Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
252
Facts: Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda,defendant, were
legally married in the city of Manila. They establishedtheir residence 115
Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month. However,
the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The allegations of the
complaint were that the defendant, one month after they had contracted
marriage, demanded plaintiff to performunchaste and lascivious acts on his genital
organs in which the latter rejectthe said demands. With these refusals, the
defendant got irritated andprovoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed.
Unable to induce thedefendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of
maltreatingher, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge
inthe home of her parents. The plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her
husband forsupport outside of the conjugal domicile. However, the defendant
objectsthat the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action.
Issue: Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugaldomicile.
Ruling:
Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a
newrelation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon
theagreement of the parties but upon the general law which defi nes
andprescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of
amarriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of theparties
and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way
should be obtainable. The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to
support thewife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or
bymaintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option givenby law is
not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade orterminate his
obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leavethe conjugal abode
because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant, Beatriz may
claim support from the defendant for separatemaintenance even outside of the
conjugal home.
It has been held that the wife, who is forced to leave the conjugalabode by
her husband, without fault on her part, may maintain an actionagainst the
husband for separate maintenance when she has no other remedy,
notwithstanding the provision of the law giving the person who isobliged to furnish
support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixedpension or by receiving and
maintaining in his home the one having theright to the same
of
writ
of
habeas
corpus
to
Ruling:
SC dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother
andretain the custody of the children to the father. The illicit or
immoralactivities of the mother had already caused emotional
Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate
maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the de facto separation of the two
parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as impossible, and
separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband. She is
under obligation to return to the domicile.
When people understand that they must live togetherthey learn to soften by
mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they
become good husbands and wivesnecessity is a powerful master in teaching the
duties which it imposes (Evans v. Evans)
2. On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the
courts to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to,
the other. In the case of property rights, such an action may be maintained. Said
order, at best, would have no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live
together. Other countries, such as England and Scotland have done this with much
criticism.
Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented herself
without sufficient cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled to
support.
Quintana vs Lerma
Facts:
In the case at bar, defendant-appellant Gelasio Lerma appeals from the judgment of
the lower court granting his wife, the plaintiff-appellee Maria Quintana, a sum of
money allegedly due her based on a contract they made for support.
As shown in the evidence, the two were married in 1901 and entered, in February
1905, into a written agreement of separation, renouncing certain rights as against
each other, dividing the conjugal property between them and the defendant
undertaking the duty to provide plaintiff P20-worth of monthly support and
maintenance to be given within the first three days of each month.
In his original answer to the action, Lerma claimed that Quintana forfeited her right
to support by committing adultery. However, this special defense was stricken out
by the court on the ground that under Art. 152 of the Civil Code, adultery is not a
recognized ground upon which obligation to support ceases.
The lower court refused to recognize the same defense when defendant reentered it
in his amended complaint.
Issue:
W/N the written agreement made by parties is void
W/N adultery may be permitted as a special defense against action for support
Ruling:
Yes. The agreement is void because Art. 1432 of the Civil Code provides that in
default of express declarations in the marriage contract, the separation of the
property of the consorts, during marriage, shall only take place by virtue of a
judicial decree, except in the case provided by article 50. However, the wife has a
right of action against defendant under the Code.
Yes. While the plaintiff wife has the right of action, the Court ruled that the
defendant may also set up adultery as a special defense, which if properly proved
and sustain will defeat the wifes action.
Judgment reversed; cause remanded for new trial with instructions to permit the
interposition of the special defense of adultery and such amendments of the
complaint and answer as may be necessary to carry the judgment into effect.
HELD:
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between
the spouses duringmarriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character
as well as the dictates of morality requires thatthe same prohibition should apply to a
common-law relationship.As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the
policy of the law is to prohibit donationsin favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to
persons livingtogether as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.The lack of
validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in
appellanthaving exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow,
Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the
other half.Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower,the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to theother half.
