THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 145803. June 30, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENJIE PABIONA,
ROSELO BASALATAN, ANTONIO SILARCA, ROBERTO METANO, and
CHRISTOPHER DELOS REYES (at large), accused,
BENJIE PABIONA, ROSELO BASALATAN, ROBERTO METANO and
ANTONIO SILARCA, appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On appeal is the May 30, 2000 Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City, Branch 23 convicting appellants Benjie Pabiona, Roselo Basalatan,
Roberto Metano and Antonio Silarca of the crime of murder, sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering them to pay
the heirs of the victim, Robert Pagayon, the amounts of P232,100.00 as
actual damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
The Information[2] dated May 31, 1997 charging the appellants and accused
Christopher de los Reyes with murder reads as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of November, 1996, in the Municipality of
Passi, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping each other, with treachery and deliberate intent to kill,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack and assault
ROBERT PAGAYON with fist and kick blows and bamboo poles, as a result of
which the said Robert Pagayon suffered multiple physical injuries on his
body which caused his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment[3] on June 30, 1997, appellants pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged. Trial thereafter ensued. Their co-accused, Christopher de
los Reyes, has remained at large.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses whose testimonies
follow after their respective names:
Michael Pagayon (Michael), a cousin of the victim, testified that
on November 20, 1996, at about 9 p.m. at Barangay Agtambo, Passi, Iloilo,
while he was on his way to the house of his aunt, Rosalina Padernal, he
heard a cry for help emanating from a nearby river. [4] When he was about
ten (10) meters from the river, he saw appellants, including accused
Christopher de los Reyes, wielding bamboo poles. All of the accused were
striking and kicking an unidentified man who was crawling. He then heard
appellant Pabiona say, What did you tell, ha?[5] Michael then proceeded
to his aunts house and spent the night there.
The following morning, at about 6 a.m., Michael left his aunts house. On
his way to work at Villa, Iloilo, he passed by the place where he saw

appellants beating up the unidentified man. He saw two men at the area
but he kept on walking and was not able to identify them. [6]
Two weeks later, he heard a radio news report that his cousin Robert died
at Barangay Agtambo after falling into a well on the date he witnessed
appellants mauling an unknown victim. [7] He then narrated what he saw on
the night of November 20, 1996 to his wife. Two months after hearing the
radio report, he recounted what he witnessed to the mother of the victim,
Marina Pagayon.[8]
Marina Pagayon (Marina) who, like the rest of the accused, was a member
of appellant Pabionas religious group, Catholic Movement of Jesus and
Mary (CMJM), testified that at about 7 p.m. on November 20, 1996,
appellant Pabiona and his brother Popoy went to her house at Gines Viejo,
Passi, Iloilo and asked her to spend the night at his house in Dorillo Street,
Passi, Iloilo and that Robert go along with them and resume work at his
well. She acquiesced. Later that evening, appellant Basalatan, his wife
Teresita and two others arrived at the Pagayon house and they all boarded
appellant Basalatans jeepney and headed for appellant Pabionas house at
Dorillo where she and Popoy Pabiona alighted. Appellant Basalatan and
the rest of the passengers then proceeded to the well at Barangay
Agtambo.
The morning after, Marina went back to her house to attend to her
grandson. At about 11 a.m., Popoy Pabiona and Annie Ardales arrived at
her house and told her to go to Barangay Agtambo. [9] Upon arriving
thereat, she saw appellants Pabiona, Metano, Silarca, appellant Pabionas
mother Avelina, and a certain Cheryl Pampag at Pabionas nipa hut. She
then saw the lifeless body of her son-the victim on the floor of the hut. She
cried and asked appellant Pabiona what had happened. Appellant Pabiona
told her that her son died after falling into the well at about 9 a.m. She
then asked why they did not bring him to a hospital to which appellant
Pabiona replied that the victim was already dead when they found
him. Marina then noticed that her sons body was clean and he was
wearing a pair of shorts which did not belong to him, prompting her to ask
appellant Pabiona, If he fell why is it there is no mud on the body and he
is already clean.Appellant Pabiona replied that they already bathed Robert
before she arrived.[10]
A jeepney from Funeraria Pamplona later arrived to take the victims
body. While on the jeepney, appellant Pabiona instructed Marina to keep
quiet and not cry loudly as other people might hear her. He likewise
instructed her to cover the victim with a blanket and made to sit beside the
driver so that other people would not know that he was dead. Because the
victims body had already hardened, however, he was laid down on the
jeepney. His body was then taken to Funeraria Pamplona.
As Marina had misgivings about the cause of her sons death, she went to
appellant Pabionas house to talk to him and ask him again about what
really transpired before the victim died. Appellant Pabiona told her to
accept that what happened was an accident and suggested that there be
no autopsy conducted on the victims body as it might cause
trouble. Avelina, appellant Pabionas mother, then told her that she should

not be saddened as they would shoulder all the funeral expenses. [11] As she
still could not think clearly, she agreed to everything that appellant
Pabiona and his mother had told her.
Emma Pagayon (Emma), the victims sister-in-law, testified that at
about 6:30 a.m. on November 22, 1996, she was informed by Tessie
Basalatan (Tessie), the wife of appellant Basalatan, and Gina Panerio
(Gina), a member of CMJM, that the victim died after falling from the roof of
appellant Pabionas nipa hut in Barangay Agtambo. [12] Emma thus woke up
her husband Renato Pagayon and they interrogated Tessie and Gina about
the circumstances surrounding the victims alleged fall from the roof. They
were told that Robert fell face down on the ground and hit a hard object,
[13]
and that he was no longer brought to a hospital as he died
immediately. Upon further questioning by the Pagayons, Tessie and Gina
told them that nobody reported the incident to the police as all of them
were demoralized by the victims death. [14]
Emma thereupon repaired to Funeraria Pamplona and had photographs of
her brother-in-law taken as she planned to request for an autopsy of his
body. When she broached the idea of subjecting the victims body to an
autopsy to Marina, the latter initially refused because of appellant
Pabionas instructions. She later agreed upon Emmas prodding.
Emma then went to Dr. Leonardo Deza, the municipal health officer of
Passi, Iloilo, and requested for an autopsy of the victims body. Dr. Deza
was astonished and told Emma that he had already released the victims
death certificate[15] upon processing by an unidentified woman. [16] He then
immediately caused the cancellation [17] of the death certificate at the Office
of the Civil Registrar. Upon examination of the cancelled death certificate,
Emma noticed that her mother-in-laws signature therein was forged. [18]
On November 25, 1996, Emma went to Dr. Owen Jaen Lebaquin, medicolegal officer of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory Service
in Camp Delgado, Iloilo City, and requested for an autopsy of the victims
body.
Gathered from the postmortem examination conducted on the body of the
victim on December 2, 1996 by Dr. Lebaquin are the following:
FINDINGS:
Fairly
nourished,
fairly
developed
previously
embalmed
male
cadaver. Embalming incision sites are noted at the right lateral of the neck
and at the umbilical area.
HEAD, TRUNK AND EXTREMITIES:
1)
Hematoma, left periorbital area, measuring 4 x 4 cm, 5 cm from its
anterior midline.
2)
Abrasion, left mandibular area, measuring 2 x 0.5 cm, 9 cm from
its anterior midline.
3)
Area of multiple abrasion, right infraclavicular area, measuring 11
x 6 cm, 5 cm from its anterior midline.

4)
Area of multiple abrasion, sternal notch area extending to the left
supraclavicular area, measuring 8 x 6 cm, 5 cm from its anterior midline.
5)
Area of multiple abrasion, left parasternal area extending to the
left clavicular area, measuring 24 x 6 cm, 13 cm from its anterior midline.
6)
Area of multiple abrasion, right costal margin extending to the
epigastric area, measuring 29 x 11 cm, 9 cm from its anterior midline.
7)
Abrasion, left iliac area, measuring 6 x 5 cm, 11 cm from its
anterior midline.
8)
Abrasion, distal 3rd of the right thigh, measuring 9 x 3 cm, 7 cm
medial to its anterior midline.
9)
Abrasion, umbilical area, measuring 7 x 5 cm, 3 cm from its
anterior midline.
10)
Area of Multiple Abrasion, nape area along the paravertebral area
extending to the lumbar area, measuring 30 x 13 cm bisected by its
posterior midline.
A linear fracture is noted at the left sphenoid.
A blood clot measuring 2 x 1 cm at the parietal lobe of the brain left side is
noted.
Scalp hematoma is noted at the occipital area of the head.
Hemorrhagic areas are likewise noted at the underlying tissue of the left
clavicular area.
Stomach is full of partially digested food consisting mostly of rice.
CONCLUSION:
Cause of death is Cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as
a result of multiple traumatic injuries to the body. [19]
Upon the other hand, the defense presented appellants and Rosalina
Padernal whose testimonies follow after their respective names:
Appellant Pabiona testified that at about 7 p.m. on November 20, 1996, he
was told by his mother that Marina went to their house earlier to inform
him that her son-the victim would resume work at his well. [20] He thereupon
asked his brother to accompany him in fetching the victim. On arrival at
the Pagayon house at about 7:30 p.m., Marina told them to wait while she
prepared Roberts belongings. In the meantime, appellant Basalatan,
together with his wife Teresita, arrived. The six of them, on board
appellant Basalatans jeepney, then left for appellant Pabionas house
where Marina and appellant Pabionas brother alighted as they were to
spend the night there. The rest of them proceeded to appellant Pabionas
farm in Barangay Agtambo at about 9 p.m. as they planned to continue
digging at the well the following day.[21]
Appellant Pabiona and company arrived at the farm at about 9:30 p.m. and
proceeded to a nipa hut, ten (10) meters away from the well, where they
met appellants Metano, Silarca and accused de los Reyes. [22] They took

