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SAMUEL V. LASELVA
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SAMUEL V. LASELVA
the belief in universalism,but even they denied thatthe state could embracemorethanone way of life. Forthem,the only legitimatestateswere
nation states. In the history of political thought,the Canadianconstitutionalexperimentappearsto be caughtbetweenuniversalismandparticularism.Even in Canadaitself, many scholarseitherenvisage the evolution of Canadianfederalisminto a unitarystate,or predictits disintegration in responseto particularistic
demandsfor local autonomy.
Canadianshave available to them, however, an understandingof
federalismthat mediates the destructivedemandsof universalismand
particularism.To recapturethatunderstandingof Canadianfederalism,
it is necessaryto explore its moral foundationsand to think of federalism as a way of life. When federalism is understoodin this way, it
ceases to be a political or economic expedient and becomes a fundamentalmoralvalue. Moreover,the value thatfederalismas a way of life
is most intimatelyconnected with is not freedom or diversity,but fraternity. Federalismas fraternityresponds to universalismand particularism by incorporatingand transcendingthe very forces that are set
against it. By so doing, federalism as fraternitynot only provides a
moralfoundationfor the Canadianexperiment,but challenges some of
the most pervasiveimages of federalismand respondsto the inadequacies of the theoryandpracticeof consociationalfederalism.
The Crisis of Canadian Federalism
Federalismis almost neverequatedwith fraternityor describedas a way
of life. It is morecommonlydepicted,in Canadaand elsewhere,as a political expedient,or as a constitutionalarrangement,or as a sociological
characteristicof some societies.4In fact, Canadianfederalismhas even
been describedas an affairof governments,in which the most important
elites. So long as
issues areresolvedby judicial,politicalandbureaucratic
Canadianfederalismwas understoodin this way, it could be regardedas a
formof politicalandconstitutionalpragmatismdevoid of moralprinciple
and preconception.However, with the adoptionof the Charterin 1982
and the failureof the Meech LakeConstitutionalAccordin 1990 andthe
CharlottetownConsensus Reporton the Constitutionin 1992, such an
imageof federalismhas becomeincreasinglyunrealistic.
Canadianfederalism,as Alan Cairnshas observed,is no longer an
affair of governments;it now includes citizens and groups who have
acquireda new constitutionalstatus throughthe Charter.5Not only do
See, for example, William Livingston, Federalism and Constitutional Change
(Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1956), 1-15.
5 Alan Cairns, Disruptions: ConstitutionalStruggles,from the Charter to Meech
Lake,ed. by Douglas E. Williams (Toronto:McClellandand Stewart, 1991), 108.
these new actorscompete with politicians andjudges to shape the constitutionalorder;they have also transformedthe language of constitutional discourse.Canadianfederalismis now discussed in termsof conflicting constitutionalimages and competing ways of life.6 Constitutional discoursehas ceased to be a languageof political expediency and
political compromise and is increasinglybecoming a branchof moral
philosophy.
Virtually no one was able to predictthat the Charterwould effect
such a radical transformationof the constitutional order. When the
Charterwas adopted,some constitutionalscholarseven speculatedthat
it would have no effect at all.7 Others saw the Charteras an attackon
the sovereignty of the legislators;their concern was thatjudges would
displacelegislatorsas policy makers.Still othersfearedthatthe Charter
was part of the increasingAmericanizationof Canadiansociety; they
supposed that the Charterwould bring increased "bureaucratization,
centralizationand atomization."8Those who supported the Charter
saw it both as a way of protectingthe rights of the people, and as a device for promotingnationalunity in the face of provincializingtendencies.9
What the Charterhas not yet producedis greaternational unity.
Even as the Charterwas being adopted, some critics warned of its
"limited capacities" for furtheringnationalunity. Donald Smiley, for
example, objected to the Charterbecause it was adoptedwithout Que6
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bec's consent and would fuel Quebec nationalism;because it did nothing to satisfy the demandsfor intrastatefederalismor to alleviate western alienation;because it spoke of rights as the common possession of
Canadians,yet it encouragedindividuals and groups to assert special
claims and defendparticularinterests.10
Smiley's last point might be stated differently. What the Charter
has effected is a transferof sovereigntyfrom governmentto the people.
Moreover, the transferhas been real and not merely symbolic. The
Charterhas brought the citizenry into the constitutionalorderand has
createda tension between citizens and governments."1Jealous of their
rights, individuals and groups now compete with governmentsto control the constitution.Governmentscan no longer treatthe constitution
as theirpossession and modify it as they please. In a sense, the Charter
representsa victory for Canadiandemocracy,because governmentsare
now more responsive to the people. What may be of even greatersignificanceis thatthe Charterhas also broughtaboutthe demise of executive federalism,at least with respectto constitutionalmatters.
The Charterhas produceda crisis of federalismprecisely because
it has underminedthe legitimacy of executive federalism. Executive
federalismor federalismby elites (judicial, political and bureaucratic)
is virtually the only kind of federalism that Canadianshave known.