Onas vs Javillo
FACTS:
Crispulo Javillo married Ramona Levis and they had 5 children. After Ramonas
death, he married Rosario Onas and they had 4 children. - During his first marriage
11 parcels of land were acquired; while in his 2nd marriage 20 parcels of land were
acquired.
Partition was made on the claim that the properties of the 2nd marriage were
products of the first marriage. - Rosario Onas was opposing the partition that was
made by the administrator of the estate of her husband. She alleges the following
errors:
All the properties acquired during the second marriage were acquired with
the properties of the first marriage.
TC erred in approving the partition dated September 9, 1931, notwithstanding
that the same did not include all properties of the deceased.
ISSUES
and
RULING:
1) WON the community partnership shall continue to exist between the surviving
spouse and the heirs of the deceased husband or wife - NO - When the marriage is
dissolved, the cause that brought about the community ceases, for the principles of
an ordinary partnership are not applicable to this community, which is governed by
special rules. - Provisions of law governing the subject should cease to have any
effect for community of property is admissible and proper in so far as it conforms to
unity of life, to the mutual affection between husband and wife, and serves as a
recompense for the care of preserving and increasing the property; all of which
terminates by the death of one of the partners. - Community terminates when the
marriage is dissolved or annulled or when during the marriage and agreement is
entered into to divide the conjugal property. The conjugal partnership exists as long
as
the
spouses
are
united.
2) WON the properties of the second marriage can be claimed as products of the
properties of the first marriage - NO - Whatever is acquired by the surviving spouse
on the dissolution of the partnership by death or presumption of death whether the
acquisition be made by his or her lucrative title, it forms a part of his or her own
capital, in which the other consort, or his or her heirs, can claim no share.
3) WON the partition that was approved by the lower court is valid - NO - Was based
on the erroneous assumption that the properties of the second marriage were
produced by the properties of the first marriage. ** The property corresponding to
the first marriage consists of the 11 parcels of land. The remaining 20 parcels of
land were acquired during the second marriage.
Peoples Bank and Trust Co. vs. Register of Deeds, 60 Phil 167
FACTS:
Appeal from CFI Manila judgment denying registration of instrument entitled
Agreement and Declaration of Trust in which Dominga Angeles, married to Manuel
Sandoval living in Palawan, conveyed in trust her paraphernal property, trustee was
to redeem mortgage constituted on such property with funds derived from the rents
or sale thereof, grant a loan of P10000 with which to redeem mortgage and collect
the rents to be derived from said property while remained unsold.
ISSUES:
1. WON the rents collected are fruits of the wifes property which therefore belongs
to
CPG,
2. WON
management
belongs
to
husband
3. WON contract is null and void since husband did not give consent
HELD:
Wife, as owner and administratrix of her paraphernal property, may appoint trustee
to collect the fruits of her property. The fruits are not yet conjugal property since
they still have to answer to expenses in the administration and preservation of the
paraphernal property. She may likewise do such without consent of the husband,
subject to recourse by husband or his heirs, thus rendering such contract merely
voidable or void.
Fidel Arriola died and is survived by his legal heirs: John NaborArriola
(respondent) ,his son with his first wife , and Vilma G.Arriola, his second wife and his
other son, Anthony Ronald Arriola(petitioners).On Feb. 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a
decision ordering thepartition of the parcel of land covered by TCT No 383714
(84191)left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs JohnNabor C.
Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola inequal shares of one-third
(1/3) each without prejudice to therights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if
any.However, the parties failed to agree on how to divide the abovementioned
property and so the respondent proposed to sell itthough public auction. The
petitioners initially agreed but refusedto include in the auction the house standing
on the subject land. The respondent then filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion
for Contempt of Court but was denied by the RTC for lack of merit.When a motion of
reconsideration was still denied by the RTC, therespondent elevated the case to the
CA with a petition forcertiorari and prayed that he be allowed to push through with
theauction of the subject land including the house built on it. The CAgranted the
petition and ordered the public auction sale of thesubject lot including the house
built on it. Petitioners filed amotion for reconsideration but the CA denied the said
motion.Hence this petition for review on Certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition but in
view of the suspended proscription imposed under Article 159 of the family code, the subject
house immediately partitioned to the heirs.
