G.R. No.

107518 October 8, 1998

PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING
CORPORATION, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss actually
suffered and duly proved. 1Indeed, basic is the rule that to recover actual damages,
the amount of loss must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven
with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or best
evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof. 2 The claimant is duty-bound to
point out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory
damages are borne. 3 A court cannot merely rely on speculations, conjectures, or
guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages 4 as well as hearsay 5 or
uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect. 6 Such are the jurisprudential
precepts that the Court now applies in resolving the instant petition.
The records disclose that in the early morning of September 21, 1977, the M/V
Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing
Corporation, was navigating the waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas
on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila when it collided with the
vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation (LSC).
After investigation was conducted by the Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast
Guard Commandant Simeon N. Alejandro rendered a decision finding
the Petroparcel at fault. Based on this finding by the Board and after unsuccessful
demands on petitioner, 7 private respondent sued the LSC and
the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo, before the then Court of First Instance of
Caloocan City, paying thereto the docket fee of one thousand two hundred fifty-two
pesos (P1,252.00) and the legal research fee of two pesos (P2.00). 8 In particular,
private respondent prayed for an award of P692,680.00, allegedly representing the
value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia
XV, with interest at the legal rate plus 25% thereof as attorney's fees. Meanwhile,
during the pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation sought to be substituted in place of LSC as it had already acquired
ownership of thePetroparcel. 9
For its part, private respondent later sought the amendment of its complaint on the
ground that the original complaint failed to plead for the recovery of the lost value
of the hull of M/V Maria Efigenia XV. 10 Accordingly, in the amended complaint,
private respondent averred that M/V Maria Efigenia XV had an actual value of
P800,000.00 and that, after deducting the insurance payment of P200,000.00, the
amount of P600,000.00 should likewise be claimed. The amended complaint also
alleged that inflation resulting from the devaluation of the Philippine peso had
affected the replacement value of the hull of the vessel, its equipment and its lost
cargoes, such that there should be a reasonable determination thereof.
Furthermore, on account of the sinking of the vessel, private respondent
supposedly incurred unrealized profits and lost business opportunities that would
thereafter be proven. 11
Subsequently, the complaint was further amended to include petitioner as a
defendant 12 which the lower court granted in its order of September 16,
1985. 13 After petitioner had filed its answer to the second amended complaint, on
February 5, 1987, the lower court issued a pre-trial order 14 containing, among
other things, a stipulations of facts, to wit:
1. On 21 September 1977, while the fishing boat "M/V MARIA EFIGENIA" owned by
plaintiff was navigating in the vicinity of Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas, on its
way to Navotas, Metro Manila, said fishing boat was hit by the LSCO tanker
"Petroparcel" causing the former to sink.
2. The Board of Marine Inquiry conducted an investigation of this marine accident
and on 21 November 1978, the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard, the
Honorable Simeon N. Alejandro, rendered a decision finding the cause of the
accident to be the reckless and imprudent manner in which Edgardo Doruelo
navigated the LSCO "Petroparcel" and declared the latter vessel at fault.
3. On 2 April 1978, defendant Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LUSTEVECO),
executed in favor of PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation a Deed of Transfer
involving several tankers, tugboats, barges and pumping stations, among which was
the LSCO Petroparcel.
4. On the same date on 2 April 1979 (sic), defendant PNOC STC again entered into
an Agreement of Transfer with co-defendant Lusteveco whereby all the business
properties and other assets appertaining to the tanker and bulk oil departments
including the motor tanker LSCO Petroparcel of defendant Lusteveco were sold to
PNOC STC.
5. The aforesaid agreement stipulates, among others, that PNOC-STC assumes,
without qualifications, all obligations arising from and by virtue of all rights it
obtained over the LSCO "Petroparcel".
6. On 6 July 1979, another agreement between defendant LUSTEVECO and PNOCSTC was executed wherein Board of Marine Inquiry Case No. 332 (involving the sea
accident of 21 September 1977) was specifically identified and assumed by the
latter.

7. On 23 June 1979, the decision of Board of Marine Inquiry was affirmed by the
Ministry of National Defense, in its decision dismissing the appeal of Capt. Edgardo
Doruelo and Chief mate Anthony Estenzo of LSCO "Petroparcel".
8. LSCO "Petroparcel" is presently owned and operated by PNOC-STC and likewise
Capt. Edgardo Doruelo is still in their employ.
9. As a result of the sinking of M/V Maria Efigenia caused by the reckless and
imprudent manner in which LSCO Petroparcel was navigated by defendant Doruelo,
plaintiff suffered actual damages by the loss of its fishing nets, boat equipments
(sic) and cargoes, which went down with the ship when it sank the replacement
value of which should be left to the sound discretion of this Honorable Court.
After trial, the lower court 15 rendered on November 18, 1989 its decision disposing
of Civil Case No. C-9457 as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant PNOC Shipping & Transport Corporation, to
pay the plaintiff:
a. The sum of P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the fishing boat with interest
from the date of the filing of the complaint at the rate of 6% per annum;
b. The sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and
c. The costs of suit.
The counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Likewise, the case against
defendant Edgardo Doruelo is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
In arriving at the above disposition, the lower court cited the evidence presented by
private respondent consisting of the testimony of its general manager and sole
witness, Edilberto del Rosario. Private respondent's witness testified that M/V
Maria Efigenia XV was owned by private respondent per Exhibit A, a certificate of
ownership issued by the Philippine Coast Guard showing that M/V Maria Efigenia
XV was a wooden motor boat constructed in 1965 with 128.23 gross tonnage.
According to him, at the time the vessel sank, it was then carrying 1,060 tubs
(baeras) of assorted fish the value of which was never recovered. Also lost with
the vessel were two cummins engines (250 horsepower), radar, pathometer and
compass. He further added that with the loss of his flagship vessel in his fishing fleet
of fourteen (14) vessels, he was constrained to hire the services of counsel whom
he paid P10,000 to handle the case at the Board of Marine Inquiry and P50,000.00
for commencing suit for damages in the lower court.
As to the award of P6,438,048.00 in actual damages, the lower court took into
account the following pieces of documentary evidence that private respondent
proffered during trial:
(a) Exhibit A certified xerox copy of the certificate of ownership of M/V Maria
Efigenia XV;
(b) Exhibit B a document titled "Marine Protest" executed by Delfin Villarosa, Jr.
on September 22, 1977 stating that as a result of the collision, the M/V Maria
Efigenia XVsustained a hole at its left side that caused it to sink with its cargo of
1,050 baerasvalued at P170,000.00;
(c) Exhibit C a quotation for the construction of a 95-footer trawler issued by
Isidoro A. Magalong of I. A. Magalong Engineering and Construction on January 26,
1987 to Del Rosario showing that construction of such trawler would cost
P2,250,000.00;
(d) Exhibit D pro forma invoice No. PSPI-05/87-NAV issued by E.D. Daclan of
Power Systems, Incorporated on January 20, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that two
(2) units of CUMMINS Marine Engine model N855-M, 195 bhp. at 1800 rpm. would
cost P1,160,000.00;
(e) Exhibit E quotation of prices issued by Scan Marine Inc. on January 20, 1987
to Del Rosario showing that a unit of Furuno Compact Daylight Radar, Model FR604D, would cost P100,000.00 while a unit of Furuno Color Video Sounder, Model
FCV-501 would cost P45,000.00 so that the two units would cost P145,000.00;
(f) Exhibit F quotation of prices issued by Seafgear Sales, Inc. on January 21, 1987
to Del Rosario showing that two (2) rolls of nylon rope (5" cir. X 300fl.) would cost
P140,000.00; two (2) rolls of nylon rope (3" cir. X 240fl.), P42,750.00; one (1)
binocular (7 x 50), P1,400.00, one (1) compass (6"), P4,000.00 and 50 pcs. of floats,
P9,000.00 or a total of P197,150.00;
(g) Exhibit G retainer agreement between Del Rosario and F. Sumulong
Associates Law Offices stipulating an acceptance fee of P5,000.00, per appearance
fee of P400.00, monthly retainer of P500.00, contingent fee of 20% of the total
amount recovered and that attorney's fee to be awarded by the court should be
given to Del Rosario; and
(h) Exhibit H price quotation issued by Seafgear Sales, Inc. dated April 10, 1987 to
Del Rosario showing the cost of poly nettings as: 50 rolls of 400/18 3kts. 100md x
100mtrs., P70,000.00; 50 rolls of 400/18 5kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P81,500.00; 50
rolls of 400/18 8kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P116,000.00, and 50 rolls of 400/18 10kts.
100md x 100mtrs., P146,500 and baera (tub) at P65.00 per piece or a total of
P414,065.00.
The lower court held that the prevailing replacement value of P6,438,048.00 of the
fishing boat and all its equipment would regularly increase at 30% every year from
the date the quotations were given.
On the other hand, the lower court noted that petitioner only presented Lorenzo
Lazaro, senior estimator at PNOC Dockyard & Engineering Corporation, as sole
witness and it did not bother at all to offer any documentary evidence to support its

position. Lazaro testified that the price quotations submitted by private respondent
were "excessive" and that as an expert witness, he used the quotations of his
suppliers in making his estimates. However, he failed to present such quotations of
prices from his suppliers, saying that he could not produce a breakdown of the costs
of his estimates as it was "a sort of secret scheme." For this reason, the lower court
concluded:
Evidently, the quotation of prices submitted by the plaintiff relative to the
replacement value of the fishing boat and its equipments in the tune of
P6,438,048.00 which were lost due to the recklessness and imprudence of the
herein defendants were not rebutted by the latter with sufficient evidence. The
defendants through their sole witness Lorenzo Lazaro relied heavily on said witness'
bare claim that the amount afore-said is excessive or bloated, but they did not
bother at all to present any documentary evidence to substantiate such claim.
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of the credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself. (Vda. de Bonifacio vs. B. L. T. Bus Co., Inc. L26810, August 31, 1970).
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the lower court's
decision contending that: (1) the lower court erred in holding it liable for damages;
that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by paying only
P1,252.00 as docket fee; (2) assuming that plaintiff was entitled to damages, the
lower court erred in awarding an amount greater than that prayed for in the second
amended complaint; and (3) the lower court erred when it failed to resolve the
issues it had raised in its memorandum. 16 Petitioner likewise filed a supplemental
motion for reconsideration expounding on whether the lower court acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case despite therein plaintiff's failure to
pay the prescribed docket fee. 17
On January 25, 1990, the lower court declined reconsideration for lack of
merit. 18 Apparently not having received the order denying its motion for
reconsideration, petitioner still filed a motion for leave to file a reply to private
respondent's opposition to said motion. 19 Hence, on February 12, 1990, the lower
court denied said motion for leave to file a reply on the ground that by the issuance
of the order of January 25, 1990, said motion had become moot and academic. 20
Unsatisfied with the lower court's decision, petitioner elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the same in toto on October 14,
1992. 21 On petitioner's assertion that the award of P6,438,048.00 was not
convincingly proved by competent and admissible evidence, the Court of Appeals
ruled that it was not necessary to qualify Del Rosario as an expert witness because
as the owner of the lost vessel, "it was well within his knowledge and competency
to identify and determine the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded" on the
vessel. Considering the documentary evidence presented as in the nature of market
reports or quotations, trade journals, trade circulars and price lists, the Court of
Appeals held, thus:
Consequently, until such time as the Supreme Court categorically rules on the
admissibility or inadmissibility of this class of evidence, the reception of these
documentary exhibits (price quotations) as evidence rests on the sound discretion
of the trial court. In fact, where the lower court is confronted with evidence which
appears to be of doubtful admissibility, the judge should declare in favor of
admissibility rather than of non-admissibility (The Collector of Palakadhari, 124
[1899], p. 13, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, Evidence, Volume VII, Part I,
1990 Edition, p. 18). Trial courts are enjoined to observe the strict enforcement of
the rules of evidence which crystallized through constant use and practice and are
very useful and effective aids in the search for truth and for the effective
administration of justice. But in connection with evidence which may appear to be
of doubtful relevancy or incompetency or admissibility, it is the safest policy to be
liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them
unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their
rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court. If they are thereafter
found relevant or competent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding or
ignoring them. (Banaria vs. Banaria, et al., C.A. No. 4142, May 31, 1950; cited in
Francisco, Supra). [Emphasis supplied].
Stressing that the alleged inadmissible documentary exhibits were never
satisfactorily rebutted by appellant's own sole witness in the person of Lorenzo
Lazaro, the appellate court found that petitioner ironically situated itself in an
"inconsistent posture by the fact that its own witness, admittedly an expert one,
heavily relies on the very same pieces of evidence (price quotations) appellant has
so vigorously objected to as inadmissible evidence." Hence, it concluded:
. . . The amount of P6,438,048.00 was duly established at the trial on the basis of
appellee's documentary exhibits (price quotations) which stood uncontroverted,
and which already included the amount by way of adjustment as prayed for in the
amended complaint. There was therefore no need for appellee to amend the
second amended complaint in so far as to the claim for damages is concerned to
conform with the evidence presented at the trial. The amount of P6,438,048.00
awarded is clearly within the relief prayed for in appellee's second amended
complaint.
On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, the respondent court held that following the
ruling in Sun Insurance Ltd. v. Asuncion, 22 the additional docket fee that may later
on be declared as still owing the court may be enforced as a lien on the judgment.
Hence, the instant recourse.

In assailing the Court of Appeals' decision, petitioner posits the view that the award
of P6,438,048 as actual damages should have been in light of these considerations,
namely: (1) the trial court did not base such award on the actual value of the vessel
and its equipment at the time of loss in 1977; (2) there was no evidence on
extraordinary inflation that would warrant an adjustment of the replacement cost
of the lost vessel, equipment and cargo; (3) the value of the lost cargo and the
prices quoted in respondent's documentary evidence only amount to
P4,336,215.00; (4) private respondent's failure to adduce evidence to support its
claim for unrealized profit and business opportunities; and (5) private respondent's
failure to prove the extent and actual value of damages sustained as a result of the
1977 collision of the vessels. 23
Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those
awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They
proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that
has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a
penalty. 24 In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. 25 There
are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person
already possesses (dao emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a
benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante). 26 Thus:
Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the defendant the plaintiff is
entitled to their value at the time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of
money which he would have to pay in the market for identical or essentially similar
goods, plus in a proper case damages for the loss of use during the period before
replacement. In other words, in the case of profit-earning chattels, what has to be
assessed is the value of the chattel to its owner as a going concern at the time and
place of the loss, and this means, at least in the case of ships, that regard must be
had to existing and pending engagements, . . .
. . . . If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case virtually
certain of profitable employment, then nothing can be added to that value in
respect of charters actually lost, for to do so would be pro tanto to compensate the
plaintiff twice over. On the other hand, if the ship is valued without reference to its
actual future engagements and only in the light of its profit-earning potentiality,
then it may be necessary to add to the value thus assessed the anticipated profit on
a charter or other engagement which it was unable to fulfill. What the court has to
ascertain in each case is the "capitalised value of the vessel as a profit-earning
machine not in the abstract but in view of the actual circumstances," without, of
course, taking into account considerations which were too remote at the time of
the loss. 27 [Emphasis supplied].
As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party to recover actual or
compensatory damages, he is required to prove the actual amount of loss with
reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence available. 28 The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if
no evidence would be presented on either side. He must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by
one side is superior to that of the other. 29 In other words, damages cannot be
presumed and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts that could
afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are
borne. 30
In this case, actual damages were proven through the sole testimony of private
respondent's general manager and certain pieces of documentary evidence. Except
for Exhibit B where the value of the 1,050 baeras of fish were pegged at their
September 1977 value when the collision happened, the pieces of documentary
evidence proffered by private respondent with respect to items and equipment lost
show similar items and equipment with corresponding prices in early 1987 or
approximately ten (10) years after the collision. Noticeably, petitioner did not
object to the exhibits in terms of the time index for valuation of the lost goods and
equipment. In objecting to the same pieces of evidence, petitioner commented that
these were not duly authenticated and that the witness (Del Rosario) did not have
personal knowledge on the contents of the writings and neither was he an expert
on the subjects thereof. 31 Clearly ignoring petitioner's objections to the exhibits,
the lower court admitted these pieces of evidence and gave them due weight to
arrive at the award of P6,438,048.00 as actual damages.
The exhibits were presented ostensibly in the course of Del Rosario's testimony.
Private respondent did not present any other witnesses especially those whose
signatures appear in the price quotations that became the bases of the award. We
hold, however, that the price quotations are ordinary private writings which under
the Revised Rules of Court should have been proffered along with the testimony of
the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the
contents of the writings even though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet
because he was not the one who issued the price quotations. Section 36, Rule 130
of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a witness can testify only to those facts
that he knows of his personal knowledge.
For this reason, Del Rosario's claim that private respondent incurred losses in the
total amount of P6,438,048.00 should be admitted with extreme caution
considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it should be supported by
independent evidence. Moreover, because he was the owner of private respondent
corporation 32 whatever testimony he would give with regard to the value of the