supper after which appellant Basalatan and his wife Teresita left for
home. The five remaining men then slept at the nipa hut.
Appellant Pabiona woke up the next day at about 5:45 a.m. and joined his
companions who were drinking coffee. At around 7 a.m., he told them to
stay at the nipa hut while he walked around the farm. His companions
then told him that they would start digging shortly after he leaves.
At around 11:00 a.m., when appellant Pabiona was about 500 meters from
the nipa hut, he was startled to find appellant Silarca running towards him,
shouting that the victim fell down the well. [23] Both of them thus repaired to
the well and found appellant Metano crying while accused de los Reyes
was inside the well cradling the victim. Appellant Pabiona then instructed
appellants Metano and Silarca to help the victim. After much difficulty, the
victim being heavy, they were finally able to lift him from the 15 meter
deep well by spreading his legs, placing him astride appellant Silarcas
shoulders, tying a blanket which was connected to a rope around his
armpits, pulling the rope (by appellant Pabiona) as appellant Metano and
accused de los Reyes helped appellant Silarca climb the bamboo ladder
inside the well.
After lifting the victim from the well, appellant Silarca performed mouth to
mouth resuscitation in order to revive Robert, but to no avail. [24] They
thereupon brought him to the nipa hut. Appellant Pabiona instructed
accused de los Reyes to look for a vehicle so they could bring Robert to a
doctor. He likewise ordered him to inform Marina that her son was involved
in an accident.[25]
At about 12 noon, Marina, together with Annie Ardales, arrived at the nipa
hut. Appellant Pabiona left for home at about 2:30 p.m.[26] while appellants
Metano and Silarca remained in the hut with Marina and Annie.

wife Teresita left the nipa hut at Barangay Agtambo at about 11:30 p.m.
and proceeded to their home.[31] The following day, at about 6:30 a.m., he
traveled to Iloilo City for some business and went home to Passi, Iloilo at
about 4 p.m. He was then informed by his wife that the victim died after
falling from the well at appellant Pabionas farm. [32]
Appellant Metano corroborated his co-appellants testimonies.
Rosalina Padernal, the aunt of Michael Pagayon, testified that, contrary to
her nephews testimony, Michael did not spend the night at her house
on November 20, 1996.[33] She likewise testified that sometime in April
1997, Michael, together with a companion, went to her house and told her
that if anyone asks whether he spent the night at her place on November
20, 1996, she should answer in the affirmative. [34]
By Decision of May 30, 2000, the trial court found appellants guilty of
murder. The dispositive portion reads, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and in the light of the facts obtaining
and the jurisprudence aforecited, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused Benjie Pabiona, Roselo Basalatan, Antonio Silarca and Roberto
Metano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER hereby
sentencing the aforenamed accused to a penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and further condemning all of the said accused to indemnify the
heirs of the victim actual damages in the amount of P232,100.00 and
death compensation in the sum of P50,000.00
The bail bond posted by the accused are ordered cancelled and their
subsequent
arrest
and
confinement
is
ordered. The
Jail
Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center, is ordered to remit (sic) National
Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City at the earliest opportunity.

Appellant Silarca testified that at about 9:30 p.m. on November 20, 1996,
he, together with appellant Metano and accused de los Reyes, was at
appellant Pabionas nipa hut at Barangay Agtambo to work on the nearby
well when appellants Pabiona and Basalatan, Teresita Basalatan and the
victim arrived.[27] He then substantially corroborated appellant Pabionas
testimony regarding the events that transpired that night.

Let there be issued an alias order of arrest to the accused Christopher de

los Reyes who remained (sic) at-large up to the present time.

The following morning, with appellant Metano, accused de los Reyes and
the victim, appellant Silarca prepared to work on the well. An iron bar, two
bamboo poles and a shovel were inside the well. [28] While the victim was
going down the bamboo ladder, he slipped on one of the rungs and let out
a cry.[29] Appellants Silarca and accused de los Reyes were about seven
meters away while appellant Metano was about a meter away when the
victim slipped. Accused de los Reyes and appellant Metano went down the
well to help the victim who fell on the objects earlier placed therein while
he ran to find appellant Pabiona. He then corroborated appellant Pabionas
version of the events that transpired thereafter, adding only that they
washed the victims body after lifting him from the well in order to check
his injuries, his body being covered by mud from the well. [30]

In their joint brief of February 4, 2002, appellants Basalatan and Silarca

assign the following as errors of the trial court:

Appellant Basalatan corroborated his co-appellants version of what

happened on the night of November 20, 1996 and added that he and his

III

SO ORDERED.[35]
Dissatisfied with the decision, the four appellants filed their Notice of
Appeal[36] on July 20, 2000.

I
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVEN (sic) CREDENCE TO THE
UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF THE LONE WITNESS OF THE
PROSECUTION MICHAEL PAGAYON
II
THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE IS PURELY CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND DOES NOT
SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS FOR SUFFICIENCY OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED

THE PROSECUTION HAS NOT OVERCOME THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE

GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT[37]

The trial court likewise relied upon the testimony of Michael Pagayon, the
pertinent portions of which read:

In his brief of March 9, 2002, appellant Pabiona imputes the following

errors:

Q:
Because you said you slept in the house of your aunt Rosalina
Padernal because you were not able to catch up (sic) a ride at 6:00 oclock,
at 9:00 oclock in the evening, where were you specifically at Brgy.
Agtambo?

I
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE
TO THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF LONE EYE-WITNESS MICHAEL
PAGAYON

A:
At around 9:00 oclock I went to a store to buy cigarettes but the store
was already closed.

II

Q:
Because the store was already closed at 9:00 oclock when you
intended to buy cigarettes, what happened next?

THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT, IN THE

ALTERNATIVE, THERE IS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO
WARRANT CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED
III
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY
OF THE CRIME OF MURDER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT [38]
Per certification[39] dated April 9, 2003 issued by Assistant Director Joselito
A. Fajardo of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, this Court was
informed of the death of appellant Metano on August 30, 2002.[40]
In rendering its decision, the trial court disregarded appellants version of
what transpired and relied on circumstantial evidence culled from the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, which it enumerated as follows:

A:

I walked home because there was no cigarettes.

Q:
From the store where you intended to buy cigarettes from the house
of your aunt Rosalina Padernal, how far is that in terms of meters, more or
less?
A:

About 300 meters.

xxx
Q:
When you were walking from the store where you intended to buy
cigarettes back to your house, to the house of your aunt Rosalina Padernal,
did you notice of (sic) any unusual incident?
A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

What was that about?

a)
the accused Benjie Pabiona and Roselo Basalatan personally
brought the victim Robert Pagayon to the crime scene in the evening
of November 20, 1996 situated on the property of the Pabiona family;

A:

I heard a shout asking for help.

Q:

When you heard a shout asking for help, what did you do?

b)
the presence of all the accused in the scene of the crime
immediately before, during and immediately after the incident;

A:

I went near.

c)
no one reported the death of the victim to the police authorities
nor to any barangay officials;

Q:

From where [did] that shout of help came (sic) from?

A:

From the river.

d)
the victim was not brought by the accused to the hospital
immediately after the incident;

Q:
From where you were standing at that time towards the place in the
river where the shout came from, how far from (sic) you?

e)
the driver and a laborer of Pamplona Funeral Homes were
instructed not to bring any casket when they got the cadaver of the victim
from the crime scene;

A:

10 meters.

Q:

Were you able to reach the river where the shout for help came from?

A:

No, sir.

f)
the cadaver of the victim was washed by the accused and seen by
the victims mother naked with his clothes nowhere to be found except for
a stripe (sic) short pants on not belonging to the victim;
g)
the well where the victim accidentally fell as claimed by the
accused is only five (5) meters deep with sandy soil and one (1) foot deep
water at the bottom thereof; and
h)
no other person/persons were present before, during and after the
incident except the five (5) accused. [41]

Q:
You said you were not able to reach the river where the shout came
from, how many meters more or less were you from the place where the
shout came from?
A:

10 meters.

xxx
Q:
You said you saw them mauling and kicking a person, why were you
able to see those people mauling and kicking a person?

A:

Because I went there.

xxx

Q:

What did he say?

A:

What I have heard, What did you tell, ha?

Q:

How many people were mauling that person?

Q:

How about this Antonio Silarca, what was he doing actually?

A:

Five.

A:

Also holding a bamboo.

Q:

How many persons were being mauled and kicked?

Q:

What was he doing with the bamboo?

A:

One.

A:

Striking with the bamboo.

Q:

Do you know these persons who mauled the person?

Q:

How about Roselo Basalatan, what was he doing at that time?

A:

Yes, sir.

A:

Also holding a bamboo.

Q:

Can you mention their names?

Q:

What was he doing?

A:

Yes, sir.

A:

Also hitting.

Q:

Please tell the Court?

Q:

How about Roberto Metano, what was he doing at that time?

A:
Benjie Pabiona, Antonio Silarcan (sic), Roberto Metano (Witness
pointing to persons seated on the accused bench), Roselo Basalatan,
Christopher delos Reyes.

A:

Also the same.

Q:

How about Christopher delos Reyes, what was he doing at that time?

Q:

This Benjie Pabiona that you mentioned, is he inside the Courtroom?

A:

Also the same.

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

Have you seen how big is the bamboo being held by Benjie Pabiona?

Q:
Please point to him? (Witness pointing to a person inside the
Courtroom who when asked answered to the name of Benjie Pabiona.

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

Will you please show?

Q:

How about Antonio Silarca, is he inside the Courtroom?

A:

As big as my wrist which is about 2 inches in diameter.

A:

Yes, sir.

xxx

Q:
Please point to the accused. (Witness pointing to a person when
asked answered to the name of Antonio Silarca).
Q:
How about Roselo Basalatan? (Witness pointing to a person when
asked answered to the name of Roselo Basalatan).

Q:
At thattime (sic), at about 9:00 oclock in the evening that you saw
these people mauling the person, do you know the person being mauled at
that time?
A:

No, sir.

