 7,
1982, the members of the Board of
Directors of the school, with the exception
of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, signed a letter
notifying her that she was "reinstated to
torts & damages
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report and do your usual duties as

Classroom Teacher . . . effective July 5,
1982," and that "any letter or notice of
termination received by you before this
date has no sanction or authority by the
Board of Directors of this Institution,
therefore it is declared null and void."
- On July 9, 1982, the president, vice
president, secretary, and three members of
the Board of Directors, out of a membership
of nine (9), resigned their positions from
the Board "for the reason that the ICI
Faculty, has reacted acidly to the Board's
deliberations for the reinstatement of Mrs.
Esteria F. Garciano, thereby questioning the
integrity of the Board's decision".
- On September 3, 1982, petitioner filed a
complaint for damages in the Regional Trial
Court, Cebu, Branch XI, against Fr. Wiertz,
Emerito Labajo, and some members of the
faculty of the school for discrimination and
unjust and illegal dismissal.
simply exercising their right of free

speech or their right to dissent from
the Board's decision. Their acts were not
contrary to law, morals, good customs or
public policy. They did not "illegally
dismiss" her for the Board's decision to
retain her prevailed. She was ordered to
report for work on July 5, 1982, but she did
not comply with that order. Consequently,
whatever loss she may have incurred in the
form of lost earnings was self-inflicted.
Volenti non fit injuria.
Ratio Liability for damages under Articles
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises only
from unlawful, willful or negligent acts that
are contrary to law, or morals, good
customs or public policy.
ISSUE
WON the defendants prevented the petitioner from
reporting to the school and thus making them liable for
damages
NATURE
Petition for review decision of CA
HELD
NO
- The Court of Appeals was correct in
finding that petitioner's discontinuance
from teaching was her own choice. While
the respondents admittedly wanted her
service terminated, they actually did
nothing to physically prevent her from
reassuming her post, as ordered by the
school's Board of Directors. That the school
principal and Fr. Wiertz disagreed with the
Board's decision to retain her, and some
teachers allegedly threatened to resign en
masse, even if true, did not make them
liable to her for damages. They were
BARONS MARKETING V CA (PHELPS DODGE

PHILS)
286 SCRA 96
KAPUNAN; February 9, 1998
FACTS
- Phelps Dodge appointed Barons Marketing as one of
its dealers of electrical wires and cables. As such dealer,
Barons was given 60 days credit for its purchases of
Phelps products.
- From Dec1986 to Aug1987, Barons purchased on
credit wires and cables worth P4.1m, which it in turn
supplied to MERALCO. In the sales invoice, it was
stipulated that an interest of 12% would be imposed,
plus 25% for attys fees and collection. On Sept1987,
Barons paid P300k (thereby leaving an unpaid account
of P3.8m). Phelps sent several demands, but Barons still
did not pay. It instead wrote Phelps requesting if it
could pay the outstanding account in monthly
installments of P500k plus 1% interest.
- Phelps, instead of responding to the request of Barons,
filed a complaint for recovery of the P3.8m plus
prof. casis
interest, and prayed for attys fees of 25% of the amt,
and exemplary damages amounting to P100k.
- Barons admitted the purchase of the wires and cables,
but disputed the amt claimed by Phelps. The RTC
rendered decision in favor of Phelps, ordering Barons to
pay the debt and interest of 12% and awarding 25% as
attys fees. CA affirmed (with modification, reducing
attys fees to 5%) Barons now assail the CA decision,
alleging that Phelps should have been held guilty of
creditors abuse of rights, and Barons should not be
liable for attys fees.
*note: Barons contends that Phelps abused its rights
when it rejected Barons offer to settle the debt in
installments
**right involved: right of a creditor to refuse partial
fulfillment of a prestation due to him
ISSUES
1. WON there was creditors abuse of rights in this case
2. WON Barons should be liable for interest and attys
fees
HELD
1. NO
Ratio there is no abuse of rights when there is no bad
faith nor intent to prejudice another. Also, the mere
exercise of a right cannot be said to be an abuse of
right.
Reasoning
- the law prescribes a "primordial limitation on all
rights" by setting certain standards that must be
observed in the exercise thereof. Thus, the inclusion of
Art.19 in the CC: Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.
- To constitute abuse of rights, there must be bad faith
or intent to prejudice the plaintiff. Citing Tolentino:
There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is
exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or
injuring another. When the objective of the actor is
illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be concealed under the
guise of exercising a right. xxx The exercise of a right
must be in accordance with the purpose for which it
torts & damages

was established, and must not be excessive or unduly
harsh; there must be no intention to injure another.
- In this case, bad faith on the part of Phelps was not
proved. More importantly, Phelps was driven by
legitimate reasons for rejecting Barons offer. It merely
wanted to avoid a situation wherein its cash position
would be compromised, making it harder for them to
pay its own obligations.
Clearly, this (the request of Barons) would be
inimical to the interests of any enterprise, especially a
profit-oriented one like Phelps. It is plain to see that
what we have here is a mere exercise of rights, not an
abuse thereof.
2. YES
Ratio the penal clause included in the contract should
be complied with in the event of breach.
Reasoning
- the contract expressly provided for the imposition of
the 12% interest plus 25% for attorneys fees and
collection, by way of penal clause. Thus, Barons is
bound to pay the said amounts.
- However, since 25% if P4.1m is almost P2m, this
should be reduced to 10% for being manifestly
exorbitant. Thus, attys fees should be reduced to 10%
Disposition CA decision modified WRT attys fees but
AFFIRMED in other respects
BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION V CA
(MARASIGAN)
296 SCRA 260
KAPUNAN; September 25, 1998
FACTS
- December 8, 1989 - Atty. Ricardo J. Marasigans
credit card was dishonored, the bill amounting to
P735.32, by Caf Adriatico when the he entertained
some guests. One of his guests, Mary Ellen Ringler,
paid the bill by using her own credit card a Unibankard
- MARASIGAN was a complimentary member of
BECC from February 1988 to February 1989 and was
issued Credit Card with a credit limit of P3,000.00 and
with a monthly billing every 27th of the month His
membership was renewed for another year or until
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February 1990 and the credit limit was increased to

P5,000.00.
- MARASIGAN oftentimes exceeded his credit limits
but this was never taken against him by BPI and even
his mode of paying his monthly bills in check was
tolerated.
- October 1989 statement amounting to P8,987.84 was
not paid in due time. MARASIGAN admitted having
failed to pay his account because he was in Quezon
attending to some professional and personal
commitments. He was informed that bpi was
demanding immediate payment of his outstanding
account, was requiring him to issue a check for
P15,000.00 which would include his future bills, and
was threatening to suspend his credit card.
- MARASIGAN issued Far East Bank Check of
P15,000.00, postdated December 15, 1989 which was
received on November 23, 1989 by Tess Lorenzo, an
employee of the defendant who in turn gave to Jeng
Angeles, a co-employee who handles the account of the
plaintiff. The check remained in the custody of Jeng
Angeles. Mr. Roberto Maniquiz, head of the collection
department of defendant was formally informed of the
postdated check about a week later.
- November 28, 2989 - BPI served MARASIGAN a
letter by ordinary mail informing him of the temporary
suspension of the privileges of his credit card and the
inclusion of his account number in their Caution List.
He was also told to refrain from further use of his credit
card to avoid any inconvenience/embarrassment and
that unless he settles his outstanding account with the
defendant within 5 days from receipt of the letter, his
membership will be permanently cancelled
- There is no showing that the plaintiff received this
letter before December 8, 1989.
- December 12, 1989 MARASIGAN requested that he
be sent the exact billing due him as of December 15,
1989, to withhold the deposit of his postdated check and
that said check be returned to him because he had
already instructed his bank to stop the payment because
BPI violated their agreement that when MARASIGAN
issued the check to cover his account amounting to only
P8,987.84 on the condition that BPI will not suspend
the effectivity of the card
prof. casis
- December 16, 1989 MARASIGAN sent letter to the
manager of FEBTC requesting the bank to stop the
payment of the check
- March 12, 1990 MARASIGAN sent another letter
reminding the manager of FEBTC that he had long
rescinded and cancelled whatever arrangement he
entered into with BPI and requesting for his correct
billing, less the improper charges and penalties, and for
an explanation within five (5) days from receipt thereof
why his card was dishonored on December 8, 1989
despite assurance to the contrary by defendant's
personnel-in-charge, otherwise the necessary court
action shall be filed to hold defendant responsible for
the humiliation and embarrassment suffered by him
- March 21, 1990 - final demand by BPI requiring him
to pay in full his overdue account, including stipulated
fees and charges, within 5 days from receipt thereof or
face court action and also to replace the postdated check
with cash within the same period or face criminal suit
for violation of Bouncing Check Law
- April 5, 1990 MARASIGAN demanded BPI
compliance with his request in his first letter dated
March 12, 1990 within three (3) days from receipt,
otherwise the plaintiff will file a case against them
- May 7, 1990 - MARASIGAN filed a complaint for
damages against petitioner before the RTC Makati
- TC: ruled for MARASIGAN finding that BPI abused
its right in contravention of A19 CC ordering BPI to
pay P 100,000.00 as moral damages; P 50,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and P 20,000.00 by way of
attorney's fees.
- CA: AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
P50,000.00 as moral damages: P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and P10,000.00 by way of
attorney's fees.
ISSUES
1. WON BPI abused its right to suspend the credit card
2. WON MARASIGAN can recover moral damages
arising from the cancellation of his credit card by BPI
HELD
1. NO
Ratio The agreement was for the immediate payment of
the outstanding account. A check is not considered as
torts & damages

cash especially when it is postdated sent to BPI. Thus,
the issuance of the postdated check was not effective
payment. BPI was therefore justified in suspending his
credit card. BPI did not capriciously and arbitrarily
canceled the use of the card.
Reasoning
- Under the terms and conditions of the credit card,
signed by MARASIGAN, any card with outstanding
balances after thirty (30) days from original
billing/statement shall automatically be suspended,
Any CARD with outstanding balances unpaid after
thirty (30) days from original billing/statement date
shall automatically be suspended and those with
accounts unpaid after sixty (60) days from said
original billing/statement date shall automatically be
cancelled without prejudice to BECC's right to
suspend or cancel any CARD any time and for
whatever reason.
- By his own admission MARASIGAN made no
payment within 30 days for his billing/statement dated
27 September 1989. Neither did he make payment for
his original billing/statement dated 27 October 1989.
Consequently as early as 28 October 1989 thirty days
from the non-payment of his billing dated 27 September
1989, BPI could automatically suspend his credit card.
Ratio To find the existence of an abuse of right A19 the
following elements must be present (1) There is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Reasoning
- Good faith is presumed and the burden of proving bad
faith is on the party alleging it. As early as 28 October
1989, BPI could have suspended MARASIGANS card
outright. Instead, BPI allowed him to use his card for
several weeks.
Ratio The underlying basis for the award of tort
damages is the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach
of some duty and the imposition of liability for that
breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach
of such duty should be the proximate cause of the
injury.
Reasoning
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- Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is

the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded
for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or
harm was not the results of a violation of a legal duty.
In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the
injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for
damages resulting from an act which does not amount
to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often
called
damnum
absque
injuria
- It was petitioner's failure to settle his obligation which
caused the suspension of his credit card and subsequent
dishonor at Caf Adriatico. He can not now pass the
blame to the petitioner for not notifying him of the
suspension of his card. As quoted earlier, the
application contained the stipulation that the petitioner
could automatically suspend a card whose billing has
not been paid for more than thirty days. Nowhere is it
stated in the terms and conditions of the application that
there is a need of notice before suspension may be
affected as private respondent claims.
2. NO
- MARASIGANS own negligence was the proximate
cause of his embarrassing and humiliating experience in
not reading the letter of notice of cancellation. The
award of damages by the CA is clearly unjustified.
RUIZ V SECRETARY
PAREDES; 1966
NATURE
Appeal from an order of the Manila CFI
FACTS
- Enrique Ruiz and Jose Herrera, both shareholders of
Allied Technilogists, Inc. filed an action against the
Secretary of National Defense and also against their
own company (together with Pablo Panlilio who is also
a shareholder of the company) in connection with the
15% retention fund withheld by the DND relating to the
construction of the Veterans Hospital. It turned out that
prof. casis
said retention was already released by the DND to the
Company. The Court then proceeded with the other
cause of action which was deemed to be the controversy
between Ruiz and Panlilio over the said 15%.
- As it turned out, the real issue was the credit as to the
architects of the building were. Under the contract and
all other documents relating to the construction of the
Veterans Hospital, the named architect was only
Panlilio. Ruiz and Herrera want to be recognized as
architects of the building also citing Article 21 of the
Civil Code as their base for he cause of action.
- The amended complaint of appellants claimed that the
non inclusion of their names as architects resulted in
their professional prestige and standing being seriously
impaired. Hence, they claim that even if the retention
fund was in act released, their pleas for recognition as
architects should have been heard by the lower court.
ISSUE
WON the lower court erred in dismissing the case
HELD
NO
- The sole object of the appellants was to secure for
themselves recognition that they were co-architects of
the Veterans Hospital, together with Panlilio, so as to
enhance their standing and prestige. If this is so, there is
no need or necessity for a judicial declaration. Prestige
and recognition are bestowed on the deserving even if
there is no judicial declaration. On the other hand no
amount of declaration will help an incompetent person
achieve prestige and recognition. Article 21, which was
used as basis of the action, states;
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs, or public
policy shall compensate the
latter for damages.
- While the word injury may also refer to honor or
credit, the article envisions a situation where a person
has a legal right which was violated by another in a
manner contrary to morals, good custom, or public
policy. Hence it presupposes losses or injuries which
are suffered as a result of said violation. The pleadings
in this case do not show damages were ever asked or
torts & damages

alleged. - And under the facts and circumstances
obtaining, one cannot sustain the contention that the
failure or refusal to extend recognition was an act
contrary to morals, good custom, or public policy.
Disposition Petition denied. Order appealed from is
affirmed. he modified award of attorneys fees.
ALBENSON V CA (BALTAO)
217 SCRA 16
NATURE
Appeal from decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- Albenson Enterprises Corp. delivered to Guaranteed
Industries Inc. the mild steel plates which the latter
ordered. As part payment, Albenson was given a check
drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks.
- Check was dishonored for the reason Account
closed.
- Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed
was one Eugenio S. Baltao and that E.L. Woodworks
was registered in the name Eugenio Baltao. The
signature on the subject check belonged to Eugenio
Baltao.
- Albenson made an extrajudicial demand but Balbao
denied issuing the check. Thus, Albenson filed a
complaint against Eugenio S. Baltao for violation of BP
22.
- Asst. Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information
against Eugenio S. Baltao for Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22.
- Baltao filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a
motion for reinvestigation. It appears that private
respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III,
who manages E.L. Woodworks.
- Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal reversed
the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated
respondent Baltao.
- Baltao filed before the RTC a complaint for damages
against Albenson Enterprises, its owner, and one
employee.
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- Trial court granted Baltaos claim for actual or

compensatory, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and costs.
- CA modified by reducing the moral damages and the
attorney's fees awarded.
ISSUES
WON Baltao should be awarded damages (based on
malicious prosecution)
HELD
NO
- A party injured by the filing of a court case against
him, even if he is later on absolved, may file a case for
damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of
rights, or on malicious prosecution. In order that such a
case can prosper, however, the following three (3)
elements must be present, to wit: (1) The fact of the
prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was
himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally
terminated with an acquittal; (2) That in bringing the
action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3)
The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal
malice
- To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be
proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister
design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was
initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his
charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the
mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for
prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution. Proof and motive that the institution of the
action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and
humiliate a person must be clearly and preponderantly
established to entitle the victims to damages
- Probable cause is the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief, in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
- An award of damages and attorney's fees is
unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. If
damage results from a person's exercising his legal
rights, it is damnum absque injuria.
prof. casis
- Actual and compensatory damages are those
recoverable because of pecuniary loss in business,
trade, property, profession, job or occupation and the
same must be proved, otherwise, if the proof is flimsy
and unsubstantiated, no damages will be given
- In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of
fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded
and that the adverse result of an action does not per se
make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the
payment of damages, for the law could not have meant
to impose a penalty on the right to litigate
- Where there is no evidence of the other party having
acted in wanton, fraudulent or reckless, or oppressive
manner, neither may exemplary damages be awarded
Disposition Petition granted. CA decision reversed and
set aside
WASSMER V VELEZ
12 SCRA 648
BENGZON; December 24, 1964
FACTS
- Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following
their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and
set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2,
Velez left a note for Wassmer saying that he has to
postpone the wedding because his mother opposes it.
- But the next day, he sent a telegram assuring Wassmer
that nothing has changed and he will return soon. But
Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
- Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer
and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence
before the clerk of court as commissioner Judgment
was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000
as actual damages; P25,000 as moral and exemplary
damages; P2,500 as attorney's fees; and the costs.
ISSUE
WON Velez is liable for the cost of wedding
preparations spent by Wassmer
HELD
YES
- While mere breach of contract is not an actionable
torts & damages

wrong, Article 21 of the Civil Code says that when the
person willfully causes loss or injury contrary to good
custom, he shall compensate the latter for damages. It is
the abuse of right which can be a cause for moral and
material damages.
- The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff
and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage,
which was subsequently issued. Their wedding was set.
Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives,
friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-be's trousseau,
party dresses and other apparel for the important
occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor
and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed,
with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were
given and gifts received.
- This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry.
To formally set a wedding and go through all the abovedescribed preparation and publicity, only to walk out of
it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is
quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which defendant must be
held answerable in damages in accordance with Article
21 aforesaid.
- Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New
Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary
damages, defendant contends that the same could not be
adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the
New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is
devoid of merit as under the above-narrated
circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a
"wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner."
P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed
to be a reasonable award.
TANJANCO V SANTOS
REYES; December 17, 1966
NATURE
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals
revoking an order of the CFI dismissing appellant's
action for support and damages.
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FACTS
- Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos, both being
of adult age; that he expressed and professed his
undying love and affection for her who also in due time
reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration
of his promise of marriage Araceli consented and
acceded to Tanjancos pleas for carnal knowledge.
Regularly until December 1959, through his
protestations of love and promises of marriage,
Tanjanco succeeded in having carnal access to Araceli,
as a result of which she conceived a child. Due to her
pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social
humiliation, Araceli had to resign her job as secretary in
IBM Philippines, Inc. She became unable to support
herself and her baby and duer to Tanjanco's refusal to
marry her as promised, she suffered mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree
compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child
that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than
P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby,
plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages,
plus P10,000.00 attorney's fees. CFI dismissed the
complaint. The Court of Appeals, entered judgment
setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of
origin to proceed with the case.
ISSUE
WON CS erred in reversing the CFI decision
HELD
YES
- In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action
for damages, under Article 21, the Court of Appeals
relied upon and quoted from the memorandum
submitted by the Code Commission where it stated,
but the Code Commission has gone farther than the
sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law.
Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed
it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in
prof. casis
the proposed Civil Code the following rule: ART. 23.
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
the damage." They gave an example "A" seduces
the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of
marriage either has not been made, or can not be
proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present
laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen
years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of
promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the
grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though
the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral
damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for
damages. But under the proposed article, she and her
parents would have such a right of action. The Court of
Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set
forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to
a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential
feature is seduction, that in law it is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of
marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit,
enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on
the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded.
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some
sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must
yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she
consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is
from mutual desire, there is no seduction. She must be
induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of
some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are
calculated to have and do have that effect, and which
result in her ultimately submitting her person to the
sexual embraces of her seducer.
- And in American Jurisprudence: On the other hand,
in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion
or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere
proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness
arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the female,
and the defendant merely affords her the needed
opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been
emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases
would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and
torts & damages

would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit.
- Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the
complaint. Over and above the partisan allegations, the
facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to
1959, Araceli Santos, a woman of adult age, maintained
intimate sexual relations with Tanjanco, with repeated
acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with
the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had Araceli been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of
the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the
defendant, she would not have again yielded to his
embraces, much less for one year, without exacting
early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage,
and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his
promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made
under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause
of action being alleged, no error was committed by the
Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.
Disposition the decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is
affirmed..
BAKSH V CA
219 SCRA 115
DAVIDE JR; February 19, 1993
NATURE
Appeal by certioriari to review and set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- Private respondent, without the assistance of counsel,
filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for
damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation
of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said
complaint that: she is 22 years old, single, Filipino and
a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation
duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the
other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano
Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange
student taking a medical course at the Lyceum
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Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20

August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry
her; she accepted his love on the condition that they
would get married; they therefore argued to get married
after the end of the school semester, which was in
October of that year; petitioner then visited the private
respondent's parents in Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan
to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20
August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him
in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she
began living with him; a week before the filing of the
complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to
change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a
result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries,
during a confrontation with a representative of the
barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the
complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore
and; the petitioner is already married to someone living
in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for
judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages,
reimbursement for actual expenses, attorney's fees and
costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as
may be just and equitable.
- In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner admitted
only the personal circumstances of the parties as
averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the
allegations either for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or
because the true facts are those alleged as his Special
and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he
never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married
with the private respondent; he neither sought the
consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to
live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only
told her to stop coming to his place because he
discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his
money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took
place with a representative of the barangay captain.
Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is
baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he
was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to
incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a
prof. casis
besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award for
miscellaneous expenses and moral damages.
- After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying
Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October
1989 a decision 5 favoring the private respondent. The
petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages
and attorney's fees.
- The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings
and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private
respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a
woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who
readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner,
through machinations, deceit and false pretenses,
promised to marry private respondent, (d) because of
his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself
to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful
promise, private respondent and her parents in
accordance with Filipino customs and traditions
made some preparations for the wedding that was to be
held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and
chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting
sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to
marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a
foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality,
have offended our sense of morality, good customs,
culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to
the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia,
she would not have had the temerity and courage to
come to court and expose her honor and reputation to
public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.
- Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the
respondent Court of Appeals. Respondent Court
promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto
the trial court's ruling. Unfazed by his second defeat,
petitioner filed the instant petition; he raises therein the
single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil
Code applies to the case at bar.
- It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not
applicable because he had not committed any moral
wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public
policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage
to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated
her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking
Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring
torts & damages

the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant
with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an
Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and
Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a
promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the
same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem
upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which
purportedly allows a Muslim to take four wives and
concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred
in ruling that he does not possess good moral character.
Moreover, his controversial "common law wife" is now
his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in
civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his
unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent,
petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be
pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private
respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an
illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that
even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had
professed his love to the private respondent and had
also promised to marry her, such acts would not be
actionable in view of the special circumstances of the
case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable.
ISSUE
WON Art. 21 is applicable to the case at bar
HELD
YES
- The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry
per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil
Code the provisions that would have made it so. This
notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision,
Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of
torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
- In light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21,
The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that where a
man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of
the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes
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the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in

a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only
a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to
the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to
marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and
the willful injury to her honor and reputation which
followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such
injury should have been committed in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. In
the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the
petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of
love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her
surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live
with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would
keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage."
Disposition Petition denied
BUNAG V CA (CIRILO)
211 SCRA 441
REGALADO; July 10, 1992
NATURE
Petition for review from the decision of CA
FACTS
- Conrado Bunag, Jr brought Zenaida Cirilo to a hotel
where they had sex. Later that evening, Bunag brough
her to his grandmothers house in Las Pinas where they
liver together as husband and wife for 21 days. During
that time, Bunag, Jr. and Cirilo applied for their
respective Marriage Licenses, but after leaving, Bunag
Jr withdrew his application. Cirilo contends that she
was abducted by Bunag Jr along with unidentified man
and brought her to the motel where she was raped. The
Court a quo adopted her evidence.
- The Court found that Cirilo and Bunag Jr were
sweethearts but for 2eeks before the alleged rape, they
had a quarrel. On the day of the said rape, Bunag jr
prof. casis
invited her for merienda to talk things over. Bunag Jr
came riding in a car with an unidentified man. Cirilo
rode in the passengers seat while Bunag Jr was driving.
When she noticed they were going the wrong way,
Cirilo protested but Bunag threatened her that he would
bump the car against the post if she made any noise.
They never got to the restaurant where they were
supposed to eat.
- She was then dragged by the 2 men in the hotel where
Bunag Jr deflowered her against her will and consent.
- Bunag initially allowed her to go home but later
refused to consent and stated that he would only let her
go after they were married, so much so that she
promised not to make any scandal and to marry him.
they proceeded to Bunags grandmothers house. That
night, Bunag Sr arrived and assured them that they
would apply for the ML the next day.
- After filing for the ML, they lived as husband and
wife for 21 days. Bunag then left and never returned.
Cirilo was ashamed when she went home and could not
sleep and eat because of the deception done against her
by Bunag, Jr.
- A complaint fro breach of promise to marry was filed
against Bunag Sr and Bunag Jr. The RTC upon finding
that she was forcibly abducted and raped Bunag Jr was
ordered to pay for P80K for moral damages, P20K for
exemplary damage, P20K by way of temperate damage,
and P10K for attys fees. Bunag Sr was absolved from
liability.
- Cirilo appealed on the disculpation of Bunag Srs
liability. While the Bunags assigned several errors in
the TC decision. CA dismissed the petitions and
affirmed judgment of RTC in toto.
- Bunag filed for the petition for review claiming that
CA failed to consider vital exhibits and testimonies and
error in the proper application of the law.
ISSUE
WON lower courts erred in granting damages for the
breach of promise to marry
HELD
Ratio A breach of promise to marry is not
actionable per se, except where the plaintiff
torts & damages

incurred expenses for the wedding and the
necessary incidents therrof. However, the award
for moral damages is allowed in cases specified
and analogous to those provided in Art 2219 CC.
Under Art 21 CC, in relation to Art 2219, par10,
any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for damages.
Reasoning
- The court is constrained with the factual findings
of the lower courts.
- A breach of promise to marry has no standing in
the civil law, apart from the right to recover for
money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon
the faith of such promise.
- Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the
petitioners promising to marry Cirilo to evade criminal
liability constitutes acts contrary to morals and good
customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible
transgressions which warrant and justify the award of
moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Art 21 in
relation to par 3 and 10, Art 2219, and Art 2229 and
2234 CC.
- Although TC granted damages on the basis of the
forcible abduction and rape even after the criminal
complaints dismissal, the extinction of the criminal
liability does not extinguish civil liability unless there is
a declaration of a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil case may arise did not exist. In the case,
only the fiscal made such dismissal of the criminal
complaint.
Disposition petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit, and the assailedjudgment and resolution are
hereby AFFIRMED.
CONSTANTINO V MENDEZ
BIDIN; May 14, 1992
NATURE
FACTS
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- Petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for

acknowledgment, support and damages against private
respondent Ivan Mendez.
- In her complaint, Amelita Constantino alleges that she
met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant located at Sta.
Cruz, Manila, where she worked as a waitress; that the
day following their first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita
to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted;
that while dining, Ivan professed his love and courted
Amelita; that Amelita asked for time to think about
Ivan's proposal; that at about 11:00 o'clock in the
evening, Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to which
the latter agreed, that on the pretext of getting
something, Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room
and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with the latter; that after the sexual
contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married
man; that they repeated their sexual contact in the
months of September and November, 1974, whenever
Ivan is in Manila, as a result of which Amelita got
pregnant; that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf
ears; that Amelita had no sexual relations with any other
man except Ivan who is the father of the child yet to be
born at the time of the filing of the complaint; that
because of her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to leave
her work as a waitress; that Ivan is a prosperous
businessman of Davao City with a monthly income of
P5,000 to P8,000.00. As relief, Amelita prayed for the
recognition of the unborn child, the payment of actual,
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus
costs.
ISSUE
WON Amelita can claim for damages which is based on
Articles 19 3 & 21 4 of the Civil Code on the theory
that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she
surrendered her virginity
HELD
NO
Ratio Mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis
for recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual
intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual
desire.
prof. casis
Reasoning
- Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she
surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or
deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could
have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when
she was informed after their first sexual contact
sometime in August, 1974, that he was a married man.
Repeated sexual intercourse only indicates that passion
and not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving
force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
QUIMIGUING V ICAO
34 SCRA 132
REYES; July 31, 1970
NATURE
Appeal on points of law from an order of the CFI
FACTS
- Appellant, Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued
her neighbor Icao with whom she had close and
confidential relations. The latter, although married,
succeeded in having sex with plaintiff several times by
force and intimidation and without her consent. She
became pregnant and despite efforts and drugs (abortion
pills?) supplied by defendant, she had to stop studying.
Hence, she claimed support of P120/mo.
- Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action as
the complaint did not allege the child had been born
the motion was sustained. Plaintiff amended the
complaint but the TC ruled such was not allowable as
the original complaint averred no cause of action.
ISSUES
1. WON Quimiguing had a right to the support of the
child
2. WON Quimiguing is entitled to damages
HELD
1. YES
- A conceived, unborn child is given a provisional
personality by law and therefore has a right to support
from its progenitors, particularly Icao (Art. 40) and may
receive donations (Art. 742). Its being ignored by the
parent in his testament may result in preterition of a
torts & damages

forced heir that annuls the institution of the
testamentary heir, even if such child should be born
after the death of the testator (Art. 854)
2. YES
- For a married man to force a woman not his wife to
yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint)
constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim
that entitles her to claim compensation for damages
caused. As stated in Art. 21, Any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for damage. This is furthered by
Art. 2219 which provides compensation in cases of
seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.
- Hence, independent of the right to support of the child,
plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages; thus
the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of
action was doubly in error.
Disposition the orders under appeal are reversed and set
aside
PE V PE
5 SCRA 200
1962
FACTS
- Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita
PE, an unmarried woman 24 years of age. Defendant, a
married man, frequently visited Lolitas house on the
pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the
rosary. They fell in love and conducted clandestine
trysts. When the parents learned about this, they
prohibited defendant from going to their house. The
affair continued just the same. On april 14, 1957, Lolita
disappeared from her brothers house where she was
living. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was
found inside Lolitas aparador. The present action was
instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The lower
court dismissed the action. Hence, this appeal by the
plaintiffs
ISSUE
WON the defendant can be held liable under Article 21
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HELD
YES
- The circumstances under which the defendant tried to
win Lolitas affection cannot lead to any other
conclusion than that it was he who, through an
ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the
extent of making her fall in love with him. This is
shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house
of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him
how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his
visits to the latters family who allowed free access
because he was a collateral relative and was considered
as a member of the family, the two eventually fell in
love with each other and conducted clandestine love
affairs. Defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita
until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed,
no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of
events than that the defendant not only deliberately, but
through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the
affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit
relations with her. The wrong he had caused her and her
family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that
he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury
to Lolitas family in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21
of the New Civil Code.
QUE V IAC (NICOLAS)
169 SCRA 137
CRUZ; January 13, 1989
NATURE
Petition for review
FACTS
- Magtanggol Que is a dealer of canvass strollers while
Antonio Nicolas orders from him. The two had an
amicable business relation until 1975, when Nicolas
ordered strollers from Que, which were delivered, and
then issued 5 postdated checks in favor of Que. The
checks were dishonored, in accordance with Nicolas
order to stop payment. After making demands for
payment, which Nicolas allegedly ignored. Que filed an
prof. casis
estafa case against Nicolas. The case was dismissed for
lack of merit.
- Nicolas then filed a case against Que for malicious
prosecution. He allegedly ordered that payment be
stopped because the goods delivered to him by Que
were defective and that Que allegedly refused to replace
them. Que on his part alleged that the said defective
products were only returned after he filed an estafa
case. TC ruled in favor of Que, IAC reversed.
ISSUE
WON Que had instituted a malicious prosecution of the
private respondent (WON the reversal made by IAC
was correct)
HELD
NO
- It is evident that the petitioner was not motivated by ill
feeling but only by an anxiety to protect his his rights
when he filed the criminal complaint for estafa with the
fiscal's office.
Ratio. One cannot be held liable in damages for
maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted
with probable cause.
Reasoning
-. 'Under the Spanish Law, the element of probable
cause was not treated separately from that of malice, as
under the American Law. When a complaint was laid
and there was probable cause to believe that the person
charged had committed the acts complained of,
although, as a matter of fact, he had not, the
complainant was fully protected, but not so much on the
theory of probable cause as on the ground that, under
such circumstances, there was no intent to accuse
falsely. If the charge, although false, was made with an
honest belief in its truth and justice, and there were
reasonable grounds on which such a belief could be
founded, the accusation could not be held to have been
false in the legal sense.
design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated
deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges
were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of
torts & damages

submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does
not make one liable for malicious prosecution (Manila
Gas Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602)
- Nicolas issued 5 checks which Que cannot encash,
inspite of demands by the latter. Also, the goods which
were allegedly defective were not yet returned to Que
before the filing of the estafa case. Instead, Nicolas kept
the goods, did not demand for its repair. He just stopped
payment, without Que knowing that there were defects
in the goods he delivered. Therefore, from Ques point
of view, the circumstances presented the possibility that
Nicolas might cheat him.
Disposition decision of the respondent court dated
March 12, 1984, is SET ASIDE and the amended
decision of the trial court dated February 21, 1979, is
REINSTATED as above modified. This decision is
immediately executory.
DRILON V CA (ADAZA)
270 SCRA 211
HERMOSISIMA JR; March 20, 1997
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filing against him a charge of rebellion complexed with

murder and frustrated murder when petitioners were
fully aware of the non-existence of such crime in the
statute books.
- Petitioners filed MD since there was no valid cause of
action for this complaint for damages.
- RTC denied MD. MFR for Order of Denial was also
denied.
- CA also dismissed petition for certiorari and ordered
RTC judge to proceed with the trial of civil case filed
by ADAZA.
(In Adazas latest Comment, he maintained that his
claim before the trial court was merely a suit for
damages based on tort and NOT a suit for malicious
prosecution.)
ISSUES
1. WON complaint was a suit for damages for malicious
prosecution
2. WON petitioners are liable for malicious prosecution
NATURE
Petition to reverse CAs Resolutions
FACTS
- Gen Renato DE VILLA, Chief of Staff of the AFP,
requested the DOJ (headed by Sec Franklin DRILON)
to order the investigation of several individuals,
including private respondent ADAZA for their alleged
participation in the failed Dec 1989 coup detat.
- This was then referred for preliminary inquiry to the
Special Composite Team of Prosecutors who issued a
subpoena to the said individuals after finding sufficient
basis to continue the inquiry. The panel assigned to
conduct prelim investigation found that there was
probable cause to hold them for trial for the crime of
REBELLION WITH MURDER AND FRUSTRATED
MURDER. Information was filed before RTC QC, with
no recommendation as to bail.
- Feeling aggrieved by the institution of these
proceedings against him, ADAZA filed a complaint for
damages and charged petitioners with engaging in a
deliberate, willful and malicious experimentation by
HELD
1. YES
Definition of Malicious Prosecution:
- In American jurisdiction, it has been defined asOne begun in malice without probable cause to believe
the charges can be sustained. Instituted with intention of
injuring defendant and without probable cause, and
which terminates in favor of the person prosecuted. For
this injury an action on the case lies, called the action of
malicious prosecution.
- In Philippine jurisdiction, it has been defined asAn action for damages brought by one against whom a
criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal
proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without
probable cause, after the termination of such
prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the
defendant therein. The gist of the action is the putting of
legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of
vexation or injury.
Reasoning
prof. casis
- Nowhere in his complaint filed with the trial court did
respondent Adaza allege that his action is one based on
tort. (Sec 3e of RA 3019) An examination of the records
would show that this latest posture as to the nature of
his cause of action is only being raised for the first time
on appeal. Such a change of theory cannot be allowed.
2. NO
Ratio In order for a malicious prosecution suit to
prosper, the plaintiff must prove these elements:
(a) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that
the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the
action finally terminated with an acquittal;
(b) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted
without probable cause; and
(c) That the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by
legal malice, that is by improper or sinister motive.
- The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for
malicious prosecution are found in the provisions of the
NCC [Art 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219
(8)].
Reasoning
- Judging from the face of the complaint itself filed by
Adaza, NONE of these requisites have been alleged,
thus rendering the complaint dismissible on the ground
of failure to state a cause of action.
(a) Insofar as Adazas Criminal Case is concerned, what
appears clear from the records only is that respondent
has been discharged on a writ of habeas corpus and
granted bail. This is not considered the termination of
the action contemplated under Philippine jurisdiction to
warrant the institution of a malicious prosecution suit
against those responsible for the filing of the
information against him.
(b) It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for
maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has
acted with probable cause. The petitioners were of the
honest conviction that there was probable cause to hold
Adaza for trial.
(c) Suffice it to state that the presence of probable cause
signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice.
Disposition Petition is GRANTED. Respondent Judge
is DIRECTED to take no further action on civil case
except to DISMISS it.
torts & damages
GLOBE MACKAY V CA
CORTES; August 25, 1989
NATURE
Certiorari
FACTS
- Globe Mackay found out an anomaly that has
been causing them to lose money, to which Tobias
was the number one suspect though he claimed
he was the one who reported it.
- The results of the investigations said that the
handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in
the checks and other documents involved in the
fraudulent transactions were not those of -Tobias.
The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also
yielded negative results.
- Despite being cleared, complaints for estafa were
filed against Tobias. All of the six criminal
complaints were dismissed by the fiscal and MRs
of Globe were denied too.
- Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal upon
receiving the notice of his termination.
- LA: dismissed the complaint; NLRC- reversed;
the Secretary of Labor: reinstated the LA's
decision which Tobias appealed to the Office of the
President.
- During the pendency of the appeal with said
office, petitioners and private respondent Tobias
entered into a compromise agreement regarding
the latter's complaint for illegal dismissal.
- Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the
Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO).
- However, Hendry, without being asked by
RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating
that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY
due to dishonesty.
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- This led Tobias to file a civil case for damages

anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious,
oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners.
- RTC: rendered judgment in favor of Tobias by
ordering petitioners to pay him P80,000.00 as
actual damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages,
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P30,000.00
as attorney's fees, and costs.
- Both parties appealed. CA: affirmed the RTC
decision in toto, denied Globes MR.
ISSUE
WON there was malicious prosecution
HELD
YES
- Petitioners were not content with just dismissing
Tobias. There was malicious intent manifested
through the filing of the criminal cases as the case
for illegal dismissal was pending; Hendrys threat
of more suits against Tobias; The filing of the
cases despite the police reports exculpating
Tobias; and the eventual dismissal of the cases.
SC anchored its findings on TCs finding (re bad
faith of Globe Mackay in filing the criminal
complaints against Tobias).
Reasoning
- Although Globe claims that they must not be
penalized for exercising their right and prerogative
of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints
against an employee who was their principal
suspect in the commission of forgeries and in the
perpetration of anomalous transactions which
defrauded them of substantial sums of money, the
right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be
exercised maliciously and in bad faith [Ventura v.
Bernabe, 38 SCRA 5871.]
- Yutuk V. Manila Electric Co.,[ 2 SCRA 337]: the
Court held that the right to file criminal complaints
should not be used as a weapon to force an
alleged debtor to pay an indebtedness. To do so
would be a clear perversion of the function of the
criminal processes and of the courts of justice.
prof. casis
- Hawpia CA,[20 SCRA 536]: the Court upheld the
judgment against the petitioner for actual and
moral damages and attorney's fees after making a
finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at
least six criminal complaints against respondent,
all of which were dismissed.
*Findings of bad faith (as per the TC):
> After the dismissal of the 4 cases and denial of
the MR by the Ministry of Justice, 2 cases were
refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office
of the AFP to railroad Tobias arrest and
detention in the military stockade, but this was
frustrated by a presidential decree transferring
criminal cases involving civilians to the civil
courts.
> Despite the clearing Tobias of participation or
involvement in the fraudulent transactions
complained of, despite the negative results of
the lie detector tests which Globe Mackay
compelled him to undergo, and although the
police investigation was "still under follow-up and
a supplementary report will be submitted after all
the evidence has been gathered," Globe Mackay
hastily filed 6 criminal cases with the city Fiscal's
Office of Manila, 5 for estafa thru falsification of
commercial document and 1 for violation of A290
of the RPC (all of which were dismissed), with
one of the investigating fiscals, Asst. Fiscal de
Guia, commenting in one case that, "Indeed, the
haphazard way this case was investigated is
evident. Evident likewise is the flurry and haste
in the filing of this case against respondent
Tobias," there can be no mistaking that
defendants would not but be motivated by
malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress,
and cause damage to plaintiff.
Ratio To constitute malicious prosecution, there
must be proof that the prosecution was prompted
by a design to vex and humiliate a person and that
it was initiated deliberately by the defendant
knowing that the charges were false and
groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, 100
SCRA 602]. Concededly, the filing of a suit by
itself, does not render a person liable for malicious
torts & damages

prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. CA, 122
SCRA 576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the
criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of
damages for malicious prosecution if there is no
competent evidence to show that the complainant
had acted in bad faith [Sison v. David, 1 SCRA 60].
Disposition CAs decision AFFIRMED.
ALBENSON V CA (BALTAO)
NATURE
Appeal from CA judgment modifying RTCs
decision as regards amount to be paid
FACTS
- Albenson Enterprises delivered mild steel plates to
3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila. The delivery
was received by Guaranteed Industries, of which
Eugeneio Baltao was president; a check in the amount
of P2,575 was given as payment. Said check was signed
by a Eugenio Baltao, drawn against the account of E.L.
Woodworks.
- The check bounced. Albenson extrajudicially
demanded payment from Baltao. Baltao denied that it
was his signature on the check. Albenson filed case for
violation of BP22. Investigating fiscal found probable
cause and filed info with the RTC. Baltao appealed to
the Provincial Prosecutor. The provincial prosecutor
found out that something was amiss during the
investigation and upon reinvestigation, found no
probable cause. He told the trial fiscal to move for
dismissal.
- After the criminal case was dismissed, Baltao filed a
complaint for damages against Albenson because the
latter had unjustly filed a criminal case against him.
- IT TURNS OUT that E.L. Woodworks business
address was the same as Guaranteed Industries. ELW
was owned by Baltaos son, who is his namesake.
- RTC granted actual (P133k), moral (P1M) and
exemplary damages (P200k), and attys fees (P100k).
CA modified by awarding only half of original moral
damages and attys fees.
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ISSUE
WON Baltao is entitled to damages
HELD
NO
- An award of damages and attorney's fees is
unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. If
damage results from a person's exercising his legal
rights, it is damnum absque injuria.
- ABUSE OF RIGHTS
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly
certain standards which may be observed not only in the
exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of
one's duties. These standards are the following: to act
honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes
the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their
exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself
legal because recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. Although the requirements of each
provision is different, these three articles are all related
to each other.
"With this article (Article 21), combined with articles
19 and 20, the scope of our law on civil wrongs has
been very greatly broadened; it has become much
more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American
law on torts. It is now difficult to conceive of any
malevolent exercise of a right which could not be
checked by the application of these articles"
(Tolentino, 1 Civil Code of the Philippines 72).
- There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be
applied to determine whether or not the principle of
abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of
whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been
violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21
or other applicable provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case. (Globe Mackay Cable and
prof. casis
Radio Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778
[1989]).
- The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are
the following:
(1) There is a legal right or duty;
(2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
- ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES
Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and
has the following elements:
1) There is an act which is legal;
2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public
order, or public policy;
3) and it is done with intent to injure.
- Thus, under any of these three provisions of law, an
act which causes injury to another may be made the
basis for an award of damages.
- There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21,
and that is, the act must be intentional. However, Article
20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either
"willfully", or "negligently". The trial court as well as
the respondent appellate court mistakenly lumped these
three articles together, and cited the same as the bases
for the award of damages.
- Albenson did not abuse its rights. The second and
third elements are not present. All they wanted was to
collect what is owed them. They believed Baltao was
really the one who issued the check because it was his
company who ordered and received the delivery. They
wrote to him. He replied by denying and telling them to
check the veracity of their claim. He didnt tell them
that his son was his namesake and that the latter
operated a business in the same building. Albenson
acted in good faith and had probable cause in filing
their complaint against Baltao.
- There was no malicious prosecution. To constitute
malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex
and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated
were false and groundless. The presence of probable
cause means the absence of malice.
Disposition Petition granted. CA reversed and set aside.
torts & damages

MANILA GAS CORPORATION V CA (ONGSIP)
MAKASIAR; October 30, 1980
NATURE
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA
(treated as a special civil action)
FACTS
- On May 20, 1964, respondent Ongsip applied for gas
service connection with petitioner Manila Gas
Corporation.
- A burner gas was installed by petitioner's employees in
respondent's kitchen at his residence.
- On July 27, 1965, respondent Ongsip requested
petitioner to install additional appliances as well as
additional gas service connections in his 46-door Reyno
Apartment: petitioner installed two 20-gallon capacity
water storage heaters and two heavy-duty gas burners
and replaced the original gas meter with a bigger 50light capacity gas meter.
- The installations and connections were all done solely
by petitioner's employees.
- There was no significant change in the meter reading
despite additional installations, and on May and June
1966, no gas consumption was registered in the meter,
prompting petitioner to issue a 'meter order' with
instructions to change the gas meter in respondent's
residence.
- On August 17, 1966, petitioner's employees went to
Ongsip's place.
- Without notifying or informing respondent Ongsip,
they changed the gas meter and installed new tube
connections. Private respondent was then taking a nap,
but he was informed afterwards of what had taken place
by his houseboy.
- On that same afternoon, petitioner's employees
returned with a photographer who took pictures of the
premises. Ongsip inquired from Coronel why they were
taking pictures but the latter simply gave him a calling
card with instructions to go to his office. There, he was
informed about the existence of a by-pass valve or
"jumper" in the gas connection and that unless he gave
P3,000.00, he would be deported.
- Respondent Ongsip refused to give the money
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- By the end of August, a reading was made on the new

meter and expectedly, it registered a sudden increase in
gas consumption.
-Thereafter, in October, 1966, a complaint for
qualified theft was filed by petitioner against
respondent Ongsip
- On February, 1967, pending investigation of the
criminal
complaint,
petitioner
disconnected
respondent's gas service for alleged failure and/or
refusal to pay his gas consumptions from July, 1965
to January, 1967.
- Subsequently, the complaint was dismissed
- On July 14, 1967, following the dismissal by the
investigating fiscal of the complaint for qualified
theft and the disconnection by petitioner of his gas
service, respondent Ongsip filed a complaint for
moral and exemplary damages against petitioner
Manila Gas Corporation based on two causes of
action, firstly: the malicious, oppressive and
malevolent filing of the criminal complaint; and,
secondly: the illegal closure of respondent Ongsip's
gas service connection without court order and
without notice of warning.
- Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied
- On May 2, 1972, the trial court rendered its decision
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff:(1) P50,000.00 as
moral damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION; (2)
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages in the FIRST
CAUSE OF ACTION; (3) P30,000.00 as moral
damages in the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION; (4)
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages in the SECOND
CAUSE OF ACTION; (5) P10,000.00 as attorney's
fees; and (6) the costs of the suit.
- Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
- CA affirmed the lower courts decision in toto, hence,
this petition
ISSUE
WON the amount of moral and exemplary damages
awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of
appeals is excessive
HELD
YES
prof. casis
- Article 2217 of the Civil Code states that "moral
damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or
omission." On the other hand, Article 2229 provides
that "exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by
way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition, to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages."
- The first cause of action, for which respondent Ongsip
was awarded moral and exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 and P10,000.00, respectively, is
predicated on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which
states that "moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases: .. . (8) malicious
prosecution; .. .
design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated
were false and groundless.
- Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the
authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for
malicious prosecution.
- In the instant case, however, there is reason to believe
that there was malicious intent in the filing of the
complaint for qualified theft.
- As correctly observed by the trial court in its decision
A significant fact brought about by the testimony of
Coronel himself is the total absence of immediate
accusation against Plaintiff right at the very moment
when the by-pass valve was allegedly discovered. Right
then and there Coronel should have told Plaintiff that he
was using a by-pass valve and in effect stealing gas
from Defendant. The circumstance was familiar to that
of catching a thief in flagrante delicto. But the truth is
that when Coronel and his men entered Plaintiff's
compound and made changes therein, Plaintiff was
sleeping. When Plaintiff woke up at four o'clock in the
afternoon, Coronel and his men had already made the
changes and had already gone. They returned however
torts & damages

at five o'clock, this time with a photographer. This was
the time when Plaintiff met Coronel. Here was then the
opportunity for Coronel to confront Plaintiff with the
allegedly discovered 'by-pass valve' and bluntly, even
brutally, tell him that there was thievery of gas. This,
Coronel did not do. .. .. ."
- It bears noting that when he was informed as to the
existence of a 'jumper' in his gas connection, respondent
Ongsip did not show any sign of fear or remorse and
did not yield to the threatening demand of Coronel
this is the attitude of someone who knows how to take a
firm stand where his principles and rights are
concerned. To prove his innocence, he was even willing
to have his place excavated but petitioner would not
dare take the consequences. Besides, Delfin Custodio,
petitioner's own mechanical engineer, testified that the
second gas meter was replaced as being defective
because "some of its parts were worn out and that it was
not properly registering."
- Evidently, petitioner Manila Gas Corporation, in
failing to recover its lost revenue caused by the gas
meter's incorrect recording, sought to vindicate its
financial loss by filing the complaint for qualified theft
against respondent Ongsip knowing it to be false. It was
actually intended to vex and humiliate private
respondent and to blacken his reputation not only as a
businessman but also as a person. Qualified theft is a
serious offense indicating moral depravity in an
individual. To be accused of such crime without basis is
shocking and libelous. It stigmatized private respondent
causing him emotional depression and social
degradation. The fact that the complaint for qualified
theft was dismissed by the Pasay City fiscal is no
consolation. The damage had been done. Necessarily,
indemnification had to be made.
- The Court gives due consideration to respondent
Ongsip's social and financial status as a businessman
and the mental anguish he suffered as a result of the
false imputation. However, petitioner's financial
capability must also be considered. Petitioner is a public
utility corporation whose primary concern is service to
the people, the profit motive being merely secondary.
Under the circumstances, the award of moral and
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exemplary damages should be reduced to P25,000.00

and P5,000.00, respectively.
- Petitioner's act in disconnecting respondent Ongsip's
gas service without prior notice constitutes breach of
contract amounting to an independent tort. The
prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to
cause additional mental and moral suffering to private
respondent. This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the
Civil Code.
- The award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article
2220 which provides that "willful injury to property
may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if
the court should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith"
- Respondent Ongsip's default in payment cannot be
utilized by petitioner to defeat or nullify the claim for
damages. At most, this circumstance can be considered
as a mitigating factor in ascertaining the amount of
damages to which respondent Ongsip is entitled. In
consequence thereof, We reduce the amount of moral
damages to P15,000.00 The award of P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages, on the other hand, is sustained,
being similarly warranted by Article 2234 of the Civil
Code as complemented by Article 2220.
Disposition Decision of CA modified as regards the
amount of damages.
PATRICIO V LEVISTE
PADILLA; April 26, 1989
FACTS
- Rafael Patricio, an ordained Catholic priest, and
actively engaged in social and civic affairs in Pilar,
Capiz, where he is residing, was appointed Director
General of the 1976 Religious and Municipal Town
Fiesta of Pilar, Capiz. While a benefit dance was ongoing in connection with the celebration of the town
fiesta, petitioner together with two (2) policemen were
posted near the gate of the public auditorium to check
on the assigned watchers of the gate. Private respondent
Bienvenido Bacalocos, President of the Association of
Barangay Captains of Pilar, Capiz and a member of the
prof. casis
Sangguniang Bayan, who was in a state of drunkenness
and standing near the same gate together with his
companions, struck a bottle of beer on the table causing
an injury on his hand which started to bleed. Then, he
approached petitioner in a hostile manner and asked the
latter if he had seen his wounded hand, and before
petitioner could respond, private respondent, without
provocation, hit petitioner's face with his bloodied hand.
As a consequence, a commotion ensued and private
respondent was brought by the policemen to the
municipal building. As a result, Patricio filed a
complaint for Slander by Deed. the court ruled in favor
of herein petitioner (as complainant), holding private
respondent liable to the former for moral damages as a
result of the physical suffering, moral shock and social
humiliation caused by private respondent's act of hitting
petitioner on the face in public.
ISSUE
WON Patricio is entitled to damages for the humiliation
he experienced during the town fiesta
HELD
YES
- As to moral damages, An award of moral damages is
allowed in cases specified or analogous to those
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, to wit:
"ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in
the following and analogous cases:
(1)
A criminal offense resulting in physical
injuries;
(2)
Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3)
Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious
acts.
(4)
Adultery or concubinage;
(5)
Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6)
Illegal search;
(7)
Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8)
Malicious prosecution;
(9)
Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26,
27, 28, 29, 30 32, 34, and 35.
- Private respondent's contention that there was no bad
faith on his part in slapping petitioner on the face and
torts & damages

that the incident was merely accidental is not tenable. It
was established before the court a quo that there was an
existing feud between the families of both petitioner
and private respondent and that private respondent
slapped the petitioner without provocation in the
presence of several persons.
- The act of private respondent in hitting petitioner on
the face is contrary to morals and good customs and
caused the petitioner mental anguish, moral shock,
wounded feelings and social humiliation. Pursuant to
Art. 21 of the Civil Code in relation to par. (10) of Art.
2219 of the same Code, "any person who wilfully
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
- In addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary
or corrective damages may be imposed upon herein
private respondent by way of example or correction for
the public good. The amount of exemplary damages
need not be proved where it is shown that plaintiff is
entitled to either moral, temperate or compensatory
damages
Disposition Decision in favor of Patricio.
GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET INC V ESPINO
GUERRERO; December 28, 1979
NATURE
Certiorari from CAs decision to grant P75k, P25k and
P5k to Espino for moral damages, exemplary damages
and attys fees.
FACTS
- Espino is a graduate Mechanical Engineer from U.P.
Class 1950, employed as an executive of Proctor &
Gamble Phils., Inc., a corporate manager incharge of
motoring and warehousing therein; honorably
discharged from the Philippine Army in 1946; a
Philippine government pensionado of the United States
for six months; member of the Philippine Veterans
Legion; author of articles published in the Manila
Sunday Times and Philippines Free Press; member of
the Knights of Columbus, Council No. 3713; son of the
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- PAGE 77 -
late Jose Maria Espino, retired Minister, Department of

Foreign Affairs at the Philippine Embassy, Washington.
- One morning in 1970, he and his wife and their two
daughters went to shop at South Supermarket (owned
by Grand Union) in Makati. While his wife was
shopping for groceries, he went around the store and
found a cylindrical rat-tail file that he had wanted to
buy for his hobby. Because it was small, he didnt put it
in the grocery cart because it might fall and get lost. He
instead held it in his hand. While still shopping, he and
his wife ran into his aunts maid. While they were
talking he stuck the file in his breast pocket, with a
good part of the merchandise exposed.
- He paid for the items in his wifes cart; but he forgot
about the file in his pocket. On their way out, the guard
stopped him and told him he hadnt paid for the file. He
apologized and said he had forgotten. He started
towards the cashier to pay; but the guard stopped him
and said they were to go to the back of the supermarket.
There, a report was made, where Espino said that he
just forgot that he placed it in his pocket while talking
to the maid and his wife. He was then brought to the
front of the grocery, near the cashiers to a Mrs. Fandino.
It was around 9am and the many people were at the
store.
- Fandino read the report and remarked: Ano,nakaw
na naman ito. Espino said he was going to pay for it.
Fandino replied: That is all they say, the people whom
we cause not paying for the goods say . . . They all
intended to pay for the things that are found to them.
Espino objected, saying he was a regular customer of
the supermarket. Espino took out a P5 bill to pay for the
P3.85 file. Fandino reached over and took the P5 bill
and said it was a fine. Espino and wife objected and
said that he was not a common criminal. Fandino said it
was a reward for guards who apprehend pilferers.
People started milling around and stared at Espino. He
was directed to get in line at the cashier to pay for the
file. All the time the people were staring at him. He was
totally embarrassed.
- After paying he and his wife walked out quickly. He
thought about going back that night to throw stones at
the supermarket; but decided to file a case. The CFI
dismissed. CA awarded him damages.
prof. casis
ISSUE
WON Espino is entitled to damages for the humiliation
he experienced at the supermarket
HELD
YES
- The false accusation charged against the private
respondent after detaining and interrogating him by the
uniformed guards and the mode and manner in which
he was subjected, shouting at him, imposing upon him a
fine, threatening to call the police and in the presence
and hearing of many people at the Supermarket which
brought
and
caused
him
humiliation
and
embarrassment, sufficiently rendered the petitioners
liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation
to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Petitioners wilfully
caused loss or injury to private respondent in a manner
that was contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy. It is against morals, good customs and public
policy to humiliate, embarrass and degrade the dignity
of a person. Everyone must respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons (Article 26, Civil Code). And one
must act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith (Article 19, Civil Code).
- While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order
that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary
damages may be adjudicated, the assessment of such
damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion
of the court, according to the circumstances of each
case (Art. 2216, New Civil Code). The whole incident
that befell respondent had arisen in such a manner that
was created unwittingly by his own act of forgetting to
pay for the file. It was his forgetfulness in checking out
the item and paying for it that started the chain of
events which led to his embarrassment and humiliation,
thereby causing him mental anguish, wounded feelings
and serious anxiety. Yet, private respondent's act of
omission contributed to the occurrence of his injury or
loss and such contributory negligence is a factor which
may reduce the damages that private respondent may
recover (Art. 2214, New Civil Code). Moreover, that
many people were present and they saw and heard the
torts & damages

ensuing interrogation and altercation appears to be
simply a matter of coincidence in a supermarket which
is a public place and the crowd of onlookers, hearers or
bystanders was not deliberately sought or called by
management
to witness private respondent's
predicament. The Court does not believe that private
respondent was intentionally paraded in order to
humiliate or embarrass him because petitioner's
business depended for its success and patronage the
good will of the buying public which can only be
preserved and promoted by good public relations.
Disposition Petition denied. CA modified: moral
damages = P5k; attys fees = P2k. no exemplary
damages.
CARPIO V VALMONTE
438 SCRA 38
TINGA; September 9, 2004
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals
FACTS
- Respondent Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Del
Rosario and Sierra engaged her services for their church
wedding on 10 October 1996. At about 4:30 p.m. on
that day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel where the
bride and her family were billeted. When she arrived at
Suite 326-A, several persons were already there
including the bride, the bride's parents and relatives, the
make-up artist and his assistant, the official
photographers, and the fashion designer. Among those
present was petitioner Carpio, an aunt of the bride who
was preparing to dress up for the occasion.
- After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the
suite carrying the items needed for the wedding rites
and the gifts from the principal sponsors. She proceeded
to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception was to
be held. She paid the suppliers, gave the meal
allowance to the band, and went back to the suite. Upon
entering the suite, Valmonte noticed the people staring
at her. It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly
uttered the following words to Valmonte: Ikaw lang
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ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag?

Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto,
ikaw ang kumuha. Petitioner then ordered one of the
ladies to search Valmonte's bag. It turned out that after
Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties, petitioner
discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed
inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost. The
hotel security was called in to help in the search. The
bags and personal belongings of all the people inside
the room were searched. Valmonte was allegedly bodily
searched, interrogated and trailed by a security guard
throughout the evening. Later, police officers arrived
and interviewed all persons who had access to the suite
and fingerprinted them including Valmonte. During all
the time Valmonte was being interrogated by the police
officers, petitioner kept on saying the words Siya lang
ang lumabas ng kwarto. Valmonte's car which was
parked at the hotel premises was also searched but the
search yielded nothing.
- A few days after the incident, petitioner received a
letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of
apology which she wanted to be circulated to the
newlyweds' relatives and guests to redeem her smeared
reputation as a result of petitioner's imputations against
her. Petitioner did not respond to the letter. Thus,
Valmonte filed a suit for damages against her before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 268.
In her complaint, Valmonte prayed that petitioner be
ordered to pay actual, moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorney's fees.
- Responding to the complaint, petitioner denied having
uttered words or done any act to confront or single out
Valmonte during the investigation and claimed that
everything that transpired after the theft incident was
purely a police matter in which she had no participation.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and
for the court to adjudge Valmonte liable on her
counterclaim.
- The trial court rendered its Decision dismissing
Valmonte's complaint for damages. It ruled that when
petitioner sought investigation for the loss of her
jewelry, she was merely exercising her right and if
damage results from a person exercising his legal right,
it is damnum absque injuria. It added that no proof was
presented by Valmonte to show that petitioner acted

maliciously and in bad faith in pointing to her as the
culprit. The court said that Valmonte failed to show that
she suffered serious anxiety, moral shock, social
humiliation, or that her reputation was besmirched due
to petitioner's wrongful act.
- Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging
that the trial court erred in finding that petitioner did not
slander her good name and reputation and in
disregarding the evidence she presented. The Court of
Appeals ruled differently. It opined that Valmonte has
clearly established that she was singled out by petitioner
as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. The
appellate court held that Valmonte's claim for damages
is not predicated on the fact that she was subjected to
body search and interrogation by the police but rather
petitioner's act of publicly accusing her of taking the
missing jewelry. It categorized petitioner's utterance
defamatory considering that it imputed upon Valmonte
the crime of theft. The court concluded that petitioner's
verbal assault upon Valmonte was done with malice and
in bad faith since it was made in the presence of many
people without any solid proof except petitioner's
suspicion. Such unfounded accusation entitles Valmonte
to an award of moral damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 for she was publicly humiliated, deeply
insulted, and embarrassed. However, the court found no
sufficient evidence to justify the award of actual
damages.
- Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the
appellate court's conclusion that she publicly humiliated
respondent does not conform to the evidence presented.
She adds that even on the assumption that she uttered
the words complained of, it was not shown that she did
so with malice and in bad faith.
ISSUE
WON petitioner had willfully caused injury to
respondent in a manner that is contrary to morals and
good customs
HELD
YES
torts & damages

- Petitioner's verbal reproach against respondent was
certainly uncalled for considering that by her own
account nobody knew that she brought such kind and
amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. This being the
case, she had no right to attack respondent with her
innuendos which were not merely inquisitive but
outrightly accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as
the only person who went out of the room before the
loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests
therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily
searched, petitioner virtually branded respondent as the
thief. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain the
identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent
without an iota of proof that she was the one who
actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any
standard or principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner
had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner
which is contrary to morals and good customs. Her
firmness and resolve to find her missing jewelry cannot
justify her acts toward respondent. She did not act with
justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other
purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly,
petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in
relation to Article 21 for which she should be held
accountable. A person should be protected only when he
acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when
he acts with prudence and good faith; but not when he
acts with negligence and abuse.
- Respondent is clearly entitled to an award of moral
damages. Moral damages may be awarded whenever
the defendant's wrongful act or omission is the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury in the cases specified or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code. Though no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary
in order that moral damages may be adjudicated, courts
are mandated to take into account all the circumstances
obtaining in the case and assess damages according to
their discretion. Worthy of note is that moral damages
are not awarded to penalize the defendant, or to enrich
a complainant, but to enable the latter to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
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prof. casis
moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of

defendant's culpable action. In any case, award of moral
damages must be proportionate to the sufferings
inflicted. Considering respondent's social standing, and
the fact that her profession is based primarily on trust
reposed in her by her clients, the seriousness of the
imputations made by petitioner has greatly tarnished her
reputation and will in one way or the other, affect her
future dealings with her clients, the award of
P100,000.00 as moral damages appears to be a fair and
reasonable assessment of respondent's damages.
Disposition Petition denied
- Sta Ines et al moved to dismiss the complaint on

the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Davao CFI,
asserting that the proper forum is the NLRC
established by Presidential Decree No. 21.
- Quisaba opposed the motion;the NLRC's
authorized representative in Davao City opined
that the NLRC no power to award damages
- CFI granted the motion to dismiss on the ground
that the complaint basically involves an employeeemployer relationship.
QUISABA V STA. INES

CASTRO; August 30, 1974
ISSUE
WON a complaint for moral damages, exemplary
damages, termination pay and attorney's fees,
arising from an employer's constructive dismissal
of an employee, is exclusively cognizable by the
regular courts of justice or by the NLRC
NATURE
Special civil action for certiorari
FACTS
- Quisaba avers in his complaint that for 18 yrs
prior to his dismissal, he was in the employ of the
defendant corporation.
- That Robert Hyde instructed him to purchase
logs for the company's plant to which he refused
on the ground that the work of purchasing logs is
inconsistent with his position as internal auditor
- That on the following day Hyde informed him of
his temporary relief as internal auditor so that he
could carry out immediately the instructions thus
given, and he was warned that his failure to
comply would be considered a ground for his
dismissal
- He pleaded for fairness but was instead demoted
from a position of dignity to a servile and menial
job; that the defendants did not reconsider their
"clever and subterfugial dismissal" of him which for
all purposes constituted a "constructive discharge;"
and that because of the said acts of the
defendants, he suffered mental anguish, serious
moral shock and social humiliate on. The
complaint does not pray for reinstatement or
payment of backwages.
HELD
NO
- The case at bar is intrinsically concerned with a
civil (not a labor) dispute. It has to do with an
alleged violation of Quisaba's rights as a member
of society, and does not involve an existing EE-ER
relation within the meaning of section 2(1) of LC.
The complaint is thus properly and exclusively
cognizable by the regular courts of justice, not by
the National Labor Relations Commission.
Reasoning
-The jurisdiction of the NLRC is defined by section
2 of PD No. 21(AKA LC) which reads:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the following.
(1) All matters involving employee employer
relations including all disputes and grievances
which may otherwise lead to strikes and lockouts
under Republic Act No. 875;
(2) All strikes overtaken by Proclamation No.
1081; and
(3) All pending cases in the Bureau of Labor
Relations.
torts & damages

- Although the acts complained of seemingly
appear to constitute "matters involving employeeemployer relations" as Quisaba's dismissal was
the severance of a pre-existing employeeemployer relation, his complaint is grounded not
on his dismissal per se as in fact he does not ask
for reinstatement or backwages, but on the
manner of his dismissal and the consequent
effects of such dismissal.
- Civil law consists of that "mass of precepts that
determine or regulate the relations ... that exist
between members of a society for the protection of
private interests. 3
- The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba
should not be confused with the manner in which
the right was exercised and the effects flowing
therefrom.
- If the dismissal was done anti-socially or
oppressively, as the complaint alleges, then the
respondents violated article 1701 of the Civil Code
which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital
or labor against the other, and article 21, which
makes a person liable for damages if he wilfully
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy,
the sanction for which, by way of moral damages,
is provided in article 2219, no. 10.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in
the following and analogous cages:
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles
21, ....
Disposition CASE REMANDED to the CFI for
further proceedings in accordance with law.
MEDINA V CASTRO-BARTOLOME
ABAD SANTOS; September 11, 1982
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FACTS
- This is a civil case filed by Medina and
Ong against Cosme de Aboitiz and Pepsicola Bottling. Medina was the former Plant
General Manager and Ong was the former
Plant Comptroller. De Aboitiz is President
and CEO of Pepsi-cola Bottling.
- Without provocation, De Aboitiz shouted
at plaintiffs in the presence of the plaintiffs
subordinates, GOD DAMN IT.
YOU
FUCKED ME UP. YOU SHUT UP! FUCK
YOU! YOU ARE BOTH SHIT TO ME! YOU
ARE FIRED! (Medina)
YOU TOO ARE
FIRED! (Ong)
- Plaintiffs filed joint criminal complaint for
oral defamation.
But after preliminary
investigation, complaint was dismissed
allegedly because the expression was not
intended to slander but to express anger.
Deputy Minister of Justice issued resolution
sustaining
complaint,
reversing
the
resolution of the Provincial Fiscal.
It was alleged that the defendants
dismissed the plaintiffs because of an
alleged delay in the use of promotional
crowns when such delay was true with
respect to the other plants.
- The dismissal was effected on the very
day that plaintiffs were awarded rings of
loyalty to the Company, five days before
Christmas and on the day when the
employees' Christmas party was held in the
Muntinlupa Plant, when plaintiffs went
home that day and found their wives and
children already dressed up for the party,
they didn't know what to do and so they
cried.
- Motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction was filed by
the defendants. The trial court denied the
motion because civil damage complaint is
not
based
on
employer-employee
relationship but on manner of dismissal.
PD 1367 provides that Regional Directors

shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall
not entertain claims for moral or other
forms of damages, now under courts
jurisdiction.
- Defendants filed second motion to dismiss
because of amendments to the Labor Code
and PD No 1691. They said the case arose
from such employer-employee relationship,
which under PD No 1691, is under exclusive
original jurisdiction of labor arbiter. The
ruling with respect to defendants' first
motion to dismiss, therefore, no longer
holds.
- Motion to reconsider was filed but was
denied.
ISSUE
WON Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs
sought by the plaintiffs
HELD
NO
- Plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair labor practice.
Theirs is a simple action for damages for tortuous acts
allegedly committed by defendants. Governing statute
is Civil Code and not Labor Code.
SEPARATE OPINION
AQUINO [dissent]
- In my opinion the dismissal of the civil action for
damages is correct because the claims of Medina and
Ong were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC.
- Medina and Ong should not split their cause of action
against Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola.
OTHER TORTS
AMARO V SUMANGUIT
G.R. No. L-14986
MAKALINTAL; July 31, 1962
torts & damages

NATURE
Appeal from decision of CFI
FACTS
- October 5, 1958: Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot
at near the city government building of Silay
- The following day he, together with his father and his
witnesses, "went to the office of the defendant but
instead of obtaining assistance to their complaint they
were harassed and terrorized"
-In view thereof, they "gave up and renounced their
right and interest in the prosecution of the crime "
- Upon advice of the City Mayor an investigation was
conducted and as a result the city attorney of Silay was
about to file or had already filed an information for
illegal discharge of firearm against the assailant
- Having finished the investigation of the crime
complained of, the defendant chief of police is now
harassing the plaintiffs in their daily work, ordering
them thru his police to appear in his office when he is
absent, and he is about to order the arrest of the
plaintiffs to take their signatures in prepared affidavits
exempting the police from any dereliction of duty in
their case against the perpetrator of the crime."
- Appellants filed suit for damages in the CFI of Negros
Occidental against the chief of police of the City of
Silay. Although not specifically alleged in the
complaint, it is admitted by both parties, as shown in
their respective briefs, that the action is predicated on
Articles 21 and/or 27 of the Civil Code.The complaint
was dismissed upon appellee's motion in the court
below on the ground that it does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
ISSUE
WON the case should have been dismissed
HELD
NO
Ratio An action should not be dismissed upon mere
ambiguity, indefiniteness or uncertainty, for these are
not grounds for a motion to dismiss, under Rule 8, but
rather for a bill of particulars according to Rule 16.
Reasoning
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- The facts set out constitute an actionable dereliction

on appellee's part in the light of Article 27 of the Civil
Code, which states that
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss
because a public servant or employee refuses or
neglects, without just cause, to perform his official
duty may file an action for damages and other relief
against he latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
- That appellants were "harrased and terrorized" may be
a conclusion of law and hence improperly pleaded.
Their claim for relief, however, is not based on the fact
of harassment and terrorization but on appellee's refusal
to give them assistance, which it was his duty to do as
an officer of the law. The requirement under the
aforesaid provision that such refusal must be "without
just cause" is implicit in the context of the allegation.
The statement of appellee's dereliction is repeated in a
subsequent paragraph of the complaint, where it is
alleged that "he is about to order the arrest of the
plaintiffs" to make them sign affidavits of exculpation
in favor of the policemen.
- All that the Rules require is that there be a showing by
a statement of ultimate facts, that the plaintiff has a
right and that such right has been violated by the
defendant.
- Moran: The real test of good pleading under the new
rules is whether the information given is sufficient to
enable the party to plead and prepare for trial. A legal
conclusion may serve the purpose of pleading as well as
anything else if it gives the proper information. If the
party wants more he may ask for more details in regard
to the particular matter that is stated too generally
Disposition THE ORDER APPEALED from is set
aside and the case is remanded to the Court of origin for
further proceedings. Costs against appellee.
ST. LOUIS REALTY V ARAMIL
AQUINO; November 14, 1984
FACTS
- St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the
permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without
permission of Doctor Aramil) in the issue of the Sunday
prof. casis
Times of December 15, 1968 an advertisement with the
heading "WHERE THE HEART IS". Below that
heading was the photograph of the residence of Doctor
Aramil and the Arcadio family and then below the
photograph was the following write-up:
"Home is where the heart is. And the hearts of MR.
AND MRS. ARCADIO S. ARCADIO and their
family have been captured by BROOKSIDE HELLS
[note: thats not MY typo ha]. They used to rent a
small 2-bedroom house in a cramped neighborhood,
sadly inadequate and unwholesome for the needs of a
large family. They dream(ed) of a more pleasant place
free from the din and dust of city life yet near all
facilities. Plans took shape when they heard of
BROOKSIDE HELLS [again, not MY typo]. With
thrift and determination, they bought a lot and built
their dream house . . . for P31,000. The Arcadios are
now part of the friendly, thriving community of
BROOKSIDE HILLS [whew, there you are, no typo
at last]... a beautiful first-class subdivision planned
for wholesome family living."
- The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday
Times dated January 5, 1969. Doctor Aramil, a
neuropsychiatrist and a member of the faculty of the
U.E. Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital, noticed the
mistake. On that same date, he wrote St. Louis Realty a
letter of protest.
- The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer
of St. Louis Realty in charge of advertising. He stopped
publication of the advertisement. He contacted Doctor
Aramil and offered his apologies. However, no
rectification or apology was published.
- On February 20, 1969, Aramil's counsel demanded
from St. Louis Realty actual, moral and exemplary
damages of P110,000. St. Louis Realty claimed that
there was an honest mistake and that if Aramil so
desired, rectification would be published in the Manila
Times. It published in the issue of the Manila Times of
March 18, 1969 a new advertisement with the Arcadio
family and their real house. But it did not publish any
apology to Doctor Aramil and an explanation of the
error.
- On March 29, Aramil filed his complaint for damages.
St. Louis Realty published in the issue of the Manila
torts & damages