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an
unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the
land on which it is situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the
value allowed by law.
Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject
land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and
petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20
years back
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons
thereafter. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the
family home.
JOVELLANOS vs. CA
210 SCRA 126 (Art. 1164)
Facts:
Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a a lease and conditional sale
agreement over a house and lot. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to
Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children, the petitioners. Leonor Dizon died
consequently. Then Daniel married private respondent Annette with whom he begot
two children. The daughter from the 1st marriage Mercy Jovellanos married Gil
Martinez and at the behest of Daniel Jovellanos, they built a house on the back
portion of the premises. With the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife
executed to Daniel Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the
latter donated to herein petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the lot and
bungalow thereon. In 1985, Daniel died. Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos
claimed in the lower court that the aforestated property was acquired by her
deceased husband while their marriage was still subsisting and which forms part of
the conjugal partnership of the second marriage. Petitioners contend that the
property, were acquired by their parents during the existence of the first marriage
under their lease and conditional sale agreement with Philamlife of September 2,
1955.
Issue:
WON the house and lot pertains to the second marriage? YES
Held:
The conditional sale agreement in said contract is, therefore, also in the nature of a
contract to sell, as contradistinguished from a contract of sale. In a contract to sell
or a conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of the property but
upon full payment of the purchase price. Generally, ownership is transferred upon
delivery, but even if delivered, the ownership may still be with the seller until full
payment of the price is made, if there is stipulation to this effect. The stipulation is
usually known as a pactum reservati dominii, or contractual reservation of title, and
is common in sales on the installment plan. Compliance with the stipulated
payments is a suspensive condition. The failure of which prevents the obligation of
the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.
Daniel consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said
amount hence, although he had been in possession of the premises since
September 2, 1955, it was only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed the
deed of absolute sale thereof in his favor.
Daniel Jovellanos did not enjoy the full attributes of ownership until the execution of
the deed of sale in his favor. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law, 19 and,
under the contract, Daniel Jovellanos evidently did not possess or enjoy such rights
of ownership.
Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in
Daniel Jovellanos. Since. as early as 1967, he was already married to Annette H.
Jovellanos, this property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his
said second wife.
NB: But since it pertained to the second wife, she is still liable to pay the
corresponding reimbursements to the petitioners who helped pay for the
amortization of the house and lot. Remember Article 118 of the Family Code on
property bought on installments, where ownership is vested during the marriage,
such property shall belong to the conjugal partnership.
Cervantes v Fajardo
Facts: This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus over the person of the minorAngelie Anne
Cervantes.Angelie Ann Cervantes was born on 14 February 1987 to Conrado Fajardo andGina
Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. They offered the child foradoption to Gina
Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, Zenaida Carreon-Cervantesand Nelson Cervantes, spouses,
who took care and custody of the child when shewas barely two weeks old. An Affidavit of
Consent to the adoption of the child wasexecuted by respondent Gina Carreon. The petition for
adoption was filed bypetitioners before the RTC of Rizal, which granted the petition.Sometime in
1987, the adoptive parents, Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes,received a letter from the
respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back
their child. Petitioners refused. As aresult, while petitioners were out at work, the Gina Carreon
took the child from her"yaya" at the petitioners' residence, on the pretext that she was
instructed to do soby her mother. Gina Carreon brought the child to her house. Petitioners
demandedthe return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire togive
up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption shehad executed was
not fully explained to her.
Issue: Whether or not the natural parents or the adoptive parents have custodyover Angelie
Ann Cervantes.
Held: The custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are granted topetitioners,
Zenaida and Nelson Cervantes, to whom they properly belong.
