Executive Dept

Executive Department
G.R. No. L-46440

January 18, 1939
CARMEN PLANAS, petitioner, vs. JOSE GIL, Commissioner of Civil
Service, respondent.
67 Phil. 62 Political Law Separation of Powers Rule of Non-Interference
In November 1938, Carmen Planas, then a municipal board member of Manila,
published a statement criticizing the acts of certain government officials
including Pres. Manuel Quezon in a newspaper. The following morning, she
received a letter from Jorge Vargas (Secretary to the President) by order of the
president directing her to report before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). She
was directed to explain and prove her allegations.
She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC over
the matter. She said that as an elective official, she is accountable for her
political acts to her constituency alone, unless such acts constitute offenses
punishable under our penal laws, and not to executive officials belonging to a
party opposed to that to which petitioner is affiliated. Further, she contends that
her statement in the newspaper was made by her as a private citizen and in the
exercise of her right to discuss freely political questions and cannot properly be
the subject of an administrative investigation; that the issue is only cognizable by
courts of justice in case the contents of said statement infringe any provision of
the Penal Code. The CSC, acting through Commissioner Jose Gil, however took
cognizance of the case hence Planas appealed to the Supreme Court. The
Solicitor General replied for the CSC arguing that under the separation of powers
marked by the Constitution, the court has no jurisdiction to review the orders of
the Chief Executive which are of purely administrative in character.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to review orders issued by the
President.
HELD: The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his
jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain
executive action in such cases. The rule is non-interference. But from this legal
premise, it does not necessarily follow that the SC is precluded from making an
inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his acts when these are properly
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical separation of
governmental powers viewed in the light of political philosophy is a relative
theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence
than in independence and separation of powers.
In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding. He is neither
compelled nor restrained to act in a particular way. The CSC is the party
respondent and the theory is advanced by the Sol-Gen that because an
investigation undertaken by him is directed by authority of the President of the
Philippines, the SC has no jurisdiction over the present proceedings instituted by
Planas. The argument is farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer of the
government is acting under orders from the Chief Executive may be an important
averment, but is neither decisive nor conclusive upon this court. Like the dignity
of his high office, the relative immunity of the Chief Executive from judicial
interference is not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the subordinate
official and employees of the executive Department to the extent that at the mere
invocation of the authority that it purports the jurisdiction of this court to inquire
into the validity or legality of an executive order is necessarily abated or
suspended.
Nevertheless, SC ruled that the CSC can take cognizance of the case. Planas was
not denied the right to voice out her opinion but since she made allegations
against the administration it is but right for her to prove those allegations. The
CSC has the right to elicit the truth.
Myers v. United States
Brief Fact Summary. Appointee to the postmaster of the first class in Oregon was
forced to resign.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Constitution grants to the President the executive
power of the government- i.e., the general administrative control of those
executing the laws, including the power of appointment and removal of
executive officers-a conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed; that article 2 excludes the exercise of legislative
power by Congress to provide for appointments and removals, except only as
granted therein to Congress in the matter of inferior offices; that Congress is only
given power to provide for appointments and removals of inferior officers after it
has vested, and on condition that it does vest, their appointment in other
authority than the President with the Senates consent; that the provisions of the
second section of article 2, which blend action by the legislative branch, or by
part of it, in the work of the executive, are limitations to be strictly construed,
and not to be extended by implication; that the Presidents power of removal is
further established as an incident to his specifically enumerated function of
appointment by and with the advice of the Senate, but that such incident does not
by implication extend to removals the Senates power of checking
appointments.
Facts. Under an 1876 rule, the President had to get the Senates permission to
remove the postmaster of Portland, Oregon. That individual had been appointed
with the Senates advice and consent. The President asked for the individuals
resignation without consulting the Senate first, and the Senate refused the
President permission to do so.
Issue. [W]hether under the Constitution the President has the exclusive power
of removing executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Held. Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States (the Supreme Court)
produced a long-winded opinion, examining the legislative and adjudicative
history of executive appointments, including Marbury v. Madison. It concluded
that Tenure of Office Act of 1867, in so far as it attempted to prevent the
President from removing executive officers who had been appointed by him by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid, and that subsequent
legislation of the same effect was equally so. Dissent. Justice McReynolds
found that it is impossible for me to accept the view that the President may
dismiss, as caprice may suggest, any inferior officer whom he has appointed with
consent of the Senate, notwithstanding a positive inhibition by Congress after his
own lengthy review of precedent. Justice Brandeis felt that the central issue was
May the President, having acted under the statute in so far as it creates the
office and authorizes the appointment, ignore, while the Senate is in session, the
provision which prescribes the condition under which a removal may take
place? Justice Holmes emphasized the fact that the office was created by
Congress.
FACTS
MWSS entered into a contract for water service connections with
KC Waterworks Service Construction (KC).On 20 May 1988, KC was given a
Job Order by the South Sector Office of MWSS to conduct and effect
excavationsat the corner of M. Paterno and Santolan Road, San Juan, Metro
Manila, a national road, for the laying of water pipesand tapping of water to the
respective houses of water concessionaires.Only of the job was finished in
view of the fact that the workers were still required to re-excavate that
particular portion for the tapping of pipes for the water connections to the
concessionaires.Between 10 oclock and 11 oclock in the evening of 31 May
1988, Priscilla Chan was driving her Toyota Crown car with Plate No. PDK 991
at a speed of thirty (30) kilometers per hour on the right side of Santolan Road
towards thedirection of Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro Manila. She was with
prosecutor Laura Biglang-awa. The road wasflooded as it was then raining
hard. Suddenly, the left front wheel of the car fell on a manhole where the
workers of KC had earlier made excavations. As a result, the humerus on the
right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa wasfractured.Consequent to the foregoing
incident, Biglang-awa filed before the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro
Manila acomplaint for damages against MWSS, the Municipality of San Juan
and a number of San Juan municipal officials.After due proceedings, the trial
court rendered judgment in favor of Biglang-awa adjudging MWSS and
theMunicipality of San Juan jointly and severally liable to her. CA affirmed RTC
with modification.
Discussion. To hold [an opposite rule] would make it impossible for the
President, in case of political or other difference with the Senate or Congress, to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
[G.R. No. 125183. September 29, 1997]
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, CORAZON DE JESUS HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., ADRIANO A. DELAMIDA, SR. CELSO T.
TORRES, TARCILA V. ZATA, QUIRICO T. TORRES, CATALINA
BONGAT, MILAGROS A. HERBOLARIO, ROSALINDA A. PIMENTAL,
PURIFICACION MORELLA, FRANCISCO RENION, SR., MARCELINA
CORPUZ, BENEDICTO FALCON, MAXIMO FALCON, MARIO
BOLANOS, VICENTE T. SURIAO, ROSARIO GREGORIA G. DORADO,
JEREMIAS Z. PATRON, ALEX RODRIGUEZ, MARIA LUISA
ALPAPARA, HERMINIA C. RODRIGUEZ, VICTORIANO ESPANOL,
MARIO L. AGUILAR, FREDDIE AMADOR, SILVERIO PURISIMA, JR.,
PROCOPIO B. PENARANDA, ELADIO MAGLUYAN, HELENITA
GUEI, CELESTINO MONTANO, ROMEO GOMEZ, OFELIA LOGO,
JIMMY MACION, DAISY A. MANGA, MAURO MANGA, ARTHUR
HERBOLARIO, MANOLITO HERBOLARIO, ROSARIO ANCHETA,
TERESITA A. VICTORIA, ROSALINA SAMPAGA, MARIQUITA
RUADO, FELIPE ANCHETA, MAGDALENA CABREZA, MARIA
BIANDILLA, NILDA ARENSOL, LORENZO S. TOLEDO, and
NAPOLEON D. VILORIA, SR., respondents.
ISSUE: WON the Municipality of San Juan can be held liable