Times of April 15,1969 the following "NOTICE OF
RECTIFICATION" in a space 4 by 3 inches:
"This will serve as a notice that our print ad 'Where
the Heart is' which appeared in the Manila Times
issue of March 18, 1969 is a rectification of the same
ad that appeared in the Manila Times issues of
December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 wherein a
photo of the house of another Brookside Homeowner
(Dr. Aramil-private respondent) was mistakenly used
as a background for the featured homeowners the
Arcadio family. The ad of March 18, 1969 shows the
Arcadio family with their real house in the
background, as was intended all along."
- Judge Jose Leuterio observed that St. Louis Realty
should have immediately published a rectification and
apology. He found that as a result of St. Louis Realty's
mistake, magnified by its utter lack of sincerity, Doctor
Aramil suffered mental anguish and his income was
reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover,
there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy (Art. 26,
Civil Code). The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as
actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000
as allomey's fees. St. Louis Realty appealed. The CA
affirmed. The CA reasoned that St. Louis Realty
committed an actionable quasi-delict under Articles 21
and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned
advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not
belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally,
was annoyed by that.
ISSUE
WON the CA erred by ignoring certain facts and
resorting to surmises and conjectures hence its decision
is contrary to law and the rulings of the SC
HELD
1. NO.
Reasoning
- St. Louis Realty argues that the case is not covered by
Article 26 which provides that "every person shall
respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons". "Prying into
the privacy of another's residence" and "meddling with
or disturbing the private life or family relations of
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prof. casis
another" and "similar acts, " "though they may not

constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of
action for damages, prevention and other relief."
- The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned
by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code.
Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions
mentioned in Article 26. [NOTE: see Art 2219 for the
list of cases where moral damages may be granted.] The
acts and omissions of the firm fall under Article 26.
- St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in
mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a
widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To
suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and
explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a
cavalier "rectification." Persons, who know the
residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the
distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his
residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it
from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly
and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of
income and mental anguish.
Disposition Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel

Tolentino.
- The Supreme Court upheld the RTCs decision as to
the guilt of the three accused, FELIPE
BALLESTEROS, CESAR GALO and ALVIN
BULUSAN. This digest will focus on the RTCs award
of damages which is relevant to our recitation.
- As to damages, the RTC further sentenced them to pay
jointly and solidarily:
1. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in
the amount of P50,000, moral damages in the amount of
P20,000, and actual damages in the amount of P35,755,
with interest;
2.
The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino, Sr.,
compensatory damages in the amount of P50,000,
moral damages in the amount of P20,000, and actual
damages in the total amount of P61,785, with interest;
3. Carmelo Agliam, actual damages in the amount of
P2,003.40, and moral damages in the amount of
P10,000, with interest;
4.
Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel
Tolentino, moral damages in the amount of P5,000
each, with interest.
5. The costs.
CONCEPCION V CA
ISSUE
WON the trial court erred in the award of damages to
the victims heirs
PEOPLE V BALLESTEROS
285 SCRA 438
ROMERO; January 29, 1998
HELD
1. NO
Ratio Damages may be defined as the pecuniary
compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury
sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary
consequences which the law imposes for the breach of
some duty or the violation of some right. Actual or
sustained, whereas moral damages may be invoked
when the complainant has experienced mental anguish,
serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock and so
forth, and had furthermore shown that these were the
proximate result of the offender's wrongful act or
omission.
DAMAGES
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Bangui, Ilocos
Norte, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as charged
under Article 248 of the RPC.
FACTS
- The information alleged that the accused with the use
of firearms caused the death of Eduardo Tolentino Sr.
and Jerry Agliam and inflicted gunshot wounds to Vidal
torts & damages

Reasoning
- In granting actual or compensatory damages, the party
making a claim for such must present the best evidence
available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and the like, as
corroborated by his testimony. Here, the claim for
actual damages by the heirs of the victims is not
controverted, the same having been fully substantiated
by receipts accumulated by them and presented to the
court. Therefore, the award of actual damages is proper.
- However, the order granting compensatory damages to
the heirs of Jerry Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr.
must be amended. Consistent with the policy of this
Court, the amount of P50,000 is given to the heirs of the
victims by way of indemnity, and not as compensatory
damages.
- As regards moral damages, the amount of
psychological pain, damage and injury caused to the
heirs of the victims, although inestimable, may be
determined by the trial court in its discretion. Hence, we
see no reason to disturb its findings as to this matter.
Disposition Decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED
WITH
MODIFICATION.
No
pronouncement as to cost.
CUSTODIO V CA
ALGARRA V SANDEJAS
27 Phil 284
TRENT; March 24, 1914
NATURE
Civil action for personal injuries received from a
collision with the defendants automobile due to the
negligence of the defendant, who was driving the car.
The negligence is not questioned and this case involves
only the amount of damages which should be allowed.
FACTS
5 The accident occurred on July 9, 1912.
6 Because of injuries, plaintiff spent 10 days in the
hospital. The first 4-5 days he couldnt leave his bed.
After being discharged, he received medical attention
from a private practitioner for several days.
7 Plaintiff testified that he had down no work since the
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accident, that his earning capacity was P50/month

8 He described himself as being well at the end of July;
the trial took place September 19
9 Plaintiff sold distillery products and had about 20
regular customers who purchased in small quantities,
necessitating regular, frequent deliveries
10
It took him about 4 years to build up the
business he had at the time of the accident, and since
the accident, he only kept 4 of his regular customers.
11
The lower court refused to allow him any
compensation for injury to his business due to his
enforced absence therefrom.
ISSUE
How to determine the amount of damages to award
plaintiff
HELD
Reasoning
- Actions for damages such as the case at bar are based
upon article 1902 of the Civil Code: "A person who, by
act or omission, causes damage to another where there
is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the
damage so done." Of this article, the supreme court of
Spain, in considering the indemnity imposed by it, said:
"It is undisputed that said reparation, to be efficacious
and substantial, must rationally include the generic idea
of complete indemnity, such as is defined and explained
in article 1106 of the said (Civil) Code."
- Art 1106. Indemnity for losses and damages includes
not only the amount of the loss which may have been
suffered, but also that of the profit which the creditor
may have failed to realize, reserving the provisions
contained in the following articles.
- Art 1107. The losses and damages for which a debtor
in good faith is liable, are those foreseen or which may
have been foreseen, at the time of constituting the
obligation, and which may be a necessary consequence
of its nonfulfillment.
- The rules for the measure of damages, once that
liability is determined: The Civil Code requires that the
defendant repair the damage caused by his fault or
negligence. No distinction is made therein between
damage caused maliciously and intentionally and
prof. casis
damages caused through mere negligence in so far as
the civil liability of the wrongdoer in concerned. Nor is
the defendant required to do more than repair the
damage done, or, in other words, to put the plaintiff in
the same position, so far as pecuniary compensation can
do so, that he would have been in had the damage not
been inflicted. In this respect there is a notable
difference between the two systems. Under the AngloSAxon law, when malicious or willful intention to cause
the damage is an element of the defendant's act, it is
quite generally regarded as an aggravating circumstance
for which the plaintiff is entitled to more than mere
compensation for the injury inflicted. These are called
exemplary or punitive damages, and no provision is
made for them in article 1902 of the Civil Code.
- article 1902 of the Civil Code requires that the
defendant repair the damage done. There is, however, a
world of difficulty in carrying out the legislative will in
this particular. The measure of damages is an ultimate
fact, to be determined from the evidence submitted to
the court. The complexity of human affairs is such that
two cases are seldom exactly alike, a thorough
discussion of each case may permit of their more or less
definite classification, and develop leading principles
which will be of great assistance to a court in
determining the question, not only of damages, but of
the prior one of negligence. As the Code is so indefinite
(even though from necessity) on the subject of damages
arising from fault or negligence, the bench and bar
should have access to and avail themselves of those
great, underlying principles which have been gradually
and conservatively developed and thoroughly tested in
Anglo-Saxon courts. A careful and intelligent
application of these principles should have a tendency
to prevent mistakes in the rulings of the court on the
evidence offered, and should assist in determining
damages, generally, with some degree of uniformity
- The case at bar involves actual incapacity of the
plaintiff for two months, and loss of the greater portion
of his business. As to the damages resulting from the
actual incapacity of the plaintiff to attend to his business
there is no question. They are, of course, to be allowed
on the basis of his earning capacity, which in this case,
is P50 per month. the difficult question in the present
torts & damages

case is to determine the damage which has results to his
business through his enforced absence. In Sanz vs.
Lavin Bros. (6 Phil. Rep., 299), this court, citing
numerous decisions of the supreme court of Spain, held
that evidence of damages "must rest upon satisfactory
proof of the existence in reality of the damages alleged
to have been suffered." But, while certainty is an
essential element of an award of damages, it need not
be a mathematical certainty. That this is true is adduced
not only from the personal injury cases from the
supreme court of Spain which we have discussed above,
but by many cases decided by this court, reference to
which has already been made. As stated in Joyce on
Damages, section 75, "But to deny the injured party the
right to recover any actual damages in cases f torts
because they are of such a nature a cannot be thus
certainly measured, would be to enable parties to profit
by and speculate upon their own wrongs; such is not the
law."
- As to the elements to be considered in estimating the
damage done to plaintiff's business by reason of his
accident, this same author, citing numerous authorities,
has the following to say: It is proper to consider the
business the plaintiff is engaged in, the nature and
extent of such business, the importance of his personal
oversight and superintendence in conducting it, and the
consequent loss arising from his inability to prosecure
it.
- The business of the present plaintiff required his
immediate supervision. All the profits derived
therefrom were wholly due to his own exertions. Nor
are his damages confined to the actual time during
which he was physically incapacitated for work, as is
the case of a person working for a stipulated daily or
monthly or yearly salary. As to persons whose labor is
thus compensated and who completely recover from
their injuries, the rule may be said to be that their
damages are confined to the duration of their enforced
absence from their occupation. But the present plaintiff
could not resume his work at the same profit he was
making when the accident occurred. He had built up an
establishing business which included some twenty
regular customers. These customers represented to him
a regular income. In addition to this he made sales to
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other people who were not so regular in their purchases.

- But he could figure on making at least some sales each
month to others besides his regular customers. Taken as
a whole his average monthly income from his business
was about P50. As a result of the accident, he lost all
but four of his regular customers and his receipts
dwindled down to practically nothing. Other agents had
invaded his territory, and upon becoming physically
able to attend to his business, he found that would be
necessary to start with practically no regular trade, and
either win back his old customers from his competitors
or else secure others. During this process of
reestablishing his patronage his income would
necessarily be less than he was making at the time of
the accident and would continue to be so for some time.
Of course, if it could be mathematically determined
how much less he will earn during this rebuilding
process than he would have earned if the accident had
not occurred, that would be the amount he would be
entitled to in this action. But manifestly this ideal
compensation cannot be ascertained. The question
therefore resolves itself into whether this damage to his
business can be so nearly ascertained as to justify a
court in awarding any amount whatever.
- When it is shown that a plaintiff's business is a going
concern with a fairly steady average profit on the
investment, it may be assumed that had the interruption
to the business through defendant's wrongful act not
occurred, it would have continued producing this
average income "so long as is usual with things of that
nature." When in addition to the previous average
income of the business it is further shown what the
reduced receipts of the business are immediately after
the cause of the interruption has been removed, there
can be no manner of doubt that a loss of profits has
resulted from the wrongful act of the defendant. In the
present case, we not only have the value of plaintiff's
business to him just prior to the accident, but we also
have its value to him after the accident. At the trial, he
testified that his wife had earned about fifteen pesos
during the two months that he was disabled. That this
almost total destruction of his business was directly
chargeable to defendant's wrongful act, there can be no
manner of doubt; and the mere fact that the loss can not
prof. casis
be ascertained with absolute accuracy, is no reason for
denying plaintiff's claim altogether. As stated in one
case, it would be a reproach to the law if he could not
recover damages at all. (Baldwin vs. Marquez, 91 Ga.,
404)
- We are of the opinion that the lower court had before
it sufficient evidence of the damage to plaintiff's
business in the way of prospective loss of profits to
justify it in calculating his damages as to his item. That
evidence has been properly elevated to this court of
review. Under section 496 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, we are authorized to enter final judgment or
direct a new trial, as may best subserve the ends of
justice. We are of the opinion that the evidence
presented as to the damage done to plaintiff's business
is credible and that it is sufficient and clear enough
upon which to base a judgment for damages. Plaintiff
having had four years' experience in selling goods on
commission, it must be presumed that he will be able to
rebuild his business to its former proportions; so that at
some time in the future his commissions will equal
those he was receiving when the accident occurred.
Aided by his experience, he should be able to rebuild
this business to its former proportions in much less time
than it took to establish it as it stood just prior to the
accident. One year should be sufficient time in which to
do this. The profits which plaintiff will receive from the
business in the course of its reconstruction will
gradually increase. The injury to plaintiff's business
begins where these profits leave off, and, as a corollary,
there is where defendant's liability begins. Upon this
basis, we fix the damages to plaintiff's business at P250.
Disposition The judgment of the lower court is set
aside, and the plaintiff is awarded the following
damages; ten pesos for medical expenses; one hundred
pesos for the two months of his enforced absence from
his business; and two hundred and fifty pesos for the
damage done to his business in the way of loss of
profits, or a total of three hundred and sixty pesos. No
costs will be allowed in this instance.
PNOC V CA (MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING
CORPORATION)
torts & damages

297 SCRA 402
ROMERO; October 8, 1998
NATURE
Petition for certiorari on a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
FACTS
- In the early morning of September 21, 1977, the M/V
Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent Maria
Efigenia Fishing Corporation, was navigating the
waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its
way to Navotas, Metro Manila when it collided with the
vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC) but then
subsequently transferred to PNOC, causing the former
to sink.
- Private respondent averred that M/V Maria Efigenia
XV had an actual value of P800,000.00 and that, after
deducting the insurance payment of P200,000.00, the
amount of P600,000.00 should likewise be claimed. The
amended complaint also alleged that inflation resulting
from the devaluation of the Philippine peso had affected
the replacement value of the hull of the vessel, its
equipment and its lost cargoes, such that there should be
a reasonable determination thereof. Furthermore, on
account of the sinking of the vessel, private respondent
supposedly incurred unrealized profits and lost business
opportunities that would thereafter be proven.
- Lower court, on November 18, 1989 disposing of
Civil Case No. C-9457, rendered judgment in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant PNOC Shipping
& Transport Corporation, to pay the plaintiff:
a. The sum of P6,438,048.00 representing the value of
the fishing boat with interest from the date of the filing
of the complaint at the rate of 6% per annum;
b. The sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and
c. The costs of suit.
- The lower court concluded:
Evidently, the quotation of prices submitted by the
plaintiff relative to the replacement value of the
fishing boat and its equipments in the tune of
P6,438,048.00 which were lost due to the
recklessness and imprudence of the herein defendants
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were not rebutted by the latter with sufficient

evidence. The defendants through their sole witness
Lorenzo Lazaro relied heavily on said witness' bare
claim that the amount afore-said is excessive or
bloated, but they did not bother at all to present any
documentary evidence to substantiate such claim.
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from
the mouth of the credible witness, but it must be
credible in itself.
- Unsatisfied with the lower court's decision, petitioner
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which,
however, affirmed the same in toto on October 14,
1992. On petitioner's assertion that the award of
P6,438,048.00 was not convincingly proved by
competent and admissible evidence, the Court of
Appeals ruled that it was not necessary to qualify Del
Rosario as an expert witness because as the owner of
the lost vessel, "it was well within his knowledge and
competency to identify and determine the equipment
installed and the cargoes loaded" on the vessel.
ISSUE
WON respondent courts award for damages is
appropriate
HELD
NO
Ratio A party is entitled to adequate compensation only
for such pecuniary loss actually suffered and duly
proved. Indeed, basic is the rule that to recover actual
damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable
of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable
degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or
best evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof.
The claimant is duty-bound to point out specific facts
that afford a basis for measuring whatever
compensatory damages are borne. A court cannot
merely rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork
as to the fact and amount of damages as well as hearsay
or uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect.
Reasoning
- Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or
prof. casis
sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice
and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done,
to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose
a penalty. In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts,
actual damages include all the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of.
There are two kinds of actual or compensatory
damages: one is the loss of what a person already
possesses (dao emergente), and the other is the
failure to receive as a benefit that which would have
pertained to him (lucro cesante).
- Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the
defendant the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the
time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money
which he would have to pay in the market for identical
or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case
damages for the loss of use during the period before
replacement. In other words, in the case of profitearning chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of
the chattel to its owner as a going concern at the time
and place of the loss, and this means, at least in the case
of ships, that regard must be had to existing and
pending engagements,
- If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is
in any case virtually certain of profitable employment,
then nothing can be added to that value in respect of
charters actually lost, for to do so would be pro tanto to
compensate the plaintiff twice over. On the other hand,
if the ship is valued without reference to its actual
future engagements and only in the light of its profitearning potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to
the value thus assessed the anticipated profit on a
charter or other engagement which it was unable to
fulfill
- What the court has to ascertain in each case is the
"capitalised value of the vessel as a profit-earning
machine not in the abstract but in view of the actual
circumstances," without, of course, taking into
account considerations which were too remote at the
time of the loss.
- Del Rosario's claim that private respondent incurred
losses in the total amount of P6,438,048.00 should be
admitted with extreme caution considering that, because
it was a bare assertion, it should be supported by
torts & damages

independent evidence. Moreover, because he was the
owner of private respondent corporation whatever
testimony he would give with regard to the value of the
lost vessel, its equipment and cargoes should be viewed
in the light of his self-interest therein. Accordingly, as
stated at the outset, damages may not be awarded on the
basis of hearsay evidence.
- Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits
does not mean that it totally deprives private respondent
of any redress for the loss of its vessel.
- Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation
arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or
omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in
every case where property right has been invaded.
Under Article 2223 of the Civil Code, "(t)he
adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further
contest upon the right involved and all accessory
questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their
respective heirs and assigns."
- Actually, nominal damages are damages in name only
and not in fact. Where these are allowed, they are not
treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply
in recognition of the existence of a technical injury.
However, the amount to be awarded as nominal
damages shall be equal or at least commensurate to the
injury sustained by private respondent considering the
concept and purpose of such damages. The amount of
nominal damages to be awarded may also depend on
certain special reasons extant in the case.
- Applying now such principles to the instant case, we
have on record the fact that petitioner's vessel
Petroparcel was at fault as well as private respondent's
complaint claiming the amount of P692,680.00
representing the fishing nets, boat equipment and
cargoes that sunk with the M/V Maria Efigenia XV. In
its amended complaint, private respondent alleged that
the vessel had an actual value of P800,000.00 but it had
been paid insurance in the amount of P200,000.00 and,
therefore, it claimed only the amount of P600,000.00.
Ordinarily, the receipt of insurance payments should
diminish the total value of the vessel quoted by private
respondent in his complaint considering that such
payment is causally related to the loss for which it
claimed compensation. This Court believes that such
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allegations in the original and amended complaints can

be the basis for determination of a fair amount of
nominal damages inasmuch as a complaint alleges the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action.
Private respondent should be bound by its allegations
on the amount of its claims.
Disposition the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 14, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No.
26680 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 121, is hereby MODIFIED
insofar as it awarded actual damages to private
respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation in the
amount of P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases
therefor. Considering the fact, however, that: (1)
technically petitioner sustained injury but which,
unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved,
and (2) this case has dragged on for almost two
decades, we believe that an award of Two Million
(P2,000,000.00) in favor of private respondent as and
for nominal damages is in order.
INTEGRATED PACKING V CA
DBP V CA (CUBA)
DAVIDE JR; January 5, 1998
FACTS
- Plaintiff Lydia Cuba is a grantee of a Fishpond Lease
Agreement. She obtained loans from DBP. As security
for said loans, plaintiff Lydia P. Cuba executed two
Deeds of Assignment of her Leasehold Rights.
- Plaintiff failed to pay her loan. Without foreclosure
proceedings, DBP appropriated the leasehold Rights of
Cuba over the fishpond in question. After which
defendant DBP, in turn, executed a Deed of Conditional
Sale of the Leasehold Rights in favor of plaintiff Lydia
Cuba over the same fishpond.
- In the negotiation for repurchase, plaintiff Lydia Cuba
addressed two letters to the Manager DBP, Dagupan
City thereafter accepted the offer to repurchase in a
letter addressed to CUBA.
- After the Deed of Conditional Sale was executed in
favor of Cuba, a new Fishpond Lease Agreement was
issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food .
prof. casis
- Cuba failed to pay the amortizations stipulated in the
Deed of Conditional Sale. After which she entered with
the DBP a temporary arrangement whereby in
consideration for the deferment of the Notarial
Rescission of Deed of Conditional Sale, plaintiff Lydia
Cuba promised to make certain payments as stated in
temporary Arrangement.
- DBP thereafter sent a Notice of Rescission thru
Notarial Act and which was received by Cuba. After the
Notice of Rescission, DBP took possession of the
Leasehold Rights of the fishpond in question;
- That after defendant DBP took possession of the
Leasehold Rights over the fishpond in question, DBP
thereafter executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in favor
of defendant Agripina Caperal.
- Thereafter, defendant Caperal was awarded Fishpond
Lease Agreement by the Ministry of Agriculture and
Food.
- CUBA filed complaint questioning the act of DBP in
appropriating to itself CUBA's leasehold rights over the
fishpond in question without foreclosure proceedings.
TC ruled in favor of petitioner and granted actual
damages in the amount of P1,067,500 representing lost
equipment and dead fish due to DBPs forecloseure of
fishpond and ejectment of laborers.
- CA regarding damages granted ruled that CUBA was
not entitled to loss of profits for lack of evidence, but
agreed with the trial court as to the actual damages of
P1,067,500. It, however, deleted the amount of
exemplary damages and reduced the award of moral
damages from P100,000 to P50,000 and attorney's fees,
from P100.00 to P50,000
ISSUE
WON the damages granted to CUBA are valid
HELD
NO
- Article 2199 provides:
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.
torts & damages

Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages
- Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed,
but must be proved with reasonable degree of certainty.
A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures, or
guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but
must depend upon competent proof that they have been
suffered by the injured party and on the best obtainable
evidence of the actual amount thereof.
- In the present case, the trial court awarded in favor of
CUBA P1,067,500 as actual damages consisting of
P550,000 which represented the value of the alleged
lost articles of CUBA and P517,500 which represented
the value of the 230,000 pieces of bangus allegedly
stocked in 1979 when DBP first ejected CUBA from the
fishpond and the adjoining house.
- We find that the alleged loss of personal belongings
and equipment was not proved by clear evidence. Other
than the testimony of CUBA and her caretaker, there
was no proof as to the existence of those items before
DBP took over the fishpond in question. As pointed out
by DBP, there was no "inventory of the alleged lost
items before the loss which is normal in a project which
sometimes, if not most often, is left to the care of other
persons." Neither was a single receipt or record of
acquisition presented.
- in her complaint dated 17 May 1985, CUBA included
"losses of property" as among the damages resulting
from DBP's take-over of the fishpond. Yet, it was only
in September 1985 when she came to know of the
alleged loss of several articles. Such claim for "losses of
property," having been made before knowledge of the
alleged actual loss, was therefore speculative. The
alleged loss could have been a mere afterthought or
subterfuge to justify her claim for actual damages.
- With regard to the award of P517,000 representing the
value of the alleged 230,000 pieces of bangus which
died when DBP took possession of the fishpond in
March 1979, the same was not called for. Such loss was
not duly proved; besides, the claim therefor was
delayed unreasonably. From 1979 until after the filing
of her complaint in court in May 1985, CUBA did not
bring to the attention of DBP the alleged loss
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- The award of actual damages should, therefore, be

struck down for lack of sufficient basis.
- In view however, of DBP's act of appropriating
CUBA's leasehold rights which was contrary to law and
public policy, as well as its false representation to the
then Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources that
it had "foreclosed the mortgage," an award of moral
damages in the amount of P50,000
- Exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of
P25,000 should likewise be awarded by way of example
or correction for the public good. 20 There being an
award of exemplary damages, attorney's fees are also
recoverable
FUENTES V CA
323 PHIL 508
BELLOSILLO; February 9, 1996
FACTS
- 24 June 1989 Julieto Malaspina was at a benefit dance
at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Petitioner
called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the
shoulder of the latter saying, "Before, I saw you with a
long hair but now you have a short hair. Suddenly
petitioner stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with a
hunting knife. After muttering that Fuentes stabbed him,
he died.
- Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his
cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed
Malaspina. He said that his cousin directly told him that
he stabbed the victim out of grudge.
- The Regional Trial Court of Prosperidad, Agusan del
Sur, found petitioner guilty of murder qualified by
treachery and imposed on him an indeterminate prison
term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum, to
indemnify the heirs of the victim Julieto Malaspina the
prof. casis
amount of P50,000.00 and to pay P8,300.00 as actual
damages plus costs. CA affirmed
ISSUE
1. WON appellate court erred when it held that
petitioner was positively and categorically identified as
the killer of Malaspina, in affirming the judgnment of
conviction
2. WON CA erred in holding petitioner liable for
damages to the heirs of the victim
HELD
1. NO
- Petitioner would make much of the alleged confession
of Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., since it is a declaration against
penal interest and therefore an exception to the hearsay
rule. One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay
rule is that pertaining to declarations made against
interest
- There are three (3) essential requisites for the
admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the
declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the
declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the
declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it
improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
- we find that the declaration particularly against penal
interest attributed to Zoilo Fuentes Jr. is not admissible
in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
- One striking feature that militates against the
acceptance of such a statement is its patent
untrustworthiness. Zoilo who is related to
accusedappellant had every motive to prevaricate
2. NO
- Petitioner maintains that assuming that he committed
the crime it is error to hold him answerable for
P8,300.00 as actual damages on the basis of the mere
testimony of the victim's sister, Angelina Serrano,
without any tangible document to support such claim.
- This is a valid point. In crimes and quasi-delict's, the
defendant is liable for all damages which are the natural
and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. To seek recovery for actual damages it
is essential that the injured party proves the actual
amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty
torts & damages

premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence available.. Courts cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the
fact and amount of damages.
- The award by the court a quo of P8,300.00 as actual
damages is not supported by the evidence on record. We
have only the testimony of the victim's elder sister
stating that she incurred expenses of P8,300.00 in
connection with the death of Malaspina
- However, no proof of the actual damages was ever
presented in court. Of the expenses alleged to have been
incurred, the Court can only give credence to those
supported by receipts and which appear to have been
genuinely expended in connection with the death of the
victim. Since the actual amount was not substantiated,
the same cannot be granted
TALISAY SILAY V ASSOCIACION
247 SCRA 361
FELICIANO; August 15, 1995
NATURE
Petition to review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals reducing the award of damages granted by the
court a quo from approximately P15.4 million to only
P1 million
FACTS
- On 15 February 1966, Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc.
("TSMC") and Talisay-Silay Industrial Cooperative
Association, Inc. ("TSICA") instituted an action for
damages against defendants Asociacion de Agricultores
de Talisay-Silay, Inc. ("AATSI"), et. al.
- On 4 March 1972, the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal rendered its decision condemning the defendants
jointly and severally to pay plaintiff Talisay-Silay
Industrial Cooperative Association the amount of
P6,609,714.32 and to plaintiff Talisay-Silay Milling
Co., Inc. the sum of P8,802,612.89 with legal rate of
interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid.
- The Court of Appeal rendered a decision affirming
with modification the decision of the court a quo by
reducing the amount of damages due plaintiffs-
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appellees TSMC and TSICA from approximately P15.4

million to only P1 million.
ISSUE
WON the reduction of damages was proper
HELD
- In reducing the amount of damages awarded by the
court a quo to petitioners TSMC and TSICA from
roughly P15.4 million to only P1 million, the Court of
Appeals, citing Malayan Insurance Co.. Inc. v. Manila
Port Service reasoned that the reduction was dictated by
the failure or TSMC and TSICA to comply with Section
5, Rule 10 of the Rule of Court, i.e., TSMC and
TSICA's failure to amend their complaint to conform to
the evidence presented during trial which showed that
TSMC and TSICA suffered damages amounting to
more than P1 million by virtue of the illegal transfer of
export sugar quota from TSMC to FFMCI. We are
unable to agree with the Court of Appeals on this point.
- A court may rule and render judgment on the basis of
the evidence before it even though the relevant pleading
had not been previously amended, so long as no
surprise or prejudice is thereby caused to the adverse
party. Put a little differently, so long as the basic
requirements of fair play had been met, as where
litigants were given full opportunity to support their
respective contentions and to object to or refute each
other's evidence, the court may validly treat the
pleadings as if they had been amended to conform to
the evidence and proceed to adjudicate on the basis of
all the evidence before it.
- The record of the instant case shows that TSMC and
TSICA formally offered as evidence documents which
set out in detail the estimated unrealized income
suffered by TSMC and TSICA during four (4)
consecutive crop years, i.e., (CYs) 1964-1965, 19651966, 1966-1967 and 1967-1968, the failure of
realization being attributed to the transfer by AATSI, et
al. of their sugar quota to FFMCI. These documents,
along with the corroborative testimony of one Ricardo
Yapjoco, a Certified Public Accountant and Internal
Auditor of TSMC, were the basis of the trial court's
award of P8,802,612.89 to TSMC and of P6,609,714.32
prof. casis
to TSICA. It is noteworthy that the joint record on
appeal reveals that AATSI, et al. objected to the Offer of
Evidence of TSMC and TSICA not on the basis that
such evidence fell outside the scope of the issues as
defined in the pleadings as they then stood, but rather
on the basis that such evidence was "incompetent" and
speculative in character, i.e., as "being mere estimates
prepared by witness Yapjoco" and constituting merely
his "opinion." It should also be noted that the testimony
of Mr. Yapjoco was subjected to extensive crossexamination by counsel for AATSI, et al. The trial
court did not expressly overrule AATSI, et al.'s
objection to the Offer of Evidence of TSMC and
TSICA; it is nevertheless clear that the trial court did
not accord much weight to that objection.
- The point that may be here underscored is that AATSI,
et al., having been given the opportunity and having in
fact been able to register their objections to the
evidence formally offered by TSMC and TSICA were
not in any way prejudiced by the discrepancy between
the allegations in the complaint filed and the
propositions which the evidence submitted by TSMC
and TSICA tended to establish. We conclude that the
Court of Appeals erred when it failed to treat the
amended and supplemental complaint of TSMC and
TSICA as if such complaint had in fact been amended
to conform to the evidence, and when it limited the
damages due to TSMC and TSICA to the amount
prayed for in their original complaint.
- A review of the damages actually awarded to TSMC
and TSICA by the trial court on the one hand and the
Court of Appeals on the other, reveals the need for a
more careful and thorough examination of the matter.
As earlier noted, the Court of Appeals' award of P1
million based simply on the amount set out in the
original complaint of TSMC and TSICA must be
discarded. Upon the other hand, the award by the trial
court of damages to TSMC and TSICA was arrived at
merely by totalling up the unrealized income sustained
by TSMC and TSICA over the relevant four (4) crop
year period:
- "Because on the refusal of the defendants planters to
return to TSMC, plaintiff TSMC [and TSICA] suffered
an unrealized profit; of P1,934,847.73 in 1964-65 while
torts & damages

for 1965-66 crop year, in the amount of P3,033,301.16,
for 1966-67 in the amount of P4,656,643.20, and for
1967-1968, in the amount of P4,805,472.12.
- The plaintiff TSMC failed to realize P3,015,077.77
and plaintiff TASICA failed to realize P6,609,714.32 or
a total of P9,624,792.09. In 1967-68 after the lease to
TASICA has expired, TSMC failed to realize a net
income of P4,805,514.12."
- We believe, in other words, that the figures and
computations utilized by the trial court in its award on
damages need further examination and refinement. For
instance, the award of damages rendered by the trial
court took into account the loss of income suffered by
TSMC and TSICA when AATSI, et al. transferred two
(2) of sugar quota: the "domestic quota" and the "export
quota." The consent of the sugar central was not
required for the validity of a transfer of the domestic
sugar quota. Accordingly, the transfer by AATSI, et al.
of their domestic sugar quota must be regarded as valid
and the loss of income attributable to the transfer of
such domestic sugar quota from TSMC and TSICA to
FFMCI must be deducted from the aggregate amount of
damages due to TSMC and TSICA. A second example:
Exhibits "P-1" and "W-1" embody figures relating to
"molasses." Molasses are a by-product of milled sugar,
whether that sugar be covered by a "domestic quota" or
by an "export quota." The amount of income lost
traceable to molasses that would have been extracted
from domestic sugar must be deducted from the
aggregate damages due to TSMC and TSICA.
Disposition Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals MODIFIED insofar as the award of actual
damages due Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. and
Talisay-Silay Industrial Cooperative Association, Inc.
are concerned. Subject to the rulings referred to herein,
this case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
the determination, with all deliberate dispatch, of the
amount of damages due Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc.
and Talisay-Silay Industrial Cooperative Association,
Inc.
PNOC V CA
297 SCRA 402
ROMERO; October 8, 1998
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NATURE
Petition for review on the decision of CA
FACTS
- M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent
Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, collided with the
vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC).
- After investigation was conducted by the Board of
Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard Commandant
Simeon N. Alejandro rendered a decision finding the
Petroparcel at fault. Based on this finding by the Board
and after unsuccessful demands on petitioner private
respondent sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain,
Edgardo Doruelo, before the then Court of First
Instance of Caloocan City. In particular, private
respondent prayed for an award of P692,680.00,
allegedly representing the value of the fishing nets, boat
equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, petitioner
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be
substituted in place of LSC as it had already acquired
ownership of the Petroparcel.
- Private respondent later sought the amendment of its
complaint on the ground that the original complaint
failed to plead for the recovery of the lost value of the
hull of M/V Maria Efigenia XV. Accordingly, in the
amended complaint, private respondent averred that
M/V Maria Efigenia XV had an actual value of
P800,000.00 and that, after deducting the insurance
payment of P200,000.00, the amount of P600,000.00
should likewise be claimed. Furthermore, on account of
the sinking of the vessel, private respondent supposedly
incurred unrealized profits and lost business
opportunities that would thereafter be proven.
- The lower court its decision in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant PNOC Shipping & Transport
Corporation, to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the fishing boat
with interest from the date of the filing of the complaint
at the rate of 6% per annum.
prof. casis
HELD
RE DAMAGE TO PROPERTY
- Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or
sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice
and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done,
to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose
a penalty. In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts,
actual damages include all the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of.
There are two kinds of actual or compensatory
damages: one is the loss of what a person already
possesses (dao emergente), and the other is the failure
to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained
to him (lucro cesante). Thus:
"Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of
the defendant the plaintiff is entitled to their value at
the time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of
money which he would have to pay in the market for
identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a
proper case damages for the loss of use during the
period before replacement. In other words, in the
case of profit-earning chattels, what has to be
assessed is the value of the chattel to its owner as a
going concern at the time and place of the loss, and
this means, at least in the case of ships, that regard
must be had to existing and pending engagements.x x
x.
x x x. If the market value of the ship reflects the fact
that it is in any case virtually certain of profitable
employment, then nothing can be added to that value
in respect of charters actually lost, for to do so would
be pro tanto to compensate the plaintiff twice over.
On the other hand, if the ship is valued without
reference to its actual future engagements and only in
the light of its profit-earning potentiality, then it may
be necessary to add to the value thus assessed the
anticipated profit on a charter or other engagement
which it was unable to fulfill. What the court has to
ascertain in each case is the `capitalised value of the
vessel as a profit-earning machine not in the abstract
but in view of the actual circumstances,' without, of
torts & damages

course, taking into account considerations which
were too remote at the time of the loss."
- Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation
arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or
omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in
every case where property right has been invaded.
[Arts. 2222 & 1157, Civil Code.] Under Article 2223 of
the Civil Code, "(t)he adjudication of nominal damages
shall preclude further contest upon the right involved
and all accessory questions, as between the parties to
the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns."
RAMOS V CA (DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL
CENTER, DR. HOSAKA)
321 SCRA 584
KAPUNAN; December 29, 1999
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals.
FACTS
- Erlinda Ramos, a 47-year old robust woman, was
advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a
stone in her gall bladder for occasional complaints of
discomfort due to pains she felt.
- She and her husband, Rogelio E. Ramos, met thru a
mutual doctor friend, Dr. Orlino Hosaka, one of the
defendants on June 10, 1985. The scheduled operation
would be on June 17, 1985 9AM at Delos Santos
Medical Center (DLSMC). When asked for an
anesthesiologist, Dr. Hosaka claimed he would get a
good one without giving a name.
- At around 7:30AM of June 17, she was prepared for
the operation by the hospital staff. Her sister-in-law,
Herminda Cruz, Dean of the College of Nursing of
Capitol Medical Center, was there and was allowed to
be in the operating room to give moral support. Cruz
saw 2 or 3 nurses and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, another
defendant, who administered the anesthesia. At
9:30AM, Dr. Hosaka was not yet in. Erlinda Ramos was
getting impatient. It was at almost 12NN when Dr.
Hosaka arrived. At 12:15AM when the operating room
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prof. casis
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was very busy, final preparations for the operation were

done.
- When the patient was being intubated, Cruz heard Dr.
Gutierrez say Aang hirap maintubate nito, mali yata
ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan. These
remarks made her look at what the Dr. was doing. She
then noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the
left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka
approached her. Dr. Hosaka then ordered someone to
call for another anesthesiologist, Dr. Calderon. Dr.
Calderon came and was also trying to intubate the
patient. The patient was placed in a tredelenburg
position - a position where the head of the patient is
placed in a position lower than her feet which is an
indication that there is a decrease of blood supply to the
patients brain.
- Rogelio Ramos who was outside of the operating
room then saw a respiratory machine being rushed into
the O.R. At almost 3PM of that day, the patient was
taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU).
- Erlinda stayed at the ICU for a month. Four months
later, the patient was released from the hospital. She has
been brain damaged ever since, and comatose.
- Petitioners then filed a civil case for damages in Jan.
1986. Petitioners proved that the damage sustained by
Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused
by the faulty management of her airway by private
respondents during the anesthesia phase. Respondents
claimed that the damage was Erlindas allergic reaction
to the anesthetic agent, Thiopental Sodium (Penthonal).
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. RTC awarded a
total of P632K (should be P616K) in compensatory
damages to the plaintiff, "subject to its being updated"
covering the period from 15 November 1985 up to 15
April 1992, based on monthly expenses for the care of
the patient estimated at P8K. CA overturned the
decision. Hence, this appeal.
(NOTE: See Crim Law 2 Digest re discourse on Res
ipsa loquitur and the negligence of Dr. Gutierrez, and
Dr. Hosaka. It was ruled in here that the surgeon, the
anesthesiologist and the hospital should be made liable
for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient
scheduled for cholecystectomy or surgical excision of
the gall bladder)
ISSUE
WON the damages awarded by lower court was
inadequate
HELD
YES
- The amount of actual damages recoverable in suits
arising from negligence should at least reflect the
correct minimum cost of proper care, not the cost of the
care the family is usually compelled to undertake at
home to avoid bankruptcy. However, the provisions of
the Civil Code on actual or compensatory damages
present us with some difficulties.
Actual damages which may be claimed by the
plaintiff are those suffered by him as he has duly
proved. (A1299 CC19)
- Our rules on actual or compensatory damages
generally assume that at the time of litigation, the injury
suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has
been completed and that the cost can be liquidated. But
these provisions neglect to take into account those
situations, as in this case, where the resulting injury
might be continuing and possible future complications
directly arising from the injury, while certain to occur,
are difficult to predict.
Other damages discussed:
- In these cases, the amount of damages which should
be awarded, if they are to adequately and correctly
respond to the injury caused, should be one which
compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up
to the time of trial; and one which would meet
pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could
not, from the nature of the case, be made with certainty.
In other words, temperate damages can and should be
awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in
instances where the injury is chronic and continuing.
And because of the unique nature of such cases, no
incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate
damages are provided for. The reason is that these
damages cover two distinct phases.
19
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate

compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation
is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
torts & damages