lost vessel, its equipment and cargoes should be viewed in the light of his selfinterest therein. We agree with the Court of Appeals that his testimony as to the
equipment installed and the cargoes loaded on the vessel should be given
credence 33 considering his familiarity thereto. However, we do not subscribe to the
conclusion that his valuation of such equipment, cargo and the vessel itself should
be accepted as gospel truth. 34 We must, therefore, examine the documentary
evidence presented to support Del Rosario's claim as regards the amount of losses.
The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay
evidence considering that the persons who issued them were not presented as
witnesses. 35 Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative
value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge
of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether
objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the
evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule. 36 On this point,
we believe that the exhibits do not fall under any of the exceptions provided under
Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130. 37
It is true that one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule pertains to "commercial lists
and the like" under Section 45, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. In this
respect, the Court of Appeals considered private respondent's exhibits as
"commercial lists." It added, however, that these exhibits should be admitted in
evidence "until such time as the Supreme Court categorically rules on the
admissibility or inadmissibility of this class of evidence" because "the reception of
these documentary exhibits (price quotations) as evidence rests on the sound
discretion of the trial court." 38 Reference to Section 45, Rule 130, however, would
show that the conclusion of the Court of Appeals on the matter was arbitrarily
arrived at. This rule states:
Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of matters of interest to
persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other
published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant
matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that
occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them there.
Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a
statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation; (2) such
statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation;
(3) said compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation,
and (4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.
Based on the above requisites, it is our considered view that Exhibits B, C, D, E, F
and H 39 are not "commercial lists" for these do not belong to the category of "other
published compilations" under Section 45 aforequoted. Under the principle
of ejusdem generis, "(w)here general words follow an enumeration of persons or
things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to
be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons
or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned." 40 The exhibits
mentioned are mere price quotations issued personally to Del Rosario who
requested for them from dealers of equipment similar to the ones lost at the
collision of the two vessels. These are not published in any list, register, periodical
or other compilation on the relevant subject matter. Neither are these "market
reports or quotations" within the purview of "commercial lists" as these are not
"standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data of everyday professional need
and relied upon in the work of the occupation." 41 These are simply letters
responding to the queries of Del Rosario. Thus, take for example Exhibit D which
reads:
January 20, 1987
PROFORMA INVOICE NO. PSPI-05/87-NAV
MARIA EFIGINIA FISHING CORPORATION
Navotas, Metro Manila
Attention: MR. EDDIE DEL ROSARIO
Gentlemen:
In accordance to your request, we are pleated to quote our Cummins Marine
Engine, to wit.
Two (2) units CUMMINS Marine Engine model N855-M, 195 bhp. at 1800 rpm., 6cylinder in-line, 4-stroke cycle, natural aspirated, 5 1/2 in. x 6 in. bore and stroke,
855 cu. In. displacement, keel-cooled, electric starting coupled with Twin-Disc
Marine gearbox model MG-509, 4.5:1 reduction ratio, includes oil cooler,
companion flange, manual and standard accessories as per attached sheet.
Price FOB Manila P580,000.00/unit
Total FOB Manila P1,160,000.00
TERMS : CASH
DELIVERY : 60-90 days from date of order.
VALIDITY : Subject to our final confirmation.
WARRANTY : One (1) full year against factory defect.
Very truly yours,
POWER SYSTEMS, INC.
(Sgd.)
E. D. Daclan
To be sure, letters and telegrams are admissible in evidence but these are,
however, subject to the general principles of evidence and to various rules relating
to documentary evidence. 42 Hence, in one case, it was held that a letter from an

automobile dealer offering an allowance for an automobile upon purchase of a new

automobile after repairs had been completed, was not a "price current" or
"commercial list" within the statute which made such items presumptive evidence
of the value of the article specified therein. The letter was not admissible in
evidence as a "commercial list" even though the clerk of the dealer testified that he
had written the letter in due course of business upon instructions of the dealer.43
But even on the theory that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the admissibility
of those letters or communications when it held that unless "plainly irrelevant,
immaterial or incompetent," evidence should better be admitted rather than
rejected on "doubtful or technical grounds," 44 the same pieces of evidence,
however, should not have been given probative weight. This is a distinction we wish
to point out. Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the
circumstance (or evidence) is to considered at all. 45 On the other hand, the
probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an
issue. 46 Thus, a letter may be offered in evidence and admitted as such but its
evidentiary weight depends upon the observance of the rules on evidence.
Accordingly, the author of the letter should be presented as witness to provide the
other party to the litigation the opportunity to question him on the contents of the
letter. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter
renders its contents suspect. As earlier stated, hearsay evidence, whether objected
to or not, has no probative value. Thus:
The courts differ as to the weight to be given to hearsay evidence admitted without
objection. Some hold that when hearsay has been admitted without objection, the
same may be considered as any other properly admitted testimony. Others
maintain that it is entitled to no more consideration than if it had been excluded.
The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is the latter one. Our Supreme Court held that
although the question of admissibility of evidence can not be raised for the first
time on appeal, yet if the evidence is hearsay it has no probative value and should
be disregarded whether objected to or not. "If no objection is made" quoting
Jones on Evidence "it (hearsay) becomes evidence by reason of the want of such
objection even though its admission does not confer upon it any new attribute in
point of weight. Its nature and quality remain the same, so far as its intrinsic
weakness and incompetency to satisfy the mind are concerned, and as opposed to
direct primary evidence, the latter always prevails.
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent
evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rules of res inter alios
acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give such
evidence any probative value. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated
with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no
probative value. 47
Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages may not be awarded on the basis of
hearsay evidence. 48
Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits does not mean that it totally
deprives private respondent of any redress for the loss of its vessel. This is because
in Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of Appeals, 49 the Court said:
In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private
respondent is "entitled to nominal damages which, as the law says, is adjudicated in
order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by defendant,
may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered." [Emphasis supplied].
Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts,
quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in every
case where property right has been invaded. 50 Under Article 2223 of the Civil Code,
"(t)he adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the
right involved and all accessory questions, as between the parties to the suit, or
their respective heirs and assigns."
Actually, nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact. Where these
are allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply in
recognition of the existence of a technical injury. 51However, the amount to be
awarded as nominal damages shall be equal or at least commensurate to the injury
sustained by private respondent considering the concept and purpose of such
damages. 52 The amount of nominal damages to be awarded may also depend on
certain special reasons extant in the case. 53
Applying now such principles to the instant case, we have on record the fact that
petitioner's vessel Petroparcelwas at fault as well as private respondent's complaint
claiming the amount of P692,680.00 representing the fishing nets, boat equipment
and cargoes that sunk with the M/V Maria Efigenia XV. In its amended complaint,
private respondent alleged that the vessel had an actual value of P800,000.00 but it
had been paid insurance in the amount of P200,000.00 and, therefore, it claimed
only the amount of P600,000.00. Ordinarily, the receipt of insurance payments
should diminish the total value of the vessel quoted by private respondent in his
complaint considering that such payment is causally related to the loss for which it
claimed compensation. This Court believes that such allegations in the original and
amended complaints can be the basis for determination of a fair amount of nominal
damages inasmuch as a complaint alleges the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiffs cause of
action. 54 Private respondent should be bound by its allegations on the amount of
its claims.

With respect to petitioner's contention that the lower court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the amended complaint increasing the amount of damages
claimed to P600,000.00, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the lower court
acquired jurisdiction over the case when private respondent paid the docket fee
corresponding to its claim in its original complaint. Its failure to pay the docket fee
corresponding to its increased claim for damages under the amended complaint
should not be considered as having curtailed the lower court's jurisdiction. Pursuant
to the ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, 55 the unpaid docket fee
should be considered as a lien on the judgment even though private respondent
specified the amount of P600,000.00 as its claim for damages in its amended
complaint.
Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the
lower court on the ground of insufficient docket fees in its answers to both the
amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so only in its motion
for reconsideration of the decision of the lower court after it had received an
adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 56 participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that included
invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by
estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its
answer to the second amended complaint on April 16, 1985, 57 petitioner did not
question the lower court's jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989 58 when it
filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower court's decision that petitioner
raised the question of the lower court's lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus
foreclosed its right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 14,
1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 26680 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, Branch 121, is hereby MODIFIED insofar as it awarded actual damages to
private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation in the amount of
P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases therefor. Considering the fact, however,
that: (1) technically petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not
adequately and properly proved, and (2) this case has dragged on for almost two
decades, we believe that an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) 59 in favor of
private respondent as and for nominal damages is in order. No pronouncement as
to costs.
G.R. No. 190521
January 12, 2011
LETICIA TAN, MYRNA MEDINA, MARILOU SPOONER, ROSALINDA TAN, and MARY
JANE TAN, MARY LYN TAN, CELEDONIO TAN, JR., MARY JOY TAN, and MARK
ALLAN TAN, represented herein by their mother, LETICIA TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
OMC CARRIERS, INC. and BONIFACIO ARAMBALA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the motion for reconsideration1 filed by Leticia Tan, Myrna Medina,
Marilou Spooner, Rosalinda Tan, Mary Jane Tan, Mary Lyn Tan, Celedonio Tan, Jr.,
Mary Joy Tan, and Mark Allan Tan (petitioners), all heirs of the late Celedonio Tan
asking us to reverse and set aside our Resolution of February 17, 2010.2 We denied
in this Resolution their petition for review on certiorari for failing to show any
reversible error in the assailed Court of Appeals (CA) decision of June 22,
20093 sufficient to warrant the exercise of our discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
The CA decision, in turn, affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City in Civil Case No. 96-186, finding the
respondents OMC Carriers, Inc. (OMC) and Bonifacio Arambala guilty of gross
negligence and awarding damages to the petitioners.
THE FACTS
On September 27, 1996, the petitioners filed a complaint for damages with the RTC
against OMC and Bonifacio Arambala.4 The complaint states that on November 24,
1995, at around 6:15 a.m., Arambala was driving a truck5with a trailer6 owned by
OMC, along Meralco Road, Sucat, Muntinlupa City. When Arambala noticed that the
truck had suddenly lost its brakes, he told his companion to jump out. Soon
thereafter, he also jumped out and abandoned the truck. Driverless, the truck
rammed into the house and tailoring shop owned by petitioner Leticia Tan and her
husband Celedonio Tan, instantly killing Celedonio who was standing at the
doorway of the house at the time.7
The petitioners alleged that the collision occurred due to OMCs gross negligence in
not properly maintaining the truck, and to Arambalas recklessness when he
abandoned the moving truck. Thus, they claimed that the respondents should be
held jointly and severally liable for the actual damages that they suffered, which
include the damage to their properties, the funeral expenses they incurred for
Celedonio Tans burial, as well as the loss of his earning capacity. The petitioners
also asked for moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.8
The respondents denied any liability for the collision, essentially claiming that the
damage to the petitioners was caused by a fortuitous event, since the truck skidded
due to the slippery condition of the road caused by spilled motor oil.9
THE RTC DECISION
After trial, the RTC found OMC and Arambala jointly and severally liable to the
petitioners for damages.10 Relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the RTC held
that it was unusual for a truck to suddenly lose its brakes; the fact that the truck

rammed into the petitioners house raised the presumption of negligence on the
part of the respondents. These, the respondents failed to refute.11
The RTC did not agree with the respondents claim of a fortuitous event, pointing
out that even with oil on the road, Arambala did not slow down or take any
precautionary measure to prevent the truck from skidding off the road. The alleged
oil on the road did not also explain why the truck lost its brakes. Had OMC done a
more rigid inspection of the truck before its use, the defective brake could have
been discovered. The RTC, thus, held OMC jointly and severally liable with Arambala
for the damage caused to the petitioners, based on the principle of vicarious
liability embodied in Article 218012 of the Civil Code.13
The dispositive portion of the decision stated:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants ordering:
1. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount
of P50,000.00 for the death of Celedonio Tan;
2. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount
of P500,000.00 for the loss of earning capacity of Celedonio Tan, plus interest
thereon from the date of death of Celedonio Tan;
3. The defendants to pay the plaintiff Leticia Tan jointly and severally the amount
of P355,895.00 as actual damages;
4. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount
of P500,000.00 as moral damages;
5. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount
of P500,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
6. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and solidarily the amount
of P500,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.14
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs findings on the issues of the respondents
negligence and liability for damages. However, the CA modified the damages
awarded to the petitioners by reducing the actual damages award
from P355,895.00 to P72,295.00. The CA observed that only the latter amount was
duly supported by official receipts.15
The CA also deleted the RTCs award for loss of earning capacity. The CA explained
that the petitioners failed to substantiate Celedonio Tans claimed earning capacity
with reasonable certainty; no documentary evidence was ever presented on this
point. Instead, the RTC merely relied on Leticia Tans testimony regarding Celedonio
Tans income. The CA characterized this testimony as self-serving.16
The CA further reduced the exemplary damages from P500,000.00 to P200,000.00,
and deleted the award of attorneys fees because the RTC merely included the
award in the dispositive portion of the decision without discussing its legal basis.17
THE PETITION
In the petition for review on certiorari before us,18 the petitioners assert that the CA
erred when it modified the RTCs awarded damages. The petitioners submit the
reasons outlined below.
First, the CA erred when it reduced the RTCs award of actual damages
from P355,895.00 to P72,295.00. The petitioners claim that they sought
compensation for the damage done to petitioner Leticia Tans house, tailoring shop,
sewing machines, as well as other household appliances. Since the damages
primarily refer to the value of their destroyed property, and not the cost of
repairing or replacing them, the value cannot be evidenced by receipts. Accordingly,
the RTC correctly relied on petitioner Leticia Tans testimony and the documentary
evidence presented, consisting of pictures of the damaged property, to prove their
right to recover actual damages for the destroyed property.
Second, the petitioners are entitled to actual damages for the loss of Celedonio
Tans earning capacity. While they admit that they did not submit any documentary
evidence to substantiate this claim, the petitioners point out that Celedonio Tan
was undisputably a self-employed tailor who owned a small tailor shop; in his line of
work, no documentary evidence is available.
Third, the petitioners maintain that they are entitled to exemplary damages in the
amount of P500,000.00 because the RTC and the CA consistently found that the
collision was caused by the respondents gross negligence. Moreover, the
respondents acted with bad faith when they fabricated the "oil slick on the road"
story to avoid paying damages to the petitioners. As observed by the CA, the Traffic
Accident Investigation Report did not mention any motor oil on the road at the time
of the accident. SPO4 Armando Alambro, the Investigation Officer, likewise testified
that there was no oil on the road at the time of the accident. For the public good
and to serve as an example, the respondents should be made to pay P500,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
Lastly, the petitioners are entitled to attorneys fees based on Article 2208 of the
Civil Code which provides, among others, that attorneys fees can be recovered
when exemplary damages are awarded, and when the defendant acted in gross and
evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and
demandable claim.
We initially denied the petition in our Resolution of February 17, 2010, for the
petitioners failure to show any reversible error in the CA decision sufficient to
warrant the exercise of our discretionary appellate jurisdiction. In our Resolution of

