Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
13/11/2014
Abstract
The recent development of philosophy is discussed in terms of its re-positioning with
respect to science. The basic ideas on the traditional line of thinking dealing with this
relationship are briefly summarized, giving an overview on theories beginning with
ancient Stoa and reaching up to the philosophy of Ernst Bloch, including the Arab
conception of matter as a modified Aristotelian approach, and the theories of Bruno,
Spinoza, and Schelling, respectively. The relationship between the major results of
this philosophical tradition and recent concepts of modern science is discussed then,
displaying the heuristic power of philosophy in more detail. In particular, ideas put
forward by Trifonov, Tegmark, and Smolin are reviewed with respect to a possible
foundation of physics and mathematics in view of a consequent rephrasing of what
philosophy can mean today in terms of a unified onto-epistemic conception. Hence,
the problem of cosmological principles determining early evolutionary aspects of the
universe is addressed, referring to what is called a theory of everything (TOE) and its
further consequences for the shaping of the world, in particular with respect to other
fields of science. Also, Smolins ansatz of cosmological natural selection is generalized somewhat, and it is shown that in principle, the basic material for a truly unified
approach to the totality of the world is assembled already, provided that an appropriate type of generalized perspective is taken into account. It is shown that such a
perspective is basically one which points to a theory of reflexion which in turn, in so
far as reflexion is visualized as nothing but as a product of this same process of evolution being discussed here, shows up as a theory of self-organizing nature, being a
self-differentiation of its underlying foundation, at the same time. Hence, the
re-constructing of basic categories such as space, time, matter, and so forth, is basically the same as the re-constructing of the underlying process which produces the
concrete correlates to these categories. And so, categories as being the result of the
1
L.Smolin: The Life of the Cosmos, Oxford University Press, 1997, 145.
13/11/2014
epistemic progression of (human) reflexion, are themselves the auto-epistemic correlate of the unfolding of the world. A short, programmatical systematic is given as an
outline then, of how to unify all these aspects in one conception, encompassing science as well as art, in order to eventually gain some more insight into the manner in
which humans grasp their worldly environment for establishing a basic orientation
which may serve as a guideline for their actions according to what they call conscious
understanding of the world. This is also important for gaining some more insight into
the role, philosophy on the one hand, and science and art on the other, play in the
explicit designing of everyday life, as it is defined in empirical terms. Ethical implications of this discussion are given, with a view to the fact that - well in Spinozist tradition - philosophy serves primarily the foundation of ethics, an objective which basically depends on improving human reflexion.
Contents (Outline)
I
II
Introduction
The General Line of Thought
A. The Stoic Foundation
B. Averroes
C. Bruno
D. Spinoza
E. Schelling
F. Bloch
III Modern Implications of the General Line
A. Metaphysics as Ultima Philosophia
B. The Relationship to Science
C. The Principle of Self-Narration
D. Topoi of Emergence
IV The Conception of Trifonov
V
The Conception of Tegmark
VI Cosmological Natural Selection According to Smolin
VII Systematic Aspects of Unified Onto-Epistemology
VIII New Organon of Philosophy (A Proto-Theoretic Matrix
of Basic Concepts)
IX Intercultural Stability of Concepts
X
Ethno-Poetical Ethics as Advanced Theory-Praxis: Walking
the Songlines of Nature
13/11/2014
I. Introduction
One should have two lifes: one for reading all the important books that come
across, and the second for carefully re-reading them. During the last twenty-five
years a considerable amount of conceptual change has taken place in the physical sciences. And it looks very much as if a kind of permanent revolution has
been underway all the time. As Paul Davies has formulated in the preface to his
collected contributions to the New Physics, the beginning of this century saw
the dawning of this new physics rather than a Golden Age lying buried in the
past and giving rise to nostalgic moments. And he visualizes a third revolution
by now, taking place across a broad front, indeed.2 Consequently, in his collection, all the fields of actual development have been assembled, including,
among others, space-time physics (presented in contributions by Will, Guth and
Steinhardt, Hawking, and Isham), the new astrophysics (Longair), critical point
phenomena (Bruce and Wallace), far-from-equilibrium systems (Nicolis), and
the celebrated GUT (Georgi). The names quoted are well-known by today such
that merely listing them indicates the change of physical viewpoints related to
the work of their holders. On the other hand, this was almost ten years ago.
Hence, in the meantime, other topics have emerged which were hardly mentioned before. But the point is that everything was there already, only that our
sharpened perception and our heightened attention are used to realize this not
before the end of a second turn. Usually however, there is not enough time to
start a second turn in first place. (This would be the necessary re-reading phase.)
Indeed, if one would like to deal with the history of this change in more detail
(what is not our objective here, in fact3), one would realize that the milestones of
this development can be easily mapped to a particular reception of significant
books being published at the time. So, before we continue with the explication
of what this present paper is actually all about, we will shortly outline the basic
aspects of this correspondence. 4
It was in the year of 1973, when the historic volume by Hawking and Ellis, on
2
13/11/2014
the large-scale structure of space-time, had been published, collecting for the
first time the insights gained by general relativity, after the introduction and establishment of the co-ordinate-free notation in terms of differential geometry
and topology. About the same time, the famous work of Misner, Thorne, and
Wheeler, and the concise book by Weinberg, represented the standard instruments of understanding the universe as a whole. 5 The innovative aspect of the
English work was the consequent exploitation of the methods developed. These
techniques were also discussed by the American texts, but they did not really
establish the methodological nucleus which consisted instead of an alternative
(canonical) formalism developed first by Arnowitt, Deser, and Misner in all
generality. 6 (Of course, from the beginning on there was no doubt as to the
permanent interactions between the two conventions which can be seen most
clearly in terms of the Newman-Penrose spin coefficient formalism developed
even earlier.7) For someone who had acquired the basic knowledge of relativity
in terms of classical books such as Adler, Bazin and Schiffers introduction8, the
change of viewpoint was an enlightenment: In particular, the new quality of a
formal language extending towards physical problems which could be formulated exactly, but without necessarily relying on anything of a quantitative,
computable or measurable kind in the traditional sense, was a centre of strong
intellectual attraction. This was even felt in view of the very layout of the text in
these books such as that given by Hawking and Penrose: theorems being presented not so much in terms of a long sequence of equations, but in a closed bloc
of colloquial text, similar to a piece of literary prose. Not that there had not
been elegant expositions of theoretical physics before, the generation of the students then being accumstomed to works on physics such as the equally canonical books by Landau and Lifshitz, or the Bourbaki mathematics taught by
Dieudonn in volume 1 of his Elements of modern analysis, but their style
was the usual one known from school (not however from Dieudonns volume 2
onward), - and although the new form of language was not really less interspersed with abstract symbols (in a way, all in all, the degree of abstraction had
actually been increased), the new texts breathed a kind of concrete atmosphere
which encouraged the student to tackle far more difficult problems in a wider
5
S.W.Hawking, G.F.R.Ellis: The Large-Scale Structure of Space-Time, Cambridge University Press, 1973.C.W.Misner, K.S.Thorne, J.A.Wheeler: Gravitation, Freeman, San Francisco, 1973.- S.Weinberg: Gravitation
and Cosmology: Principles and Applications of the General Theory of Relativity. Wiley, New York etc., 1972.
6
In Weinbergs book there are two relevant chapters, one on the action principle (ch. 12) including the tetrad
formalism (12.5), and one on symmetric spaces (ch. 13), respectively, while in the book of Misner, Thorne, and
Wheeler, these aspects were treated in more detail, as global techniques (sect. 34), and spinors (sect. 41), being
accompagnied then by other techniques such as Regge calculus, superspace, or pre-geometry (sect. 42sqq.).- A
direct (and fruitful) confrontation of the two could be observed during the 1974 visit of Wheeler to England,
related to the historic Oxford symposion on quantum gravity in the spring of that year. Cf. C.J.Isham, R.Penrose,
D.W.Sciama (eds): Quantum Gravity. An Oxford Symposium. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975. This volume
includes a detailed exposition of twistor theory (Penrose, 268-407) and the famous article by G.M.Patton and
J.A.Wheeler: Is Physics Legislated by Cosmogony? (538-605).
7
E.T.Newman, R.Penrose: An approach to gravitational radiation by a method of spin coefficients, J.Math.Phys.
3, 1962, 566-578.
8
R.Adler, M.Bazin, M.Schiffer: Introduction to General Relativity, McGraw-Hill, New York etc., 1965.
13/11/2014
range as had been expected before. And these problems became more and more
related to a conception which viewed the universe as a unified totality governed
by laws which could be extended in a progressive differentiation into detailed
regions of very specific processes, even extending beyond physics, at the same
time.9
This became even more important when another branch of physics emerged all
of a sudden, in a comparatively spontaneous onset of publication (in English
language). Curiously enough, it started in pure mathematics, and was generalized in physical chemistry first, before being re-introduced within a wide range
of possible applications into the field of physics proper: It was the advent of the
theories of self-organization and the formation of structure, introduced first by
Ren Thom, and by Ilya Prigogine, from two different perspectives. While the
former, in his creation of catastrophe theory, aimed to the modelling of archetypal germs for some local dynamics, the latter concentrated on the thermodynamical aspect of the maintaining of stable structures far from equilibrium. 10
Later on, it was recognized that Thom described in fact a special case of models
contained in the theory of Prigogine, referring to a dynamics of gradient-type,
only.11 The important point however was (still a number of years before the impact of chaos theory was actually fully comprehended) that both of them did not
hesitate to extend their basically mathematical and physical arguments to other
domains of sciences, in particular to those which had not been the topic of
mathematical modelling before. To be more precise, there were two different
aspects of this kind: On the one hand, the range of possible applications was decisively extended. On the other hand, first philosophical implications were being
discussed, including a closer look to the practical interactions between science
and society. Hence, the work of Prigogine gave rise to activities not only in
physics, chemistry, and biology, but also in social science, and in philosophy
itself. (In fact, it was Michel Serres who for the first time found a direct connection between philosophy and modern science, which was introduced on-line (so
to speak) into the theory of Prigogine in two subsequent works the latter published together with Isabelle Stengers, a former student of Serres. 12) The same
did the work of Thom.13 But contrary to the impression one could have won in
9
It was in fact, an intellectual adventure alone, to try the rephrasing of well-known outlines of classical theory in
terms of both new formalism and style, e.g. when applied to Einsteins theory of unified fields, to KK theory, or
the gauge theory of Weyl. Cf. M.A.Tonnelat: Les thories unitaires de llectromagnetisme et de la gravitation.
Gauthiers-Villars, Paris, 1965. (See ch.IV on KK theory, and ch.IX on Weyl theory.) Also id.: Einsteins Unified
Field Theory, Gordon and Breach, New York, 1966. (French ed. at Gauthiers-Villars, Paris, 1955).
10
R.Thom: Structural Stability and Morphogenesis, Benjamin, Reading (Mass.), 1975.- I.Prigogine: Vom Sein
zum Werden (From Being to Becoming), Piper, Mnchen, 1979.- G.Nicolis, I.Priogine: Self-Organization in
Non-Equilibrium Systems. From Dissipative Structures to Order through Fluctuations. Wiley-Interscience, New
York etc., 1977.
11
R.E.Zimmermann: Ordnung und Unordnung. Zum neueren Determinismusstreit zwischen Thom und Prigogine. Lendemains 50, 1988, 60-74.
12
I.Prigogine, I.Stengers: Dialog mit der Natur (La nouvelle alliance), Piper, Mnchen, Zrich, 1981.- Id., id.:
Das Paradox der Zeit (Time, chaos, and the quantum), Piper, Mnchen, Zrich, 1993.
13
Cf. R.Thom: Mathematical Models of Morphogenesis. Ellis-Horwood, Chichester (UK), 1983.- T.Poston,
I.Stewart: Catastrophe Theory and its Applications, Pitman, London etc., 1978.
13/11/2014
the beginning, namely that the theory of the latter was nothing but a restricted
version of Priogines theory of self-organization, in particular with a view to the
rather unfortunate debate on determinism taking place in France afterwards,
there was another point of difference to it: Thom extended not only the domain
of processes to be dealt with by catastrophe theory, but he also extended the
range of formal languages pointing to a kind of convergence with other,
non-formal types of language. The idea was originally, to develop a kind of linguistic theory bound to a semiological approach to meaning in general, with
finding the language of qualitative mathematics at the root of this. 14 It is this
idea in fact, which has secured the value of Thoms theory for the future, and
which enables Thom to visualize his approach as a first approximation to a future philosophy of nature still to be developed. 15 The key volume illustrating
similar aspects of a possible interaction of philosophy and science, was the collection of essays edited by Jantsch and Waddington in 1976 16: Within the frame
of a systematic network of topical references, the above mentioned problems
were combined to give a global panorama of human development. Or to be more
precise: The anthropological roots of science were in the focus of this interdisciplinary discussion. We could learn about the analogy of self-organization in social systems (Prigogine), or about the self-reproducing aspects of natural auto-poiesis (Zeleny and Pierre). And of course, we learnt of the relevance of the
principle of resilience, as the correct interpretation of Darwins theory of evolution in terms of natural selection (Holling). 17 It was the latter concept in fact,
that turned our attention to the classical work of Robert May on ecosystems. 18
(The full implications of this however remained hidden for quite a long while.)
At the time of the Einstein centennial however, there was still only little contact
between the physics mainstream dealing with relativity and its implications on
the one hand, and non-equilibrium processes of self-organization on the other,
although Hawking and Ellis in 1973, actually had referred to (the French version
of) Thoms book stating that (i)t may be that there is some connection between
the singularities studied in General Relativity and those studied in other branches of physics (...).19 Three monumental reviews of mainline relativity appeared
in 1979, but there was no explicit reference to any change (or extension at least)
of the classical paradigms handed down to us from an epoch prior to the qualitative step taken in 1973. Instead, the approaches to quantum gravity had been di14
R.Thom: Langage et catastrophes: Elments pour une smantique topologique. In: M.M.Peixoto (ed.), Dynamical Systems, Academic Press, New York, London, 1973, 619-654.
15
R.Thom: Towards a Revival of Natural Philosophy. In: W.Gttinger, H.Eikemeier (eds.), Structural Stability
in Physics, Springer, Berlin etc., 1979, 5-11. See more recently R.E.Zimmermann: Emergenz und exakte Narration des Welthaften. Zur Naturdialektik aus heutiger Sicht. System & Struktur III/1, 1995, 139-169.
16
E.Jantsch, C.H.Waddington (eds.): Evolution and Consciousness. Human Systems in Transition. Addison-Wesley, Reading (Mass.), 1976.
17
C.S.Holling: Resilience and Stability of Ecosystems. (73-92) - I.Prigogine: Order through Fluctuation:
Self-organization and Social System. (93-133) - M.Zeleny, N.A.Pierre: Simulation of Self-Renewing Systems.
(150-165)
18
R.M.May: Stability and Complexity of Model Ecosystems. Princeton University Press, 1973.
19
Hawking, Ellis, op.cit., 363.- For some of us this was a strong encouragement to actually start looking for this
connection.
13/11/2014
20
S.W.Hawking, W.Israel (eds.): General Relativity. An Einstein Centenary Survey. Cambridge University
Press, 1979.
21
B.Carter: The general theory of the mechanical, electromagnetic, and thermodynamic properties of black
holes, 294-369.- S.Chandrasekhar: An introduction to the theory of the Kerr metric and its perturbations,
370-453.- R.Penrose: Singularities and time-asymmetry, 581-638.- B.S.DeWitt: Quantum gravity: the new synthesis, 680-745.- S.W.Hawking: The path-integral approach to quantum gravity, 746-789.- S.Weinberg: Ultraviolet divergences in quantum theories of gravitation, 790-831.
22
I have summarized some of these aspects myself in: The Anthropic Cosmological Principle. Philosophical
Implications of Self-Reference. In: J.L.Casti, A.Karlquist (eds.), Beyond Belief, Randomness, Prediction, and
Explanation in Science, CRC Press, Boca Raton etc., 1991, 14-54. See also my: Self-Reference. On the Generic
Non-linearity of Nature. Phil. Nat. 27 (2), 1990, 272-297.
23
H.Nelkowski et al. (eds.): Einstein Symposion Berlin, Springer (Lecture Notes in Physics 100), Berlin etc.,
1979.
24
Cf.e.g. B.Zumino: Supersymmetry. A Way to the Unitary Field Theory. (114-127)(Including a reference to
KK theory, in fact.)- J.Wess: Methods of Differential Geometry in Gauge Theories and Gravitational Theories.
(233-244)
25
B.Kanitscheider: Die philosophische Relevanz der Kosmologie, 336-357.
13/11/2014
was the situation within the two Princeton volumes. 26 Hence, for quite some
time, there were two more or less isolated strings of development running parallel to each other with a certain amount of convergence, but without really coming into contact. Some of the outstanding books, collecting a large number of
important results in their own right, did not change this situation at all. 27 But
instead, the time of twistors was dawning.
The twistor concept of Penrose was in fact the natural generalization of what
had been learned before, on the relationships between space-time structure and
evolution in the thermodynamical sense, and with a view to the possible foundation of the universe on a pre-geometric structure existing in a sense (logically)
prior to the universe. The basic idea of twistors, as introduced end of the sixties,
and particularly in a volume of collected essays on combinatorial methods edited by Ted Bastin 28 , rooted in the concept of spin networks. Penrose tried to
re-construct space-time from combinatorial elements of structure, basically consisting of a network of abstract particles interacting only by exchanging their
respective spin numbers, without referring to any background metric. Geometric
concepts such as angles among principle directions of space could be approximated then by simply condensing the underlying network. Twistors were
nothing but a generalization of this approach in order to actually include more
complicated (and thus more real) particles having also momentum and total
angular momentum under relativistic conditions.
It was not before 1986 however, that the master piece on twistors had been finished by Penrose and Rindler.29 (I am not sure whether Penrose would himself
judge it as a master piece today, but it was one indeed, and the subsequent work
has confirmed this beyond any doubt.30) Of course, Wheeler and others had discussed the possibility of pre-geometry before, thinking of a straightforward realization of Einsteins vision. And the idea of superspace had been born. But, in
a sense, the American approach appeared to be too qualitative (if not intuitive),
and it did not couple immediately to the problem of unifying general relativity
and quantum theory, if not in the interior of the world, then exterior to it. And
the spinor picture of space-time was well established about that time. Insofar as
twistor space showed up as a product of spin space and its dual, it was a kind of
systematic revelation of how to interpret the condensation of spin networks in
order to define something like a formal foundation of space-time-matter (because for the self-dual case, pieces of space and time as well as elementary par26
A.Held (ed.): General Relativity and Gravitation. 2 vols., Plenum, New York, London, 1980.- Cf.e.g. Stanley
Deser (I 357-392) and Ferrara and van Nieuwenhuizen (I 557-585) on supergravity, Tipler et al. on singularities
and horizons (II 97-206), and Penrose and Ward on twistors (II 283-328).
27
Cf.e.g. F.P.Esposito, L.Witten (eds.): Asymptotic Structure of Space-Time, Plenum, New York, London,
1977, with important contributions by Geroch on asymptotic structure (1-105), Parker on particle production by
strong gravitational fields (107-226), and Ko, Newman, and Tod on H-space theory (227-271).- Also
P.G.Bergmann, V. DeSabbata (eds.): Cosmology and Gravitation, Plenum, New York, London, 1980, with contributions by E.T.Newman on complex manifolds (275-285) and R.Penrose on twistors (287-316). Probably, the
latter paper is the most concise and clear contribution to the understanding of twistor theory.
28
T.Bastin (ed.): Quantum theory and beyond, Cambridge University Press, 1971.
29
R.Penrose, W.Rindler: Spinors and Space-Time, 2 vols., Cambridge University Press, 1984, 1986.
30
See e.g. R.S.Ward, R.O.Wells jr.: Twistor Geometry and Field Theory, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
13/11/2014
10
ticles could be produced without referring to a classical background space). Independent of the further development (in particular, of the fact that loops and
knots appear by now as a generic generalization of spin networks, but (perhaps)
not twistors), the twistor concept, including Newmans heaven theory as a special case, was a first clear step towards telling the history of the origin of the
universe as its foundation, and as an explication of the emergence of the relativity view, and of the quantum view, respectively, at the same time.