- Moral damages: the actual physical, emotional and
financial cost of the care of petitioner which would be
virtually impossible to quantify. The husband and the
children will have to live with the day to day
uncertainty of the patient's illness, knowing any hope of
recovery is close to nil. They have fashioned their daily
lives around the nursing care of petitioner, altering their
long term goals to take into account their life with a
comatose patient. They are charged with the moral
responsibility of the care of the victim. The family's
moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real
one.
- Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages are
awarded considering the length and nature of the instant
suit.
Disposition Decision and resolution of the appellate
court appealed from are modified so as to award in
favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private
respondents the ff: 1) P1.352M as actual damages
computed as of the date of promulgation of this
decision plus a monthly payment of P8K up to the time
that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously
survives; 2) P2M as moral damages, 3) P1.5Mas
temperate damages; 4) P100K each as exemplary
damages and attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the
suit.
GATCHALIAN V DELIM
203 SCRA 126
FELICIANO; October 21, 1991
NATURE
Appeal from a decision of CA
FACTS
- In July 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded,
as a paying passenger, respondent's "Thames" mini bus
and on the way, while the bus was running along the
highway in Bauang, La Union, "a snapping sound" was
suddenly heard at one part of the bus and, shortly
thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on
the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and
fell into a ditch. Several passengers, including petitioner
Gatchalian, were injured. They were promptly taken the
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hospital for medical treatment. Upon medical

examination, petitioner was found to have sustained
physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead.
- While injured. passengers were confined in the
hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited
them and later paid for their hospitalization and medical
expenses. She also gave petitioner P12 with which to
pay her transportation expense in going home from the
hospital. She also had the injured passengers, including
petitioner, sign an already prepared Joint Affidavit
which stated, among other things: That we are no
longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil
against the said driver and owner of the said Thames,
because it was an accident and the said driver and
owner of the said Thames have gone to the extent of
helping us to be treated upon our injuries.
- Despite this document, petitioner Gathalian filed with
CFI La Union an action extra contractu to recover
compensatory and moral damages. Respondents
defense was that vehicular mishap was due to force
majeure, and that petitioner had already been paid and
moreover had waived any right to institute any action
against him and his driver, when Gatchalian signed the
Joint Affidavit.
- TC ruled in favor of respondents because of the
waiver. CA reversed but affirmed TC in denying
petitioners claim for damages. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON there was a valid waiver to effect
relinquishment of any right of action on the oart of the
petitioner
2. WON private respondent Delim was able to prove
that he had exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent
the mishap
3. WON damages may be awarded petitioner
Gatchalian
HELD
1. NO
Ratio A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the
first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms
which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to
give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him.
prof. casis
A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person
when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly
evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such
person.
Reasoning
[1] Under the circumstances petitioner was still reeling
from the effects of the vehicular accident, having been
in the hospital for only 3 days, when the waiver/Joint
Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while
reading it, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the
other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the
document, she too signed without bothering to read it in
its entirety. There is substantial doubt whether petitioner
fully understood it
[2] because what is involved here is the liability of a
common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in
respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise
extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such
purported waiver most strictly against the common
carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must
not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good
customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to
claim damages by an injured passenger, under
circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would
be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary
diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and
hence to render that standard unenforceable. Such
waiver is offensive to public policy.
2. NO
Ratio A duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in
protecting the safety of its passengers is imposed upon a
common carrier. In case of death or injuries to
passengers, a statutory presumption arises that the
common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently
"unless it proves that it [had] observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in A1733 and A1755. To
overcome this presumption, the common carrier must
slow to the court that it had exercised extraordinary
diligence to prevent the injuries. The standard of
extraordinary diligence imposed upon common carriers
is considerably more demanding than the standard of
ordinary.
Reasoning
torts & damages

- When a "snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one
part of the bus. One of the passengers cried out, "What
happened?" The driver replied, "That is only normal".
The driver did not stop to check if anything had gone
wrong with the bus. The driver's reply necessarily
indicated that the same "snapping sound" had been
heard in the bus on previous occasions. This meant that
the bus had not been checked physically or
mechanically to determine what was causing the
"snapping sound" which had occurred so frequently that
the driver had gotten accustomed to it. Force majeure is
no defense.
3. YES
- Compensatory and moral damages may be awarded.
[1] A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or
her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished,
actual injury is suffered for which actual or
compensatory damages are due and assessable.
Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly
as possible in the condition that she was before the
mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the
woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her,
is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a
legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante.
Hence, compensatory damages is awarded, especially to
cover the petitioners expenses for the plastic surgery.
[2] Moral damages may be awarded where gross
negligence on the part of the common carrier is shown.
18 Since we have earlier concluded that respondent
common carrier and his driver had been grossly
negligent in connection with the bus mishap which had
injured petitioner and other passengers, and recalling
the aggressive manuevers of respondent, through his
wife, to get the victims to waive their right to recover
damages even as they were still
Disposition CFI and CA decisions reversed and set
aside. Respondent ORDERED to pay petitioner
Gatchalian the ff. sums: 1) P15K as actual or
compensatory damages to cover the cost of plastic
surgery for the removal of the scar on petitioner's
forehead; 2) P30Kas moral damages; and 3) P1K as
atty's fees, the aggregate amount to bear interest at the
legal rate of 6% per annum counting from the
promulgation of this decision until full payment thereof.
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PEOPLE V MANGAHAS
311 SCRA 384
GONZAGA-REYES; July 28, 1999
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court
FACTS
- Rodrigo Mangahas alias Mang Rudy was accused of
shooting and killing Rufino Gestala.
- Different witnesses came forward for the prosecution
Police Captain Florante Baltazar, the medico-legal
officer at the PC-INP, QC testified about the postmortem examination saying the victim sustained 3
gunshot wounds. He estimated the distance between the
assailant and the victim at more than 24 inches.
Diosdado Padios, said that while the two were drinking,
he saw Mangahas suddenly shoot Rufino Gestala, who
was then seated less than one meter away from the
former while he himself, was one meter away from the
two when the incident occurred. Renato Panoso the best
friend of Gestala said they had been conversing for
about four (4) minutes when Rudy Mangahas arrived
and offered a beer to each of them. They had been
drinking for only a short time when the accused
suddenly approached Rufino Gestala, pulled out a gun
and shot him. After the shooting and upon seeing
Gestala bloodied and clutching his chest, the witness
ran away in the direction of his house and reported the
matter to his uncle.
he saw witness Diosdado Padios but the latter did not
drink beer nor was he offered one as he was just passing
by. Trinidad Balatbat, was likewise presented and she
testified mainly on the expenses their family incurred as
a result of the death of the victim.
- Mangahas admitted that he shot the victim but alleged
that the killing was done in self-defense. Mangahas
narrated that on his way home from work to check up
on his lunch. When he was near the sari-sari store of
Tiangco, he was called by Renato Panoso who was then
talking with the victim Gestala. Gestala was then sitting
on the pasimano in front of the store while Renato
Panoso was standing on the other side. When he
prof. casis
approached them, Panoso got a gun from behind his
waist, showed it to the accused and offered it to him
saying, Bilihin mo na lang ito, mahusay ito, to which
the accused replied, mahirap yan. Gestala, who was
standing about one (1) meter away from them suddenly
raised his voice and said, Putang-ina mo mahusay
naman yong isinasanla namin sa iyo bat ayaw mong
tanggapin? In order to pacify them, he offered them
bottles of beer. After they had consumed one-half of
the bottles of beer, Gestala, who was then about two
meters away from him, said, Putang-ina mo bat ayaw
mong tanggapin yon ay mahusay naman. Immediately
thereafter, Gestala pulled out a gun from the right side
of his body, poked it at him and squeezed the trigger.
The gun did not fire however. The accused then moved
away from Gestala towards the pasimano of the store
and bumped Panoso. He was able to take hold of the
gun which was on the pasimano of the store and he
fired the same at Gestala. The accused stressed that he
fired only once at Gestala as he was only defending
himself and that he threw away the gun which he used
right after the incident. After he fired at Gestala, the
latter, still carrying his gun, ran away towards the back
portion of the store. He himself ran way after the
shooting incident as he was confused and afraid of the
group of Gestala. When he had calmed down, he went
to the barangay hall of Barangay Tungkong Mangga to
surrender himself and explain his side but nobody was
there when he arrived. Upon returning to his house, he
was told that the group of Panoso had been looking for
him. Because of this threat on his life, he left the place
and went to his in-laws at Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Nestor
dela Rosa collaborated the accuseds account of the
incident.
- SP03 Mario Fernandez who testified on the
procedures undertaken by his police detachment in
investigating the shooting of Rufino Gestala.
- The Court a sided with plaintiff. Defendant filed an
MFR which was denied.
ISSUES
1. WON trial court erred in concluding that herein
accused-appellant failed to prove any basic element of
self-defense
torts & damages

2. WON treachery can be appreciated to qualify the
crime into murder
3. What is the correct amount for the indemnity
HELD
1. NO
- The Court has almost invariably ruled that the matter
of assigning value to the declaration of witnesses is best
done by trial courts which, unlike appellate courts, can
assess such testimony in the light of the demeanor,
conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial stage
and thus, unless cogent reasons are shown, the findings
of the trial court are accorded great respect and credit.
- Accuseds defense is devoid of merit. At first, accused
put up the defense of alibi when the instant case was
being investigated by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Bulacan. Then, he sets up self-defense at
the trial on the merits of the case. These two defenses
are incompatible with each other. They do not at all
provide shield to the accused to ward off the
commission of the crime charged against him. Setting
up such contradictory defenses will lead to the
conclusion that the accused is confused of what defense
is for real. This being so, accuseds testimony is
wanting of credence at the outset. When accused finally
he adopts self-defense saying that the victim pulled out
a gun from his right side then poked it to the accused,
squeezed its trigger once but misfired. Reacting to the
situation, accused picked up the gun from the
pasimano of the store, fired it once to the victim and
then ran away from the scene of the incident.
Analyzing the testimony of the accused, the inevitable
conclusion would be that such testimony is
unreasonable and improbable. If the victim really
intended to kill the accused, it is natural for him, under
the situation, to squeeze the trigger of his gun not only
once if the first squeeze missed, but for several times
until his gun fired or to pick up the gun on the
pasimano of the store and use it instead in shooting
the accused. It is inconceivable also that the victim
would have to kill the accused just because the latter
refused to buy or accept as pledge the gun Renato
Panoso was offering to the accused. Incidentally, the
alleged gun of the victim was not presented in Court.
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Likewise unbelievable is the claim of the accused that

he picked up the gun from the pasimano of the store
then shot the victim. At the moment of the incident,
accused was facing the store and 1 meter, more or less,
away from the victim who was sitting on the said
pasimano indicating that that the victim was nearer to
the gun on the pasimano than him. This being so, the
victim should have picked up the gun from the
pasimano ahead of the accused or should have
grappled for the gun taken by the accused after his gun
misfired at first squeeze of the trigger. This should
have been the natural reaction of the victim when his
life was placed in imminent danger after his gun
misfired. Moreover, it is strange why Renato Panoso a
best friend of the victim and who was much nearer to
the gun on the pasimano than the accused and the
victim did not react to the situation when the life of his
best friend was in imminent danger. It is likewise
strange why Renato Panoso should place and leave the
gun on the pasimano and then continued drinking
beer while the transaction on the gun has already been
through.
- Another doubt on the testimonies of the accused and
his witness Nestor dela Rosa lies on their claims that the
accused fired his gun only once. The victim sustained 3
gunshot wounds of separate and different entries and
exits on his body. For a single shot to produce those
wounds is highly irreconcilable. Further, the accused
claimed as he demonstrated in open Court, that while he
was standing he pointed his gun towards the victim at
the level of his (accuseds) chest. The accused and the
victim were of the same height. If the accused fired his
gun in the position demonstrated, the wounds would be
through and through straight at the level of the chest
from the point of entry to the point of exit. The 2
gunshot wounds of the victim were through and through
from his chest towards the lower exit at his back,
indicating that the position of the accused was higher
than that of the victims when the fatal shots were fired.
In other words, the allege position of the accused is
inconsistent with the location and direction of the
wounds. It is rather consistent with the established facts
that the accused was standing when he shot the victim
who was then sitting and facing him.
prof. casis
- By the same token, the corroborating testimony of
defense witness Nestor dela Rosa likewise lacks
credence. The fact that he could not identify or name
the person who pointed a gun to the accused and
squeezed its trigger once but misfired and other persons
in the group, even as he has already discussed the
incident with the accused, indicates that he was not an
eye witness to the incident.
- It is doctrinal that the assessment of the credibility of
the witnesses is left largely to the trial court because of
its opportunity, unavailable to the appellate court, to see
witnesses on the stand and determine by their conduct
and demeanor whether they are testifying truthfully or
are simply lying. The determination of credibility is the
domain of the trail court, and the matter of assigning
values to the testimonies of the witnesses is best
performed by it; thus the evaluation by the trial judge
on the credibility of witnesses is well nigh conclusive
on this Court.
- Inconsistent defenses put up by the accused during the
preliminary investigation and trial of the case as seen in
the Sworn Statement and the trial testimony, and again
during the hearing for the MFR. He himself by his own
act of giving false testimony impeaches his own
testimony and the court is compelled to exclude it from
all consideration.
- Another factor which contributes further to the
doubtfulness of the veracity of the testimony of the
accused and his witness Nestor dela Rosa is their
insistence that accused-appellant shot the victim only
once. As stated by the medico-legal officer in his direct
examination, the victim sustained three (3) gunshot
wounds with three (3) different exit and entry points on
different parts of the victims body. The presence of
several gunshot wounds on the body of the victim is
physical evidence which eloquently refutes accusedappellants allegation of self-defense. The location,
number and gravity of the wounds of the victim belie
appellants pretension that he acted in self-defense.
- A final indication of appellants guilt is his flight after
shooting. His claim that he fled because of the threats
allegedly made by the victims friends and relatives is
not sufficient reason for him not to surrender to the
police since the latter could have adequately protected
torts & damages

him if there were really threats to his life. Indeed, flight
strongly indicates a guilty mind and betrays the
existence of a guilty conscience.[58]
2. NO, there is no convincing evidence supports such a
finding.
- The eyewitnesses accounts were unclear in details,
and cannot fairly deduce that the means of execution of
the crime used by accused-appellant were deliberately
or consciously adopted or that the person attacked had
no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. The only
proof that the attack was treacherous is their bare
testimonies that the accused-appellant suddenly shot the
victim. However, there is no treachery where there is
no evidence proving that the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure
execution without risk to himself - mere suddenness of
attack would not, by itself, constitute treachery. In fact,
the circumstances surrounding the case belie the trial
courts finding that treachery was present. The shooting
occurred in broad daylight. The victim was openly
conversing with accused-appellant for several minutes
before the incident. The victim himself was with his
best friend who could have come to his aid at anytime.
Verily, if accused-appellant wanted to insure that no risk
would come to him, he could have chosen another time
and place to shoot the victim. The evidence then for the
prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of the accused for the crime of homicide only,
not murder. The penalty imposed for homicide in
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
temporal.
3. In conformity with prevailing jurisprudence, the trial
court correctly awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as
death indemnity to the heirs of the deceased. With
respect to the actual damages incurred by the relatives
of the deceased, we have previously held:
Of the expenses allegedly incurred, the Court can
only give credence to those supported by receipt and
which appear to have been genuinely incurred in
connection with the death, wake, or burial of the
victim. Thus, the Court cannot take account of
receipts showing expenses incurred before the date of
slaying of the victim; those incurred after a
considerable lapse of time from the burial of the
A2010
- PAGE 77 -
victim and which do not have any relation to the

death, wake, or burial of the victim; those incurred
for purely aesthetic or social purposes, such as the
lining of the tomb of the victim
- Thus, from the evidence presented before the lower
court, we affirm the award of P14,590.00 for funeral
and burial expenses as these were properly supported by
receipts and proven during the trial of the case.
However, we reduce the amount awarded as actual
damages for food served during the burial of the victim
to P7,285.00 which cover only those expenses incurred
during the wake and vigil of the victim. The other
expenses relating to the 9th day, 40th day and 1st year
death anniversaries are deleted as these were incurred
after a considerable lapse of time from the burial of the
victim.
Disposition the appealed decision of the Regional Trial
Court is hereby MODIFIED, and the accused-appellant
is found GUILTY OF HOMICIDE and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. Accused-appellant is further
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the death
indemnity of P50,000.00; and actual damages of
P21,875.00.
VICTORY LINER V HEIRS OF ANDRES
MALECDAN
MENDOZA; December 27, 2002
NATURE
Appeals
FACTS
- Andres Malecdan, a 75 yr old farmer, was crossing the
National Highway. A Dalin bus stopped to allow him to
pass. However, a bus of the petitioner overtook the
Dalin bus and his Malecdan. Malecdan died.
- A suit was brought for damages against the bus
company. Judgment was rendered in favor of the heirs
of Malecdan. The court awarded them:
a. P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
prof. casis
b. P88,339.00 for actual damages;
c. P200,000.00 for moral damages;
d. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
e. Thirty percent (30%) as attorneys fees of whatever
amount that can be collected by the plaintiff; and
f. The costs of the suit.
ISSUE
WON the court erred in the amount of damages
awarded
HELD
YES
- To justify an award of actual damages, there should be
proof of the actual amount of loss incurred in
connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim.
HYPERLINK
"http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/d
ec2002/154278.htm" \l "_ftn37" \o "" We cannot take
into account receipts showing expenses incurred some
time after the burial of the victim, such as expenses
relating to the 9th day, 40th day and 1st year death
anniversaries.
HYPERLINK
ec2002/154278.htm" \l "_ftn38" \o ""
- The award of P200,000.00 for moral damages should
likewise be reduced. The trial court found that the wife
and children of the deceased underwent intense moral
suffering as a result of the latters death. HYPERLINK
ec2002/154278.htm" \l "_ftn39" \o "" Under Art. 2206
of the Civil Code, the spouse, legitimate children and
illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased
may demand moral damages for mental anguish by
reason of the death of the deceased. Under the
circumstances of this case an award of P100,000.00
would be in keeping with the purpose of the law in
allowing moral damages. (they only prayed for 100k in
the RTC, but RTC gave them 200k)
HYPERLINK
ec2002/154278.htm" \l "_ftn40" \o "" - On the other
hand, the award of P50,000.00 for indemnity is in
accordance with current rulings of the Court.
torts & damages

HYPERLINK
ec2002/154278.htm" \l "_ftn41" \o "" - Art. 2231
provides that exemplary damages may be recovered in
cases involving quasi-delicts if the defendant acted with
gross negligence. In this case, petitioners driver Joson,
Jr. was grossly negligent in driving at such a high speed
and overtaking another vehicle. He did not even help
the victim. The amount of exemplary damages is proper
Disposition Decision affirmed with modification
QUIRANTE V IAC
REGALADO; January 31, 1989
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari seeking to set aside the judgment
of the IAC which found the petition for certiorari
therein meritorious
FACTS
- Dr. Indalecio Casasola (father of respondents) had a
contract with a building contractor named Norman
GUERRERO. The Philippine American General
Insurance Co. Inc. (PHILAMGEN, for short) acted as
bondsman for GUERRERO. In view of GUERRERO'S
failure to perform his part of the contract within the
period specified, Dr. Indalecio Casasola, thru his
counsel, Atty. John Quirante, sued both GUERRERO
and PHILAMGEN before the CFI of Manila for
damages, with PHILAMGEN filing a cross-claim
against GUERRERO for indemnification.
- The CFI ruled in favor of the plaintiff by rescinding
the contract; ordering GUERRERO and PHILAMGEN
to pay the plaintiff actual, moral, and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees; ordering Guerrero alone to
pay liquidated damages of P300.00 a day from
December 15, 1978 to July 16, 1979; and ordering
PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff the amount of the
surety bond equivalent to P120,000.00. In the
meantime, on November 16, 1981, Dr. Casasola died
leaving his widow and several children as survivors.
- Herein petitioner Quirante filed a motion in the trial
court for the confirmation of his attorney's fees.
According to him, there was an oral agreement between
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him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard to his

attorney's fees, which was allegedly confirmed in
writing by the widow and the two daughters of the
deceased. The trial court granted the motion for
confirmation despite an opposition thereto.
ISSUE
WON petitioner may claim his attorneys fees
HELD
NO
Ratio Since the main case from which the petitioner's
claims for their fees may arise has not yet become final,
the determination of the propriety of said fees and the
amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This
procedure gains added validity in the light of the rule
that the remedy for recovering attorney's fees as an
incident of the main action may be availed of only when
something is due to the client.
Reasoning
- Well settled is the rule that counsel's claim for
attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action
in which the services in question have been rendered, or
in a separate action. What is being claimed here as
attorney's fees by petitioners is, however, different from
attorney's fees as an item of damages provided for
under Article 2208 of the CC, wherein the award is
made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and the
litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who
may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by
execution. Here, the petitioner's claims are based on an
alleged contract for professional services, with them as
the creditors and the private respondents as the debtors.
In filing the motion for confirmation of attorney's fees,
petitioners chose to assert their claims in the same
action. This is also a proper remedy under our
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, we agree with the
respondent court that the confirmation of attorney's fees
is premature. We take exception to and reject that
portion of the decision of the respondent court which
holds that the alleged confirmation to attorney's fees
should not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto,
since it is also premised on the eventual grant of
damages to the Casasola family, hence the same
prof. casis
objection of prematurity obtains and such a holding
may be pre-emptive of factual and evidentiary matters
that may be presented for consideration by the trial
court.
Disposition The decision of the respondent court is
hereby AFFIRMED.
CRISMINA GARMENTS V CA
CERRANO V TAN
38 Phil 392
FISHER; August 1, 1918
NATURE
An action by plaintiff for damages alleged to have been
caused by the breach of a contract for the hiring of a
casco.
FACTS
- During the month of January, 1916, Tan (defendant),
who was then the owner of casco No. 1033, rented it to
Cerrano (plaintiff) at a monthly rental of P70. Delivery
was made in Manila.
- Some time during the month of May, 1916, the Tan
notified Cerrano that in the following month it would be
necessary to send the casco to Malabon for repairs.
Cerrano then informed Tan that he would like to rent
the casco again after the repairs had been completed.
Defendant indicated that he was willing to rent it, but
would expect P80 a month for it.
- There was no agreement between the parties
concerning the length of time for which the hire of the
casco was to continue.
- One week before the end of the repair period Tan sold
the casco to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. J. Santos, the man
who had been employed by Cerrnao as patron of the
casco while it was in his possession, upon hearing that
it had been sold to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. went to the
office of the latter in Manila, and asked for employment
in the same capacity.
- Cerrano, claiming that he was entitled to the
possession of the casco under his contract with Tan
regardless of its sale to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. induced
Santos to refuse to take orders from the new owners.
torts & damages

Siy Cong Bieng & Co. was obliged to bring an action of
replevin against Santos for the recovery of the
possession of their casco.
- After the casco had been in possession of Santos for
three months, the replevin suit was submitted to the
court for decision upon a written stipulation in which it
was admitted that the casco was the property of Siy
Cong Bieng & Co. at the time of the suit was
commenced, and that the "illegal detention" of the casco
by Santos had caused damages to Siy Cong Bieng &
Co. in the sum of P457.98.
- Cerrano testified his average profit from other cascos
rented by him was P60 a month for each casco (P600
for 10 months supposedly).
Petitioners Claim
> It was agreed that he was to take the casco at the
increased rental.
> A contract for the rental of a casco, when made by the
owner, is deemed in the absence of an express
stipulation to the contrary, to run from the date of the
contract until the casco has to be docked for its annual
overhauling and repair (ten months).
Defendants Comments
> His offer to lease it at the higher rate was never
accepted.
> In the absence of an express stipulation regarding the
duration of the hire, duration is deemed to be from
month to month when a monthly rental is agreed upon.
> Cerranos claim of P60 profit does not furnish the
proper measure of damages, and that plaintiff's right is
limited to the recovery of the difference between the
contract price at which the casco was hired by him and
such higher rate as he might have been compelled to
pay for the hire of a similar casco in the open market to
take its place.
> It Cerranos responsibility to rent another casco
seeing that the one owned by Tan was already sold to
Siy Cong Bieng & Co. (thus mitigating his liability to
pay damages).
ISSUES
1. WON it was agreed between the plaintiff and
defendant that the casco was to be leased to the former
again after it had been repaired
A2010
- PAGE 77 -
2. What is the duration of the term

3. WON there is liability for damages, and to what
extent (mitigation of liability)
HELD
1. YES, there was an agreement for the subsequent
rental.
Reasoning
- It was understood between the parties that Cerrano
was to have it again at the increased rental as soon as
the contemplated repairs had been completed. That such
was the understanding is shown by the fact that plaintiff
paid for the towage of the casco to the dry dock at
Malabon; that he left his equipment in it; and that his
patron stayed with the casco in Malabon during the
time it was on the dock.
- The sale to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. was a breach of
contract between the Cerrano and Tan.
2. The period was for a monthly rental.
Ratio The reasonable presumption that one who agrees
to pay a monthly rent intends that his tenancy is to
endure for a like period, subject to indefinite tacit
renewals at the end of each month as long as the
arrangement is agreeable to both parties.
Reasoning
- When no definite agreement has been made regarding
its duration, the lease of a house is deemed to have been
made from day to day, from month to month, or from
year to year, according to whether a daily, monthly, or
yearly rent is to be paid.
3. YES, there is liability for damages, and there is no
mitigation of the liability.
Ratio Plaintiff is entitled to recover, as damages for the
breach of the contract by the defendant, the profit which
he would have been able to make had the contract been
performed. HOWEVER, It is a well-recognized
principle of law that damages resulting from avoidable
consequences of the breach of a contract or other legal
duty are not recoverable. It is the duty of one injured by
the unlawful act of another to take such measures as
prudent men usually take under such circumstances to
reduce the damages as much as possible.
Reasoning
prof. casis
- By selling the casco to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. Tan
broke his contract with Cerrano and is responsible for
the damages caused by his failure to give plaintiff
possession of the casco for the term of one month.
- Article 1106 of the Civil Code establishes the rule that
prospective profits may be recovered as damages, while
article 1107 of the same Code provides that the
damages recoverable for the breach of obligations not
originating in fraud (dolo) are those which were or
might have been foreseen at the time the contract was
entered into.
- The injured party must produce the best evidence of
which his case is susceptible and if that evidence
warrants the inference that he has been damaged by the
loss of profits which he might with reasonable certainty
have anticipated but for the defendant's wrongful act, he
is entitled to recover.
- It is equally well-settled, however, that the burden of
proof rests upon the defendant to show that the plaintiff
might have reduced the damages. In this case the
defendant has made no effort whatever to show that any
other similar cascos were in fact available to plaintiff,
or the price at which he would have been able to obtain
the use of one. In the absence of evidence it will not be
presumed that plaintiff could have secured another
casco at the same price had he looked for one.
Disposition It is decreed that Cerrano recover from Tan
P50 as damages, and his costs in the Court of First
Instance.
KIERULF V CA (PANTRANCO NORTH
EXPRESS)
269 SCRA 433
PANGANIBAN; March 13, 1997
FACTS
- About 7:45 pm, 28 Feb 1987: a Pantranco
bus was traveling along EDSA from
Congressional Avenue towards Clover Leaf,
Balintawak. Before it reached the corner of
Oliveros Drive, the driver lost control of the
bus, causing it to swerve to the left, and
then to fly over the center island occupying
the east-bound lane of EDSA. The front of
torts & damages

the bus bumped the front portion of an
Isuzu pickup driven by Porfirio Legaspi,
which was moving along Congressional
Avenue heading towards Roosevelt Avenue.
- As a result, the points of contact of both
vehicles were damaged and physical
injuries were inflicted on Legaspi and his
passenger Lucila Kierulf. The bus also hit
and injured a pedestrian who was then
crossing EDSA.
- Despite the impact, said bus continued to
move forward and its front portion rammed
against a Caltex gasoline station, damaging
its building and gasoline dispensing
equipment.
- As a consequence of the incident, Lucila
suffered injuries which required major
surgeries and prolonged treatment by
specialists. Legaspi also suffered injuries.
The front portion of the pickup truck,
owned by Spouses Kierulf was smashed to
pieces.
(cost of repair estimated at
P107,583.50.)
- The victims of the vehicular mishap pray
for an increase in the award of damages,
over and above those granted by the
appellate court. Victor, husband of Lucila,
claims compensation/damages for the loss
of his right to marital consortium which,
according to him, has been diminished due
to the disfigurement suffered by his wife.
- Pantranco asks for exoneration by
invoking an alleged fortuitous event as the
cause of the mishap. They say that while
bus driven by Jose Malanum was cruising
along EDSA, a used engine differential
accidentally and suddenly dropped from a
junk truck in front of the bus. Said
differential hit the underchassis of the bus,
throwing Malanum off his seat and making
him lose control of said bus. The bus
swerved to the left, hit the center island,
and bumped the pickup of the spouses.
RTC
CA
reque
SC
A2010
174,1
00.77
241,8
61.81
Moral
100,0
0.00
200,0
00.00
Exem
plary
VICT
OR
Actua
l
LEGA
SPI
Actua
l
Moral
10,00.
00
100,0
00.00
st
+ amt
for
lost
incom
e
1
Millio
n
500,0
00.00
96,82
5.15
96,82
5.15
107,5
83.50
6,328.
18
6,328.
18
10,00
0.00
25,00
0.00
25,00
0.00
YES
50,00
0.00
YES
LUCI
LA
Actua
l
Exem
plary
attys
fees
costs
ISSUES
prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
241,86
1.81
400,0
00.00
200,0
00.00
96,825
.15
16,00
0.00
100,0
00.00
50,00
0.00
50,00
0.00
50,00
0.00
50,000
.00
+
intere
st
+6%
legal
intere
st
from
date
of RTC
decisi
on
until
actual
payme
nt
How much moral, exemplary and actual

damages are victims of vehicular accidents
entitled to?
1. WON the bus driver was negligent and
such negligence (and not a fortuitous event)
was the proximate cause of the accident
2. WON Victors claim for deprivation of the
right to marital consortium as a factor for
the award of moral damages is proper
3. WON social and financial standing of
Lucila can be considered in awarding moral
damages
4. WON exemplary damages should be
awarded
5. WON loss of earnings may be a
component of damages in this case
6. WON the 10% reduction of the estimated
actual damages on the pickup was proper
HELD
1. Negligence and proximate cause are
factual issues which SC can not pass upon
in the absence of conflict between the
findings of the trial court and the CA.
2. NO
- For lack of factual basis, such claim of
deprivation of the right to consortium
cannot be ruled upon by this Court at this
time.
- Petitioners cited a California case,
Rodriguez vs. Bethlehem Steel Corporation,
as authority for the claim of damages by
reason of loss of marital consortium, i.e.
loss of conjugal fellowship and sexual
relations. In the Rodriguez case20, it was
ruled that when a person is injured to the
extent that he/she is no longer capable of
20
Rodriguez involved a couple in their early 20s, who were married for only 16 months and full of
dreams of building a family of their own, when the husband was struck and almost paralyzed by a
falling 600-pound pipe. The wife testified how her life had deteriorated because her husband became a
lifelong invalid, confined to the home, bedridden and in constant need of assistance for his bodily
functions; and how her social, recreational and sexual life had been severely restricted. It also deprived
her of the chance to bear their children. As a constant witness to her husband's pain, mental anguish
and frustration, she was always nervous, tense, depressed and had trouble sleeping, eating and
concentrating. Thus, the California court awarded her damages for loss of consortium.
torts & damages

giving love, affection, comfort and sexual
relations to his or her spouse, that spouse
has suffered a direct and real personal
loss.
The
loss
is
immediate
and
consequential rather than remote and
unforeseeable; it is personal to the spouse
and separate and distinct from that of the
injured person.
- Whether Rodriguez may be cited as
authority to support the award of moral
damages to Victor &/or Lucila Kierulf for
"loss of consortium" cannot be properly
considered in this case. Victor's claim,
although argued before CA, is not
supported by the evidence on record.
3. NO
- The social and financial standing of a
claimant of moral damages may be
considered in awarding moral damages
only if he or she was subjected to
contemptuous
conduct
despite
the
offender's knowledge of his or her social
and financial standing.
- But, it is still proper to award moral
damages to Lucila for her physical
sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety and wounded feelings.
She
sustained multiple injuries on the scalp,
limbs and ribs. She lost all her teeth. She
had
to
undergo
several
corrective
operations and treatments. She suffered
sleepless
nights
and
shock
as
a
consequence of the vehicular accident. And
it has taken 10yrs to prosecute the
complaint and this appeal!
4. YES
- in view of CAs finding of gross negligence
on the part of Pantranco: "Public utility
operators like the defendant, have made a
mockery of our laws, rules and regulations
governing operations of motor vehicles and
have ignored either deliberately or through
negligent disregard of their duties to
exercise extraordinary degree of diligence
A2010
- PAGE 77 -
for the safety of the travelling public and

their passengers."
- Batangas Transportation Company vs.
Caguimbal: "it is high time to impress
effectively upon public utility operators the
nature and extent of their responsibility in
respect of the safety of their passengers
and their duty to exercise greater care in
the selection of drivers and conductors."
- Exemplary damages are designed to
permit the courts to mould behavior that
has socially deleterious consequences, and
its imposition is required by public policy to
suppress the wanton acts of an offender.
However, it cannot be recovered as a
matter of right. It is based entirely on the
discretion of the court.
5. For Lucila, NO.
- CA already considered this when it stated
that
the
award
of
P25k
included
compensation for "mental anguish and
emotional strain of not earning anything
with a family to support."
- Lucila's claim of loss of earning capacity
has not been duly proven with ITRs. The
alleged loss must be established by factual
evidence for it partakes of actual
damages. A party is entitled to adequate
compensation for such pecuniary loss
actually suffered and duly proved. Such
damages, to be recoverable, must not only
be capable of proof, but must actually be
shown with a reasonable degree of
certainty.
- For Legaspi, YES. Pantranco failed to
rebut the claim of Legaspi that he had been
incapacitated for 10 months and that during
said period he did not have any income.
6. YES
- SC takes judicial notice of the propensity
of motor repair shops to exaggerate their
estimates. An estimate is not an actual
expense incurred or to be incurred in the
repair. The reduction made by respondent
prof. casis
court is reasonable considering that in this
instance such estimate was secured by the
complainants themselves.
Epilogue
- In order that moral damages may be
awarded, there must be pleading and proof
of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright
and the like. While no proof of pecuniary
loss is necessary in order that moral
damages may be awarded, the amount of
indemnity being left to the discretion of the
court, it is nevertheless essential that the
claimant should satisfactorily show the
existence of the factual basis of damages
and its causal connection to defendant's
acts.
- Moral damages, though incapable of
pecuniary estimation, are in the category of
an award designed to compensate the
claimant for actual injury suffered and not
to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
-Francisco vs. GSIS: there must be clear
testimony on the anguish and other forms
of mental suffering.
- Cocoland Devt Corp vs. NLRC: additional
facts must be pleaded and proven to
warrant the grant of moral damages under
the Civil Code, these being, social
humiliation,
wounded
feelings,
grave
anxiety, etc., that resulted therefrom.
- Moral damages are awarded to enable the
injured party to obtain means, diversions or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he/she has undergone, by
reason of the defendant's culpable action.
- Its award is aimed at restoration, as much
as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante;
thus, it must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted.
- There is no hard and fast rule in
determining the proper amount.
The
yardstick: amount awarded should not be
so palpably and scandalously excessive as
to indicate that it was the result of passion,
torts & damages

prejudice or corruption on the part of the
trial judge. Neither should it be so little or
so paltry that it rubs salt to the injury
already inflicted on plaintiffs.
VISAYAN SAWMILL V CA
219 SCRA 378
CALLEJO; January 17, 2005
NATURE
FACTS
- ON may 1, 1983, Visayan Sawmill and RJH trading
entered into a sale of scrap iron located at the formers
stockyard, subject to the condition that RJH will open a
letter of credit in favor of Visayan in the amount of
P250,000.
- Respondentfs men started digging and gather scrap
iron in petitioners premises. On may 30, they were
asked to stop by the plaintiff in view of an alleged case
filed against respondent by a certain Albert Pursuelo.
This is howver denied by the petitioner who alleges that
on May 23, 1983, they sent a telegram to respondent
cancelling the contract of sale because of failure of the
latter to comply with the conditions thereof.
- On may 24, respondent informed petitioner that the
letter of credit was opened on may 12, 1983 but then the
transmittal was delayed.
- On may 26, the bank sent a letter to petitioner
informing that the letter of credit was opened in their
favor.
- On july 19, respondent sent a series of telegrams
stating that the case against him has been dismissed and
demanding that petitioner comply with the contract.
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner. RTC
and CA ruled in favor of respondent. (+P100,000 moral
damages)
ISSUE
WON the Visayan Sawmill can be compelled to honor
the agreement
HELD
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- PAGE 77 -
NO
- There was only a contract to sell, not a contract of
sale. The petitioner corporation's obligation to sell is
unequivocally subject to a positive suspensive
condition, i.e., the private respondent's opening, making
or indorsing of an irrevocable and unconditional letter
of credit. The former agreed to deliver the scrap iron
only upon payment of the purchase price by means of
an irrevocable and unconditional letter of credit.
Otherwise stated, the contract is not one of sale where
the buyer acquired ownership over the property subject
to the resolutory condition that the purchase price
would be paid after delivery. Thus, there was to be no
actual sale until the opening, making or indorsing of the
irrevocable and unconditional letter of credit. Since
what obtains in the case at bar is a mere promise to sell,
the failure of the private respondent to comply with the
positive suspensive condition cannot even be
considered a breach casual or serious but simply
an event that prevented the obligation of petitioner
corporation to convey title from acquiring binding
force.
- In the instant case, not only did the private respondent
fail to open, make or indorse an irrevocable and
unconditional letter of credit on or before 15 May 1983
despite his earlier representation in his 24 May 1983
telegram that he had opened one on 12 May 1983, the
letter of advice received by the petitioner corporation on
26 May 1983 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands
Dumaguete City branch explicitly makes reference to
the opening on that date of a letter of credit in favor of
petitioner Ang Tay c/o Visayan Sawmill Co. Inc., drawn
without recourse on ARMACO-MARSTEEL ALLOY
CORPORATION and set to expire on 24 July 1983,
which is indisputably not in accordance with the
stipulation in the contract signed by the parties on at
least three (3) counts: (1) it was not opened, made or
indorsed by the private respondent, but by a corporation
which is not a party to the contract; (2) it was not
opened with the bank agreed upon; and (3) it is not
irrevocable and unconditional, for it is without recourse,
it is set to expire on a specific date and it stipulates
certain conditions with respect to shipment. In all
probability, private respondent may have sold the
prof. casis
subject scrap iron to ARMACO-MARSTEEL ALLOY
CORPORATION, or otherwise assigned to it the
contract with the petitioners. Private respondent's
complaint fails to disclose the sudden entry into the
picture of this corporation.
- In relation to the outline, not really an issue in this
case:
This Court notes the palpably excessive and
unconscionable moral and exemplary damages awarded
by the trial court to the private respondent despite a
clear absence of any legal and factual basis therefor. In
contracts, such as in the instant case, moral damages
may be recovered if defendants acted fraudulently and
in bad faith, 16 while exemplary damages may only be
awarded if defendants acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. 17 In the
instant case, the refusal of the petitioners to deliver the
scrap iron was founded on the non-fulfillment by the
private respondent of a suspensive condition. It cannot,
therefore, be said that the herein petitioners had acted
fraudulently and in bad faith or in a wanton, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner. What this Court
stated in Inhelder Corp. vs. Court of Appeals 18 needs to
be stressed anew:
At this juncture, it may not be amiss to remind
Trial Courts to guard against the award of exhorbitant
(sic) damages that are way out of proportion to the
environmental circumstances of a case and which,
time and again, this Court has reduced or eliminated.
Judicial discretion granted to the Courts in the
assessment of damages must always be exercised
with balanced restraint and measured objectivity.
- For, indeed, moral damages are emphatically not
intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of the
defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured
party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that
will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has
undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action.
Its award is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of
the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and it must
be proportional to the suffering inflicted.
Disposition Petition granted
torts & damages