Ratio: In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children,the latter's
welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separatedfrom a child under five (5)
years of age, will not apply where the Court findscompelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all
controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical
and social welfare of thechild concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as
socialstanding of the contending parents.Conrado Fajardo's relationship with the Gina Carreon is
a common-lawhusband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with Gina will not accord
theminor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an uprightand moral-
minded person. Gina Carreon had also previously given birth to anotherchild by another married
man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years butwho eventually left her and vanished.
For a minor to grow up with a sister whose"father" is not her true father, could also affect the
moral outlook and values of saidminor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married
appear to bemorally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor
andgiving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless butalso
maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.Minor has been legally
adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge andconsent of respondents. A decree of adoption
has the effect of dissolving theauthority vested in natural parents over the adopted child. The
adopting parentshave the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise
parentalauthority and responsibility over him.
a g a i n t o a n o t h e r w o m a n a n d t h e f o rm e r d e s i re s t o re s u m e
h e r maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change of
nameand comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
NOW h e n a w o m a n m a rr i e s a m a n , s h e n e e d n o t a p p l y a n d / o r s e e k
j u d i c i a l authority to use her husband's name by prefi xing the word "Mrs."
before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden
firstname. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when
themarriage ties or
vinculum
n o l o n g e r e x i s t s a s i n t h e c a s e o f d e a t h o f t h e husband or divorce as
authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorceeneed not seek judicial
confirmation of the change in her civil status in order tor e v e r t t o h e r m a i d e n
n a m e a s t h e u s e o f h e r f o r m e r h u s b a n d ' s n a m e i s optional and not
obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, shedid not change her
name but only her civil status. Neither was she required tos e c u r e j u d i c i a l
a u t h o r i t y t o u s e t h e s u r n a m e o f h e r h u s b a n d a f t e r t h e marriage,
as no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname during themarriage, after
annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husbandis permissive and not
obligatory except in case of legal separation.T h e c o u r t fi n d s t h e p e t i t i o n
t o r e s u m e t h e u s e o f m a i d e n n a m e fi l e d b y p e t i t i o n e r b e f o r e
t h e r e s p o n d e n t c o u r t a s u p e r fl u i t y a n d u n n e c e s s a r y p ro c e e d i n g
s i n c e t h e l a w re q u i re s h e r t o d o s o a s h e r f o r m e r h u s b a n d i s already
married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in
accordance with Muslim laws.
Versola vs CA
Facts:
Dolores Ledesma secured a P1m loan from Dra Oh. Ledesma sold the house and
lot to petitioners Eduardo and Elsa Versola for 2.5m with a down payment of 1m. ledesma
asked for the rest of the payment. Petitioners were only able to give 50k. Petitioners secured a
loan from Asiatrust Bank to pay for their remaining balance. Bank settled an agreement
between parties that Dr. Oh will give another 450k to Ledesma making her debt 1.45m.
Spouses should execute a mortgage to secure a loan of 2m. When Asiatrust tried to register the
mortgage of the spouses, it discovered a notice of levy of execution on the title in connection
with another of Ledesmas to Miladays Jewels, Inc. Asiatrust refused to grant 2m loan to the
spouses. Dra. Oh filed a case against Asiatrust, petitioners, and Ledesma. RTC favoured Dra Oh
and sheriff auctioned the said house. The petitioners objected to this auction saying that the
house is their family home and should not be subject to execution.
Issue: WON the family home should be exempted from execution.
Held: The house is not exempted from execution. It is not sufficient that the person claiming
exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. The claim must be proved to the
Sheriff. The records in the case do not disclose that petitioners proved that the property to be
sold was FH. They simply alleged it, and presupposed that the sheriff already knew of such.
They rigorously asserted such exemption only 2 years after the date of the auction sale. Their
assertion for exemption therefore is a mere afterthought, a sheer artifice to deprive private
respondent of the fruits of the verdict of her case.
various amounts from December 1951 to July 1952, still pursuant to the deed of
mortgage.
The loan went unpaid and so RFC initiated a foreclosure proceeding on the
mortgaged property. According to RFC, the monthly payments were supposed to be
due in October 1952.