*
So what is the intention of this present paper now, with a view to what we have
said so far? In fact, other topics have emerged by now that govern the mainstream discussions today, in particular strings (including M-theory), loops, and
knots ( there are about 400 papers in the hep-th and gr-qc sections of the Los
Alamos preprint archives per month, about a quarter of them referring to quantum gravity, of which roughly 90% deal with either string theory or loop theory
(in a division of about 3:1) such that most of the string papers appear in the
hep-th section, most of the other papers in the gr-qc section31). But it is still the
twistor concept which has the privilege of having founded the first contact to a
classical line of philosophy.
During all the progress made in the understanding of the physical foundations of
the universe, mainstream philosophy has stood aside all the time. While being
engaged in either historical problems of its own field, or in the re-phrasing of
everyday language in logical terms in order to eventually extract a meaning from
where no meaning was actually being expected, philosophy missed the connection to innovations in science. Ironically, those who worked in the field which
was traditionally associated to questions of speculative physics in the sense of
Schelling, and to the materialistic turn of this approach, looking forward to a
possible foundation of the world in scientific terms, were at the same time those
who (due to reasons related to their social and political theory) not only criticized (or censured rather) the progress made by science, but even neglected the
actual development deliberately (so that very soon their arguments missed the
mark in first place). Hence, nowadays, very near to the millennium, a philosophy of nature in the traditional sense has almost disappeared, exactly at a time
when it is most needed.
It is probably an illustrating example to look at volume 31/2 of the journal Philosophia
naturalis which is one of the leading journals of its kind in Germany (though it is understood
as being an international journal, in fact, publishing both in German and English). This second
part of the volume appeared in 1994 and was dedicated to problems of space and time in general, and especially to cosmology. There are eight papers in the collection of this volume: Luciano Boi discusses the relationship between Riemanns conceptions of a dynamical geometry
and his ideas about the philosophy of nature, William Craig and Adolf Grnbaum continue
31
These dates have been collected meritoriously, by Carlo Rovelli, cf. his GR 15 lecture in Poona, gr-qc
9803024.
13/11/2014
11
their debate about the question whether the universe has necessarily been created or not according to indications given by cosmology, Thomas Arzt discusses the interests of Pauli, especially with a view to his contact with C.G.Jung, Axel Ziemke deals with aspects of the
neuro-biology of perception, Andreas Bartels refers to Earmans concept of absolute space,
and Claus Kiefer finally, discusses quantum gravity. Except Ziemkes contribution, which
falls into biology rather than into the field of the main topic discussed here, all the other contributions are of a decidedly unsatisfactory type: Boi talks about basically old points which are
well-known for quite a while (except perhaps that the philology applied to extract these results is comparatively new). As the most important insight into Riemann he visualizes that the
metric structure of a space is represented as a given state (or as he says equivalently: as a
type of being) of matter, i.e. the metric structure is in a causality relation with the state of
matter.32 Neither is this a very new insight in fact, nor is the terminology used very clearly.
It is actually the fact of knowing what might be meant by the author what makes a conceptual
critique of this formulation possible at all, because otherwise one could not extract a proper
meaning from this relationship between states of matter on the one hand, and causality, on the
other. There are several of similarly unclear passages, and we would not like to comment on
them any further. But it is interesting to note that a discussion which primarily refers to aspects of substance metaphysics, mentions Herbart, but not Schelling. Instead of pointing to
the fact that Riemann might have anticipated Husserl and Cassirer, it would be more straightforward to reflect about the influence of Schelling onto Riemann. It is in fact the philosophy
of Schelling which anticipates numerous (philosophical) problems modern physics encountered not only during the 19th century, but also during our own century. (Note that it is actually Ziemke who explicitly refers to Schelling! And he even knows of the important work of
Camilla Warnke of the late seventies.33) Craig and Grnbaum engage on a debate about the
theological implications of the Big Bang. 34 This may be interesting in its own right, but the
question is what the philosophy of nature has actually to do with it. An error of category is
probably the least one could state in order to object to this debate in such a journal. And indeed, even in philosophical terms, the arguments presented are obviously rather off-shore:
Craig insists that the origin of the universe is actually prior to the Big Bang (which is
well-known). Unfortunately, with respect to a cause of the universe, he continues: From the
nature of the cause involved, that cause must have transcended space and time (...) and therefore be uncaused, changeless, eternal, immaterial, and enormously powerful (himself). He
clearly describes the properties of substance (which in modern terminology can be defined as
non-being in the sense of a field of possibilities, or of a potentiality, out of which actuality
eventually may emerge. But he does not use this standard concept, but postulates instead that
such a cause be (most plausibly, he says) a personal agent.35 And he concludes, like it or
not (!), cosmological theory ... does lend tangible support to the theistic doctrine of creatio ex
nihilo. This is in fact inconsistent, but, apart from that, do we have to read that in such a
journal?36 As Craig states on Grnbaum discussing Craig: If God exists, why could He not
32
L.Boi: Die Beziehungen zwischen Raum, Kontinuum und Materie im Denken Riemanns; die thervorstellung
und die Einheit der Physik. Das Entstehen einer neuen Naturphilosophie. Phil. Nat. 31 (2), 1994, 171-216. Here:
188.
33
C.Warnke: Systemdenken und Dialektik in Schellings Naturphilosophie. In: H.Bergmann et al. (eds.),
Dialektik und Systemdenken, Historische Aspekte, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin (Ost = DDR), 1977, 99-146.
34
W.L.Craig: Creation and Big Bang Cosmology, 217-224, A.Grnbaum: Some Comments on William Craigs
Creation and Big Bang Cosmology, 225-236, W.L.Craig: A Response to Grnbaum, On Creation and Big
Bang Cosmology, 237-249.
35
Ibid. 219.- In note 4 (p. 222) he adds: I mean that it is false that something existed prior to the singularity. Is
non-being nothing(ness)?
36
It is interesting to learn that Grnbaum also discusses god and the world in a seemingly respectable volume of
collected essays edited by B.Falkenburg and L.Krger (eds.): Physik, Philosophie und die Einheit der
Wissenschaft, BI Mannheim, 1995.
13/11/2014
12
cause momentary effects which are not events in the GTR sense of the word?37 Yes, why
couldnt he?38 - Arzt gives a historical account of the contact between Pauli and Jung, discussing especially the unity of one world.39 This account is consistent and mentions the interesting semiological aspect of the role of symbolics for the unity of the world. (It is only unfortunate that the author cannot abstain from reproducing the very questionable quotation of
Whitheads that occidental philosophy would be nothing than a series of footnotes to Plato.
This quotation had a very negative impact on the ideas British (and American) scientists often
have about the uniqueness of Platonic philosophy. In fact, we will come back to this point
later.) Bartels has the word substance metaphysics in his title even. 40 But he does not actually deal with this topic. What he does instead is to discuss Earmans concept of absolute
space based on a modified Leibniz argument (as Bartels calls it) designed in order to refute
the position of Leibniz in his debate with Lockes follower Clarke. Although it may be interesting in its own right to continue this discussion in one way or the other, it is not very useful
from the outset (I think), to deal with this debate in such a journal. Also, the author confounds
various forms of substance and their meaning, going back to Aristotle e.g., in order to discuss
his topic. But he does not get the concept of substance quite right altogether, which is mainly
due to the fact that he leaves out Spinoza. (This is actually also true for the other authors
dealing with a philosophical context.)41 Finally, Kiefer discusses quantum gravity. 42 This is
in fact, the only contribution of this volume which is eactly to the point. Kiefer is an outstanding, young scientist, well-known in his field. Unfortunately, he diminishes the quality of
his works by being very ideological as far as the relevance of quantum theory is concerned.
So he begins by stating that it is actually quantum theory which governs the picture of the
world we have today. Only gravitation would stand aside (or stand back?). And for him, the
universe as a whole can only be understood within the frame of a theory of quantum cosmology. But he mentions string theory (without any doubt on the hep-th side of science, but with
generalizing aspects in fact) only in passing. And when discussing loop theory and knots, he
forgets to mention that this approach is actually completely on the gr-qc side (which means
that it is working completely without any background space in being based on generalized
spin networks). He also quotes Penrose as a witness for the breakdown of classical theory, but
not as a witness for twistor theory which is actually also based on the same concept of spin
networks as loops are. Indeed, his example for the regulation of divergences can exactly be
interpreted as a case which demonstrates that gravity is more fundamental than anything else.
But it does not follow necessarily that this fundamental gravity must be a quantum gravity.
Hence: Only one paper (15 pages out of roughly 150 = 10%) is to the point (though we can
argue about it). Most of the text (Boi, the Craig/Grnbaum debate, Bartels = 90 pages = 60%)
is not to the point (and also very unclear, to say the least). One paper does not belong to this
section (Ziemke = 20%), and one is acceptable if viewed in historical terms (Arzt 10%). So
far the characterization of the philosophy of nature in Germany and in some other places.
The result is that physicists more and more often tend to create their own philosophical approach. On the one hand, this is basically a good idea, but on the
other hand, it carries its intrinsic dangers: The problem is that for most of the
37
13/11/2014
13
British and Anglo-American authors, philosophy is more or less the same as the
theory of Plato (which they usually do not know very well though). It is very
rare indeed that physicists deal with other philosophers such as Leibniz e.g. in
detail (and in a sufficiently consistent way). Probably, Lee Smolin, Louis
Kauffman, Julian Barbour, and some others are honourable exceptions here.
And of course, the reference to Whitehead is very popular in English-speaking
countries. But it is less popular to discuss the consistency of the foundations
leading to Whiteheads theory. In fact, the necessity to deal with philosophical
problems of physics has been recognized for quite a while, but the approach to
such problems is not well founded, especially because of the literary
one-sidedness just mentioned. The main point is that it is decidedly inappropriate to deal with philosophical problems of modern physics in terms of ancient
theories who could not be properly adapted to a modern environment. Either one
refers to modern philosophy then, or one refers (even better) to modern philosophy in view of the development which has actually produced it. Hence, the theory of Leibniz is not actually anticipating developments in science, being interesting therefore to be dealt with today, but it is its structural viewpoint and its
further development during the last two centuries as well as the more recent
discussions (including Mach, Einstein, Reichenbach and others) that make it interesting for a philosophy which deals with modern physics. (The theories of
Augustinus and Thomas of Aquinas e.g., though full of brilliant ideas in their
own right, cannot offer anything comparable. 43)
It is nevertheless more appropriate, as we shall see later, to substitute the line
Leibniz-Hegel by the alternative line of Spinoza-Schelling: This is not simply a
variation of the perspective taken, but this line is also part of a longer tradition
that actually dealt with the foundation of the totality of the world, and with its
relationship to the latters evolution, in first place, originating in fact, as early as
in the time of the Greek Stoa, and extending into the year 1975, when the German philosopher Ernst Bloch published his final main work on the experiment
of the world (Experimentum Mundi). This is actually one thing we will do in
this present paper: to re-trace the structural development of this traditional line
of thought in the philosophy of nature, and to re-connect it with the recent developments in modern science. This will be the topic of the chapters II and III,
the former giving a brief outline of approaches by stoic philosophers, by Averroes, Bruno, and Spinoza, up to the theories of Schelling and Bloch, the latter
summarizing the relationship between philosophy and science, as we see it today, discussing then the modern implications of this with a view to recent developments in physics. What we will find is that the general idea underlying all
the conceptions on the line to be discussed is mainly based on fundamental aspects of what is called substance metaphysics. And this is the reason for the
aforementioned privilege of twistor theory: that it provides a first, formal anal43
Hence, although the pledge for metaphysics staged by B.M.McCoy recently, is to be welcomed in principle, it
does not really help to imply that these comparatively ancient philosophers had a direct influence on the development of modern science. (hep-th 9609160)
13/11/2014
14
ogy for what substance in this sense could actually mean for us today.
But we will also deal with the following: In the meantime, a new, third string of
development has come into contact with the two other lines (of space-time
physics and chaos theory, respectively) mentioned here: This is the theory of the
physical foundations of consciousness, which points to a unified theory of physics and logic, at the same time. The point is that when visualized itself as a
product of nature, consciousness must not only have physics at its root, but the
kind of thinking which it produces itself must be bound in one way or another to
that of what it is product. This is nothing but a consequence of the philosophical
line discussed here, which actually leads to what we call a transcendental materialism, in the sense that thinking itself is just one (though very complex) form
of that matter which is there from the beginning on. Seen this way, physical
matter evolves to a high degree of complexity actually producing matter systems
whose characteristic activity (as their mode of being) is nothing but to think.
Hence, this thinking has to be adapted from the outset to about what is being
thought, in fact. This is one important point to be discussed in further detail
here. The other point is that necessarily, because this is a primarily evolutionary
view, the sort of thinking as we know it (that is, as humans actually do apply it)
cannot be the final stage of development: The universe being still comparatively
young, there is still time for many things to come. This introduces a kind of rational modesty into the discussion, because it will probably not be humans after
all who participate in the shaping of the final stages of this universe.
Consequently, some of the chief protagonists of the seventies and eighties have
left their old fields, at least to a certain extent, in order to work on more promising topics. Penrose in particular, has concentrated on an explicit relationship
between fundamental physics and the theory of consciousness. 44 Unfortunately,
contrary to his earlier works, his two recent books on consciousness suffer a little from the fact that he belongs apparently to the Platonic adherents. But the
strong resonance to his books and to the debate following the Tucson II discussion of the Penrose-Hameroff model of consciousness demonstrate the widespread interest in this topic. We will deal with this aspect within the discussion
of a number of approaches which do not only change the relationship between
physics and logic, and physics and the science of consciousness (or cognitive
science as it is usually referred to), respectively, but which shed also a new light
on the relationship between physics and mathematics (being perhaps of even
more importance). In this sense, we will briefly outline the conceptions presented more recently by Trifonov and by Tegmark, respectively. This will be topic
of the chapters IV and V. We discuss then aspects of a true evolutionary theory of the universe, based on philosophical motivations of Darwinian type (associated with the mentioned Leibniz-Hegel line), presented by Smolin, referred
to as cosmological natural selection. This will be the topic of chapter VI. We
will also refer to other recent developments within these chapters so as to secure
44
R.Penrose: The Emperors New Mind, 1989, and: Shadows of the Mind, 1994, both at Oxford University
Press.
13/11/2014
15
the connection to what we discussed above and left in the mid-eighties with the
winding up of twistor theory.
Finally, as a preliminary entry into the future development of a self-consistent
philosophy of nature under conditions of modern science, we will list systematic
aspects of a theory which will take into account that both physics and cognitive
science can only be sufficiently consistent in their own right, if their mutual relationship is founded on a unified (and in fact, historically unfolding) basis, including both ontological as well as epistemological concepts. This is the place
where the Klymene principle will be introduced, as a methodological convention
which facilitates the handling of intertwined historical processes of the mentioned kind. A first list of onto-epistemic aspects is given in chapter VII, and a
second list is given of what may serve as a new organon of philosophy resulting
from the discussion here, in chapter VIII. - But two additional remarks are in
order: The ansatz displayed does not solve all problems in the sense of giving a
kind of generalized TOE. Instead, it serves only as a rough draft to be filled out
by forthcoming work. And in this sense, it can be understood as exerting a critical amount of heuristic pressure acting on the future development of scientific
models. On the other hand, having eventually achieved a systematic outline of a
closed model of the world, this does not keep us from having to work out all of
the details: The point is simply that understanding the physical foundations of
neuro-physiology will not help in understanding what thinking actually means in
one case or the other, in the same way as understanding the physical foundations
of oscillations does not help in understanding what music actually means in one
or the other composition.
But finally, it is still far from clear whether the models displayed here do actually have that universal relevance which is usually granted without mentioning.
Hence, it is the problem of intercultural stability in fact, that is discussed in
chapter IX, in order to look for explicit criteria that might define anthropic invariants underlying systems of concepts similar to those which are known in
cosmology. Not unlike the latter, far from what an anthropic principle in the
strong sense would suggest, they could at best be expected to give a consistency
framework for thinking itself, connected to the very definition of what human
life actually means rather than providing a mechanistic sort of scheme according
to which thinking could be classified as a static property. The basic idea is that
once philosophy is interpreted as following up the results of science, then what
is actually being thought about in philosophy should have a unified root in what
is a structurally stable result in science, because all humans inhabit the same
world. Hence, up to local variations, there should be a class of isomorphic pictures of the world of universal type. And also, one would expect a respective
class of languages which are compatible in the sense of being able to map these
pictures up to isomorphy. In terms of the perspective chosen here, it may be
possible to save the concept of Achsenzeit (axial time = axial epoch) introduced
by Jaspers, and to rescue it from racist connotations which were not being intended at the time, but which nowadays can be interpreted as a residue of the
13/11/2014
16
colonial age when one used to divide humans into hierarchically ordered classes
of more or less developed cultural sections. Instead, the meaning of Achsenzeit
can be vindicated now in terms of a generalized concept which serves as a
guideline for language criteria within a unified hermeneutic of communication.
In this sense, such a hermeneutic is not much different from a hermeneutic of
nature which is the object of modern materialistic theory. Hence, such a humanization of nature and naturalization of the humans (Marx) may be taken
as a starting point for improving the interaction between humans and nature on
the one hand, and among humans on the other. And this is explored briefly in
chapter X which also provides an outlook of how to actually proceed.
M.Forschner: Die stoische Ethik, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt, 2nd ed. 1995 (originally
Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 1981 = Habilitation thesis 1979/80).
13/11/2014
17
Ibid., 56.
Ibid., 58.
13/11/2014
18
Typically, the logos represents the actual law according to which all what happens is constituted, and in this sense it combines the concept of a natural law
with a normative meaning. In particular, the order exhibited by social systems is
interpreted as a direct consequence of a cosmic, fundamental law. Viceversa, the
laws of nature are interpreted according to the model of legal order. Hence, the
epistemological problem is one of founding this unity and totality on an
all-encompassing ground such that it is possible to derive (so to speak) the multitude of varying objects in the world as the explicit unfolding of some potential
which is inherent in this foundation. It is thus necessary to systematically determine the unity of the world within a framework of manifold appearances and
motions, and also to ask for the source of this dialectically mediated process. In
a way, the difference of hyle and logos is expressed therefore in terms of the
conceptual differentiation between the ontological entity and its semantic representation. It is interesting to note that the desire for giving a consistent foundation for both the legally ordered structure of the world, and also for its adequate
description and comprehension due to immanent criteria which are themselves
products of this very process, coincides with the retreating of mythology in ancient Greece. This leads to the emergence of a completely new perspective with
respect to the legitimation of knowledge about the world, because its relevance
for social praxis is not trivially secured anymore. (This is probably at least one
source of the permanent ressentiment since then, as far as philosophical conceptions are concerned when being offered to the general public, because the soberness of rational philosophy generally lacks that kind of self-securing
re-insurance which mythology could originally provide with emotional ease.)
The actual constitution of the pneumatic structures is called hxis which characterizes the quality and quantity of a field of force for some object. Within the
state of perfection, the set of given hexeis represents the actual virtues associated
with such a material state. The objective is thus to achieve blissful happiness
(eudaimona) by stabilizing virtues and bringing the own actions in line with
them.48 Note hence, that no a priori differentiation between physical objects and
acting (human) beings is made as far as the classification of virtues is concerned! Another important aspect is the close relationship between the ontological state and its epistemological representing by means of a direct mapping of
epistemic elements into a differentiated theory of language. (Remember that
Zenon, the founder of the stoic school, is also the inventor of the first standard
grammar which we still use today in a modified form handed down to us by the
Romans.) This approach to language approximates modern semiology in referring basic definitions such as those for specific types of propositions,
predicational strategies, and logical rules, to the explicit sign-structure of symbolic communication. Note that according to stoic theory, a correlation between
language and reality is possible, because language is itself a part of reality.
48
Ibid., 64sq.