HELD:YES Jurisprudence[7] teaches that for liability to arise under Article
2189[8] of the Civil Code, ownership of the roads,streets, bridges, public
buildings and other public works, is not a controlling factor, it being sufficient
that a province,city or municipality has control or supervision thereof.At any
rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability
therein established to attach thatthe defective roads or streets belong to the
province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. Whatsaid
article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or
supervision" over said street or roadWe must emphasize that under paragraph
[1][bb] of Section 149, of the Local Government Code, the phrasesregulate the
drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer,
and other pipes, and adoptmeasures to ensure public safety against
open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to life andproperty,
are not modified by the term municipal road. And neither can it be fairly
inferred from the same provisionof Section 149 that petitioners power of
regulation vis--vis the activities therein mentioned applies only in caseswhere
such activities are to be performed in municipal roads. To our mind, the
municipalitys liability for injuriescaused by its failure to regulate the drilling
and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes,
attaches regardless of whether the drilling or excavation is made on a national
or municipal road, for as long asthe same is within its territorial
jurisdiction.Neither is the [petitioner] relieved of liability based on its purported
lack of knowledge of the excavation and thecondition of the road during the
period from May 20, 1988 up to May 30, 1988 when the accident occurred. It
mustbe borne in mind that the obligation of the [petitioner] to maintain the safe
condition of the road within its territory is acontinuing one which is not
suspended while a street is being repaired
Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the
issue that the issuance of A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As
taxpayer and member of the Government Service InsuranceSystem (GSIS),
petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and
the misuse of GSISfunds to implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for
adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the
implementing rules of A.O.No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople
assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on itsface. His action is not
premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects.
Moreover, therespondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O.
No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent
Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for
themanufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive
Secretary Torres has publicly announcedthat representatives from the GSIS and
the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identificationsystem.All
signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No.
308 and we need not wait forthe formality of the rules to pass judgment on its
constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that wetighten the rule on
standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an
importantconstitutional principle and a fundamental right.
BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,

HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO,ROBERT BARBERS,
CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA,
TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEADOF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER
and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
[G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998]
Facts: The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F.
Ople to prevent the shrinking of the rightto privacy, which the revered Mr.
Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the
rightmost valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled"Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds,
viz :(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.We grant the
petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger
barriers against furthererosion.A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of
general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24,
1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torresand the heads of the government agencies, who as
members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, arecharged with the
implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary
restraining orderenjoining its implementation.
TITLE: MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS, G.R. No. 88211 September

15, 1989CAPTION: FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS,
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE
MANOTOC,TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO
E. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTIONASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its
President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,vs.HONORABLE RAUL
MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ,
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS,RENATO DE
VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive
Secretary, Secretary of Justice, ImmigrationCommissioner, Secretary of
National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.
FACTS:In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from precidency
via the non-violent people power revolution and forced into exice.Corazon
Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary
government.Her ascension to and consolidation of power have not been
unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by politicalleaders of
Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops with the
support of Marcos loyalists andthe unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouse to
return from Hawaii awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to
stirtrouble even from afar and to the fanatism and blind loyalty of their followers
in the country.Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the
Issue: WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308
Ruling: YES As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the
threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of thepetitioner and the
justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that
petitioner has no legalinterest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O.
No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our
sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. Asa
Philippines to die.President Aquino, considering the dire consequence to the
nation of his return, has stood firmly on the decision to bar thereturn of Marcos
and his family.
a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to
the Philippines, theinstant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Webb v De Leon (Criminal Procedure) GR No. 121234 August 23, 1995
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the

Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcosesfrom retyrning to
the Philippines.
FACTS: On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the
DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian,
Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of
Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister
Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes,
Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.
RULING:The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of theliberty of abode and the
right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as agenerally accepted principle of international law and, under our
Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of theConstitution.]
However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different
protection under theInternational Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e.,
against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]Faced with the problem
of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines, the President is,under the Constitution, constrained to consider these
basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn todefend
and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the
Constitution to protect the people, promotetheir welfare and advance the national
interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an
allocation ofpower is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered
their sovereign powers to the State for the common good.Hence, lest the officers
of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the
servants of the peoplebecome rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that
"[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authorityemanates from
them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and
pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized
communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies
to grab power, urban terrorism,the murder with impunity of military men, police
officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented historyof
the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as
earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the
Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed
against theState and instigate more chaos.The President has determined that the
destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the
gainsachieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse.
Given what is within our individual and commonknowledge of the state of the
economy, we cannot argue with that determination.WHEREFORE, and it being
our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with
grave abuse ofdiscretion in determining that the return of former President
Marcos and his family at the present time and under presentcircumstances poses
Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Petitioners: fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail
the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to her
inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sown statements.
They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine
witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.
charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and respondent Judge Amelita
Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required
preliminary examination.
Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and
violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the
prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there is
probable cause to charge accused with crime of rape and homicide?
(2) Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their discretion
when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of
arrest against the accused?
(3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional right to due process during
their preliminary investigation?
(4) Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when it failed
to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused?
HELD: (1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty
of guilt.
Truman was afraid that a strike would cause the United States to run out of steel.
Congress had allowed the strike with the Taft Hartley Act passed in 1947 over
President Trumans veto. The Act gave the president the power to get an
injunction against such strikes but Congress had rejected an amendment to
permit government seizures to avoid serious shutdowns.
Issue. Can President Truman acting under the aggregate of his powers, exercise a
law making power independent of Congress in order to protect serious national
interests?
(2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a
crime has been committed and that the person arrested committed it.
Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that upon filing of an information, the RTC
may issue a warrant for the accused.
Held. Justice Black opinion. No.

Although Article II Section: 1 grants executive power to the President to execute
the laws. His general executive power is inapplicable since there was no relevant
law here to execute. Under Section 2, the Commander in Chief power does not
warrant the seizure here either, since it was lawmaking and too far removed from
the theater of war. That power did not include the President being able to take
possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping
production. That is the job for the Nations lawmakers and not for its military
authorities. The Founders of the Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the
Congress alone in good and bad times.
Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that respondent judges should
have conducted searching examination of witnesses before issuing warrants of
arrest against them.
(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all
the opportunities to be heard.
The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to adduce more evidence in their
behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.
Dissent. Chief Justice Vinson, Justices Reed and Minton dissenting.
(4) NO. Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption
that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of
courts and beyond executive and legislative interference.
There was legislation authorizing the supplying of the forces engaged in the
Korean War. The President had a duty to execute the foregoing legislative
programs and successful execution depended upon continued production of steel
and stabilized prices for steel.
In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department whose

principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed.
A necessary component of this right is to prosecute their violators.
Work stoppage would have resulted in a serious curtailment of production of