August 11, 2010, we reinstated the petition on the basis of the petitioners motion
for reconsideration.
OUR RULING
Finding merit in the petitioners arguments, we partly grant the petition.
Procedural Issue
As both the RTC and the CA found that the respondents gross negligence led to the
death of Celedonio Tan, as well as to the destruction of the petitioners home and
tailoring shop, we see no reason to disturb this factual finding. We, thus,
concentrate on the sole issue of what damages the petitioners are entitled to.
We are generally precluded from resolving a Rule 45 petition that solely raises the
issue of damages, an essentially factual question, because Section 1, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, expressly states that
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by
certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
In light, however of the RTCs and the CAs conflicting findings on the kind and
amount of damages suffered which must be compensated, we are compelled to
consider the case as one of the recognized exceptions.19 We look into the parties
presented evidence to resolve this appeal.
Temperate damages in lieu of actual damages
We begin by discussing the petitioners claim for actual damages arising from the
damage inflicted on petitioner Leticia Tans house and tailoring shop, taking into
account the sewing machines and various household appliances affected. Our basic
law tells us that to recover damages there must be pleading and proof of actual
damages suffered.20 As we explained in Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos
Santos:21
Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must
actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely
on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of
damages. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of
the actual amount of loss, credence can be given only to claims which are duly
supported by receipts.22
The petitioners do not deny that they did not submit any receipt to support their
claim for actual damages to prove the monetary value of the damage caused to the
house and tailoring shop when the truck rammed into them. Thus, no actual
damages for the destruction to petitioner Leticia Tans house and tailoring shop can
be awarded.
Nonetheless, absent competent proof on the actual damages suffered, a party still
has the option of claiming temperate damages, which may be allowed in cases
where, from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be
adduced although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some
pecuniary loss.23As defined in Article 2224 of the Civil Code:
Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but
less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of
the case, be proved with certainty.
In Canada v. All Commodities Marketing Corporation,24 we disallowed the award of
actual damages arising from breach of contract, where the respondent merely
alleged that it was entitled to actual damages and failed to adduce proof to support
its plea. In its place, we awarded temperate damages, in recognition of the
pecuniary loss suffered.
The photographs the petitioners presented as evidence show the extent of the
damage done to the house, the tailoring shop and the petitioners appliances and
equipment.25 Irrefutably, this damage was directly attributable to Arambalas gross
negligence in handling OMCs truck. Unfortunately, these photographs are not
enough to establish the amount of the loss with certainty. From the attendant
circumstances and given the property destroyed,26 we find the amount
of P200,000.00 as a fair and sufficient award by way of temperate damages.
Temperate damages in lieu of loss of earning capacity
Similarly, the CA was correct in disallowing the award of actual damages for loss of
earning capacity. Damages for loss of earning capacity are awarded pursuant to
Article 2206 of the Civil Code, which states that:
Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict
shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity
shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on
account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no
earning capacity at the time of his death[.]
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for
loss of earning capacity.27 By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity
may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the
deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the
deceased's line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased

is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws.28
According to the petitioners, prior to his death, Celedonio was a self-employed
tailor who earned approximatelyP156,000.00 a year, or P13,000.00 a month. At the
time of his death in 1995, the prevailing daily minimum wage
was P145.00,29 or P3,770.00 per month, provided the wage earner had only one
rest day per week. Even if we take judicial notice of the fact that a small tailoring
shop normally does not issue receipts to its customers, and would probably not
have any documentary evidence of the income it earns, Celedonios alleged
monthly income ofP13,000.00 greatly exceeded the prevailing monthly minimum
wage; thus, the exception set forth above does not apply.
In the past, we awarded temperate damages in lieu of actual damages for loss of
earning capacity where earning capacity is plainly established but no evidence was
presented to support the allegation of the injured partys actual income.
In Pleno v. Court of Appeals,30 we sustained the award of temperate damages in the
amount of P200,000.00 instead of actual damages for loss of earning capacity
because the plaintiffs income was not sufficiently proven.
We did the same in People v. Singh,31 and People v. Almedilla,32 granting temperate
damages in place of actual damages for the failure of the prosecution to present
sufficient evidence of the deceaseds income.
Similarly, in Victory Liner, Inc. v. Gammad,33 we deleted the award of damages for
loss of earning capacity for lack of evidentiary basis of the actual extent of the loss.
Nevertheless, because the income-earning capacity lost was clearly established, we
awarded the heirs P500,000.00 as temperate damages.
In the present case, the income-earning capacity of the deceased was never
disputed. Petitioners Mary Jane Tan, Mary Lyn Tan, Celedonio Tan, Jr., Mary Joy Tan
and Mark Allan Tan were all minors at the time the petition was filed on February 4,
2010,34 and they all relied mainly on the income earned by their father from his
tailoring activities for their sustenance and support. Under these facts and taking
into account the unrebutted annual earnings of the deceased, we hold that the
petitioners are entitled to temperate damages in the amount ofP300,000.00 [or
roughly, the gross income for two (2) years] to compensate for damages for loss of
the earning capacity of the deceased.
Reduction of exemplary damages proper
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.35 In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant
acted with gross negligence.36
Celedonio Tans death and the destruction of the petitioners home and tailoring
shop were unquestionably caused by the respondents gross negligence. The law
allows the grant of exemplary damages in cases such as this to serve as a warning to
the pubic and as a deterrent against the repetition of this kind of deleterious
actions.37 The grant, however, should be tempered, as it is not intended to enrich
one party or to impoverish another. From this perspective, we find the CAs
reduction of the exemplary damages awarded to the petitioners from P500,000.00
to P200,000.00 to be proper.
Attorneys fees in order
In view of the award of exemplary damages, we find it also proper to award the
petitioners attorney's fees, in consonance with Article 2208(1) of the Civil
Code.38 We find the award of attorneys fees, equivalent to 10% of the total amount
adjudged the petitioners, to be just and reasonable under the circumstances.
Interests due
Finally, we impose legal interest on the amounts awarded, in keeping with our
ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,39 which held that:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts,
delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages.
The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in
determining the measure of recoverable damages.lavvphil
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of
money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which
may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn
legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation,
the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169
of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is
breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at
the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall
be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand
can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is
established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time
the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the
interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at
which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably

ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case,
be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction,
this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.
Accordingly, legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the amounts awarded
starts to run from May 14, 2003, when the trial court rendered judgment. From the
time this judgment becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% per
annum on the judgment amount and the interest earned up to that date, until the
judgment is wholly satisfied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. The June 22,
2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 84733, which modified the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, in Civil Case No.
96-186, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, respondents OMC Carriers,
Inc. and Bonifacio Arambala are ordered to jointly and severally pay the petitioners
the following:
(1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Celedonio Tan;
(2) P72,295.00 as actual damages for funeral expenses;
(3) P200,000.00 as temperate damages for the damage done to petitioner Leticias
house, tailoring shop, household appliances and shop equipment;
(4) P300,000.00 as damages for the loss of Celedonio Tans earning capacity;
(5) P500,000.00 as moral damages;
(6) P200,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(7) 10% of the total amount as attorneys fees; and costs of suit.
In addition, the total amount adjudged shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from May 14, 2003, and at the rate of 12% per annum, from the finality of
this Resolution on the balance and interest due, until fully paid.
G.R. No. 94590 July 29, 1992
CHINA AIRLINES LIMITED, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MANUEL J. OCAMPO, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
Private respondent Manuel J. Ocampo bought, through the Ultraman Travel
Agency, a round-trip ticket for Manila-San Francisco-Manila from petitioner China
Airlines Limited ("CAL"). The ticket purchased was a GV-10, or a Group Tour, ticket
for which Ocampo paid a special discounted (reduced) price of P6,063.00. A Group
Tour ticket is issued to members of a group of at least ten (10) passengers travelling
for a minimum of fourteen (14) days and for a maximum of thirty-five (35) days. It is
a condition of a Group Tour ticket that the holder thereof must stay in the place of
destination (in this case, the United States), for at least fourteen (14) but not
exceeding thirty-five (35) days. The portion of the ticket covering the return trip
may be used only after expiration of fourteen (14) days counted from the date of
arrival at the place of destination; beyond the thirty-five (35) allowable days, the
return trip ticket is no longer valid.
The ticket purchased by respondent Ocampo bore the following schedule and
status:
Date Time Status
Manila-Taipei 09 May 1030 RQ
Taipei-S.F. 09 May 1525 RQ
S.F.-Honolulu 24 May 2350 RQ
Honolulu-Tokyo 30 May 0405 RQ
Tokyo-Taipei 02 June 1545 RQ
Taipei-Manila 09 June 1120 RQ 1
It will be noted from the above schedule that respondent Ocampo's return flight
from San Francisco to Manila was scheduled for 24 May 1979, i.e., the 15th day
after arrival in San Francisco. Respondent Ocampo, however, wanted to leave for
Manila earlier than 24 May 1979 because he had several business meetings
scheduled to be held here prior to 24 May 1979 and because of his desire to attend
to his wife's and son's forthcoming departure for Europe scheduled on 24 May
1979. 2
Notwithstanding the limitations on his discounted GV-10 ticket, therefore,
respondent Ocampo sought to make special arrangements, through Ultraman
Travel Agency, with CAL Manila for a change in schedule. The travel agency was,
according to respondent Ocampo, assured that the necessary adjustments would
be made and that Mr. Ocampo could definitely take the CAL flight from San
Francisco on 18 May 1979. Not satisfied, respondent Ocampo sent his private
secretary to the office of CAL Manila to have the ticket changed. There, the
secretary was handed a typewritten note purporting to show a revised schedule for
the different sectors of the return trip from San Francisco to Manila with the
corresponding flight numbers. The revised schedule was as follows:
CI001 flight number
dep San Francisco 11:50 p.m. May 18
arr Honolulu 1:55 a.m. May 19
C1007 flight number

dep Honolulu 4:05 a.m. May 20

arr Taipei 10:25 a.m. May 21
C1811 flight number
dep Taipei 11:20 a.m. May 21
arr Manila 1:10 p.m. May 21 3
Respondent Ocampo was asked to reconfirm his return flight with CAL San
Francisco which would alter the ticket by attaching a sticker on it showing the
adjusted flights and departure dates. The revised schedule was also entered into
respondent Ocampo's reservation card on file in the office of CAL Manila.
Respondent Ocampo left Manila for San Francisco's on 9 May 1979 and arrived in
San Francisco also on the same day, San Francisco local time. Next day, he
proceeded to CAL San Francisco' office to confirm his revised return flight schedule.
CAL San Francisco, however, declined to confirm his return flight, since the date
indicated on the ticket was not 18 May 1979 but rather 24 May 1979. Mr. Ocampo,
however, apprised CAL San Francisco about the special arrangement that he had
requested from CAL Manila. CAL San Francisco contacted CAL Manila by telex
requesting verification of the revised schedule for respondent Ocampo. CAL San
Francisco, however, received a negative reply from CAL Manila.
Respondent Ocampo persisted in his efforts to book himself on the CAL San
Francisco-Honolulu flight on 18 May 1979. By telephone, he contacted his private
secretary in Manila to make the necessary inquiry and verification at CAL Manila.
His secretary later telephoned back to inform him that CAL Manila would forthwith
send a communication to CAL San Francisco to correct the situation. With that
information, respondent Ocampo proceeded once more to CAL San Francisco and
left his telephone number and address where he could be contacted upon receipt
of confirmation from CAL Manila.
CAL San Francisco never sent any notice to private respondent. On the morning of
18 May 1979, respondent Ocampo went to CAL San Francisco's office to check again
on the status of his return flight; there he was apparently informed that CAL Manila
had not responded. Respondent Ocampo was accordingly constrained to take a
Philippine Airlines flight which left San Francisco on 20 May 1979, the earliest
available return flight which respondent Ocampo could secure after 18 May 1979. 4
Upon arrival in Manila, respondent Ocampo demanded an explanation from CAL
Manila. He was told candidly that a mistake had been committed by an employee of
CAL Manila who had sent a negative reply to CAL San Francisco's request for
confirmation without first consulting Ocampo's passenger reservation card. Another
employee or representative of CAL Manila offered private respondent
compensation for actual expenses incurred by him due to his inability to board the
CAL 18 May 1979 flight from San Francisco. Private respondent asked that the offer
be reduced to writing; however, nothing in writing emanated from CAL Manila and
nothing further happened.
Private respondent then filed a complaint for damages before the then Court of
First Instance of Manila. He asked for P200,000.00 as moral damages, P200,000.00
as exemplary damages and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
On 23 May 1983, after trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which read as follows:
In View of the Foregoing Considerations, the Court is of the opinion and so holds
that when the plaintiff tried to return to Manila from San Francisco, a date different
from the scheduled date of his departure from San Francisco as contained in his
plane ticket, the plaintiff is considered as a chance passenger and could only board
the defendant's plane, on his departure on May 18, 1979 depending upon the
volume of passengers and plane load on May 18, 1979 and defendant had not
violated any provisions of the plane ticket issued to the plaintiff which is the
contract between plaintiff and the defendant; the complaint is hereby dismissed for
lack of cause of action. On principles of equity and justice, defendant is hereby
ordered to reimburse the plaintiff the sum of $601.00 or its equivalent value in
Philippine Currency at the rate then existing on May 18, 1979. The counterclaim of
the defendant is hereby dismissed as tin same had not been fully established,
without special pronouncement as to cost.
So ordered. 5
On appeal by private respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
decision. The Court of Appeals found petitioner CAL guilt of bad faith in not allowing
respondent Ocampo to board the 18 May 1979 CAL flight in San Francisco despite
messages from CAL Manila confirming the change in schedule and the availability of
seats for the different sectors of the flight from San Francisco to Manila. The Court
of Appeals awarded, in addition to the US$601 that the trial court had ordered CAL
to pay to private respondent, the sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages, another
P200,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's fees of P50,000.00.
In the instant Petition for Review, petitioner CAL argues that:
1. The respondent Court erred when it concluded that the petitioner [was] liable to
the private respondent on the basis that he had a confirmed reservation contrary to
the express finding of the lower court.
2. The respondent Court erred when it concluded that the petitioner was guilty of
bad faith.
3. The respondent Court erred when it awarded damages not warranted by the
evidence and which are excessive. 6
We note that while the ticket, held by private respondent himself, showed on its
face a 24 May 1979 departure from San Francisco to Honolulu and a "RQ" [Request]

status, the evidence of record showed that private respondent had indeed
requested CAL Manila for an earlier return flight, to which request CAL Manila
eventually agreed. The record shows a stream of telexes between the several
offices of petitioner CAL involved in respondent's trip, disclosing the following
salient facts:
1. On 7 May 1979 at 2:54 p.m., Manila time, CAL Manila sent telexes to CAL Taipei
and CAL San Francisco informing the two (2) offices that respondent Ocampo had a
sold seat for the sector San Francisco-Honolulu on 18 May 1979, but that the status
of the sector Honolulu-Taipei for 20 May 1979 and the sector Taipei-Manila for 21
May 1979, was only "wait listed."
2. On 7 May 1979 at 4:44 p.m., San Francisco time, CAL San Francisco sent a reply to
CAL Manila to confirm the San Francisco-Honolulu sector scheduled for 18 May
1979 as well as the Honolulu-Taipei sector for 20 May 1979.
3. On 8 May 1979, at 10:10 a.m., Manila time, CAL Manila sent another telex to CAL
Taipei, urging the latter to do everything possible to confirm the Taipei-Manila
sector of the flight scheduled for 21 May 1979.
4. On 14 May 1979 at 8:06 a.m., Taipei time, CAL Taipei telexed CAL Manila
confirming the Taipei-Manila sector as earlier requested.
5. On 17 May 1979 at 1:10 P.m., San Francisco time, CAL San Francisco, which by
then had learned about the confirmed status of all segments of the flight San
Francisco-Manila, reiterated its request to CAL Manila for an early departure
authority, i.e., as an exception to the regular conditions of a GV-10 ticket, so that
respondent Ocampo may be allowed to board the 18 May 1979 flight leaving San
Francisco for Honolulu.
6. On 17 May 1979 at 2:28 p.m., Manila time, CAL Manila instructed CAL San
Francisco to inform respondent Ocampo of the confirmed status of the different
sectors of his return flight, and to accept private respondent for carriage by reason
of a prior arrangement made with CAL Manila.
7. On 18 May 1979 at 9:32 a.m., Manila time, CAL Manila sent an urgent message to
CAL San Francisco substantially reiterating the instructions in CAL Manila's telex of
17 May 1979 sent at 2:28 p.m. For some reason not clear in the record, the last two
(2) telexes received in CAL San Francisco from CAL Manila apparently did not get to
the attention of, and were not acted upon by, the right person or persons in CAL
San Francisco.
Because CAL Taipei had confirmed as early as 14 May 1979 the Taipei-Manila sector
of Private respondent's return trip, public respondent Court of Appeals considered
CAL San Francisco's refusal to board private respondent as an act of bad faith, and
awarded private respondent the large amounts he sought by way of moral and
exemplary damages totalling P400,000.00.
We consider that private respondent was able to show that petitioner CAL had
indeed confirmed a seat for Mr. Ocampo on the 18 May 1979 flight from San
Francisco-Honolulu (and all the way to Manila). We agree, therefore, with the Court
of Appeals that petitioner CAL had breached its contract of carriage with private
respondent by such failure or refusal to board him on that flight.
We are not, however, persuaded that that breach of contractual obligation had
been attended by bad faith or malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. To
the contrary, it appears to the Court that petitioner CAL had exercised diligent
efforts to effect the change of schedule which it apparently had earlier stated to
private respondent (prior to his departure from Manila) it would carry out. There
was clearly a concerted effort among the involved CAL offices as shown by the flow
of telexes from one to the others. If at the outset, petitioner CAL simply did not
intend to comply with its promise to private respondent that it would
accommodate his requested change of schedule, it would not have taken the
trouble of composing and transmitting all those telexes between its several offices.
CAL San Francisco was obviously aware of the limitations on a GV-10 CAL ticket and
its employee(s) who bad refused to accede summarily to respondent Ocampo's
request for confirmation of his revised schedule, cannot be held guilty of bad faith;
the procedure adopted of seeking verification from CAL Manila was one taken in
the usual course of business and was not in itself unreasonable or arbitrary. 7 There
responsible officer(s) of CAL Manila admitted that it had initially sent an erroneous
message to CAL San Francisco concerning authorization for early departure of
private respondent from San Francisco. While the CAL Manila employee who had
sent a mistaken telex message was negligent, there was no evidence either of
deliberate malice or of gross negligence. The last two (2) telexes sent by CAL Manila
to CAL San Francisco on 17 May and 18 May 1979 were presumably received by CAL
San Francisco in time to have relayed to respondent Ocampo his acceptance as a
passenger on the CAL flight out of San Francisco scheduled for 18 May 1979. Again,
however, we do not believe that respondent Ocampo had convincingly shown that
the employees of petitioner CAL were motivated by personal malice or bad faith, or
that there was patently negligence so gross as to amount to bad faith. Bad faith
under the law is not presumed; it must be established by clear and convincing
evidence. 8 Private respondent has not adduced that kind of evidence in the instant
case. There was no pretense that any of the employee of any of the CAL offices
involved knew respondent Ocampo from Adam.
Under Article 2201 of the Civil Code, the measure of recoverable damages for
breach of contract varies according to the circumstances attending that breach.
Article 2201 provides:

In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in
good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of
the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude the obligor shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 2220 is also pertinent:
Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the
court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The
same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently
or in bad faith. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the law distinguishes a contractual breach effected in good faith from one
attended by bad faith. Where in breaching the contract, the defendant is not shown
to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the
natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation and which the
parties had foreseen or could reasonably have foreseen; and in that case, such
liability would not include liability for moral and exemplary damages. 9 Under Article
2232 of the Civil Code, in a contractual or quasi-contractual relationship, exemplary
damages may be awarded only if the defendant had acted in "a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner." We are unable to so characterize the
behavior here shown of the employees of CAL Manila and of CAL San Francisco.
Thus, we believe and so hold that the damages recoverable by respondent Ocampo
are limited to the peso value of the Philippine Airlines ticket it had purchased for his
return flight from San Francisco; and reasonable expenses occasioned to private
respondent by reason of the delay in his return San Francisco-Manila trip
exercising the Court's discretion, we believe that for such expenses, US$1,500.00
would be a reasonable amount plus attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000.00,
considering that respondent Ocampo was ultimately compelled to litigate his claim
against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 25 July 1990 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby ENTERED requiring petitioner
to pay private respondent Ocampo the Philippine Peso equivalent of US$2,101.00,
at the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment thereof, as reasonable
compensatory damages, plus attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000.00 and
costs. Petitioner's counterclaim before the trial court is hereby DISMISSED.
G.R. No. L-12306
October 22, 1918
SIMONA MANZANARES, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
RAFAEL MORETA, defendant-appellant.
Sanz & Luzuriaga for appellant.
Jose C. Zulueta for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
In the case which is brought for the recovery of the damages resulting from the
death of the child Salvador Bona, of from 8 to 9 years of age, who had been run
over by an automobile driven and managed by the defendant on the morning of
March 5, 1916, a judgment was rendered on August 3, 1916, whereby the said
defendant was sentenced to pay the sum of P1,000 as indemnity child, and to pay
the costs. From this judgment, an appeal was taken by the defendant after his
motion for a new trial had been overruled, and the case is now before this court by
bill of exceptions.
The statement of facts is at once admitted, and we find no reason for disturbing the
findings made by the trail judge in his judgement appealed from, wherein the
defendant was found liable for the accident which occurred to the said child on
Solana Street on the morning of said day, and consequently, the defendant, as the
one who had cause the accident, is bound to indemnify the mother of the deceased
child in the amount of P1,000, which was deemed by the trial judge to be the value
of the damages occasioned to the mother for the loss and death of a member of
her family.
To the reasons given by the trail judge as grounds for his decision, we deem
pertinent to add the following:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana
Street, had to stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met
vehicles which were going along the latter street or were coming from the opposite
direction along Solana street, it is to be believed that, when he against stated to run
his auto across said Real Street and to continue its way along Solana Street
northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was operating
until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on
Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of
Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred, if the auto had been running
at a slow speed, aside form the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing
Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen
the child in the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to
that on the left; and if the accident had occurred in such a way that after the
automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child's body had already
been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a distance of
about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered

Solana Street form Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant having blown
the horn. If these precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable
accident which caused the death of the child would not have occurred.
In view of the foregoing considerations as well as those contained in the judgment
of the trial court, which, we believe that he errors assigned by the appellant are
thereby refuted and that therefore the judgment appealed from, should be, as it
hereby is, affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo and Street, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-25499 February 18, 1970
VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, TRINIDAD A. QUINTOS, PRIMA A. QUINTOS, AND JULITA
A. QUINTOS,respondents.
Laurea and Pison for petitioner.
Bonifacio M. Abad, Jr. for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc., seeks the review by certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The
basic facts are set forth in said decision of the Court of Appeals, from which We
quote:
At about 1:30 in the morning of March 17, 1960, an Izuzu First Class passenger bus
owned and operated by the defendant, bearing Plate No. TPU-14871-Bulacan and
driven by Laureano Casim, left Lingayen, Pangasinan, for Manila. Among its paying
passengers was the deceased, Policronio Quintos, Jr. who sat on the first seat,
second row, right side of the bus. At about 4:55 o'clock a.m. when the vehicle was
nearing the northern approach of the Sadsaran Bridge on the national highway in
barrio Sto. Domingo, municipality of Minalin, Pampanga, it frontally hit the rear side
of a bullcart filled with hay. As a result the end of a bamboo pole placed on top of
the hayload and tied to the cart to hold it in place, hit the right side of the
windshield of the bus. The protruding end of the bamboo pole, about 8 feet long
from the rear of the bullcart, penetrated through the glass windshield and landed
on the face of Policronio Quintos, Jr. who, because of the impact, fell from his seat
and was sprawled on the floor. The pole landed on his left eye and the bone of the
left side of his face was fractured. He suffered other multiple wounds and was
rendered unconscious due, among other causes to severe cerebral concussion. A La
Mallorca passenger bus going in the opposite direction towards San Fernando,
Pampanga, reached the scene of the mishap and it was stopped by Patrolman
Felino Bacani of the municipal police force of Minalin who, in the meantime, had
gone to the scene to investigate. Patrolman Bacani placed Policronio Quintos, Jr.
and three other injured men who rode on the bullcart aboard the La Mallorca bus
and brought them to the provincial hospital of Pampanga at San Fernando for
medical assistance. Notwithstanding such assistance, Policronio Quintos, Jr. died at
3:15 p.m. on the same day, March 17, 1960, due to traumatic shock due to cerebral
injuries.
The private respondents, Trinidad, Prima and Julita, all surnamed Quintos, are the
sisters and only surviving heirs of Policronio Quintos Jr., who died single, leaving no
descendants nor ascendants. Said respondents herein brought this action against
herein petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc., as owner and operator of said passenger
bus, bearing Plate No. TPU-14871-Bulacan, for breach of the contract of carriage
between said petitioner and the deceased Policronio Quintos, Jr., to recover the
aggregate sum of P63,750.00 as damages, including attorney's fees. Said petitioner
defendant in the court of first instance contended that the mishap was due to
a fortuitous event, but this pretense was rejected by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, both of which found that the accident and the death of Policronio had
been due to the negligence of the bus driver, for whom petitioner was liable under
its contract of carriage with the deceased. In the language of His Honor, the trial
Judge:
The mishap was not the result of any unforeseeable fortuitous event or emergency
but was the direct result of the negligence of the driver of the defendant. The
defendant must, therefore, respond for damages resulting from its breach of
contract for carriage. As the complaint alleged a total damage of only P63,750.00
although as elsewhere shown in this decision the damages for wake and burial
expenses, loss of income, death of the victim, and attorneys fee reach the
aggregate of P79,615.95, this Court finds it just that said damages be assessed at
total of only P63,750.00 as prayed for in plaintiffs' amended complaint.
The despositive part of the decision of the trial Court reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay to the
plaintiffs the amount of P63,750.00 as damages for breach of contract of carriage
resulting from the death of Policronio Quintos, Jr.
which, as above indicated, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the
present petition for review oncertiorari, filed by Villa Rey Transit, Inc.
The only issue raised in this appeal is the amount of damages recoverable by
private respondents herein. The determination of such amount depends, mainly
upon two (2) factors, namely: (1) the number of years on the basis of which the
damages shall be computed and (2) the rate at which the losses sustained by said
respondents should be fixed.

The first factor was based by the trial court the view of which was concurred in
by the Court of Appeals upon the life expectancy of Policronio Quintos, Jr., which
was placed at 33-1/3 years he being over 29 years of age (or around 30 years for
purposes of computation) at the time of his demise by applying the formula (2/3
x [80-301 = life expectancy) adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality
or the actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality. Upon the other hand,
petitioner maintains that the lower courts had erred in adopting said formula and in
not acting in accordance with Alcantara v. Surro1 in which the damages were
computed on a four (4) year basis, despite the fact that the victim therein was 39
years old, at the time of his death, and had a life expectancy of 28.90 years.
The case cited is not, however, controlling in the one at bar. In the Alcantara
case, none of the parties had questioned the propriety of the four-year basis
adopted by the trial court in making its award of damages. Both parties appealed,
but only as regards the amount thereof. The plaintiffs assailed the non-inclusion, in
its computation, of the bonus that the corporation, which was the victim's
employer, had awarded to deserving officers and employees, based upon the
profits earned less than two (2) months before the accident that resulted in his
death. The defendants, in turn, objected to the sum awarded for the fourth year,
which was treble that of the previous years, based upon the increases given, in that
fourth year, to other employees of the same corporation. Neither this objection nor
said claim for inclusion of the bonus was sustained by this Court. Accordingly, the
same had not thereby laid down any rule on the length of time to be used in the
computation of damages. On the contrary, it declared:
The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased
person has therefore no fixed basis. Much is left to the discretion of the court
considering the moral and material damages involved, and so it has been said
that "(t)here can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life
and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical
calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of the deceased or of the
beneficiary, whichever is shorter, is an important factor.' (25 C.J.S. 1241.) Other
factors that are usually considered are: (1) pecuniary loss to plaintiff or beneficiary
(25 C.J.S. 1243-1250) ; (2) loss of support (25 C.J.S., 1250-1251); (3) loss of service
(25 C.J.S. 1251-1254); (4) loss of society (25 C.J.S. 1254-1255); (5) mental suffering
of beneficiaries (25 C.J.S., 1258-1259) ; and (6) medical and funeral expenses (26
C.J.S., 1254-1260)."2
Thus, life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also, an important element in fixing
the amount recoverable by private respondents herein. Although it is not
the sole element determinative of said amount, no cogent reason has been given to
warrant its disregard and the adoption, in the case at bar, of a purely arbitrary
standard, such as a four-year rule. In short, the Court of Appeals has not erred in
basing the computation of petitioner's liability upon the life expectancy of
Policronio Quintos, Jr.
With respect to the rate at which the damages shall be computed, petitioner
impugns the decision appealed from upon the ground that the damages awarded
therein will have to be paid now, whereas most of those sought to be indemnified
will be suffered years later. This argument is basically true, and this is, perhaps, one
of the reasons why the Alcantara case points out the absence of a "fixed basis" for
the ascertainment of the damages recoverable in litigations like the one at bar. Just
the same, the force of the said argument of petitioner herein is offset by the fact
that, although payment of the award in the case at bar will have to take place upon
the finality of the decision therein, the liability of petitioner herein had been fixed
at the rate only of P2,184.00 a year, which is the annual salary of Policronio
Quintos, Jr. at the time of his death, as a young "training assistant" in the Bacnotan
Cement Industries, Inc. In other words, unlike the Alcantara case, on which
petitioner relies, the lower courts did not consider, in the present case, Policronio's
potentiality and capacity to increase his future income. Indeed, upon the conclusion
of his training period, he was supposed to have a better job and be promoted from
time to time, and, hence, to earn more, if not considering the growing
importance of trade, commerce and industry and the concomitant rise in the
income level of officers and employees
therein much more.
At this juncture, it should be noted, also, that We are mainly concerned with the
determination of the losses or damages sustained by the private respondents, as
dependents and intestate heirs of the deceased, and that said damages
consist, not of the full amount of his earnings, but of the support, they received or
would have received from him had he not died in consequence of the negligence of
petitioner's agent. In fixing the amount of that support, We must reckon with the
"necessary expenses of his own living", which should be deducted from his
earnings. Thus, it has been consistently held that earning capacity, as an element of
damages to one's estate for his death by wrongful act is necessarily his net earning
capacity or his capacity to acquire money, "less the necessary expense for his own
living.3 Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is not loss of the entire earning,
but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have
received.4 In other words, only net earnings, not gross earning, are to be
considered5 that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation
of such earnings or income6 and less living and other incidental expenses.7

All things considered, We are of the opinion that it is fair and reasonable to fix the
deductible living and other expenses of the deceased at the sum of P1,184.00 a
year, or about P100.00 a month, and that, consequently, the loss sustained by his
sisters may be roughly estimated at P1,000.00 a year or P33,333.33 for the 33-1/3
years of his life expectancy. To this sum of P33,333.33, the following should be
added: (a) P12,000.00, pursuant to Arts. 104 and 107 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Article 2206 of our Civil Code, as construed and applied by this
Court;8 (b) P1,727.95, actually spent by private respondents for medical and burial
expenses; and (c) attorney's fee, which was fixed by the trial court, at P500.00, but
which, in view of the appeal taken by petitioner herein, first to the Court of Appeals
and later to this Supreme Court, should be increased to P2,500.00. In other words,
the amount adjudged in the decision appealed from should be reduced to the
aggregate sum of P49,561.28, with interest thereon, at the legal rate, from
December 29, 1961, date of the promulgation of the decision of the trial court.
Thus modified, said decision and that of the Court of Appeals are hereby affirmed,
in all other respects, with costs against petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc. It is so
ordered.
G.R. No. L-28512 February 28, 1973
PEDRO R. DAVILA and PRECIOSA C. TIRO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, defendant-appellant.
Dizon, De Guzman and Vitug and Pedro R. Davila for plaintiffs-appellants.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo, Belo and Ongsiako for defendant-appellant.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
In Civil Case No. 5728 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (Pedro R. Davila and
Preciosa C. Tirol, plaintiffs, vs. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., defendant) judgment was
rendered ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs various sums of money, as
follows:
(1) For the death of Pedro T. Davila, Jr. the amount of P6,000.00;
(2) For the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased at the rate of P12,000.00
per annum for five (5) years in the amount of Sixty Thousand Pesos. (P60,000.00);
(3) For moral damages in favor of the plaintiffs Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00);
(4) For exemplary damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00);
(5) For actual damages the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) broken
down to as follows: A rolex watch valued at P600.00; a pistol worth P300.00; burial
expenses P600.00; for the lot and the mausoleum P3,500.00;
(6) For Attorney's fees the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) or a total
amount of One Hundred and One Thousand Pesos (P101,000.00)
To pay the costs of this proceedings.
Both parties appealed directly to this Court in view of the aggregate of the amounts
awarded, the judgment having been rendered before the effectivity of Rep. Act No.
5440. In this appeal the plaintiffs seek an increase in said amounts, and the
defendant, complete exoneration from, or at least mitigation of, liability.
The case arose from the tragic crash of a passenger plane of the defendant which
took the lives of all its crew and passengers. The plane, identified as PI-C133, was a
DC-3 type of aircraft, manufactured in 1942 and acquired by the defendant in 1948.
It had flown almost 18,000 hours at the time of its ill-fated flight. Despite its age,
however, it had been certified as airworthy by the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
On November 23, 1960, at 5:30 in the afternoon, it took off from the Manduriao
Airport, Iloilo, on its way to Manila, with 33 people on board, including the plane's
complement. It did not reach its destination, but crashed at Mt. Baco, Mindoro, one
hour and fifteen minutes after take-off. A massive search was undertaken by the
defendant and by other parties as soon as it was realized that the plane's arrival in
Manila was overdue. The plaintiffs, parents of Pedro T. Davila, Jr., who was one of
the passengers, had no definite news of what had happened to their son, getting
what information they could only from conflicting newspaper reports, until they
received, on December 19, 1960, a letter of condolence from the defendant's
president Andres Soriano, informing them that their son had died in the crash. And
it was only on December 29 that his body was recovered an taken back to Iloilo.
The issues before the trial court, and now before Us in this appeal, are whether or
not the defendant is liable for violation of its contract of carriage and if so, for how
much. The provisions of the Civil Code on this substantive question of liability are
clear and explicit. Article 1733 binds common carriers, "from the nature of their
business and by reasons of public policy, ... to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance ... for the safety of the passengers transported by them according to all
the circumstances of each case." Article 1755 establishes the standard of care
required of a common carrier, which is, "to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances." Article 1756 fixes the burden of
proof by providing that "in case of death of or injuries to passengers, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless
they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733
and 1755." Lastly, Article 1757 states that "the responsibility of a common carrier
for the safety of passengers ... cannot be dispensed with or lessened by stipulation,
by the posting of notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise."
The route prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Administration for the flight of plane
PI-C113 in the afternoon of November 23, 1960 was Iloilo-Romblon-Manila, the