13/11/2014
19
Hence, there is an actual isomorphism between linguistic and non-linguistic entities. In this sense, it is ptsis which is the meaning of the grammatical subject
while kategrema is the meaning of the grammatical predicate which bound together by the copula constitute the practical meaning of a proposition (axoma).
The latter is the intension of a sentence, the idea which is actually being expressed, or the contents of the expression (prgma). Based on modern encounters with language, developed in the philosophy of the 19th century, but referring themselves to this original stoic systematic, we still use this conventional
setting in phrasing propositions of the form A = B, even when applying it to
formal languages such as mathematics. Basically, a theory in this sense is nothing but a set of propositions of this form obeying a certain number of rules. 49
Hence, what we actually have here is a close connection between the three basic
components of stoic theory: physics, logic, and ethics, such that the problem is
to comprehend the world (as given by physics) so correct and consistent as possible by means of a straightforward application of logic which is nothing but another product of the same underlying physics. The capability of gaining
knowledge about the world at all is obviously secured by this fact such that results of any (correct and consistent) reflexion are isomorphic to the constitutional aspects of the world. Once, an appropriate picture of the world is achieved in
terms of the logic provided, adequate actions to be undertaken are well-defined,
provided the criterion is this very constitution of nature. In this sense, all three
main components of the theory, physics, logic, and ethics, are operating on the
same (ontological) level of the world, and their character is thus of an intrinsically objective, say, scientific, type.
4. Ethics
Now, if there is a cosmic sympathy which shows up as the fundamental binding
force in the world, and if ethics works on the same level as ontology (mapped to
physics) and epistemology (mapped to logic) do, then it is straightforward to
expect that this global sympathy can be differentiated down into the smallest
regions of daily praxis. If moreover, hyle and logos represent two types of
worldly activities, the former referring to a principle of passivity, the latter to
one of activity, then this implies that there can be a choice of alternative types of
being for any member of the worldly community, e.g. for a member of the social
system. Hence, there is a freedom of choice for humans. And there is an intrinsic
existential problem humans have to solve: namely to base their explicit choice
on principles they have derived from their knowledge about the world achieved
so far. And still more: If the principle of activity is preferred (as the principle of
logos), then living according to nature (kat physein) refers to a nature which
is primarily producing (active) nature, permanently creating new forms within
the world. Consequently, an appropriate life (according to nature) should be one
49
Ibid., 73sq.
13/11/2014
20
of permanent innovation. But, obviously, there is a contradiction between (human-made) legal normativity and the laws of nature. And also, due to the different states of knowledge achieved by one or the other, it is not quite clear how
the relation between the two should be valued. So, the main problem is to actually overcome this contradiction. And this can only be achieved in terms of
studying the properties of nature in their totality, of studying ones own relations
to nature and to the social system, and of communicating the results to others in
order to establish a consentient discourse.
The important point is that one has to start from oneself: It is only the correct
utilization of my imaginations which is within my discretion, nothing else.50
This is the basic rule to begin with. On the other hand, it is secured that I have
the possibility at all to do so, because there is already, from the beginning on, a
characteristic relationship of the human being to itself (due to the concept of
oikeisis). 51 The logos is actually providing a freedom of consent
(synkatthesis), which shows up as a special case of the general freedom of
choice: It depends on what has been recognized as virtue according to a permanent reflexion of our perceptions and cognitions, in particular, of our
self-perceptions and self-cognitions. Hence, reality is the continuous motion of
matter (which leads by the way to the fact that the extension of cosmic motion is
time - such that it is the temporality of the worldly what gives the processual
frame for human reflexion and action, respectively). And in terms of physics,
objects cannot be separated from their determinations. But in terms of language,
this is possible.52 So, ethics can be actually developed within a physical framework which defines the space of free play for practical actions, its
recognizability being guaranteed by a balanced interplay of physics and logic on
the one hand, and logic and ethics, on the other. Situative synkatthesis is the
goal for a consistent succession of single actions, pointing forward to an existential conception developed in more detail by Sartre and others within a modern
perspective of French philosophy. The spontaneous shining forth of a possible
future within products of nature still to come is not excluded when listing the
possibilities for actually gaining consistent information about the world, thus
pointing forward to an ontology of the not-yet-being in the sense of Bloch.
Hence, the morally good is provided by nature itself which according to the telos-formula of Chrysippos gives the final standard for human action. This is the
reason why only the morally good is actually good (mnon t kaln agathn)
as the stoic guiding principle states.
Note finally that there is always the difficulty of consistently dealing with the problem of determination which lurks in the background of global systematics of the kind presented here in
the case of the Stoa: Forschner himself formulates that a theory which makes the process of
the world globally as well as in all local details to a lawful process of explicating a unique and
divine substance, can hardly associate a consistent meaning to the concept of moral freedom
50
51
52
Ibid., 112.
Ibid., 146.
Ibid., 79, 81.
13/11/2014
21
and responsibility. 53 But this is not necessarily true, because the system is not a static one,
even substance itself is not visualized in terms of an absolute and intrinsically non-dynamical
structure. It is however acting from beyond space and time, because otherwise it could not
possibly be a substance, but nevertheless it is generating a space of free play for future
worldly processes including human actions. In so far, it is not determining the single events to
be taking place, but it defines a worldly dynamic instead which exhibits the empirical traces
of what cannot be comprehended in empirical terms otherwise. Hence, the responsibility of a
single human is to consistently operate within the boundaries provided for by this space of
free play. Freedom of choice means freedom according to given necessities and given possibilities which are left open for further innovative development. This is not a theory of determinism in the strict, mechanical sense. It is rather a very modern dialogue between randomness and necessity, very much in the sense of our chaos theory today, or in terms of social
philosophy, very much in the sense of Sartrean existentialism: Become what you are!
B. Averroes
In contrary to the stoic movement in ancient Greece and Rome, the Arab reception of European philosophy is mainly based on Aristotelian theory (including a number of neo-platonic and other ideas flowing in from falsely attributed
classical texts).54 The beginning of this reception is usually attributed to a philosopher of the 9th century, Al-Kindi, who lived in Bagdad. He mainly dealt
with the problem of the relationship between body and soul, but also discussed
the category of infinity. In contrary to Aristotle himself, he postulates a dualism
between the finite region of the wordly and the infinite region of God. For him,
the world is a true creatio ex nihilo corresponding to the thesis derived from
the Koran. Matter so created is something passive (in the Aristotelian sense)
which needs some external influence to gain distinct qualities. But for Al-Kindi,
different from Aristotelian conception, substrate and form as well as potentiality
and actuality, cannot be separated from each other. It is some time later that
Al-Farabi continues this discussion trying to adapt the Aristotelian system to the
Islam in re-interpreting a crucial passage on creation (Koran, s.30, v.26) such
that not nothingness is the foundation of the world, but some entity acting as a
potential for the world to be created. But it is not before Avicenna (Ibn Sina), a
student of Al-Farabi, begins his work that the relationship between possibility
and actuality is clarified in more detail. First of all, Avicenna differs between the
53
Ibid., 113.
Note that the history of the reception of Aristotles texts is very complex indeed: Originally stored in ancient
Syria, in order to save them in times of war and unrest, they were eventually sold to the Roman Lukullus who
forgot about them. Their contents was taught in an ancient Syrian language badly known to the Arabs of six,
seven centuries later, emerging from the Arab peninsula. Nevertheless, the nucleus of Aristotles theory served
as a modern epistemological instrument in the development of a philosophy based on the principles of the Islam
which provided the basis for what is generally referred to as the Golden Age of Arab Thinking, encompassing
mainly the original Arab countries, including Mesopotamia, as well as Spain, where a very fruitful, interdisciplinary and intercultural science and philosophy emerged. It is not before the advent of scholastic theory in Europe, especially developed by Thomas of Aquinas, that this Arab version of Aristotelian theory comes to light in
central Europe. At last, the original texts of Aristotle are recovered again. But while greeting this theoretical
inflow as a progress, Thomas is later obliged to modify and to actually re-transform Arab theory in order to be
able to secure compatibility with Christian dogmatism.
54
13/11/2014
22
necessary existence which is origin of itself (causa sui), and possible existence
which needs a cause external to itself. Hence, the former is the immanent cause
in God himself, the latter the worldly entity which is determined by other entities.The actual dator formarum giving essence to worldly objects (and thus to
worldly existence) is the intellectus agens, the highest form of intelligence already introduced in a hierarchy of activities invented by Al-Farabi earlier. It is in
fact this intellectus which, once it is achieved by humans, opens up the way back
to their divine origin, because through it they can learn to participate in the
knowledge of God. Hence, the process of becoming has a basically cyclic structure, and it is indeed matter which is the underlying, dynamical principle of this
process. In this sense, matter appears as a creative principle of multitude. And
although both matter and form are universalia for human knowledge, they cannot be properly separated, hence the close interaction between ontological being
and epistemological reflecting this being (reflexion being appropriately
expressend in terms of language). Matter is thus eternal entity (as principle according to original (primordial) being), but in worldly terms it gains temporality,
and worldly objects are being constituted in terms of this temporal matter. In
fact, Avicenna opens the discussion here, for differing between the (God-like)
substantial perspective of eternal things and the worldly perspective of temporal
things. (In many discussions today, this difference is still a problem, namely in
differentiating between internal and external observers, which corresponds to
two different perspectives chosen in modern physics.) Avicenna formulates:
The eternal can be understood either in terms of being or in terms of time. The
eternal with respect to being means that its existence is unconditioned. The
eternal with respect to time means that it has no beginning in time.55 This does
not necessarily mean that matter, form, time (and motion) are eternal and
non-created, as is often indicated in various interpretations. It simply means not
more that, if visualized in terms of a substantial perspective, the fundamental
categories of the world have an eternal significance, but that locally, in terms of
a worldly perspective, they can be visualized as finite projections of these eternal entities which develop as anything else does. (This means in particular, that
also time itself, as we see it, is subjected to a process of being actually produced!) It is interesting to note that nothingness therefore, for Avicenna, is
non-being rather than nothing at all: It is a moment of transition between two
states, so it gains the connotation of an active, dynamical potential.
But the main protagonist of this creative period of philosophy is without any
doubt Averroes (Ibn Rushd) living in the 12th century in Cordoba, Spain. His
main work consists of commentaries of Aristotle, and it will serve as stimulation
for Thomas of Aquinas to eventually begin his own work on Aristotle (from
1260 on). In contrary to his predecessors, for Averroes, the manifold of worldly
objects is not created by means of a mediation with intelligent entities. The primary cause for all what there is, is God himself who creates this manifold com55
13/11/2014
23
pletely from the beginning on. But this creation is actually a permanent process
rather than a single moment at the beginning of the world. In a way, creation is
conservation rather than permanent innovation. And creation in this sense is not
a creation out of nothingness: The idea is simply to apply the implications of a
shifting perspective rather consequently. Unique creation at a beginning of the
world and the subsequent evolution of objects having been so created, are only
concepts which are due to the fact that humans interpret their world in temporal
terms. But for God himself who is himself eternal, there is no time. He is the
universal mover who is not moved himself, because he is, according to his essence, eternal. And there is no motion, if there is no time. But the world is actually caused and moved, and as humans are part of the world, their perspective is
one of causality and thus temporality. At best, humans can speculate about the
eternal perspective of God, because they are led to concepts of potentiality and
actuality, once they have gained some more insight into the historical structure
of their world. Consequently, matter is also given immediately, as a universal
potential, and its form is founded on its substratum. Hence, form becomes immanent property of the material, and there is a reciprocal interaction between the
two. Note that this implies that matter itself gains the quality of being causa sui,
because it is a necessary entity now (which means that it could exist without
God as well). If there are two entities of substantial character one can basically
decide in one of the following two ways: either matter is the basic foundation of
the world itself (and the concept of God is superflous), or both matter and God
are synonymous and fall into one. Averroes decides in favour of the second version and visualizes nature in pantheistic terms. Consequently, for him, motion is
self-motion (and evolution, as the permanent unfolding of forms which are inherent to the potentiality of matter, becomes self-organization).56
C. Bruno
This aspect of productivity is also one which is of considerable interest for Bruno, who a number of centuries later sets out to re-formulate the structure of the
universe in terms of a relational infinity of uniform worlds which are subjected
to a permanent actualization of divine creativity. Productivity is visualized then,
as the immanent activity of the world which is not a consequence but an equivalent of that divine creativity. In this sense, mathematics is not only natures
scripture in which the book of nature is written down, but it is a concrete representation of nature as alternative aspect to what is being manifested in the very
process of creation. God himself is being naturalized, and the theological per56
It is obvious that such an autonomous kind of matter is in serious conflict with Christian dogmatism which
postulates the dominating role of the spirit in contrary to the complete unimportance of matter. Hence, the progressive re-interpretation of Aristotle as offered by Arab philosophy, had to be modified again, and the result
was even more: a modified Aristotle reduced to his conservative rather than progressive aspects. Remember that
professors at the first universities of Europe, founded in the Middle Ages not much later, were obliged to swear
by the name of (that modified) Aristotle to promote and advance his theory in doing their work.
13/11/2014
24
spective is nothing but a metaphor, setting the ontological structure of the world
and its philosophical reflexion into one (onto-epistemic) unity. To be more precise: The mathematical explication of a process is therefore the same as the unfolding dynamics of this process. Nevertheless, there is no explicit connection
between the logic and the physics of a phenomenon. Hence, Brunos critique
concerning Galileian physics: For Bruno, the tendency of modern mathematics,
long before the works of Galilei (which Bruno could not know), to represent
concrete processes in terms of formal structures, appeared as a translation from
one language into another, without really understanding the meaning of both.
Hence, for him, mathematical knowledge fell under the criterion of what his
teacher Nicholas de Cusa called docta ignorantia, unless it would be
accompagnied by philosophy understood as a hermeneutic of nature leading to
a true understanding of the structure of the world (being cooperatrice di natura
in this sense). One basic aspect to this desired understanding would be the
grasping of the intrinsically productive character of nature as it is expressed in
Brunos concept of matter, referring to stoic ideas as well as the conception of
Averroes.57 The important passage in his matter text 58 is the following:
...: therefore, the always persisting fruitful (and productive) matter must have the privilege to
be recognized as the only substantial principle and as that which is and always remains; and
all forms together are nothing but different determinations of matter which go and come,
while others cease and renew themselves, which is the reason why they all do not have the
reputation of a principle. Hence, among those who have contemplated the logic of natural
forms in approriate detail, so far as one could recover it from Aristotle and others of the same
line of thinking, one has found only those who have deduced at last, that these forms are
nothing but accidents and random circumstances of matter; and that therefore the privilege of
being action and perfection refers to matter itself and not to objects of which we can say no
more in fact, than that they are neither substance nor nature, but objects of substance and of
nature, of which they say that it be matter, which according to them is a necessary, eternal and
divine principle, as says this moor Avicebron who calls it God who is in all things.
Hence, for Bruno, matter is (very much in the Arab tradition) substratum and
potential, at the same time. But referring to this concept of productivity means
also transgressing not only the limit given by de Cusa, but also the formal conception of the Copernican system: First of all, the heliocentric interpretation of
worldly organization produces an obvious conflict with the order of being as it
had been handed down to Bruno in terms of scholastic theory. 59 But even more
radical is the consequence for the hierarchical structure of this classical order,
57
Usually, Brunos conception is attributed to what is called neo-platonism. But this label is owed somehow
to the tradition of mixing the ancient lines of argument leading up to the Renaissance due to the fact that very
often sources had been falsely ascribed to one or the other school. Contrary to this, we refer Brunos conception
to the stoic tradition, basing this on the structural similarities of his ansatz with that of the Stoa as explained in
section A. Hence, we give a primarily systematic argument for this, not a historical one.
58
De la causa, principio ed uno, Venezia (= London), 1584, in: Dialoghi Italiani, p.1 (dialoghi metafisici),
Sansoni, Firenze, 1985 (1958), 273sq.
59
There is a short, enlightening review of this aspect in the book of A.Eusterschulte: Giordano Bruno zur
Einfhrung, Junius, Hamburg, 1997.
13/11/2014
25
because for Bruno, the Copernican approach is only the starting point for explicating his principal thesis of self-motion, in terms of an intrinsic motion to
which all moving objects in space are subjected, due to the fact that no place in
the universe is distinguished in one way or another. In a sense, Bruno visualizes
an infinite universe which is completely isotropic and homogeneous. Hence,
there is no location anymore into which a first mover who is not moved himself
(in the Aristotelian sense) could be eventually placed. There is at most an intrinsic mover who is permanently acting upon objects such that he is immanent
cause of these objects. The universe becomes a uniform organism whose organizational principle determines a living process of metabolism within infinite
space. The idea is then, that an infinite universe be the consequence of an infinite cause and an infinite principle. It is inhabited by an infinity of living worlds
which are themselves organisms, and of which Earth is only one. And the structure of these organisms can be grasped only in terms of an all-encompassing
reason which is one aspect of the immanent creative power underlying this infinity. The dynamical principle which actually governs the self-motion of this
organism of organisms, is matter itself.
Hence, as Blumenberg has shown in more detail 60 , the post-Copernican universe, in having no distinguished location anymore, does not have any place for
divine salvation also: God himself has spent himself completely to the act of
creation. This is one of the most important contradictions, Bruno produces with
his ansatz. (So it is Bonaventura e.g. who categorically formulates: Multa de
suis thesauris profert, non omnia. And William of Okham states that a complete
spending of God when creating would be a degradation in the sense that he
shows up as a mere cause of nature then.) The idea of de Cusa was that infinity
could be grasped only in terms of finite understanding such that all that exists
would constitute a kind of finite infinity or created god (quasi infinitas finita
aut deus creatus). During creation then, something would have emerged at all,
having the ability to become similar to God, because it could not be a God himself that was being produced (quia deus fieri non potuit). This indicates an actual
limit of attainment in the sense that there is a difference between generatio and
creatio such that God creates the world, but generates his son, both of them being different aspects of the same action which is itself nothing but an expression
of his essence. The time between creation and generation however, is only a
human impression subjected to the human mode of perception. From Gods
perspective, there is no time, and the act of self-integration into the world created by himself (once, the word has become flesh) is one and the same
self-motion as the original creation actually is. The absolute power being expressed in these two aspects of the same underlying action actualizes itself completely (quiescit potentia in seipsa).
Unfortunately, there is no logical way of giving a sound foundation for the underlying postulate (that the above mentioned limit exists). And this is the scan60
H.Blumenberg: Die Legitimitt der Neuzeit. (Erneuerte Ausgabe 1996) Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M.,
1983-1985, 639-700.
13/11/2014
26
dal Bruno excites when introducing his conception. For him, a God who must
realize what he can, reproduces himself necessarily. That is, generatio = creatio.
And there is no personalization as absolute self-realization. That there is a world
at all, is not founded in the volition of God, but in his essence. The world is the
correlation of Gods impersonality, hence it is a manifestation, not a revelation.
The latter would assume that there is a possibility for hiding and holding back
the world. But this is not the case. In particular, the world is not a message of
God, not a book of nature therefore, because it does not express a specific order at all. It is indifferent instead, it is due to plurality, in the sense that if there is
anything at all, then all what is possible actually exists. Hence, with a view to
existence, all what is possible is also equal. It is probably this explicit (and according to the state of then progressive scholastic theory unsolvable) scandal
which renders any attempt of mediation unsuccessful and makes Bruno the last
philosopher who is burnt at stake. (In a sense, one can say that he indeed forces
the inquisition to choose the maximum of punishment.)
*
What we realize so far is the following: As a result of ancient theories being
provided by the schools of Plato and Aristotle, it is the stoic approach which
according to the systematic needs of its epoch can provide an intrinsically dynamical and open system encompassing the totality of nature including the epistemic structures designed in terms of human thinking itself. The advent of christian religion (referring itself to various aspects of stoic theory) causes the necessity to adapt the innovative potential intrinsic to the stoic system to the dogmatic
frame which is defined in terms of traditional concepts of God which in turn
cannot be based in one way or another on stoic logic. The same is true more or
less for the later development of the Islam. Hence, the philosophical foundation
of the world gains a purely negative quality, because it is necessary in first
place, to re-interpret concepts which are not compatible with a given basic
structure of irrefutible elements instead of developing them further. Obviously,
this permanent construction of apologies cannot be suitable for continuing an
innovative line of thought. Hence, the consequent resumption and continuation
of the stoic line is obstructed in a well-aimed manner, in particular with a view
to the dynamical aspects of a nature which is primarily based on an active sort of
creative matter, so that one would be able to exploit the early concept of a field
approach to forces acting in nature and to ask for the foundation of this action.