COMPAIA MARITIMA V ALLIED FREE
WORKERS UNION
77 SCRA 24
AQUINO; May 24, 1977
FACTS
- Since the onset in 1954 of litigation between the
parties herein, this is the fifth case between them that
has been elevated to the Court
- The trial court awarded to the company of P450,000
as damages.
- The appellants contend that the trial court erred in
awarding to the company actual damages, amounting to
P450,000, moral damages, of P50,000 and attorney's
Considering of P20,000, and in holding that the four
officers of the union are solidarily liable for the said
damages.
- Appellants' counsel assailed the award of actual
damages, on the ground that the auditors' reports, on
which they were based, were hearsay.
ISSUE
WON the appellants assignment of error meritorious
HELD
YES
- The appellants assignment of error is meritorious, the
Court found after analyzing the nature of the damages,
awarded, how the same were computed, and the
trustworthiness of the company's evidence
- On the basis of the reports of the two accountants, the
damages, claimed by the complaint as a matter of
simple addition, does not reach the sum of P 450,000
fixed by the trial court. The damages, shown in the
accountants' reports and in the statement made by the
consignees. chief clerk (who did not testify) amount to
P349,245.37, or much less than P450,000.
- The company argues that the accountants' reports are
admissible in evidence because of the rule that "when
the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without
great loss-of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is oth the general result of the whole", the
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original writings need not be produced (Sec. 2[e], Rule

130, Rules of Court).
- That rule cannot be applied in this case because the
voluminous character of the records, on which the
accountants' reports were based, was not duly
established.
- It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that
the records and accounts should be made accessible to
the adverse party so that the company, of the summary
may be tested on cross-examination
- What applies to this case is the general rule "that an
audit made by, or the testimony of, a private auditor, is
inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original
records, books of accounts, reports or the like".
- That general rule cannot be relaxed in this case
because the company failed to make a preliminary
showing as to the difficulty or impossibility attending
the production of the records in court and their
examination and analysis as evidence by the court.
Disposition The trial court's judgment declaring the
arrastre and stevedoring contract terminated,
permanently enjoining the union and its officials from
performing arrastre and stevedoring work for the
vessels of the Compaia Maritima, and dismissing
defendants' counterclaim was affirmed.
The lower court's award of damages, was reversed and
set aside. No costs.
MIRANDA-RIBAYA V BAUTISTA
95 SCRA 672
TEEHANKEE; January 28, 1980
FACTS
- Mrs. Niceta Miranda-Ribaya was engaged in the
pawnshop business in 1968 and in the buying and
selling of jewelry.
- Sometime before April 23, 1968 Josefine Roco
Robles, one of her agents, informed her that millionaire
logger Marino Bautista was interested to buy big
diamond stones. Miranda-Ribaya went to visit Bautista
and at the sight of his huge house, she became
convinced that he indeed was as rich as Josefina had
portrayed him to be.
prof. casis
> Miranda-Ribaya then offend to sell to the Bautista
ten pieces of jewelry for the total amount of
P224,000. After some haggling (But I thought they
were rich!), Miranda-Ribaya settled for P222,000
(Para naman two thousand lang!).
> Miranda-Ribaya was paid through two Equitable
PCI cheques, one for P112,000 and the other for
P110,000. In return, she issued a voucher as evidence
of payment.
> The next day, Miranda-Ribaya went back to see
Bautista to request him to break up the P110,000
cheque into smaller amounts. She had to share some
of the money with Miss Gisioco who owned some of
the jewelry sold. She was then issued 4 Bank of
America cheques with the following amounts:
P14,000, P84,000, P12,000 and P50,000.
- April 24, 1968 Miranda-Ribaya sold four pieces of
jewelry to Bautista for P94,000 in Bautistas office.
She was then issued four Bank of America checks
amounting to the total price of the pieces of jewelry.
She again issued another voucher as proof of payment.
- The original owners of some of the jewelry sold by
Miranda-Ribaya wanted to have them back so MirandaRibaya went to Bautistas house. She brought with her
three pieces of jewelry to be offered in exchange for
some of the jewelry she wanted to take back. Since his
wife and daughter were not home, Bautista requested
Miranda-Ribaya to leave the jewelry with him so he
could show the jewelry to his wife and daughter first.
- Bautista did not return the jewelry but instead sent
Miranda-Ribaya a P45,000 cheque as payment for the
three pieces of jewelry she left with him. She also
heard that these pieces of jewelry were given away by
Bautista as gifts.
- Miranda-Ribaya tried to contact Bautista when the
post-dated checks neared their maturity date but she
was unable to do so. Worse, when she deposited the
cheques, the bank dishonored them because the
accounts were closed.
- Following a hunch acquired from years of experience
as a pawnshop dealer, Miranda-Ribaya ran a check on
the different pawnshops in Manila and discovered that
most of the jewelry she had sold to Bautista were
pledged to different pawnshops.
torts & damages

- Bautista promised to settle his obligations with
Miranda-Ribaya but was unable to do so despite
repeated demands. He eventually surrendered the
pawnshop tickets to Miranda-Ribaya who was then able
to regain possession of the pawned pieces of jewelry.
She recomputed Bautistas obligations and found that
he owed her P125,460.79, not including the amount she
had given to Gisioco.
- The trial court rendered judgment in favor of MirandaRibaya but did not award damages to her for
insufficiency of evidence.
> Bautista claimed he had acted "in utmost good faith"
and that damages in any concept could not be assessed
against them
> Neither did the appellate court look favorably upon
Miranda-Ribayas claim for damages, saying that
petitioner did not mention mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock in her
testimony. Neither could exemplary damages be
awarded because these damages cannot be recovered as
a matter of right and the appellate court was not
prepared to disturb the lower court's exercise of
discretion in this regard.
ISSUE
WON the award of moral and exemplary damages is
proper
HELD
YES
Ratio In order that moral damages may be awarded,
there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering,
mental anguish fright and the like. There must be clear
testimony on the mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and similar injuries. Plaintiff must
testify to his said injury and this should not merely be
inferred from certain proven facts.
Reasoning
- In her testimony, Miranda-Ribaya established that due
to respondents' deceitful and malevolent acts of
defraudation, she had suffered "extreme - anguish
(without using the word anguish) and "could not sleep
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for three months," since she was forced to close her

pawnshop, sell some of her personal jewelry and
borrow money in order to pay off the owners of the
jewelry wrongfully acquired by respondents from her.
- Even if Miranda-Ribaya failed to use the precise legal
terms, it is sufficient that these exact terms have been
pleaded in the complaint and evidence has been
adduced, as cited above, amply supporting the
averments of the complaint.
- Having established the moral damages, petitioners are
also entitled to exemplary damages. The wantonness
and malevolence through which respondents defrauded
petitioners, deceitfully incurring and then evading
settlement of their just liability certainly justifies the
award of exemplary damages by way of example and
correction for the public good and also to serve as a
deterrent to the commission of similar misdeeds by
others, even if the transaction were viewed as a breach
of civil contract.
Disposition the decision of respondent court insofar as
it denies petitioners' claim for damages is hereby set
aside. In addition to the amounts awarded in the
affirmed judgment of the lower court, petitioners are
further awarded moral and exemplary damages
equivalent to twenty-five per cent (25%) of the
principal sum of P125,460.79 adjudged in their favor by
the lower court.
DEL ROSARIO V CA (METAL FORMING CORP)
NARVASA; January 29, 1997
FACTS
- The Del Rosarios' charged Metal Forming Corp
(MFC) with a violation of Section 3 of Act No. 3740,
"An Act to Penalize Fraudulent Advertising,
Mislabeling or Misbranding of Any Product, Stocks,
Bonds, etc.
- MFC sold to the public roofing materials known as
"Banawe" shingles which they advertised to be
structurally safe and strong. Del Rosarios purchased a
quantity and had installed in their house. However
when typhoon Ruping came, portions of the roof were
blown away by strong winds and this also led to the
damage of the interior of their home.
prof. casis
- The spouses sought to recover from MFC, damages
resulting from the events, contending that aside from
the destruction of the roof of their house, injury was
also caused to its electrical wiring, ceiling, furtures,
walls, wall paper, wood parquet flooring and furniture.
The plaintiffs reckoned their actual damages at
P1,008,003.00 "representing the estimated cost of the
repair, restoration and/or replacement of the damaged
areas and items in plaintiffs' house and the cost of the
inspection conducted by the independent adjuster..."
They also prayed for an award to them of moral
damages in the sum of P3,000,000,00, exemplary
damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00, and attorney's
fees in the sum of P1,000,000.00.
ISSUE
WON the Del Rosario spouses are entitled to moral
damages
HELD
YES
- That MFC did in truth act with bad faith, in
flagrant breach of its express warranties made to the
general public and in wanton disregard of the rights
of the Del Rosarios who relied on those warranties,
is adequately demonstrated by the recorded proofs.
The law explicitly authorizes the award of moral
damages "in breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith."
There being, moreover, satisfactory evidence of the
psychological and mental trauma actually suffered
by the Del Rosarios, the grant to them of moral
damages is warranted. Over a period of about a
month. they experienced "feelings of shock,
helplessness, fear, embarrassment and anger."
- As declared by this Court in Makabili v. Court of
Appeals, among other precedents:
It is essential. . . . in the award of damages that the
claimant must have satisfactorily proven during the
trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages
and its causal connection to defendant's acts. This is
so because moral damages though incapable of
pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury
torts & damages

suffered and not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer (Enervida v. De la Torre, 55 SCRA 340
[1974.] and are allowable only when specifically
prayed for in the complaint. (San Miguel Brewery,
Inc. v. Magno, 21 SCRA 292 [1968])
- As reflected in the records of the case, the Court of
Appeals was in agreement with the findings of the trial
court that petitioners suffered anguish, embarrassment
and mental sufferings due to the failure of private
respondent to perform its obligation to petitioners.
- Its grant of moral and exemplary damages was
justified by the Trial Court as follows:
Form the evidence presented, plaintiffs' sufferings
have been duly and substantially proven by the
defendant's fraudulent actuation and breach of
warranty, and thereby entitled for the claim of
damages and litigation costs as enunciated by the
testimony of the plaintiff... that the damages to his
house caused sufferings and feelings of shock.
helplessness, fears, embarrassment and anger, thereby
entitling him to Moral Damages which should be
assessed at P500,000.00.
"The moral damages. . . . (are awarded) for indemnity
or reparation not punishment or correction, that is, an
award to entitle the injured party to obtain means (of)
diversions and amusement that will serve to alleviate
the moral sufferings he has undergone by reason of
defendant's culpable action. (RNB Surety and Ins.
Co. v. IAC, G.R No. 64515, June 22, 1984, 129
SCRA 745)."
- This Court also agrees with the Trial Court
- However, the same statutory and jurisprudential
standards just mentioned dictate reduction of the
amounts of moral and exemplary damages fixed by the
Trial Court. the moral damages awarded must be
commensurate with the loss or injury suffered.
RAAGAS v TRAYA
22 SCRA 839
CASTRO; Feb 27, 1968
FACTS
- spouses Raagas filed a complaint with the CFI Leyte
against spouses Traya and Bienvenido Canciller.
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- PAGE 77 -
- Complaint alleges that on or about April 9, 1958,

while Canciller was "recklessly" driving a truck owned
by the Traya spouses, the vehicle ran over the Raagas'
three-year old son Regino, causing his instantaneous
death.
Defendants Comments
> They specifically deny that Canciller was "driving
recklessly" at the time of the mishap, and assert that the
truck "was fully loaded and was running at a very low
speed and on the right side of the road"
> it was the child who "rushed from an unseen position
and bumped the truck so that he was hit by the left rear
tire of the said truck and died", and consequently the
defendants are not to blame for the accident which was
"entirely attributable to an unforeseen event" or due to
the fault of the child and negligence of his parents;
> defendants-spouses have exercised due diligence in
the selection and supervision of their driver Canciller,
whom they hired in 1946 only after a thorough study of
his background as a truck driver; and that each time
they allowed him to drive it was only after a check of
his physical condition and the mechanical fitness of the
truck assigned to him.
Lower Court
> plaintiffs moved for a judgment on the pleadings,
upon the claim that the defendants' answer not only
"failed to tender an issue" but as well "admitted
material allegations" of the complaint. This motion was
set for hearing on June 18. On the previous day,
however,
defendants
counsel
requested
for
postponement as he was sick. The lower court denied
the request for lack of "proper notice to the adverse
party," and considered the case submitted for decision
upon the filing of the plaintiffs' memorandum.
- On June 24 it rendered a judgment on the pleadings,
condemning the defendants, jointly and severally, to
pay damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.
The lower court reasoned that
the denial of the charge of reckless driving "did not
affect the plaintiffs' positive allegation in their
complaint that the truck . . . did not have a current
year registration plate . . . for the year 1958 when the
accident occurred,"
prof. casis
"this failure . . . has the effect of admitting
hypothetically that they operated . . . the said car
without proper license . . . when the accident
occurred,"
"unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed
that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation (article 2185 CC)."
- The defendants appealed to CA, which certified the
case to SC because the issues raised are purely of law.
- NOTE: Section 10 of Rule 35 of the old Rules of
Court authorized a judgment on the pleadings where
an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading.
ISSUE
WON the court a quo acted correctly when it rendered
judgment on the pleadings
HELD
YES
- The plaintiffs' claim for actual, moral, nominal and
corrective damages, was controverted by the averment
in the answer to the effect that the defendants "have no
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth of the allegations" as to such damages, "the
truth of the matter being that the death of Regino
Raagas was occasioned by an unforeseen event and/or
by the fault of the small boy Regino Raagas or his
parents." Such averment has the effect of tendering a
valid issue.
In a long line of cases, SC has consistently held that
even if the allegations regarding the amount of
damages in the complaint are not specifically denied
in the answer, such damages are not deemed
admitted.
in no uncertain terms that actual damages must be
proved, and that a court cannot rely on "speculation,
conjecture or guesswork" as to the fact and amount of
damages, but must depend on actual proof that
damages had been suffered and on evidence of the
actual amount.
although an allegation is not necessary in order that
moral damages may be awarded, "it is, nevertheless,
torts & damages

essential that the claimant satisfactorily prove the
existence of the factual basis of the damage and its
causal relation to defendant's acts."
Disposition Case is remanded to the court of origin for
trial on the merits.
ENERVIDA v DELA TORRE
55 SCRA 339
ESGUERRA; January 28, 1974
NATURE
FACTS
- Petitioner Roque Enervida filed a complaint against
defendant spouses Lauro and Rosa dela Torre, praying
that the deed of sale executed by his deceased father
over a parcel of land covered by a Homestead Patent be
declared null and void for having been executed within
the prohibited period of 5 years in violation of Sec.118
of Commonwealth Act 141 (the Public Land Law). He
further prayed that he be allowed to repurchase said
parcel of land for being the legitimate son and sole heir
of his deceased father.
- Defendants filed their answer, stating that the
petitioner has no cause of action against them as his
father is still living; that petitioner is not the only son of
Ciriaco and that the sale of the property in question was
well beyond the 5 year prohibition period.
- During pre-trial, petitioner admitted the claims of the
defendants: his father was still living, that he has
siblings, and that the sale did not take place within the
prohibited period. The CFI, in view of such admissions,
dismissed Roques complaint and held that he had no
cause of action, no legal capacity to sue and that he is
prompted with malice and bad faith in alleging false
statements in his complaint. He was also ordered to pay
the defendants P2000 for actual, moral and exemplary
damages.
- Petitioner then filed an appeal to the CA which
certified the case to the SC as it involved purely a
question of law.
ISSUE
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- PAGE 77 -
WON the award for moral damages by reason of the

unfounded civil action was proper
HELD
NO
Ratio Art.2219 enumerates the cases when moral
damages may be recovered. A clearly unfounded suit is
not included in the enumeration and cannot be basis for
an award of moral damages.
Reasoning
- It will be observed that unlike compensatory or actual
damages which are generally recoverable in tort cases
as long as there is satisfactory proof thereof (Art. 2202),
the Code has chosen to enumerate the cases in which
moral damages may be recovered (Art. 2219).
- A like enumeration is made in regard to the recovery
of attorney's fees as an item of damage (Art. 2208). But
the two enumerations differ in the case of a clearly
unfounded suit, which is expressly mentioned in Art.
2208 (par. 4), as justifying an award of attorney's fees,
but is not included in the enumeration of Art.2219 in
respect to moral damages.
- Art. 2219 also provides that moral damages may be
awarded in analogous cases to those enumerated, but
we do not think the Code intended a clearly unfounded
civil action or proceedings to be one of these
analogous cases wherein moral damages may be
recovered, or it would have expressly mentioned it in
Art.2219, as it did in Art.2208; or else incorporated
Art.2208 by reference in Art.2219.
- Art.2219 specifically mentions quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries, as an instance when moral damages
may be allowed, thereby implying that all other quasidelicts not resulting in physical injuries are excluded,
excepting, the special torts referred to in Art.309, par. 9,
Art.2219 and in Arts.21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and
35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art.
2219).
- While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order
that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of
indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is,
nevertheless, essential that the claimant satisfactorily
prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage
(Art.2217) and its causal relation to the defendants acts
prof. casis
because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary
estimation, are in the category of an award designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and
not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
- The trial court and the CA both seem to be of the
opinion that the mere fact that respondents were sued
without any legal foundation entitled them to an award
of moral damages, hence they made no definite finding
as to what the supposed moral damages suffered consist
of. Such a conclusion would make of moral damages a
penalty, which they are not, rather than a compensation
for actual injury suffered, which they are intended to be.
Moral damages, in other words, are not corrective or
exemplary damages.
Disposition the dismissal order is affirmed with
modification that only attys fees are awarded to
respondents.
PEOPLE V BUGAYONG
PANGANIBAN; December 2, 1998
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of RTC Baguio
FACTS
- Alberto Cauan and Leticia Yu Cauan were married and
had 3 children, ALBERT, HONEYLET and ARLENE,
the private complainant herein. The spouses separated.
Albert and Arlene stayed with their mother Leticia
while Honeylet stayed with her grandmother Anita Yu.
Later, Alberto and Leticia started living together with
another woman and another man respectively. Leticia
cohabited with the accused RODELIO BUGAYONG
and had a child, CATHERINE BUGAYONG.
- the accused RODELIO BUGAYONG had ARLENE
hold his penis inside the room he shared with Leticia.
At that time CATHERINE who was 6yrs. old was also
inside the same room and her father, the accused was
letting her sleep. Bugayong threatened to maim Arlene
if she did not hold his penis. When the penis was
already hard and stiff, he placed it inside the mouth of
Arlene and a white substance came out from the penis.
CATHERINE saw this incident.
torts & damages

- Arlene Cauan accompanied by her father Alberto
Cauan and her aunt Marilyn Yu, Carmelita Yu and Rosie
Yu went to the NBI to file a complaint.
- Arlene gave her sworn statement. Alberto Cauan also
gave his sworn statement.
- Arlene testified that her stepfather had been doing the
same act when she was still in Grade 3 and was nine
years old. She also said that there were occasions when
BUGAYONG played first with his penis then touched
her vagina with his penis until a white substance came
out of it and that was the time BUGAYONG would pull
back his penis. Arlene said that the penis of
BUGAYONG partly entered [her] vagina and she got
hurt.
- The trial court held that the accused raped the victim
in 1993, not in 1994. Notwithstanding the rather
encompassing allegation in the Information that the
crime was committed before and until October 15,
1994, the trial court ruled that it could legally convict
the accused for the crime committed in 1993. The
primordial consideration in determining the sufficiency
of the averment in the Information as to time is whether
the accused was accorded the opportunity to prepare a
defense. In this case, the trial court observed that he
was not so deprived. Furthermore, it noted that the
Information charged more than one offense, but that the
accused failed to interpose an opposition.
- The Information charged appellant with statutory rape
committed before and until October 15, 1994 xxx
several times. In the instant appeal, accused asserts
that this allegation regarding the date of the commission
of the offense violated his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
- Appellant claims a violation of his constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. He maintains that he was unable to
prepare properly for his defense or to anticipate the
evidence to be controverted
ISSUE
WON accused may be convicted of rape committed in
1993, under the present Information, which accused
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- PAGE 77 -
him of committing the said crime before and until

October 15, 1994 xxx several times.
HELD
YES
Ratio Indeed, the determinative factor in the resolution
of the question involving a variance between allegation
and proof in respect of the date of the crime is the
element of surprise on the part of the accused and his
corollary inability to defend himself properly. The
records of this case belie appellants claim of surprise.
Reasoning
- It is doctrinal that the precise time of the commission
of an offense need not be alleged in the complaint or
information, unless time is an essential element of the
crime
charged.
HYPERLINK
ec1998/126518.htm" \l "_edn10" \o ""
- If vagueness afflicted the aforementioned text of the
Information, it was cured by the victims Sworn
Statement, which was expressly made an integral part
of the Information. The victim categorically alleged
that she had been raped by appellant in 1993 when she
was in grade three
- Furthermore, appellant could not have been oblivious
to the victims Sworn Statement, for he requested and
was given an opportunity to rebut the same in his
Motion for Reinvestigation.
- It will be noted that appellant was charged with rape
committed before and until October 15, 1994 xxx
several times. Said acts are alleged in only one
Information which, as a general rule, is defective for
charging more than one offense. HYPERLINK
ec1998/126518.htm" \l "_edn19" \o "" However,
appellant failed, within the prescribed period, to file
such motion on the ground of duplicity. He is thus
deemed to have waived the defect in the Information.
- appellant cannot be said to have been deprived of his
constitutional right to be informed of the accusation
against him. Despite the duplicitous nature of the
Information, he did not object to such defect.
Moreover, he was given the chance to defend himself in
court and to cross-examine the complainant.
prof. casis
- the Court rigorously examined the records and arrived
upon the conclusion that his guilt had been established
beyond reasonable doubt. The victims clear,
categorical and straightforward testimony indubitably
demonstrated the culpability of appellant for
the dastardly acts committed before and until October
15, 1994
- The foregoing shows that appellant sexually assaulted
complainant in 1993 when she was 10 years old. Thus,
the trial court correctly convicted him of statutory rape
under Article 335 (3) of the RPC. Moreover, appellant
is also guilty of acts of lasciviousness committed on
October 15, 1995.
- The trial court correctly awarded P50,000 as
indemnity ex delicto, an amount which is automatically
granted to the offended party without need of further
evidence other than the fact of the commission of rape.
HYPERLINK
ec1998/126518.htm" \l "_edn22" \o ""
- Consistent with recent jurisprudence, appellant should
also be ordered to pay the victim the additional amount
of P50,000 as moral damages. In People v. Prades,
HYPERLINK
ec1998/126518.htm" \l "_edn23" \o "" the Court
resolved that moral damages may additionally be
awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in
such amount as the Court deems just, without the need
for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has
heretofore been the practice.
Disposition The appeal is hereby DENIED and the
assailed Decision is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that Appellant Rodelio Bugayong is
ordered to pay Complainant Arlene Cauan P50,000 as
indemnity and the additional amount of P50,000 as
moral damages.
FRANCISCO V GSIS
torts & damages

7 SCRA 577
REYES JBL; March 30, 1963
NATURE
Appeal by the Government Service Insurance System
from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
FACTS
- CFI ordered GSIS to abide by the terms of the contract
created by plaintiff's offer and its unconditional
acceptance, with costs against the GSIS. Trinidad J.
Francisco (plaintiff) appealed separately (L-18155),
because the trial court did not award the P535,000.00
damages and attorney's fees she claimed.
- October 10,1956: Trinidad J. Francisco mortgaged in
favor of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
a parcel of land containing an area of 18,232 square
meters, with twenty-one (21) bungalows, known as VicMari Compound. This was in consideration of a loan in
the amount of P400K, out of which the sum of
P336,100.00 was released to her.
- January 6, 1959: GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgage on the ground that up to that date Francisco
was in arrears on her monthly installments in the
amount of P52,000.00. Payments made by the plaintiff
at the time of foreclosure amounted to P130,000.00.
GSIS itself was the buyer of the property in the
foreclosure sale.
- February 20, 1959: the plaintiff's father, Atty. Vicente
J. Francisco, sent a letter to the general manager of the
defendant corporation, Mr. Rodolfo P. Andal, proposing
to pay said amount of P30,000 to the GSIS if it would
agree that after such payment the foreclosure of my
daughter's mortgage would be set aside. As for the
balance, Atty. Francisco proposed for GSIS to take over
the administration of the mortgaged property and to
collect the monthly installments, amounting to about
P5,000, until the balance is paid.
- February 20 1959: Atty. Francisco received a telegram
containing an approval of his request. It was signed by
Andal.
- February 28 1959: Atty. Francisco remitted to GSIS,
through Andal, a check for P30K. GSIS received the
amount of P30K, and issued an official receipt No.
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- PAGE 77 -
1209874, dated 4 March 1959. It did not, however, take

over the administration of the compound (as was
proposed by Atty. Francisco).
- Remittances, all accompanied by letters,
corresponding to the months of March, April, May, and
June, 1960 and totalling P24,604.81 were also sent by
Francisco to GSIS from time to time, all of which were
received and duly receipted for.
- Then the System sent three (3) letters, one dated 29
January 1960, which was signed by its assistant general
manager, and the other two letters, dated 19 and 26
February 1960, respectively, which were signed by
Andal, asking the plaintiff for a proposal for the
payment of her indebtedness, since according to the
System the one-year period for redemption had expired.
Respondents Comment
> The remittances previously made by Atty. Francisco
were allegedly not sufficient to pay off her daughter's
arrears, including attorney's fees incurred by the
defendant in foreclosing the mortgage.
ISSUES
1. WON the telegram generated a contract that is valid
and binding upon the parties
2. WON Francisco is entitled to damages (moral
damages in the outline)
HELD
1. YES, the contract is binding.
Ratio If a corporation knowingly permits one of its
officers, or any other agent, to do acts within the scope
of an apparent authority, and thus holds him out to the
public as possessing power to do those acts, the
corporation will, as against any one who has in good
faith dealt with the corporation through such agent, be
estopped from denying his authority
Reasoning
- GSIS does not disown the telegram, and even asserts
that it came from its offices, as may be gleaned from the
letter, dated 31 May 1960, to Atty. Francisco, and
signed "R. P. Andal, general manager by Leovigildo
Monasterial, legal counsel.
prof. casis
- In remitting the payment of P30,000 advanced by her
father, Trinidads letter to Mr. Andal quoted verbatim
the telegram of acceptance Mr. Andal sent.
- Notwithstanding this notice, the defendant System
pocketed the amount, and kept silent about the telegram
not being in accordance with the true facts, as it now
alleges. This silence, taken together with the
unconditional acceptance of three other subsequent
remittances from plaintiff, constitutes in itself a binding
ratification of the original agreement.
2. NO, Francisco is not entitled to damages.
- The court a quo correctly refused to award such actual
or compensatory damages because it could not
determine with reasonable certainty the difference
between the offered price and the actual value of the
property.
- Without proof the Court cannot assume, or take
judicial notice, as suggested by the plaintiff, that the
practice of lending institutions in the country is to give
out as loan 60% of the actual value of the collateral.
- There was no error in the appealed decision in denying
moral damages, not only on account of the plaintiff's
failure to take the witness stand and testify to her social
humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety, etc., as the
decision holds, but primarily because a breach of
contract like that of defendant, not being malicious or
fraudulent, does not warrant the award of moral
damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
ART. 2220
Disposition The appealed decision if affirmed, with
costs against GSIS.
EXPERT TRAVEL & TOURS INC V CA (LO)
VITUG; June 25, 1999
NATURE
Petitioner, Expertravel and Tours, Inc., seeks in the
instant petition for review on certiorari a modification
of the decision, dated 20 March 1997, of the Court of
Appeals affirming in toto the 07th November 1994
judgment of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 5) of
Manila declaring the instant suit DISMISSED, and
ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant Ricardo Lo
moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; attorney's
torts & damages

fees in the amount of P10,000.00, and to pay the costs
of the suit.
FACTS
- On 07 October 1987, Expertravel & Tours, Inc.,
("Expertravel"), a domestic corporation engaged in the
travel agency business, issued to private respondent
Ricardo Lo four round-trip plane tickets for Hongkong,
together with hotel accommodations and transfers, for a
total cost of P39,677.20. Alleging that Lo had failed to
pay the amount due, Expertravel caused several
demands to be made. Since the demands were ignored
by Lo, Expertravel filed a court complaint for recovery
of the amount claimed plus damages.
- Respondent Lo explained, in his answer, that his
account with Expertravel had already been fully paid.
The outstanding account was remitted to Expertravel
through its then Chairperson, Ms. Ma. Rocio de Vega,
who was theretofore authorized to deal with the clients
of Expertravel. The payment was evidenced by a Monte
de Piedad Check No. 291559, dated 06 October 1987,
for P42,175.20 for which Ms. de Vega, in turn, issued
City Trust Check No. 417920 in favor of Expertravel
for the amount of P50,000.00, with the notation
"placement advance for Ricardo Lo, etc." Per its own
invoice, Expertravel received the sum on 10 October
1987.
- The trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, held
that the payment made by Lo was valid and binding on
petitioner Expertravel. Even on the assumption that Ms.
de Vega had not been specifically authorized by
Expertravel, both courts said, the fact that the amount
"delivered to the latter remain(ed) in its possession up
to the present, mean(t) that the amount redounded to the
benefit of petitioner Expertravel, in view of the second
paragraph of Article 1241 of the Civil Code to the effect
that payment made to a third person shall also be valid
in so far as it has redounded to the benefit of the
creditor."
ISSUE
WON moral damages be awarded for negligence or
quasi-delict that did not result to physical injury to the
offended party
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- PAGE 77 -
HELD
NO
Ratio Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are
designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury
unjustly caused to a person. Although incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages, nevertheless,
must somehow be proportional to and in approximation
of the suffering inflicted. Such damages, to be
recoverable, must be the proximate result of a wrongful
act or omission the factual basis for which is
satisfactorily established by the aggrieved party.
- An award of moral damages would require certain
conditions to be met; to wit:
(1) First, there must be an injury, whether physical,
mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the
claimant;
(2) second, there must be a culpable act or omission
factually established;
(3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant
is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of damages is
predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219.
OTHER GROUNDS FOR THE AWARD OF MORAL
DAMAGES
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
"1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
"2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
"3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious
acts;
"4) Adultery or concubinage;
"5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
"6) Illegal search;
"7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
"8) Malicious prosecution;
"9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
"10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26,
27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
prof. casis
"The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped,
or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this Article, may
also recover moral damages.
"The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers
and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9
of this Article, in the order named."
- Under the provisions of this law, in culpa contractual
or breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered
when the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of
gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton
disregard of his contractual obligation and,
exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself
is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries. By
special rule in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206,
of the Civil Code, moral damages may also be awarded
in case the death of a passenger results from a breach of
carriage. In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict,
(a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or
(b) where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, [In
this latter case, moral damages may be recovered even
in loss of or damage to property.] moral damages may
aptly be recovered.
- This rule also applies, as aforestated, to contracts
when breached by tort. In culpa criminal, moral
damages could be lawfully due when the accused is
found guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts,
adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention,
illegal arrest, illegal search, or defamation. Malicious
prosecution can also give rise to a claim for moral
damages. The term "analogous cases," referred to in
Article 2219, following the ejusdem generis rule, must
be held similar to those expressly enumerated by the
law.
- Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil
suit can at times be a legal justification for an award of
attorney's fees, [Article 2208(4), Civil Code; such
filing, however, has almost invariably been held not to
be a ground for an award of moral damages. The
rationale for the rule is that the law could not have
meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. The
anguish suffered by a person for having been made a
defendant in a civil suit would be no different from the
usual worry and anxiety suffered by anyone who is
haled to court, a situation that cannot by itself be a
torts & damages