Q:
How about Roberto Metano? (Witness pointing to a person who
answered to the name of Roberto Metano).

Q:
Because that night you did not know who the person being mauled
(sic), what did you do?

Q:

How about Christopher delos Reyes, is he inside the Courtroom?

A:

I went home.

A:

No, sir.

Q:

You went home to whose house?

A:

Antie (sic) Saling.

Q:

The following morning what time did you wake up?

A:

6:00 oclock.

Q:

When you woke up where did you go?

A:

I went back to Iloilo to my work.

Q:
You said that these people were mauling aperson (sic), what was
Benjie Pabiona particularly doing at that time you saw (sic)?
A:

Holding a bamboo.

Q:

What was he doing with the bamboo?

A:

Striking.

Q:
While he was striking the person with the bamboo, was he saying
anything?
A:

Yes, sir.

xxx
Q:

Were you present when Robert Pagayon died?

A:

No, sir.

Q:

So you do not personally know at what time did Robert Pagayon die?

A:

No, sir.

Q:
Also you do not know on what date Robert Pagayon died because you
were not there?
A:
I do not know the time, place on November 21 and November 20
when he died.
Q:
Also you do not know the actual circumstances and how Robert
Pagayon died because you were not there?
A:

I know.

Q:

You were there when Robert Pagayon died?

A:

No, sir.

Q:
So how did you know how Robert Pagayon died because you said you
do (sic) were not there?
A:

When he was mauled he is not yet dead.

Q:

Did you see Robert Pagayon being mauled?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

You are very positive that you saw Robert Pagayon being mauled?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

You said that because you saw the person being mauled?

A:

The one being mauled I do not know him when he was being mauled.

circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable

doubt. With respect to the third requisite, the circumstantial evidence
presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of others,
as the guilty person.[45] All the circumstances must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with
every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.[46]
From a considered scrutiny of the evidence in the case at bar in light of the
standards set forth above, this Court holds that the evidence adduced by
the prosecution does not prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of
appellants.
The evidence does not rule out the possibility that there had only been an
accidental death. Hitting ones head on a hard object such as an iron bar
or shovel after accidentally slipping could account for the fracture, blood
clot and scalp hematoma found on the back of the victims head which, in
turn, could have caused his death soon thereafter. As testified to by Dr.
Lebaquin:
Q:
Of these injuries mentioned, what could have been considered as the
fatal injury which caused the death?
A:

Fracture of the skull.

xxx
Q:
In terms of minutes, how many minutes or hours will death occur
after these injuries were sustained?
A:
There was a blood clot. I think immediately, it is possible the victim
could have died minutes after.

Q:
And you are saying that you are merely making a conclusion and your
opinion that the person mauled was Robert Pagayon?

Q:

5 minutes?

A:

Possible.

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

10 minutes?

Q:

That is your own belief?

A:

Possible.[47]

A:

Yes, sir.

The victims injuries, contrary to the trial courts evaluation, are more
consistent with appellants version of the events that transpired
on November 21, 1996. While the victim sustained a fracture, a hematoma
and a blood clot on his head, the rest of the injuries on his body are mere
abrasions.[48] Abrasions are injuries characterized by the removal of the
superficial epithelial layer of the skin caused by rubbing or friction against
a hard rough surface. [49] Such abrasions found on the victims body are
more likely to have been caused by his slipping from the bamboo ladder
and falling into the well rather than by force applied by five able-bodied
men striking him with bamboo poles and kicking him as claimed by the
prosecution. As testified to by Dr. Lebaquin:

[42]

The fundamental issue in the instant appeal is whether or not there is

sufficient circumstantial evidence to sustain the trial courts judgment
finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of
facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference.
[43]
Such evidence is founded on experience and observed facts and
coincidences establishing a connection between the known and proven
facts and the facts sought to be proved.[44]
Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules on Evidence provides that circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following requisites are complied
with: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the

Q:
Next item, Injury No. 2. Abrasion, left mandibular area, measuring 2 x
0.5 cm. 9 cm. from its anterior midline. Please point to the Court where is
this situated?

A:

Left jaw.

Q:
In the laymans language, please kindly explain to the Court this
injury?
A:
In our dialect this is called gasgas, caused by rubbing in a rough
surface.
Q:

Please explain what could have caused this?

A:

Rubbing of the skin at hard object. [50]

The mere presence of appellants at an alleged locus criminis does not

suffice to implicate them in a crime, [51] more so as in the case at bar where
appellants presence was sufficiently explained to have been due to their
digging of the well on appellant Pabionas property which commenced long
before November 20, 1996.
While the motive of the accused in a criminal case is generally held to be
immaterial, not being an element of the crime, motive becomes important
when, as in this case, the evidence of the commission of the crime is
purely circumstantial or inconclusive and there is some doubt on whether a
crime has been committed or whether the accused has committed it. [52]

xxx
A:

I saw the two but I do not know them.

Q:
But during the direct examination you said there were five (5)
persons who mauled (sic)?
A:

Yes, sir.[57]

That appellants were the malefactors cannot be simply inferred from the
mere fact that appellant Pabiona and his family offered to shoulder the
expenses for the burial of Robert. As the victim was in appellant Pabionas
employ and died while working at his well, it was not unnatural for him to
make an offer to bear the expenses that Marina would incur attendant to
the burial of her son.
Nor can appellants failure to report the victims death to police authorities
and barangay officials be considered as an indication of their guilt, as the
records show that they, through their relatives,[58] immediately informed
the victims mother and brother that he died.
The other circumstances enumerated by the trial court are too equivocal to
establish appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In the case at bar, the prosecution was unable to establish motive of the
appellants in allegedly perpetrating the offense charged. In fact,
prosecution eyewitness Michael Pagayon testified:

In People v. Capili,[59] this Court similarly ruled that the circumstantial

evidence adduced by the prosecution was utterly inadequate to justify a
judgment of conviction:

Q:
Before November 20, 1996, do you know if there was any
misunderstanding or quarrel between Robert Pagayon on the one hand and
any or all of the accused here in Court?

In fact, there is even some possibility that Baduas identification of

accused-appellant as the perpetrator was a mere afterthought, there being
no definite lead as to the identity of the author of the crime even after the
lapse of several days following the finding of the cadaver of the victim by
the riverside on October 7, 1994. The foregoing considerations taken
together cast reasonable doubt on the culpability of accused-appellant as
killer of Alberto Capili. The evidence which stands on record does not
eliminate the possibility of absence of foul-play, i.e., that there had been
only an accidental death by drowning. Striking a rock after accidentally
slipping could cause contusions similar to those found at the back of the
victims head and shoulders and result in the loss of consciousness leading
to drowning. Only by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which requires moral
certainty, may the presumption of innocence be overcome. Moral certainty
has been defined as a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason
and conscience of those who are to act upon it. Absent the moral
certainty that accused-appellant caused the death of the victim, acquittal
perforce follows.[60]

A:

No, sir, he has no enemy. [53]

The records reveal, on the other hand, that the Pagayons enjoyed close
relations with appellants, Marina being, as reflected above, a co-member of
the appellants in CMJM. It was even shown that she was accustomed to
sleeping over at the Pabiona residence at every opportunity. [54]
This Court likewise notes prosecution eyewitness Michael Pagayons
inordinate delay in reporting what he allegedly saw on the night
of November 20, 1996. Even after hearing the radio news report on his
cousin-the victims death on December 1, 1996 and deducing that he was
the victim of the mauling that he claimed to have witnessed, he only
reported such incident to his aunt Marina and the authorities two months
later. It is but logical for a relative who was an eyewitness to a crime to
promptly and audaciously take the necessary steps to bring the culprit into
the hands of the law and seek justice for the poor victim. [55]
It may be relevant to note too that while in his direct examination, Michael
categorically declared that he saw only five persons mauling an
unidentified man,[56] in his cross examination, he testified that there were
actually seven men:
Q:
In this affidavit of yours you stated that aside from the five accused
here, there were 2 other persons because you said there were seven (7)
persons mauling another, do you remember that?

It is a basic principle in criminal law that where the evidence is capable of

two or more inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of
innocence and the other compatible with a finding of guilt, the court must
acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and therefore is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction.
[61]
Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt
on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of
proof loses.[62]

In the case at bar, two antithetical interpretations may be inferred from the
evidence presented. The pieces of circumstantial evidence do not
inexorably lead to the conclusion that appellants are guilty of the crime
charged.
The circumstances proffered by the prosecution and relied upon by the trial
court only create suspicion that appellants probably perpetrated the crime
charged. However, it is not sufficient for a conviction that the evidence
establishes a strong suspicion or probability of guilt. [63]
The basis of acquittal in this case is reasonable doubt, the evidence for the
prosecution not being sufficient to sustain and prove the guilt of appellants
with moral certainty. By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of
possibility may arise but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of
the whole proof and an inability, after such an investigation, to let the mind
rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.[64] An acquittal based on reasonable
doubt will prosper even though the appellants innocence may be doubted,
for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defense.[65]
WHEREFORE,
the May
30,
2000 decision
of
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Appellants Benjie Pabiona, Roselo Basalatan, and Antonio
Silarca are ACQUITTED of the charge of murder on the ground of
reasonable doubt. Their immediate release from custody is hereby ordered
unless they are being held for other lawful causes.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 157039. October 1, 2004]
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
DIMALANTA, appellant.

JOSEFINA

M.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, Branch 121, in Criminal Case No. C-58083 (99), which disposed of the
case thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused JOSEFINA M.
DIMALANTA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ESTAFA and
sentences her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 30 years of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the private complainant Elvira D. Abarca
the sum of P383,826.00.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.[1]
On November 10, 1999, appellant was charged with Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 818, in an Information which reads:
That sometime during the month of October, 1998 in Caloocan City, MM.
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, after misrepresentation that she has more than enough fund,
defrauded and deceived one, ELVIRA D. ABARCA in the following manner,
to wit: said accused purchased and received assorted jewelries from
herein complainant in the total amount of P408,826.00 and in payment
thereof, accused simultaneously issued the following Panasaid [should
read: Panasia] Banking, Inc. checks, to wit:
Check No.