Ironically however, it is exactly this sort of negative approach which - as a kind
of by-product - makes it possible to gain more insight into the relationship between a world and its foundation in the long run, because the contradictions encountered sooner or later do not leave another wayout than just the resumption
of the ancient line earlier dismissed. The permanent spinning around the relationship between God and world ends soon in blind alleys and on wrong tracks.
Their by-passing in terms of modern mathematics opens up an alternative ap-
13/11/2014
27
proach which causes a two-fold result: On the one hand, the concept of substance is re-formulated in an abstract way, in explicitly denying its existence in
the traditional, scholastic sense, thus re-introducing it as a concept in terms of a
productive misunderstanding and in a somewhat clandestine way. On the other
hand, the progressing detachment of philosophy from theology opens up a new
way to all aspects which had been suppressed before: such as the dynamics of
self-creative and self-organizing matter as substratum and potential of an unfolding nature, including a re-definition of the organizational hierarchy of the
universe, and of the mediation of matter with its explicit forms up to its social
forms constituting human systems, themselves dealing with the reflexion of this
very process, being subjected however to incomplete information. It is Spinoza
in fact, who draws all these aspects (which are drifting apart for quite a while)
together again and re-bases them onto a sound foundation of stoic systematics.
D. Spinoza
However, Spinoza does not only cumulate the various strings of philosophy
which had been developed earlier in the stoic tradition. He visualizes philosophy
as something which is practically identical with ethics. It is a theory of the conditions according to which human life is defined, if it is succeeding with respect
to an ethical frame of references. Ethics itself, unfolds the conditions according
to which the human striving can be realized. In other words: The realization of
the human conatus perseverandi is the existential aim of the world which is
nothing but the appropriate form of that finite mode which is determining human
being. Humans are capable of finding and conserving their own mode of being,
if they act according to adequate knowledge. Hence, there is a close connection
between freedom and insight. It is necessary therefore, to find the adequate way
(inveniri) in an appropriate project which is to be designed by humans themselves. If proposition 34 in part I of the Ethics states that the power of God is
his own essence (Dei potentia est ipsa ipsius essentia), then, for humans, one
could add that the power of humans is their own existence (Humani potentia est
ipsa ipsius existentia). And the adequate form of this existence is prescribed in
terms of the virtue which leads forward to blissful happiness
(beatitudo/eudaimona). For humans therefore, virtue in this sense and power,
are identical. (IV def. 8: Per virtutem et potentiam idem intelligo.) Hence,
virtue is human essence or nature, in so far as it is subjected to its capability
(potestas) to actually cause something. (To translate potentia by power
though, which appears to be a common custom, is nevertheless somewhat unsatisfactory. The German connotation of the word Vermgen (capacity) could be
more appropriate.)
We note here that the ethical foundation of Spinozas philosophy is basically a
consequent re-formulation of the stoic idea. But more than this: Spinoza also
tries to define God as causa immanens of the world, but in terms of a twofold
13/11/2014
28
perspective taken according to whether the relationship between God and world
is visualized under the substantial perspective of God himself, or under the
modal perspective of humans who represent a finite mode of what worldly exists. Obviously, the former perspective can be taken in speculative terms only,
but because God represents himself completely in each of his attributes, it is
possible that humans could grasp his existence in principle, provided they have
developed the adequate knowledge about this due to their adequate reflexion. In
this sense, everything is in God (quicquid est, in Deo est), but the viceversa is
also true. But reflexion itself is an outcome of the organization of substance: The
constitution of the latter according to which it is productive with respect to the
field of modi, is its organization in terms of attributes.61 This means that God
does not really produce attributes, but he (as substance) is attributively organized instead. Hence, God is causa sui only in so far as he produces everything
what there is, but this is only true with respect to the finite perspective of humans. Nevertheless, a finite mode is in God, because it is a created mode within
the totality of nature. But in this mode as its cause, it is only God who acts as
immanent cause of permanency, it is not the totality of nature which is acting as
this cause.62 Hence, the central position of nature which is classified by Spinoza
in a twofold way according to the classification given earlier by Averroes: He
actually differs between natura naturans (the actively creating nature producing
things) and natura naturata (the passively produced nature which is the outcome
of processes performed by natura naturans). The former represents the productivity of God, the latter its result. Nature is the form of mediation in which God
acts upon the world as seen (and interpreted) under the modal perspective of
humans. But in reality, he does not think himself, because it is only the humans
who do (II ax. 2: Homo cogitat.), and therefore, he is not a spirit either. 63 So
nature has an important role to play within the frame of references which constitutes the world. But as it is only humans that think (and have thus the task of
reflecting about the world), the basic concept of worldly orientation is
intersubjectivity in first place, nature only in second. It is reflexion, and it is the
political form of communication that determines adequate knowledge. But the
latter can only be achieved, if the structure of the world in terms of its nature is
uncovered and logically displayed. Hence, to study nature means to lay the
ground for adequate knowledge, and in the end, for adequate action according to
ethical principles.
61
In W.Bartuschat: Spinozas Theorie des Menschen, Meiner, Hamburg, 1992, 66, a precise discussion of this
aspect in given in more detail.
62
Ibid. 37, 44-49 par.
63
Ibid. 65.
13/11/2014
29
B.Spinoza: Ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata ..., Opera, vol. 2, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft
Darmstadt, 1989, p.I, prop. XV, scholium.
13/11/2014
30
W.Bartuschat: Baruch de Spinoza, Beck, Mnchen, 1996, 52. - See also G.Deleuze: Spinoza. Praktische
Philosophie. Merve, Berlin, 1988, 90sqq.
13/11/2014
31
quate in order to produce any useful insight into the architecture of the relationship between (real) substance and (modal) attributes, it is the explicit method of
thinking - Spinoza calls it the geometrical method and thinks of it as a kind of
mathematical hermeneutic well in the tradition of universal languages as they
were developed in the Renaissance - which is necessary condition for attaining
the actual framework of reflexion which may serve as a starting point to taking
the world in sight. Hence, the method actually applied in the Ethics is not just
an external form of representation, of something which could also be represented otherwise, but it is instead the only appropriate method available, because its
form is identical with the constitutional form of the world, and its performance
is identical with the dynamical process which is actually underway within the
unfolding of the world.
3. Ethics Revisited
Hence, for Spinoza, the whole project is basically one of improving human reflexion by means of contemplating the systematic structure of knowledge according to an appropriate method which is basically organized in mathematical
terms. In a letter to Bouwmeester (10th of June, 1666), Spinoza writes: The
true method ... consists of the knowledge of pure intelligence ... In order to
awaken it one has to differ in first place, between intelligence and imagination,
or between the true ideas and the false. This basic point is taken up later by
Leibniz again when he aims at theorems (of contradiction and of foundation,
formulated in Monadology, numbers 31 and 32) which may serve as a fundamental convention of how to lay the grounds for a consistent philosophical
speculation of universal relevance. On the other hand, this is also a normative
aspect prescribed by the methodological rules: Obviously, there is no other
choice as far as the epistemically correct procedure of thinking is concerned,
because there is no alternative way to actually acquire adequate knowledge of
the world, and of its relationship to God. In a sense, this conception is reproducing somehow the stoic perspective: The Stoa thought that once one has improved human reflexion such that correct knowledge is achieved, then adequate
behaviour (as ethical objective) would be realized automatically, because the
mere impact of adequate knowledge would guide human freedom immediately
toward the only rational solution available. Spinoza re-phrases the problem accordingly, but he is more liberal, in so far he admits that failures are possible.
For him, the ethical guidelines are nothing but rational informations given to
anyone who might be interested. If someone is not acting adequately however,
this is for Spinoza not a reason for moral condemnation. This only means that
the knowledge on which action had been based was not yet adequate knowledge,
and has to be improved therefore.
The point is actually one of political relevance, and a philosopher who explicitly
dealt with political praxis as Spinoza had done, could see the implications of
ethical adequation: It is indeed a structural problem of social organization to de-
13/11/2014
32
E. Schelling
1. The Tbingen Axiomatic
As I have shown at other places 66 in more detail, the central concepts of the
Tbingen axiomatic are based on aspects of Herders philosophy of unification and on decisions taken by Schiller in view of an aesthetics which might be
able to serve as philosophical and universal science on a global level of reflexion. 67 It is actually the concept of freedom which is the most important for
Schiller who thinks of it as the foundation of all what exists, and in terms of
something which cannot be restricted by any dualism between morality and
sensousness. In fact, Schiller looks for a possibility of morality at all, with a
view to a freedom which rehabilitates sensousness and expresses the positive
affirmation of concrete life. It is the objective of science to actually realize moral freedom in this sense. This is indeed the traditional aspect of unification, because within the world there is nothing left now which would not correspond to
the totality and which would oppose morality. And a stoic element is added, because there is the idea that humans might be able to attain this morality by a
practical excercising of their power (capacity) while studying as close as possible the system of the world. In this sense, the human objective is also of public
relevance from the outset. As Kondylis formulates: Humans are ... organic part
and mirror of the world at the same time. The development of the forces (power)
seems the more the appropriate way to gain true freedom, insofar it is performed
within a world which is originally equi-essential (wesensgleich) to these forces.68 Duty therefore is not anymore in a contradiction with the autonomy of
humans: In following the law which is this duty, nature and freedom actually do
coincide. It is Hlderlin who starts from this point, and tries to develop his own
generalization of a philosophy of unification. For him, and for the other protagonists of the Tbingen axiomatic, including Schelling and Hegel, it is necessary
to transgress Kants conception as laid down in his Critique of Judgement, in
order to bind morality to anthropology and the theory of knowledge to practical
philosophy, thus considering the autonomy of the subject (not necessarily of the
human subject alone) as fundamental and basically creative. The Tbingen ax66
See my Selbstreferenz und poetische Praxis, Junghans, Cuxhaven, 1991, in particular section II 1.- Also
more recently: Die Rekonstruktion von Raum, Zeit und Materie. Moderne Implikationen Schellingscher
Naturphilosophie. Lang, Frankfurt a.M. etc., 1998, sect. 5.7.
67
P.Kondylis: Die Entstehung der Dialektik, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 1979, 19, 56.
68
Ibid. 29,- emphasis is mine.
13/11/2014
33
iomatic points to a wedding of spirit on the one hand, and nature as metaphysical foundation of the former, on the other.69
In his most important text of programmatic character, Judgement and Being, Hlderlin introduces the concept of judgement in the strict sense as the original separation of what has
been primordially the unified subject and object. These two are made possible by this initial
separation. On the concept of the latter the notion of a relationship between subject and object
and the necessary assumption of a whole of which subject and object are parts, are based from
the beginning on.70 If we choose the Fichtean (fundamental) judgement I = I (= I am I - Ich
bin Ich), for Fichte a first principle of his philosophy of free subjectivity, a theoretical judgement of this kind is one which explicitly expresses the relationship between subject and object. Hlderlin calls this being. But being is not an identity (as Fichte would like to ascertain), the I is instead possible only if separated from itself. (Self-consciousness is possible
only, if I oppose myself, that is, if I separate myself from myself.) Indeed, this re-interpreted
identity is actually threefold: We have the I-subject and the I-object (referring to the
left-hand-side and the right-hand-side of the above identity theorem, respectively), and also
the unity of both of which I have to have knowledge (for being self-conscious). Hence, it is an
identity of an identity and of a difference. Later on, Hlderlin, Schelling and others will try to
re-formulate this very abstract principle in terms of a practical philosophy which in turn unifies the aspects of daily life with science, and both with the question for the appropriate mediation of these aspects to the general public.71 In the end, the proposal will be to develop a
modern, rational, new mythology in parallel to ancient mythologies, in order to offer a
sound basis for the paedagogical mediation of these principles.72
Ibid. 274sq.
The double connotation of Urteil (= judgement) and Ur-Theil (= the first part) cannot be appropriately
reproduced in an English translation.
71
Cf. e.g. Hlderlins Standard Edition, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt, vol. 1, 917-919.- For
Urtheil und Seyn see ibid., 840-841.
72
For a description of the social aspects of such a program, cf. M.Frank: Hlderlin ber Mythos, in:
Hlderlin-Jahrbuch (= Yearbook) 1990-1991, Metzler, Stuttgart, 1-31.
70
13/11/2014
34
I quote from the standard edition of Schellings works (Smmtliche Werke (= SW), ed. K.F.A.Schelling,
I.Abtheilung, vols. 1-10 (= I-X), Cotta, Stuttgart, 1856-1861) translating myself.
13/11/2014
35
ontological excess which transcends Fichtes view towards the practical side
of the worldly. Schelling points here to something which today can be called an
onto-epistemic connection of mediations.74 Hence, Schelling relates the concept of unity to science and its parts, because his construction starts with the notion of knowledge. But there is already a new correspondence between form and
contents of science on the one hand, and between what can be known and what
really exists, on the other. In his Wrzburg lectures of 1804, Schelling discusses
this problem again. In the famous paragraph 270 he writes: Between the real
and the ideal, being and thinking, there is no causal connection possible, or
thinking can never be the cause of a determination in thinking.- Because real and
ideal are only different perspectives of one and the same underlying substance
... (SW VI 500sq.) Hence, the reflecting comprehending of the world shows up
as a human mode of being. And the latter is, together with all the other modes of
being, an irreducible aspect of something which is underlying them. So Schelling thinks of an ontological structure which logically preceeds the real as well
as the ideal. And this is the substantial foundation of worldly being. This tendency towards an active kind of substance, which is actually a crucial point of
dissent with Fichte, is due to Schellings reception of Spinoza, in fact. Schelling
refers here to the important theorem of identity (proposition VII of the second
part of the Ethics) which we have already discussed above. For Schelling,
proposition VII points to the nucleus of the problem of onto-epistemic mediation.
As compared to Fichte, this is the essentially new turn in Schelling: Philosophy
starts from the unconditioned and hence from freedom. But Spinozas conception is raised into an idealistic framework, and for Schelling, this is the reason
for developing a new concept of organization (with a view to Kants Critique
of Judgement in fact) in which concrete being and its reflexion by human
thinking co-develop from the beginning on:
Hence, this has led the human mind to the early idea of a matter which is organizing itself ...
and to an original unification of mind and matter ... He (man) feld obliged to look for the
foundation of the things in nature itself on the one hand, and for a principle of transcending
nature on the other ... (in order to) think of mind and nature as being One therefore. (SW II
47)
If we summarize nature as being One Whole, so we do encounter the opposition to a mechanism ... and expediency itself. In unifying these two extremes, we develop the idea of the expediency of the whole, nature becomes a circle ..., a system closed in itself ... There emerges a
reciprocal connection of means and ends. Neither can the individual become real without the
whole, nor can the whole become real without the individual ... This absolute expediency is an
idea which we do not think of as being voluntary but necessary ... Hence, it is a necessary
maxim of reflecting reason to always presume a connection in nature according to the mediation of means and ends. (SW II 54)
74
13/11/2014
36
In this sense, for Schelling, the world is nothing but an organization, and a
general organism itself is the condition of mechanism. (SW II 350) The mechanism becomes the merely negative of the organism: Hence, our philosophy
cannot start with a mechanism, but can only start with an organism, and the latter cannot be explained out of the former therefore. (SW II 349) But the world
is only organization insofar it reflects the original unity of its foundation which
in turn is reflected within the totality of immanent mediations. Hence, this unity
of the world is founded on something pre-worldly as substance. In this sense, the
world satisfies Schellings organozational criterion: The system has to have a
principle which exists in itself and by itself, which reproduces itself in each part
of the whole, it has to be organic: One has to be determined by All, and All by
One ...75 Hence, organism implies systematics: There is no true system therefore which is not an organic whole ... It is not the whole which emerges out of
the parts, but these in fact, have to emerge out of the whole ... It is not we know
nature therefore, but nature is a priori ... (SW III 279)
Stuttgart Private Lectures, quoted according to the Vet edition (Bottega dErasmo, Torino, 1973), 102sq.
(Henceforth: PL)
76
I quote the Critique of Judgement according to the German edition (ed. Vorlnder, Meiner, Hamburg, 7th
ed. 1993), 237.
77
Ibd. 237sq.
13/11/2014
37
the process itself (of the global process of the becoming of worldly reality as
well as of the multitude of local processes being mediated within the worldly
totality). Obviously, if something new emerges, it has to be produced. Because
of the underlying principle of unity therefore, it is implied that nature produces
itself. It is productivity in fact, which is the principle of the potentiality of nature
with the view to the production of innovative structures. But the unity of nature
pre-conditions the unity of natures products: That is, the worldly process is itself a mediation of structures which are at the same time producers and products,
respectively. But the production within the totality of the world is nothing but a
mere projection of that primordial production which pre-conditions initial
emergence itself: Meanwhile, because we have to start from something, I assume ... that a philosophy of nature should start from the derivation of the possibility for a nature, that is for all of the world of experience. (SW II 11) Hence,
we choose here a philosophy of principles, and the very first principle of this
philosophy is productivity itself. But at this point, Schelling relates his systematic concept with his aesthetical theory, because what he is looking for is an explicit hermeneutic of nature which is able to grasp the first principle in its full
meaning. He looks for a principle which - fluctuating between anorganic and
organic nature - contains the first cause (and foundation) of all alterations in the
former and the last reason (foundation) of all activity in the latter, which - because it is everywhere present - is nowhere, and because it is everything, is
nothing in particular; for which language has no direct connotation therefore,
and the idea of which the oldest philosophy ... has handed down within poetic
imaginations only. (SW II 347)
Hence, speculative physics as a philosophy of nature, can be visualized as well
as having components encroaching on regions of aesthetical production and theory in a somewhat generalized sense. The philosophy of art therefore, presented
later by Schelling, is not really a replacement of the philosophies of nature and
history, but rather a generalization, if not a proper sublation in the threefold Hegelian sense of the word. If Schelling tends to construct the universe in the gestalt of art such that Philosophy of art ... is a science of the universe in the form
of a potentiality of art (SW V 368), then this has an explicit hermeneutic
meaning in which sense philosophy of art ... (shall) represent the real which is
within the art as being an ideal. (SW V 361sqq.) This furnishes in fact a consequent regression of the history of the world onto its foundation. Very much in
the same sense, nature has its reality in itself (and) is its own product, a Whole
which is organized out of itself, and is organizing itself. (SW III 17)
13/11/2014
38
and of which productivity is the main (or most fundamental) principle. Nature as
product is what we perceive, nature as productivity is what we reflect about. The
laws of nature being immanent therefore render nature to be he-autonomous:
that is they have absolute reality, and this is a principle of the philosophy of nature. (SW III 17) There is a teleological aspect to this view of nature which is
reflecting the implicit project structure of the world: It is the fragmented shining
forth and shining forward of the future which imprints itself onto the proportions
of the mode of actions generated by the worldly process. Hence, what we perceive as future is not merely a future present as derived from an appropriate
past, but as nature is also expression of its own self-reference, a possible future
is shining forth as a choice we have. This is an existential aspect of Schellings
philosophy which he relates to the parallel he draws between natures productivity and the prodcutivity of human self-consciousness. (SW III 19sq.)
Insofar, for Schelling, there is already an explicit perspective which opens up
towards a generalized view of aesthetics itself: For him, the material of art ...
(is) each possible object by art only, not separated thus from the form. (SW VI
570) Art needs a material which is organic itself and symbolical as such: I
would like to state it shortly, on what deficiency of the true symbolic within the
modern world is actually based. All symbolics have to start from nature, and
have to go back to it. The object of nature signifies and is at the same time.