In his defense, Ponce de Leon insists that the amortizations never became due
because allegedly, RFC did not complete the disbursement of the loan to him
(allegedly, P19k was withheld). He also invokes that on the face of the promissory
note it was written that the installments have no fixed or determined dates of
payment. Hence, the monthly payments were never due therefore the foreclosure
is void. He insists that the court should first determine the date of maturity of the
loan.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ponce de Leon is right.
HELD: No. During trial and based on the records, Ponce de Leons lawyer admitted
that all the remainder of the loan was released to Ponce de Leon so he cannot
invoke that not all of the P495k was released by RFC.
Anent the issue of the loans maturity date, under Secs. 13 and 14 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, when a promissory note expresses no time for payment, it is
deemed payable on demand. Therefore, when RFC demanded payment on
October 24, 1952, the installments become due.
marriage, and theheirs of his other deceased child (also from the first marriage).
Lower court divided the properties in the following way:
a. 3 children of first marriage
b. Dorotea
c. children of both marriage (divided in 13 parts).
CA: Point of contention was Caanawan lands in Nueva Ecija. Other lands belong
tosecond marriage
No proof property owned by second marriage
Testimony of Dorotea not persuasive
Moises Patricio places acquisition sometime after the revolution: Rosa was
stillalive at this time
LC: conjugal partnership of first marriage transformed into co-ownership by
Nicolasand his children, thus fruits belong to co-ownership.
CA disagrees with LC: HOWEVER, IT WAS DOROTEA AND NICOLAS WHOCULTIVATED
THE LAND, HENCE THE FRUITS OF THE LAND SHOULD GO TO THESECOND
MARRIAGE. Dorotea elevated case to SC. According to her, Canaawan
properties were not part of first marriages CPG as lands were homesteads.
First marriage had possessory rights,but second marriage had exclusive right
over it as it was during the second marriagethat it was registered pursuant to
Act 926.
Issue:
Held: Property belongs to the CPG of the 2nd marriage as land was only registered
during secondmarriage.
Act 926 (Homestead Act): Rights of homesteader to land does not become
absoluteuntil the following requirements of law are fulfilled:a.Person filing
application backed by two credible witnesses has to prove he hasresided and
cultivated the land for 5 years after filing applicationb.Person fi ling has to make
affi davit attesting that the land is notencumbered/alienated. Lands were only
distributed by cabecillas in 1905
When Dacquel, Antolin, and Pascua conveyed the land to Nicolas, they could
nothave fulfilled the requirements of Act 926 before conveyances to Delizo.
Dacquel, less than a year, Antolin, 2 years, Pascua, 3 years
The 3 did not have legal rights to transfer to Delizo. What they transferredwere
inchoate rights, not ownership rights.
PRINCIPLE: Deciding factor where homestead belongs to time of registration NOT
when homestead patent is issued as registration is the onlytime all requirements
have been fulfilled.
Philippine National Bank vs. Margarita Quintos E Yparraguirre and Angel A. Ansalso
Facts: On June 20, 1918 PNB granted the defendants a credit to the amount of P31,284 to
whichdefendants mortgaged stocks from BPI, Compaia Naviera, Davao Agriculture and
CommercialCompany etc. In the document, it did not clearly show that they were husband and
wife, except intheir civil statues. On April 2, 1921/ July 22, 1921 a complaint was filed requiring
Mr. Ansalso to pay his debt.SC First TRIAL: Defendants claim that their debt is not of a solidary
nature and should thus only bind one tothe extent of their share in the obligation thus should
not be charged to their conjugal partnership.However Art 1408 of NCC provides that all debts
incurred by both husband and wife during themarriage are chargeable to the conjugal
partnership thus Margarita, the wife, is part of theobligation as her husband as the legal
manager of the conjugal partnership is liable for the debt. Supreme Court first decision held that
conjugal partnership should be used to pay for the debtincurred as well as private property of
each of them since they are both obligated.SC 2nd TRIAL (DECISION UPON MOTION
FORRECONSIDERATION) Reasserts that conjugal property is liable for the debt they incurred as
husband and wife. Conjugal partnership begins existing at celebration of marriage.