Date

Amount

0002598

Nov. 30, 1998

P 37,166.00

0020952

Dec. 15, 1998

37, 166.00

0020953

Dec. 31, 1998

37, 166.00

0020954

Jan. 15, 1999

37, 166.00

0020956

Jan. 31, 1999

37, 166.00

0020957

Feb. 15, 1999

37, 166.00

0020958

Feb. 28, 1999

37, 166.00

0020959

Mar. 15, 1999

37, 166.00

0020960

Mar. 31, 1999

37, 166.00

0020961

Apr. 15, 1999

37, 166.00

0020962

Apr. 30, 1999

37, 166.00
--------------P408,826.00

when said accused knew fully well that at the time the said checks were
not covered with sufficient funds in said bank and would not have such
fund even on the date stated on the faces thereof, and when the said
checks were presented to the drawee bank for encashment, the same were
dishonored for the reason ACCOUNT CLOSED and despite due notice as
required by Republic Act 4885 and further amended by PD 818 and despite
repeated demands, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
refuse and fail to make good her checks and still refused and fails to do so,
to the damage and prejudice of herein complainant ELVIRA D. ABARCA in
the aforestated amount of P408,826.00.
Contrary to law.[2]

jewelry. Appellant and complainant agreed that Maranan will sell the
jewelry and, upon the latters confirmation that the items had been sold,
appellant shall deliver to complainant the postdated checks in payment
therefor. They further agreed that the unsold pieces of jewelry shall be
returned to complainant.[9]
In the middle of September 1998, complainant delivered to appellant the
pieces of jewelry to be sold, which were then picked up by Maranan. After
one week, appellant issued to complainant postdated checks representing
the purchase price of the sold jewelry, with the understanding that
Maranan will fund the same. Maranan was able to remit to appellant
money to cover the first check, hence it was honored by the drawee bank.
[10]

Maranan failed to fund the second check. In order to cover its amount,
appellant gave complainant P25,000.00 out of her own money as partial
satisfaction. Subsequently, Maranan, who had apparently encountered
financial problems, went into hiding. As a consequence, the rest of
appellants checks were dishonored.[11]
On October 16, 2002, the trial court rendered the appealed decision
convicting appellant of Estafa.

On January 24, 2000, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, was

arraigned. She entered a plea of not guilty.[3] Trial on the merits followed
in due course.

In the instant appeal, appellant alleged that the Regional Trial Court
committed reversible errors:

The evidence for the prosecution disclosed that in the first week of October
1998, appellant, who was then employed at the Caloocan City Engineers
Office, called up complainant Elvira D. Abarca on the telephone to express
her desire to purchase jewelry. Complainant went to appellants house,
located at No. 89 P. Jacinto Street, Caloocan City, where the latter
purchased twelve pairs of jewelry. In payment thereof, appellant issued
twelve postdated checks with the representation that the same will be
sufficiently funded on their respective maturity dates. [4]

IN FINDING APPELLANT JOSEFINA M. DIMALANTA

REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA;

The first check issued by appellant was honored and paid by the drawee
bank. However, the eleven checks, which are enumerated in the
Information, were all returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the reason
that appellants account was closed. [5] Thus, on May 28, 1999,
complainants counsel wrote a letter to appellant informing her of the
dishonor of the eleven checks and demanding payment of the value of the
checks within five banking days from receipt thereof. [6] The letter was sent
to appellant by registered mail on June 7, 1999. [7]

IN ORDERING HER
P383,826.00.[12]

Appellant failed to pay the value of the checks despite the lapse of the
five-day period contained in the demand letter. On June 21, 1999,
appellant filed with the Prosecutors Office a complaint charging appellant
with the crimes of Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.[8]

Appellant was charged with and convicted of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4885, defined as follows:

In her defense, appellant denied that she purchased jewelry from

complainant, saying that she could not afford them. She alleged that it
was complainant who approached her asking for help in selling jewelry. In
turn, appellant asked her friend, Levinia Maranan, to look for buyers for the

xxx

I
GUILTY

BEYOND

II
IN SENTENCING HER TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF 30
YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA; AND
III
TO

PAY

COMPLAINANT

ABARCA

THE

SUM

OF

The Office of the Solicitor General thereafter filed a Manifestation and

Motion in Lieu of Appellees Brief, recommending that a judgment of
acquittal be rendered in Criminal Case No. C-58083 (99) without prejudice
to appellants civil liability as found by the trial court. [13]
The appeal has merit.

2.
By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
xxx

xxx.

(d)
By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation
when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein
were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the
drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check
within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee
or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of
funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or
fraudulent act.
xxx

xxx

xxx.

Presidential Decree No. 818 amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code insofar as the penalties for felonies under paragraph 2 (d) are
concerned, viz:
SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false
pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall be
punished by:
1st. The penalty of reclusin temporal if the amount of the fraud is over
12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case
exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty shall be termed reclusin perpetua;
2nd. The penalty of prisin mayor in its maximum period, if the amount of
the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of prisin mayor in its medium period, if such amount is
over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By prisin mayor in its minimum period, if such amount does not
exceed 200 pesos.
The elements of this form of Estafa are: (1) postdating or issuing a check in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2)
lack of sufficient funds to cover the check; (3) knowledge on the part of the
offender of such circumstances; and (4) damage to the complainant. [14]
Damage and deceit are essential elements of the offense and must be
established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. The false
pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or simultaneously
with the issuance of the bad check. [15] Thus, the drawer of the dishonored
check is given three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor to cover
the amount of the check. Otherwise a prima facie presumption of deceit
arises.[16]
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to establish beyond a shadow of a
doubt that appellant employed deceit. Its evidence was overcome by the
defenses proof that the pieces of jewelry were not purchased by appellant

for her own use; rather the same were merely given to her for resale. This
much is admitted by complainant, to wit:
ATTY. QUIROZ:
Q. Is it not a fact, Madam Witness, that it was your agreement with Mrs.
Dimalanta that these jewelries were subject of a reselling, that she will sell
them?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. You were very aware of that?

A.

Yes, sir.[17]

In point of fact, appellant was able to show that she was merely requested
by complainant to assist in the sale of the jewelry. In her desire to help,
she was able to convince Levinia Maranan to dispose of the items.
Appellant further testified that the checks she issued to complainant were
to be funded by Maranan everytime she was able to sell pieces of jewelry.
Significantly, the Office of the Solicitor Generals own findings sustain
appellants position. Thus, in its Manifestation and Motion in lieu of
Appellees Brief wherein it joined the prayer for appellants acquittal, it
made the following observations:
This admission lends credence to the claim of appellant that she
subsequently delivered the jewelry to Maranan. It was only after notice
from Maranan that the jewelry had been sold on installment that appellant
issued the postdated checks. The issuance of the checks was merely to
facilitate collection by Abarca of payments due. Thus, the checks were not
the efficient cause of the defraudation. The bad checks were not issued
prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud, but rather, for a pre-existing
obligation. This fact is evidenced by Abarcas own testimony that appellant
signed a piece of paper acknowledging receipt of the jewelry, the
individual items of which were listed therein. Abarca went on to say that
she no longer had the receipt signed by appellant, which was why she had
to rely on another list on a pink slip of paper during her testimony in court
(TSN, April 23, 2001, p. 4). If indeed appellant issued the postdated checks
as payment for the jewelry on the same occasion that the said jewelry
were delivered, why then would she need to sign a receipt for the same?
Moreover, why was the said receipt no longer in the possession of Abarca?
It is entirely possible that Abarca surrendered the receipt upon the
subsequent delivery of the checks to her by appellant.
xxx

xxx

xxx.

Thus, even assuming that the checks were indeed issued simultaneously
with the delivery of the jewelry as Abarca claims, she was not induced to
part with the jewelry because of the checks. Abarca admitted that she
knew that appellant was just a secretary at the Caloocan City Hall and that
the latter was merely renting the place where she was residing. These
facts tend to show that Abarca was aware of the financial status of
appellant, that is, that the latter could not afford the P408,826.00-price of
the jewelry. Consequently, Abarca must have likewise known at the time

the checks were issued that appellant had no money of her own to fund
the checks on their maturity. She was well aware that the jewelry were to
be sold by appellant and that the proceeds of the sale would be deposited
by the latter in her current account to fund the checks. It was a business
arrangement she entered into with appellant whereby the latter would
assist her in selling the jewelry. Abarca had been in the business of buying
and selling jewelry for around ten years already. Abarca was thus fully
aware of the conditions, advantages and disadvantages of the
arrangement and cannot now allege to be the victim of deceit. [18]

Courts are mandated to put prosecution evidence under severe testing.

Furthermore, the constitutional presumption of innocence requires them to
take a more than casual consideration of every circumstance or doubt
favoring the innocence of the accused. [24] The evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the defense. [25] Considering the failure of
the prosecution to discharge its burden of proof and overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence, it is not only appellants right to
be freed; it is, even more, this Courts constitutional duty to acquit her. [26]

In effect, therefore, appellant issued the checks as evidence of

indebtedness to cover the value of the jewelry. It has been ruled in this
connection that a drawer who issues a check as security or evidence of
investment is not liable for Estafa.[19]

Anent the civil liability which was impliedly instituted together with the
criminal action, it appears that Levinia Maranan, in whom resided the duty
to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the jewelry or to return the same if
unsold, must be impleaded either as a co-defendant or a third-party
defendant. Since she was not a party in the case at bar, a separate action
should be instituted for the full determination of the civil liability.