latter stage, denominated as airway "Amber I," being a straight lane from Romblon
to Manila. The prescribed elevation of the flight was 6,000 ft. The plane reported its
position after take-off and again when it was abeam the Roxas homer. However, it
did not intercept airway "Amber I" over Romblon as it was supposed to do, and the
pilot did not give his position then although Romblon was a compulsory checking
point. The fact was that the plane had deviated from the prescribed route by 32
miles to the west when it crashed at Mt. Baco. The reading of the altimeter of the
plane when its wreckage was found was 6,800 ft.
There is a suggestion that in the course of the flight between Romblon and Mindoro
the aircraft was drifted westward by the cross-winds then blowing in the region.
The defendant, however, has not given a definite explanation as to why, if such was
the case, the pilot failed to make the necessary correction in his flight to
compensate for the drift. According to the defendant's witness, Maj. Mijares, Chief
of the Aviation Safety Division of the Civil Aeronautics Administration and Chairman
of the CAA Investigating Committee, there was a navigational error, to which
several factors contributed: "the weather observation at that time from the
Weather Bureau was not so good between Mt. Baco and Romblon and the wind
aloft was quite strong, which would be also one of the causes for the drifting of the
aircraft; and the other strong probability, I would say, would be the malfunction of
the aircraft's navigational instrument." He further explained that "a cross-wind can
drift the plane if the pilot will not make the necessary correction, if his navigational
instrument is malfunctioning and the visual reference outside the aircraft could not
make the necessary corrections."
There is nothing in the testimony of Maj. Mijares to show just how strong the crosswinds were in the region at the time, although in the investigation of the accident
by the Senate Committee on transportation there was testimony that the crosswinds had a velocity of either 20 to 25 knots or 25 to 35 knots an hour. Considering
the relatively short distance from Romblon to Mt. Baco and the brief span of time it
would take to fly that distance, cross-winds with the velocity stated could not have
possibly deviated the plane by as much as 32 miles.
The defendant points out that the navigational instrument on board the plane
consisted of two (2) sets of automatic direction finders (ADF) which, when found
after the crash, showed a reading that the aircraft was heading north, which was
the proper flight direction. This point, however, is of no vital significance in this case
since it does not explain why the aircraft was 32 miles off its prescribed route in the
first place. It is suggested that the pilot did not notice the drift of his plane because
of poor visibility due to thick clouds, which prevented him from making the
corresponding correction on the basis of visual references to the terrain outside.
But according to Maj. Mijares himself the report from the Weather Bureau at the
time showed that visibility was 15 miles between Romblon and Mt. Baco and that
the clouds from 2,700 to 7,000 ft. elevation were "scattered." And the profile of the
probable weather cross-section along airway "Amber I" during the flight (Exh. 33-A)
shows that at 6,000 ft. the airlane was clear and free of clouds. The suggestion
therefore that the pilot was practically flying blind and consequently failed to notice
the drift of the aircraft is not justified by the evidence. Indeed even the
investigating team of the defendant under the chairmanship of Capt. Jaime
Manzano concluded in its report that "based on the limited evidences available, the
board is of the opinion that the probable cause was the inability of the pilot to
intersect airway "Amber I" over Romblon and to maintain track within its
designated airway lane for reasons unknown."
What is undisputed therefore is that the pilot did not follow the route prescribed
for his flight, at least between Romblon and Manila. Since up to that point over
Romblon, where he was supposed to intersect airway "Amber I" the weather was
clear, the most reasonable conclusion is that his failure to do so was intentional,
and that he probably wanted to fly on a straight line to Manila. It was a violation of
air-craft traffic rules to which, under the circumstances, the accident may be
directly attributable.
In any case, absent a satisfactory explanation on the part of the defendant as to
how and why the accident occurred, the presumption is that it was at fault, under
Article 1756 of the Civil Code.
The next question relates to the amount of damages that should be awarded to the
plaintiffs, parents of the deceased. The trial court fixed the indemnity for his death
in the amount of P6,000.00. Pursuant to current jurisprudence on the point it
should be increased to P12,000.00. 1
The deceased was employed as manager of a radio station 2, from which he was
earning P8,400.00 a year, consisting of a monthly salary of P600.00 and allowance
of P100.00. As a lawyer and junior partner of his father in the law office, he had an
annual income of P3,600.00. From farming he was getting an average of P3,000.00.
All in all therefore the deceased had gross earnings of P15,000.00 a year.
According to Article 2206, paragraph (1), of the Civil Code, "the defendant shall be
liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased and indemnity shall be
paid to the heirs of the latter." This Article, while referring to "damages for death
caused by crime or quasi-delict," is expressly made applicable by Article 1764 "to
the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier."
The deceased, Pedro Davila, Jr., was single and 30 years of age when he died. At
that age one's normal life expectancy is 33-1/3 years, according to the formula (2/3
x [80-30]) adopted by this Court in the case of Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals 3 on the basis of the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the

Actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality. However, although the

deceased was in relatively good health, his medical history shows that he had
complained of and been treated for such ailments as backaches, chest pains and
occasional feelings of tiredness. It is reasonable to make an allowance for these
circumstances and consider, for purposes of this case, a reduction of his life
expectancy to 25 years.
In the same case of Villa Revenue Transit this Court stated:
"... earning capacity, as an element of damages to one's estate for his death by
wrongful act is necessarily his net earning capacity or his capacity to acquire money,
less the necessary expense for his own living. Stated otherwise, the amount
recoverable is not loss of the entire earnings, but rather the loss of that portion of
the earnings which the beneficiary would have received. In other words, only net
earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered, that is, the total of the earnings
less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living
and other incidental expenses."
Considering the fact that the deceased was getting his income from three (3)
different sources, namely from managing a radio station, from law practice and
from farming, the expenses incidental to the generation of such income were
necessarily more than if he had only one source. Together with his living expenses,
a deduction of P600.00 a month, or P7,200.00 a year, seems to Us reasonable,
leaving a net yearly income of P7,800.00. This amount, multiplied by 25 years, or
P195,000.00 is the amount which should be awarded to the plaintiffs in this
particular respect.
Actual losses sustained consist of the following, as found by the trial court: "Rolex
Watch P600.00; pistol P300.00; Burial Expenses P600.00; and cost of
cemetery lot and mausoleum - P3,500.00."
Under Article 2206, in relation to Article 1764, of the Civil Code, the parents of the
deceased are entitled to moral damages for their mental anguish. The trial court
awarded P10,000.00 in this concept, and We find no justification to change the
award, considering the long period of uncertainty and suffering the plaintiffs
underwent from November 23, when the plane crash occurred, to December 19,
when they received a letter from the defendant's president confirming the death of
their son, and again to the following December 29, when his body was finally
recovered and taken back to them.
With respect to the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, it is Our opinion
that the same should be eliminated. According to Article 2232 of the Civil Code, in
contracts and quasi-contracts the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner. The failure of the defendant here to exercise extraordinary diligence, as
required by law, does not amount to anyone of the circumstances contemplated in
the said provision.
The trial court has awarded attorney's fees of P10,000.00. We do not find this
award groundless or the amount thereof unreasonable.
The total of the different items above enumerated is P232,000.00. The judgment of
the court a quo is therefore modified accordingly and the defendant is ordered to
pay the said amount to the plaintiffs, with legal interest thereon from the finality of
this judgment. With costs against the defendant.
G.R. No. 164266
July 23, 2008
NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR y DE LEON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed
by petitioner Nover Bryan Salvador y De Leon, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1 dated February 26, 2004 which affirmed the Regional Trial Court2 (RTC)
Decision3 dated October 26, 2001. Likewise assailed is the appellate courts
Resolution4 dated July 6, 2004 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case follow:
Spouses Ernesto and Margarita Zuiga had three daughters, namely: Marianne,
Mary Ann and the victim Arlene. Mary Ann was married to the petitioner herein.
The Zuiga family, including Mary Ann and the petitioner were living together at
550 Coloong I, Valenzuela City. Their residence had three bedrooms one for the
Zuiga spouses; the other for Marianne and Arlene; and the last for Mary Ann and
the petitioner.
On September 20, 1997, the Zuiga spouses, together with Marianne, went to
Bulacan to attend the wake of Ernestos mother; while Mary Ann with her new born
child, and Arlene, stayed at their Valenzuela home. Petitioner, at that time, asked
permission to attend a birthday party.5
At about 9:00 in the evening, petitioner, accompanied by Eduardo Palomares,
returned home to get some karaoke tapes to be used at the birthday party. They
thereafter went back to the party and stayed there until 12 midnight before
heading back home.
At 4:30 in the morning, the following day, the Zuiga spouses and Marianne arrived
home. They opened the main door which was then locked. After preparing for
sleep, Marianne proceeded to the room which she was sharing with Arlene. There
she saw Arlene, who suffered stab wounds, already dead. After seeing Arlenes
body, the Zuiga spouses rushed to the room of Mary Ann and the petitioner. While

Mary Ann proceeded to Arlenes room, petitioner stayed at the sala and cried. He
was later seen embracing Mary Ann and telling her that he was innocent.6
At around 5:00 in the morning, police investigators arrived. The police found no
forcible entry into the house; no valuables were missing; and no bloodstains in
other parts of the house except Arlenes room. They likewise discovered, on top of
the kitchen table, petitioners underwear (briefs), gray t-shirt and short pants.7 They
further found hair strands on Arlenes bed. These pieces of evidence were brought
to the laboratory for examination.
On September 21, 1997, Dr. Noel Minay (Dr. Minay), a medico-legal of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an autopsy of the deceased.8 He found that
Arlene suffered 21 stab wounds produced by a pointed instrument, one side of
which was sharp like a balisong or a kitchen knife. He further declared the
possibility that Arlene struggled with the assailant before she died.9
The NBI Forensic Biologist also examined petitioners briefs, t-shirt and short pants,
and found that the briefs and shirt were positive of type "O" human blood, Arlenes
blood type.10 The NBI Forensic Chemist, subsequently, conducted DNA Analysis on
the following specimens:
1. One (1) dirty white Hanford brief[s];
2. One (1) light gray t-shirt with DKNY print infront;
3. Several strands of hair allegedly recovered in the bedroom of [the] victim;
4. Buccal swabs taken from the following:
a. ERNESTO ZUIGA (victims father)
b. MARGARITA ZUIGA (victims mother)
c. NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR (suspect)11
The examination of specimen no. 1 yielded a negative result for the presence of
human DNA; while specimen nos. 2, 3, and 4 a-c, yielded positive results.12
Petitioner was thus charged with Homicide in an Information dated April 8, 1998,
the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 1997, in Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without any justifiable cause and with deliberate intent to kill, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and stab one ARLENE ZUIGA,
hitting on the different parts of her body, which led to the death of said Arlene
Zuiga.
CONTRARY TO LAW.13
The aforementioned facts were established during the prosecutions presentation
of evidence. It was further testified to by the witnesses that petitioner owned a
knife otherwise known as balisong, which he usually brought every time he went
out. Ill motive was shown by petitioners previous act of peeping through the
bathroom and Arlenes room on two occasions while she was taking a bath and
while she was inside the room with Marianne.
For his part, all that the petitioner could offer was bare denial of the accusations
against him.
On October 26, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision finding the petitioner guilty of
homicide. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused NOVER BRYAN
SALVADOR y DE LEON guilty beyond reasonable doubt and as principal of the crime
of homicide as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code,
without any attending mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to an indeterminate penalty of
EIGHT (8) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as
minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The accused is further sentence (sic) to
indemnify Spouses Ernesto and Margarita Zuiga the amount of P50,000.00 for the
death of Arlene Zuiga and another amount ofP50,000.00 as moral damages, both
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The accused is further
sentenced to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.14
The RTC considered the following circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish
petitioners guilt:
(1) The perpetrator did not use any force or destroy any portion of the house to get
inside the house. This implies that the perpetrator is an occupant of the house. The
accused was, during the time material to this case, residing with his in-laws. The
allegation of the accused that the main door of the house was open when he
returned to get the tape is difficult to believe. It is unthinkable that the remaining
occupants of the house, namely, Arlene and Mary Ann, who are both female, would
not take the necessary precaution for their own protection such as locking the door
of the house. It is as difficult to suppose that the perpetrator of the crime would go
to the house where his intended victim was sleeping without being sure that he
could gain entry to the house or have the necessary instruments to open the door.
(2) There were no personal belongings missing in the house. This shows that the
person who entered the room of the victim had no intention to steal. This fact can
better be appreciated if we consider the evidence that the accused was caught
many times peeping at Arlene during her lifetime; and that [bloodstains] were
found not in the short pants of the accused but in his Hanford brief and T-shirt.
(3) The absence of [bloodstains] or spots in any other part of the house except the
room of the victim. This indicates that the assailant must have cleaned the traces of

blood inside the house. The facility and time to clean the area is more available to
an assailant who was an occupant of the house or a member of the household.
(4) Prior to and up to the date of the commission of the crime on September 20 or
21, 1997[,] the accused was seen by his parents-in-law Ernesto and Margarita
Zuiga and her sister-in-law Marianne and his friend Dondy Hiponia in many
occasions to have in *his+ possession a balisong" or "beinte (sic) nueve." A
"balisong" or "beinte (sic) nueve" is the tagalong name for a knife with folding
blade. There is no reason for the Court to doubt the testimonies of said witnesses.
Being close relatives and friend of the accused[,] they have no motive to fabricate a
story against the accused or to implicate him to the commission of the crime
charged. The claim of the accused that his father-in-law Ernesto Zuiga is trying to
implicate him [for] the killing of Arlene because his father-in-law disapproved his
marrying Mary Ann, and that he accompanied his mother-in-law to the house of the
mistress of his father-in-law is not supported by the facts of the case. The accused
was allowed to stay in the house of the Zuigas, an indication that he was
acceptable to the family. The alleged mistress of Ernesto was not shown to exist,
nor her supposed address revealed by the accused. The disappearance of said
bladed weapon and the denial by the accused that he ever owned the same are
intriguing because, according to expert testimony, the stab wounds sustained by
the victim were produced by a pointed instrument one side of which is sharp like a
"balisong" or "beinte (sic) nueve."
(5) The presence of human blood with type "O" in the t-shirt and brief of the
accused, the finding that the blood type of the victim belongs to groupd (sic) "O,"
and the circumstance that the accused had suffered no scratches or wound from
which to come blood to stain his T-shirt and brief are revealing and could only lead
to the conclusion that the victim was the source of the blood found in the T-shirt
and brief of the accused.
(6) The conclusion arrived at by Magsipoc that the DNA Profile of the [bloodstain] in
the light gray t-shirt and the DNA Profile on the hair strands could come from the
accused and the victim.
(7) The unusual behavior of the accused after the discovery of the dead body of
Arlene betrayed the accused. Ernesto and Margarita Zuiga testified that soon after
the discovery of the death of Arlene[,] they immediately went to the room of the
accused and his wife Mary Ann; that it took Margarita a hard time to awaken the
accused; and that upon being awakened, the accused did not get (sic) inside the
room where Arlene was and instead stayed and cried in the sala telling his wife that
he was innocent even if nobody yet at that time was pointing to him as the suspect.
The actuation of the accused then was that of a perpetrator of the crime with
troubled conscience.15
On appeal, the CA affirmed petitioners conviction.16 Hence, the present petition for
review on certiorari anchored on the following grounds:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE MOST CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION IS
THE RESULT OF THE DNA ANALYSIS CONDUCTED BY THE NBI FORENSIC CHEMIST.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT BY MEANS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IT WAS PROVEN
AND ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS
THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF ARLENE ZUIGA.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT FINDING ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.17
The petition lacks merit.
Direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may
draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules of evidence allow a trial court to
rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial
evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts
in issue may be established by inference. At times, resort to circumstantial evidence
is imperative since to insist on direct testimony would, in many cases, result in
setting felons free and deny proper protection to the community.18
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if the following requisites are complied with:
(1) There is more than one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.19
All the circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence
can be upheld, provided that the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.20
In the present case, both the trial and appellate courts considered these pieces of
evidence in finding petitioners guilt: 1) the non-employment of force in entering
the scene of the crime; 2) no missing personal belongings; 3) the absence of
bloodstains in other parts of the house except Arlenes room; 4) petitioners