Confined to properties stated in Art 1401 of CC (a) Those acquired by onerous (heavy
obligations) title during themarriage at the expense of the common property whether the
acquisition is made for thecommunity or for only one of them;(b)those obtained by the industry,
salary or labor of the spouses or any of them;(c) the fruits, rents or interest received or accruing
during themarriage, from the common or the private property of each of the spouses. Conjugal
partnership DOES NOT merge the properties they acquired before. Therest of the property that
the spouse acquired before their marriage is separate fromthe conjugal partnership.
Guaranteed by absolute separation of capitals.
ISSUE:
partnership
Whether or not they are jointly liable for the debts incurred through conjugal
HELD: Under New Civil Code 1698 it states that partners are not solidarily liable with respect to
the debtof the partnership; New Civil Code 1137 that solidarity will exist only when it is
expresslydetermined. Meaning, partner cannot be solidarity liable for the debts of the
partnership, becausethere is no legal provision imposing such burden up on one. And it is now
held that properties of the conjugal partnership of the defendants are liable for the debt to the
plaintiff, and in defaultthereof, they are jointly liable for the payment thereof. It is being
understood that the judgmentappealed from is modified in the sense above stated and the
motion of the appellants is denied.
The petitioner, the heirs of the late Manuel Lorenzo, are not entitled to one-half of the two
parcels of land. But the installments paid during coverture are deemed conjugal, there being no
evidence thatthey were paid out of funds belonging exclusively to the late Magdalena
Clemente.Upon these grounds and reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeals under review
is affirmed,without cost.
LAHOM VS SIBULO
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003
FACTS:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In
1972, the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil
Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that,
despite the her pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use
their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities.
Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new
statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption
(Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of
care and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to
rescind the decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When
Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A.
8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it
was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject
to rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee
for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter
after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the
adopters action prescribed.
RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the
law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the
effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption
granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right
of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of
adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom
after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.
thate a rn e s t e ff o r t s t o w a rd s a c o m p ro m i s e h a d b e e n m a d e , c o n s i d e r i
n g that petitioner Augusto Hontiveros and private respondent
GregorioH o n t i v e r o s a r e b r o t h e r s ; t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e I
n t e r m e d i a t e Appellate Court in Land Registration Case No. N-581-25
was null andvoid since it was based upon a ground which was not passed
upon
byt h e t r i a l c o u r t ; t h a t p e t i t i o n e r s ' c l a i m f o r d a m a g e s w a s b a r r
e d b y prescription with respect to claims before 1984; that there were
norentals due since private respondent Hontiveros was a possessor
ing o o d f a i t h a n d f o r v a l u e ; a n d t h a t p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t A y s o n
hadn o t h i n g t o d o w i t h t h e c a s e a s s h e w a s n o t m a rr i e d t o
p r i v a t e re s p o n d e n t G re g o r i o H o n t i v e ro s a n d d i d n o t h a v e a n y p ro p r i
e t a r y interest in the subject property. Private respondents prayed for
thedismissal of the complaint and for an order against petitioners to
paydamages to private respondents by way of counterclaim, as well
asreconveyance of the subject land to private respondents.
ISSUE:T h e R e g i o n a l Tr i a l C o u r t p a l p a b l y e r r e d i n d i s m i s s i n g
t h e complaint on the ground that it does not allege under oath that earnesteff orts
toward a compromise were made prior to the fi ling thereof as required by
Article 151 of the Family Code.