essential weapons and munitions of all kinds. The President was acting to save
the legislative programs and in that sense he was there to take care that the laws
were faithfully executed. He had to execute a defense program which Congress
had enacted and strike would have had a disastrous effect on those programs.
The President acted to preserve those programs by seizing the steel mills. It was
temporary and subject to congressional direction. Presidents in the past have
acted in the same way.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case)
Brief Fact Summary. During the Korean War, President Truman in order to
avoid a strike that would impede the war effort, issued an executive order seizing
the mills and operating them under federal direction.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The President has limited inherent authority. He may
have a legislative power in theaters of war. The President can act without
Congress when it is an emergency and Congress has not negated such action that
the President wishes to undertake.
Concurrence. All of the Justices who joined Justice Blacks opinion for the Court
also wrote individual concurring opinions.
Justice Frankfurter stated that questions concerning the extent of the Presidential
power in the absence of legislation were not before the Court. The Labor
Facts. During the Korean War, President Truman seized the steel mills so that a
strike would not impede the Korean War effort. The United Steel Workers were
upset that they were not getting paid enough and wanted a raise. President
Management Relations Act of 1947 was an explicit Congressional negation of
the authority asserted by the seizure
appointments and a list of the recipientsof luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau
of Customs and turned over to Malacaang.
Justice Burton stated that the controlling fact was that Congress had prescribed
specific procedures and they did include seizure for this emergency.
Issue:Whether or not petitioner possesses the requisites of filing a suit as a

citizen and as taxpayer.
Justice Douglas emphasized the Fifth Amendments requirement for

compensation for takings of property.
Ratio Decidendi:The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have standing to
bring suit as citizen. Petitioner didnot in fact show what particularized interest
they have to bring the suit. As civic leaders, they stillfall short of the
requirements to maintain action. Their interest in assailing the EO does
notpresent to be of a direct and personal character. Furthermore, they do not
sustain or are inimmediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
its
enforcement.As taxpayers, petitioners cannot attack the EO. There is no appropri
ation granted fromCongress but only an authorization by the president. There
being exercise by Congress of itstaxing and spending power, petitioner cannot be
allowed to question the PCCRs creation. Thepetitioner has failed to show that
he is a real party in interest.With regards to the petitioners request of disclosure
to public information, the Court upheld thatcitizens may invoke before the courts
the right to information. When a mandamus proceedinginvolves the assertion of
a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by themere fact
that the petitioner is a citizen.The Supreme Court dismissed the
petition with the exception that respondent ExecutiveSecretary is ordered to
furnish petitioner with the information requested.
Justice Jackson said that the President had inherent legislative powers to act in
preserving the nation, but only when there was an absence of any provision
passed by Congress purporting to deal with the situation.
Justice Clark stated that the President must follow the procedures laid down by
Congress in the Act. If Congress had not acted, then in the absence of
Congressional action, the Presidents independent power to act depends on the
gravity of the situation confronting the nation.
Discussion. The majority described this as inherent power, while the dissent
argued this was implied power.
If there had been an emergency and Congress had declined or neglected to act,
then the President would have had the narrow sliver of authority to seize the steel
mills. This is inherent power.
The dissent argued that the President exercised his implied powers to take care
that the laws were faithfully executed. Since the list in the United States
Constitution of the Presidents powers is not exclusive, then as long as the
Presidents act seems reasonably related to carrying out the laws made by
Congress, the Court will not strike the act merely because it does not fall within
any narrow enumerated presidential power.
G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993

ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. PALO,
DOMINGO A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ and MANUEL P. REYES,
petitioner, vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, and
RICHARD J. GORDON, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic,
challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional
manager as administrator of the SBMAprovided that for the 1st year of its
operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as
the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.
Gonzales v Narvasa G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000

Facts:On December 9, 1999, a petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed a
ssailing theconstitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Co
nstitutional Reform(PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants,
advisers and assistants.In his capacity as citizen and as taxpayer, he seeks to
enjoin the Commission on Audit frompassing in audit expenditures for the PCCR
and the presidential consultants, advisers
andassistants. Petitioner also prays that the Executive Secretary be compelled thr
ough amandamus to furnish the petitioner with information requesting the names
of executive officialsholding multiple positions in government, copies of their
ISSUES
(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against
appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.
(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of
Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted circumstance.
(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to
receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no elective
official may be appointed to another post.
officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of
Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe
qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of
an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during
his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the
constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for
appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official
remains ineligible for appointment to another public office.
(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the

President.
(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and
other emoluments which he may have received pursuant to his appointment.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to

the position of Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto
cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts
as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de
facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled to such benefits.
HELD
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official
shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an
elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as
Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits.
It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his
appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his
constitutents.
FELIMON LUEGO vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G. R. No. L69137, August 6, 1986
FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City
Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983. The
appointment was described as "permanent" but the Civil Service Commission
approved it as "temporary." On 22 March 1984, the Civil Service Commission
found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested
position and accordingly directed herein private respondent in place of
petitioner's position. The private respondent was so appointed on 28 June 1984,
by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now invoking his
earlier permanent appointment as well as to question the Civil Service
Commission's order and the private respondent's title.
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically
attached to the Office of the Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase
shall be appointed unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts
appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to

disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better
qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his
replacement by the latter.
(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any
case, the Vice-President for example, an elective official who may be appointed
to a cabinet post, may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position
if specifically authorized by law.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service
Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to
approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the
Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the Civil Service
Commission's resolution is set aside.
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint
the Chairman of SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of
Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint.
Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Hence,
when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it
cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate.
Such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to
choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment.
While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the
RULING: The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner,
Civil Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her by President
Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993. Expired on February 02, 1999.However, she
served as de facto Officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled
to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service
rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit
such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminus
staff. ACCORDINGLY, The Court REVERSED the decisions of the
Commission on Audit insofar as they disallow the salaries and emoluments of
Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her coterminous staff during her tenure
as de facto officer from February 02, 1999, until February 02, 2000.
HELMA P. GAMINDE, Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT and/or

Hon. CELSO D. GANGAN, Hon. RAULC. FLORES and EMMANUEL M.
DALMAN, Respondent.
FACTS: On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner
Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She
assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. OnSeptember 07,
1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress of the Philippines confirmed
theappointment. However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification
from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In
reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April
07, 1998. Opined that petitioners term of office would expire on February 02,
2000, not on February 02, 1999.Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner
remained in Leon, wrote office after February 02, 1999. On February 04,1999,
Chairman Corazon Alma G. de the Commission on Audit requesting opinion on
whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may
be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on
February 02, 1999.
G.R. No. 79974

December 17, 1987
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners,
vs.
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity
as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents,
On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an

opinion that the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02,
1999 as stated inher appointment conformably with the constitutional
intent.Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U.
Felipe issued notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing in audit
the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminus staff,
effective February 02, 1999. On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed the
disallowance to the Commission on Audit Enbanc.
156 SCRA 549 Political Law Appointment of Head of Bureaus Officers

Requiring Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison
was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president
Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of
the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the
appointment of Mison because it appears that Misons appointment was not
submitted to the Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento
insists that uner the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation
of the COA.
Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then
Secretary of the Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of
Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Misons appointment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of heads of bureaus needed
confirmation by the Commission on Appointment.
HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed heads of bureaus as
one of those officers needing confirmation by the Commission on
Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers
whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;
On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision dismissing

petitioners appeal.
The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding
that the issue of petitioners term of office may be properly addressed by mere
reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date on February
02,1999, and that the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of
her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President.
In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the
Commission on Audit denied the motion.
ISSUE: The basic issue raised is whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P.
Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was
appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the
appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her.
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.
The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president
which require confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do
not require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as the head of the
Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group hence he does not need to
be confirmed by the COA.
[G.R. No. 107369. August 11, 1999]
JESULITO A. MANALO, Petitioner, vs. PEDRO G. SISTOZA, REGINO
ARO III, NICASIO MA. CUSTODIO, GUILLERMO DOMONDON,
RAYMUNDO L. LOGAN, WILFREDO R. REOTUTAR, FELINO C.
PACHECO, JR., RUBEN J. CRUZ, GERONIMO B. VALDERRAMA,
MERARDO G. ABAYA, EVERLINO B. NARTATEZ, ENRIQUE T.
BULAN, PEDRO J. NAVARRO, DOMINADOR M. MANGUBAT,
RODOLFO M. GARCIA and HONORABLE SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ
II In His Capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, Respondents.
compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and
for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.
In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of
Manila revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding
inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly,
it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional
because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over
local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the
Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of
the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. The court
cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being the
power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for the latter, while the second is the power of a superior officer to see
to it that lower officers perform their functions is accordance with law.
ISSUES:
The issues in this case are
(1) whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is
unconstitutional; and
Petitioner, Jesulito Sistoza question the constitutionality and legality of the