ownership of a balisong, the same weapon used in stabbing the victim; 5) the
presence of type "O" human blood on petitioners T-shirt and briefs; 6) the positive
result of the DNA analysis using the bloodstains found in petitioners shirt and
briefs; and 7) petitioners unusual behavior after the discovery of the victims
lifeless body.21
In his appeal before the CA and likewise in this present petition, petitioner
questions the sufficiency of each and every circumstance enumerated above. He
specifically points out the inconsistent findings of the NBI Forensic Chemist and
those of the NBI Forensic Biologist.22 As to the circumstance that there was no
forcible entry to the house, he insists that the main door was not locked; and he, in
fact, faults Arlene for not locking the door to her bedroom.23 Petitioner adds that
the connection between the alleged "peeping incident" and intent to kill was so
remote; and thus insufficient to convict him.24 He also persuades this Court to give
credence to his testimony that he owned a samurai (double-bladed knife) and not a
balisong (single-bladed) which thus negates his authorship of the crime, since it
would be contrary to the medico-legals findings that the weapon used was an
instrument one side of which was sharp.25 Petitioner further asserts that the
absence of scratches, wounds and bruises on his body were more consistent with
his innocence rather than his guilt, if we follow the courts conclusion that Arlene
had a chance to struggle with him prior to his death.26 Lastly, petitioner claims that
if we were to believe the prosecutions version, it would be hard to imagine that
Mary Ann (petitioners wife), who was then in the other room, was not awakened.27
Prior to the fateful night when Arlenes lifeless body was discovered, several
witnesses saw petitioner in possession of a balisong. The NBI autopsy report, in
turn, stated that the wounds sustained by Arlene were inflicted with the use of a
weapon only one side of which was sharp (such as a balisong). After the discovery
of the crime, the balisong was nowhere to be found. Hence, the trial court was
correct in its conclusion that the balisong previously seen in petitioners possession
was the very weapon used in stabbing the victim. While petitioner admitted owning
a different kind of weapon, he failed to produce it in court. As such, it remained a
self-serving allegation that cannot be considered to exonerate him from liability.
As to petitioners shirt and briefs, as correctly held by the trial court (and as
affirmed by the appellate court), they were found to be stained with type "O" blood
(the victims blood type). Instead of questioning the absence of proof that he was
not of the same blood type as the victim, petitioner should have presented
evidence that he indeed has type "O" blood. The fact remains that petitioner
offered no explanation why his shirt and briefs contained bloodstains. It is,
therefore, correct to conclude that they were stained with the victims blood.
Moreover, the absence of scratches and bruises on petitioners body parts does not
negate the trial courts conclusion that the victim had the chance to struggle with
the petitioner. This is so because, at the time the petitioner attacked the victim
between 1:00 and 4:00 in the morning, she was most likely asleep and was only
awakened by the petitioner; she was, therefore, not in a position to offer strong
resistance. This explains why such struggle produced no bruises and scratches.
The presence of petitioners wife inside the house at that time does not likewise
negate the commission of the crime. Considering that his wife was a nursing mother
who definitely had sleepless nights, she could not be expected to be conscious of
everything that happened outside her room.
More importantly, intent to kill was duly established by the witnesses when they
testified relative to the "peeping incident." Although there was no evidence or
allegation of sexual advances, such incident manifested petitioners evil motive. It is
a rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the
testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or
immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may express
it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred.28 Motive
and intent may be considered one and the same, in some instances, as in the
present case.
Lastly, the DNA analysis made by the NBI expert placed the petitioner at the scene
of the crime.1avvphi1 Such evidence was considered, together with the other
circumstances discussed earlier. The individual pieces of evidence may not be
sufficient to point to the accused as the author of the crime. However, when taken
together, they are more than enough to establish beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioner committed the crime of homicide. We would like to emphasize at this
point that the peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the accused
cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one particular piece of evidence. It is more
like a puzzle which, when put together, reveals a remarkable picture pointing
towards the conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime.29
The prosecutions evidence, especially the testimonies of the witnesses who
happen to be the victims relatives, was not weakened by the fact of such
relationship. The Court notes that petitioner himself is a relative of the witnesses,
albeit by affinity, being the husband of the victims sister. It is unnatural for a
relative, who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody else other
than the real culprit. For her/him to do so is to let the guilty go free.30 Where there
is nothing to indicate that witnesses were actuated by improper motives on the
witness stand, their positive declarations made under solemn oath deserve full faith
and credence.31
We also reiterate the well-settled rule that this Court accords great weight and a
high degree of respect to factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed

by the CA, as in the present case. Here, the RTC was unequivocally upheld by the
CA, which was clothed with the power to review whether the trial courts
conclusions were in accord with the facts and the relevant laws.32 The credibility
given by the trial courts to prosecution witnesses is an important aspect of evidence
which appellate courts can rely on, because of the trial courts unique opportunity
to observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, during
the direct and cross-examination by counsels.33
In view of the foregoing, petitioner was correctly convicted of homicide punishable
by reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of
the indeterminate penalty, absent any modifying circumstances, shall be taken
from the full range of prision mayor and the maximum of which shall be taken from
the medium period of reclusion temporal.34 Specifically, the indeterminate penalty
that should be imposed is within the range of 6 years and 1 day to 12 years of
prision mayor, as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Hence, a modification of the penalty
imposed by the trial court is in order. Instead of 8 years, 8 months and 1 day, the
minimum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor;35 while the maximum term shall be that imposed by the trial court.
An appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review. It then
becomes the duty of this Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment,
whether or not included in the assignment of errors.36
We affirm the award of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity ex delicto to the Zuiga
spouses. When death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are
entitled to such amount as indemnity for death without need of any evidence or
proof of damages.37 The court likewise correctly awarded P50,000.00 as moral
damages because of their mental anguish and moral suffering caused by Arlenes
death.
The trial and appellate courts did not award actual damages, obviously because the
victims heirs failed to present proof of the expenses they incurred. However, it has
been repeatedly held by this Court that where the amount of actual damages
cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to prove the same,
temperate damages may be fixed at P25,000.00.38
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated February 26, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26048 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Nover Bryan Salvador y De Leon is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In addition to civil indemnity and moral
damages, petitioner is ordered to pay spouses Ernesto and Margarita Zuiga the
sum of P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
G.R. No. 156302
April 7, 2009
THE HEIRS OF GEORGE Y. POE, Petitioners,
vs.
MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition for Review under Rule 451 of the Rules of Court assails the
Decision2 dated 26 June 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67297,
which granted the Petition for Certiorari of respondent Malayan Insurance
Company, Inc. (MICI) and recalled and set aside the Order3 dated 6 September 2001
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 73, of Antipolo City, in Civil Case No. 932705. The RTC, in its recalled Order, denied the Notice of Appeal of MICI and
granted the Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution filed by petitioners Heirs
of George Y. Poe. The present Petition also challenges the Resolution4 dated 29
November 2002 of the appellate court denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Records show that on 26 January 1996 at about 4:45 a.m., George Y. Poe (George)
while waiting for a ride to work in front of Capital Garments Corporation, Ortigas
Avenue Extension, Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, was run over by a ten-wheeler
Isuzu hauler truck with Plate No. PMH-858 owned by Rhoda Santos (Rhoda), and
then being driven by Willie Labrador (Willie).5 The said truck was insured with
respondent MICI under Policy No. CV-293-007446-8.
To seek redress for Georges untimely death, his heirs and herein petitioners,
namely, his widow Emercelinda, and their children Flerida and Fernando, filed with
the RTC a Complaint for damages against Rhoda and respondent MICI, docketed as
Civil Case No. 93-2705.6 Petitioners identified Rhoda and respondent MICI, as
follows:
Defendant RHODA SANTOS is likewise of legal age, Filipino and a resident of Real
Street, Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila where she may be served with summons
and other court processes.
[Herein respondent] MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. (hereinafter "[MICI]"
for brevity) is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine law with
address at Yuchengco Bldg., 484 Q. Paredes Street, Binondo, Manila where it may
be served with summons and other processes of this Honorable Court;
Defendant Rhoda Santos, who is engaged in the business, among others, of selling
gravel and sand is the registered owner of one Isuzu Truck, with Plate No. PMH-858
and is the employer of Willie Labrador the authorized driver of the aforesaid truck.

[Respondent MICI] on the other hand is the insurer of Rhoda Santos under a valid
and existing insurance policy duly issued by said [MICI], Policy No. CV-293-007446-8
over the subject vehicle owned by Rhoda Santos, Truck-Hauler Isuzu 10 wheeler
with plate no. PMH-858, serial no. SRZ451-1928340 and motor no. 10PA1-403803.
Under said insurance policy, [MICI] binds itself, among others, to be liable for
damages as well as any bodily injury to third persons which may be caused by the
operation of the insured vehicle.7
And prayed that:
[J]udgment issue in favor of [herein petitioners] ordering [Rhoda and herein
respondent MICI] jointly and solidarily to pay the [petitioners] the following:
1. Actual damages in the total amount of THIRTY SIX THOUSAND (P36,000.00)
PESOS for funeral and burial expenses;
2. Actual damages in the amount of EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR (P805,984.00) PESOS as loss of earnings and financial
support given by the deceased by reason of his income and employment;
3. Moral damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS;
4. Exemplary damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS;
5. Attorneys fees in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS and
litigation expense in the amount of ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P1,500.00)
PESOS for each court appearance;
6. The costs of suit.
Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.8
Rhoda and respondent MICI made the following admissions in their Joint Answer9 :
That [Rhoda and herein respondent MICI] admit the allegations in paragraphs 2, 3
and 4 of the complaint;
That [Rhoda and respondent MICI] admit the allegations in paragraph 5 of the
complaint that the cargo truck is insured with [respondent] Malayan Insurance
Company, Inc. [(MICI)] however, the liability of the insured company attached only
if there is a judicial pronouncement that the insured and her driver are liable and
moreover, the liability of the insurance company is subject to the limitations set
forth in the insurance policy.10
Rhoda and respondent MICI denied liability for Georges death averring, among
other defenses, that: a) the accident was caused by the negligent act of the victim
George, who surreptitiously and unexpectedly crossed the road, catching the driver
Willie by surprise, and despite the latters effort to swerve the truck to the right, the
said vehicle still came into contact with the victim; b) the liability of respondent
MICI, if any, would attach only upon a judicial pronouncement that the insured
Rhoda and her driver Willie are liable; c) the liability of MICI should be based on the
extent of the insurance coverage as embodied in Rhodas policy; and d) Rhoda had
always exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of her driver Willie.
After the termination of the pre-trial proceedings, trial on the merits ensued.
Petitioners introduced and offered evidence in support of their claims for damages
against MICI, and then rested their case. Thereafter, the hearings for the reception
of the evidence of Rhoda and respondent MICI were scheduled, but they failed to
adduce their evidence despite several postponements granted by the trial court.
Thus, during the hearing on 9 June 1995, the RTC, upon motion of petitioners
counsel, issued an Order11declaring that Rhoda and respondent MICI had waived
their right to present evidence, and ordering the parties to already submit their
respective Memorandum within 15 days, after which, the case would be deemed
submitted for decision.1avvphi1.zw+
Rhoda and respondent MICI filed a Motion for Reconsideration12 of the Order dated
9 June 1995, but it was denied by the RTC in another Order dated 11 August 1995.13
Consequently, Rhoda and respondent MICI filed a Petition for Certiorari,
Mandamus,14 Prohibition and Injunction with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, assailing the Orders dated 9 June 1995
and 11 August 1995 of the RTC foreclosing their right to adduce evidence in support
of their defense. The Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 38948.
The Court of Appeals, through its Third Division, promulgated a Decision15 on 29
April 1996, denying due course to the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 38948. Rhoda and
respondent MICI elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a Petition for
Certiorari,16 docketed as G.R. No. 126244. This Court likewise dismissed the Petition
in G.R. No. 126244 in a Resolution dated 30 September 1996.17 Entry of Judgment
was made in G.R. No. 126244 on 8 November 1996.18
On 28 February 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 93-2705, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, [Rhoda and herein respondent MICI] are hereby ordered to pay jointly
and solidarily to the [herein petitioners] the following:
1. Moral damages amounting to P100,000.00;
2. Actual damages for loss of earning capacity amounting to P805,984.00;
3. P36,000.00 for funeral expenses;
4. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5. P50,000.00 for attorneys fees plus P1,500 per court appearance; and
6. Cost of suit.19
Rhoda and respondent MICI received their copy of the foregoing RTC Decision on 14
March 2000.20 On 22 March 2000, respondent MICI and Rhoda filed a Motion for
Reconsideration21 of said Decision, averring therein that the RTC erred in ruling that
the obligation of Rhoda and respondent MICI to petitioners was solidary or joint

and several; in computing Georges loss of earning capacity not in accord with
established jurisprudence; and in awarding moral damages although it was not
buttressed by evidence.
Resolving the Motion of respondent MICI and Rhoda, the RTC issued an Order22 on
24 January 2001 modifying and amending its Decision dated 28 February 2000, and
dismissing the case against respondent MICI.
The RTC held that:
After a careful evaluation of the issues at hand, the contention of the [herein
respondent MICI] as far as the solidary liability of the insurance company with the
other defendant [Rhoda] is meritorious. However, the assailed Decision can be
modified or amended to correct the same honest inadvertence without necessarily
reversing it and set aside to conform with the evidence on hand.
The RTC also re-computed Georges loss of earning capacity, as follows:
The computation of actual damages for loss of earning capacity was determined by
applying the formula adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the
actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality applied in x x x Villa Rey
Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (31 SCRA 521). Moral damages is awarded in
accordance with Article 2206 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines. While death
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is automatically awarded in cases where the
victim had died (People v. Sison, September 14, 1990 [189 SCRA 643]).23
In the end, the RTC decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Decision of this Court
dated 28 February 2000 is hereby amended or modified. Said Decision should read
as follows:
"Wherefore, defendant Rhoda Santos is hereby ordered to pay to the [herein
petitioners] the following:
1. Moral damages amounting to P100,000.00;
2. Actual damages for loss of earning capacity amounting to P102,106.00;
3. P36,000.00 for funeral expenses;
4. P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
5. P50,000.00 for attorneys fees plus P1,500.00 per court appearance;
6. Costs of the suit.
The case against Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. is hereby dismissed."24
It was petitioners turn to file a Motion for Reconsideration25 of the 24 January 2001
Order, to which respondent MICI filed a "Vigorous Opposition to the Plaintiffs
Motion for Reconsideration."26
On 15 June 2001, the RTC issued an Order reinstating its Decision dated 28 February
2000, relevant portions of which state:
Finding the arguments raised by the [herein petitioners] in their Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of this Court dated January 24, 2001 to be more
meritorious to *herein respondents+ Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (sic) arguments in
its vigorous opposition thereto, said motion is hereby granted.
Accordingly, the Order under consideration is hereby reconsidered and set aside.
The decision of this Court dated February 28, 2000 is hereby reinstated.
Notify parties herein.27
Respondent MICI received a copy of the 15 June 2001 Order of the RTC on 27 June
2001.
Aggrieved by the latest turn of events, respondent MICI filed on 9 July 2001 a
Notice of Appeal28 of the 28 February 2000 Decision of the RTC, reinstated by the 15
June 2001 Resolution of the same court. Rhoda did not join respondent MICI in its
Notice of Appeal.29
Petitioners filed their Opposition30 to the Notice of Appeal of respondent MICI, with
a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution.
After considering the recent pleadings of the parties, the RTC, in its Order dated 6
September 2001, denied the Notice of Appeal of respondent MICI and granted
petitioners Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution. The RTC reasoned in its
Order:
The records disclosed that on February 28, 2000 this Court rendered a Decision in
favor of the [herein petitioners] and against [Rhoda and herein respondent MICI].
The Decision was said to have been received by MICI on March 14, 2000. Eight days
after or on March 22, 2000, MICI mailed its Motion for Reconsideration to this
Court and granted the same in the Order dated January 24, 2001. From this Order,
[petitioners] filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 21, 2001 to which MICI
filed a vigorous opposition. On June 15, 2001 this Court granted *petitioners+
motion reinstating the Decision dated February 28, 2000. According to MICI, the
June 15, 2001 order was received by it on June 27, 2001. MICI filed a Notice of
Appeal on July 9, 2001 or twelve (12) days from receipt of said Order.
[Petitioners] contend that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time while
[respondent] MICI opposes, arguing otherwise. The latter interposed that the Order
dated June 15, 2001 is in reality a new Decision thereby giving it a fresh fifteen (15)
days within which to file notice of appeal.
*Respondent+ MICIs contention is not meritorious. The fifteen (15) day period
within which to file a notice of appeal should be reckoned from the date it received
the Decision on March 14, 2000. So that when MICI mailed its Motion for
Reconsideration on March 22, 2000, eight (8) days had already lapsed, MICI has
remaining seven (7) days to file a notice of appeal. However, when it received the
last Order of this Court it took [respondent] MICI twelve (12) days to file the same.
Needless to say, MICIs Notice of Appeal was filed out of time. The Court cannot

