DIANA D.

DE GUZMAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LOURDES I. DE DIOS, respondent.
FACTS:
In 1995, Diana De Guzman, complainant hired and engaged the services of Atty. Lourdes de Dios in order to
form a corporation of hotel and restaurant in Olongapo City, on which the former pays monthly P5,000 as
retainers fee to the latter.
With the assistance of the Atty. De Dios, Suzuki Beach Hotel, Inc (SBHI) was established and was registered with
SEC.
On December 1997, the corporation has required Diana De Guzman, to pay her subscribed shares of stocks
amounting to P2.2 Million or 22,350 shares in or before Dec 30, 1997. As the complainant defaulted in her
payment, a notice of public sale was sent to her together with a Board Resolution authorizing the sale.
Diana was ousted in the company as she lost her stocks and sold it to save the company from bankruptcy;
meanwhile Mr. Del Rosario became the majority stockholder of the company. He granted 100 shares of stocks
to the respondent as payment for her services.
Contention of the Complainant:
- Diana de Guzman relied to her counsel and signed pleadings in favor of her as she claims that there
was attorney-client relationship between them.
Defense:
- That there is no attorney-client relationship.
- That a sour relationship broke out and that it ruined the trust of the board members.

The IBP ruled in favor of Atty. De Dios since the complainant failed to prove the attorney-client relationship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of Atty. De Dios presents a conflict of interest and violates the CPR.
RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of the complainant, Diana De Guzman.
The Court ruled that: it was the complainant who retained respondent to form a corporation. Atty. De Dios
appeared as counsel in behalf of complainant.
There was evidence of collusion between the board of directors and respondent. Indeed, the board of directors
now included respondent as the president, Ramon del Rosario as secretary, Hikoi Suzuki as chairman, Agnes
Rodriguez as treasurer and Takayuki Sato as director. The present situation shows a clear case of conflict of
interest of the respondent.
As a lawyer, respondent is bound by her oath to do no falsehood or consent to its commission and to conduct
herself as a lawyer according to the best of her knowledge and discretion. The lawyers oath is a source of
obligations and violation thereof is a ground for suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action. The
acts of respondent Atty. De Dios are clearly in violation of her solemn oath as a lawyer that this Court will not

tolerate.
ROMANA R. MALIGSA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent.
FACTS:
Roman Maligsa charged the respondent, Atty. Arsenio Cabanting for the conduct of unbecoming of a lawyer for
certifying under oath a Deed of Quitclaim dated MAY 5, 1992.
The said DEED of QUITCLAIM was executed by one IRENE MALIGSA, in favor of Juanito Abaoag over a parcel of
land located in Pangasinan. The said document was notarized by respondent on the same date. The document
was apparently used as evidence against complainant in a pending civil case for annulment of OCT No. P-31297,
quieting of title with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
plus damages
IRENE MALIGSA died in APRIL 21, 1992, (16) days earlier before the execution of the DEED of QUITCLAIM on
MAY 5, 1992. Irene Maligsa could not have signed the document because she "never knew how to write as she
uses the thumb mark in every transaction she entered."
Contention of the Complainant:
It would have been physically and legally impossible for the affiant Irene Maligsa to have executed the alleged
Deed of Quitclaim on 5 May 1992 and to have personally subscribed to its authenticity and validity before
respondent notary public on the same date, affiant having died on 21 April 1992. Also, it behooves respondent
as a notary public to require the personal appearance of the person executing a document to enable the
former to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the respondent must be penalized for his acts in the notarized quitclaim.
RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of the complainant. The Court found that Atty. Cabanting is guilty of grave misconduct
on which he is DISBARRED from the profession. Atty Cabanting committed an act of malpractice in violation of
his oath as a lawyer and the Canons of Professional Ethics.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:
The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging
the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official
seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state
Atty. Cabanting was given a graver penalty as he was already given a (6) months suspension in the practice of
law and a warning by the Court as he has committed a previous offense against the Art II of the Code of
Professional Ethics and Art 1491 of the New Civil Code. In the previous offense, Atty. Cabanting has purchased
his clients property which is still in certiorari proceeding.
The Court said with regard to the practice of Notary Public:

Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree
and protection of the interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as
notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and the administrative offices generally.
Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in
court without further proof of its authenticity.
The respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties
being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost
respect of the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such
responsibility is incumbent upon respondent and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate
consequences of his professional indiscretion. By his effrontery of notarizing a fictitious or spurious
document, he has made a mockery of the legal solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment.
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The bar should maintain a
high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a
member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the
confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession.
Sps. Pedro and Angelina Telan vs. CA, Roberto Telan and sps. Vicente and Virginia Telan
October 4, 1991
Petitioner Pedro settled on a property abutting the national highway in Guibang, Gamu, Isabela and when the
govt needed the land, he was compelled to transfer to the other side of the highway owned by Luciano Sia
where he set vulcanizing shop and an eatery followed by his cousins, herein private respondents (sps. Vicente
and Virginia). The Devt Bank of the Phils. (DBP) sent Notice to Vacate to petitioners while Vicente and Virginia
executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage with Sia over the said lot. Meanwhile, Roberto Telan was
able to secure cert. of title in his name over the contested lot. Roberto and sps. Vicente and Virginia filed
Accion Publiciana against petitioners in which the lower court awarded the possession to Roberto and the
spouses.
In the course of the proceedings, the petitioners wanted to appeal and got the services of Ernesto Palma who
represented himself as a lawyer. Petitioners were not aware that CA Resolution was issued considering their
appeal as abandoned and dismissed for failure to file an appeal brief within the reglementary period. Atty.
Palma turned to be not a real lawyer, hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: WON the representation of the petitioners by a fake lawyer amounts to a deprivation of their right to
counsel and lack of due process.
Held: Yes. The right to counsel in civil case exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, especially so when as a
consequence, life, liberty or property is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss.
The right to counsel is absolute and maybe invoked at all times. More so, in the case of an ongoing litigation, it
is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company.
No arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the right to counsel exists only
in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal. This is the reason why under
the ordinary circumstances, a lawyer cannot simply refuse anyone the counsel that only the exercise of his
office can impart.
A client is generally bound by the action of his counsel in the management of litigation even by the attorneys
mistakes or negligence in the procedural technique. But how can there be negligence by the counsel in the case
at bar when the lawyer turned to be fake?
Petition is granted. The case is reinstated and the CA ordered to give due course.

PLA vs Agrava
Facts:
This is a petition for injuction filed by the PLA against Celedonio Agrava in his capacity as director of the Phil.
Patent Office. Agrava as Director of the PPO has scheduled an examination for lawyers who wish to practice and
handle cases for applications for patents before the PPO. Thhere has been similar examinations in the past and
the passing in the said examination is a condition precedent in order to handle patent application cases before
the PPO.It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good
standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of the
respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination
given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such as
representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his
jurisdiction and is in violation of the law. On the other hand, the Director of the PPO contends that the
prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application
of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the
prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with
sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . .
. that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring
further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as
stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than
the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with
Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States
Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination
as that prescribed by respondent.
Isssue: W/N the Director of the PPO has exceeded his jurisdiction in requiring all lawyers to pass an examination
before allowing practice before the PPO.
Held:
The Court finds for the petitioner. The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect
to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good
standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative,
in the Philippines. Before arriving at its decision, the court first determined whether appearance before the PPO
and the prosecution of patent application is within the definition of the practice of law. The Court said that :
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in
many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns
the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary
functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and

acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
It is the opinion of the court that the preparation of patents and the prosecution the application of patents is
within the definition of what constitutes the practice of law. although the transaction of business in the Patent
Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business
has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the
Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the
existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. In support of the
proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involve
questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165,
Section 61, provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel a
patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the Office may
appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office and the
acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific
knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to
a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
There is also no express provision of the law that requires the Director of the Patent Office to require an
examination as condition precedent before allowing a lawyer to practice before its office. Unlike in the United
Stes, Rule 78 of the Philippine Patent Law is silent on this issue and although the Director of the Patent Office is
given the authority to issue rules and regulations, it has to be not inconsistent with existing laws.