appointments issued by former Pres. Corazon Aquino to the respondent senior
officers of the PNP who were promoted to the rank of Chief Superintendent and
Director without their appointments submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation. The said police officers tool their Oath of
Offices and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of
Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador Enriquez III,
authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments. The petitioner
brought before this petition for prohibition, as a tax payer suit to the SC to assail
the legality of subject appointment and disbursement thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of the senior officers of the PNP is valid
even without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
HELD: The SC held that the appointments are valid. The court has the inherent
authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the
limit alienated by the fundamental law. When it does the courts will not hesitate
to strike down such unconstitutionality.
Drilon vs Lim GR No. 112497, August 4, 1994
(2) whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise control, rather than
supervision, over the local government
HELD:
The judgment of the lower court is reversed in so far as its declaration that
Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional but affirmed the
said lower courts finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of
the Manila Revenue Code have been observed.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on
either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax
ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the
judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did
set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own
version of what the Code should be.
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of Justice
had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance
No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not
followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover
such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules
are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary
Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act
not of control but of mere supervision.
The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the
President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that under our
constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by
authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or
even reverse any order that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
including the Director of Lands, may issue.
The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, shall
remain valid until reversed, disapproved, or reprobated by the President. In this
case, no reprobation was made hence the decision granting the land to Pao
cannot be reversed.
G.R. No. 96409 February 14, 1992
CITIZEN J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO, petitioner, vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and
THE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
206 SCRA 290 Political Law Control Power Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency
In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
UNDER A REORGANIZED
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES was passed. Antonio Carpio, as a member of the bar
and a defender of the Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said law
as he averred that it only interferes with the control power of the president.
He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) by limiting its power to administrative control over the PNP
thus, control remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the
NPC and the PNP were placed; that the system of letting local executives choose
local police heads also undermine the power of the president.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP
and NPC by virtue of RA 6975.
HELD: No. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of
government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the
lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of
the President, is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. As the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in
person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
Regarding the issue on the non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the
enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court carefully examined every
exhibit and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have
indeed been observed. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as
approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its
publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will
satisfy due process.
G.R. No. L-27811
November 17, 1967
LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs.
JOSE PAO, HON. JUAN PAJO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
and HON. JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, defendants-appellees
21 SCRA 895 Political Law Delegation of Control Power to the Executive
Secretary
Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in
Davao. The said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an
agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to Lacson-Magallanes Co.,
Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner.
Jose Pao was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The
Director of Lands denied Paos request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise
denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President.
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Pao. LMC averred that the
earlier decision of the Secretary of Agriculture is already conclusive hence
beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary is an
undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain any
provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the
Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President
to act personally upon the matter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive
Secretary.
HELD: Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his
constitutional powers in person. However, the president may delegate certain
powers to the Executive Secretary at his discretion. The president may delegate
powers which are not required by the Constitution for him to perform personally.
The reason for this allowance is the fact that the resident is not expected to
perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions.
10
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by
and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts
of the Chief Executive.
Thus, and in short, the Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him
over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the
bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive
department.
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed
under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would
bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local
executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety
agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large
part subsidized by the national government.
G.R. No. 171396
May 3, 2006
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to
his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided
by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups.
Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and
seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was
however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions
against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current
imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national
emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred
that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly
declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such
declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred
that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural
calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an
overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The
Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the
lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred
that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care power and
take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly
unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of
the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still
affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take
cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part
and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC
ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing
PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment
and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the
issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat
of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders.
There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the
military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any
contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in
issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAADA III, RONALD

LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER
R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES,
CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners, vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL
ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE, Respondents.
489 SCRA 160 Political Law The Executive Branch Presidential
Proclamation 1017 Take Care Clause Take Over Power Calling Out
Power
Bill of Rights - Freedom of Speech Overbreadth
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the
discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017
(PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law
was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring
down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the
same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public
organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit,
11
incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to
prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for
testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at
bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017
shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related
conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing
the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered
harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial
overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal
laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the
incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not
free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The
SC considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely
vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of
whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or
whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The
SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the
most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it
becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been
met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al
averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it
arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress.
They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The
SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former
President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that
the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to

promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out
of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or
institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On
the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not
limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a
distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her
exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such
exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be
based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not
tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by
the president.
G.R. No. L-37364 May 9, 1975
BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., petitioner, vs.
MILITARY COMMISSION 2, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, and SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE
CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT, and SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE,
Martial Law Open Court Theory Military Courts
In September 1972, after the declaration of Martial Law, Ninoy was arrested and
was placed under custody. He was brought Fort Bonifacio. He filed for the
issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus which was denied by the SC. Ninoy then
questioned the validity of such denial and the declaration of martial law; at the
same time he questioned the authority of the military court [No. 2] created
[pursuant to GO 2-A] to try him and his other companions. He was being
charged for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives. He was
12
also being charged for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and for murder. All
were filed before the military court. Ninoy argued that the military court has no
jurisdiction or civilian courts are still operational.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ninoy can be validly charged before the military court.
HELD: The SC upheld the power of the president to create military tribunals or
military courts which are authorized to try not only military personnel but also
civilians even at that time civil courts were open and functioning. The SC
basically rejected the open court theory observed in the USA.
nationwide on September 24, 1862,[1] Congress ratified this action almost six
months later, on March 3, 1863, with the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act.
Milligan was detained in 1864, well after Congress formally suspended the writ.
That notwithstanding, military jurisdiction had been limited.
G.R. No. L-54558 May 22, 1987
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER, OTHONIEL V. JIMENEZ, ESTER MISAJIMENEZ,
CARLOS
LAZARO,
REYNALDO
MACLANG,
MAGDALENA DE LOS SANTOS-MACLANG, TEODORICO N.
DIESMOS, RENE J. MARCIANO, DANILO R. DE OCAMPO,
VICTORIANO C. AMADO and MAC ACERON, petitioners,vs.
MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34, THE TRIAL COUNSEL OF
MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34, and THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, respondents.
Habeas Corpus
In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they
were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians.
They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary
devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy
to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente
Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and
Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs.
Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver;
and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion.
On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition
for prohibition and habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because
by the time the case reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already
released from military confinement. When the release of the persons in whose
behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the
Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as
the herein petitioners have been released from their confinement in military
detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
should be dismissed for having become moot and academic. But the military
court created to try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still
continues to subsist.
ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the
jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning.
HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the
military courts or tribunals during the period of martial law in all cases involving
civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise
jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), was a United States Supreme