countenance the argument of MICI that a resolution to a motion for a final order or
judgment will have the effect of giving a fresh reglementary period. This would be
contrary to what was provided in the rules of procedure.31
Accordingly, the RTC adjudged:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, *herein respondent+ MICIs Notice of Appeal is
hereby Denied for having filed out of time making the Decision of this Court dated
February 28, 2000 as final and executory. Accordingly, the Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Execution filed by [herein petitioners] is hereby Granted.
Notify parties herein.32
Respondent MICI filed a Petition for Certiorari33 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
before the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67297. The
Petition assailed, for having been rendered by the RTC with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the following: (1) the Order
dated 6 September 2001, denying the Notice of Appeal of respondent MICI and
granting petitioners Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution; (2) the Decision
dated 28 February 2000, holding Rhoda and respondent MICI jointly and severally
liable for Georges death; and (3) the Order dated 15 June 2001, reinstating the
Decision dated 28 February 2000.
The Court of Appeals granted the Petition for Certiorari of respondent MICI in a
Decision dated 26 June 2000, ratiocinating thus:
Prescinding therefrom, we hold that the fifteen (15) day period to appeal must be
reckoned from the time the [herein respondent] Malayan received the order dated
15 June 2001 reversing in toto the order of 24 January 2000 and reinstating in full
the Decision dated 28 February 2000. Thus, [respondent] Malayan had until 12 July
2001 within which to file its notice of appeal. Therefore, when [respondent]
Malayan filed its notice of appeal on 09 July 2001, it was well within the
reglementary period and should have been given due course by the public
respondent court.
It was therefore, an excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent court
when it reckoned the *respondent+ Malayans period to appeal on the date it
received on 14 March 2000 the formers decision dated 28 February 2000. As
earlier expostulated, the said decision was completely vacated insofar as the
[respondent] Malayan is concerned when the public respondent court in its order
dated 24 January 2001 dismissed the case against the former. Thus, to reckon the
fifteen (15) days to appeal from the day the [respondent] Malayan received the said
decision on 14 March 2000, is the height of absurdity because there was nothing for
the [respondent] Malayan to appeal inasmuch as the public respondent court
vacated the said decision in favor of the former.
The aforesaid conclusion finds support in Sta. Romana vs. Lacson (104 SCRA 93),
where the court, relying on the case of Magdalena Estate, Inc. vs. Caluag, 11 SCRA
334, held that where the court of origin made a thoroughly (sic) restudy of the
original judgment and rendered the amended and clarified judgment only after
considering all the factual and legal issues, the amended and clarified decision was
an entirely new decision which superseded (sic). For all intents and purposes, the
court concluded the trial court rendered a new judgment from which the time to
appeal must be reckoned.
In the instant case, what is involved is not merely a substantial amendment or
modification of the original decision, but the total reversal thereof in the order
dated 24 January 2000. Given the rationale in the aforecited cases, it is only logical
that the period of appeal be counted from 27 June 2001, the date that [respondent]
Malayan received the order dated 15 June 2001 reversing in toto the order of 24
January 2000 and reinstating the Decision dated 28 February 2000.34 (Emphasis
supplied.)
The fallo of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the petition for certiorari
is partially GRANTED. Accordingly, the public respondent courts order dated 06
September 2001 is hereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE.
Public respondent court is hereby directed to approve the petitioner Malayans
notice of appeal and to refrain from executing the writ of execution granted on 06
September 2001.35
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution
dated 29 November 2002.
Understandably distraught, petitioners come before this Court in this Petition for
Review, which raise the following issues:
I.
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion when it ruled that private respondent could file a Petition for Certiorari
even though its Motion for Reconsideration was still pending resolution with the
lower court.
II.
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion when it ruled that the private respondent had filed its Notice of Appeal
with the trial court within the reglementary period.36
The Court first turns its attention to the primary issue for its resolution: whether
the Notice of Appeal filed by respondent MICI before the RTC was filed out of time.
The period for filing a Notice of Appeal is set by Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Court:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on
appeal is required, the appellants shall file a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. x x x.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.
It is clear under the Rules that an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or final order appealed from.37 A final judgment or order is one
that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect
to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented
at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are;
or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.38
Propitious to petitioners is Neypes v. Court of Appeals,39 which the Court
promulgated on 14 September 2005, and wherein it laid down the fresh period rule:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial
Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for
review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals
by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion
for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order
or resolution. (Emphases ours.)
The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant when a party opts to file a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which
rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and,
in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment.40 With the advent of
the fresh period rule, parties who availed themselves of the remedy of motion for
reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen days from
the denial of that motion.41
The Court has accentuated that the fresh period rule is not inconsistent with Rule
41, Section 3 of the Rules of Court which states that the appeal shall be taken
"within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from." The
use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one
thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily
implies.42 Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of
appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days
from notice of the final order in the case.
Applying the fresh period rule, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals and holds
that respondent MICI seasonably filed its Notice of Appeal with the RTC on 9 July
2001, just 12 days from 27 June 2001, when it received the denial of its Motion for
Reconsideration of the 15 June 2001 Resolution reinstating the 28 February 2000
Decision of the RTC.
The fresh period rule may be applied to the case of respondent MICI, although the
events which transpired concerning its Notice of Appeal took place in June and July
2001, inasmuch as rules of procedure may be given retroactive effect on actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. The Court notes that
Neypes was promulgated on 14 September 2005, while the instant Petition was still
pending before this Court.
Reference may be made to Republic v. Court of Appeals,43 involving the retroactive
application of A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC which provided that the 60-day period within
which to file a petition for certiorari shall be reckoned from receipt of the order
denying the motion for reconsideration. In said case, the Court declared that rules
of procedure "may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of
procedure."
Hence, the fresh period rule laid down in Neypes was applied by the Court in
resolving the subsequent cases ofSumaway v. Urban Bank, Inc.,44 Elbia v.
Ceniza,45 First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands,46 even
though the antecedent facts giving rise to said cases transpired before the
promulgation of Neypes.
In De los Santos v. Vda de Mangubat,47 particularly, the Court applied the fresh
period rule, elucidating that procedural law refers to the adjective law which
prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to
administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes.
The fresh period rule is irrefragably procedural, prescribing the manner in which the
appropriate period for appeal is to be computed or determined and, therefore, can
be made applicable to actions pending upon its effectivity without danger of
violating anyone elses rights.
Since the Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent MICI filed
its Notice of Appeal with the RTC within the reglementary period, the appropriate

action, under ordinary circumstances, would be for the Court to remand the case to
the RTC so that the RTC could approve the Notice of Appeal of respondent MICI and
respondent MICI could already file its appeal with the Court of Appeals.
However, considering that the case at bar has been pending for almost sixteen
years,48 and the records of the same are already before this Court, remand is no
longer necessary.
Jurisprudence dictates that remand of a case to a lower court does not follow if, in
the interest of justice, the Supreme Court itself can resolve the dispute based on
the records before it. As a rule, remand is avoided in the following instances: (a)
where the ends of justice would not be subserved by a remand; or (b) where public
interest demands an early disposition of the case; or (c) where the trial court has
already received all the evidence presented by both parties, and the Supreme Court
is in a position, based upon said evidence, to decide the case on its merits.49 In Lao
v. People,50 the Supreme Court, in consideration of the years that it had taken for
the controversy therein to reach it, concluded that remand of the case to a lower
court was no longer the more expeditious and practical route to follow, and it then
decided the said case based on the evidentiary record before it.
The consistent stand of the Court has always been that a case should be decided in
its totality, resolving all interlocking issues in order to render justice to all
concerned and to end the litigation once and for all. Verily, courts should always
strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or
branch to bear the seed of future litigation.51 Where the public interest so
demands, the court will broaden its inquiry into a case and decide the same on the
merits rather than merely resolve the procedural question raised.52 Such rule
obtains in this case.
The Court is convinced that the non-remanding of the case at bar is absolutely
justified. Petitioners have already suffered from the tragic loss of a loved one, and
must not be made to endure more pain and uncertainty brought about by the
continued pendency of their claims against those liable. The case has been dragging
on for almost 16 years now without the petitioners having been fully compensated
for their loss. The Court cannot countenance such a glaring indifference to
petitioners cry for justice. To be sure, they deserve nothing less than full
compensation to give effect to their substantive rights.53
The complete records of the present case have been elevated to this Court, and the
pleadings and evidence therein could fully support its factual adjudication. Indeed,
after painstakingly going over the records, the Court finds that the material and
decisive facts are beyond dispute: George was killed when he was hit by the truck
driven by Willie, an employee of Rhoda; and the truck is insured with respondent
MICI. The only issue left for the Court to resolve is the extent of the liability of
Rhoda and respondent MICI for Georges death and the appropriate amount of the
damages to be awarded to petitioners.
The Court now turns to the issue of who is liable for damages for the death of
George.
Respondent MICI does not deny that it is the insurer of the truck. Nevertheless, it
asserts that its liability is limited, and it should not be held solidarily liable with
Rhoda for all the damages awarded to petitioners.
A solidary or joint and several obligation is one in which each debtor is liable for the
entire obligation, and each creditor is entitled to demand the whole obligation. In a
joint obligation, each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability and to
each obligee belongs only a part of the correlative rights. Well-entrenched is the
rule that solidary obligation cannot lightly be inferred. There is solidary liability only
when the obligation expressly so states, when the law so provides or when the
nature of the obligation so requires.54
It is settled that where the insurance contract provides for indemnity against
liability to third persons, the liability of the insurer is direct and such third persons
can directly sue the insurer. The direct liability of the insurer under indemnity
contracts against third party liability does not mean, however, that the insurer can
be held solidarily liable with the insured and/or the other parties found at fault,
since they are being held liable under different obligations. The liability of the
insured carrier or vehicle owner is based on tort, in accordance with the provisions
of the Civil Code;55 while that of the insurer arises from contract, particularly, the
insurance policy. The third-party liability of the insurer is only up to the extent of
the insurance policy and that required by law; and it cannot be held solidarily liable
for anything beyond that amount.56 Any award beyond the insurance coverage
would already be the sole liability of the insured and/or the other parties at fault.57
In Vda. de Maglana v. Consolacion,58 it was ruled that an insurer in an indemnity
contract for third-party liability is directly liable to the injured party up to the extent
specified in the agreement, but it cannot be held solidarily liable beyond that
amount. According to respondent MICI, its liability as insurer of Rhodas truck is
limited. Following Vda. de Maglana, petitioners would have had the option either
(1) to claim the amount awarded to them from respondent MICI, up to the extent
of the insurance coverage, and the balance from Rhoda; or (2) to enforce the entire
judgment against Rhoda, subject to reimbursement from respondent MICI to the
extent of the insurance coverage. The Court, though, is precluded from applying its
ruling in Vda. de Maglana by the difference in one vital detail between the said case
and the one at bar. The insurer was able to sufficiently establish its limited liability
in Vda. de Maglana, while the same cannot be said for respondent MICI herein.

The Court highlights that in this case, the insurance policy between Rhoda and
respondent MICI, covering the truck involved in the accident which killed George,
was never presented. There is no means, therefore, for this Court to ascertain the
supposed limited liability of respondent MICI under said policy. Without the
presentation of the insurance policy, the Court cannot determine the existence of
any limitation on the liability of respondent MICI under said policy, and the extent
or amount of such limitation.
It should be remembered that respondent MICI readily admits that it is the insurer
of the truck that hit and killed George, except that it insists that its liability under
the insurance policy is limited. As the party asserting its limited liability, respondent
MICI then has the burden of evidence to establish its claim. In civil cases, the party
that alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Burden of proof is the duty of a
party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to prove its claim or
defense by the amount of evidence required by law.59 Regrettably, respondent MICI
failed to discharge this burden.60 The Court cannot rely on mere allegations of
limited liability sans proof.
The failure of respondent MICI to present the insurance policy which,
understandably, is not in petitioners possession, but in the custody and absolute
control of respondent MICI as the insurer and/or Rhoda as the insured gives rise
to the presumption that its presentation is prejudicial to the cause of respondent
MICI.61 When the evidence tends to prove a material fact which imposes a liability
on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which, from its very
nature, must overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded on fact, and
he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if
produced, would operate to his prejudice and support the case of his adversary.62
Respondent MICI had all the opportunity to prove before the RTC that its liability
under the insurance policy it issued to Rhoda, was limited; yet, respondent MICI
failed to do so. The failure of respondent MICI to rebut that which would have
naturally invited an immediate, pervasive, and stiff opposition from it created an
adverse inference that either the controverting evidence to be presented by
respondent MICI would only prejudice its case, or that the uncontroverted evidence
of petitioners indeed speaks of the truth. And such adverse inference, recognized
and adhered to by courts in judging the weight of evidence in all kinds of
proceedings, surely is not without basis its rationale and effect rest on sound,
logical and practical considerations, viz:
The presumption that a man will do that which tends to his obvious advantage, if he
possesses the means, supplies a most important test for judging of the comparative
weight of evidence x x x If, on the supposition that a charge or claim is unfounded,
the party against whom it is made has evidence within his reach by which he may
repel that which is offered to his prejudice, his omission to do so supplies a strong
presumption that the charge or claim is well founded; it would be contrary to every
principle of reason, and to all experience of human conduct, to form any other
conclusion." (Starkie on Evidence, p. 846, Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 544)
xxxx
The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge peculiarly within his own control,
and refuses to divulge it, cannot complain if the court puts the most unfavorable
construction upon his silence, and infers that a disclosure would have shown the
fact to be as claimed by the opposing party." (Societe, etc., v. Allen, 90 Fed. Rep.
815, 817, 33 C.C.A. 282, per Taft, C.J., Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 561).63
The inference still holds even if it be assumed, for argument's sake, that the solidary
liability of respondent MICI with Rhoda is improbable, for it has likewise been said
that:
Weak evidence becomes strong by the neglect of the party against whom it is put
in, in not showing by means within the easy control of that party that the
conclusion drawn from such evidence is untrue. (Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v.
Callaghan, 50 III. App. 676, 681, Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 572).64
Given the admission of respondent MICI that it is the insurer of the truck involved in
the accident that killed George, and in the utter absence of proof to establish both
the existence and the extent/amount of the alleged limited liability of respondent
MICI as insurer, the Court could only conclude that respondent MICI had agreed to
fully indemnify third-party liabilities. Consequently, there is no more difference in
the amounts of damages which petitioners can recover from Rhoda or respondent
MICI; petitioners can recover the said amounts in full from either of them, thus,
making their liabilities solidary or joint and several.
The Court now comes to the issue of the amounts of the damages awarded.
In its Decision dated 22 February 2000, the RTC awarded petitioners moral and
actual damages, as well as funeral expenses and attorneys fees. Subsequently, in
its Order dated 24 January 2001, the RTC reduced the amount of actual damages
from P805,984.00 to P102,106.00, but additionally awarded death indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00. Its award of moral damages and funeral expenses as well as
attorneys fees remained constant in its 28 February 2000 decision and was carried
over to its 24 January 2001 Order.
The Court shall now proceed to scrutinize said award of damages.
As regards the award of actual damages, Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that
"[e]xcept as provided by law or by stipulation one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved x x
x."