Grande vs De Silva
Facts:
Emilio Grande is the private complainant in a criminal case versus Sergio Natividad for estafa and violation of
Batas Pambansa 22. Acting as the lawyer for the accused, Atty. Evangeline De Silva tendered to complainant a
check for the payment of the amount required in order to satisfy the civil liability resulting from said criminal
action. Complainant refused to accept the check, but respondent assured him that the same will be paid upon
its presentment to her drawee bank. She manifested that as a lawyer, she would not issue a check which is not
sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was prevailed upon by complainant to accept the check. Consequently, he
desisted from participating as a complaining witness in the criminal case, which led to the dismissal of the same
and the release of the accused, Sergio Natividad.When complainant deposited the check, the same was
returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the reason: Account Closed. On June 19, 1997, complainant wrote a
letter to respondent demanding that she pay the face value of the check. However, his demand was ignored by
respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal complaint against her for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 and an administrative complaint for disbarment for deceit and violation of the lawyers oath. Several
resolutions were sent first to the respondent's former address but was returened with the notation moved
and another to her new address but was also returned with a notation refused. Therefore the case was
elevated to the Commission on Bar disciplined for comment and resolution. In a Report dated December 6,
2001, Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found respondent guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and
violation of the Lawyers Oath.Thus, he recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for two (2) years. The said recommendation was adopted by the IBP.

Issue: WON the respondent is guilty of deceit and violation of the Lawyer's Oath
Held:
The court finds the respondent guilty and aopted the decesion of the IBP board of Governors. It is clear that the
breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted to deceit and constituted a
violation of her oath, for which she should be accordingly penalized.Such an act constitutes gross misconduct
and the penalties for such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without
authority to do so.
The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral character. Since
this qualification is a condition precedent to a license to enter upon the practice of law, the maintenance
thereof is equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. Gross
misconduct which puts the lawyers moral character in serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the
practice of law. Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional
or non-professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of a
debt validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the bar, for a
lawyers professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion.
Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on her betrays a
deplorably willful character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal profession.Her conduct not only
underscores her utter lack of respect for authority; it also brings to the fore a darker and more sinister
character flaw in her psyche which renders highly questionable her moral fitness to continue in the practice of
law: a defiance for law and order which is at the very core of her profession.

Khan vs. Simbillo

This is an administrative complaint which arose from an ad on a newspaper which reads which reads:
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.s. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the
Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to
be an interested party.She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an
expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the
case will not involve separation of property or custody of children.Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband
charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a
decision thereon has been rendered. Fuurther research has shown that similar ads were posted in other
newspapers which prompted Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief
of the Public Information Office, to file an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for
improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. In his defense, Atty Simbillo said that
that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views
about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the
absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the
rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned.Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from
all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered

by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is dignified. The Case was filed to
the IBP for resolution and the IBP Commision for Bar Disciplinerule that the respondent is guilty of violation of
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court,
and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts
would be dealt with more severely. The respondent filed an urgent motion for reconsideration but was denied
hence the petition.
Issue: WON the respondent is guilty.

Held:
The Court finds the respondent guilty. The solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed.However,
for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession.If it is made in a
modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.Thus, the use of simple signs
stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as
advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible.Even the use of calling cards is
now acceptable.Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct
imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. Furthermore, the act of
the respondent in ensuring that a favorable ruling for te annulment case shows disrespect to the sanctity of
marriage as an institution as recognized by the constitution which, he as an office of the court, has sworn to
uphold and protect.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making
venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The
following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity
and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
8.
Cordon vs. Balicanta
A.C. No. 2797
Facts:
Complainant Rosaura Cordon filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent herein. It was stated that
when the husband of the complainant died they inherited 21 parcels of land and it was respondent who helped
her settle the estate of her late husband. Respondent enticed complainant and her daughter to organize a
corporation that would develop the said real properties. . Such corp. was formed, and the properties were

registered in the corp.s name. Atty Balicanta was the one who single-handedly ran the corp.s affairs, by being
its Chairman, President, General Manager, and treasurer. By being such officers, he made a number of acts: 1)
made Cordon sign a voting trust agreement; 2) made Cordon sign a SPA to sell/mortgage properties; 3)
transferred title of some of the properties to other people. And by using spurious Board resolutions, Atty
Balicanta also made the following acts: 1) obtained a loan from Land Bank using the properties as collateral; 2)
Sold the Corps right to redeem the properties to another person; 3) demolished the ancestral home of the
Cordons and sold the lot to another person. In all of these, Atty Balicanta did not account for the proceeds
coming the sales and dispositions.
The Cordons made several demands for Atty Balicanta to give back the properties and to account the proceeds
of the loan. When such demands were unheeded, The Cordons terminated Balicantas services and filed a
complaint for disbarment against the latter in the IBP. The Commissioner, in its report, recommended for
Balicantas disbarment as well. The IBP Board of Governors resolved that Balicanta be suspended for 5 years for
such conduct.
Issue:
Whether respondent should be disbarred.
Held:
Yes. The fraudulent acts he carried out against his client followed a well thought of plan to misappropriate the
corporate properties and funds entrusted to him. He started his devious scheme by making himself the
President, Chairman of the Board, Director and Treasurer of the corporation, although he knew he was
prohibited from assuming the position of President and Treasurer at the same time. He also entered into
dishonest transactions under the cloak of sham resolutions. His misdemeanors reveal a deceitful scheme to use
the corporation as a means to convert for his own personal benefit properties left to him in trust by
complainant and her daughter.
Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will
to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be
so because vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he
deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his all.
9.
Ui vs. Bonifacio
A.C. No. 3319
Facts:
A complaint for disbarment was filed against Bonifacio on the ground of immorality for having illicit relations
with a married man which resulted in the birth of two children. Her defense: She married complainant's
husband without knowledge, in good faith, of his true marriage status; that she parted ways upon knowledge
of such fact. She is also charged for disrespect toward the IBP for willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified
copy of the marriage certificate.
Issue:
Whether respondent should be disbarred on the ground of immorality for having an affair with a married man.
Held:
No. While a lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct," there is no fixed standard
for such conduct. Although circumstances existed which should have irked Bonifacio's suspicion, her act cannot
be considered immoral. Immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to moral norms of society.
Moreover, "a member of the bar must so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the

belief that he is flouting those moral standards." Bonifacio's act of immediately distancing herself from
complainant's husband upon
knowledge of his true civil status avoids the alleged moral indifference--that she had no intention of flouting
the law and the high standards of the legal profession. The complaint is dismissed but she is reprimanded for
attaching to her Answer a falsified copy of her marriage certificate.
10.
Narag vs. Narag
A.C. No. 3405
Facts:
Mrs. Julieta B. Narag complainant, filed a petition for disbarment against his husband respondent herein,
alleging that her husband courted one of his students, later maintaining her as a mistress and having children
by her. Atty. Narag claims that his wife was a possessive, jealous woman who abused him and filed the
complaint out of spite.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Narag should be disbarred based on the allegations of his wife.
Held:
Yes. Atty. Dominador Narag failed to prove his innocence because he failed to refute the testimony given
against him and it was proved that his actions were of public knowledge and brought disrepute and suffering to
his wife and children. Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the bar.
Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw
his or her privilege to practice law. (Canons 1&7, Rule 7.03, Code of Ethics for Lawyers) It is not only a condition
precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members. Hence when a lawyer is found
guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. Grossly immoral means it must be so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. As a lawyer, one
must not only refrain from adulterous relationships but must not behave in a way that scandalizes the public by
creating a belief that he is flouting those moral standards

A.C.
No.
376.
Josefina ROYONG v. ATTY. Ariston OBLENA

April

30,

1963

DOCTRINES:
DISBARMENT; STATUTORY ENUMERATION OF GROUNDS NOT EXCLUSIVE; INHERENT POWER OF COURT TO
EXCLUDE UNFIT MEMBERS OF THE PROFESSION.
RULE ON DISBARMENT BROAD ENOUGH TO COVER ANY MISCONDUCT. The moral turpitude for which an
attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or non-professional activities
OFFENSES TO BE CHARGED BY SOLICITOR GENERAL NOT LIMITED TO THOSE CHARGED BY COMPLAINANT.
REMOVAL OF A LAWYER ANY TIME HE CEASES TO POSSESS GOOD CHARACTER.
STANDARD OF PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY TO BE APPLIED TO PERSONS ADMITTED TO PRACTICE

LAW. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.

FACTS: Complainant is the niece of the respondents common law wife. She filed a complaint of rape against
the respondent which resulted to her giving birth. Respondent, a member of the Bar, denied the allegation and
said he has a relation with the complainant. The case was given to the SolGen for investigation.
The incident happened in August 1958 when Royong was left alone in their house doing housework when
Oblena came and forced himself upon her after bringing her forcibly to the bedroom. However because he
threatened the teenager with death to her and to her family, she was not able to shout for help. The incident
resulted in her pregnancy and she gave birth in July the following year.
Respondent was co-habiting with Briccia Angeles, aunt of Royong, when the crime happened. Oblena wooed
Royongs aunt after the latter parted ways with her husband.
The findings of the SolGen revealed that the sexual relation between the respondent and the petitioner
continued after the incident. However, such cannot be treated as exoneration on the part of the respondent. He
tempted Angeles to live maritally with him not long after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable
that the spouses never reconciled because of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after more than
fifteen years of adulterous relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that Angeles, could not bear a
child, he seduced Royong, then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, in June
1959. The seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means of promises of marriage
which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to Angeles. He also took advantage of his moral
influence over Royong, who treated him as an uncle and called him tata. Considering her age, it is not difficult
to
see
why
she
could
not
resist
him.
The SolGen thus recommended that Oblena be removed from his office or be stricken from the roll of
attorneys. Even if respondent did not commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct.
The Solicitor General formulated another complaint which he appended to his report, charging the respondent
of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral
character; of living adulterously with Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the complainant
Royong, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal business
of others.
Respondent argued that he cannot be disbarred because the cause of action differed from the original
complaint, that there is no sufficient proof as to the rape, seduction, nor to the perjury or fraudulent
concealment when he filed his application for admission to the bar as well as to the allegation that he is not
morally fit to be a lawyer.
ISSUE: Are the illicit relations with the complainant Royong and the open cohabitation with Angeles, a married
woman, sufficient grounds to cause the respondents disbarment?
HELD: Yes.

1. Respondents argument that he is not liable for disbarment because he has not been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude is untenable. It has already been held that the enumeration in Section 25, Rule 127
(Sec. 27, Rule 138) of the Rules of Court is not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and
unworthy members of the profession is inherent as it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of
justice, and may be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless positively
prohibited by statute.
Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power)
may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and
rules merely regulate the power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict
the general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for other
than statutory grounds.
The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his
professional or non- professional activities. The tendency of the decisions of this Court has been toward the
conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than
statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a
lawyer. In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His pretension that before
complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not
to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing
her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his knowledge of the law, he took
advantage of, for his lurid purpose. The act was even more despicable due to the fact that Royong was the niece
of his commonlaw wife.
2. The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he admittedly committed
fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as have been proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency,
certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law.
To continue maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and simultaneously maintaining
promiscuous relations with the latters niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned. Respondents
conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal profession. As good character
is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he may be removed therefrom whenever
he ceases to possess such character.
3. The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examination in 1954 since
according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral character.
This contention is clearly erroneous. Ones own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character.
Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is
what a person really is, and not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran observed:
An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as
distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he
is held by the public in the place where he is known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal and
professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by such

conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least
common honesty.
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar.
He lived an adulterous life with Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to
his status, did not render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was
discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.

A.C. No. 6486. September 22, 2004

EMMA T. DANTES v. ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES
Per curiam: Where practice of law is regulated, the candidate must demonstrate that he or she has good moral
character and once he becomes a lawyer he should always behave in accordance with the standard. Good
moral character is not only a condition precedent, but an unending requirement for all the members of the bar.
If found guilty of gross immoral conduct he may be suspended or disbarred.
FACTS:
Complainant is the wife of respondent. She filed an affidavit-complaint before the IBP seeking disbarment to
her husband on the ground of immorality, abandonment and violation of professional ethics and law. She
alleged that respondent is a philanderer, engaged in illicit relationships with women and had illegitimate
children with them. Respondent failed to give regular suppot to complainant and their children, forcing the
complainant to go abroad to provide for their childrens needs.
Respondent in his answer admit to the fact of marriage but claimed they mutually agreed to separate but
returned after 18 years. He alleged that he never failed to support his family even after complainant abandoned
him in 1983.
The IBP conducted an investigation which was able to establish that both parties were married and had three
children. They were supported by the respondents mother while complainant engaged in buy and sell and
respondent was just a fourth year law student. The relationship was marred by frequent quarrels due to the
respondents extra-marital affairs. In 1983, complainant brought her children to her mother for her to be able
to work abroad as respondent failed to provide adequate support. It was also established that respondent sired
three illegitimate children with two different women.
The IBP recommended that respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
ISSUE: Did respondent violate the Code of Professional Responsibility?
HELD: Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. (Rule 1.01)
Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so wilful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary
action, the lawyers conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. The
requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than
the possession of legal learning. It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three
ostensible purposes, namely:
(i) to protect the public;
(ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and
(iii) to protect prospective clients.
A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from themselves (Barrientos v. Daarol)
Lawyers may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Where a
lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be
decreed. But in the case at bar, the seriousness of the offense compels the court to wield its power to disbar as
it appears to the most appropriate penalty.