(SW VI 571) This semiological aspect points to Schellings earlier thought
about a true mythology of rationality as originating from the Oldest Systems
Program of the Tbingen axiomatic: A true symbolical material is only possible within mythology, but the latter itself only by its relation of its forms to nature. The re-incarnation of a symbolical view of nature would be a first step
therefore towards a re-incarnation of a true mythology. (SW VI 572)
Hence, for Schelling, the unification of theoretical and practical philosophy as
being the ideal-realism which has become objective, is the system of art (SW
IV 86), and it is generically expressed in terms of a hermeneutical grasping-seizing of a true work of art which is the absolute ideation (forming into One
= Ineinsbildung) of the material into the form by means of imagination (SW IV
423) - the result (as its product) being capable of infinite (exegetic) reading, because it is actually mapping the infinite itself. (SW III 620) So true objectivity is
in its totality nothing but art itself (SW V 284), and mythology is its necessary
condition, and the first material of art, at the same time. (SW V 405) But note
the explicit reference to social praxis: Thinking is basically schematization, but
acting is allegorical while art is symbolical. (SW V 411) That is, within art, the
principle of absolute knowledge becomes onjective, but not as a mere principle
of cognition, but at the same time as a principle of action. (SW VI 573) In this
very sense, deciphering is signifying and construing, but signifying implies acting. (SW VIII 445) The ideation results finally in a re-constructive duplicating
of the worldly process evolving out of its substantial foundation, expressed in
terms of an aesthetical process of re-creation such that reciting its poetical
product (a text in fact) is actually identical to executing the associated practical
13/11/2014
39
(real) action.
It is Steffens in fact, student and friend of Schelling, originally physicist and scientist in general, who explicates this aspect of an onto-epistemic execution of reality in some detail when
going back to Denmark and starting his co-operation with the Danish poet Oehlenschlger.
For Steffens, the world formula is the expression of the adequate treatment of the question
concerning the immanent mediation of the scientific and philosophical-aesthetical complex
within a hermneutic of science.78 He tries to approximate the corporal (bodily) world by representing it in terms of cipher and symbol, on an epistemic basis which he calls romantic
universal poetry. For Steffens, everything is starting from a chaos which is All or Nothing(ness) (better: non-being) at the same time, as the uncomprehendable nucleus of the universe itself. Nature being thought of as representing the universal poem of creation is insofar
pointing to a philosophy of real nature. Hence, Spinozism of physics simply means in principle the affinity of the latter to poetry. The method of the physicist has to become historical,
his last end shall be mythology. Consequently, the highest representation of physics will be
necessarily a novel.79 Steffens and Oehlenschlger have tried to reconstruct such a narrative
vision of the worldly process in Oehlenschlgers epic poem The Golden Horns which is to
be understood as the expression of poetic immanence in terms of a philosophy of nature being
unfolded according to the basic principles as they are laid down by Schelling. 80
3. Inherent Materialism
For Schelling, matter is the finite result of the fundamental principle. (SW II
360) He visualizes matter as the expression of the copula which is grasped by
reason as the eternal unity of the infinite and the finite which are in turn being
unified by the original and absolute necessity of this copula. Schelling agrees
with Spinoza therefore, who ... to the question whether by the mere motion of
extension ... the manifold of corporal (bodily) things could be derived a priori,
answers: I think of the matter as an attribute which expresses the infinite and
eternal essence in itself! (SW II 359) Schelling continues: Because ... each
part of matter has to be an imprint onto the whole universe for itself, it cannot be
really a mere attribute which expresses infinite essence, but it has to be thought
of as being the proper embodiment (the quint-essence) of such attributes. In
actually transgressing Spinozas concept here, Schelling prepares for the notion
of matter as being the primum existens: In a letter to Oldenburg (of 10th November 1665), Spinoza explains that with the connection of parts he would
mean that the laws or the nature of one part assimilate to the laws or nature of
another part such that they are in contradiction as little as possible. And: With
respect to a whole and its parts I consider the things as parts of a whole insofar
as their nature assimilates to each other such that they are conformal to each
other as far as possible.81 Interpreted in terms of Schellings formulation that
each part of matter would be an expression of the whole universe, the view of
78
Cf. F.Paul: Henrik Steffens. Naturphilosophie und Universalromantik. Fink, Mnchen, 1973, 10.
Ibid. 143-154 par. - Also: F.Schlegel, Fragm. 378sq. (1799), Standard Edition (KFSA 18, 154sq.).
80
Ibid. 172sq.
81
Letters, Meiner edition, ed. C.Gebhardt, Hamburg, 1986. In the last letter there is the important sentence: As
to the human mind however, I think of it as being a part of nature, too.
79
13/11/2014
40
13/11/2014
41
13/11/2014
42
The important aspects of this passage refer to the foundation of the world (unbiased being) which provides the inherent productivity to actually produce a
world. As such it is (active) subject rather than produced object. And Schelling
states the following:
(a) Primordial being has no reflective consciousness (or cognition). It is subjectivity as pure potential and unconscious non-being, because it is not (but it could
be and presumably will be).
(b) Before becoming worldly, it is complete (pure) freedom.
(c) It must become worldly quite inevitably, because it is the very sense of primordial being as subjectivity to eventually become an object to itself.
(d) Having become wordly, the subject is not anymore a pure subject, it is biased
insofar it is self-difference.
(e) Because it is self-difference from its (worldly) beginning on, it cannot get
hold of itself, and this initial dissonance founds the explicit project structure of
worldly being and hence its actual dynamics.
So, for Schelling, the basic tenor is that the initial subject in its pure form (in its
proper essentiality) is potential of the becoming (worldly) and thus potential of
production, at the same time: The beginning of reality itself is the self-producing
of the initial subject in the sense of spontaneously becoming something at all (in
worldly terms), instead of remaining potential non-being. With the first emergence of an object, the foundation of motion itself (as being worldly motion
then) is laid down. Schelling visualizes the transition from nothing(ness) (=
non-being) to worldly reality in the following sense: The subject in its pure essentiality is thought of as being the prius of itself within its non-unfolded being.
It is causa sui in a positive sense. In this moment of pure substantiality it is what
exists before/in front of itself. As such, the subject is not nothing(ness), but as
nothing(ness) (= non-being).83 Consequently, for Schelling, true science then,
has to start from this first dissonance in order to be able to eventually end up
with harmony.
These basic aspects of the onset of worldly evolution have been developed by
Schelling as early as in his works on freedom and in the Stuttgart private lectures (of 1809/10). 84 Obviously, Schellings conception of organicity is of
central importance here, for mediating identity with difference in the framework
of an onset of evolution viewed as based on a structure which is mainly
self-different. We have discussed already the innovative aspects of this conception in some detail. Hence, the unifying principle Schelling looks for can be ex82
Grundlagen der positiven Philosophie (Munich lectures 1832/33), ed. Fuhrmans, Bottega dErasmo, Torino,
1972, 187. (Henceforth: PP)
83
For the difference between nothing(ness) and non-being see PP 385sq.
84
ber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (= Freiheitsschrift), SW VII 331-413 and PL, op.cit.
13/11/2014
43
(*)
(A 3/A2 = (A = B)) B,
and Schelling elaborates that neither A nor B can exist for itself, but B must exist in first power as an identity A = B, as a real being which is always A in B,
while A as the position (thesis) of the first power must contain the latter within
itself, which is A2. Formally, he follows the nomenclature of Fichte who in his
theorem of identity formulates that A = A, which according to Schellings interpretation means that A is taken as subject and object, respectively, at the same
time, but also as an identity of both. Insofar (because of this difference of A to
itself), also A = B is valid which represents the disunity, with A being the unity
85
Die Weltalter-Fragmente, in den Urfassungen von 1811 (I) und 1813 (II), ed. M.Schrter, Beck, Mnchen,
1979 (1946). Henceforth: WA.
13/11/2014
44
and totality, which again has its object in A = B. This is in fact the celebrated
unity of contradiction (disunity) pursued in German idealistic philosophy for a
long time. (PL 113) Formula (*) generalizes this unity to one of the unity itself
and of contradiction, at the same time. But the differences introduced do not really act as positions, but rather as powers.
Schelling explains this formula again in his world ages: He starts from the true
sense of judging, say from the proposition A = B. This means in principle that
what = A is what = B. Hence, there is a double feature of the fundamental proposition: Not A is simply A, but any X which is A, and B is not simply B, but any
X which is B, and not these two are identical as such, but only the said X is
identical with itself. Hence, in the proposition A = B, there are actually three
different propositions. (WA II 41sq., 129) The basic idea of this is (the nucleus
of this argument coming from the work on freedom) that nature, once it is
brought to unity with the eternal, absolute being (and also with what eternally
exists), nature as totality is lowest (first) power of essence, hence mere foundation of existence (because, in fact, it is to eternal being like a being which contains all powers). The latter is the positive at the same time, the affirmative of
nature, and insofar it is the second power. The eternally existing is what is affirmative to both of these, hence it is the third power. Within their simultaneity,
these are the principles of being. But their relationship is one which is also valid
for the acting forces, so that these principles of being are principles of becoming
within a progressive succession, at the same time. (WA II 129sq., 179)
Schelling points to two problems which have not lost their relevance until today:
On the one hand it is shown that becoming can only be thought of as being a
succession, as an unfolding of basically simultaneous principles of being. This
means in particular, that the fact of becoming itself can hardly be mapped in a
dynamical way, but only in terms of a static picture (today, we would speak of a
time cut in the sense of a slice). On the other hand, the ordering of negation
and position becomes meaningful: For Schelling, the first power is the negation,
and as such it is the foundation of affirmation which is the second power (rather
than viceversa). And the third power is the unity of both. Hence, the Spinozist
omnis determinatio est negatio is conserved. Actually, this progression of
powers generates time, because temporality, as being inveloped at the beginning within the absolute, is also developed in the course of evolution by this
very unfolding of powers.
In a way, this leads to another interpretation of the world formula which
Hogrebe has given recently86: That which is the same when A = B, is A 2, and
that this is the case, is A3. But this fact is opposed by the immanence of endangering this relationship which is the manner in which identity is given, by identity itself (B). To put it another way: There are relations of identity at all, because there is meaning, but the latter is only the kind of being given, not identity
itself and without identity nothing. But identity is nothing without the kinds of
86
13/11/2014
45
being given, too. The Fichtean element of this is the reciprocal conditioning of
negation and position which appear to be the same insofar each judgement is
more or less a selection among things which are opposed to each other. (This is
indicated by the isolated B standing outside the bracket in formula (*).) That is,
the accepting (A) of a thought (p) is always identical with the negation (B) of
the contradictory opposite (p*). Insofar A = B is in fact valid. According to the
execution, both, position as well as negation, are the same (A 2), but what is affirmed or negated in detail, is different (p and p*). This belonging together (of
identity according to execution and difference of what is judged in judging)
documents the proposition which is actually in question (A 3), and for which a
judging proposition is epistemically All up to One. Insofar the arbitrary is negated and precedes by this the predication itself, there is validity at all. Hence,
the true is the totality up to One. And this can be clarified by Schellings world
formula.
A prime aspect of this discussion is the fact of the irreducible singularity of
self-reference. I have tried to illustrate this fact by comparing it with the blind
spot of the eye:87 That on what seeing is actually founded (the optical nerve)
prevents seeing at its own origin. Trying to see (out of this place) means to attempt the grasping of the origin of an activity by means of this same activity
(which is not possible). This is the important problem of differentiating internal
from external observers, common to physics. Schelling secures this fact by formulating that foundation is against that to which it is foundation, non-being.
(PP 440) Hence, in terms of res cogitans, self-reference means reflecting reflexion itself back to its own origin. In this sense, insofar the origin of the activity of seeing signifies a locality of the eye which is essentially pre-optical, the
origin of reflexion points to a locality within thinking which is pre-reflective.
Hogrebe locates a cosmological meaning in the world formula which points
back to this problem of origin: It is the external One in which he visualizes the
singular which structures the dynamics of the self-organizing universe out of its
own irreducibility, and expresses this structure in the form of symmetry breakings and phase transitions. That is, the permanent self-organization of the
worldly is insofar due to something which is situated outside of itself, in an ontological as well as in an epistemological sense. This is what Schelling actually
means when talking of eternal beginning which he realizes as the criterion for
existence at all. And this beginning cannot know itself as being a beginning.
Hence, according to the world formula, for Schelling, the world is one which out
of an open beginning remains and exists as an open one. In particular, it is open
with respect to a permanent activity intruding from outside, which is essentially
original negation. The actual opening coincides with the ungraspable origin of
the onto-epistemic process which is hidden deeply inside the pre-reflective region. It is the singularity of the world. And insofar there is something at all,
there is time. As Hogrebe says, the beginning remains displaced (verdrungen) in
87
Cf. Ernst Bloch: Experimentum Mundi, Standard Edition of 1985, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 69.
13/11/2014
46
everything what exists. That is, time is the kind of a beginning being given as
something which is displaced. In this manner, the ungraspable looms (ragt) into
the world and contaminates the unity of the worldly, and it becomes, as Schelling says, this source of bitterness which is in fact the topic of art. (PP 479sq.)
If there is an insight into the fundamental inconsistency which within all
consistent situations and relationships is lurking (lauernde) foundation, and thus
epistemic exaction (Zumutung), then it is the innovative task of art, to integrate
this into a general process of orienting within the world in a creative manner which at the same time secures its social relevance based on an intrinsically anthropological foundation. And in this very sense, art is always already engaged.88
It is interesting to note that in his later works, Schelling comes back to the problem of initial
emergence with a view to the technical problem of phrasing appropriate conditions for it, in
first place: He actually combines the concept of singularity with that of emergence in stating
that there is a moment of mediation representing the locus of initial emergence, at which the
original (primordial) connection of being is torn (or broken) in order to sublate its exclusiveness. This original connection is torn by its own immanent self-contradiction, and by this
tearing space is produced, as form of brokenness ... Hence, this is the reason why in each element of the worldly a trace of this emergence can still be found. (PP 362) It is not before
this katabol tou ksmou is finished that, for Schelling, the true process of the coming into
being of nature actually begins, - thus out of fragments which are the result of this initial tearing at the singular locus of emergence. (PP 362sqq.)
F. Bloch
From the beginning on, the incorporation of nature, in order to achieve a true
unification of the worldly, is a necessary point of argument for Ernst Bloch. 89 In
a letter to Lowe he elaborates on this conception: The question is now: is there,
like a possible mediation with the subject of history, also one with the - always
hypothetical - subject of nature? With the material mover (motive power) of the
technologically incorporated proceedings of nature ...? Can in this line a Marxism of Technology be found? Engels does not yet possess something like that ...
Is it not a borderland ideal for the non-available marxism of concrete technology, to look into nature, say, as you look into a comrades bosom? My technological chapter on utopia tries to deal with such an alliance (if not with more). 90
The task is for Bloch, to develop a consistent view of dialectical processes of the
worldly within a totality which is encompassing nature as well as culture, insofar following the line of Schelling, for whom the former was the Iliade, the latter
88
Sartre defines this as meaning inserted, instituted, engaged, at the same time. Cf. his LEtre et le nant (Being and Nothingness), Gallimard, Paris, 1943, 521.
89
I have discussed the philosophy of Ernst Bloch in more explicit detail, especially with a view to possible applications within the general field of sciences today, in my The Utopian Function of Art and Literature in the
Philosophy of Ernst Bloch - A Topic Revisited, Bloch-Jahrbuch (Yearbook) 15/1996, Ludwigshafen, 33-73.
90
Letter to Lowe, 12th October 1944, Letters, 2 vols., 1985, 741.
13/11/2014
47
Das Materialismusproblem - seine Geschichte und Substanz. Suhrkamp Standard Edition, 1985, 469.
Subjekt-Objekt. Erluterungen zu Hegel. Suhrkamp Standard Edition, 1985, 143.
Das Prinzip Hoffnung. Suhrkamp Standard Edition, 1985, 807.
Literarische Aufstze, Suhrkamp Standard Edition, 1985, 137sqq.
13/11/2014
48
13/11/2014
49
Quite correct is the Blochian critique concerning the two other innovative aspects he introduces into his theory, missing them in the case of Spinoza and
Schelling: namely that of the actual mediation of singularity and totality in terms
of the dialectical, fundamental problem, and that of the mechanistic-formal concept of time as applied by physics. 100 The idea of Engels, of the qualitative transition or turning (Umschlag) of quantitative situations, is still useful when discussing the explicit conflict structure of the world, in a progressive competition
of tendency and latency (visualizing the latter as matter-in-action and matter-in-potentiality, respectively).101 Bloch visualizes force and logicon as attributes of matter, and insofar he re-formulates Spinozas substance model in a decisive way.102 Hence, matter of matter appears as substance (on the speculative
level), of which res extensa (mass-energy) and res cogitans (theory-praxis) are
two attributes which fall into the human mode of perception and cognition.
If it is now progression in becoming and shining forth of what is pointed to
within this becoming, which appears as the central theme of philosophy, if the
subject in this sense is always on the way towards its own predication (S is not
yet P writes Bloch instead of the traditional S = P which is the same as the
Fichtean A = B we have discussed earlier in more detail), then the fundamental
category of this thinking is that it is possible at all to actually relate between the
That (quod/Da) and the What (quid/Was) of the process. 103 This problem is
taken up again more systematically, after it has been discussed already by Schelling. As Bloch formulates: Underneath all of the being at hand, the question of
being acts as a riddle of origin which is not yet solved for itself. It is the question
of the That-foundation of being which realizes everything what there is. 104
Hence, the theorem of foundation (Satz vom Grunde) itself points to a That
which is what we all ourselves are being in principle, without being cleared yet
by an object-like predicate.105 The categories then utilized are nothing but the
mode of relationship of the classical quodditas and quidditas. Insofar tendency
is the becoming within the historical experiment of its totality, it includes its
own utopian function which is latency, driving towards a novum: Quidquid
latet, apparebit formulates Bloch with the apocalyptic power of the Gospels. 106
Note in passing that in this way the ontological process structure is mediated
with an epistemological process structure, because for Bloch, (propositional)
reflexion does not start with a concept (Begriff), but with a pre-concept or preintroduced by Averroes himself, as we have seen before, and this thought of a world which is the universal unfolding of what is available already in matter from the beginning on, has not been left by Thomas of Aquinas,
and has been continued in Bruno and Spinoza. See also ibid., 155, 178 for more details.
100
Das Materialismusproblem, op.cit., 351, 353.
101
Ibid., 363, 407sq. - Referring to the notion of project structure (p-structure) as I have introduced it in my
Yearbook paper quoted above, one can formulate that implicit as well as explicit conflict structures imply project
structures (c-structures imply p-structures), the former meaning the perspective of the foundation (substance), the
latter that of the world proper.
102
Das Materialismusproblem, op.cit., 475.
103
Experimentum Mundi, op.cit., 41, 71.
104
Ibid., 74.
105
Ibid., 75.
106
Ibid., 148.
13/11/2014
50
cept (which in the German word Ergriff carries also the connotation of
grasping in the sense of seizing and adopting, in contrary to understanding - while the connotation of commanding is conserved in the fact that it is a
kind of implicit social command to choose well-defined (though intuitively
seized) precepts, in first place). Hence, if we visualize theories as sets of propositions subject to a collection of rules, then an old theory is being replaced in
terms of a new one by expanding the number of elements of one such set, which
re-structures the pattern of derivational interactions among propositions, at the
same time. But note now that the formulation of a new proposition starts with a
formulation of a new concept to which the proposition is the predicational operator. And a new concept arises from new precepts which are actually nothing but
the old concepts! It is in this way that the process dynamic is intrinsic from the
beginning on. And this fact can be used to prove that the result is always open:
That is, there is no absolute truth which would make it possible to eventually
close a theory. On the contrary, there is no sufficient reason to assume that the
process of transforming precepts into concepts would ever come to an end.