cogent reason for the award of moral damages. If the
rule were otherwise, then moral damages must every
time be awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant
against an unsuccessful plaintiff.
- The Court confirms, once again, the foregoing rules.
Disposition petition is GRANTED and the award of
moral damages to respondent Ricardo Lo under the
assailed decision is DELETED. In its other aspects, the
appealed decision shall remain undisturbed. No costs.
MIJARES V CA (METRO DRUG INC)
271 SCRA 558
KAPUNAN; April 18, 1997
NATURE
FACTS
- Dioscoro Lamenta, salesman/collector of Metro
Manila Drug Inc.
- Mijares as owners of Aklan Drug had been buying
pharmaceutical products from Metro Drug since 1976.
They had good record with Metro Drug.
- Editha Mijares, aside from being the operator of Aklan
Drug, was also an officer of the Ospital Ng Maynila
Consumers Cooperative, Inc., which became a
concessionaire of a small area right inside the hospital
compound and it operated a drugstore. Said drugstore
had some transactions with the plaintiff as supplier of
pharmaceutical products. Subsequently the Cooperative
was dissolved and it stopped operating. Solomon
Silverio, Jr. leased from the City of Manila the site
previously occupied by the Cooperative and put up a
drugstore on the same.
- Lamenta delivered pharmaceutical products to the
said store (8 times).
- The first to the seventh deliveries were received by
Luz Espares,the 8th delivery was received by Hilda
Rodrigona. Both were never the employees of the
defendants.
- In partial payment of these receivables Solomon
Silverio, Jr. issued a check under the account name
Farmacia delos Remedios in the amount of P14,180.46,
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- PAGE 77 -
prof. casis
which was subsequently dishonored on the ground of

insufficient fund.
- Metro Drug went after Mijares demanding full
redemption of the dishonored check and full payment of
outstanding account for P27,938.06.
- When Lamenta tried to collect from Editha Mijares for
the disputed claim, Editha Mijares referred him to Mr.
Silverio as the new operator and concessionaire of the
drugstore. She informed him verbally that they have no
more business inside the Ospital ng Maynila as the
cooperative drugstore has already stopped operations.
Despite said verbal notice, the demand telegram
addressed to Aklan Drug was still sent to Editha
Mijares. On Lamenta's follow-up of said telegram,
Editha Mijares again directed Lamenta to see Solomon
Silverio, the new owner of the drugstore.
- RTC: Complaint dismissed; plaintiff ordered to pay
the defendants P30,000.00 for moral damages and
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees
CA: Reversed
person, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing

that the charge was false and baseless (Manila Gas
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602
[1980]).
- Mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable for
malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful, for
the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the
right to litigate (Ponce v. Legaspi, 208 SCRA 377
[1992]; Saba v. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 50
[1990]); Rubio v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488
[1986]).
- Moral damages cannot be recovered from a person
who has filed a complaint against another in good faith,
or without malice or bad faith (Philippine National
Bank v. Court of Appeals, 159 SCRA 433 [1988]; R &
B Surety and Insurance v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
129 SCRA 736 [1984]).
- If damage results from the filing of the complaint, it is
damnum absque injuria (Ilocos Norte Electrical
Company v. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989]).
ISSUE
WON moral damages should be awarded to the Mijares
spouses (bec of malicious prosecution)
DE LA PEA V CA (TAN)
231 SCRA 456
BELLOSILLO; March 28, 1994
HELD
NO
- Settled in our jurisprudence is the rule that moral
damages cannot be recovered from a person who has
filed a complaint against another in good faith, or
without malice or bad faith (Philippine National Bank v.
Court of Appeals, 159 SCRA 433 [1988]; R & B Surety
and Insurance v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129
SCRA 736 [1984]).
Reasoning
- Mijares spouses failed to show that private respondent
was motivated by bad faith when it instituted the action
for collection.
- In China Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals it
was held that Malicious prosecution, both in criminal
and civil cases, requires the presence of two elements,
to wit: a) malice; and b) absence of probable cause.
Moreover, there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of CA dismissing petitioners
action for reconveyance with damages against private
respondent.
FACTS
- Pantaleon De La Pena imputes fraud and
misrepresentation to private respondent Herotido Tan in
securing Free Patent No. (XI-6) 1326 and OCT No. P7923 over the same.
- Ciriaco Reducto was occupying a 24-hectare parcel of
land in Sulongvale, Sulop, Davao del Norte (previously
Padada, Tanwalang, Davao), designated as Lot No.
5714, for which he filed Homestead Application No.
192495 (E-100806) with the Bureau of Lands.
- However, another party also filed a Homestead
Application for the same.
- Ciriaco transferred his possessory rights over six (6)
hectares (later increased to eight [8]) of Lot 5714 to
torts & damages

petitioner Pantaleon de la Pea who thereafter entered
his appearance in the administrative case when the
portion transferred to him remained included in the
homestead applications of Ciriaco Reducto and
Potenciano Nazaret. After it was ascertained in a field
verification that petitioner had a better right to acquire
the portion claimed by him being its actual occupant
and cultivator, the Director of Lands directed petitioner
to apply for the portion himself within sixty (60) days
after its survey or else "lose his preferential right
thereto." However, no such application was filed.
- Meanwhile, on 7 March 1950, Ciriaco transferred his
rights over another 1 1/2-hectare portion of Lot 5714 to
Michael Doble who in turn sold his rights in 1956 to
Ricardo Tan, herein private respondent's father. The
portion sold to Michael Doble, and later on acquired by
Ricardo Tan, became the western boundary of de la
Pea's land.
- On 24 and 25 August 1970, a survey was conducted
and it was discovered that the land occupied by
petitioner was bigger by 3/4 of a hectare than what he
actually bought and paid for from Ciriaco. On the other
hand, the land ceded to Doble (later acquired by Tan)
was "very much smaller" than what he actually bought.
- Although the 3/4-hectare portion was part of the area
acquired by Doble in 1950, it was petitioner de la Pea
who cultivated the same without objection from Doble.
However, when Ricardo Tan acquired the lot on 2
March 1956, he built a fence to reclaim the portion, but
petitioner kept destroying it; hence, the start of a
boundary dispute.
- On 5 May 1975, Ricardo Tan transferred his rights
over Lot 5714-C to his son, private respondent Herotido
Tan, by means of "Affidavit of Relinquishment." But
the conflict over the 3/4-hectare portion continued. In
an effort to resolve the conflict, a relocation survey was
agreed upon except that the parties failed to agree on a
common surveyor. Consequently, each party had to hire
his own. Petitioner's surveyor conducted a relocation
survey on 18 April 1977, while respondent's surveyor
conducted his own five (5) days later. After it was
determined that the 3/4-hectare portion was within
Lot 5714-C of private respondent, the latter built a
fence around the property to prevent petitioner from
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- PAGE 77 -
entering. The sugarcane and bananas planted by

petitioner were destroyed in the process.
- On 29 April 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for
forcible entry against Ricardo Tan in the Municipal
Trial Court of Sulop. When it was discovered that
private respondent Herotido Tan was the registered
owner of Lot 5714-C under OCT No. P-7923 which
was issued pursuant to Free Patent No. (XI-6) 1326
dated 15 September 1975, the complaint was
accordingly amended to implead him.
- The MTC and CFI ruled in favor of petitioner and
ordered that possession be restored to the petitioner..
- On 18 July 1977, during the pendency of the forcible
entry case, petitioner instituted the present action for
reconveyance with damages against private respondent
in the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur and Davao
City.
-Petitioner alleged that private respondent fraudulently
registered the 3/4-hectare portion actually cultivated by
him when the former stated in his free patent
application that "the land applied for is not claimed or
occupied by any other person." In addition, petitioner
denied that a survey was conducted in 1970; if at all, it
was merely a "table survey." Incidentally, it was
discovered in the survey that the area of petitioner's
actual occupation exceeded that which he bought from
Ciriaco Reducto in 1946.
- After trial, the court rejected petitioner's denial of the
1970 Survey. Since the disputed 3/4-hectare portion was
not part of the area bought and paid for in 1946 by
petitioner, the latter was not entitled to reconveyance.
Petitioner was declared a mere trespasser and planter in
bad faith who was "enjoying freely the use of
government property" without even applying for the
same nor paying taxes thereon. His prayer for
P5,000.00 as actual damages for the sugarcane and
bananas destroyed on the disputed portion was denied.
Instead, private respondent's counterclaim was
granted and petitioner was ordered to pay P6,000.00
in attorney's fees and expenses of litigation,
P15,000.00 for moral damages, and the costs of the
proceedings.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed decision
in toto.
prof. casis
ISSUES
1. WON petitioner has legal standing in the suit
2. WON the award for attorney's fees, moral damages
and expenses of litigation against the petitioner are
proper
HELD
1. NO
- Petitioner Pantaleon de la Pea has absolutely no
standing to institute the present suit for reconveyance.
2. NO
Ratio It is well-settled that reconveyance is a remedy
granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be
erroneously titled in another's name. In the case at
bench, petitioner does not claim to be the owner of the
disputed portion. Admittedly, what he has is only a
"preferential right" to acquire ownership thereof by
virtue of his actual occupation since January 1947.
However, petitioner's possession is not one that could
ripen into ownership. Title to alienable public lands can
be established through open, continuous, and exclusive
possession for at least thirty (30) years. It must be noted
that the dispute regarding the 3/4-hectare portion started
even before a free patent and OCT could be issued to
private respondent in 1975. As early as 1956, the
controversy already began between petitioner and
private respondent's father. Hence, petitioner's
possession falls short of the required period. Not being
the owner, petitioner cannot maintain the present suit.
- An award for attorney's fees and moral damages on
the sole basis of an action later declared to be
unfounded in the absence of a deliberate intent to cause
prejudice to the other party is improper. The right to
litigate is so precious that a Penalty should not be
charged on those who may exercise it erroneously.
Disposition Affirmed, with the sole modification that
the award for attorney's fees, expenses of litigation, and
moral damages is DELETED.
J MARKETING V SIA
285 SCRA 580
FRANCISCO; January 29, 1998
torts & damages

NATURE
Appeal from decision of CA
FACTS
- J Marketing was company engaged in the business of
appliances and motorcycles. It received from Kawasaki
motors one brand new, color blue motorcycle, which
was stored in the company bodega. However (4 years
after receipt), the company found out that the
motorcycle was missing, and immediately reported this
to the police.
- The companys representative, Caludac, tried to trace
the lost motorcycle to Felicidad SIa (defendant herein),
who brought a motorcycle from a Renato Pelande.
Allegedly, Caludac went to the house of Sia and
examined the chasis and motor numbers of the
motorcycle in his possession, and found out that the
chasis and motor numbers have been tampered with to
jibe with the chais and motor numbers of a
motorcycle previously purchased by Pelande from J
Mktg.
- When Caludac confronted Sia about the questionable
motorcycle, Sia refused to surrender possession of the
motorcycle and instead told Caludac to file a case in
court. Hence, J mktg filed a complaint for replevin
against Sia. Sia, in turn, filed a 3 rd party complaint
against Pelante (which was subsequently declared in
default).
- RTC dismissed J mktgs complaint but awarded
damages (moral and exemplary) and attys fees. CA
affirmed RTCs decision.
ISSUE
WON award of moral and exemplary damages and
attys fees is proper
HELD
1. NO
Ratio No damages can be charged on those who may
exercise their rights in good faith, even if done
erroneously.
Reasoning
- A person's right to litigate should not be penalized by
holding him liable for damages. This is especially true
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when the filing of the case is to enforce what he

believes to be his rightful claim against another
although found to be erroneous.
- J mktg precisely instituted the replevin case against
Sia based on the latter's own challenge to the former
that if they really had a right on the motorcycle, then
they should institute the necessary case in court. When J
mktg, through Caludac, did sue Sia, it cannot be said
that the institution of the replevin suit was tainted with
gross and evident bad faith or was done maliciously to
harass, embarrass, annoy or ridicule Sia.
- Moreover, the adverse result of an action - dismissal
of petitioner's complaint - does not per se make an act
unlawful and subject the actor to the payment of moral
damages. It is not a sound public policy to place a
premium on the right to litigate.
- The award of exemplary damages has likewise no
factual basis. It is a requisite that the act must be
accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent
or malevolent manner - circumstances which are absent
in this case. In addition, exemplary damages cannot be
awarded as the requisite element of compensatory
damages was not present.
- With respect to the attorney's fees, an adverse decision
does not ipso facto justify the award thereof to the
winning party. Everything points to the fact that
petitioner honestly thought that they had a good cause
of action, so that notwithstanding the dismissal of their
case, no attorney's fees can be granted to private
respondent.
- Considering that Sia claims to be the owner of the
motorcycle, J mktg was compelled to sue him. When
Sia "necessarily" became a party defendant no
attorney's fees and litigation expenses can automatically
be recovered even if he should win, as it is not the fact
of winning alone that entitles recovery of such items but
rather the attendance of special circumstances - the
enumerated exceptions in Article 2208 NCC.
- There being no bad faith reflected in petitioner's
persistence in pursuing its case, other than an erroneous
conviction of the righteousness of its cause, attorney's
fees cannot not be recovered as cost.
Disposition Decision of CA AFFIRMED
prof. casis
COMETA V CA (MACLI-ING ET AL)
301 SCRA 459
MENDOZA; December 29, 1999
FACTS
- 1989 > SITI and Cometa filed a criminal case against
Guevara for falsification of Public Documents (State
Investment House, Inc. vs. Reynaldo S. Guevara) The
basis of the aforesaid case is a forged Affidavit of
Undertaking with its application of a License to Sell its
townhouse units in the RSG CondominiumGueventville II. The signature therein purporting to be
that of Cometa is not Cometas signature.
- Consequently, a criminal information was filed against
Guevara in RTC Makati (People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff, vs. Reynaldo s. Guevara, Accused)
- Upon the filing of the information, a Warrant of Arrest
was issued against Guevara. Guevara posted the
necessary bail bond and the warrant for his arrest was
lifted.
- After the prosecution had rested its case, Guevara filed
a Motion to Dismiss on a Demurrer to the Evidence,
contending that all the evidence submitted by the
prosecution do not suffice to show that he had
committed the crime for which he has been accused
- March 26, 1992 - RTC Makati issued an order,
granting Guevara's Motion to Dismiss on a Demurrer to
the Evidence and ordered the dismissal of the criminal
case for falsification of public documents against him
- it is clear that the defendants had maliciously
prosecuted Guevara, to his and HBI's embarassment,
damage and prejudice. The criminal case filed by the
defendants against Guevara had absolutely no basis in
fact and in law. Quite clearly, defendants had filed the
aforesaid case with the sole intent of harassing and
pressuring Guevara, in his capacity as Chairman of
GIDC, to give in to their illicit and malicious desire to
appropriate the remaining unsold properties of GIDC
and/or to influence the appellate courts to decide in
their favor, their appeal of the lower court's decision in
the GIDC case.
ISSUE
WON requisites for malicious prosecution are present
torts & damages

HELD
YES
- a complaint for malicious prosecution states a cause of
action if it alleges the following:
(1) that the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that
at least the prosecution was instituted at his instance;
(2) that the prosecution finally terminated in the
acquittal of the plaintiff;
(3) that in bringing the action the prosecutor acted
without probable cause; and
(4) that the prosecutor was actuated by malice, i.e. by
improper and sinister motives
- first TWO requisites are sufficiently alleged in the
complaint.
- the FOURTH requisite malice in which a a general
averment is sufficient in view of Rule 8, 5 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure. Petitioners filed the criminal case
for the purpose of harassing and pressuring Guevarra, in
his capacity as chairman of Guevent Industrial
Development Corporation (GIDC), to give in to their
illicit and malicious desire to appropriate the remaining
unsold properties of the corporation, may be considered
sufficient.
- To be sure, lack of probable cause is an element
separate and distinct from that of malice. It follows,
therefore, that one cannot be held liable in damages for
maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted
with probable cause.
- Obviously, a determination that there was no probable
cause cannot be made to rest solely on the fact that the
trial court, acting on private respondent Guevarra's
demurrer to evidence, dismissed the criminal
prosecution, just as it cannot be made to turn on the fact
that the Department of Justice reversed the fiscal's
findings and ordered the criminal case against private
respondent Guevarra to be filed in court. The first
would transform all acquittals into veritable
countersuits for malicious prosecution. On the other
hand, the second would result in the dismissal of all
complaints for malicious prosecutions.
- Accordingly, the inquiry should be whether sufficient
facts are alleged showing that in bringing the criminal
action, the defendant in the civil action for malicious
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prosecution acted without probable cause. This Court

has ruled that for purposes of malicious prosecution,
"probable cause" means "such facts and circumstances
as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting
on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he
was prosecuted." Buchanan v. Vda. de Esteban. In this
case, even if we consider the allegations in the
complaint as true, as well as the order of the trial court
annexed thereto, we do not find the same sufficient to
establish the absence of probable cause.
- To prove that the subject UNDERTAKING (Exhibit
"N") is falsified, the prosecution presented the
testimony of complaining witness REYNALDO
COMETA to prove that as President of the STATE
INVESTMENT he did not execute the document of
undertaking and thus, the subject document (Exhibit
"N") is falsified and his signature thereat is not his
signature. To corroborate the testimony of COMETA,
the NBI handwriting expert LUZVIMINDA C.
SABADO, submitted the questioned Documents Report
No. 278-688 dated 21 June 1988 to show that the
signature above the name of COMETA in the subject
undertaking (Exhibit "N") and the specimen signatures
of COMETA WERE not written by one and the same
person (Exhibit "Y").
- To prove that accused falsified and/or caused the
falsification of the subject undertaking (Exhibit "N"),
the prosecution presented the records of the HOUSING
BOARD which include the "Official Form" letterapplication (Exhibit "J") submitted by accused together
with the required documents enumerated therein which
supposedly included the undertaking to release
mortgage. The testimony of a HOUSING BOARD
official, Ms. Floredeliza Manuel was presented to
testify as an official of the HOUSING BOARD the
standard procedure is that the BOARD requires from
applicants for authority such as that applied for by
accused, the following requirements were quoted by the
prosecution in page 5 of their OPPOSITION and
reproduced hereunder:
- there is neither direct nor circumstantial evidence to
prove that accused is the author of this falsified
document
prof. casis
- trial court ruled that the evidence for the prosecution
did not establish "a prima facie case against accused
private private respondent Reynaldo Guevarra."
However, prima facie evidence is different from
probable cause. Prima facie evidence requires a degree
or quantum of proof greater than probable cause. "It
denotes evidence which, if unexplained or
uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a prosecution or
establish the facts, as to counterbalance the presumption
of innocence and warrant the conviction of the
accused." On the other hand, probable cause for the
filing of an information merely means "reasonable
ground for belief in the existence of facts warranting the
proceedings complained of, or an apparent state of facts
found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which would
induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to
believe that the accused person has committed the
crime." What is needed to bring an action in court is
simply probable cause, not prima facie evidence. In the
terminology of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, what is
required for bringing a criminal action is only such
evidence as is sufficient to "engender a well founded
belief as to the facts of the commission of a crime and
the respondent's probable guilt thereof.
Disposition petitioners' motion for reconsideration is
GRANTED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED, and the complaint against petitioners is
DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action.
INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE COMPANY V
BONDAD
PANGANIBAN; 2000
NATURE
Petition for review under Rule 45 assailing the decision
of the CA
FACTS
- The suit arose from a traffic incident which involved a
Sigma Galant car owned by one Grace Ladaw Morales,
a packed passenger jeepney driven by Ligorio Bondad
but owned by Pablo Bondad, and a BD Tansit bus
driven by Eduardo Mendoza. The incident happened at
South Expressway on December 17, 1984.
torts & damages

- Industrial Insurance brought suit against both the
drivers and owners of the passenger jeep and the bus
contending that they were the sole and proximate cause
of the damages done on their clients Sigma Gallant
thru joint gross and wanton negligence, careless,
imprudence of the drivers and the owners failure to
exercise the diligence required from them by law in the
selection and supervision of their respective drivers.
- In their defense, the Bondads claimed that at the time
of the accident, their jeepney was on full stop on the
right shoulder of the road because of the flat tire. And
that there was therefore no fault or negligence on their
part.
- The trial court found in favor of the Bondads and
orderedthe petitioner to pay them actual, moral, and
exemplary damages. The CA affirmed the findings of
the trial court citing the investigation report made by
the policeman that the damage on the car of Morales
was caused by the DM bus and not by the jeepney of
the Bondads. It was concluded by the CA that based on
the evidence, the proximate cause of the damage to the
car was the negligence of the driver of the DM bus and
that the petitioner had no cause of action against the
Bondads. The CA agreed that the defendants were
entitled to their counterclaims in view of the fact that
the insurance company did not verify the facts before
impleading the defendants. Thus, the action brought
against them resulted not only in inconvenience but also
in unnecessary expenses, including expenses for
atorneys fees. The CA reduced the damages that were
awarded.
- The petitioners filed this motion for review by the the
SC.
ISSUE
WON the award of moral and exemplary damages are
proper
HELD
YES
- In impleading the defendants, the petitioner clearly
acted in wanton disregard of the facts that were very
obvious. This carelessness and lack of diligence
destroyed their claim of good faith. While the court
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uphelds the right of any person to litigate without fear

of penalty, this right should be exercised in good faith.
Reasoning
- As the defendants were compelled to hire the services
of a lawyer to defend themselves against the unjustified
suit, it is only proper that this cost be shouldered by the
petitioner.
- The award of moral damages was affirmed as it was
shown that the defendants suffered injury which sprung
from the unjustified act of the petitioner in bring the
suit. The SC clarified however that mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feeling, social humiliation are
not enough to grant moral damages. It said that it must
be shown that the acts, as in this case, must have been
tainted with bad faith or ill motives.
- The Award for exemplary damages, which are
imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good, was likewise affirmed due to the petitioners
conduct that needlessly dragged innocent bystanders
into an unfounded litigation.
Disposition Petition denied. Order appealed from is
affirmed.
TRIPLE EIGHT INTEGRATED SERVICES, INC
V NLRC
299 SCRA 608
ROMERO; December 3, 1998
NATURE
FACTS
- In August 1992, private respondent Osdana was
recruited by petitioner for employment with the latters
principal, Gulf Catering Company (GCC), a firm based
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Under the original
employment contract, Osdana was engaged to work as
Food Server for a period of thirty-six (36) months
with a salary of five hundred fifty Saudi rials.
- Osdana claims she was required by petitioner to pay a
total of P11,950.00 in placement fees and other charges,
for which no receipt was issued. She was likewise
asked to undergo a medical examination conducted by
the Philippine Medical Tests System, a duly accredited
prof. casis
clinic for overseas workers, which found her to be Fit
of Employment.
- Petitioner asked Osdana to sign another ContractorEmployee Agreement which provided that she would
be employed as a waitress for twelve (12) months with
a salary of two hundred eighty US dollars ($280). It
was this employment agreement which was approved
by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA).
- Osdana left for Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and commenced
working for GCC. She was assigned to the College of
Public Administration of the Oleysha University and,
contrary to the terms and conditions of the employment
contract, was made to wash dishes, cooking pots, and
utensils, perform janitorial work and other tasks which
were unrelated to her job designation as waitress. She
was made to work a gruelling twelve-hour shift, without
overtime pay.
- Osdana suffered from numbness and pain in her arms.
The pain was such that she had to be confined at a
housing facility of GCC from June 18 to August 22,
1993, during which period, she was not paid her
salaries.
- Osdana was allowed to resume work, this time as
Food Server and Cook at the Hota Bani Tameem
Hospital, where she worked seven days a week from
August 22 to October 5, 1993. Again, she was not
compensated.
- Then, from October 6 to October 23, 1993, Osdana
was again confined for no apparent reason. During this
period, she was still not paid her salary.
- On October 24, 1993, she was re-assigned to the
Oleysha University to wash dishes and do other menial
tasks. Osdana worked long hours and under harsh
conditions. She was diagnosed as having Bilateral
Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, a condition precipitated by
activities requiring repeated flexion, pronation, and
supination of the wrist and characterized by
excruciating pain and numbness in the arms.
- Osdana underwent two surgical operations. Between
these operations, she was not given any work
assignments even if she was willing and able to do light
work in accordance with her doctors advice. Again,
Osdana was not paid any compensation for the
torts & damages

period between February to April 22, 1994.
- Osdana was discharged from the hospital on April 25,
1994. The medical report stated that she had very
good improvement of the symptoms and she was
discharged on the second day of the operation.
- Four days later, however, she was dismissed from
work, allegedly on the ground of illness. She was not
given any separation pay nor was she paid her salaries
for the periods when she was not allowed to work.
- Upon her return to the Philippines, Osdana sought the
help of petitioner, but to no avail. She was thus
constrained to file a complaint before the POEA.
ISSUES
WON NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion for
the following reasons: (a) ruling in favor of Osdana
even if there was no factual or legal basis for the award
and, (b) holding petitioner solely liable for her claims
despite the fact that its liability is joint and several with
its principal, GCC.
HELD
- The decisions of both the labor arbiter and the NLRC
were based mainly on the facts and allegations in
Osdanas position paper and supporting documents. We
find these sufficient to constitute substantial evidence to
support the questioned decisions. Generally, findings of
facts of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC are
accorded great respect and, at times, even finality if
supported by substantial evidence. This Court,
therefore, upholds the finding of herein public
respondents that the facts and the evidence on record
adduced by Osdana and taken in relation to the answer
of petitioner show that indeed there was breach of the
employment contract and illegal dismissal committed
by petitioners principal.
- Article 284 of the Labor Code is clear on the matter of
termination by reason of disease or illness, viz:
Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination An
employer may terminate the services of an employee
who has been found to be suffering from any disease
and whose continued employment is prohibited by
law or prejudicial to his health as well as the health of
his co-employees: x x x.
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- Specifically, Section 8, Rule 1, Book VI of the

Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides:
Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal Where
the employee suffers from a disease and his
continued employment is prohibited by law or
prejudicial to his health or to the health of his coemployees, the employer shall not terminate his
employment unless there is a certification by
competent public authority that the disease is of such
nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within
a period of six (6) months with proper medical
treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured
within the period, the employer shall not terminate
the employee but shall ask the employee to take a
leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to
his former position immediately upon the restoration
of his normal health.
- Viewed in the light of the foregoing provisions, the
manner by which Osdana was terminated was clearly in
violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules
and regulations.
Osdanas continued employment
despite her illness was not prohibited by law nor was
it prejudicial to her health, as well as that of her coemployees. In fact, the medical report issued after her
second operation stated that she had very good
improvement of the symptoms. Besides, Carpal
Tunnel Syndrome is not a contagious disease.
- Petitioner has not presented any medical certificate or
similar document from a competent public health
authority in support of its claims. If, indeed, Osdana
was physically unfit to continue her employment, her
employer could have easily obtained a certification to
that effect from a competent public health authority in
Saudi Arabia, thereby heading off any complaint for
illegal dismissal. The requirement for a medical
certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot
be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the
unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer
of the gravity or extent of the employees illness and
thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor.
- As regards the monetary award of salaries for the
unexpired portion of the employment contract, unpaid
salaries and salary differential granted by public
respondents to Osdana, petitioner assails the same for
prof. casis
being contrary to law, evidence and existing
jurisprudence, all of which therefore constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
- Although this contention is without merit, the award
for salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract
must, however, be reduced. Paragraph 5, Section 10 of
R.A. No. 8042, applies in this case, thus:
In case of termination of overseas employment
without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by
law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for
the unexpired portion of his employment contract or
for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less.
- While it would appear that the employment contract
approved by the POEA was only for a period of twelve
months, Osdanas actual stint with the foreign principal
lasted for one year and seven-and-a-half months. It
may be inferred, therefore, that the employer renewed
her employment contract for another year. Thus, the
award for the unexpired portion of the contract should
have been US$1,260 (US$280 x 4 months) or its
equivalent in Philippine pesos, not US$2,499 as
adjudged by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the
NLRC.
- As for the award for unpaid salaries and differential
amounting to US$1,076 representing seven months
unpaid salaries and one month underpaid salary, the
same is proper because, as correctly pointed out by
Osdana, the no work, no pay rule relied upon by
petitioner does not apply in this case. In the first place,
the fact that she had not worked from June 18 to August
22, 1993 and then from January 24 to April 29, 1994,
was due to her illness which was clearly work-related.
Second, from August 23 to October 5, 1993, Osdana
actually worked as food server and cook for seven days
a week at the Hota Bani Tameem Hospital, but was not
paid any salary for the said period. Finally, from
October 6 to October 23, 1993, she was confined to
quarters and was not given any work for no reason at
all.
- With respect to the award of moral and exemplary
damages, the same is likewise proper but should be
torts & damages

reduced. Worth reiterating is the rule that moral
damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the
employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or
constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public
policy. Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded
if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
- Finally, petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on
the part of public respondents for holding it solely liable
for the claims of Osdana despite the fact that its liability
with the principal is joint and several. Petitioner
misunderstands the decision in question. It should be
noted that contrary to petitioners interpretation, the
decision of the labor arbiter which was affirmed by the
NLRC did not really absolve the foreign principal.
Petitioner was the only one held liable for Osdanas
monetary claims because it was the only respondent
named in the complaint and it does not appear that
petitioner took steps to have its principal included as
co-respondent. Thus, the POEA, and later the labor
arbiter, did not acquire jurisdiction over the foreign
principal.
PEOPLE V PIRAME
ARCONA V CA (PEOPLE)
YNARES-SANTIAGO; December 9, 2002
NATURE
Instant petition for review of the decision of the CA.
FACTS
- Carlos Arcona pleaded not guilty to a murder using the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. The element of
unlawful aggression by the victim was not proven. He
was convicted of murder with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. In this petition, the
Court affirmed CA decision but modified the damages.
- Petitioner Carlos Arcona y Moban and his brother
Benito Arcona y Moban were charged with Murder and
Frustrated Murder in separate informations. Both
pleaded not guilty.
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- At around 7:30 in the evening of June 27, 1986,

Napoleon Ong and Edgardo Talanquines were walking
on their way home after coming from a birthday party.
When they were near the house of Jerry Boston,
Edgardo heard a loud thud. He turned around saw
Napoleon slump to the ground. Suddenly, someone hit
Edgardo from behind with a piece of bamboo, causing
him to fall. He saw no one in the immediate premises
except petitioner. Edgardo then stood up and ran
towards the house of Cesar Umapas to ask for help.
- Prosecution witness Leo Zaragoza testified that he was
standing in front of Jerry Boston house, about 7 meters
away, when he saw petitioner stab Napoleon.
- Napoleon died on the way to the hospital. The doctor
certified that the cause of death was the stab wound
sustained at the stomach area just above the waistline.
- Carlos voluntarily surrendered go the police.
- In his defense, Carlos alleged that he was walking
alone when he met Napoleon and Edgardo . Without
any provocation, Napoleon suddenly drew his bolo and
shouted, "Caloy, I will kill you!" Napoleon swung the
bolo at him twice but missed him. Petitioner then drew
out his knife and stabbed Napoleon. When he saw
Edgardo rushing towards him, he grabbed a piece of
bamboo from the newly constructed culvert and hit the
former on the left arm. Edgardo ran away. Carlos also
left the premises and went home. On the way, he met
his brother, Benito, and together they proceeded to their
house.
- TC convicted the Carlos Arcona of homicide, with the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and
acquitted him of attempted homicide. He was ordered to
pay indemnity of 30k for Napoleons death, 10K for
actual damages, and 10K as moral damages.
On the other hand, Benito Arcona was acquitted of
homicide and convicted of attempted homicide. He was
made to indemnify Edgardo the sum of 10K as actual
damages.
- Only Carlos appealed. CA affirmed the TC findings
but increased civil liability to 50K. Hence, this petition.
He maintains that it was self-defense.
ISSUES
1. WON all elements of self-defense were present
prof. casis
2. What are the proper damages to be rendered?
HELD
1. NO
- Unlawful aggression was not proven.
- When self-defense is invoked, the defendant has the
burden of proving that the killing was justified. Even if
the prosecution is weak, the case cannot be dismissed
because of the open admission of the killing.
- To prove self-defense, the accused must show with
clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) he is not the unlawful aggressor;
(2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part;
and
(3) he employed reasonable means to prevent or repel
the aggression.
- Self-defense is a question of fact. He failed to prove
that there was unlawful aggression of the part of the
victim. Although the bolo of Napoleon was unsheathed,
it does not conclude that there was unlawful aggression.
When Jerry Boston testified to hearing someone say,
Caloy, I will kill you, he did not categorically say it
was Napoleon; and iIt was still possible that he said it
while being assaulted by Carlos. It was not possible that
Carlos escaped his alleged ambush with out a scratch.
2. CA was correct in increasing civil indemnity to 50K
in line with existing jurisprudence. In cases of murder,
homicide, parricide and rape, civil indemnity in the
amount of 50K is automatically granted to the offended
party or his heirs in case of his death, without need of
further evidence other than the fact of the commission
of the crime.
- On the other hand, the award of moral damages (10K)
must be increased to 50K. As borne out by human
nature and experience, a violent death invariably and
necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on
the part of the victims family. It is inherently human to
suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one
becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such
violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the
family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them
forever of his love, affection and support, but often
leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice
has been done to them. For this reason, moral damages
torts & damages

must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation
and proof of the heirs emotional suffering.
- The award of actual damages in the amount of 10K
was not substantiated. Only those expenses which are
duly proven, or those that appear to have been
genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake
or burial of the victim, will be recognized in court. It
was deleted.
Disposition petition for review is DENIED. The
decision of CA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
As modified, petitioner is further ordered to pay the
heirs of the deceased moral damages in the increased
amount of 50KThe award of actual damages is deleted
for lack of factual and legal basis.
PNB V CA (FLORES)
266 SCRA 136
KAPUNAN; 1997 Jan 6
FACTS
- Flores is a prominent businessman, licensed and
engaged in the real estate business, buying and selling
houses and lots. Flores filed a complaint against PNB
when the appellant bank refused to honor his Manager's
Checks worth P1 Million because of the alleged
shortage in appellee's payment to the effect that he had
to go back and forth the bank to encash said checks and
that he lost a deal of a house for sale in Baguio City
worth P1 Million as he could not produce said amount
withheld by the appellant bank. Appellee Flores further
testified as to the effect of the incident on his integrity
as a businessman.
- Flores won in the suit and the LC awarded him P1M
moral damages andt P100,000.00 exemplary damages,
but was later reduced by the CA to P100,000.00 and
P25,000.00 respectively.
- PNB appealed from the decision, believing that no or
lower amount of damages should be awarded to Flores.
As a defense, PNB even attacked Flores character by
alluding to his alleged reputation as a gambler and big
time casino player. PNB asserted that Flores used the
proceeds of the managers check on the gaming table
and not for purchase of a house.
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ISSUEWON the moral and exemplary damages should

be reduced
HELD
NO
- The SC even increased the moral and exemplary
damages awarded by CA by 50% (P200,000.00 and
P50,000.00 respectively).
Ratio
There is no hard and fast rule in the
determination of what would be a fair amount of moral
damages, since each case must be governed by its own
peculiar circumstances.
- Article 2217 of the Civil Code recognizes that moral
damages which include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injury, are incapable of pecuniary estimation.
- As to exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil
Code provides that such damages may be imposed by
way of example or correction for the public good.
While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a
matter of right, they need not be proved, although
plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages before the court
may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded.
FULE V CA (CRUZ, BELARMINO)
286 SCRA 698
ROMERO; March 23, 1998
NATURE
FACTS
- Fule, a corporate secretary of the Rural Bank of
Alaminos (the Bank) by profession and jeweler on the
side, acquired a 10-hectare property in Rizal. The
former owner, Jacobe, had mortgaged it to the Bank for
a loan of 10k but it was later foreclosed and offered for
public auction upon his default.
- Petitioner asked Dichoso and Mendoza (the Agents) to
look for an interested buyer, and found one in private
respondent Dr. Cruz. At the time, petitioner had shown
prof. casis
interest in buying a pair of emerald-cut diamond
earrings from Dr. Cruz but never came to an agreed
price. Subsequently, negotiations for the barter of the
jewelry and the property ensued; upon the request of Dr.
Cruz, it was found by Atty. Belarmino that no barter
was feasible because the 1-year period of redemption
had not expired. To get over this legal impediment,
petitioner executed a deed of redemption on behalf of
Jacobe.
- Petitioner arrived at Belarminos residence with the
agents to execute a deed of absolute sale while Cruz
held on to the earrings. Petitioner issued a certification
stating the actual consideration of the sale was Php200k
and not Php80k as indicated in the deed. Since the
earrings were appraised at only Php160k, the remaining
40k was to be paid later in cash. This was done
apparently to minimize the capital gains tax that
petitioner would have to shoulder. Petitioner headed for
the bank to meet up with Cruz and pick up the earrings.
When asked if the jewelry was ok, petitioner nodded to
express his satisfaction. Petitioner paid the agents $300
and some pieces of jewelry, but not half of the pair of
earrings in question as previously promised.
- Later that evening, petitioner arrived at Belarminos
residence complaining the earrings were fake as
confirmed by a tester. Petitioner accused the agents of
deceiving him, which they denied. He nonetheless took
back the $300 and jewelry given them. After another
failed testing, the petitioner reported the matter to the
police where the agents also executed their sworn
statements.
- Petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC to declare
the contract of sale over the property null and void on
the ground of fraud and deceit. The lower court denied
the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction over the
deed as they found that the genuine pair of earrings had
been delivered by Cruz. The 2 hours before petitioners
complaint was considered unreasonable delay, placing
petitioner in estoppel. The Court furthered that all
elements of a valid contract were present, namely a
meeting of the minds, determinate subject matter, and
price certain. As the earrings had been delivered and the
contract of absolute sale executed, the contract of barter
or sale had been consummated.
torts & damages