Court case that ruled that the application of military tribunals to citizens when
civilian courts are still operating is unconstitutional. It was also controversial
because it was one of the first cases after the end of the American Civil War.
Background of the case[edit]
Lambdin P. Milligan and four others were accused of planning to
steal Union weapons and invade Union prisoner-of-war camps. Once the first
prisoner of war camp was liberated, they planned to use the liberated soldiers to
help fight against the Government of Indianaand free other camps of Confederate
soldiers. They also planned to take over the state governments of Indiana, Ohio,
and Michigan. When the plan leaked, they were charged, found guilty, and
sentenced to be hanged by a military court in 1864. However, their execution
was not set until May 1865, so they were able to argue the case after the Civil
War ended.
The Court's decision[edit]
The Supreme Court decided that the suspension of habeas corpus was lawful, but
military tribunals did not apply to citizens in states that had upheld the authority
of the Constitution and where civilian courts were still operating.
It observed further that during the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,
citizens may be only held without charges, not tried, and certainly not executed
by military tribunals; the writ of habeas corpus is not the right itself but merely
the ability to issue orders demanding the right's enforcement.
It is important to note the political environment of the decision. Post-Civil War,
under a Republican Congress, the Court was reluctant to hand down any decision
that questioned the legitimacy of military courts, especially in the occupied
South. The President's ability to suspend habeas corpus independently of
Congress, a central issue, was not addressed, probably because it was moot with
respect to the case at hand. Though President Lincoln suspended the writ
13
allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning,
and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and
void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.
IBP VS ZAMORA
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible
use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the
Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of
the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the
Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing,
it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian
authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an
insidious incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation
of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]
FACTS: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of
the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief
of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment
and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of
the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law
enforcement.
G.R. No. L-35546 September 17, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., RAMON MITRA, JR., FRANCISCO
RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON RAMA, petitioners, vs.
HON JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE;
GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY,
Martial Law Habeas Corpus Power of the President to Order Arrests
Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos
issued and ordered the arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno
Aquino Jr even without any charge against them. Hence, Aquino and some
others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enriles answer
contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid
pursuant to Marcos declaration of Martial Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aquinos detention is legal in accordance to the
declaration of Martial Law.
HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or
rebellion, or imminent danger against the state, when public safety requires it,
the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of
rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear
and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise
pursuant to the Presidents order.
[G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001.]
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the
armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise
its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with,
namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O.

MANCAO,petitioners vs. SECRETARYHERNANDO PEREZ,
P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT.
REYNALDOBERROYA respondents
14
petitioners therein without the required judicial warrant forall acts committed in
relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.
FACTS:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an armed mob
assaulting andattempting to break into Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38
declaring that there was a state of rebellion in NCR. She also issued General
Order No. 1 directing the AFP and the PNP to suppress therebellion. Warrantless
arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion"
followed. Aggrieved, 4 related petitions were filed before the Court. The case at
bar is for prohibition,injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an urgent
application for the issuance of temporaryrestraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction). Petitioners assail the declaration of a state of rebellion
by PGMA and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as
having no basisboth in fact and in law.On May 6, 2001, PGMA ordered the
lifting of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" in MetroManila. Accordingly,
the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. As to
petitioners'claim that the proclamation of a "state of rebellion" is being used by
the authorities to justifywarrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it
has issued a particular order to arrest specificpersons in connection with the
"rebellion."
G.R. No. 2808