HELD: The trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint on
theground that, although it alleged that earnest eff orts had been
madetoward the settlement of the case but they proved futile, the complaintwas
not verifi ed for which reason the trial court could not believe the veracity of
the allegation. T h e a b s e n c e o f t h e v e r i fi c a t i o n re q u i re d i n A r t . 1 5 1
does
n o t a ff e c t t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e c o u r t o v e r t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r
o f t h e complaint. The verification is merely a formal requirement intended
tos e c u r e a n a s s u r a n c e t h a t m a t t e r s w h i c h a r e a l l e g e d a r e t r u e
a n d correct. If the court doubted the veracity of the allegations
regardingefforts made to settle the case among members of the same family,
itcould simply have ordered petitioners to verify them. As this Court hasalready
ruled, the court may simply order the correction of unverifi ed p l e a d i n g s o r
act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules
ino r d e r t h a t t h e e n d s o f j u s t i c e m a y b e s e r v e d . O t h e r w i s e
, m e r e suspicion or doubt on the part of the trial court as to the truth of
theallegation that earnest eff orts had been made toward a compromise b u t
t h e p a r t i e s ' e ff o r t s p ro v e d u n s u c c e s s f u l i s n o t a g ro u n d f o r
t h e dismissal of an action. Only if it is later shown that such efforts had
notre a l l y b e e n e xe r t e d w o u l d t h e c o u r t b e j u s t i fi e d i n d i s m i s s i n g t h e
action.Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the Family Code does not
apply in this case since the suit is not exclusively among thefamily members. Citing
several cases decided by this Court, petitionersc l a i m t h a t w h e n e v e r a
stranger is a party in the case involving
t h e f a m i l y m e m b e r s , t h e r e q u i s i t e s h o w i n g t h e e a r n e s t e ff
o r t s t o c o m p ro m i s e i s n o l o n g e r m a n d a t o r y. T h e y a rg u e t h a t s i n c e
p r i v a t e respondent Ayson is admittedly a stranger to the Hontiveros
family,the case is not covered by the requirements of Art. 151 of the
REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA
MASAUDING
Facts: Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City. Teresita left for Los
Angeles to work as a nurse where she was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later.
Reynaldo was sent by his employer to Pittsburgh as its liaison officer. Reynaldo and Teresita
began to maintain a common-law relationship of husband and wife where a child was born,
Rosalind Therese. During their vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married
and by the time they returned to the United States, Reginald Vince was born. The relationship
soon deteriorated and Teresita left her family to go back to California. Because his assignment
is not yet completed, Reynaldo had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug, in the
Philippines. Results of child psychology tests on Rosalind when she was five years old show that
the child experiences great anxiety at the thought of having to go back to the U.S. to live with
her mother. She even stated in one of these tests that she saw her mother kissing a bad man
who worked for her father. Both children are now over seven years of age and prefer to stay
with their father and aunt.
Issue: Whether or not custody of the children should be awarded to the mother.
Held: NO, AS BOTH CHILDREN ARE NOW OVER SEVEN YEARS OF AGE, THEIR CHOICE OF
PARENT SHOULD BE GIVEN RESPECT BY THE COURT. The rule that a child below seven years of
age should not be separated from the mother, unless there are compelling reasons is not
applicable in this case anymore. As the children can now ascertain what is right and moral, the
court should give due respect to their decision to stay with their father and aunt in the
Philippines. Furthermore, a mothers constant flirtations from one man to another is considered
by the court as a compelling reason not to award the childrens custody to her, for said
behaviour forms an immoral environment especially to a growing child. From all indications,
Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting two requirements found in Article 213(1) of the Family
Code.
Whether or not conjugal partnership may also be dissolved, upon agreement with judicial
approval pursuant to Article 191?
Held:
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during
the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife as well
as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the
voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the
hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third
persons.
amorous relationship, and acquired the property. It was further alleged that they lived together
in the said apartment building. Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from
the lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the
annulment of his marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not Guillerma Tumlos is a Co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148?
Held:
Mario Fernandez is validly married to Lourdes Fernandez, Guillerma and Mario are not
capacitated to marry each other. Thus, the property relation governing their supposed
cohabitation is that found in Article 148 of
the Family Code. it is clear that actual contribution is required by its
provision, in contrast to Article 147 of the Family Code which states that efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of
common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. Such provision is not
included in article 148 of the Family Code.
was opposed by the administratrix of the estate on the ground that said minors are not entitled
to the support applied for, because section 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides only for
the support of the children of the deceased and not of his grandchildren. The lower court,
however, held otherwise and allowed P15 monthly pension to. The administratrix of the estate
appealed from this ruling.