- The Court also finds that the plaintiff acted in bad,
awarding Cruz P300k as moral damages and P100k as
exemplary damages; Atty. Belarmino P250k as moral
damages and P150k as exemplary damages; and
granting both P25k each as attorneys fees and litigation
expenses. A petition with the CA yielded the same
result, hence this petition.
ISSUE
WON the TC erred in awarding damages
HELD
NO
- In the instant case, the TC awarded damages
analogous to malicious prosecution under Article
2219(8) of the NCC for the following reasons:
- The malice with which petitioner filed the case is
apparent. As an experienced jeweler who thoroughly
examined the earrings himself and went so far as to
sketch them earlier, it is illogical that he would fail to
exert extra effort to check its genuineness at the precise
moment of the exchange. His acts thus failed to accord
with what an ordinary prudent man would have done in
the same situation.
- As an experienced businessman and banker, he was
shrewd enough to bloat the propertys price from 25k to
75k only a few days after he had purchased it for a far
lower cost, the value of which still fell short of the
diamond earrings price.
- Also, it took him 2 hours of unexplained delay before
complaining the earrings were counterfeita period in
which anything could have happened while petitioner
was in possession of the jewelry.
- Given this, it would appear that the cause of action in
the instant case was contrived by the petitioner himself
in hopes of obtaining a favorable outcome in his
complaint to take the real jewelry, return a fake, and get
back the property. This is plain and simple, unjust
enrichment. All that considered, the damages prayed for
were reasonably proportionate to the sufferings they
underwent.
- Petitioner filed a malicious and unfounded case all the
while dragging down private respondents, whose
reputations had been soiled by petitioners coming to
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court with unclean hands. Because of the falsity, malice

and baseless nature of the complaint, defendants were
compelled to litigate and are thus also entitled to the
awarding of attorneys fees under Article 2208.
Disposition decision of the CA is AFFIRMED. Dr.
Cruz, however, is ordered to pay petitioner the balance
of the purchase price of Php40k
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC V CA (PANTEJO)
275 SCRA 621
REGALADO; July 17, 1997
prof. casis
- The RTC of Surigao City, rendered judgment against
PAL, ordering the latter to pay Pantejo P300 for actual
damages, P150,000 as moral damages, P100,000 as
exemplary damages, P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, and
6% interest from the time of the filing of the complaint
until said amounts shall have been fully paid, plus costs
of suit.
- On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the court a
quo, but with the exclusion of the award of attorney's
fees and litigation expenses.
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari
ISSUE
WON the lower courts erred in awarding damages in
favor of plaintiff
FACTS
- On October 23, 1988, private respondent Pantejo,
then City Fiscal of Surigao City, boarded a PAL plane in
Manila and disembarked in Cebu City where he was
supposed to take his connecting flight to Surigao City.
However, due to typhoon Osang, the connecting flight
to Surigao City was cancelled.
- To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers,
PAL initially gave out cash assistance of P100.00 and,
the next day, P200.00, for their expected stay of two
days in Cebu. Pantejo requested instead that he be
billeted in a hotel at PAL's expense because he did not
have cash with him at that time, but PAL refused. Thus,
respondent Pantejo was forced to seek and accept the
generosity of a co-passenger, an Engr. Andoni Dumlao,
and he shared a room with the latter at Sky View Hotel
with the promise to pay his share of the expenses upon
reaching Surigao.
- When the flight for Surigao was resumed, Pantejo
came to know that the hotel expenses of his copassengers were reimbursed by PAL. At this point,
Pantejo informed Oscar Jereza, PAL's Manager for
Departure Services at Mactan Airport and who was in
charge of cancelled flights, that he was going to sue the
airline for discriminating against him. It was only then
that Jereza offered to pay respondent Pantejo P300
which, due to the ordeal and anguish he had undergone,
the latter decline. Thereafter, PAntejo filed an action for
damages against PAL.
HELD
NO
- It must be emphasized that a contract to transport
passengers is quite different in kind and degree from
any other contractual relation, and this is because of the
relation which an air carrier sustain with the public. Its
business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites
people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a
relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees naturally could
give ground for an action for damages.
- In ruling for Pantejo, both the RTC and the CA found
that PAL acted in bad faith in refusing to provide hotel
accommodations for Pantejo or to reimburse him for
hotel expenses incurred despite and in contrast to the
fact that other passengers were so favored.
Factors considered in computing damages
> PAL acted in bad faith in disregarding its duties as a
common carrier to its passengers and in discriminating
against Pantejo. It was even oblivious to the fact that
PAntejo was exposed to humiliation and embarrassment
especially because of his government position and
social prominence, which altogether necessarily
subjected him to ridicule, shame and anguish. It
remains uncontroverted that at the time of the incident,
herein respondent was then the City Prosecutor of
Surigao City, and that he is a member of the Philippine
Jaycee Senate, past Lt. Governor of the Kiwanis Club
torts & damages

of Surigao, a past Master of the Mount Diwata Lodge
of Free Masons of the Philippines, member of the
Philippine National Red Cross, Surigao Chapter,
and past Chairman of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines,
Surigao del Norte Chapter.
- It is likewise claimed that the moral and exemplary
damages awarded to respondent Pantejo are excessive
and unwarranted on the ground that respondent is not
totally blameless because of his refusal to accept the
P100 cash assistance which was inceptively offered to
him. It bears emphasis that respondent Pantejo had
every right to make such refusal since it evidently could
not meet his needs and that was all that PAL claimed it
could offer.
- His refusal to accept the P300 proffered as an
afterthought when he threatened suit was justified by
his resentment when he belatedly found out that his copassengers were reimbursed for hotel expenses and he
was not. Worse, he would not even have known about it
were it not for a co-passenger who verbally told him
that she was reimbursed by the airline for hotel and
meal expenses. It may even be said that the amounts,
the time and the circumstances under which those
amounts were offered could not salve the moral wounds
inflicted by PAL on private respondent but even
approximated insult added to injury.
The discriminatory act of petitioner against
respondent ineludibly makes the former liable for moral
damages under Article 21 in relation to Article 2219
(10) of the Civil Code. Such inattention to and lack of
care by petitioner airline for the interest of its
passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration,
particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith
which entitles the passenger to the award of moral
damages.
- Moral damages are emphatically not intended to
enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They
are awarded only to allow the former to obtain means,
diversion, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendant's
culpable action and must, perforce, be proportional to
the suffering inflicted. However, substantial damages do
not translate into excessive damages. Except for
attorney's fees and costs of suit, it will be noted that the
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Court of Appeals affirmed point by point the factual

findings of the lower court upon which the award of
damages had been based. We, therefore, see no reason
to modify the award of damages made by the trial court.
- Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we are
convinced that the awards for actual, moral and
exemplary damages granted in the judgment of
respondent court, for the reasons meticulously analyzed
and thoroughly explained in its decision, are just and
equitable. It is high time that the travelling public is
afforded protection and that the duties of common
carriers, long detailed in our previous laws and
jurisprudence and thereafter collated and specifically
catalogued in our Civil Code in 1950, be enforced
through appropriate sanctions.
VALENZUELA V CA
SUMALPONG V CA (PEOPLE)
268 SCRA 764
FRANCISCO, February 26, 1997
NATURE
Petition for review
FACTS
- Sumalpong shot the victim Ramos after the former
slapped the latters wife. Before this, Sumalpong called
upon the spouses then inquired regarding the identity of
those who stoned his house, then accused Ramos of
stoning his house. Ramos wife, Leonarda, remarked
that he should first confirm the information he received
before accusing anyone, then after this Sumalpong shot
Leonarda at the back of her head (though apparently,
Leonarda was not harmed) then Ramos rushed towards
Sumalpong who then shot Ramos twice but missed.
They wrestled and in the act, Sumalpong bit on Ramos
ear, causing its mutilation.
- TC: Sumalpong convicted of attempted homicide.
Ramos awarded with P 16,800.00 for the loss of his
crops due to his failure to attend to his farmwork
because of the injuries inflicted upon him by the
petitioner, P2,000.00 for hospitalization expenses, and
P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.
prof. casis
- CA: affirm conviction, removed award for loss of
crops and hospitalization expenses, increased moral
damages to P10,000.00, and awarding nominal damages
in the same amount.
ISSUE
WON the increase in moral damages is warranted
HELD
YES
- Anent the increase in the amount of moral damages
awarded, suffice it to state that the nature of the injuries
and the degree of physical suffering endured by the
complainant warrants the same. The tragic incident
caused a mutilation of complainant's left ear and a
permanent scar on his right forearm. These injuries
have left indelible marks on the complainant's body and
will serve as a constant reminder of this traumatic
experience. (more discussion on the modification of
amount of nominal damages and moral damages when
it was not the issue appealed, rationalization for
deletion of actual and compensatory damages)
Disposition the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
LOPEZ V PAN AM WORLD AIRWAYS
16 SCRA 431
BENGZON; March 30, 1966
FACTS
- Sen Fernando Lopez, his wife, his son-in-law, and his
daughter made reservations, through their agency, for
first class accommodations in the Tokyo San
Francisco flight of PAN-AM. PAN-AM's SF head office
confirmed the reservations. First class tickets were
subsequently issued, with the total fare having been
fully paid before this.
- As scheduled, they left Manila and as soon as they
arrived in Tokyo, they contacted PAN-AM's Tokyo
office regarding their accommodations. For the given
reason that the first class seats were all booked up,
PAN-AM's Tokyo office informed them that they could
not go in that flight unless they took the tourist class.
Due to pressing engagements in the US, they were
torts & damages

constrained to take PAN-AM's flight as tourist
passengers.
- Sen Lopez filed suit for damages alleging breach of
contracts in bad faith by defendant out of racial
prejudice against Orientals. He asked for P500T actual
and moral damages, P100T exemplary damages, P25T
attorney's fees plus costs.
- PAN-AM asserted that its failure to provide first class
accommodations to plaintiffs was due to honest error of
its employees. It interposed a counterclaim for atty's
fees of P25T.
- CFI Rizal decision: in favor of plaintiff and granted
(a) P100T, moral damages; (b) P20T, exemplary
damages; (c) P25T, atty's fees, and costs of the action.
- Plaintiffs filed MFR asking that moral damages be
increased to P400T and for 6% interest per annum on
amount to be granted.
- CFI modified decision: (a) P150T, moral damages; (b)
P25T, exemplary damages; with legal interest on both
from date of filing of complaint until paid; (c) P25T,
atty's fees; and costs of the action.
- Both appealed: PAN-AM contended that there was
NO bad faith; Lopez et al wanted a total of P650T as
award for damages.
ISSUES
1. WON there was bad faith on the part of PAN-AM
2. WON the amount of damages should be increased
HELD
1. YES
Reasoning
- Defendant through its agents first cancelled
plaintiffs, reservations by mistake and thereafter
deliberately and intentionally withheld from plaintiffs
or their travel agent such information. In so misleading
plaintiffs into purchasing first class tickets in the
conviction that they had confirmed reservations, when
in fact they had none, defendant wilfully and knowingly
placed itself into the position of having to breach its
contracts with plaintiffs should there be no last-minute
cancellation by other passengers before flight time, as it
turned out in this case. Bad faith means a breach of a
known duty through some motive of interest or ill-will.
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prof. casis
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- At any rate, granting all the mistakes advanced by the

defendant, there would at least be negligence so gross
and reckless as to amount to malice or bad faith.
2. YES
Ratio Moral damages are recoverable in breach of
contracts where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith (Art. 2220). Exemplary or corrective damages
may be imposed by way of example or correction for
the public good, in breach of contract where the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner (Art. 2229, 2232). A
written contract for an attorney's services shall control
the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court
to be unconscionable or unreasonable (Sec. 24, Rule
138, ROC).
- Factors in determining Amount for Moral
Damages: The amount of damages awarded in this
appeal has been determined by adequately considering
the official, political, social, and financial standing of
the offended parties on one hand, and the business and
financial position of the offender on the other. The
present rate of exchange and the terms at which the
amount of damages awarded would approximately be in
U.S. dollars has also been considered.
(a) MORAL DAMAGES
- As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad
faith of its contracts with plaintiffs, the latter suffered
social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety
and mental anguish. It may not be humiliating to travel
as tourist passengers; it is humiliating to be compelled
to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be
expected from the contractual undertaking.
- Sen Lopez was then Senate President Pro Tempore.
International carriers like defendant know the prestige
of such an office. For the Senate is not only the Upper
Chamber of the Philippine Congress, but the nation's
treaty-ratifying body. He was also former VicePresident of the Philippines. (MD = P100T)
- Mrs. Maria Lopez, as wife of the Senator, shared his
prestige and therefore his humiliation. In addition she
suffered physical discomfort during the 13-hour trip;
her reason for going to the US was actually for medical
check-up and relaxation. The fact that the seating spaces
in the tourist class are quite narrower than in first class
will suffice to show that she indeed experienced

physical suffering during the trip. (MD = P50T)
- Mr. and Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., were travelling
as immediate members of the family of Sen Lopez.
Even if they initially wanted to change their seat
reservations from first class to tourist class, they
eventually paid for first class seats. Hence, they also
suffered social humiliation. (MD = P25T each)
(b) EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
- In view of its nature, it should be imposed in such an
amount as to effectively deter similar breach of
contracts in the future by defendant or other airlines.
(ED = P75T)
(c) ATTORNEYS FEES
- Record shows a written contract of services wherein
plaintiffs engaged the services of their counsel Atty.
Francisco and agreed to pay the sum of P25T upon
the termination of the case in the CFI, and another P25T
if case is appealed to the SC. This is reasonable
considering the subject matter of the present
controversy, the professional standing of the attorney
for plaintiffs-appellants, and the extent of the service
rendered by him.
Disposition Judgment appealed from is hereby
MODIFIED so as to award in favor of plaintiffs and
against defendant, the following:
(1) P200T as moral damages, divided among
plaintiffs;
(2) P75T as exemplary or corrective damages;
(3) Interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on the
moral and exemplary damages, from date of amended
CFI decision, until said damages are fully paid;
(4) P50T as attorney's fees; and
(5) Costs of action. Counterclaim dismissed.
PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILS V CA (SPS
CHUA)
MELO; September 17, 2001
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision and
resolution of the CA
FACTS
torts & damages

- Sometime in April, 1982, respondent Salvador Chua
was offered by Mr. Jimmy Rojas, manager of Producers
Bank of the Philippines, to transfer his account from
Pacific Banking Corporation to herein petitioner bank.
- Respondent spouses opened and maintained
substantial savings and current deposits with, and
likewise obtained various loans from petitioner bank,
one of which was a loan for P2,000,000.00 which was
secured by a real estate mortgage and payable within a
period of three (3) years or from 1982 to 1985.
- On January 20, 1984, private respondents deposited
with petitioner bank the total sum of P960,000.00,
which was duly entered in private respondents' savings
account passbook.
- Petitioner bank failed to credit this deposit due to the
fact that its Branch Manager absconded with the money
of the bank's depositors.
- Consequently, petitioner bank dishonored the checks
drawn out by private respondents in favor of their
various creditors on the ground of insufficient funds,
despite the fact that at that time, the balance of private
respondents' deposit was in the amount of
P1,051,051.19.
- Private respondents requested for copies of their
ledgers covering their savings and current accounts, but
petitioner bank refused.
- Private respondents instituted on January 30, 1984 an
action for damages against petitioner bank
- On the other hand, petitioner bank filed with the City
Sheriff of Bacolod a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate
- Private respondents filed a complaint for injunction
and damages, alleging that the petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure was without basis and was instituted
maliciously in order to harass private respondents.
- On April 26, 1988, the trial court rendered its decision
on the latter case, in favor of the spouses Chua,
awarding the sum of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages,
and the sum of P250,000.00 as exemplary damages,
among others.
- On October 31, 1991, upon appeal by petitioner bank,
the Court of Appeals modified the decisionone of the
changes was the award of the sum of P500,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages.
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prof. casis
- Petitioner moved for a consideration but the same was

denied, hence, this petition
ISSUE
WON the petitioner bank is liable for moral damages
HELD
YES
- Moral and exemplary damages may be awarded
without proof of pecuniary loss. In awarding such
damages, the court shall take into account the
circumstances obtaining in the case and assess
damages according to its discretion.
- As borne out by the record of this case, private
respondents are engaged in several businesses, such as
rice and corn trading, cement dealership, and gasoline
proprietorship. The dishonor of private respondents'
checks and the foreclosure initiated by petitioner
adversely affected the credit standing as well as the
business dealings of private respondents as their
suppliers discontinued credit lines resulting in the
collapse of their businesses.
- In the case of Leopoldo Araneta vs. Bank of America,
it was held that: "The financial credit of a businessman
is a prized and valuable asset, it being a significant
part of the foundation of his business. Any adverse
reflection thereon constitutes some financial loss to
him."
- The damage to private respondents' reputation and
social standing entitles them to moral damages. Article
2217, in relation to Article 2220, of the Civil Code
explicitly provides that "moral damages include
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury."
- Obviously, petitioner bank's wrongful act caused
serious anxiety, embarrassment, and humiliation to
private respondents for which they are entitled to
recover moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00
which we deem to be reasonable.
Disposition The decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed with modification only as to the award of
damages
STREBEL V FIGUERAS
96 PHIL 321
CONCEPCION; December 29, 1954
FACTS
- Strebels side: As a lessee of a lot situated in Santa
Mesa, Manila, plaintiff Strebel subleased part thereof to
the Standard Vacuum Oil Company; that the latter
constructed thereon a Mobilgas Station which was
operated by Eustaquio & Co., a partnership organized
by said plaintiff and one Primo Eustaquio, that, "out of
spite and with a view to the eventual acquisition of the
said property for himself and his men," defendant Jose
Figueras "tried all he could to built a drainage through"
the aforementioned property; that, in order to
accomplish this purpose, and, using his official and
political influence, defendant Figueras, then UnderSecretary of Labor, caused. his co-defendant Cornelio
S. Ruperto, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, to
prepare an opinion which was signed by the City Fiscal,
holding that the City of Manila has a right to construct
said drainage, and, to this effect, make the necessary
excavations at the boundary line of said lot leased to
Strebel and the lot belonging to Figueras
- Plaintiff Strebel also claims that defendant Figueras
"by making use of his official and political
connections," was able to induce the Secretary of
Justice to transfer temporarily, from the Bureau of
Immigration to the Bureau of Prisons, one Dr. Manuel
Hernandez, the husband of plaintiff's step daughter;
- Plaintiff asked Secretary Nepomuceno to mediate
between them and Under-Secretary of Labor to forget
about past family problems.
- Plaintiff later on claims that Figueras still didnt forget
about the past and "making use of his official and
political influence," and with the cooperation of his
former secretary, defendant Cornelio S. Ruperto, an
Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, as well as "in
torts & damages

connivance with the Director of Labor" which office
was then held by defendant Felipe E. Jose, "and other
employees in the Department and Bureau of Labor,"
defendant Figueras succeeded in securing the
institution, against plaintiff Strebel, and his partner,
Primo Eustaquio, of Criminal Case No. 11005 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, for allegedly
compelling several employees to work more than eight
(8) hours a day, in violation of Commonwealth Act No.
444, in relation to Commonwealth Act No. 303,
although before the filing of the information "the
defendants collectively and singly knew that the
allegations therein are false;" that said criminal case
was subsequently dismissed by the Court of First
Instance of Manila for failure of the prosecution "to
establish even a prima facie case against the accused";
- Through the foregoing series of acts, the defendants
have "caused moral and mental suffering to the . . .
plaintiff, his wife, and his entire family, and damage to
his business in the amount of P15,000.00 besides actual
damages in the amount of P1,500.00 paid to his
attorney in defending himself from the malicious
charge,"
ISSUE
WON Plaintiff may recover damages for moral and
mental suffering
HELD
NO
- The plan to built said drainage was seemingly
abandoned before plaintiff's property rights could be
violated. There was nothing wrong, either legally or
morally, in the desire of Figueras to seek an outlet for
the water coming from his property. On the contrary, it
is required by the elementary principles of health and
sanitation. Besides, there is no allegation that any lot
other than that of plaintiff Strebel was better suited for
the purpose.
Neither could he have any arising from the
assignment of his wife's son-in-law from the Bureau of
Prisons - to which he had been previously assigned
temporarily to the Bureau of Immigration, for
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1.The authority of the Secretary of Justice to make the

assignment in question and the validity thereof, under
said legal provision, are submitted. Hence, it is not
claimed that said officer may be held civilly liable for
the aforementioned assignment. This being the case,
how can such responsibility be exacted from Figueras
who, it is urged, merely instigated said assignment?
2.Even if we assumed the act complained of to be
wrong or to have caused injury, the right of action
hypotethically resulting therefrom, if any on which
we need not, and do not, express any opinion would
have accrued in favor of Dr. Hernandez who is not a
party in the present action not plaintiff herein.
- "As a general rule, the right of recovery for mental
suffering resulting from bodily injuries is restricted to
the person who has suffered the bodily hurt, and there
can be no recovery for distress caused by sympathy for
another's suffering, or for fright due to a wrong against
a third person. So the anguish of mind arising as to the
safety of others who may be in personal peril from the
same cause cannot be taken into consideration.
- '. . . damages are not recoverable for fright or shock
even when sustained as result of wilful act, unless such
act was directed toward person or property or person
seeking recovery; hence plaintiff is not entitled to
recover against administratrix of sister's murderer for
fright or shock caused by viewing mutilated body of
murdered sister. The rule on this point, as stated in the
American Jurisprudence, is: "Injury or Wrong to
Another. In law mental anguish is restricted as a
rule, to such mental pain or suffering as arises from
an injury or wrong to the person himself, as
distinguished from that form of mental suffering
which is the accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow
for another's suffering or which arises from a
contemplation of wrongs committed on the person of
another. Pursuant to the rule stated, a husband or
wife cannot recover for mental suffering caused by
his or her sympathy for the other's suffering." It
should be noted that plaintiff is not even related to Dr.
Hernandez. The latter's wife is a daughter of Mrs.
Strebel by a previous marriage. Hence Dr. Hernandez is
merely related by affinity, not to Strebel, but to a
relative by affinity of said plaintiff.
prof. casis
- Another allegation made by plaintiffs in arguing their
cause of action to recover damages, they said that "with
a view to further injuring" him "and besmirching his
good name in the community and waging a cleavage in
the harmonious relation between Eustaquio & Co. and
its laborers," defendants Felipe E. Jose and Cornelio S.
Ruperto issued a press statement to the effect that
plaintiff Strebel and his partner, Eustaquio had
flagrantly violated the provisions of the Eight-Hour
Law and that said Criminal Case had been dismissed by
the court on a flimsy ground; and that this statement had
"caused moral and mental suffering to the herein
plaintiff and damage to his business in the amount of
P5,000.00," The Supreme Court said that this news
item mentions, neither the number of the case referred
to, nor the names of the persons accused therein.
Moreover, it merely contains a criticism of the action
taken by the court. The reference, therein imputed to the
Director of Labor, to the flagrant violation of the eighthour labor law by the accused, was a mere reiteration of
the theory of the Bureau of Labor, which the
prosecution had adopted by filing the information in
said case. Being a matter of court record, which had
been taken up at the hearing held publicly, and settled in
a decision already promulgated, said theory was open
for public consumption, and, hence, an allusion thereto
or statement thereof, in order to justify said criticism, is
not actionable.
- As regards the malicious prosecution point raised by
Strebel, by specific mandate of Article 2219 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, however, moral
damages may not be recovered in cases of crime or
tort, unless either results or causes "physical
injuries," which are lacking in the case at bar.
Although the same article permits recovery of said
damages in cases of malicious prosecution, this feature
of said provision may not be availed of by the plaintiff
herein, inasmuch as the acts set forth in the complaint
took place in 1949, or before said Code became
effective (laws shouldnt have retroactive effect).
ABS-CBN V CA (REPUBLIC BROADCASTING
CORP, VIVA FILMS)
DAVIDE; January 21, 1999
torts & damages

FACTS
- ABS-CBN, by virtue of contract with VIVA, had an
exclusive right to exhibit some Viva films. ABS-CBN
had a right of first refusal. VIVA gave ABS-CBN 3
packages (36 titles) to choose from. VP for ABS Charo
Santos-Concio wrote VIVA that they are not accepting
the list because there were only 10 titles there that they
could potentially purchase. ABS asked for another list,
saying they had quite an attractive offer to make.
- VIVA gave ABS a new list: 52 original movie titles
(never before aired on TV) and 104 reruns. VIVAs
proposal was P60M (P30M cash, P30M TV spots) for
52 originals and 52 reruns.
- Del Rosario (VIVAs rep) and Eugenio Lopez III had
a mtg re this in Tamarind Grill Restaurant. Accdg to
ABSCBN, the mtg culminated in Del Rosario accepting
ABSCBNs offer of P35M for 52 of the films VIVA was
selling for P60M plus Maging Sino Ka Man.
- VIVA said this wasnt their agreement and that they
refuse to sell anything less the 104-movie package for
P60M. In the meantime, RBS bought the 104-film
package (which included Maging Sino Ka Man) for
P60M. There were ads in the newspapers for the airing
of the movie on Channel 7.
- ABSCBN filed a case in RTC to enjoin RBS from
airing 14 VIVA films, including Maging Sino Ka Man.
RTC granted a preliminary injunction; but lifted the
same after RBS put up a counterbond.
- ABSCBN filed a petition in the CA to challenge the
RTC decision. CA granted TRO, but eventually
dismissed ABSCBNs petition and made them pay for
actual, moral and exemplary damages and attys fees to
RBS, and attys fees to VIVA.
ISSUE
WON RBS may recover damages from ABSCBN
HELD
NO
ACTUAL DAMAGES
- Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled to compensation for actual damages only for
such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
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proved. The indemnification shall comprehend not only

the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits
that the obligee failed to obtain. In contracts and quasicontracts the damages which may be awarded are
dependent on whether the obligor acted with good faith
or otherwise. In case of good faith, the damages
recoverable are those which are the natural and
probable consequences of the breach of the obligation
and which the parties have foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen at the time of the constitution of the
obligation. If the obligor acted with fraud, bad faith,
malice, or wanton attitude, he shall be responsible for
all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the
non-performance of the obligation. In crimes and quasidelicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages
which are the natural and probable consequences of the
act or omission complained of, whether or not such
damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably
been foreseen by the defendant.
- Actual damages may likewise be recovered for loss
or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary
or permanent personal injury, or for injury to the
plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit.
- RBS claims actual damages based on Arts 19-21 for
the injunction for having to put up a counterbond. The
SC said that since ABS had not posted a bond and was
in fact still challenging it, RBS didnt have to put up the
counterbond.
RBS also claims actual damages for the
advertisements for the airing of Maging Sino Ka
Man. The SC said that ABS is not liable for lack of
sufficient basis. The prelim injunction was lifted by
RTC upon RBS paying the counterbond, and not on any
legal and factual basis.
ATTYS FEES
- As regards attorney's fees, the law is clear that in the
absence of stipulation, attorney's fees may be recovered
as actual or compensatory damages under any of the
circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code.
- The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be
recovered as part of damages because of the policy that
no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a
prof. casis
suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees
under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and
equitable justification. Even when a claimant is
compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may
not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad
faith could be reflected in a party's persistence in a case
other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness
of his cause.
MORAL DAMAGES
- Moral damages are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury
suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
The award is not meant to enrich the complainant at the
expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured party
to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will
serve to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone.
It is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the
possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and should be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
- The award of moral damages cannot be granted in
favor of a corporation because, being an artificial
person and having existence only in legal
contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no
senses. It cannot, therefore, experience physical
suffering and mental anguish which can be experienced
only by one having a nervous system. The award for
damages must be set aside, since RBS is a corporation.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
- These are imposed by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated, or compensatory damages. They are
recoverable in criminal cases as part of the civil liability
when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances; in quasi-delicts, if the
defendant acted with gross negligence; and in contracts
and quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
- The claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not based on
contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict. The
claims for moral and exemplary damages can only be
based on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
- Arts 19-21 have at their very core the common
element of malice or bad faith. Such intentional design
torts & damages

to do a wrongful act must be proved by evidence. Here,
ABSCBN was honestly convinced of the merits of its
cause after it had undergone serious negotiations
culminating in its formal submission of a draft contract.
Settled is the rule that the adverse result of an action
does not per se make the action wrongful and subject
the actor to damages, for the law could not have meant
to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. If damages
result from a person's exercise of a right, it is damnum
absque injuria.
Disposition Petition Granted. CA decision reversed,
except to unappealed award of Attys damages of Viva
Films.
NPC v PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC
369 SCRA 629
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; November 20, 2001
NATURE
Appeal by certioriari to review and set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) issued
invitations to bid for the supply and delivery of 120,000
metric tons of imported coal for its Batangas Coal-Fired
Thermal Power Plant in Calaca, Batangas. The Philipp
Brothers Oceanic, Inc. (PHIBRO) prequalified and was
allowed to participate as one of the bidders. After the
public bidding was conducted, PHIBRO's bid was
accepted. NAPOCOR's acceptance was conveyed in a
letter. PHIBRO sent word to NAPOCOR that industrial
disputes might soon plague Australia, the shipment's
point of origin, which could seriously hamper
PHIBRO's ability to supply the needed coal. PHIBRO
again apprised NAPOCOR of the situation in Australia,
particularly informing the latter that the ship owners
therein are not willing to load cargo unless a "strikefree" clause is incorporated in the charter party or the
contract of carriage. In order to hasten the transfer of
coal, PHIBRO proposed to NAPOCOR that they
equally share the burden of a "strike-free" clause.
NAPOCOR refused.
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- Subsequently, PHIBRO received from NAPOCOR a

confirmed and workable letter of credit. Instead of
delivering the coal on or before the thirtieth day after
receipt of the Letter of Credit, as agreed upon by the
parties in the July contract, PHIBRO effected its first
shipment
only
on
November
17,
1987.
- Consequently, in October 1987, NAPOCOR once
more advertised for the delivery of coal to its Calaca
thermal plant. PHIBRO participated anew in this
subsequent bidding. On November 24, 1987,
NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBRO's application for prequalification to bid for not meeting the minimum
requirements. Upon further inquiry, PHIBRO found that
the real reason for the disapproval was its purported
failure to satisfy NAPOCOR's demand for damages due
to the delay in the delivery of the first coal shipment.
- This prompted PHIBRO to file an action for damages
with application for injunction against NAPOCOR with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Makati City. In its
complaint, PHIBRO alleged that NAPOCOR's act of
disqualifying it in the October 1987 bidding and in all
subsequent biddings was tainted with malice and bad
faith. PHIBRO prayed for actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.
- In its answer, NAPOCOR averred that the strikes in
Australia could not be invoked as reason for the delay
in the delivery of coal because PHIBRO itself admitted
that as of July 28, 1987 those strikes had already
ceased. And, even assuming that the strikes were still
ongoing, PHIBRO should have shouldered the burden
of a "strike-free" clause because their contract was "C
and F Calaca, Batangas, Philippines," meaning, the cost
and freight from the point of origin until the point of
destination would be for the account of PHIBRO.
Furthermore, NAPOCOR claimed that due to
PHIBRO's failure to deliver the coal on time, it was
compelled to purchase coal from ASEA at a higher
price. NAPOCOR claimed for actual damages in the
amount of P12,436,185.73, representing the increase in
the price of coal, and a claim of P500,000.00 as
litigation expenses.
- Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The trial court
decided in favor of PHIBRO. Unsatisfied, NAPOCOR
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
prof. casis
Appeals rendered a Decision affirming in toto the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE
WON PHIBRO is entitled to damages
HELD
NO
- NAPOCOR was not bound under any contract to
approve PHIBRO's pre-qualification requirements. In
fact, NAPOCOR had expressly reserved its right to
reject bids. And where the government as advertiser,
availing itself of that right, makes its choice in rejecting
any or all bids, the losing bidder has no cause to
complain nor right to dispute that choice unless an
unfairness or injustice is shown.
- Owing to the discretionary character of the right
involved in this case, the propriety of NAPOCOR's act
should therefore be judged on the basis of the general
principles regulating human relations, the forefront
provision of which is Article 19 of the Civil Code which
provides that "every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith." Accordingly, a person will be protected
only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right,
that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith;
but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. 3
NAPOCOR's act of disapproving PHIBRO's
application for pre-qualification to bid was without any
intent to injure or a purposive motive to perpetrate
damage. Apparently, NAPOCOR acted on the strong
conviction that PHIBRO had a "seriously-impaired"
track record. NAPOCOR cannot be faulted from
believing so. We cannot fault NAPOCOR if it mistook
PHIBRO's unexpected offer a mere attempt on the
latter's part to undercut ASEA or an indication of
PHIBRO's inconsistency. The circumstances warrant
such
contemplation.
- One who acted pursuant to the sincere belief that
another willfully committed an act prejudicial to the
interest of the government cannot be considered to have
acted in bad faith. Bad faith has always been a question
of intention. It is that corrupt motive that operates in the
torts & damages

mind. As understood in law, it contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive of self-interest or ill-will or for ulterior
purpose. While confined in the realm of thought, its
presence may be ascertained through the party's
actuation or through circumstantial evidence. The
circumstances under which NAPOCOR disapproved
PHIBRO's pre-qualification to bid do not show an
intention to cause damage to the latter. The measure it
adopted was one of self-protection. Consequently, we
cannot penalize NAPOCOR for the course of action it
took. NAPOCOR cannot be made liable for actual,
moral and exemplary damages.
- Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the
amount of loss must not only be capable of proof but
must actually be proven with reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof or best
evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof. A
court cannot merely rely on speculations, conjectures,
or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages.
Thus, while indemnification for damages shall
comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but
also that of the profits which the obligee failed to
obtain, it is imperative that the basis of the alleged
unearned profits is not too speculative and conjectural
as to show the actual damages which may be suffered
on a future period.
- The award of moral damages is likewise improper. To
reiterate, NAPOCOR did not act in bad faith. Moreover,
moral damages are not, as a general rule, granted to a
corporation. While it is true that besmirched reputation
is included in moral damages, it cannot cause mental
anguish to a corporation, unlike in the case of a natural
person, for a corporation has no reputation in the sense
that an individual has, and besides, it is inherently
impossible for a corporation to suffer mental anguish.
- Neither can we award exemplary damages under
Article 2234 of the Civil Code. Before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded, the plaintiff must show
that he is entitled to moral, temperate, or compensatory
damages.
- This Court has also laid down the rule that in the
absence of stipulation, a winning party may be awarded
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attorney's fees only in case plaintiff's action or

defendant's stand is so untenable as to amount to gross
and evident bad faith. This cannot be said of the case at
bar. NAPOCOR is justified in resisting PHIBRO's
claim for damages.
VENTANILLA V CENTENO
PADILLA; January 28, 1961
NATURE
APPEAL
FACTS
- Ventanilla instituted this action to recover
damages against his lawyer, Atty. Centeno for
neglecting to perfect within the reglementary
period his (V) appeal from an adverse judgment
rendered by the CFI of Manila.
- TCs facts showed that the required appeal bond
was not filed by Atty. Centeno. The fact that the
record on appeal was admitted for filing is the best
evidence that Atty. Centeno had not in fact filed
any appeal bond. The record on appeal was
disapproved because it was filed out of time and
no appeal bond had been filed by the plaintiff.
- TC: rendered judgment in favor of V; ordered
Centeno to pay V the sum of P200 as nominal
damages and the costs.
- V appealed to the CA which certified the case to
this Court on the ground that only questions of law
are raised. The defendant did not appeal.
ISSUE
WON TC erred in not ordering the Centeno to pay
him actual or compensatory, moral, temperate or
moderate, and exemplary or corrective damages;
in ordering that only the sum of P200 be paid
to him, and not P2,000 as nominal damages;
and in not ordering that the sum of P500 as
attorney's fee be paid as well.
HELD
NO
Reasoning
prof. casis
AS REGARDS ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES:
- V is not entitled to such damages as his basis is
highly speculative.
- A2199 NCC provides:
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one
is entitled to an adequate compensation only for
such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has
duly proved. Such compensation is referred to
as actual or compensatory damages.
- Malonzo vs. Galang: He who claims actual or
compensatory damages must establish and prove
by competent evidence actual pecuniary loss.
- Ventanillas allegation that by Centenos
negligence in not paying the appeal bond of P60,
V lost his chance to recover from the defendants
therein the sum of P4,000 and moral and actual
damages, which V could have recovered if the
appeal had duly been perfected, indicates that his
claim for actual or compensatory damages is
highly speculative.
AS REGARDS MORAL DAMAGES:
- Since the VENTANILLAS cause of action for
recovery of moral damages is not predicated upon
any of those specifically enumerated (under
A2219, Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35
on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art.
2219) TC did not err in declining to award moral
damages to him
-V claims that he suffered mental anguish upon
learning that his appeal had not been perfected
within the reglementary period due to the
Centeno's negligence; serious anxiety upon
learning that his adversary had won by a mere
technicality; besmirched reputation for losing the
opportunity to substantiate his claim made while
testifying in open court that he was entitled to
collect the sum of P4,000 and damages from the
defendants in civil No. 18833; and wounded
feelings for the Centenos failure to remain faithful
to his client and worthy of his trust and confidence.
(SEE A2217, 2219 AND 2220 NCC)
-Malonzo vs. Galang:
torts & damages