But because the categories of gestalt are a measure for the forthcoming novum,
namely with a view to the forms of extraction being permanently produced
within the process of the world, what appears is not simply something worldly,
for Bloch it remains graspable within a frame of aesthetics, knowledge, and ethics. In particular, the categories of the aesthetical have a large amount of a
non-settled archetypal in them. Hence, in the process of artistically mapping
the essence of the world points to an ornament which can be visualized as the
geometricum of a natural eidos, insofar it relates to real ciphers which can be
understood as the problem of a nucleus of the real world which is not yet fully
extracted.107 With a view to connotations used by Schelling, Bloch calls these
real ciphers odysseys of the departing lying dormant such that nature contains
lineaments of final states of apocalyptic relevance which can be expressed
only in terms of an exact poetry of nature.108 And this is the critical function
of philosophy, because it is not allowed to leave all that out which is actually
opposition to leading the process to a final success: Because there were no
process at all, if in the world there would not be something which shall not be,
which shall not be the way it actually is. 109 In this sense, Bloch locates a contents of hope in this process which is not yet settled, and he calls this the patmos-contents which is an ethical condition at the same time: Because the real
contains in its being the possibility of a being like utopia ...110 Or more exactly:
The zero-point within the That looks for and tries (sucht und ver-sucht) - via
the experiment of the world - its, that is its (the worlds) omega, shining forth
for the subject as happiness, in society as solidarity of human dignity, in the ex107
13/11/2014
51
Ibid., 261.
Ibid., 242.
Ibid., 243.
Erbschaft dieser Zeit. Suhrkamp Standard Edition, 1985, 122. Cf. also: Tbinger Einleitung, op.cit., 316.
Erbschaft dieser Zeit, op.cit., 124.
Ibid., 111sqq. - Tbinger Einleitung, op.cit., 133.- Bloch uses here the connotation of Einsteins theory of
13/11/2014
52
general relativity and speaks explicitly of the non-Euclidean structure of the world.
117
In fact, Bloch speaks of metaphysation with an intended double connotation of the word. And he refers to
Weyls book on space, time, and matter, stating that this approach should eventually achieve what the formal
laws of physics cannot actually do: to arrive at the true essence of reality and to grasp its foundation. Cf. Das
Materialismusproblem, op.cit., 350, 357.
118
G.Raulet: Der dritte Hiob. Zu Ernst Blochs dialektisch-materialistischer Hermeneutik. (1976) In: B.Schmidt
(ed.), Materialien zu Ernst Blochs Prinzip Hoffnung, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1978, 104-111. Here: 107.
119
Tbinger Einleitung, op.cit., 343.
13/11/2014
53
13/11/2014
54
13/11/2014
55
13/11/2014
56
Of course, it is not space, time, and matter in physical terms, which serves as
such a kind of foundation (of a substance-like quality), but a pre-geometry can
achieve this state. It is true though that we could never grasp the full meaning of
such a pre-geometric structure, because we can only know of it in terms of its
consistency with the worldly structures we can observe. This is actually what is
undertaken presently in pre-geometric theories such as those of the string or loop
type. (There is a consequence, by the way, for spaces with more than four dimensions, as they are treated in superstring theory: If space and time (dimensions 1 through 4) are illusions, then so are the others. This might actually open
a line of convergence between string and loop theories.) But one can realize easily the close relationship between this idea and the earlier ideas as they were
developed on the line discussed here in some detail. Some of the consequences
involved we will discuss in the following, looking for an explicit connection to
recent results in physics and mathematics, in order to embed the ideas collected
so far into a background of present research actually being undertaken at the
moment. Note however that the re-positioning of philosophy which can be defined in terms of the aspects listed in sections A through C above, is from the
beginning on well-adapted to what is going on in scientific research, once the
chosen perspective is defined in a self-consistent way.
D. Topoi of Emergence120
With arguments based on topos theory (topoi) it has been shown recently that it
is possible to express the degree to which the logic of an observer (in the physical universe) determines the observation, thus to formalize rational behaviour. In
particular, a formal way of unifying logical, physical, and psychological templates of perception and cognition has been outlined. (Trifonov 1995) Hence, for
the first time, the logical structure of physics (in a topos-theoretic sense having
been investigated by Isham 1996 e.g.) can be generalized in order to explicitly
cover the relationship between what thinks and what is being thought about (as
representing two different aspects of the same underlying material substrate,
dynamical status, and process of signification in the semiological sense). This
empirically confirms an idea that Jean Piaget already mentioned in the seventies,
pointing to this close relationship between perception and cognition on the one
hand, and the mathematical concepts of morphism and categories, on the other.
(ed. Brown 1992) Meanwhile, fractal aspects of cognition have been recently
discussed by MacCormac, Stamenov (eds. 1996) et al. - thus establishing a link
to the evolutionary structures on which the celebrated theories of
self-organization and the formation of structure (chaos theory) in the sense of
Prigogine and others are principally based. Looking at these results in terms of a
philosophical rationale, we can say the following: If reflexion (i.e. proposi120
I follow here the line of argument given in my Cambridge talk at the ANPA 19 meeting, 1997, and in my
Tucson III paper, 1998.
13/11/2014
57
13/11/2014
58
2. Mathematical Topoi
With a view to quantum mechanics, Isham has recently addressed the problem
that there are many d-consistent sets that are mutually incompatible. In this
sense, a complete set of history propositions C: {, , ...} is said to be
d-consistent, if the decoherence function d(, ) vanishes for all possible pairwise entries. The probability that be realized is then identified with the real
number d(, ). (Note that this historical context of propositions has been discussed similarly from another point of view in Abner Shimonys paper on potentiality and actuality in Penrose, 1997, referring here to a perspective which
points to a more classical philosophy.) If the sieve on C gives the semantic value
of some proposition within the context of C, then Isham can show that the set of
all possible semantic values possesses the structure of a Heyting algebra: Be Set p
the category of varying sets over P. A subobject then, is a varying set {A(p),
pP} with A(p)X(p) for all p, and with Apq being the restriction of Xpq to A(p),
whenever Xpq: X(p) X(q) such that there is an identity and a composition. We
call then (p), pP, the collection of all upper sets lying above p. Hence, a sieve
on p in P is any subset S of P such that if rS, then a) rp and b) rS for all r
r. For each pP, the set (p) of all sieves on p can be shown to be a Heyting algebra. What is the use of knowing this set? If we know the appropriate , if A is
a subobject of X, then there is an associated characteristic morphism x A: X
which in each branch of the poset going up from p, picks out the first member q
in that branch for which Xpq lies in A, and the commutative diagram on
13/11/2014
59
subobjects guarantees that Xpr will lie in A(r) for all r q. Hence, each
morphism x defines a subobject of X, and therefore in Setp is known as the
subobject classifier in this category. This indicates that the latter can be made a
topos.
The generalizations of this view of topoi in terms of Trifonovs approach are
shown in more detail in the appendix. For our purpose here it suffices to state
that the basic idea is now to formalize the above mentioned self-narration in
terms of an algebraical formulation which can be associated with these aspects
of topoi, in order to produce a suitable relationship to the logic underlying categories. To this end, negator algebra is being introduced. This means that evolution is visualized as constituting a set of distributed self-compositions such that
n
f (x): = f o ... o f(x), n-times, defines a sequence of iterates {fo(x), f(x), f2(x), ...}.
We call the first term ground state, and the second initial state of the unfolding
system, and identify the latter with the set of attainable world states. The mathematical details can be found in the appendix already mentioned. The idea is
now to give this sequence the meaning of a global dynamical system, of the
general form (dW/ds)n = Nn (W), where W refers to the ground state of the development. Effectively, the dynamics is produced by means of the operator N
called negator (negation operator), and it is proposed (but not yet clearly proven) that NEG (the category of negators) can be made a topos.
We have a parallel then between philosophy and physics (with respect to modelling the real world) in that there are fundamental concepts on the one hand, such
as substance, attributes and so forth, telling something about the foundations of
being as deriving it in some sense out of non-being which is usually identified
with the field of possibility or potential of being. On the other hand, physics uses
a formal terminology such as dim and sign, for describing the (metric) properties
of space-time-matter and aims at pre-geometric models which enable us to
eventually derive these properties out of the foundations these models offer.
Twistor theory (of Penrose - including its approximation which is Newmans
Heaven theory), M-Theory (or superstrings theory, introduced by Green,
Schwarz, and Witten and a number of others) as well as loops (Ashtekar) and
knots (Kauffman) lie on this line of thought. Both in philosophical and physical
terms, the question is one for the structure of non-being, or to put it differently:
for the condition for the possibility that N(W) exists consistently such that a
universe might emerge. This can be thought of as establishing a generalized
method according to Spinozas idea of a philosophy more geometrico.
I have discussed a biological system in adequate detail at another place
(Selbstreferenz und poetische Praxis, 1991, 87sqq.), in order to illustrate the
praxis of negation. See particularly numbers 7 through 9 of the appendix for
more information, especially for some relationship to the bit bang evolution
discussed by Mike Manthey with respect to the notion of computing anticipatory
systems (CASYS).
3. Semiological Aspects of Metaphorization
13/11/2014
60
The basic semiological idea of language centres around a dualism between language as system (langue) and spoken language (parole). Although the latter is in
principle prescribed by the structure of the former, it is nevertheless able to influence the former by a straightforward innovation called metaphor. If a metaphor is associated with a carrying over of meaning from one word to another,
we call it metonymy, if this translation remains within the same context. If this is
not the case, we speak of a metaphor in the strict sense. In the process of signification then, the signifier (S) refers to a significate (s). But the signifier can
never grasp the complete meaning of the significate, this being symbolically expressed by the quotient S/s. This means that there is a certain kind of reciprocity
between the two, but that there is also a crucial gap between them. In principle,
metaphorization (substituting one word by another in order to actually produce a
new meaning) can then be expressed as a generalized quotient (S/S) (S/s) indicating the space of free play for new meanings. It can be shown that the process
of signification is closely related to psychoanalytic categories in that the metaphor can be visualized in terms of the condensational aspects of a symptom,
while a metonymy can be visualized in terms of displacement (or shifting) aspects of desire (following here the terminology of Lacan and Kristeva). Hence,
speaking as well as symbolizing/signifying at all is always - for any kind of interpretation/translation,
as
we
know
from
literature
mis-representation/distortion or transposition (Ent-stellung). (Note that the same
is true for using any mathematical formalism for expressing symbolically a process taking place in the real world.) If science can be visualized as the search for
minimizing mis-representations, then metaphorization is the appropriate method
to achieve this goal by means of testing the stability of innovative metaphors.
Wheelwright and MacCormac have discussed in more detail the relationship of
metaphorization (being charged with all hermeneutic implications just mentioned) and the physical sciences. 121
Within another line of argument, Deleuze has shown that metaphorization has an
important meaning for the concept of differentiation. The ancient idea of omnis
determinatio est negatio comes to a new life when thinking of the differentiation of differences which is a valid activity on both the ontological as well as the
epistemological levels (namely in that it happens really within permanent evolution, and in that its modelling pursues in very much the same way). Abstraction
in the traditional sense, namely as the task to separate substance from attribute,
is based on signification visualised as expressio which is explicatio and
121
Especially, the epiphoric aspects of a metaphor are compared with its diaphoric aspects: The former has the
primary function to express and to imply an obvious meaning, while the latter has the primary function to suggest and to imply possible new meanings. A famous example for this is the notion of tachyon which is a
diaphor so long as empirical evidence is found for such particles when it changes to become an epiphor. Hence,
as Ricoeur has noted, the metaphor is a process in itself with an equivalence between the semantic and the cognitive process structures. In this sense, metaphors generate historical contexts: Compare e.g. the proposition
quarks are coloured. We confirm that Ricoeur is right when calling a metaphor an impertinent predication in
so far the innovative aspect of metaphors unfolds their heuristic intentions.
13/11/2014
61
complicatio at the same time. Hence the hermeneutic aspect: what is expressed
is veiled and unveiled to equal parts. The traditional metaphors of expressio
visualize therefore a mirror that reflects, but also a germ which expresses itself
in unfolding. In this sense, Derrida has introduced the concept of diffrance
(incorporating both diffrencier = to differentiate, and diffrer = to delay, to
suspend) characterizing the nature of what is being produced in the process of
signification by differentiating. Recently, MacCormac and Stamenov have discussed these aspects with a view to the mathematical connotations of fractals,
relating these ideas to concepts of self-organization in the sense of Prigogine and
others.
What we have as a (preliminary) result is a scheme for a recursive production of
structures, both in ontological as well as epistemological terms. Modelling the
world in physical or in philosophical terms means in anyway to deal with the
foundations of language. The formal method (called here geometrization) is opposed by the heuristic method (metaphorization in the strict sense) according to
whether one concentrates on the macroscopic or microscopic foundations of
language, respectively, the former being dealt with in terms of formal logic and
social philosophy, the latter in terms of hermeneutic logic and psycho-analysis:
heuristic
formal
Semiology
Mathematics
Logic
Logic (formal)
metaphorization
geometrization
microscopic foundations
scopic foundations
(hermeneutic)
macro-
13/11/2014
62
of language (psycho-analysis)
(social phil./
anthropology)
of language
Philosophy
D.Papineau (1995): Der antipathetische Fehlschlu und die Grenzen des Bewutseins. (Re-translated here
from the German text.) In: T.Metzinger (ed.), Bewutsein, Schningh, Paderborn etc., 1995, 305-319, here:
311sq.
123
R.E.Zimmermann (1997): Topoi of Energence (I). The Logic of (the) Matter, op.cit.
124
C.Isham (1996): Topos Theory and Consistent Histories: The Internal Logic of the Set of all Consistent Sets,
gr-qc 9607069 (referred to in the introduction).- A.Shimony: On Mentality, Quantum Mechanics and the Actualization of Potentialities, op.cit.
13/11/2014
63
2 Chaotic Mappings: Mappings f of the above mentioned type are called chaotic on Y,
if 1) f is sensitively dependent on boundary conditions (unpredictability) and 2) f is
topologically transitive (indecomposability),
i.e. if there is for each pair of open sets U,V of Y a positive k such that f k(U) V is
nonzero, finally 3) the periodical points of f lie dense in Y (nucleus of regularity): i.e.
if for P:= {fn(x) = x of period n} and P Y, the closure of P = Y.
3 Ground state: Let us refer the iteration to the formal ground state of the sequence.
Let us call it W0 {W} and the mapping N, calling Wk with k0 world state in general and N negation. Then the state W kM, any k, is element of a suitable world
space of states M, usually a smooth manifold with a metric of dimension m and signature s. Thus we obtain a new sequence of the form {N(W 0) = W1 = A, N(W1) = W2 =
N(N(W0)) = N2(W0), ..., N(Wn-1) = Wn = Nn(W0) = }. This describes the evolution of
states of a given world, starting with an initial state and ending with a final state.
4 Global Boundary Conditions: For such a gobal evolution it is useful to specify
boundary conditions which characterize the boundary states A and in more detail. In
this way we can obtain results on the conditions for the possibility of such a world
(transcendentality). For a realistic, physical world in the sense of modern cosmology,
we can easily choose the Penrose conditions for this purpose: A = (F); (F) ;
(P) = 0 and = (P); (F) = 0; (P) , respectively. In this case, (F) and
(P) are the Ricci and Weyl components of the Riemann curvature tensor from Einsteins theory such that the relationships Riemann = Ricci + Weyl = (F) + (P) and
Ricci = Energy-Momentum are valid.
5 Evolution Equation (Unfolding of the Ground State): Generally, we can describe the
evolution of a world with the above mentioned boundary conditions as a formal dynamical system, of the characteristic form (dW0/ds)n = Nn(W0). Note that the exponent
at the derivation has here a combinatorial function only: It signifies the initiation of a
generic frequency of cadence (of a rhythmical beat) with which the successive negations control the evolution in acting upon the ground state. Hence, this action is one
of a multi-contextual kind and surpasses the frame of a merely analytical description.
The main reason for this is that the internal logic of the process is not one of the Boolean type. Also, it is important to note that what is unfolded (the ground state itself) is
per definitionem outside of the world which actually emerges by this unfolding in first
place.
6 The Category of Negators: Operators actually acting as negations are called
negators. Their category NEG, in which they are the morphisms in first place while
the world states are the objects, can be visualized in terms of the category of varying
sets over an index set P: SetP - in analogy to the argument given by Isham (1996) on
the complete set of d-consistent history propositions in quantum theory (if d means the
decoherence function). In this sense it can be shown that for subobjects of NEG there
is a subobject classifier such that NEG is a topos with an internal logic which secures
that the semantics of negation operators has the structure of a Heyting algebra. Even
13/11/2014
64
more: After Trifonov has shown 125 that the paradigm A of an R-xenomorph is
Grassmannian (or supersymmetric), if A(F), as category of linear algebras over a partially ordered field, has paradigms as its objects which are themselves non-trivial
Grassmann algebras, it is straighforward to assume (but not yet explicitly proven) that
NEG is an R-xenomorph with a Grassmannian paradigm itself (this actually securing
the applicability of an intuitionistic logic). Note the relevant definitions for this in the
local appendix given below.
7 Formalization of the Scheme: The formalization of this scheme of analysis referring
to local actions of NEG can be illustrated e.g. by the well-known Keller-Segel scenario
from Biology.126 Is E the evolution operator inherent to a given system, and is N(E) its
negation, then the formal scheme can be established in a cyclic manner such that N(E)
gives the transition from stability to instability and N2(E) the transition to a new stability (of local structures). Obviously, it is secured that N 2(E) E. Such a local cycle in
three steps corresponds to a complete transition from old actuality through potentiality
toward new actuality. Such a cycle we call sandwich layer. We can see clearly now
that world states are not really static but inherently dynamical (hence evolutionary by
themselves). But because we can interpret this ansatz also in global terms, the underlying dynamics constitutes two different perspectives which can be utilized in order to
discuss the nature of sandwich layers: on the one hand the local perspective which
concentrates on the layers one by one, on the other the global perspective which visualizes the totality of several layers at a time, according to whether or not this is adequate with a view to the reserach actually undertaken.
8 Concatenation of Sandwich Structures: Hence, the evolution of a given world can be
visualized as concatenation of sandwich structures. According to the actual research
undertaken a given structure has to be analyzed according to its fine structure. The
original form of a sandwich is conserved in the sense that independent of the strength
of magnification as it is applied to a local fine structure, the basic dynamical scheme
will always be reproduced. This is the way in which the fractal pattern of the processes
is mirrored, reflecting the fact that their internal logic is basically of Grassmannian
type. There is thus a universal structure of mediation of worldly evolution which relates the singularity to the totality (on microscopic as well as on macrsocopic levels).
Note that the question of the complexity of a system can be answered easily with a
view to this structure of mediation.
9 Anticipation and Duality: Mike Manthey has shown 127 that in terms of a pure process view anticipatory systems can be characterized by an explicit project structure
(which can be interpreted in the sense of existential concepts of productivity and subjectivity) and a hierarchy which does not only regulate the levels of abstraction, but
also those of the real concretion (of evolution). In particular, it can be shown that there
is a morphic level of abstraction which corresponds to a self-reflexion of the system.
Manthey models events (alterations of states of a system) and processes (as sequences
125
V.Trifonov (1995): A Linear Solution of the Four-Dimensionality Problem, Europhys. Lett. 32 (8), 621-626.
R.E.Zimmermann (1991): Selbstreferenz und poetische Praxis, Junghans, Cuxhaven, 87sqq.
127
M.Manthey (1997): Distributed Computation, the Twisted Isomorphism, and Auto-Poiesis, R-97-5007, Aalborg Univ. (DK).
126
13/11/2014
65
13/11/2014
66
bra, then the paradigm is the Grassmannian of an R-xenomorph. Because A has a zero
divisor, M(A) cannot be a group. Hence, the logic of a Grassmannian paradigm is always non-Boolean, and mathematics is non-classical.
J.Lacan: Die logische Zeit und die Assertion der antizipierten Gewiheit. Ein neues Sophisma. In: id.,
Schriften III, Walter, Olten und Freiburg, 1980, 101-121. (French edition of the Ecrits at du Seuil, Paris,
1966.) - In fact, the aspect of temporality in mathematical structures is somewhat more involved: The theory of
sets is basically static implying a certain amount of universality for given elements of sets. Temporality is introduced then when generalizing sets to categories, because the explicit temporal change of quantity and quality of
elements of sets is admitted when introducing objects and morphisms. Because Topoi refer also to a change of
the logical type expressed within the mathematical structure chosen, irreversibility (that is: realistic temporality)
is introduced on that level.
13/11/2014
67
speaking) with the subject level (that what determines the logic of the observer
who speaks about a theory - always assuming here that speaking and thinking is
basically the same).
To this end, we note that the process of the concrete unfolding of the world (as it
can be visualized in empirical terms) is identical with the process of reflecting
about it, in a cyclic manner which secures that the egg comes before the hen.
However, independent of this, we cannot conclude from it that space, time, and
matter were real entities in one way or another, if real refers to something
which is true in an absolute sense, apart from any single observation and interpretation actually being undertaken. To the contrary, we have to accept that all
we can say in terms of knowledge is limited to the worldly aspects of being, i.e.
to the interior of our universe. But when speculating about the exterior, we
have to take a change of perspective into account which renders worldly entities
as we know them completey irrelevant. This is the reason for confounding the
different notions of time and irreversibility: Prigogine e.g. used to criticize Einstein for his insisting on the fact that development in time as being irreversible
would be nothing but an illusion.130 For him, on the contrary, the world is fundamentally irreversible, i.e. historical, and it is reversibility what is the illusion.
But what he does not see is that Einstein argued under a different perspective:
Einstein visualized his dynamical geometry as a kind of immanent substance
which was brought into the world in terms of relativity theory. And in terms of a
substance, as we know now, the concept of time is not relevant anymore. Illusion refers here to the perspective of the world (and in particular to the human
mode of being), and under this perspective it is not excluded at all that observers
might have the impression of irreversibility. Prigogine however, argues under
the worldly perspective from the beginning on. And this is the difference. 131
As compared to the approach of Tegmark which we will discuss in the next
chapter, Trifonovs conception has the advantage of adjusting mathematics and
logic to real-life conditions in terms of human modality, thus leaving the possibility of a materialistic interpretation open for further discussion. Hence, the
picture of an evolution of matter which is simply the unfolding of its complexity
can be easily integrated in this model. And there are no Platonic references
which should be necessarily introduced into the discussion. On the contrary,
Tegmarks conception carries explicit Platonic connotations from the beginning
on, which is a serious drawback of his otherwise interesting approach. In a
sense, Tegmark replaces the onto-epistemic perspective taken here with respect
to the worldly processes by an epistemo-ontic perspective which clearly contradicts the basic notions of materialism. However, according to what we have said
above, the idealistic retreat towards the concept of spirit rather than matter is not
130
I.Prigogine: Vom Sein zum Werden (From Being to Becoming), Piper, Mnchen, 1979, 208sqq.
In his book, Prigogine mentions in fact Einsteins reception of Spinoza, but he does not draw the correct
conclusions, because he refers to a theological connotation of determinism only, and he visualizes Spinoza in
purely deterministic terms, which, with respect to the worldy perspective he is interested in, is not correct. It
maybe that this misunderstanding is also what is at the roots of the recent controversy on determinism between
Thom and Prigogine, discussed in France.
131
13/11/2014
68
132
M.Tegmark: Is the theory of everything merely the ultimate ensemble theory? (Aug. 97) From the web
page, http://www.sns.ias.edu/..., Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton.
133
Ibid., 10-12 par.
13/11/2014
69
Ibid., 12.
Ibid., 14. - He gives in Planck units with c = G = h/2 = 1 the following values: (0,12; 0,03; 1/137; 5,9.10-39)
for strong, weak, electromagnetic, and gravitational interactions, and (1/1836, 1,0014) for the respective mass
ratios. One would add a cosmological constant and various neutrino masses, if appropriate.
136
Ibid., 16-21.
137
Ibid., 25.
138
Ibid., 1.
135
13/11/2014
70
ment returns later when he argues against higher dimensions.) But this is actually not very clear, because mathematics might guarantee a certain amount of predictive power according to the state of knowledge, an SAS has attained. On the
other hand, hermeneutic techniques in the non-mathematical region, such as they
are applied in the arts, or in social philosophy, or psycho-analysis, respectively,
can also generate a certain amount of predictive power without gaining the same
quality of exactness which is known from mathematics. In fact, there is also a
close interaction between these two fields: The metaphorization of concepts, by
itself a very intuitive and non-quantitative process, is often the practical entry
towards creating a new theory which turns out to be testable in empirical terms.
Viceversa, the playful metaphorization of concepts from physics can be introduced into fields of hermeneutic interpretation supporting new insights into
complex situations. (This actually means that Sokal was not right when criticising the generous metaphorical utilization of mathematical concepts in the humanities, because this is nothing but a common strategy of inventing new perspectives which might be useful to open up horizons.) Category 1c then is excluded from the outset, because for Tegmark, it is actually disproven empirically. In fact, similar to the problem of the state of metaphorization in epistemic
terms, the state of mathematical representation is in itself unclear as far as its
practical application to real situations is concerned. The point is that as a technique of representation (and hence of mapping), mathematics is introduced according to a generalizing abstraction of what humans are actually able to perceive. Insofar mathematics abstracts from praxis in a very systematic way, the
consistency gained by this procedure is paid with a loss of concreteness. This
means that usually, mathematical models carry a large amount of idealization so
that a consistent representation is still approximate in a sense. We have found
that Tegmark would like to re-formulate this according to a view which is exactly the opposite: He would prefer to think of physics as being the approximation. But this is difficult to comprehend (except perhaps for a Platonian thinker),
because nowadays we would expect that there have been physical structures
first, before the conditions were suitable enough to also develop SAS. Hence,
historically, thinking is more complex and later than the conditions necessary for
thinking to evolve. If thinking then, is nothing but an innovative kind of
re-processing the matter in the universe, part of its activities consists in mapping
the world in order to be able to consistently representing it. And if mathematics
is one of the appropriate techniques which have been developed by living beings
who think, then obviously, mathematics is mapping (and thus approximating)
the underlying physics, and not viceversa. Note that Lee Smolin (as we shall
see) argues very much on this line, and hence in anti-Platonic terms. (Tegmark
by the way, calls himself his approach one of radical Platonism.)
Category 1b is interpreted in terms of its leaving the question of choice unanswered (e.g., why is a particular subset chosen for having physical existence,
and not another one?). But this raises a problem similar to the one mentioned
when asking for the relationship between mathematics and hermeneutics. Be-
13/11/2014
71
cause it is imputed from the beginning on that the world as being a primarily
physical world can be mathematically represented in all its totality due to the
fact that nothing but physics is actually underlying it. And I think that nowadays
we can sufficiently agree upon this. However, knowing this, does not really
help, because neurophysiology e.g., is related to thinking (reflexion) in a similar
way than the theory of oscillations is related to music. Knowing the oscillatory
interactions of sound waves does not help in understanding a composition.
Knowing the spectral theory of light does not tell anything about the understanding of paintings. Hence, although we actually may impute that physics is at
the roots of nature, it is more economical to develop macroscopic theories of a
qualitative nature, in order to interpret more or less adequately phenomena of
the arts (or alternatively, of everyday life), instead of waiting for a completely
novel physics which shows up as the successive superposition of the micro- and
macro-physics of today, in order to progressively develop an all-encompassing
physical theory of the world. (One day this may be possible, but note that the
problem we have with the TOEs is that they are not really theories of everything
in the sense discussed here, but only theories of everything in terms of physics.)
So he ends up with category 1a. - But then, we still have the problem mentioned
above: How could we actually prove that, say a simple set, exists physically
(because it exists mathematically)? Can you say that a particular set of apples
exists, because you count the number of apples lying on the table? Or would you
not rather say that individually, there are samples of the family of apples lying
on the table, and you can map their quantity to a set of numbers such as to count
them? Hence, counting is nothing but setting up an isomorphism between the
apples and some set of numbers which (are) nonsense words specially designed
for the purpose.139 In an abuse of language, because of this isomorphism, one is
inferring that the apples form a set. But they do so only in their quality of being
mappable in some formal sense. They do not exist, because they are a mathematical structure, instead they have one. But what exists there on the table (even
without my counting it, or even noticing it at all) is something which had to be
there in first place, so that I can (but not must) map them to a set of numbers.
(We would agree instead with what Smolin is stating on category theory: that it
is this theory which can actually solve the tautology problem immanent in
mathematics, being discussed first by Leibniz with respect to his principle of
the identity of indiscernibles. But even then, there is a distinct mapping distance in the description of the relationships among distinct objects in the world.
We will come back to this in the next chapter.)
Note in passing that the argument Tegmark is giving against the possibility of
more than one time dimension is related to the relationship between substance
and its attributes as we have discussed it earlier: Tegmarks shows that by excluding a certain type of differential equation, predictability cannot be secured
for such models. (Remember that in fact, more than one time dimensions show
139
J.C.Baez, J.Dolan: Categorification, preprint (Feb. 1998), from the web page http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez.
13/11/2014
72
13/11/2014
73
13/11/2014
74
Ibid., 153.
Ibid., 154sq.
Ibid., 100sq.
Ibid., 100.
13/11/2014
75
154
13/11/2014
76
replicase.159
Partially, this is in principle what Smolin says as to the definition of living systems (including
the already mentioned caveat). But the idea is now that selection is phenomenologically taking place in terms of phenotypes while the organizational details are regulated in terms of
genotypes. Remember that the genetic coding is of a linguistic structure such that a single
nucleotid defines a letter of this code. The building blocs of life, on the molecular level, are
proteins (organizing the structure), and enzymes (another kind of proteins organizing the processes), respectively. It is the DNA which explicitly calls on the amino-acids, and the chains
of these amino-acids are what defines the genetic code in terms of combinations being stored
in the DNA. A nucleotid consists basically of a constant residue of phosphoric acid and a
constant desoxyribose plus an organic base which varies all the time. For the DNA, only four
such bases are relevant (called adenine, thymine, guanine, cytosine). They actually form the
four significant letters of the genetic code. Within the chains of nucleotids forming the DNA,
a triplett of nucleotids forms a word of the code, and several hundreds of these words form
a sentence (called a gene). The combinatorial power of this coding system lies in the fact
that a sequence of n amino-acids being called by a word gives 20n possibilities of combination, because there are no more than 20 such acids. They can be called up by a sequence of
tripletts (that is by three-letter-words out of a set of four letters available), which gives 43 = 64
words for 20 acids. Note that the obvious redundancy is very economical indeed, because a
duplett with 42 = 16 possibilities would not suffice. This code structure is universal for all the
life as we know it, including humans. Reproduction is nothing but a duplication of this DNA
information stored in the nucleus of the cell material while cell division is taking place, very
much like in terms of a xerox copying procedure. The genes (the propositional contents of this
information) are located in a string-like structure inside the chromosomes (the socalled
chromatides). Hence, we have four organizational levels of living structures, the DNA on the
original molecular level, the chromosomes of which humans have 46 (females and males
having 22 pairs of homological chromosomes called autosomes plus two sexual chromosomes, in combinations of X plus X, and X plus Y, respectively) in the cellular nucleus, the
cell itself, and the organismic level. The genetic pool of a population is defined as the set of
all possible alleles which are states of genes. The combination of alleles is actually what defines the explicit genotype, the macroscopic appearance of which is defined in terms of the
phenotype.
The evolution factors however act on phenotypes, not on genotypes: Basically, there are five
of them, the mutation pressure, the meiotic drive, the genetic flow, selection proper, and the
genetic drift. The mutation pressure defines an equilibrium condition in terms of mutation
rates: Be p, q allele frequencies of type a,b, respectively, and , the appropriate mutation
rates (of the mutation a b, and the back mutation a b). Then, if p*, and q* are the respective equilibrium frequencies, then p*/q* = /. In general, these quantities satisfy equations of the type dp/dt = - p, e.g., where t is the (discrete) number of generations (being
made continous in terms of usual caluculus). Basically, mutation is nothing but a replication
error in DNA sequences. The meiotic drive defines an asymmetric production of gametes
adding to the variability. The genetic flow deals with the migration of species among populations. The genetic drift is a random action on genetic frequencies. Apart from the genetic
flow, it is selection however, which is of the most significant influence on the variation of the
genetic pool. To be more precise, it is the variation of relative frequencies of genotypes according to the capability of their phenotypes to come into the next generation. The velocity of
selection is a function of the geneticity h 2 := V(G)/V(P), where V(G) is the variance in the
variation of the genotype, and V(P) is the variance in the variation of the phenotype, respectively. From this the relative fitness w can be defined as the rate of excess production cor159
M.Eigen, P.Schuster: Stages of Emerging Life - Five Principles of Early Organization. In: C.W.Kilmister
(ed.), Disequilibrium and Self-Organization, Reidel, Dordrecht etc., 1986, 169-183.
13/11/2014
77
rected by a term according to the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium law. Obviously, the selection
coeffcient s = 1 - w is strictly neighborhood-dependent in the sense that environmental
boundary conditions (determining the ecology) are constraints acting upon the gene pool such
as to enhance a preferred direction (which is reflected on the molecular level in terms of alleles exhibiting dominating or recessive action accordingly).
It is important to note that the rate of mutation (with respect to the genes) and the coefficient
of selection (with respect to genotypes) are of equal weight for the determination of explicit
equilibrium frequencies in a population. The rate of evolution is thus roughly proportional to
the genetic variance of populations. If r is the Malthusian capacity of a population (its specific
growth rate that is), and if K is the capacity of the environment (in suitable terms), then
r-strategies or K-strategies, respectively, determine the explicit structure of co-operative
competition among species. In competitive eco-systems e.g., it is a collection of
Lotka-Volterra profiles (exhibiting limit-cycle behaviour in phase space) which determines
the evolution of the participating populations (e.g. in a simple classification of eco-systems
with populations of herbivores, carnivores, extreme specialists, and extreme universalists,
respectively). Explicit competition matrices can be defined in order to characterize the detailed evolutive structure of systems of populations. In particular, aspects of niche production
and niche overlap production influence the form of these competition matrices which may
even display exact forms of cusp-type in phase space for given settlement structures of appropriate habitats. In a sense, all these details strengthen the point which is also mentioned by
Smolin, that the real purpose of life might be defined in terms of the enlarging of a variety
of available niche types in order to secure the long-term stabilization of multifarious phenotypes which are capable to smoothly co-exist. This also means that their stability would be
primarily determined by their own capability to overcome perturbations as they are exhibited
in eco-systems by means of large-scale fluctuations. Hence, not the survival of the fittest in
the classical sense of Darwinian interpretation would be the important point, but rather a principle of resilience, according to Holling and Leigh who independently introduced this concept
of which is nothing but a measure of the volume in phase space into which the system may be
perturbed without becoming unstable and being subjected to collapse.160
R.M.May, Model Ecosystems, op.cit., 216 (Afterthoughts for the Second Edition of 1974).
13/11/2014
78
But let us first look into the inland ecology of a universes interior: The universe itself consists of a hierarchical structure of galaxies (of superclusters,
clusters, local groups, single galaxies). It is the stellar ecology of a galaxy which
explicitly determines the individual production rate for black holes. In a sense, a
galaxy could be visualized as an analogy to a local eco-system consisting of
populations of phenotypes (types of stars that is) plus a mediator which in that
case would be the interstellar matter. The universe would then be a hierarchically organized population of populations of local eco-systems. If the star-type
(perhaps its spectral class) is the phenotype, what is the corresponding genotype
then? Remember that on the biological level of organization we have basically
three steps to take in order to describe the molecular, the cellular, and the organismic sub-levels. The organismic level corresponds to the phenotype itself. The
molecular level is more or less clear, because stars consist of the same matter as
everything else does. But what would be the cellular level? It is this level on
which the cosmo-genetic coding would be stored, similar to a location within
the cell nucleus. While the coding itself would take place on the molecular level.
Hence, the genotype appropriate for the resulting phenotype would have to be
located within a cellular level to be looked for. Perhaps it can be located in organizational structures which are built within active regions of the interstellar
matter. Smolin gives a lot of details on the latter with respect to recent astrophysical results.
But there is still one point which does not really fit into the picture of super-selection we have introduced earlier: It cannot be the internal structure of a
universe which is rephrased in terms of the selection of phenotypes, because we
deal with universes in first place. Hence, we have to re-arrange our setting
somewhat. In terms of Smolins theory we have to differ therefore between internal selection (within a given universe by means of its stellar ecology), and
external selection in the sense that types of universes are selected (which is the
same as the super-selection introduced before). Obviously, the one should be
fitted to the other. If now the type of universe is the phenotype in question, and
if universes consist of hierarchically structured populations of populations of
local eco-systems which themselves are nothing but populations of stars, then
what about referring to the internal structure of the universe as to the genotype
of that universe? The idea is that galaxies are to the universe what molecules are
to organisms, and that stars are to galaxies what atoms are to molecules. Then
the universe as an organism would represent one phenotype a population of
which would be part of the super-eco-system which in turn consists of populations of universes as well as of an appropriate mediator. On the other hand, a
universe would consist of a cellular structure on the cluster level - consisting
therefore of a hierarchically organized pattern of galaxies and stars in the aforementioned fashion. The corresponding genotype of this phenotype would have
to be located in a kind of cell nucleus. The genotype, in being a combination
of alleles, i.e. a set of various gene sequences, would be constituted then on the
cellular level while the necessary information (the cosmo-genetic code) would
13/11/2014
79
be formed in molecular terms. So what could be an appropriate cosmo-nucleotid? Possibly, there is some structure hidden in the interstellar matter
which is responsible for the production of new stars. And in a sense, this structure will be closely related to the wave patterns eventually emerging within galaxies, propagating in a fashion similar to sound waves. (Back to the harmonies
of the spheres?)161
Then, what about the background necessary for giving rise to an adequate
environment of the populations and their individual members? It is very interesting to note that it is actually loop theory itself, presented by Smolin in some
detail, as we shall see in a moment, that can be used as a firm ground onto which
the idea of environment in the above inter-cosmic sense could be built. This is
mainly so because - in contrary to superstring theory - loops do not rely on a
chosen space-time background, but start from a purely combinatorial structure
of spin networks in the sense of Penrose from which physical structures such as
space and time can be eventually derived. We will elaborate on some of the details later on, but note for the time being that the relationship being established
between this abstract network structure and the explicit space-time structure as
we know it, mirrors clearly the relationship between substance and its attributes
as we have discussed it earlier. Hence, there is neither space nor time (nor matter) outside the single universes constituting the universal network in the sense
of Smolin. Instead, universes as organisms defined in terms of
space-time-matter, are bounded by their own dimensional structure rather than
giving space among them. The spin structure takes the role of a substance (or
of its formal part, to be more precise), while the populations of the universes are
nothing but representations of its attributes.
*
Finally, there are two more interesting points in Smolins text: One is that
Smolin criticizes Kants conception of prohibiting synthetic propositions a priori. In fact, although he draws the line from Plato to Kant far too coarsely, he is
certainly right in stating that the existence of features of the world which seem
both synthetic and a priori seems puzzling only if we think of a fixed, static
world so that anything that is ever true is true always. In contrary to that he argues in favour of a concept of natural selection, where truth becomes
time-dependent. And he continues: Whereas pure logic seems to have no power
to create anything when viewed in the context of a static, Platonic world of
propositions that are eternally either true or false, a process which acts over time
to transform structures ... may be both completely explicable in logical terms
and truly capable of the invention of novelty. 162 This is in fact a viewpoint
discussed earlier in philosophy, by Manfred Frank and others e.g. - compatible
161
Smolin, op.cit., 132.- Cf. recently: Nature 394 (1998), 524 (S.Battersby on B.G.Elmegreen et al. in Ap.J.Lett.
503 (1998), 119-122).
162
Ibid., 187.