Issue:
Whether or not the right to the provisional support granted by section 684 of the Code of Civil
Procedure extends to the grandchildren of the deceased?
Held:
The ordinary acceptation, therefore, of the word "hijo" or child does not include "nieto" or
"grandchild." The reference made in the aforesaid section to "allowances as are provided by the
law in force in the Philippine Islands," does not, in the opinion of the court, have the effect of
extending the right to this provisional support to persons other than the children of the
deceased. Appellee does not, and cannot, invoke but section 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure
in support of her petition, whose provisions on this point do not, in the opinion of the court,
extend to the grandchildren of the deceased. She cannot invoke the Civil Code because the
grandfather against whose estate the allowance claimed is to be charged is now dead, and
therefore the obligation of such a grandfather to give support was already extinguished. (Art.
150, Civ. Code.)
It is also appears from the record on appeal that the claims against the estate allowed by the
said committee amount to P2, 457.99. Notwithstanding this insolvent condition of the estate,
the lower court entered the order referred to of March 5, 1925, citing in its support article 1430
of the Civil Code and section 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Issue:
Whether or not support be demanded when the liabilities exceed the assets of the estate of the
deceased spouse?
Held:
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain of May 28, 1896, resolves this question
affirmatively. Sometime after the death of her husband, the widow applied for support from the
general inventoried estate of the property from the date of the death of the husband until the
delivery of her share. The court granted the application and the Audiencia affirmed its decision.
Mr. Manresa, commenting on said article 1430 relative to the said judgment of May 28, 1896,
wisely observes "That the support does not encumber the property of the deceased spouse, but
the general estate, and that by the general estate or the inventoried estate is meant the dowry
or capital of the wife; wherefore, even if the indebtedness exceed the residue of the estate, the
wife can always be allowed support as part payment of the income of her property. In any case,
the support is given prior to the termination of the liquidation of the partnership, and it does not
seem logical to deny the same before knowing exactly the result of the liquidation, just because
of the fear that the liabilities will exceed the estate, or on the ground of estimates more or less
uncertain, and without any sufficient proof of its reality. The judge or the administrator, as the
case may be, must grant the support.
Facts:
Agustin Jocson, who was appointed guardian of the persons and properties of his minor children Carlos,
Rodolfo, Perla, Enrique and Jesus, had a bond filed with Empire Insurance Co. for surety and managed his
childrens properties that included war damage payments, which formed part of their inheritance from their
mother.
In the course of the guardianship, Agustin submitted periodic accounts to the court for expenses for education
and clothing of the children.
After his death, Perla, who had already reached age of majority and thereafter appointed guardian of her still
minor brothers Enrique and Jesus, filed a petition for the reopening of Agustins accounts, claiming that illegal
disbursements were made from the guardianship funds for education and clothing. Upon reaching age of
majority, Enrique and Jesus adopted the petition and moved for declaration of illegality of disbursements
which Empire Insurance Co. and Agustins administratrix appealed fromon the ground that these should have
come instead from the support, which they were entitled to receive from their father.
Issue:
W/N the petitioners-appellants contention their fathers disbursements from their guardianship funds are
illegal are valid
Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that right to support (which includes education and clothing) must be demanded and
established before it becomes payable. It does not arise from the petitioners mere relationship with their
father. The need for support, as already stated, cannot be presumed and especially must this be true in the
present case where it appears that the minors had means of their own. Therefore, the disbursements made by
Agustin, which were even sanctioned by the lower court, are not illegal. Claim for support should also be done
in a separate action, not in guardianship proceedings. Judgment affirmed; without costs since (case) is
a paupers appeal.
condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption does not exist. Necessarily, We
rule that the properties under Exhibit 3 are the exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson.