International Phenomenological Society

Systems Philosophy as a World Hypothesis

Author(s): Stephen C. Pepper
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Jun., 1972), pp. 548-553
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2106292
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DISCUSSION
SYSTEMSPHILOSOPHYAS A WORLD HYPOTHESIS
A book has just come out that deserves more than usual attention,
and should stimulate a lot of constructivediscussion. I refer to Ervin
Laszlo's Introductionto Systems Philosophy.' To those of us interested
in synthetic treatmentsof philosophicalissues, this book comes as a
breath of fresh air, like opening a window in a crowded, smoke-filled
room.
It is a world hypothesisthoroughlyempiricalwithout any dependence
on items of self evidence or indubitability.Its paradigmor root metaphor is system or more specificallythe dynamic self-regulatingsystem.
This is a happy choice, and possibly the most fruitful or even the correct one for a detailed syntheticcomprehensionof the structureof the
universe. It seems applicable to the full range of empirical material
availablethroughthe sciences, the arts and elsewhere,and it can utilize
the results and methods of the extensive developmentof systems theoretical analysis.
After some introductoryconsiderationof the need of syntheticas well
as analytic specializedtreatmentsin philosophyand a preliminarysymmary of his method of "generalsystems synthesis,"he begins his constructivedevelopmentby applyinghis paradigmto the familiarhierarchy
of nature extendingfrom the subatomicelements throughthe atoms to
molecules, cells, organisms,societies of organismsand so on up.
He distinguishesfour characterizingfeatures of a self-regulatingsystem. The first is its inner structure,what might be called the anatomy
and physiologyof the system. His descriptionof this featureis "a coactive relation of parts in ordered wholeness in the state of the system."
The second is the "functionof adaptationto environmentaldisturbances
resultingin the re-establishmentof a previous steady state in the system." The third is the "functionof adaptationto environmentaldisturb1 Ervin Laszlo, Introduction to Systems Philosophy (Towards a New Paradigm
of ContemporaryThought). New York, London, Paris: Gordon & Breach. Pp. xxii,
320.

548

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SYSTEMS PHILOSOPHY AS A WORLD HYPOTHESIS

549

ances resultingin the reorganizationof the system's state involving ...

an overall gain" in the adaptabilityof the system to occurrencesin the
environment."The fourth is a "dual functional-structuraladaptation;
with respect to subsystems ...

and suprasystems" (pp. 35-36).

The first feature gives the structureof a natural system. The second
stresses the continuityof a steady state for the system adaptingto its
environment.The third provides for the developmentor evolution of a
natural system towards increasingadaptabilityto its environment.The
fourth calls attentionto the place in the hierarchyof nature in which a
natural system is lodged. It calls attention to its function of being a
well-adaptedcoactive part of a higher level system in which it is contained, and also as a well-adaptedwhole integratingthe subsystemsof
a lower level that constitute its inner structure.Thus a molecule is a
whole integratingthe atoms which compose it, and possibly also a part
of a living cell within which it should be properly integrated.And a
man is an organismcomposed of cells which must be adapted to the
whole for his bodily health, but he is also a memberof a humansociety
to which he must adapt himself for the integrityof the society.
One cannot fail to note that the key term in this analysis of natural
systemsis "adaptation."A naturalsystem is never a completelyisolated
whole. It is always involved in an inner and outer environment.This
is a characteristicof nature which system analysisbrings out in a manner never so empiricallystressedbefore. Adaptationis a transactionin
wh ch everythingin the naturalworld is involved. Moreover,the natural
world in Laszlo's world hypothesiscompriseseverythingthat is. This is
what empiricallyturns out to be the case as becomes clearer and clearer
as we proceedwith his philosophy.And this is not a consequencesolely
of his systems theoreticalanalysis, his paradigm,and root metaphor.It
is ratherthe reverse, that the empiricalmaterialfrom the sciences and
elsewhere just shapes up that way. It just may be that an adequate
world hypothesiscan be developed through the guidance of this paradigm of a dynamic adaptive system (or selective system as it has also
been called).
After a carefulconceptualanalysisof the four featuresdescribedabove,
Laszlo applies them to an empirical interpretationof atoms as representative of physical systems, organisms for biological systems, and
human societies for social systems. These interpretationsare given in
considerabledetail with extensive referencesto scientific authoritiesin
these fields. In the biological field, for instance, he gives special attention to the morphologyof living organisms,to varieties of homeostasis,
to types of learning, and to reproduction,heredity, and evolution. He
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550

PHILOSOPHY
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

shows how adaptationwith feedbackoperationsregulatingsteady states

function in all these systems.
Then he takes up a numberof special problems - emergence,teleology, universals, cognition, consciousness, freedom, value

and shows

how these can be handledconsistentlywith his systemsphilosophybackground.

As regardsemergence,it has long been noticed that in the advance
from simple to more complex levels new properties appear with each
new whole forming a stable system. In fact, Laszlo observes that the
number of new properties increases cumulatively with each higher level.

Incidentally,as a rule each higher level of structureis less stable than

the lower but also capable of greaterdiversityof adaptation.The emergent properties have caused a good deal of controversy as regards their
degree of novelty. In fact, it is not only properties that emerge but the

wholes as dynamic systems that propagatethem. Laszlo gives careful

attention to this problem (pp. 36 ff.) and in terms of systems theory
finds nothing mysterious in it, if one distinguishes complexes of parts

calculatedby countingthe numberof parts, and those calculatedby consideringthe syntheticrelations between the parts. The former produce
heaps or aggregateswhose propertiesare simply the sum of the properties of the parts. But in the latter the dynamic relations of the parts
through mutual adaptation bring forth properties of the whole not
present in the parts. These syntheticpropertiesare simply the dynamic
results of the syntheticaction of the parts, and the syntheticcapacities
of the parts were alreadypotentialpropertiesof the parts.
For instancethe propertyof affinity for atoms is not an actual property of any of the constituentsof an atom. But the syntheticproperties
of the constituentsproduced a structurewith distributionof electrons
which rendersan atom availablefor furthersynthesiswith certainother
atoms and not with certain others. It could be said (though this is not
the crucial question)that with sufficientprior knowledgeof the properties of subatomicelementsthe propertiesof their atomic synthesescould
be predicted.
So here we come upon an interpretationof naturalpotentialitywhich
rendersany sort of Platonic theory of forms unnecessary.The forms of
the wholes are immanent in the dynamics of the parts. Aristotelian
teleology is likewise disposedof. Naturalforms (systems)are not pulled
into being from above by a Form of all forms, but under favorable
environmentalconditions are pushed up from below by the natural
dynamicsof their constituents.
At the same time Laszlo's scheme does not dispose of a natural
teleology altogether.By recognizinga naturalpotentialityin the synthetic
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HYPOTHESIS
AS A WORLD
PHILOSOPHY
SYSTEMS

551

transactionsof naturalsystems, a significantvector factor is introduced

which involves a temporal transitiontoward a synthetic consummation
which is not purelymechanicalin a traditionalsense of classicalphysics.
There is a sort of teleology in all natural transactions,which can be
important to retain in mind when describing overt human purposive
behavior.
From Laszlo's analysis of emergentpropertiesand syntheticpatterns
among natural systems, a theory of universals comes to light. Every
naturalsystem yields a universal.These are the forms that are repeated
in nature. But these forms do not descend upon natural events from
above. They well up from below. Laszlo calls them "recurrentflow
patterns"(p. 294). When environmentalconditionsare favorablethey are
naturallysynthesizedby their constituents.They cease to be actual when
the environmentwill not supportthem, and become mere naturalpotentialities of their constituents.The source of universalsthus appearsto be
found in the ultimateconstituentsof naturalsystems,and universalsmay
be said to propagate in actuality by a sort of cumulative process of
inheritance. 2

Laszlo recognizes, however, that there is another sort of universal

which is conceptual.It consists in what he calls the "code" as a factor
in cognition(p. 294). He analyzesperceptionin detail as a basic type of
cognition.In terms of systems analysishe offers an amazinglyilluminating description. He describes perception as a dynamic behavioral
systemincludingan organismin a transactionwith its environment.There
are four principal factors: (1) E, the environmentaldisturbanceto be
cognized,(2) P, the direct perceptualstimulation,(3) C, a coding of the
perception,as say the 'hypothesis'of 'cat,' (4) R. the conative response
trying out the hypothesison the environment.There is thus a dynamic
flow in the system from E

.-*

--

--

->

E and back again to C,

for it is a feedbacksystem. If the environmentfails to match with C as

the stimulus is fed back though P, then a C', a new hypothesis (say,
'skunk')is tried, until there is no discrepancy(that is, until the completion of a negative feedback). Thus perceptualcognition is one way in
which an organismmaintainsa steady state in relation to its environment. The big thing to notice here (in view of much epistemologicalconfusion) is that the cognizer is not isolated from his environmentbut is
systematicallykept in close transactionalcontact with it. Solipsism be2

I think Laszlo's view closely parallels mine in Concept and Quality (Open
Court, 1967), pp. 416 ff. In fact, my world hypothesis in that book, and Laszlo's
in his book under review so closely resemble each other in principle that one might
think we had influenced each other. Actually they were independently developed
without either of us knowing what the other was doing until very lately.

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552

PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

comes a dead issue. The verificatoryrelationbetweenthe coding and the

environmentthroughthe feedbackdynamicsleads to a practicaltheory
of truth.A whole systemsphilosophytheoryof knowledgecan start from
here.
What about consciousness?This has clearly something to do with
brainprocesses.Laszlo does not accept the physicalidentitytheory associated with J. J. C. Smart and others. He does not deny qualitative

immediacies.Neither does he espouse a qualitativeidentity theory like

Feigl or me. He accepts a sort of double aspect theory: "The relation of
brain-events and mind-events is one of non-causal correlation" (p. 149).
However, it is so close a relation that it is almost an identity. For Laszlo
regards the structure of the physical system and that of the introspected

cognitive system as "isomorphic."Hence, he says, "these systems are

identical qua systems" (p. 152). And from now on he often uses the
hyphenatedterm "natural-cognitive
systems."
He is thus easily led to the view that qualitativecognitive aspects are
presentin all naturalsystems down to atoms and beyond. The evidence
for "mentalexperiences"in other men and other organismsresembling
men is on his systemstheoryof perceptionwell evidenced.Then he adds,
"howfar to go in extendingthe rangeof mentalphenomenais not merely
a decision of heuristic value, but one of logical consistency"(p. 150).
In this extension of qualitative immediacy, he agrees with Whitehead,

and I would go along with him. But for me, there appearsto be a logical
consistency in accepting a complete qualitativeidentity theory in this
A naturalsystem may
situation.Laszlo calls his view "biperspectivism."
be observed from without behavioristically,or "may be 'lived' (i.e.,
observed) from an immanent viewpoint" and in the latter case "the
observer. . . is not merelyinspectingthe interiorof the system, he is the
system"(p. 151).
And now lastly about values. On a systems philosophybasis, it must
be apparent that values will extend throughout the whole range of
natural-cognitive systems. Thus at one stroke the harsh opposition of

"value"to "fact"is dissolved.Cognitionis a normativevaluingoperation.

It yields the primary and fundamental value of adaptation. Every
cognitive-naturalsystem is guided by adaptation.Man at his level of the
natural hierarchy not only feels its operation and lives it, but is
self-consciousabout it and can analyzeit and write about it. Satisfaction
and pleasure have a secondary value status in that a well-adapted
organism maximizes the satisfactions available in his good physical and
mental health. Organization (integration) also acquires a secondary
value insofar as it is a function of adaptation. But degree of organization

is not equivalent to degree of adaptation."A hydrogen atom is not

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SYSTEMS PHILOSOPHY AS A WORLD HYPOTHESIS

553

intrinsically'less good' than an amoeba,and an amoebais not necessarily

'less good' than a humanbeing for the same reason. ... It is the level of
adaptation and not the level of organization,which correlates with
value" (p. 270).
It is easy to see how practicaland scientificcognitive values develop
from the normativeaction of human naturalsystems. Laszlo points out
that there is also a normativefeedbackaction for sensuous and emotive
feelings yielding aestheticvalues and religiousvalues. And one can see
how this mode of systems analysiswill yield normativesocial values for
the naturalsystemsof societies.
But I think I have gone far enough to show the sweep and fertilityof
Laszlo's systems philosophy.The aim of a review like this should be to
tempt the readerto read the book underreview itself.
Let me merely add that there is a chapternear the end on "A New
Age Ethos" with a lot of practicaladvice growing out of Laszlo's philosophy, including a warning to present-dayman to give attention to
dangeroussocial conditionsthreateninghis survival.The value norm of
adaptationstands over man and his social systems and must be treated
with respect- and even in Laszlo's favoredterm with "reverence."
STEPHENC. PEPPER.
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY.

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