Moreover,federalismby elites is more than a political arrangement;it
also makescrucialmoralassumptions.Not only does executive federalism requireelites to practise accommodationand to be committed to
nationalunity,but it supposesthatCanadawill continueto flourishonly
if the French and English subculturesare kept separate. "Consociational federalism," S. J. R. Noel has written, "works best when the
'two solitudes' are preserved." " 'National' policies aimed at promoting bilingualism and biculturalism," Noel goes on to say, "may be
misguidedin the sense thatthey may increasefrictionbetween separate
communities which previously had little direct contact with one another."12 Because the Charterhas underminedfederalismby elites or
consociationalfederalism, some scholars suppose that the Charterhas
displacedfederalism.They suppose that Canadiansmust choose either
the Charteror federalism.13But there may be more to federalismthan
elite accommodationand the two solitudes. The Chartermay not be an10 Donald Smiley, "A DangerousDeed: The ConstitutionAct, 1982," in K. Banting
andR. Simeon, eds., AndNo One Cheered(Toronto:Methuen,1983), 78-81.
11 Cairns,Disruptions, 108.
12 S. J. R. Noel, "Consociational Democracy and CanadianFederalism," in Kenneth McRae, ed., ConsociationalDemocracy (Toronto:McClellandand Stewart,
1974), 267. See also J. A. Laponce, Languages and Their Territories(Toronto:
Universityof TorontoPress, 1987).
13 Alan C. Cairns, Charter VersusFederalism (Montreal:McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), 3-10.
223
tagonistic to all forms of federalism, although it requires some rethinking of the moral dimensions of federalism.
Universalists and Particularists
The current crisis of Canadian federalism is not simply a political and
constitutional crisis. It is also a moral crisis. By undermining consociational federalism, the Charter has forced Canadians to seek alternative
foundations for federalism. But such a task is enormously problematic,
because Canadians have frequently justified their existence as a nation
by appealing to ideals that are ultimately uncongenial to federalism. Put
differently, many Canadians have not been federalists. Moral philosophers have not been federalists either. In fact, most moral philosophers
have embraced either universalistic or particularistic principles, and
such principles are ultimately antagonistic to the way of life that federalism presupposes.14 "The sentiment which creates a federal state," wrote
A. V. Dicey, "is the prevalence throughout the citizens of... two feelings which are to a certain extent inconsistent." The citizens of a federal
state must have both "the desire for national unity and the determination
to maintain the independence of each man's separate State."15 Many
Canadians have possessed one or the other of these two feelings but not
both. If Canadians are to rethink federalism, they will have to take
Dicey's insight seriously and discard some of their most prized self-images as well as a good deal of contemporary moral philosophy.
The problem that confronts Canadians begins with Confederation.
Confederation has failed Canadians, because it has not provided them
either with a foundation myth or with a moral ideal that can sustain
them during their times of trouble. It was once supposed that Confederation could not generate these things because it was the work of pragmatic politicians who avoided issues of principle in order to achieve
political consensus. Sir John A. Macdonald, for example, has been described as someone who "did not attempt to plumb the depths of political theory or speculate on the rights of man." Rather, he is said to have
been concerned "with the intricate details of concrete complexities"
and to have believed that the politician should never aspire to the
"alien role of prophet, philosopher or engineer."16 Such an assessment
14 See, for example, W. H. Walsh, "Open and Closed Morality," in B. Parekhand
R. N. Berki, eds., TheMoralityof Politics (London:George Allen, 1972), 17.
15 A. V. Dicey, Introductionto the Study of the Law of the Constitution(London:
Macmillan, 1959), 142-43. See also RichardVernon, "The Federal Citizen," in
M. Westmacottand R. Olling, eds., Perspectives on CanadianFederalism (Scarborough:Prentice-Hall,1988), 4.
16 CarlBerger, The Writingof CanadianHistory (Toronto:OxfordUniversity Press,
1976), 232-33.
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227
dence. His great speech in support of Confederation, delivered in Quebec in 1865, contains the very abstractions that Cartier claimed to abhor. In it, Cartier addressed the vital issues of Confederation in a language more suited to the political theorist than to the practical politician. He spoke of justice and injustice, of democracy and mob rule, of
national greatness, of assimilation and cultural pluralism.3' Cartier's
speech is not the work of an accomplished political thinker, yet students
of Canadian federalism have turned to it as a crucial statement of the
ideals and objectives of Confederation.
For no student of Canadian federalism has Cartier's speech had
more significance than Donald Smiley. In his last book, Smiley spoke
of "Cartier's noble vision."32 In an earlier work, Smiley relied on Cartier to establish that Canada must be one political community rather
than two, otherwise "it is not worth preserving."33 Smiley understood
the core of Cartier's position to be the rejection of assimilationist nationalism coupled with the belief that political allegiance should be
uninfluenced by linguistic and cultural affiliation.34 Put differently,
Canada is sometimes said to be a country based on "limited identities"; it is a country based on political allegiance alone, or a country
that does not impose a single way of life on its citizens.35 Canada may
be the kind of country that Cartier wished it to become, but what still
needs to be made explicit is the foundational value that unites Canadians. If Canadians are so different among themselves, what moral
value keeps them together?