Furthermore, we find that appellant acted in good faith during the

transaction. After the first check was dishonored, she exerted best efforts
to make good the value of the check, albeit only to the extent of
P25,000.00. Good faith is a defense to a charge of Estafa by postdating a
check. This may be manifested by appellants act of offering to make
arrangements with complainant as to the manner of payment.[20]
In the recent case of People v. Ojeda, et al.,[21] it was held:
The prosecution failed to prove deceit in this case. The prima
facie presumption of deceit was successfully rebutted by appellants
evidence of good faith, a defense in estafa by postdating a check. Good
faith may be demonstrated, for instance, by a debtors offer to arrange a
payment scheme with his creditor. In this case, the debtor not only made
arrangements for payment; as complainant herself categorically stated,
the debtor-appellant fully paid the entire amount of the dishonored checks.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, in Criminal Case No. C58083 (99), is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Josefina M. Dimalanta
is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. The civil action is
DISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of a separate action to recover
the civil liability under the transaction. The bail bond posted for her
provisional liberty is CANCELLED and RELEASED.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

It must be noted that our Revised Penal Code was enacted to penalize
unlawful acts accompanied by evil intent denominated as crimes mala in
se. The principal consideration is the existence of malicious intent. There
is a concurrence of freedom, intelligence and intent which together make
up the criminal mind behind the criminal act. Thus, to constitute a
crime, the act must, generally and in most cases, be accompanied by a
criminal intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. No crime is
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is
innocent.
Indeed, any allegation of intent of malice or deceit on appellants part was
rebutted by her extraordinary effort to pay complainant notwithstanding
her own financial situation.[22]
In the case at bar, the evidence for the prosecution is concededly weak. In
such cases, even if the evidence for defense is also weak, the accused
must be duly accorded the benefit of the doubt in view of the constitutional
presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys.
When the
circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one
of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other is
compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the
court must acquit.[23]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992

ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

was in the safekeeping of the financing company which is managed

by the officials and employees of LS Finance.

PARAS, J.:
Facts:

Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment

to make his car repair shop operational, approached Corazon Teng,
Vice President of Mancor Industries.

VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management

Corporation, advising its Vice President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor
was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance
could accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities.

The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total

amount of the equipment as warranty deposit but Magno couldn't
afford to pay so he requested VP Gomez to look for third party who
could lend him that amount.

Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided

that amount.

As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of

them were cleared and the rest had no sufficient fund.

Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS

Finance which then pulled out the equipment.

Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks

Law) and found guilty.

Issue:

Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the

checks in question.

Held:

No

Ratio:

EN BANC
To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did
not withdraw as it was not his own account, it having remained
with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust debt since he
did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount

[G.R. No. 142773. January 28, 2003]

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARLON
DELIM, LEON DELIM, MANUEL DELIM alias BONG (At Large),

ROBERT
DELIM
(At
Large),
DELIM alias BONG, accused-appellants.

and

RONALD

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

TREACHERY- there is treachery when the offender commits any of the

crimes against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.
For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove:

FACTS OF THE CASE:

It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46

(Urdaneta City) finding the appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
sentencing them to death for the murder of Modesto Bantas.
Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are
related for modesto is an adopted son of their father. On January 23,1999
Marlon, Robert and Ronald Delim charged into the house and poked a gun
at modesto and herded him outside the house. Leon and Manuel Delim
both armed stayed put and made sure that randy and rita stayed put.
Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon,
Ronald, and Leon used denial and alibi as their evidence against the
charge.
*alibis are the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to contrive and
difficult to disprove

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that murder can
be the crime?

Yes there is:

CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit

a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the
same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the
existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at
the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose
and were united in its executed.
appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts
were synchronized and executed with precision evincing a preconceived
plan to kill Modesto

There is no:

a. employment of means of execution which gives the person no

opportunity
to defend himself
b. the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted
in the appellants case there are no evidence to the particulars on how
Modesto was assaulted and killed and this in fact does mean that treachery
cannot be proven since it cannot be presumed that modesto was
defenseless during the time that he was being attacked and shot at by the
appellants.
Sheer numbers by the appellants when they attacked modesto does not
constitute proof that the three took advantage of their numerical
superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.

HELD:
APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE FELONY OF
HOMICIDE (THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS WERE MODIFIED TO
LOWER THE CRIME FROM MURDER TO HOMICIDE)

FIRST DIVISION
ESMERALDO RIVERA, ISMAEL

G.R. No. 166326

RIVERA, EDGARDO RIVERA,

Petitioners,

Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

- versus -

CALLEJO, SR., and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

January 25, 2006

FACTS:
As the victim, Ruben Rodil, went to a nearby store to buy food, accused
Edgardo Rivera mocked him for being jobless and dependent on his wife
for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and thereafter, a heated exchange
of words ensued. In the evening of the following day, when Ruben and his
three-year-old daughter went to the store to buy food, Edgardo, together
with his brother Esmeraldo Rivera and Ismael Rivera, emerged from their
house and ganged up on him. Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with
fist blows. And as he fell to the ground, Edgardo hit him three times with a
hollow block on the parietal area. Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to
their house only when the policemen arrived. Ruben sustained injuries and
was brought to the hospital. The doctor declared that the wounds were
slight and superficial, though the victim could have been killed had the
police not promptly intervened. The trial court found the accused guilty of
the crime of frustrated murder. An appeal was made by the accused, but
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision with modification,
changing the crime to attempted murder and imposed an indeterminate
penalty of 2 years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day
of prision mayor as maximum.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not
2) Whether or not
from frustrated to
3) Whether or not
applied.
4) Whether or not

there was intent to kill.

the Court of Appeals was correct in modifying the crime
attempted murder.
the aggravating circumstance of treachery was properly
the correct penalty was imposed.

HELD:
1) Yes. The Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes
against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the
malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the
victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately
after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. In the present case, Esmeraldo
and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows, while Edgardo hit him
three times with a hollow block. Even though the wounds sustained by the
victim were merely superficial and could not have produced his death,
intent to kill was presumed.
2) Yes. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is an
attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. Although the wounds sustained by the victim
were merely superficial and could not have produced his death, it does not
negate criminal liability of the accused for attempted murder. The intent to
kill was already presumed based on the overt acts of the accused. In fact,
victim could have been killed had the police not promptly intervened.
3) Yes. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack,
which gives no opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend himself. In
the present case, the accused attacked the victim in a sudden and
unexpected manner as he was walking with his three-year-old daughter,
impervious of the imminent peril to his life. He was overwhelmed with the
assault of the accused and had no chance to defend himself and retaliate.
Thus, there was treachery.
4) No. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since the accused were guilty only of attempted murder, the
penalty should be reduced by two degrees, in accordance to Article 51 of
the Revised Penal Code. Thus, under Article 61 (2), in relation to Article 71
of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty should be prision mayor. In the
absence of any modifying circumstance in the commission of the crime
other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision
mayor which has a range of from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten
(10) years. To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, the
penalty of prision mayor should be reduced by one degree, prision
correccional, which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. Hence, the accused were sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of from two (2) years of prision correccional in its minimum period,
as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its
medium period, as maximum.

Ruling:

JOY LEE RECUERDO

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,G.R. No. 168217, June 27, 2006, First
Division, Callejo, Sr. J.

Facts:
In September 1994, three separate Criminal Informations charging Joy Lee
Recuerdo of Estafa under Article 315,paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code involving 18 worthless bank checks were simultaneously filed by the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan. Evidence adduced by the
Prosecution tend to establish that herein private respondent Yolanda G.
Floro is engaged in the business of buying and selling of jewelry since
1985. Herein accused-appellant/petitioner Joy Lee Recuerdo, on the other
hand, a dentist by profession, who was introduced to Floro by the latters
cousin Aimee Aoro in the first week of December 1993, became her
customer. Sometime in the second week of December 1993, at around
7:30in the evening, Recuerdo went to the house of Floro and purchased
from her two pieces of jewelry, to wit: a 2.19carat diamond round stone in
white gold setting worthP220,000.00 pesos, and one piece of loose 1.55
karat marquez diamond with a value of P130,000.00 pesos.
For the 2.19 carat diamond stone, accused issued and delivered to the
complainant then and there ten post-dated checks each in the amount of
P22,000.00 drawn against Unitrust Development Bank. For the 1.55 carat
marquez loose diamond, accused issued and delivered to complainant then
and there ten (10) post dated checks, each in the amount of P13,000.00
drawn against PCI Bank, Makati. In yet another transaction that transpired
in the early evening of February 7, 1994, Recuerdo once again proceeded
at Floros house and bought another set of jewelry, this time a pair of
diamond earrings worth P768,000.00 pesos. She was given seven (7)
postdated checks one for P168,000.00 as down payment and another six
(6) postdated checks drawn against Prudential Bank, Legaspi Village,
Makati Branch, each for P100,000.00 representing the balance in the
aggregate amount of P600,000.00 pesos. Floro deposited the
aforementioned checks at Liberty Savings & Loan Association,
Meycauayan, Bulacan. Upon presentment for encashment by said
depositary bank with the different drawee banks on their respective
maturity yates, the six (6) Prudential Bank checks were all dishonored for
having been drawn against closed accounts

Issue: Is Recuerdo guilty of estafa under Art. 315 par. 2(d)?

The crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code has the following basic elements:- Postdating or issuance of a check
in payment of an obligation contracted simultaneously at the time the
check was issued;- The postdating or issuance was done when the
offender had no funds in the bank, or that his funds deposited therein were
not
sufficient
to
cover
the
amount
of
the
check;
and- Damage to the payee thereof The existence of the foregoing elements
of the crime was concretely established by the prosecution through
convincing evidence, warranting petitioners conviction of the offense of
Estafa.
The trial court found private complainant Floros testimony that petitioner
issued the subject checks as payment for the purchase of pieces of jewelry
simultaneous to their transactions to be categorical and credible.
There was sufficient evidence established by the prosecution that the
checks were issued by the accused to the complainant in exchange of the
pieces of jewelry given to her on two separate occasions.

The United States, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Ah Chong, defendant-appellant.

He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door

that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his
way into the room

The defendant warned the intruder "If you enter the room, I will kill
you."

Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the
defendant struck out wildly at the intruder (when he entered the
room) who turned out to be his roommate Pascual

Pascual ran out upon the porch heavily wounded

Recognizing Pascual, the defendant called to his employers who

slept in the next house and ran back to his room to secure
bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds

Pascual died from the effects of the wound the following day

The roommates appear to have been in friendly and amicable

terms prior to the incident, and had an understanding that
when either returned at night, he should knock that the
door and acquaint his companion with his identity

The defendant alleges that he kept the knife under his pillow as
personal protection because of repeated robberies in Fort McKinley

Defendant admitted to stabbing his roommate, but said that he did

it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron (thief)" because
he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite the
defendant's warnings

Defendant was found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide,

with extenuating (mitigating) circumstances, and sentenced to 6
years and 1 day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed
by law

En Banc
Carson, March 19, 1910
Topic: Mental element (Mens rea) - Deliberate intent (Dolo) - Mistake of fact
Facts:

The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27,"

Fort McKinley, Rizal Province

Pascual Gualberto, deceased, works at the same place as a house

boy or muchacho

"Officers' quarters, No. 27" was a detached house some 40 meters

from the nearest building

No one slept in the house except the two servants who jointly
occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of
which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the
building

This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its

entire length and height

The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent

bolt or lock; the occupants, as a measure of security, had
attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door,
and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure
means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10:00 pm, the defendant
was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of
the room

He called out twice, "Who is there?"

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant can be held criminally responsible

Holding:

No.

Ratio:

By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act

for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts
were as he supposed them to be (i.e. if Pascual was actually a
thief, he will not be criminally liable/responsible because it would
be self-defense), but would constitute the crime of homicide or
assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts (i.e.

if he knew that it was actually Pascual, he would be guilty of

homicide/assassination)

The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to

negligence or bad faith

"The act itself foes not make man guilty unless his intention were
so"

The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without

which it cannot exist

"The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as

they appear to him."

If one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which

will justify a killing, if without fault or carelessness he does believe
them, he is legally guiltless of the homicide

The defendant was doing no more than exercise his

legitimate right of self-defense

He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or

recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his
mistake as to the facts

RTC's decision is reversed. The defendant is acquitted.

Loney vs. People

G.R. No. 152644, Feb. 10, 2006
Facts:
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid and Pedro B. Hernandez are
the Pres. and CEO, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining
Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corp., a corporation
engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque. Marcopper had been
storing tailings (mine waste) from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian,
Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the
Boac and Makulapnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a
concrete plug at the tunnels end.On March 24, 1994, tailings gushed out
of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, Mt. Tapianpit had discharged
millions of tons of tailings in to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the DOJ separately charged petitioners in the MTC of Boac,
Marinduque with violation of Art. 91 (B), subparagraphs 5 and 6 of P.D. No.
1067 or the Water code of the Phil., Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 984 or the National
Pollution Decree of 1976, Sec.108 of R.A. No. 7942 or the Phil. Mining Act of
1995, and Art. 365 of the RPC for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Damage to Property .In the Consolidated Order of MTC, granting partial
reconsideration to its Joint Order quashing the information for violation of
PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the Informations for violation of
RA 7942 and Art. 365 of the RPC. Petitioners subsequently filed a petition

for certiorari with the RTC assailing that the portion of the Consolidated
Order maintaining the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and the
petition was raffled to Br. 94while public respondents appeal assailing that
portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the Info. for violation of P.D.
1067 and P.D. 984 and this appeal was consolidated with petitioners
petition. MTC Br. 94 granted the public respondents appeal but denied
petitioners petition. Petitioners then filed for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals alleging that Br. 94 acted with grave abuse of discretion because
1.the Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA7942 and the Art.
365 of the RPC proceeded from are based on a single act or incident
of polluting the rivers thru dumping of mine tailings, and the charge for
violation of Art 365 of the RPC absorbs the other charges since the element
of lack of necessary or adequate protection, negligence, recklessness
and imprudence is common among them, 2. The duplicitous nature of the
Informations contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the Br. 94 ruling.
Issue:
1. Whether or not all the charges filed against petitioners except one
should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand2.
whether or not Br. 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
contravenes People v. Relova.
Ruling:
The petition has no merit. Duplicity of charges simply means a single
complaint or information charges more than one offense, as Sec. 13 of Rule
110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. As early as the start of the
last century, the court ruled that a single act or incident might offend
against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus
justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense and the
only limit is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishing for the same offense. In People vs. Doriquez, the
court held that two or more offenses arising form the same act are not the
same. And so, double jeopardy is not an issue because not all its elements
are present. On petitioners claim that the charges for violation of Art. 365
of the RPC absorbs the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984 and RA
7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se elony (such as Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Damage in Property) cannot absorb mala
prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984 and RA 7942).
What makes the former felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence
(culpa) and what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting
them. Petitioners reiterate their contention in that their prosecution
contravenes ruling in People vs. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the
courts
statement
in
Relova
that
the
law
seeks to prevent
harassment of the accused by multiple prosecutions for offenses which
though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a
common set or over lapping sets of technical elements. Thus, Relova is no
authority for petitioners claim against multiple prosecutions based on a
single act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not an issue
here, but also because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being

prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four national statutes and

not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever fall
under the first sentence of Sec. 21, Art. III which prohibits multiple
prosecution for the same offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising
from the same incident.

TINGA, JJ.

HONORABLE
COURT
APPEALS and THE PEOPLE
THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

OF
OF

Promulgated:

March 14, 2006

In 1980, Dynetics Inc, through its president, acquired a P25M export loan
from Security Bank. In 1982, a credit accommodation (SWAP loan) was
opened by Security Bank in favor of Dynetics allowing it to acquire an
additional $700k loan. This loan was secured by an Indemnity Agreement
signed by Garcia acting as a surety. This loan was not availed of by
Dynetics however.
In 1993, the SWAP loan was renewed but it was reduced to $500k. This
time, Dynetics availed of it. Garcia still acted as surety but there was no
Indemnity Agreement involved. Later, Dynetics, without Garcias
knowledge, executed several Chattel Mortgages in favor of Security Bank.
Dynetics defaulted from paying. Security Bank foreclosed the mortgages.
The proceeds were applied to the SWAP loan leaving a balance of P3.5M.
The Export loan has a balance of P464M.
Security Bank is now demanding Garcia, as surety, to pay for the
deficiency in both loans.
ISSUE: Whether or not Garcia is liable for both loans.
HELD: No. The Indemnity Agreement specifically secured the $700k SWAP
loan which was not availed of. The Continuing Suretyship, on the other
hand, specifically secured the reduced $500k SWAP loan. The Indemnity
Agreement is not involved in the reduced SWAP loan. There was no reason
for SBTC to require the execution of the Continuing Suretyship if its
intention were to have the earlier Indemnity Agreement secure the SWAP
loan in both the original and in the reduced amounts.

THIRD DIVISION
ARSENIA B. GARCIA,

G.R. No. 157171

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

- versus -

CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, and

Garcia is not liable for the deficiency on the SWAP loan because Dynetics
executed chattel mortgages in view of the export loan in favor of Security
Bank. And this was w/o Garcias knowledge. This does not technically
release Garcia as surety but since it is a chattel mortgage which has
nothing to do with Garcia (it does not bind him), then the deficiency will
have to be shouldered by Dynetics.

about to come out of his house and upon being summoned, Garcia
suddenly punched him. Chy continued to parry the blows and when he
found an opportunity to escape, he ran home and phoned his wife to call
the police regarding the mauling. He also complained of difficulty in
breathing. He was found later unconscious on the kitchen floor, salivating.

Cause of death is heart attack to which Garcia appeals that the injuries he
caused were not as violent in nature as to have caused the death of Chy.
Garcia pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide. The autopsy doctor
confirms that the boxing and the striking of the bottle beer on the victim
could not have caused any direct physical effect to cause the heart attack
if the victims heart is healthy. What could have caused said heart attack
is the victims emotions concerning the violence inflicted upon him.

ISSUE:
Whether the circumstance of having no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed should be appreciated

RULING:

The circumstance that the petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the
death of the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability. Since he
deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said condition simply
mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal
Code. Nevertheless, said circumstance must be appreciated in favour of
the petitioner. The fact that the physical injuries he inflicted on the victim
could not have naturally and logically caused the actual death of the
victim, if the latters heart is in good condition.

Amado Alvarado Garcia vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 171951

28 August 2009

FACTS:

The Fozes were having a drinking spree at their apartment when Chy asked
them to quiet down to which Garcia commented that Chy was being
arrogant and that one day he would lay a hand on him. Two days later, the
group decided to drink at a store owned by Chys sister, Esquibel. Chy was

Considering this mitigating circumstance, imposable penalty should be in

the minimum period, that is, reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial court properly imposed
upon petitioner an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal as maximum.

hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the
condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound
in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide
and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of
Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the
Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the
shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause
of the latters death
Held:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom."

Urbano v. IAC
Facts:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his
ricefield. He found the place where he stored palay flooded with water
coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to
see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre
cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A
quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and
again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano
and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical
expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the

If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by

tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should
have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the
symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident
or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset
time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the
second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at
the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of
tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound
could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could
have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before
he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And
since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused
caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the
time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the
crime.

There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with
tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which
the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be
made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and
the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because
of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

657 SCRA 270 Criminal Law Criminal Liability Proximate Cause

Efficient Intervening Cause

On January 22, 2002, Danilo Cruz went to a sari-sari store to buy bread.
Out of nowhere, Orlito Villacorta appeared and thereafter stabbed the left
part of the body of Cruz with a sharpened bamboo stick. After that,
Villacorta fled.