September 30, 1905
FELIX BARCELON, petitioner, vs.
DAVID J. BAKER, JR., AND JOHN DOE THOMPSON, respondents.
Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ Habeas Corpus as a Political Question
being a Prerogative by the President
In the early 1900s in Batangas, Barcelon was detained by orders of Baker.
Barcelons lawyers petitioned before the court for a writ of habeas corpus
demanding Barcelon and Thompson, one of his men, to explain why Barcelon
was detained. They alleged that there is no legal authority behind Barcelons
arrest and it was w/o due process. The Atty-Gen averred that Baker et al acted
only pursuant to the Gov-Gens resolution in 1905 which suspended the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in Cavite and Batangas (Sec 5 of The Philippine
Bill). Barcelon argued that there is no rebellion or invasion or insurrection during
his arrest hence he should be set free.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barcelon was arrested w/ due process.
HELD: The SC held that the issue is a political question. Only the president can
determine the existence of the grounds specified in the Constitution for the
suspension o the privilege o the writ of habeas corpus. This power is
discretionary and therefore not justiciable. The president has superior
competence to assess the peace and order condition of the country. Hence, the
determination held by the president (GG) of the Philippines of the existence of
any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution for the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should be conclusive upon the courts. The
justification was that the president (GG), with all the intelligence sources
available to him as commander-in-chief, was in a better position than the SC to
ascertain the real state of peace and order in the country.
G.R. No. L-4221
August 30, 1952
MARCELO D. MONTENEGRO, petitioner-appellant, vs.
GEN. MARIANO CASTAEDA, and COLONEL EULOGIO
BALAO, respondents-appellees.
Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ Habeas Corpus as a Political Question
being a Prerogative by the President
In October 1950, Montenegros son was arrested by military agents. Three days
after the arrest, PP 210 was proclaimed suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. Montenegro then filed before the court to have his son be set free
for his arrest was w/o cause and that the said PP should not be applied
retroactively to his son for it would then constitute a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against bill of attainders. Montenegro then filed a
petition for the writ of habeas corpus demanding the detainers to bring his sons
body and explain his detention. Castaeda et al argued that the court has no
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid warrantless arrest against the petitioners.
HELD: No. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only
resort to warrantlessarrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The
warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on thedeclaration of a
"state of rebellion." Petitioners' contention that they are under imminent danger
of being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary
remediesof mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to
warrantless arrest is not withoutadequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.
The prayer for prohibition and mandamus is improperat this time. As regards
petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be
declarednull and void ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly
assailing the validity of thesubject hold departure orders in their petition. They
are not even expressing intention to leave thecountry in the near future. The
prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper proceedingsinitiated for that
purpose. Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of
their application for theissuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the
writ is not called for since its purpose is torelieve petitioners from unlawful
restraint, a matter which remains speculative up to this very day. Petition is
DISMISSED. However, respondents, consistent and congruent with their
undertakingearlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all
persons acting for and in theirbehalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting
15
judicial authority over the matter invoking the PP and the previous ruling
in Barcelon vs Baker.
ISSUE: Whether or not Montenegros petition should be granted.
HELD: As ruled by the SC in the Barcelon case, Montenegros petition is
likewise denied. The constitutional authority of the President to suspend in case
of imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion under Article 7 may not
correctly be placed in doubt.
G.R. No. L-33964, G.R. No. L-33965, G.R. No. L-33973 December 11, 1971
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
TEODOSIO LANSANG, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI,
ALCALA, petitioners, vs.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine
Constabulary, respondent.
ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, petitioner,
PADILLA, petitioner, vs.

MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER
GENERAL FIDEL V. RAMOS, and LT. COL. MIGUEL
CORONEL, respondents.
Reversal of the Lansang Doctrine & Reinstatement of the Montenegro Doctrine
In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference
in a house in Bayombong, NV, were arrested by members of the PC. The raid of
the house was authorized by a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina,
mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of arrest was
issued but rather it was just a warrant of arrest hence the arrest of her son and the
others was w/o just cause. Sabino and companions together with 4 others were
later transferred to a facility only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the court for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is valid.
HELD: In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was
reversed and the ruling in theBarcelon Case & the Montenegro Case was again
reinstated. The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the
WoHC was once again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again
reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved
solely by the president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right
to bail, if the governments campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced
and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the
continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the
course thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their
comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to
bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.
Abandonment of the Doctrine Held in the Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case
Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971
causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail
the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC
headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned
the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not
meet the constitutional requisites.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.
HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently
abandoned in this case where the SC declared that it had the power to inquire
into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be
established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this
matter, including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified
information was divulged by the government to the members of the SC and 3
selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there
was actually a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to
overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously
decided to uphold the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
G.R. No. L-61388 July 19, 1985
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR DR. AURORA PARONG,
NORBERTO PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA, FRANCIS DIVINA
GRACIA, IMELDA DE LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA, ZENAIDA
MALLARI, MARIANO SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG, LETTY
BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ, JR.,
JUANITO GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ, JOSEFINA GARCIA
NOTE: This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution
which expressly constitutionalized the Lansang Doctrine. Note as well that under
Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is stated that the right to bail shall not be
impaired even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
16

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G.R. No. L-46440

ISSUE: WON the Municipality of San Juan can be held liable

BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,

TITLE: MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS, G.R. No. 88211 September

ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the

Held. Justice Black opinion. No.

Dissent. Chief Justice Vinson, Justices Reed and Minton dissenting.

In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department whose

Work stoppage would have resulted in a serious curtailment of production of

Issue:Whether or not petitioner possesses the requisites of filing a suit as a

Justice Douglas emphasized the Fifth Amendments requirement for

G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993

Gonzales v Narvasa G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000

(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the

(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to

HELMA P. GAMINDE, Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT and/or

G.R. No. 79974

On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an

156 SCRA 549 Political Law Appointment of Head of Bureaus Officers

On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision dismissing

Petitioner, Jesulito Sistoza question the constitutionality and legality of the

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAADA III, RONALD

the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to

Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), was a United States Supreme

G.R. No. L-35546 September 17, 1974

PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O.

G.R. No. 2808

PADILLA, petitioner, vs.

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