. . .Art. 2219 specifically mentions "quasi-delicts
causing physical injuries," as an instance when
moral damages may be allowed, thereby
implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting
in physical injuries are excluded (Strebel vs.
Figueras, G.R. L-4722, Dec. 29, 1954),
excepting, of course, the special torts referred to
in Art. 309 (par. 9, Art. 2219) and in Arts. 21, 26,
27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the chapter on
human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).
CONCERNING TEMPERATE OR MODERATE
DAMAGES:
- Considering that he is not entitled to actual or
compensatory damages but has been awarded
nominal damages by the TC, such award
precludes the recovery of temperate or moderate
damages, and so TC did not err in refusing to
award temperate or moderate damages to the
Ventanilla
AS REGARDS EXEMPLARY OR CORRECTIVE
DAMAGES:
- It cannot be recovered as a matter of right and
the court will decide whether or not they should be
adjudicated, if the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner. TC didnt err in not giving any.
NOMINAL DAMAGES
- Considering the circumstances and the degree of
negligence committed by ATTY CENTENO in not
depositing on time the appeal bond and filing the
record on appeal within the extension period
granted by the court, which brought about the
refusal by the TCto allow the record on appeal, the
amount of P200 awarded by the TC to
VENTANILLA as nominal damages may seem
exiguous.
- Nevertheless, considering that nominal damages
are not for indemnification of loss suffered but for
the vindication or recognition of a right violated or
invaded; and that even if the appeal in civil case
No. 18833 had been duly perfected, it was not an
assurance that the appellant would succeed in
recovering the amount he had claimed in his
complaint, the amount of P2,000 the appellant
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seeks to recover as nominal damages is

excessive.
- A2221 of NCC provides:
Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a
right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated
or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him.
- A2216; Del Castillo vs. Guerrero[1960]: The
assessment of nominal damages is left to the
discretion of the court, according to the
circumstances of the case.
AS REGARDS ATTORNEY'S FEES:
- since the V's claim does not fall under any of
those enumerated in A2208 NCC, the V may not
be compelled to satisfy it.
Disposition TCs judgment affirmed
ROBES-FRANCISCO REALTY V CFI AND
MILLAN
MUOZ-PALMA; October 30, 1978
FACTS
- Robes-Francisco Realty sold to Millan a
parcel of land. Millan complied and paid.
She made repeated demands to execute
final deed of sale and for issuance to her of
TCT over the lot. Parties executed deed of
absolute sale. But corp failed to cause
issuance of TCT because title was included
among properties of corp mortgaged to
GSIS to secure an obligation. Hence, a
complaint for specific performance and
damages.
ISSUE
WON Robes-Francisco is liable for damages
HELD
YES
- Robes-Francisco is guilty of delay, amounting to nonperformance. It is liable for damages under Art 1170 of
CC.
prof. casis
- But Robes-Francisco contends that Millan is bound by
terms of provision and cant recover more than what is
agreed upon. This argument is devoid of merit. We
would agree if the clause were to be a penal clause. But
this clause doesnt convey any penalty.
- Unfortunately, vendee submitted her case below
without presenting evidence on actual damages suffered
by her.
- But it is obvious that right of vendee was violated by
petitioner and this entitles her at least to NOMINAL
DAMAGES.
- NOMINAL DAMAGES are not for indemnification of
loss suffered but for vindication or recognition of a
right.
- NOMINAL DAMAGES are damages in name only
and not in fact, and are allowed simply in recognition of
a technical injury.
- P20,000.00 is excessive. The admitted fact that
petitioner corporation failed to convey a transfer
certificate of title to respondent Milian because the
subdivision property was mortgaged to the GSIS does
not in itself show that there was bad faith or fraud. Bad
faith is not to be presumed. Moreover, there was the
expectation of the vendor that arrangements were
possible for the GSIS to make partial releases of the
subdivision lots.
PEOPLE V GOPIO
346 SCRA 408
MENDOZA; November 29, 2000
NATURE
Appeal from Decision of RTC
FACTS
- Princess Millano, 10 years old, went to Agustin
Gopios store to buy cooking oil. However, it was
closed. As Millano was about to leave, Gopio called her.
When she came near him, he seized her, brought her
inside his empty house, brought her to his bedroom and
raped her. As she would not stop crying, he eventually
let her go.
torts & damages
A2010
- The victim rushed home. Although she felt intense

pain and was actually bleeding, she did not inform her
mother of what happened to her.
- Victim related that she was molested by Gopio in 2
other occasions in the same year. The first happened
when she went to her godsisters house and found the
accused playing cards. She was about to leave when she
saw her godsisters brother crying inside the room. She
went inside and the accused followed him, locked the
door and caressed her private parts. The second instance
was when the accused followed her on her way to her
grandfathers house to get the pail requested by her
aunt.
- The victim did not confide to her family about these
incidents because she was very afraid of accusedappellant and of what her parents would do to her.
Likewise, the victim was ashamed and worried that her
friends would spread the news regarding her
unfortunate experience.
- Victims mother testified about victims age. She also
said that after the incident, her daughter became
inattentive and withdrawn. Her daughters grades even
dropped. Subsequently, she brought the victim to the
Municipal Health Center because the latter has been
experiencing navel pains. This is when she discovered
that her child got raped. She presented receipts covering
medical, transportation, food, and other expenses which
she allegedly incurred on account of the incident.
- Gopio denied allegations and said that he was in
Novaliches in May and June 1995 to sell fish. He
claims that there was animosity between their families
which started when she failed to bring along victims
mother to the market to sell fish.
- RTC found Gopio guilty of statutory rape and ordered
him to pay P3,727 as actual damages and P30,000 as
moral damages.
ISSUES
1. WON accused-appellant was guilty
reasonable doubt
2. WON award of damages was correct
HELD
1. YES
beyond
- PAGE 77 -
- On alibi: Victim positively identified accusedappellant as the perpetrator of the crime and
categorically testified that she had been raped by
accused-appellant. When a rape victims testimony is
straightforward and candid, unshaken by rigid crossexamination and unflawed by inconsistencies or
contradictions in its material points, the same must be
given full faith and credit.
- On victims failure to immediately report incident:
The victims delay in reporting the offense is not an
indication of a fabricated charge. Victim feared that
accused-appellant would hurt her and her family and
that her friends would spread the news about her plight.
Had it not been for that medical examination, the victim
would not have told them about the rape committed by
accused-appellant. This explains the delay in reporting
the crime in this case.
- On failure of the information to indicate the
approximate time of the commission of the offense: The
phrase in the information, that sometime in 1995. . .
has sufficiently apprised accused-appellant of the crime
which he allegedly committed in 1995. It bears
stressing that, in the case of rape, the date of
commission is not an essential element of the offense,
what is material being the occurrence thereof and not
the time of its commission. In any event, it is now too
late in the day to question the form or substance of the
information because when he entered his plea at his
arraignment, accused-appellant did not object to the
sufficiency of the information against him.
- On irregularity of arrest: He failed to raise objections
to his arrest at the earliest possible opportunity. The
record shows that he voluntarily entered a plea of not
guilty when he was arraigned, thereby waiving his right
to question any irregularity in his arrest.
2. NO
0The award of actual damages must be deleted in the
absence of proof required by Art. 2199 of the Civil
Code. To be entitled to actual and compensatory
damages, there must be competent proof constituting
evidence of the actual amount thereof, such as receipts
showing the expenses incurred on account of the rape
incident. In this case, only the laboratory fee issued by
the hospital amounting to P350 was duly receipted. The
prof. casis
rest of the documents were merely a doctors
prescription and a handwritten list of food expenses.
1Nevertheless, under Article 2221 of the Civil Code,
nominal damages are adjudicated in order that the
right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying
the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. As has been
held, whenever there has been a violation of an
ascertained legal right, although no actual damages
resulted or none are shown, the award of nominal
damages is proper. In this case, the victims family
clearly incurred medical expenses due to the rape
committed by accused-appellant. The victim suffered
from pains in her navel which required her physical
examination. An award of P2k as nominal damages is
thus appropriate under the circumstances.
2Based on current rulings, the award of moral damages
should be increased to P50k irrespective of proof
thereof.
3In addition, the victim is entitled to the award of P50k
as civil indemnity which must be given even if there is
neither allegation nor evidence presented as basis
therefore.
Disposition RTC decision modified. Accused-appellant
is ordered to pay the victim the amounts of P2k by way
of nominal damages, P50k as moral damages, and the
additional amount of P50k as civil indemnity, plus the
costs of the suit.
ARMOVIT V CA (NORTHWEST AIRLINES)

184 SCRA 476
GANGAYCO; April 20, 1990
FACTS
- In October 1981, Dr. Herman Armovit and his family
decided to spend their Christmas holidays with relatives
and friends in the Philippines so they purchased from
Northwest Airlines 3 round trip airline tickets from the
US to Manila and back, plus 3 tickets for the rest of the
children, though not involved in the suit. Each ticket of
torts & damages

the petitioners which was in the handwriting of
Northwests tickets sales agent contains the following
entry on the Manila to Tokyo portion of the return
flight:
"from Manila to Tokyo, NW flight 002, date 17 January,
time 10:30 AM Status, OK"
- On their return trip from Manila to the US scheduled
on January 17, 1982, they arrived at the check-in
counter of the airline at the Manila International Airport
at 9:15 in the morning, which is a good one hour and
fifteen minutes ahead of the 10:30 AM scheduled flight
time recited in their tickets. They were rudely informed
that they cannot be accommodated inasmuch as Flight
002 scheduled at 9:15 am was already taking off and the
10:30 AM flight time entered in their plane tickets was
erroneous.
- Previous to the date of departure Armovit reconfirmed
their
reservations
through
their
representative Ernesto Madriaga who personally
presented the 3 tickets at the airlines Roxas Boulevard
office. The departure time in the 3 tickets was not
changed when re-confimed. Their names appeared in
the passenger manifest and confirmed as Passenger
Nos. 306, 307, and 308, Flight 002.
- Dr. Armovit protested in extreme agitation that
because of the bump-off he will not be able to keep his
appointments with his patients in the US. They suffered
anguish, wounded feelings, and serious anxiety day and
night of January 17th until the morning of January 18th
when they were finally informed that seats will be
available for them on the flight that day.
- The RTC ruled in favor of the Armovits and ordered
Northwest to pay actual (P1,300), exemplary
(P1,100,000) and moral (P1,100,000) damages as well
as attorneys fees. The CA affirmed but eliminated the
moral damages on the ground that petitioners did not
take the witness stand to testify on their social
humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, and that the
breach of contract was not malicious or fraudulent. It
also reduced the exemplary damages to P170,000.
Armovits motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE
WON the CA erred in deleting the award of moral
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damages
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio A contract to transport passengers is quite
different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. And this is because of the relation which an air
carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly
with the traveling public. It invites people to avail of the
comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air
carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a
public duty, Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's
employees, naturally, could give ground for an action
for damages Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have the right to be treated by the
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and
due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is
that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of
employees towards a passenger gives the latter an
action for damages against the carrier. [Citing Air
France v Carrascoso]
Reasoning
- The gross negligence committed by Northwest in the
issuance of the tickets with entries as to the time of the
flight, the failure to correct such erroneous entries and
the manner by which petitioners were rudely informed
that they were bumped off are clear indicia of such
malice and bad faith and establish that Northwest
committed a breach of contract which entitles
petitioners to moral damages.
- The CA observed that the Armovits failed to take the
witness stand and testify on the matter. It overlooked
however, that their failure to appear in court to testify
was explained by them. The assassination of Senator
Benigno Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 following the
year they were bumped off caused turmoil in the
country. This turmoil spilled over to the year 1984 when
they were scheduled to testify. However, the violent
demonstrations in the country were sensationalized in
the U.S. media so they were advised to refrain from
returning to the Philippines at the time.
prof. casis
- Nevertheless, Atty. Raymund Armovit, brother of Dr.
Armovit, took the witness stand as he was with the
petitioners from the time they checked in up to the time
of their ultimate departure. He was a witness when the
check-in officer rudely informed the Armovits that their
flight had already taken off, while Dr. Armovit
remonstrated that their tickets reflected their flight time
to be 10:30 AM; that in anger and frustration, Dr.
Armovit told the said check-in-officer that he had to be
accommodated that morning so that he could attend to
all his appointments in the US; that Jacqueline Armovit
also complained about not being able to report for work
at the expiration of her leave of absence; that while the
Armovits had to accept Northwest's offer for hotel
accommodations at the Philippine Village Hotel so that
they could follow up and wait for their flight out of
Manila the following day, they did not use their meal
coupons because of the limitations thereon so they had
to spend for lunch, dinner, and breakfast in the sum of
P1,300 while waiting to be flown out of Manila; that Dr.
Armovit had to forego the professional fees for the
medical appointments he missed due to his inability to
take the January 17 flight; that the petitioners were
finally able to fly out of Manila on January 18, 1982,
but were assured of this flight only on the very morning
of that day, so that they experienced anxiety until they
were assured seats for that flight.
- No doubt Atty. Raymund Armovit's testimony
adequately and sufficiently established the serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation that
petitioners suffered upon having been bumped off.
However, considering that Northwest took care of their
accommodations while waiting and boarding them in
the flight back to the US, the following day, the Court
finds that the petitioners are entitled to moral damages
in the amount of P100,000 each.
- To provide an example for the public good, an award
of exemplary damages is also proper. The award of the
CA is adequate. Nevertheless, the deletion of the
nominal damages by the CA is well-taken since there is
an award of actual damages. Nominal damages cannot
co-exist with actual or compensatory damages.
torts & damages
A2010
Disposition Petition is granted. The judgment of the

CA is hereby modified such that Northwest shall pay
the following:
(a) actual damages in favor of Dr. Armovit in the sum of
P1,300 with interest at the legal rate from January 17,
1982;
(b) moral damages at P100,000 and exemplary damages
and P100,000 in favor of Dr. Armovit;
(c) moral damages of P100,000 and exemplary damages
of P50,000 in favor of Mrs. Dora Armovit;
(d) moral damages of P100,000 and exemplary damages
in the amount of P20,000 in favor of Miss Jacqueline
Armovit; and
(e) attorney's fees at 5% of the total awards, plus the
cost of suit.
14
Petitioner questioned the set off since there
was no call or notice for the payment of the unpaid
subscription, and that the alleged obligation is not
enforceable.
15
The NLRC held that a stockholder who fails to
pay his unpaid subscription on call becomes a debtor of
the corporation and that the set-off of said obligation
against the wages and other due to petitioner is not
contrary to law, morals, public policy
FRANCISCO V FERRER
HELD
1. NO
Reasoning
- We sustain the view of the petitioner that the ability of
an employer in quasi-delict is primary and solidary and
not subsidiary. This, we have ruled in a long line of
cases.
0
NO
Reasoning
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the awards of
damages. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, the appellate
court reduced the amount of temperate and moral
damages as well as the amount of attorney's fees on the
ground that the awards were "too high" .The award of
temperate damages was reduced by the appellate court
on the ground that the amount of P200,000.00 is rather
"too high" especially considering the fact that the driver
De Luna is a mere driver and defendant-appellant
Corporation is only subsidiarily liable thereof. The
award was reduced to P100,000.00.
- The award of temperate, moral, and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees lies upon the
discretion of the court based on the facts and
circumstances of each case.
- The court's discretion is, of course, subject to the
condition that the award for damages is not excessive
under the attendant facts and circumstance of the case.
PLENO V CA (PHILIPPINE PAPER PRODUCTS

INC ET AL)
307 SCRA 675
GUTTIERREZ JR; May 9, 1988
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision which
modified the CFI decision in a vehicular accident case
and reduced by one half the award for temperate
damages, moral damages, and attorneys fees from
P430,000 to P215,000. the awards for actual damages in
the amount of P48,244 and exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000 were affirmed
FACTS
12
Philippine Paper Products is the owner of a
delivery truck, and one of their drivers, Florante de
Luna, in a reckless and imprudent manner, by driving
the vehicle at a great speed, without taking any
precautions to avoid accidents, hit, bumped, and
sideswiped plaintiffs Volkswagen Delivery Van, driven
by plaintiff, causing the Van to swerve and ram into the
rear part of another truck
13
As a result of the accident, plaintiff was
hospitalized, suffered injuries affecting his brain, acted
beyond normalcy at times
prof. casis
- PAGE 77 -
ISSUES
0 WON the employer's liability in quasi-delict is
subsidiary
1 WON the appellant court was correct in reducing the
amount of damages awarded to the petitioner
- Temperate damages are included within the context of

compensatory damages.
- In the case of moral damages, the yardstick shaould be
that the "amount awarded should not be palpably and
scandalously excessive" so as to indicate that it was the
result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of
the trial court. The actual losses sustained by the
aggrieved parties and the gravity of the injuries must be
considered in arriving at reasonable levels
- The lower court's awards of damages are more
consonant with the factual circumstances of the instant
case.21 The trial court's findings of facts are clear and
well-developed. Each item of damages is adequately
supported by evidence on record. On the other hand,
there are no substantial reasons and no references to
any misimpressions of facts in the appellate decision.
The Court of Appeals has shown no sufficient reasons
for altering factual findings which appear correct. We,
therefore, affirm the lower court's awards of damages
21
The trial court based the amounts of damages awarded to the petitioner on the following
circumstances:
Coming now to the damages suffered by plaintiff Maximo Pleno, it is not controverted that Pleno was
hospitalized for about five months beginning December 21, 1971, the day of the incident, up to May 9,
1972. While in the hospital, he underwent several major operations on his legs and in spite of Id
operations, a deformity still resulted and that his left leg is shorter than the right. The medical expenses,
hospital bills and doctor's fees were properly exhibited and not rebutted by defendants. This being the
case, actual expenses of P48,244.08 may be awarded.
As to the loss or impairment of earning capacity, there is no doubt that Pleno is an enterpreneur and the
founder of his own corporation, the Mayon Ceramics Corporation. It appears also that he is an
industrious and resourceful person with several projects in line and were it not for the incident, might
have pushed them through. On the day of the incident, Pleno was driving homeward with geologist
Langley after an ocular inspection of the site of the Mayon Ceramics Corporation. His actual income
however has not been sufficiently established so that this Court cannot award actual damages, but, an
award of temperate or moderate damages may still be made on loss or impairment of earning capacity.
That Pleno sustained a permanent deformity due to a shortened left leg and that he also suffers from
double vision in his left eye is also established. Because of this, he suffers from some inferiority
complex and is no longer active in business as well as in social life. In similar cases as in Borromeo v.
Manila Electric Railroad Co., 44 Phil 165; Cordage, et al. v. LTB Co., et al., L-11037, Dec. 29,1960, and
in Araneta, et al. v. Arreglado, et al., L-11394, Sept. 9, 1958, the proper award of damages were given.
There is also no doubt that due to the incident, Pleno underwent physical suffering, mental anguish,
fight, severe arudety and that he also underwent several major operations. As previously stated, Pleno
is the founder of Mayon Ceramics Corporation, manufacturer of the now famous Crown Lynn ceramic
wares. He is a mechanical engineer and the topnotcher of the professional examination for mechanical
engineering in 1938. From the record, most if not all of his children excelled in academic studies here
and abroad. The suffering, both mental and physical, which he experienced, the anxiety and fright that
he underwent are sufficiently proved, if not patent. He is therefore entitled to moral damages. Pleno is
also entitled to exemplary damages since it appears that gross negligence was committed in the hiring
of driver de Luna. In spite of his past record, he was still hired by the corporation. As regards de Luna,
the very fact that he left the scene of the incident without assisting the victims and without reporting to
the authorities entitles an award of exemplary damages, so as to serve as an example that in cases of
accidents of this kind, the drivers involved should not leave their victims behind but should stop to assist
the victims or if this is not possible, to report the matter immediately to the authorities. That the
corporation did not also report the matter to the authorities and that their lawyer would attempt to bribe
the police officers in order that the incident would be kept a secret shows that the corporation ratified
the act of their employees and such act also shows bad faith. Hence, Id corporation is able to pay
exemplary damages.
The award of attorney's fees is also proper in this case considering the circumstances and that it took
more than five years of trial to finish this case. Also, plaintiffs counsel prepared lengthy and exhausive
memorandum. (pp- 48-50, Amended Joint Record on Appeal)
torts & damages

and hold that the appellate court's reduction of the
amounts of temperate and moral damages is not
justified. However, we modify the award of attorney's
fees to P20,000.00 which we deem to be just and
equitable under the circumstances.
Disposition
instant petition is GRANTED. The
questioned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Pasig) in Civil Case No. 16024 is AFFIRMED in all
respects, except for the award of attorney's fees which
is reduced to P20,000.00.
PEOPLE V SINGH
360 SCRA 404
BUENA; June 29, 2001
NATURE
Appellants Balwinder, Malkit, Mohinder and Dalvir, all
surnamed Singh, were convicted of the crime of Murder
in Criminal Case No. 8683 for killing Surinder Singh,
and Frustrated Murder in Criminal Cases No. 8682 for
stabbing Dilbag Singh. Each of them were sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for murder, and
the indeterminate penalty of 8 years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum for
frustrated murder.
FACTS
- Dilbag Singh, private complainant for frustrated
murder in Criminal Case No. 8682, recounts that on
November 26, 1993, at around 7:30 in the morning
while he was cleaning his motorbike in front of the
Mendiola Apartment in Barangay Canlalay, Bian,
Laguna, Dalvir, Balwinder, Gurmok, Jarnail, Amarjit,
Mohinder, Dial, Kuldip- all surnamed Singh-Johander
Singh Dhillon, and Malkit Singh Dhillon arrived,
shouting foul remarks in their native language and
demanding Surinder Singh to come out of the
apartment. When Surinder Singh came out of his
apartment, Dalvir Singh tried to stab him but Surinder
Singh was able to move away. Dalvir Singh told his
companions to hold Surinder Singh as he will kill him.
Thereafter, Dial Singh and Johinder Singh each held the
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right and left arms of Surinder Singh, with Kuldip

Singh pushing Surinder Singh on his back. Dalvir Singh
then stabbed Surinder Singh, hitting him on the right
side of his stomach, and causing him to fall on the
ground. Dial Singh remarked that Surinder Singh failed
to give money and if others will likewise refuse, the
same fate will befall them. As Surinder Singh tried to
get up, Malkit Singh Dhillon and Jarnail Singh started
hitting him with lead pipes all over his body, while
Johinder Singh and Dial Singh punched and kicked
Surinder. Amarjit Singh, who was holding a gun,
warned everyone not to help Surinder Singh or else he
will shoot. Thereat, when all these things were going
on, private complainant Dilbag Singh tried to stop them
but Balwinder Singh stabbed him on the left side of his
back. Gurmok Singh likewise stabbed him with a bolo,
but he was not hit as he was able to move to one side.
After that, the ten (10) accused Indians left.
Dilbag Singh and Surinder Singh, both injured, were
brought to the Perpetual Help Hospital, Bian, Laguna,
by Jaswinder Singh, Johinder Singh Gill, Balwinder
Singh Gill and Alwan Singh, for treatment. There,
Surinder Singh was pronounced dead on arrival.
- The events, according to appellants, happened in this
wise. Appellant Dalvir Singh testified that on November
26, 1993, at around 7:30 in the morning, he was
conducting his buy and sell business along Brgy.
Canlalay, Bian, Laguna. While collecting from his
customers, he was accosted by Jaswinder, Dilbag and
Surinder Singh to stop at the corner of the street. When
he stopped, he alighted from his motorcycle. Jaswinder,
Dilbag and Surinder Singh accused him of squealing
their status to the immigration authorities. Then,
Jaswinder Singh punched him. Appellant Dalvir Singh
retaliated by slapping Jaswinder Singh afterwhich,
Jaswinder Singh, went inside his apartment to get a
pipe. When Surinder Singh was about to stab him, he
wrestled the knife from him and, in the process, private
complainant Dilbag Singh was stabbed on his back with
the same knife. As Dalvir Singh grappled for the
possession of the knife from Surinder Singh, both of
them fell down, with him landing on top of Surinder
Singh and that was the time when Surinder Singh was
stabbed on the right portion of his stomach. Then,
prof. casis
Surinder Singh lost his grip and appellant Dalvir Singh
was able to get hold of the knife. Appellant Dalvir
Singh was so nervous that he left the place on his
motorcycle while holding the knife. He threw the knife
along the highway of Bian, Laguna.
- After trial, appellants were convicted of the crime
charged, thus
"WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused Balwinder
Singh, Malkit Singh Dhillon, Mohinder Singh, Dalvir
Singh and Dial Singh having been established beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated murder in
Criminal Case No. 8282 and murder in Criminal Case
8683 defined and penalized in Articles 248 and 250
of the Revised Penal Code, this Court hereby
sentences them (except Dial Singh who died during
the presentation of defense evidence on the main
case) as follows:
"Criminal Case No. 8682
"1. each to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of from eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum;
"2. jointly and severally, to pay private complainant
Dilbag Singh the amounts of P16,000 representing
his hospitalization and medical expenses, and
P30,000 for and as attorneys fees; and
"3. jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit.
"Criminal Case No. 8683
"1. each to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
"2. jointly and severally, to pay the heirs of Surinder
Singh the following sums:
a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b) P41,500.00 representing funeral, wake and
transportation expenses;
c) P5,760,000.00 for lost earnings/income;
d) P400.00 for hospitalization expenses;
e) P50,000.00 for moral damages; and
f) P500,000.00 for and as attorneys fees; and
"3. jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit.
"Since accused Jarnail Singh, Gurmok Singh, Amarjit
Singh, Johinder Singh and Kuldip Singh have
remained at-large to date, in order not to clog the
docket of this court, let the records of these two cases
torts & damages

be sent to the files and warrant be issued for their
immediate arrest.
ISSUE
WON the court a quo erred in awarding excessive
damages against accused-appellants
HELD
YES
Reasoning
- In Criminal Case No. 8682 for frustrated murder, the
trial court awarded private complainant Dilbag Singh
the amount of P16,000.00 representing his
hospitalization and medical expenses, and P 30,000.00
as attorneys fees. For his hospitalization and medical
expenses, the receipts submitted to support said claim
amounted only to P370.50. Hence, private complainant
Dilbag Singh is entitled only to the said amount. The
award of attorneys fees is hereby deleted. Nonetheless,
private complaint is entitled to moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 for the suffering he endured from
appellants felonious acts.
- In Criminal Case No. 8683 for murder, the following
amount of actual damages were duly proven
P16,500.00 funeral expenses and air ticket/freight of the
cadaver $600.27. The amount of P400.00 for
hospitalization expenses should be deleted for not being
supported by evidence. The trial courts award of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 moral
damages are affirmed. The award of P500,000.00 as
attorneys fees and P5,760,000 as compensation for loss
of earning capacity, are likewise deleted for lack of
basis. Awards for loss of earning capacity partake of
damages which must be proven not only by credible
and satisfactory evidence, but also by unbiased proof.
The testimony of Balwinder Singh Gill, first cousin of
the deceased, on the alleged income of the deceased
while in the Philippines, is not enough. The best
evidence to substantiate income earned by foreigners
while in the Philippines is the payment of taxes with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. Absent such proof, bare
allegation is insufficient. Nevertheless, considering that
the definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered,
and the fact of loss has been established, appellants
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shall pay the heirs of Surinder Singh temperate damages

in the amount of P200,000.00.
Obiter
- In lieu of actual damages which was not proven or
documented, temperate damages may be awarded in
a murder case. (People vs. dela Tongga)
Disposition
in accordance with the foregoing
disquisition, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed subject to the following modifications1. In Criminal Case No. 8682 for frustrated murder,
appellants shall only be liable to pay
a. P370.50 for hospitalization expenses;
b. P50,000.00, as moral damages, plus costs; and,
2. In Criminal Case No. 8683 for murder, in addition to
the civil indemnity, moral damages and attorneys fees
awarded by the trial court, appellants shall paya. P16,500.00, as funeral expenses;
b. $600.27, as air ticket/freight of the cadaver, to be
computed at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time
of the promulgation of this decision; and,
c. P200,000.00, as temperate damages, plus costs.
PEOPLE V PLAZO
350 SCRA 433
QUISUMBING; January 29, 2001
FACTS
- Leonor Fabula went out of her house to buy sugar
from a nearby store. There she saw her son Romeo
being beaten by Plazo for allegedly disclosing the
whereabouts of his (Plazo) brother who was wanted for
robbery in Manila.
- She tried to intervene but this was to no avail.
Eventually Romeo was able to escape. But he was
chased down by Plazo and stabbed many times the last
being a stab to the chest which led to his death. Leonora
then told people not to move her son as she was going
to ask for help from policemen.
- on the other hand, Plazo stated that it was an act of
self defense. He said that a he and his friend were
lpaynig billiards when Romeo suddenly disrupted he
game. He was drunk and when being pacified got angry
and chased Plazo with a bolo. Thy both fell and the bolo
suddenly was imbedded in Romeos chest.
prof. casis
- Court found Plazo guilty of murder and made to pay
50,000 for moral damages, 15,712 for actual damages,
and 10,000 for moral damages
ISSUES
1. WON Plazo is guilty of murder.
2. WON the 15,712 amount for actual damages is valid
HELD
1. NO
- Plazo avers that the killing of Romeo Fabula was an
act of self defense. He also questions the
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police and
Leonora Fabula
- Court held that inconsistencies were not substantial
enough as to affect the validity of the testimony.
Testimonies arent expected to be error-free. The
inconsistencies pointed out by Plazo were not enough to
disprove the testimonies of the witnesses.
- his claim of self-defense was likewise unsupported.
He wasnt able to fulfill all the elements necessary for
self-defense. The number of stab wounds was indicated
that the means employed was not necessary to repel the
aggression.
- However the circumstances qualifying the crime as
murder were unsubstantiated. Premeditation and
treachery were not proven as the elements for such were
not present. therefore the crime committed was not
murder but homicide.
2. NO
- The trial court correctly awarded the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity. However, the award of actual
damages in the amount of P15,712.00 was based solely
on the bare assertions of the mother of the victim. The
Court can only grant such amount for expenses if they
are supported by receipts. In the absence thereof, no
actual damages can be awarded. However, in lieu of
actual damages, temperate damages under Art. 2224 of
the Civil Code may be recovered where it has been
shown that the victims family suffered some pecuniary
loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved with
certainty
- We find the award of P15,000.00 as temperate
damages reasonable.
Moral damages cannot be
torts & damages

awarded in the absence of any evidence to support its
award
PNB V CA
DEL ROSARIO V CA (METAL FORMING CORP.)
267 SCRA 158
NARVASA; January 29, 1997
NATURE
An appeal of a Decision of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS
- The Del Rosarios' complaint, filed on November 21,
1990, charged Metal Forming Corp. (MFC) with
violation of Section 3 of Act No. 3740, "An Act to
Penalize Fraudulent Advertising, Mislabeling or
Misbranding of Any Product, Stocks, Bonds, etc. The
complaint alleged that:
1) "in selling to the public roofing materials known
'Banawe' shingles,** (MFC) made representations on
the durability of the product and sturdiness of its
installation through massive advertisements in print
media and television (and) brochures ;"
2)
the representations -- particularly those
characterizing the shingles as "STRUCTURALLY
SAFE AND STRONG" and that the "BANAWE
METAL TILE structure acts as a single unit against
wind and storm pressure due to the strong hook action
on its overlaps"-- "prompted the Del Rosarios to buy
the 'Banawe' shingles and have them installed at their
residence;"
3) "(b)arely two (2) months after completion of the
installation, portions of the roof of the Del Rosarios
were blown away by strong wind brought about by
typhoon "Ruping."
- The Office of the President found that:
one cannot efface the fundamental fact that MFC acted
in bad faith and/or with gross negligence in falling to
deliver the necessary accessories for the proper
installation of the structure and actually installed
inferior roofing materials at Del Rosarios residence, in
violation of the proper installation procedure expressly
specified in the former's brochures and advertisements
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for installation, i.e., the metal tile attached to the roof

panels should be two (2) self-drilling screws for one (1)
metal cleat. However, instead of conforming with this
procedure, MFC attached some of the metal cleats with
this one (1)-inch ordinary nail each and others were
fastened with only one (10) wood screw each.
- MFC however declined to concede liability for the
other damages claimed by the Del Rosario Spouses to
have been caused to the interior of their home. This
prompted the latter to commence a civil action against
MFC. The spouses sought to recover from MFC
damages resulting from the events just narrated,
contending that aside from the destruction of the roof of
their house, injury was also caused to its electrical
wiring, ceiling, fixtures, walls, wall paper, wood
parquet flooring and furniture. The Del Rosarios
reckoned their actual damages at P1,008,003. They also
prayed for an award to them of moral damages in the
sum of P3,000,000; exemplary damages in the amount
of P1,000,000; attorney's fees in the sum of P1,000,000.
- Trial Court awarded P500K as moral damages and
P300K as exemplary damages.
- CA reversed decision of the trial court, holding that
there was no privity of contract.
ISSUES
1. WON there is a privity of contract between the
parties
2. WON upon the facts established by the evidence,
MFC is answerable to the Del Rosarios for the damage
caused to the latter's residence when its roof, made of
shingles purchased from and installed by the former,
was blown away by a typhoon (this case is under
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES in the outline)
HELD
1. YES, there is privity of contract between the Del
Rosarios and MFC.
Reasoning
- At all times and with regard to the acquisition and
installation of the metal tiles or shingles, Puno was in
truth acting as contractor of the Del Rosarios and on
their instructions. Ascertainment of the definite identity
of the person who actually ordered the shingles from
prof. casis
MFC is utterly inconsequential -- it might just as well
have been a construction foreman, a trusted domestic,
or any friend or acquaintance of the Del Rosarios.
- The tiles were delivered to the Del Rosarios and used
in fabricating the roof of their home; it was the
employees and workers of MFC who (a) delivered the
shingles or metal tiles to the construction site of the Del
Rosarios' home, and (b) undertook and completed the
installation thereof.
0
YES , the Del Rosarios are entitled to moral
and exemplary damages.
Re: Actual damages
- Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed,
but must be duly proved and proved with reasonable
degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations,
conjectures or guesswork as to the fact and amount of
damages, but must depend upon competent proof that
they have (been) suffered and on evidence of the actual
amount thereof.
- The report of Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc.
contains no statement whatever of the amount of the
damage. Indeed, the testimony of Engineer Abril, the
representative of the Esteban Adjusters and Valuers,
Inc., is that his firm had been retained only to determine
the cause of the damage, not to estimate and assess it.
Moral damages
- Moral damages are awarded for indemnity or
reparation not punishment or correction, that is, an
award to entitle the injured party to obtain means (of)
diversions and amusement that will serve to alleviate
the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of
defendant's culpable action.
- That MFC did in truth act with bad faith, in flagrant
breach of its express warranties made to the general
public and in wanton disregard of the rights of the Del
Rosarios who relied on those warranties, is adequately
demonstrated by the recorded proofs.
The law
explicitly authorizes the award of moral damages "in
breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.
- Award of trial court of moral damages is reduced from
P500K to P100K.
Exemplary damages
torts & damages

- Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such
damages may be imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good. While exemplary
damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they
need not be proved, although plaintiff must show that
he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages before the court may consider the question of
whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded
Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party
or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against
or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious
actions.
- Award of trial court of exemplary damages is reduced
from P300K to P50K.
Disposition Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
November 18, 1991 is REINSTATED AND
AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award of
actual damages and attorney's fees is deleted, and the
moral and exemplary damages awarded are reduced
from P500,000.00 to P100,000.00, and from
P300,000.00 to P50,000.00, respectively.
A2010
- PAGE 77 -
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torts & damages

complaint against Sergio Naguiat under the name and

torts & damages

- Re: Sergio Naguiats liability

- Both also voluntarily submitted themselves to the

torts & damages

- basis of civil law liability: not respondent superior bu

torts & damages

- While it is true that parental authority is terminated

torts & damages

good moral character and respected

torts & damages

helpless, even though they have actually suffered

torts & damages

3. Carmelo Agliam, actual damages in the amount of

torts & damages

torts & damages

DISPOSITION The appealed decision of CA is

torts & damages

action based upon quasi-delict may proceed

torts & damages

private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La

torts & damages

- While the property involved in the cited case belonged

actually charged also criminally), to recover damages

TAYLOR V MANILA ELECTRIC

torts & damages

- Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his

torts & damages

room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness

torts & damages

YAP; July 29, 1987

torts & damages

the Kombi in which Gabat was riding-a fact admitted

one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal

torts & damages

- The Court also tackled the provision of Article 29 of

torts & damages

most instances are incapable of intelligently

torts & damages

- January 20, 1915, the plaintiff was returning home by

torts & damages

their employment, such third persons suffer damage.

torts & damages

speed, the driver lost control thereof, causing it to

torts & damages

2. WON there was contributory negligence on the part

torts & damages

- Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional

torts & damages

relationship; without such agreement, the act or

torts & damages

2. YES, the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first

torts & damages

have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,

torts & damages

- CA affirmed judgment of dismissal; MFR was also

Ratio Negligence is defined by law as the "omission of

torts & damages

torts & damages

- After watching the operation of the traveling crane

torts & damages