Cruz was helped by bystanders and he was brought to a nearby hospital

where he was treated as out-patient. He was discharged on the same day
but on February 14, 2002, or 21 days after the stabbing incident, he
returned to the same hospital where he was treated for severe tetanus.
The next day on February 15, 2002, Cruz died. The medical report states
that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.

The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals convicted Villacorta for
murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not Villacorta is guilty of murder.

HELD: No. In this case, the proximate cause of the death is not the
stabbing done by Villacorta upon Cruz. There was an efficient intervening
cause which appeared between the time of the stabbing and the time of
the death of Cruz.

In explaining this, the Supreme Court took into consideration the fact that
severe tetanus (the kind of tetanus which causes immediate death) has an
incubation period of 14 days or less. In this case, the stabbing made by
Vilalcorta could not have caused the tetanus infection as 22 days already
lapsed from the time of the stabbing until the date of death of Cruz.
Something else caused the tetanus other than the stabbing in short, Cruz
acquired the tetanus 14 days or less before February 15, 2003 and not on
the date of stabbing.

The court explained further:

People of the Philippines vs Orlito Villacorta

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And
since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused
caused the victims death must convince a rational mind beyond

reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct

possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time [Cruz] was wounded to the
time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the
crime.
Villacorta is however guilty of slight physical injuries based on the facts.
Neither is he guilty of attempted nor frustrated murder, his intent to kill
was not proven by the prosecution.

People of the Philippines, appellee

-versusNoel Sales, appellant
x------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed.

However, he may not employ sadistic beatings and inflict fatal injuries
under the guise of disciplining them.

This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 2006 Decision[1]

of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the
August 3, 2005 Joint Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and
RTC03-789, convicting appellant Noel T. Sales (appellant) of the crimes of
parricide and slight physical injuries, respectively. The Information[3] for
parricide contained the following allegations:

That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or

past 8:00 oclock in the evening at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with evident premeditation and [in] a fit of anger,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit [several] times,
the different parts of the body of his legitimate eldest son, Noemar Sales, a
9-year old minor, with a [piece of] wood, measuring more or less one meter
in length and one [and] a half inches in diameter, [thereby] inflicting upon
the latter mortal wounds, which cause[d] the death of the said victim, to
the damage and prejudice of the latters heirs in such amount as may be
proven in court.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

On the other hand, the Information[5] in Criminal Case No. RTC03789 alleges that appellant inflicted slight physical injuries in the following
manner:

That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or

past 8:00 oclock in the evening, at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named [accused] assault[ed] and hit with a piece of
wood, one Noel Sales, Jr., an 8-year old minor, his second legitimate son,
thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which have required medical
attendance for a period of five (5) days to the damage and prejudice of the
victims heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

When arraigned on April 11, 2003 and July 1, 2003, appellant pleaded not
guilty for the charges of parricide[7] and slight physical injuries[8]
respectively. The cases were then consolidated upon manifestation of the
prosecution which was not objected to by the defense.[9] During the pretrial conference, the parties agreed to stipulate that appellant is the father
of the victims, Noemar Sales (Noemar) and Noel Sales, Jr. (Junior); that at
the time of the incident, appellants family was living in the conjugal home
located in Barangay San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur; and, that
appellant voluntarily surrendered to the police.[10]

motionless despite her efforts, she told appellant that their son was
already dead. However, appellant refused to believe her. Maria then told
appellant to call a quack doctor. He left and returned with one, who told
them that they have to bring Noemar to a hospital. Appellant thus
proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a
vehicle to take them to a hospital. As there was no vehicle and because
another quack doctor they met at the junction told them that Noemar is
already dead, appellant brought his son back to their house.

Noemars wake lasted only for a night and he was immediately

buried the following day. His body was never examined by a doctor.

The Version of the Defense

Prior to the incident, Noemar and Junior had already left their
residence on three separate occasions without the permission of their
parents. Each time, appellant merely scolded them and told them not to
repeat the misdeed since something untoward might happen to them.
During those times, Noemar and Junior were never physically harmed by
their father.

Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and
eight years old, respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial
procession of Our Lady of Peafrancia without the permission of their
parents. They did not return home that night. When their mother, Maria
Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the
nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their fathers rage, Noemar and
Junior initially refused to return home but their mother prevailed upon
them. When the two kids reached home at around 8 oclock in the evening
of September 20, 2002, a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant
then whipped them with a stick which was later broken so that he brought
his kids outside their house. With Noemars and Juniors hands and feet
tied to a coconut tree, appellant continued beating them with a thick piece
of wood. During the beating Maria stayed inside the house and did not do
anything as she feared for her life.

When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the
house with appellant assisting Noemar as the latter was staggering, while
Junior fearfully followed. Maria noticed a crack in Noemars head and
injuries in his legs. She also saw injuries in the right portion of the head,
the left cheek, and legs of Junior. Shortly thereafter, Noemar collapsed and
lost consciousness. Maria tried to revive him and when Noemar remained

However, Noemar and Junior again left their home without their
parents permission on September 16, 2002 and failed to return for several
days. Worse, appellant received information that his sons stole a pedicab.
As they are broke, appellant had to borrow money so that his wife could
search for Noemar and Junior. When his sons finally arrived home at 8
oclock in the evening of September 20, 2002, appellant scolded and hit
them with a piece of wood as thick as his index finger. He hit Noemar and
Junior simultaneously since they were side by side. After whipping his sons
in their buttocks three times, he noticed that Noemar was chilling and
frothing. When Noemar lost consciousness, appellant decided to bring him
to a hospital in Naga City by waiting for a vehicle at the crossroad which
was seven kilometers away from their house.
Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and
observed his difficulty in breathing. The pupils of Noemars eyes were also
moving up and down. Appellant heard him say that he wanted to sleep
and saw him pointing to his chest in pain. However, they waited in vain
since a vehicle never came. It was then that Noemar died. Appellant thus
decided to just bring Noemar back to their house.

Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent
could kill his or her child. He claimed that Noemar died as a result of
difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never complained of the whipping done
to him. Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was brought to a hospital

more than a year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a
weak heart.

On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from

epilepsy. Whenever he suffers from epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and
passes out. But he would regain consciousness after 15 minutes. His
seizures normally occur whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.

The death of Noemar was reported to the police by the barangay

captain.[11] Thereafter, appellant surrendered voluntarily.[12]

SO ORDERED.[14]

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal[15] which was given due course in an

Order[16] dated September 21, 2005.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

However, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the
ruling of the trial court. The dispositive portion of its Decision[17] reads as
follows:

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In a Joint Decision,[13] the trial court held that the evidence

presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove that appellant was
guilty of committing the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries in
the manner described in the Informations. In the crime of parricide, the
trial court did not consider the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation against appellant since there is no proof that he planned to
kill Noemar. But the trial court appreciated in his favor the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave
a wrong. The dispositive portion of said Joint Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed

decision dated August 3, 2005 in Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and
RTC03-789 for Parricide and Slight Physical Injuries, respectively, is
AFFIRMED.

Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure, appellant may appeal this case to the Supreme Court via a
Notice of Appeal filed before this Court.

SO ORDERED.[18]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the
guilt of Noel Sales, beyond reasonable doubt, he is found guilty of parricide
in Crim. Case No. RTC03-782 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Noemar
Sales, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral
damages; P25,000,00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

Furthermore, accused Noel Sales is also found guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries in Crim. Case No. RTC03-789
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty (20) days of Arresto Menor in
its medium period.

Accused Noel Sales is likewise meted the accessory penalties as provided

under the Revised Penal Code. Considering that herein accused has
undergone preventive imprisonment, he shall be credited in the service of
his sentence with the time he has undergone preventive imprisonment in
accordance with and subject to the conditions provided for in Article 29 of
the Revised Penal Code.

Issues

Hence, appellant is now before this Court with the following twofold issues:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE

TESTIMONIES OF THE DEFENSE WITNESSES.[19]

Our Ruling
The appeal is without merit.

Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely

intended to discipline Noemar and not to kill him. However, the relevant
portion of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code states:

The Charge of Parricide

Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred:

Appellant admits beating his sons on September 20, 2002 as a

disciplinary measure, but denies battering Noemar to death. He believes
that no father could kill his own son. According to him, Noemar had a
weak heart that resulted in attacks consisting of loss of consciousness and
froth in his mouth. He claims that Noemar was conscious as they traveled
to the junction where they would take a vehicle in going to a hospital.
However, Noemar had difficulty in breathing and complained of chest pain.
He contends that it was at this moment that Noemar died, not during his
whipping. To substantiate his claim, appellant presented his wife, Maria,
who testified that Noemar indeed suffered seizures, but this was due to
epilepsy.

1.
By any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

The contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The imposition of

parental discipline on children of tender years must always be with the
view of correcting their erroneous behavior. A parent or guardian must
exercise restraint and caution in administering the proper punishment.
They must not exceed the parameters of their parental duty to discipline
their minor children. It is incumbent upon them to remain rational and
refrain from being motivated by anger in enforcing the intended
punishment. A deviation will undoubtedly result in sadism.

Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already furious with them
because they left the family dwelling without permission and that was
already preceded by three other similar incidents. This was further
aggravated by a report that his sons stole a pedicab thereby putting him in
disgrace. Moreover, they have no money so much so that he still had to
borrow so that his wife could look for the children and bring them home.
From these, it is therefore clear that appellant was motivated not by an
honest desire to discipline the children for their misdeeds but by an evil
intent of venting his anger. This can reasonably be concluded from the
injuries of Noemar in his head, face and legs. It was only when Noemars
body slipped from the coconut tree to which he was tied and lost
consciousness that appellant stopped the beating. Had not Noemar lost
consciousness, appellant would most likely not have ceased from his
sadistic act. His subsequent attempt to seek medical attention for Noemar
as an act of repentance was nevertheless too late to save the childs life. It
bears stressing that a decent and responsible parent would never subject a
minor child to sadistic punishment in the guise of discipline.

xxxx
In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from
that which he intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was
committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the
direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator.[20] Here,
there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon
him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the
beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellants criminal liability for
the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.
Appellants claim that it was Noemars heart ailment that caused his death
deserves no merit. This declaration is self-serving and uncorroborated
since it is not substantiated by evidence. While Dr. Salvador Betito, a
Municipal Health Officer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur issued a death
certificate indicating that Noemar died due to cardio-pulmonary arrest, the
same is not sufficient to prove that his death was due mainly to his poor
health. It is worth emphasizing that Noemars cadaver was never
examined. Also, even if appellant presented his wife, Maria, to lend
credence to his contention, the latters testimony did not help as same was
even in conflict with his testimony. Appellant testified that Noemar
suffered from a weak heart which resulted in his death while Maria
declared that Noemar was suffering from epilepsy. Interestingly, Marias
testimony was also unsubstantiated by evidence.

Moreover, as will be discussed below, all the elements of the crime of

parricide are present in this case.

All the Elements of Parricide are present in the case at bench.

We find no error in the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate
court, that appellant committed the crime of parricide.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:

Art. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother,
or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or
descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be
punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is
killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other
descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.[21]
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the
first element, that is, a person was killed. Maria testified that her son
Noemar did not regain consciousness after the severe beating he suffered
from the hands of his father. Thereafter, a quack doctor declared Noemar
dead. Afterwards, as testified to by Maria, they held a wake for Noemar
the next day and then buried him the day after.
Noemars Death
Certificate[22] was also presented in evidence.

There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second

element that the appellant killed the deceased. Same is sufficiently
established by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior. Maria testified
that on September 20, 2002, Noemar and his younger brother, Junior, were
whipped by appellant, their father, inside their house. The whipping
continued even outside the house but this time, the brothers were tied side
by side to a coconut tree while appellant delivered the lashes
indiscriminately. For his part, Junior testified that Noemar, while tied to a
tree, was beaten by their father in the head. Because the savagery of the
attack was too much for Noemars frail body to endure, he lost
consciousness and died from his injuries immediately after the incident.

As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is

his child.
While Noemars birth certificate was not presented, oral
evidence of filial relationship may be considered.[23] As earlier stated,
appellant stipulated to the fact that he is the father of Noemar during the
pre-trial conference and likewise made the same declaration while under
oath.[24] Maria also testified that Noemar and Junior are her sons with
appellant, her husband. These testimonies are sufficient to establish the
relationship between appellant and Noemar.
Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide are obtaining in this case.
There is Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender but not Lack of
Intention to Commit so Grave a Wrong

The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of

voluntary surrender in favor of appellant since the evidence shows that he
went to the police station a day after the barangay captain reported the
death of Noemar. The presentation by appellant of himself to the police
officer on duty in a spontaneous manner is a manifestation of his intent to

save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his
search and capture[25] which is the essence of voluntary surrender.
However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. Appellant
adopted means to ensure the success of the savage battering of his sons.
He tied their wrists to a coconut tree to prevent their escape while they
were battered with a stick to inflict as much pain as possible. Noemar
suffered injuries in his face, head and legs that immediately caused his
death. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts
employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did
actually produce the death of the victim.[26]

The Award of Damages and Penalty for Parricide

We find proper the trial courts award to the heirs of Noemar of the sums of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
However, the award of exemplary damages of P25,000.00 should be
increased to P30,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.[27]
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all
the monetary awards for damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% from
the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.[28]
As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. The trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua when it considered the presence of the mitigating circumstances
of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
However, even if we earlier ruled that the trial court erred in considering
the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong,
we maintain the penalty imposed. This is because the exclusion of said
mitigating circumstance does not result to a different penalty since the
presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary
surrender, with no aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the
imposition of reclusion perpetua as the proper prison term. Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code provides in part as follows:
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of
two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the
application thereof:

3.
When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty
shall be applied.
xxxx

The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion

perpetua to death. With one mitigating circumstance, which is voluntary
surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua and not the penalty of death on appellant
was thus proper.[29]
The Charge of Slight Physical Injuries
The victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his brother
Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein appellant, while they were tied
to a coconut tree. He recalled to have been hit on his right eye and right
leg and to have been examined by a physician thereafter.[30] Maria
corroborated her sons testimony.[31]
Juniors testimony was likewise supported by Dr. Ursolino
Primavera, Jr. (Dr. Primavera) of Tinambac Community Hospital who
examined him for physical injuries. He issued a Medical Certificate for his
findings and testified on the same. His findings were (1) muscular
contusions with hematoma on the right side of Juniors face just below the
eye and on both legs, which could have been caused by hitting said area
with a hard object such as a wooden stick and, (2) abrasions of brownish
color circling both wrist with crust formation which could have been
sustained by the patient due to struggling while his hands were tied. When
asked how long does he think the injuries would heal, Dr. Primavera
answered one to two weeks.[32] But if applied with medication, the
injuries would heal in a week.[33]

There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in

the commission of the crime, the penalty shall be in its medium period.
The RTC was thus correct in imposing upon appellant the penalty of twenty
(20) days of arresto menor in its medium period.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the Joint Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in
Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and RTC03-789, convicting Noel T. Sales of
the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS that the award of exemplary damages is increased to
P30,000.00. In addition, an interest of 6% is imposed on all monetary
awards from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

We give full faith and credence to the categorical and positive

testimony of Junior that he was beaten by his father and that by reason
thereof he sustained injuries. His testimony deserves credence especially
since the same is corroborated by the testimony of his mother, Maria, and
supported by medical examination. We thus find that the RTC correctly
held appellant guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries.

Penalty for Slight Physical Injuries

We likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC. Dr. Primavera testified
that the injuries sustained by Junior should heal in one week upon
medication. Hence, the trial court correctly meted upon appellant the
penalty under paragraph 1, Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:

ART. 266. Slight Physical Injuries and maltreatment. The crime of

slight physical injuries shall be punished:

1.
By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical
injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to
nine days or shall require medical attendance during the same period.

Intod vs. CA, 215 SCRA 52

Facts: Sulpicio Intod and 3 other men went to Salvador Mandayas house to
ask him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. The

group had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he
wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them
and that Mandaya should accompany the 4 men otherwise he would also
be killed. At 10:00 p.m. of that same day, Intod and companions, all armed
with firearms arrived at Palangpangans house. Thereafter, petitioner fired
at the said room. It turned out the Palangpangan was in another city and
her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was
in the room when the accused fired. No one was hit by the gunfire. The RTC
convicted Intod of attempted murder. Petitioner Intod seeks a modification
of the judgment on the ground that he is only liable for an impossible crime
{Art. 4(2)}. Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her
room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the
crime inherently impossible. On the other hand, Respondent People of the
Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible instead the facts were
sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted
murder. Respondent likewise alleged that there was intent. Further, In its
Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that xxx. The crime of
murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of
its accomplishment (Art 4 (2), RPC), but due to a cause of accident other
that petitioners and his co-accuseds own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3)
Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for
this fact, the crime is possible, m not impossible.

consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts
his hand in the cot pocket of another with the intention to steal the latters
wallet and finds the pocket empty.

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where
he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not
present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility

which render the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under
Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make
the act an impossible crime.

Issue: Is petitioner is liable only for an impossible crime?

Held: Under Article 4(2) of the RPC, the act performed by the offender
cannot produce an offense against person or property because: 1) the
commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or
2) the means employed is either a) inadequate or b) ineffectual.

To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must
be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either
1) legal impossibility, or 2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the
intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended act, even if complete would
not amount to a crime. Thus: legal impossibility would apply to those
circumstances where 1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform
an act in violation of the law; 2) there is intention to perform the physical
act; 3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and 4) the
consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

On the other had, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous

circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the

G.R. No. 162540 July 13, 2009

GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
PERALTA, J .:
A petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto
seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Facts:
Baby Aquino handed petitioner Gemma Jacinto a Banco De Oro (BDO)
Check in the amount of P10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby
Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then the
collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land
Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the
latter is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and
inventory clerk of Mega Foam. Later, Rowena Ricablanca, another
employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of Land
Bank, who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to
inform Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his account had
been dishonored. Ricablanca then called and relayed the message through
accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam,
because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they could be reached
through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle
at Mega Foam. Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from
Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the
check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash
and divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and
Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's
accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph
Dyhengco. Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was
able to confirm that the latter indeed handed petitioner a BDO check for
P10,000.00 as payment for her purchases from Mega Foam. Baby Aquino
further testified that petitioner Jacinto also called her on the phone to tell
her that the BDO check bounced. Verification from company records
showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam.
However, Baby Aquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam
P10,000.00 cash as replacement for the dishonored check. Dyhengco filed
a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out
an entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills
provided by Dyhengco were marked and dusted with fluorescent powder
by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked
to pretend that she was going along with Valencia's plan. Ricablanca,
petitioner, her husband, and Valencia then boarded petitioner's jeep and
went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep
and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting
cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually brought out from
the premises was theP10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by
Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and upon returning to the jeep,

gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and

Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole
time.
A case was filed against the three accused, Jacinto, Valencia and Capitle.
RTC rendered its Decision finding them GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and sentenced each imprisonment of FIVE
(5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as minimum, to
SIX(6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS, as maximum.
The three appealed to the CA and the decision of the trial court was
MODIFIED, in that:(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;
(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 months
arresto mayor medium, and (c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted

Issue:
Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft.

Held:
As may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal
Code,
the personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the
intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further
bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be
imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen. In
this case, petitioner unlawfully took the post dated check belonging to
Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it was
subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime
of qualified theft was actually produced. The Court must resolve the issue
in the negative.
Intod v. Court of Appeals is highly instructive and applicable to the present
case. In Intod (see doctrines laid out inIntod), the Court went on to give an
example of an offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts
his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the
latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.