13/11/2014
80
with the search for a hermeneutic of nature as initiated by Ernst Bloch. 163
Consequently, Smolin concludes: Mathematical and logical truths may be true
for all time because they are not really about anything that exists. ... Thus it is a
mistake (a kind of category error) to imagine that the theorems of mathematics
are about some other or Platonic realm that exists outside of time. These
theorems are outside of time because they are not about the real.164 On the one
hand, the consequence is that space and time as mathematical entities themselves, are probably vacuous concepts in real, physical terms. On the other hand,
it is necessary therefore, to explicitly deal with the relationship between physics
and logic in dynamical terms so as to shed some more light on the conditions for
their respective interactions. As Smolin formulates: Thus, if it is the case that
the laws of nature have been constructed, over time, by processes of
self-organization, then the old dream of reducing science to logic may to some
extent be realized.165 We have to add: If not the reduction, but rather the onto-epistemic mediation of the two is what we would like to have, in order to
visualize the evolution of the world as a co-evolution of what thinks and what is
being thought about. (Nevertheless, on the epistemic level, we have to use space
and time as proper expressions, although we visualize the entities so described
as concepts which approximate the grasping of complex structures in the world
according to our human perceptive and cognitive capabilities. 166) In this sense,
these arguments are similar to the results of Trifonov discussed above. Smolin
also stresses the importance of category theory when he elaborates on the fact
that space and time are purely relational concepts. He discusses this on the line
of Leibniz, and it is category theory in which he recognizes the instrument for
solving the problem Leibniz actually dealt with. 167
The second interesting point is the presentation of loop theory (Smolins actual
domain of research, in fact). This conception is primarily based on the idea of
Penrose to construct space and time out of combinatorial structures which do not
rely on any background space. The project thus initiated is a kind of alternative
to classical quantum theories in the sense that starting from a structure without a
fixed background reflects directly what Einstein introduced as diffeomorphism
invariance of relativity theory. The spin network approach views possible quantum states of space as being labeled by different ways of tying knots in pieces of
string. 168 (In fact, if taken literally, this nomenclature implies immediately a
close relationship among strings, loops, and knots. And this is actually going
163
13/11/2014
81
Ibid., 279sq.
Ibid., 281.
Ibid., 283.
13/11/2014
82
philosophia now, in the sense that the aforementioned principles of totality and
unity (of the worldly), of self-reference, and of unity of substratum, according to
what we have said in section III A, are incorporated in such an approach and
serve as a first orientation towards suitable starting points. The second one is the
principle of mediocrity with respect to human life and thinking. This implies
both the spatial as well as the temporal mediocrity of humans which serves the
re-institution of a sober modesty of conceptual modelling (instead of cherishing
the assumption that humans are the final climax of evolution, as it has been
handed down to us by tradition). The third one is the worldscape principle implying the existence of a multiverse, i.e. of a population of populations of universes whose evolution is attainable in terms of a generalized Darwinian evolution dynamics governed by an appropriate principle comparable to biological
selection as we know it. Finally, the fourth one is what we call Klymene principle demanding a methodological approach which takes into account the explicit
process structure of the worldly. Hence, what we actually do is to start from
ourselves, as a subjective standpoint relative to all what there is. We regressively
approach our own foundation, in the sense that taking in sight our personal history as worldly manifestation (our biography that is) means not only to
re-construct this history, but also its pre-history as its condition. After having
re-constructed (at least part of) this foundation, according to a speculative capacity which is closely bound to what we have taken in sight during the phase of
regression, in first place, we derive then the worldly out of this foundation in a
progressive manner. This motion consists thus of two (progressive-regressive)
components, the first one looking for what has become, the second one looking
for what could have become. Hence, what we do is to actually study the transitions from non-being to being, and this is indeed the task of philosophy in order
to unify the various sectors of the world into one single picture and subsequently
to describe its foundations.172
The systems of theoretical and practical philosophy as well as the system of the
philosophy of art, will follow then as a final result mediated in terms of the
worldly hierarchy as it is implied according to what has been found with respect
to the regressive and progressive components of the aforementioned method so
applied. Obviously, the detailed structure of this organizational hierarchy is still
subject to further work which is still in the becoming173, but for a short overview
we will give an outline here of the basic ideas involved.
It is in fact the human property of thinking in a digital sense, that is in splitting the world in artificial portions which are suitable for analysis, in a differentiation between subject and object, position and negation, being
and non-being. The progressive-regressive method which primarily deals with the epistemological consequences
of this is called after Klymene who, according to Greek mythology, was the mother of the twins Prometheus and
Epimetheus, the one looking forward and anticipating the world, the other looking backward and reflecting what
has been so far.
173
Cf. R.E.Zimmermann: System des transzendentalen Materialismus, in preparation (2000).
13/11/2014
83
13/11/2014
84
13/11/2014
85
Our first conjectures are charged now with all what we have assembled in the
first two rounds. While the regressive component had been characterized by
the phenomenology we could empirically observe in terms of our own environment, we can now strengthen our conjectures by postulating a certain degree of
generality for what we usually call laws and rules. Hence, what we have is a
sound basis for telling something about what is self-evident and what is not.
This is a basis for doing axiomatics. Note that the Cosmological Principle is
the first axiom in this sense, of a quality comparable to a synthetic judgement a
priori in the wording of Kant.
2. First Axiomatic Principles
The axiomatic principles we may derive have the property of being more general
than the special cases of their representation and expression we know from the
first round. It is in this way that theory generalizes practical experience, not
unlike an heuristic expansion of lines of thought which have not been realized in
fact, but which could have been realized under different conditions compatible
with what we know about the world so far.
3. Axiomatic Theorems
We end up with a set of theorems which gives a generalized picture of the totality and the unity of the world. Obviously, at the basis of this set lie physical theorems about the Universe, formulated in mathematical language. But note also
that from the beginning on, it is clear that theorems of such a formal kind,
though never loosing their validity, cannot be properly applied to other parts of
the world whose description surpasses theories of the physical sciences. Even
for their application in terms of physics alone, they are only of a somewhat restricted value, because they operate on a high level of abstraction which is compatible with, but not truly representative of the concrete level of worldly
emprical existence. Hence, even for fundamental categories which define the
framework for our thinking, such as space and time themselves, there is not really a concrete equivalent to the abstraction we use in our theories as a given
concept. Space and time do not exist in an absolute sense of actually being
there: Instead, space and time are concepts we have developed because they are
approriate to our modes of perception and cognition. And there is indeed some
correlate to this abstraction, but not one we really would know of, and in particular not one which would be comparable in a sense to what we understand when
talking about space and time. The point is that we need detailed theories for local regions of phenomena, in spite of knowing that it is physics which is at the
foundation of all possible phenomena we might actually encounter in one way or
the other, and in spite of knowing that even physics is nothing but a mapping of
some underlying structural details such that we might handle various aspects of
this mappings target, but not really its domain.
13/11/2014
86
13/11/2014
87
former chapter as a structural framework which has to be filled with all the relevant details governing our world, then the micro-theories hence developed
must be conceptualized under the same basic concepts. Otherwise we would
endanger the clarity of results due to a large quantity of multifarious bifurcations
of babylonic routes of terminology. (Presently, this is actually already the case
in several parts of philosophy and the sciences!) Hence, while the systematic as
it is presented in chapter VII is the chief domain of propositions to be formulated about the quantitative and qualitative nature of the world, the systematic of
the present chapter VIII is the inventory of concepts which is the condition of
actually being able to formulate propositions at all. In passing it is also secured
that we have basically the same set of fundamental concepts available. Such an
inventory we call organon in a somewhat modified sense as it has been handed down to us by Aristotle himself. And the basic concepts developed here constitute a proto-theoretic matrix in the sense that in formulating them, we have to
apply intuitive and dispositional contents in first place (in a suitable analogy to
the precept/concept process discussed by Bloch), in order to actually form these
concepts. In doing so we do not really establish a theory, but we perform a certain amount of proto-theoretic behaviour, because all we have within our thinking is already contaminated with theoretic fragments of mostly unreflected
type. Although this is also a work in progress 174, we will nevertheless give a
short survey of the relevant concepts which are in discussion so far. Note that
the type of concepts corresponds to the type of propositions formulated by these
concepts. We have therefore a close structural relationship between the concepts
listed here and the steps of propositional conceptualization as presented in chapter VII, which is also reflected in the fact that according to the explicit hierarchy
of theorems (of fundamental and main type on the one hand, and of ontological
and epistemological type, on the other) we have an appropriate hierarchy of
corresponding concepts.
A. Fundamental Concepts of Ontological Type
1. Foundation & World
These two concepts give the first step of differentiation in order to find a boundary between non-being and being. Foundation is in this sense the reason of the
world, and its cause, at the same time. It gains an active connotation by the fact
that it actually produces the world. Hence, on the contrary, the world itself carries a basically passive connotation, because it is primarily produced. On the
other hand, modes of production are also permanent expression of the world
which can be represented therefore as a worldly process with a given structure.
Both, the foundation and the world which is founded on that foundation, i.e.
174
This progress is being achieved presently by a study group working under the collective and programmatic
pseudonym of Klymene. A first paper has been published under the title Elemente der Philosophie. Ein
Systemprogramm. (System & Struktur IV/2, 1996, 225-229).
13/11/2014
88
non-being and being, have a common boundary with nothingness. This gives a
fundamental structure of all what there is, from the beginning on, and as an important starting point for developing further concepts. Note that fundamental
concepts of ontological type have the meaning of categories in the strict sense.
2. Immanence & Transcendence
These two concepts clarify the relationship among the structural regions covered
by the first pair of concepts introduced above. It is found that foundation is to
the world what substance is to its attributes. But the point is that substance is by
its very definition carrying both connotations of immanence and transcendence.
This has important results for our particular mode of thinking when reflecting
about the world.
3. Totality & Singularity
There is a basic duality we may cognitively grasp when discussing problems of
foundation. The large variety of individual forms which have emerged out of
one single foundation is something which asks for a sound clarification. This is
the place where the explicit dialectical structure of the world is being exposed.
as a permanent, progressive mediation of singularities within the totality of the
world.
B. Theoretical Main Concepts
This type of concepts can be visualized as corollaries from the categories discussed in the beginning. They have not the character of categories themselves,
but they are derived with a view to categories.
1. Motion
Traditionally, motion means here development in first place. Motion is the
general concept used when dealing with the permanent process structure of the
world. Within this terminology, processes are the worldly traces of a fundamental conflict structure which is intrinsic to the foundation of the world. Hence,
what we visualize as motion (referring implicitly to space and time) is a projection of a situation we cannot understand, because it surpasses the conditions of
the world. But we can cognitively interpret this projection in terms of conceptual
picture which guides our orientation within the world.
2. Emergence
The connotation of emergence is onset of motion rather than motion itself. In principle, at points of emergence, the really important things in the world
13/11/2014
89
happen, in a structural sense which is forming the world. In between such points,
common motion secures the stability of structures, but does not act innovatively
on the world. Hence, to know the points of emergence means to know the basic
characteristics of the world.
3. Space-Time
The dynamic concepts introduced so far lay the ground for the common concept
of space-time. The worldscape concept is thus a consequence of the way we are
used to visualize the process structure of the world (or to visualize such a process structure at all). It is not, as is often assumed, the foundation for motions,
instead it is viceversa.
4. Symmetry
The concept of symmetry is especially important in terms of its negation, when a
symmetry (of space-time) is explicitly being broken. This is so, because otherwise we would not have any chance to discover a symmetry, in first place. The
fact that motions of the world are such that permanently, symmetries are being
broken, is the condition for our cognitively mediated knowledge that there are
symmetries at all. They give us the methodological advantage of formulating
them in terms of law-like rules on which we can built our insight into many
processes which take place in this world.
5. Complexity
It is finally the concept of complexity which gives us criteria as to the
heirarchical ordering of the world which facilitates our cognition and hence orientation within the world. As we have seen already, the substratum of the world
is always the same: it is what we call matter (and we mean with that the four
field interactions plus quarks and leptons). But the forms of matter do permanently vary while developing. And this happens in terms of a building up of
structural hierarchies constituting levels of evolution we can deal with. The difference of these levels is defined by the degree of complexity of forms of matter.
The more complex the form, the higher its position in the evolutionary hierarchy. Note that this scale is open-ended. It is not the humans who are at the end
of the scale.
C. Fundamental Concepts of Epistemological Type
In contrary to concepts of ontological type which have the character of categories, concepts of epistemological type have been developed due to human praxis
and vary strongly with the historical development of theories. It is the explicit
structure of the social system using these theories which determines the common
13/11/2014
90
13/11/2014
91
13/11/2014
92
order to be able to measure this time flow, it is necessary to introduce an instrument whose most important part is a mechanism which artifically stops the
time at a series of given moments so that one is capable to divide a given scale
into well-defined intervals. This is achieved by introducing the escapement of
clocks. Otherwise the hands would continuously circulate the dials, which is not
very useful for a proper measurement.) Digitalization can be re-traced to the basically dual constitution of thinking itself. There is an intrinsic dualism between
subject and object in thinking which mirrors the fact that consciousness itself is
constituted by two components: the pre-reflexive one and the reflexive one. This
is also expressed by the fact that most of the fundamental concepts show up in
pairs of complementary character. Hence, the division between body and mind,
due to epistemological reasons, not due to ontological reasons.
2. Non-Simultaneousness
This concept covers the fact that objectivity in the sense mentioned above is
never sublated completely in an ideal manner (as a superposition of many individual perspectives developed with respect to the taking in sight of the world).
Instead, there are substantial residues which spatially as well as temporarily
demonstrate that thinking is never simultaneous and that the superposition of its
individual variants can never compensate these differences in sight.
3. Utopia & Mythology
Very much like the Blochean concept of non-simultaneousness, the conceptual
pair of utopia and mythology deals with the explicit divergences of reflexion
which are exhibited within a given social group. For the population altogether,
visualized as a group of groups, hence as the totality itself, local narrative structures are merged to form a collective story which constitutes the high-story
(history) of the population. The interpretational needs left open by the practical
consequences of non-simultaneousness give rise to a narration of the desired,
in the sense that this defines the anticipating projection of the population, given
a particular situation at some moment of development.
4. Freedom
The concept of freedom is at the foundation of all what is done, and at the end of
anticipating the future development, at the same time. In a sense, it re-guides the
motion of concepts to the first main conjectures starting from myself (section A.
1), and also to the structural main conjectures formulated according to the
re-construction of the foundation (section C. 1). It is nevertheless a practical
concept, because it is used for founding various aspects of actions within everyday life on a consistent base of fundamental principles. Freedom in ontological
terms is nothing but a property of substance making possible that there is some-
13/11/2014
93
thing worldly at all. Freedom in practical terms is the trace of this substance as it
is expressed within its own attributes in a basically fragmental form.
13/11/2014
94
that the variety is limited. And what is true for the forms of organization is certainly also true for the forms of thinking itself. Hence, the question is whether
there might be stable invariants defining social systems as such, and which are
being superposed by historically developed variants characterizing the specific
structure of a culture in detail. The first step for answering such a question is
probably to study the explicit differences in thinking. 175
We discuss a short example provided by Bruce Chatwin 176 who has demonstrated in some
detail that for the Australian aborigines, the fundamental categories of grasping their world
are of a rather different nature: The aborigines have defined a complex network of pathways
stretching over the whole continent, called songlines, deeply related to their mythological
system. Creation in terms of this mythology starts with original ancestors who define the totemic structure of the various tribes. These ancestors wandered in the beginning over the continent and sang all the geographic objects (or geological objects rather) into existence. Hence,
in singing they created the world. This early time is referred to as a dreaming time in the
sense that the ancestors created the details of the world from their dreams. The contents of
their dreams is what we actually call world. On the other hand, the songlines can be visualized
as a network of the ancestors footprints which have themselves creative potential. To be
more precise the dreaming itself is the clan emblem (totem) implying a field of possibilities
determining practically both reflexion and action. Also, the songlines are the invisible (but
acoustic) mapping of a space of dreaming in terms of a space-time relationship. But there no
European equivalent of causal succession. Each aborigine owns a part of a song which corresponds to a piece of a songline. In this sense, the knowledge of a song implies the
knowledge of a path similar to a map. But it is only in the walking of a path that a path comes
into reality. The text of the song refers to geographical details of the landscape so that if recited correctly, the person wandering is at the right place at the right time. The senses directly
co-operate with the performance of action (wandering) without the separating of reflexion and
action which is typical for European thinking. While walking the songlines a person can only
meet brothers and sisters (of the same totem) so that hospitality is guaranteed. Hence, the song
is also passport and credit card. On the other hand, failing to walk the proper path means
trespassing and is a very severe crime.
But songlines are also connections between holy places, because the characteristic points of
orientation are related to mythological narration. Holy places in this sense, are incarnations of
the episodes referring to creation itself. Hence, wandering means re-creating. The song therefore is completely regulated in a strict way and must never be changed. Walking the songlines
is primarily a ritual journey, a practical journey only in secondary terms. The tact frequency
of the song is immediately related to a characteristic measure of time valid for a pedestrian
(about six kilometres per hour) and implies therefore a measure of distance, too. But note that
time is circular in this case, because the world is permanently re-created, but nothing new can
emerge. When walking a songline, not the present aborigine alone is performing this activity,
but at the same time, all of his ancestors do the same (in an identical way, not in an equal
way!). Living on the world is thus nothing but re-actualizing the original dreams of the ancestors. There is no temporality in the European sense.
Hence, reflexion and action, for Europeans in a successive order and defining temporality in
first place, by their distance and difference, are set into one in the case of the aborigines. For
175
There is work in progress within the departmental framework of an interdisciplinary study group presently
under construction at the university of Kassel at the department for education and humane sciences including the
institute for philosophy. In the following I refer to a report given by myself to a departmental conference on 11th
December, 1998.
176
B. Chatwin: The Songlines, Picador/Jonathan Cape, London, 1987.
13/11/2014
95
them, existence means perception, and cognition is a result of early habituation, it is not operative in a strict sense. At the same time, songlines serve the re-actualization of social life. So
they also have a political and economical meaning. They are trade routes, but it is songs
which are traded, goods are of secondary importance. At best, there is a cyclic trade of symbolic values, in the sense that certain goods (of practically no material value) are being circulated allover the continent. (This is a similarity to the famous Kula cycle of island trade described by Malinowski for the people of the Trobriand archipelago in Papua-New Guinea.)
In regular intervals all members of a totem who own a piece of the related songline come together and sing the complete song from the beginning to the ending, according to strict rules
of succession. Any error within this framework of rules would not only perturb the
re-actualization of creating, but would in fact negate creation itself, it would un-create the
world. There are many parts of a song, up to 600, which covers continental distances. The
boundary points (of one piece) are called stops and define the respective sub-sections. The
boundary points are always language-compatible, i.e. a song changes languages several times,
but does remain the same song. Members of the same totem speak different languages therefore. The exchange over stops does also regulate the wedding rules: Who would like to marry
has to wander.
What we recognize here is the category dependence of the social context: We would expect
that people who utilize different categories of space and time (as do the aborigines) such that
thinking itself (due to an operational absence of temporality) does not differ between
pre-reflexive and reflexive modes (i.e. between modes of reflexion and action in this case), do
also organize their social structures differently from what we know. This has been confirmed
by the works of Lvi-Strauss some time ago, and by the corrections Bourdieu applied to these
results. Note only for one example that stops of songlines are boundary points, but not territorial boundaries in the strict sense, because they do not apply to an area. Any parallel path
would belong to another totem. Hence, economically, there cannot be a structure of
land-owning in the European sense, with a number of decisive consequences for everyday
life.
13/11/2014
96
ble, because they do not really deal with reality. This is the final question.
13/11/2014
97
the attention of those who are interested in this (or in a similar) project to the
fact that work is already done by a number of people on the line of thinking discussed here. Mostly, there is only little communication going on among groups
of people who work on similar pathways. Hence, this communication shall be
improved by a first summary of what is going on within the wider field between
physics and logic. Probably, the range of each of the chapters displayed here
could comfortably take care of a number of PhD theses in their own right. But
we repeat oncemore that the hard work has to be done all the time, despite the
fact that a unification could be eventually achieved. Hence, what we would like
to develop here is nothing but a structural theory of general aspects of mediations, but it is not a theory for testing new evidence. Except that there may
eventually emerge a kind of heuristic potential in order to check whether one has
been on the right track for a long while. Consequently, commentaries, critique,
and doubts, are being invited, and a lifely resonance produced by the readers is
the true result.