Cartier himself provided no simple or direct answer to this question. Those who have come after him, however, have been more explicit. Pierre Trudeau once argued that Canadian federalism was incompatible with emotional appeals and should base itself on reason. For
Trudeau, federalism rejected the emotionalism of separatists and nationalists and based itself on the rational consensus that held Canadians
together.36 William Morton pinned his hopes on the Canadian belief in
Debateson theSubjectof the Confederation
31 Parliamentary
of theBritishNorth
AmericanProvinces(Quebec:Hunter,Rose, 1865),53-62. Henceforthcited as
Debates.
Confederation
32 D. V. Smiley, TheFederal Conditionin Canada (Toronto:McGraw-HillRyerson,
1987),143.
33 DonaldV. Smiley,TheCanadianPoliticalNationality(Toronto:
Methuen,1967),
128.
34 Donald Smiley, "Reflections on CulturalNationhoodand Political Communityin
Canada," in K. Cartyand P. Ward,eds., Entering the Eighties: Canada in Crisis
(Toronto:OxfordUniversityPress, 1980), 28.
35 J. M. S. Careless, " 'LimitedIdentities' in Canada," CanadianHistorical Review
50 (1969), 1. See also W. L. Morton, The CanadianIdentity(Toronto:University
of TorontoPress, 1972), 85, 111.
36 Trudeau,Federalismand the French Canadians, 194-97.
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229
cial." For Cartier,projectsof nationaldevelopmentpresupposeda degree of co-operationthatwouldjoin all BritishAmerica "in the bond of
common endeavour" and produce "a common, or national pride."42
Cartieralso believed that Frenchand English sharedan identity. "We
had," Cartier said, "the same sympathies and we all desired to live
underthe BritishCrown."43For Cartier,Canadawas to be a countryin
which differentways of life flourished,but whose peoples had come togetherto promotethe good of all and were unitedby a political nationality with which "neitherthe nationalorigin, nor the religion of any individualwould interfere."44
By joining in Confederation,FrenchandEnglishagreedboth to live
apartandto live together.Canadawould standfor a new kindof nationality anda new kindof fraternity.Cartierdid nothimselfuse the wordfraternity,yet his discussionof a Canadianpoliticalnationalityappearsto presupposeit, at least in some measure.Of course,the Canadianpoliticalnationalitycould be only a partialfraternity;it could not requireintense
emotionalbondsbetweenFrenchandEnglishor demanda completeidentity of sentimentsand interests.Whatthe Canadianfraternitydid suppose
was thatpeoples with distinctiveways of life could possess good will towardseach other,participatein commonendeavours,develop and sustain
common allegiancesand common sentiments,and operatepoliticalinstitutionsfor the welfare of all. Cartierspoke of such things,but left them
nameless. There is, however, a traditionof Canadianfederalism-to
which Cartierappearsto belong-that explicitlyconnectsfederalismand
fraternity."The fatherland,for us," wroteHenriBourassa,"is the whole
of Canada,thatis a federationof distinctculturesandprovinces."French
andEnglishareseparatedby languageandreligion,Bourassaadded,"but
unitedin a sense of brotherhood."45
If Cartier'spolitical nationalityas well as a traditionof Canadian
federalistthoughtcontainwithin them an appealto fraternity,then federalistscan respondto the separatistchallenge by appealingto a value
thatnationaliststhemselves embrace.When nationalistsand separatists
describe their country as their "fatherland," they imply that citizens
should treateach other as brothersand sisters. The value that nationalists appeal to is fraternity.It is the imagining of fraternity,as Benedict
Andersonhas observed, that gives meaning to the nationalist'sidea of
the nation and motivatescitizens willingly to die for it.46The fraternity
42 Cooper,"The Political Ideasof George-EtienneCartier,"291.
43 ConfederationDebates, 59.
44 Ibid., 60.
45 Cited in Ramsay Cook, Canada, Quebec and the Uses of Nationalism (Toronto:
McClellandand Stewart,1986), 190.
46 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities(London: Verso, 1991), 7. See also
AnthonySmith,National Identity(Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1991), 76.
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SAMUEL V. LASELVA
57 Donald Johnston,ed., Pierre TrudeauSpeaks Out on Meech Lake (Toronto:General Paperbacks,1990), 30-31.
58 Deborah Coyne, "The Meech Lake Accord and the Spending Power Proposals:
FundamentallyFlawed," in Michael Behiels, ed., The Meech Lake Primer (Ottawa:Universityof OttawaPress, 1989), 246.
59 Gad Horowitz, "Tories, Socialists and the Demise of Canada," in H. D. Forbes,
ed., Canadian Political Thought (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1985),
353-59.
60 Charles Taylor, "Why Do Nations Have to Become States?" in S. French,ed.,
PhilosophersLook at Confederation(Montreal:CanadianPhilosophicalAssociation, 1979), 22-23.
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