The RTC awarded P36,000.00 for burial expenses. The award of P36,000.00 for
burial expenses is duly supported by receipts evidencing that petitioners did incur
this expense. The petitioners held a wake for two days at their residence and
another two days at the Loyola Memorial Park.65 The amount covered the expenses
by petitioners for the wake, funeral and burial of George.66
As to compensation for loss of earning capacity, the RTC initially
awarded P805,984.00 in its 28 February 2000 Decision, which it later reduced
to P102,106.00 on 24 January 2001.
Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that in addition to the indemnity for death
caused by a crime or quasi-delict, the "defendant shall be liable for the loss of the
earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the
latter, x x x." Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but for
loss of capacity to earn money. Hence, it is proper that compensation for loss of
earning capacity should be awarded to the petitioners in accordance with the
formula established in decided cases for computing net earning capacity, to wit:
The formula for the computation of unearned income is:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x (gross annual income -reasonable and
necessary living expenses).
Life expectancy is determined in accordance with the formula:
2 / 3 x [80 - age of deceased at the time of death]67
Jurisprudence provides that the first factor, i.e., life expectancy, shall be computed
by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the American
Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial of Combined Experience Table of
Mortality.
The second factor is computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net
earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the
creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses.
The loss is not equivalent to the entire earnings of the deceased, but only such
portion that he would have used to support his dependents or heirs. Hence, the
Court deducts from his gross earnings the necessary expenses supposed to be used
by the deceased for his own needs. The Court explained in Villa Rey Transit v. Court
of Appeals68 :
[The award of damages for loss of earning capacity is] concerned with the
determination of the losses or damages sustained by the private respondents, as
dependents and intestate heirs of the deceased, and that said damages consist, not
of the full amount of his earnings, but of the support they received or would have
received from him had he not died in consequence of the negligence of petitioner's
agent. In fixing the amount of that support, we must reckon with the "necessary
expenses of his own living," which should be deducted from his earnings. Thus, it
has been consistently held that earning capacity, as an element of damages to one's
estate for his death by wrongful act is necessarily his net earning capacity or his
capacity to acquire money, "less necessary expense for his own living." Stated
otherwise, the amount recoverable is not the loss of the entire earning, but rather
the loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have received.
In other words, only net earnings, and not gross earnings are to be considered that
is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings
or income and less living and other incidental expenses."
Applying the aforestated jurisprudential guidelines in the computation of the
amount of award for damages set out in Villa Rey, the Court computes the award
for the loss of Georges earning capacity as follows:
Life expectancy =

2/3 x [80 - age of deceased at the time of death]

2/3 x [80 56]
2/3 x [24]

FORMULA NET EARNING CAPACITY (NEC)

If:
Age at time of death of George Poe = 5869
Monthly Income at time of death = P6,94670
Gross Annual Income (GAI) = [(6,946) (12)] = P83,352
Reasonable/Necessary Living Expenses (R/NLE) = 50%71 of GAI = P41,676
NEC

= [2/3 (80-58)] [83,352-41,676]

= [2/3 (22)] [41,676]
= [14.67] [41,676]
= P611,386.92

Therefore, Georges lost net earning capacity is equivalent to P611,386.92

The RTC awarded moral damages72 in the amount of P100,000.00. With respect to
moral damages, the same are awarded under the following circumstances:
The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the
possible, of the spiritual status quo ante. Moral damages are designed to
compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Although incapable
of pecuniary computation, they must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
The amount of the award bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of
the offender.
In the instant case, petitioners testimonies reveal the intense suffering which they
continue to experience as a result of Georges death.73 It is not difficult to

comprehend that the sudden and unexpected loss of a husband and father would
cause mental anguish and serious anxiety in the wife and children he left behind.
Moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are proper for Georges
death.741avvphi1.zw+
The RTC also awarded P50,000.00 as death indemnity which the Court shall not
disturb. The award of P50,000.00 as death indemnity is in accordance with current
rulings of the Court.75
Finally, the RTC awarded attorneys fees to petitioners. Petitioners are entitled to
attorneys fees. Under Article 2008 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees may be granted
when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest by
reason of an unjustified act of the other party.76 In Metro Manila Transit
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,77 the Court held that an award of P50,000.00 as
attorneys fees was reasonable. Hence, petitioners are entitled to attorneys fees in
that amount.78
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
While the Court AFFIRMS the Decision, dated 26 June 2002, and Resolution, dated
29 November 2002, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67297, granting the
Petition for Certiorari of respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc., the Court,
nonetheless, RESOLVES, in consideration of the speedy administration of justice,
and the peculiar circumstances of the case, to give DUE COURSE to the present
Petition and decide the same on its merits.
Rhoda Santos and respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. are hereby
ordered to pay jointly and severally the petitioners Heirs of George Y. Poe the
following:
(1) Funeral expenses P36,000.00;
(2) Actual damages for loss of earning capacity P611,386.92;
(3) Moral damages amounting to P100,000.00;
(4) Death indemnity P50,000.00; and
(5) Attorneys fees P50,000.00 plus P1,500.00 per court appearance. No costs.
G.R. No. 97412 July 12, 1994
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MERCANTILE INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC., respondents.
Alojada & Garcia and Jimenea, Dala & Zaragoza for petitoner.
Zapa Law Office for private respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The issues, albeit not completely novel, are: (a) whether or not a claim for damage
sustained on a shipment of goods can be a solidary, or joint and several, liability of
the common carrier, the arrastre operator and the customs broker; (b) whether the
payment of legal interest on an award for loss or damage is to be computed from
the time the complaint is filed or from the date the decision appealed from is
rendered; and (c) whether the applicable rate of interest, referred to above, is
twelve percent (12%) or six percent (6%).
The findings of the court a quo, adopted by the Court of Appeals, on the antecedent
and undisputed facts that have led to the controversy are hereunder reproduced:
This is an action against defendants shipping company, arrastre operator and
broker-forwarder for damages sustained by a shipment while in defendants'
custody, filed by the insurer-subrogee who paid the consignee the value of such
losses/damages.
On December 4, 1981, two fiber drums of riboflavin were shipped from Yokohama,
Japan for delivery vessel "SS EASTERN COMET" owned by defendant Eastern
Shipping Lines under Bill of Lading
No. YMA-8 (Exh. B). The shipment was insured under plaintiff's Marine Insurance
Policy No. 81/01177 for P36,382,466.38.
Upon arrival of the shipment in Manila on December 12, 1981, it was discharged
unto the custody of defendant Metro Port Service, Inc. The latter excepted to one
drum, said to be in bad order, which damage was unknown to plaintiff.
On January 7, 1982 defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation received the shipment
from defendant Metro Port Service, Inc., one drum opened and without seal (per
"Request for Bad Order Survey." Exh. D).
On January 8 and 14, 1982, defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation made deliveries
of the shipment to the consignee's warehouse. The latter excepted to one drum
which contained spillages, while the rest of the contents was adulterated/fake (per
"Bad Order Waybill" No. 10649, Exh. E).
Plaintiff contended that due to the losses/damage sustained by said drum, the
consignee suffered losses totaling P19,032.95, due to the fault and negligence of
defendants. Claims were presented against defendants who failed and refused to
pay the same (Exhs. H, I, J, K, L).
As a consequence of the losses sustained, plaintiff was compelled to pay the
consignee P19,032.95 under the aforestated marine insurance policy, so that it
became subrogated to all the rights of action of said consignee against defendants
(per "Form of Subrogation", "Release" and Philbanking check, Exhs. M, N, and O).
(pp. 85-86, Rollo.)
There were, to be sure, other factual issues that confronted both courts. Here, the
appellate court said:

Defendants filed their respective answers, traversing the material allegations of the
complaint contending that: As for defendant Eastern Shipping it alleged that the
shipment was discharged in good order from the vessel unto the custody of Metro
Port Service so that any damage/losses incurred after the shipment was incurred
after the shipment was turned over to the latter, is no longer its liability (p. 17,
Record); Metroport averred that although subject shipment was discharged unto its
custody, portion of the same was already in bad order (p. 11, Record); Allied
Brokerage alleged that plaintiff has no cause of action against it, not having
negligent or at fault for the shipment was already in damage and bad order
condition when received by it, but nonetheless, it still exercised extra ordinary care
and diligence in the handling/delivery of the cargo to consignee in the same
condition shipment was received by it.
From the evidence the court found the following:
The issues are:
1. Whether or not the shipment sustained losses/damages;
2. Whether or not these losses/damages were sustained while in the custody of
defendants (in whose respective custody, if determinable);
3. Whether or not defendant(s) should be held liable for the losses/damages (see
plaintiff's pre-Trial Brief, Records, p. 34; Allied's pre-Trial Brief, adopting plaintiff's
Records, p. 38).
As to the first issue, there can be no doubt that the shipment sustained
losses/damages. The two drums were shipped in good order and condition, as
clearly shown by the Bill of Lading and Commercial Invoice which do not indicate
any damages drum that was shipped (Exhs. B and C). But when on December 12,
1981 the shipment was delivered to defendant Metro Port Service, Inc., it excepted
to one drum in bad order.
Correspondingly, as to the second issue, it follows that the losses/damages were
sustained while in the respective and/or successive custody and possession of
defendants carrier (Eastern), arrastre operator (Metro Port) and broker (Allied
Brokerage). This becomes evident when the Marine Cargo Survey Report (Exh. G),
with its "Additional Survey Notes", are considered. In the latter notes, it is stated
that when the shipment was "landed on vessel" to dock of Pier # 15, South Harbor,
Manila on December 12, 1981, it was observed that "one (1) fiber drum (was) in
damaged condition, covered by the vessel's Agent's Bad Order Tally Sheet
No. 86427." The report further states that when defendant Allied Brokerage
withdrew the shipment from defendant arrastre operator's custody on January 7,
1982, one drum was found opened without seal, cello bag partly torn but contents
intact. Net unrecovered spillages was
15 kgs. The report went on to state that when the drums reached the consignee,
one drum was found with adulterated/faked contents. It is obvious, therefore, that
these losses/damages occurred before the shipment reached the consignee while
under the successive custodies of defendants. Under Art. 1737 of the New Civil
Code, the common carrier's duty to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
of goods remains in full force and effect even if the goods are temporarily unloaded
and stored in transit in the warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination,
until the consignee has been advised and has had reasonable opportunity to
remove or dispose of the goods (Art. 1738, NCC). Defendant Eastern Shipping's own
exhibit, the "Turn-Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes" (Exhs. 3-Eastern) states that
on December 12, 1981 one drum was found "open".
and thus held:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:
A. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally:
1. The amount of P19,032.95, with the present legal interest of 12% per
annum from October 1, 1982, the date of filing of this complaints, until fully paid
(the liability of defendant Eastern Shipping, Inc. shall not exceed US$500 per case or
the CIF value of the loss, whichever is lesser, while the liability of defendant Metro
Port Service, Inc. shall be to the extent of the actual invoice value of each package,
crate box or container in no case to exceed P5,000.00 each, pursuant to Section
6.01 of the Management Contract);
2. P3,000.00 as attorney's fees, and
3. Costs.
B. Dismissing the counterclaims and crossclaim of defendant/cross-claimant Allied
Brokerage Corporation.
SO ORDERED. (p. 207, Record).
Dissatisfied, defendant's recourse to US.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
After a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record. We find that the conclusion
drawn therefrom is correct. As there is sufficient evidence that the shipment
sustained damage while in the successive possession of appellants, and therefore
they are liable to the appellee, as subrogee for the amount it paid to the consignee.
(pp. 87-89, Rollo.)
The Court of Appeals thus affirmed in toto the judgment of the court
a quo.
In this petition, Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., the common carrier, attributes error
and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court when
I. IT HELD PETITIONER CARRIER JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE
ARRASTRE OPERATOR AND CUSTOMS BROKER FOR THE CLAIM OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT AS GRANTED IN THE QUESTIONED DECISION;

II. IT HELD THAT THE GRANT OF INTEREST ON THE CLAIM OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT
SHOULD COMMENCE FROM THE DATE OF THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT AT THE
RATE OF TWELVE PERCENT PER ANNUM INSTEAD OF FROM THE DATE OF THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND ONLY AT THE RATE OF SIX PERCENT PER
ANNUM, PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CLAIM BEING INDISPUTABLY UNLIQUIDATED.
The petition is, in part, granted.
In this decision, we have begun by saying that the questions raised by petitioner
carrier are not all that novel. Indeed, we do have a fairly good number of previous
decisions this Court can merely tack to.
The common carrier's duty to observe the requisite diligence in the shipment of
goods lasts from the time the articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placed
in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until delivered
to, or until the lapse of a reasonable time for their acceptance by, the person
entitled to receive them (Arts. 1736-1738, Civil Code; Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals,
161 SCRA 646; Kui Bai vs. Dollar Steamship Lines, 52 Phil. 863). When the goods
shipped either are lost or arrive in damaged condition, a presumption arises against
the carrier of its failure to observe that diligence, and there need not be an express
finding of negligence to hold it liable (Art. 1735, Civil Code; Philippine National
Railways vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 87; Metro Port Service vs. Court of Appeals,
131 SCRA 365). There are, of course, exceptional cases when such presumption of
fault is not observed but these cases, enumerated in Article 1734 1 of the Civil Code,
are exclusive, not one of which can be applied to this case.
The question of charging both the carrier and the arrastre operator with the
obligation of properly delivering the goods to the consignee has, too, been passed
upon by the Court. In Fireman's Fund Insurance vs. Metro Port Services (182 SCRA
455), we have explained, in holding the carrier and the arrastre operator liable
in solidum,thus:
The legal relationship between the consignee and the arrastre operator is akin to
that of a depositor and warehouseman (Lua Kian v. Manila Railroad Co., 19 SCRA 5
[1967]. The relationship between the consignee and the common carrier is similar
to that of the consignee and the arrastre operator (Northern Motors, Inc. v. Prince
Line, et al., 107 Phil. 253 [1960]). Since it is the duty of the ARRASTRE to take good
care of the goods that are in its custody and to deliver them in good condition to
the consignee, such responsibility also devolves upon the CARRIER. Both the
ARRASTRE and the CARRIER are therefore charged with the obligation to deliver the
goods in good condition to the consignee.
We do not, of course, imply by the above pronouncement that the arrastre
operator and the customs broker are themselves always and necessarily liable
solidarily with the carrier, or vice-versa, nor that attendant facts in a given case may
not vary the rule. The instant petition has been brought solely by Eastern Shipping
Lines, which, being the carrier and not having been able to rebut the presumption
of fault, is, in any event, to be held liable in this particular case. A factual finding of
both the court a quo and the appellate court, we take note, is that "there is
sufficient evidence that the shipment sustained damage while in the successive
possession of appellants" (the herein petitioner among them). Accordingly, the
liability imposed on Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., the sole petitioner in this case, is
inevitable regardless of whether there are others solidarily liable with it.
It is over the issue of legal interest adjudged by the appellate court that deserves
more than just a passing remark.
Let us first see a chronological recitation of the major rulings of this Court:
The early case of Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., vs. Manila Port
Service, 2 decided 3 on 15 May 1969, involved a suit for recovery of money arising out
of short deliveries and pilferage of goods. In this case, appellee Malayan Insurance
(the plaintiff in the lower court) averred in its complaint that the total amount of its
claim for the value of the undelivered goods amounted to P3,947.20. This demand,
however, was neither established in its totality nor definitely ascertained. In the
stipulation of facts later entered into by the parties, in lieu of proof, the amount of
P1,447.51 was agreed upon. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the
appellants (defendants) Manila Port Service and Manila Railroad Company to pay
appellee Malayan Insurance the sum of P1,447.51 with legal interest thereon from
the date the complaint was filed on 28 December 1962 until full payment
thereof. The appellants then assailed, inter alia, the award of legal interest. In
sustaining the appellants, this Court ruled:
Interest upon an obligation which calls for the payment of money, absent a
stipulation, is the legal rate. Such interest normally is allowable from the date of
demand, judicial or extrajudicial. The trial court opted for judicial demand as the
starting point.
But then upon the provisions of Article 2213 of the Civil Code, interest "cannot be
recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty." And as was held by this Court in Rivera
vs. Perez, 4 L-6998, February 29, 1956, if the suit were for damages, "unliquidated
and not known until definitely ascertained, assessed and determined by the courts
after proof (Montilla c. Corporacion de P.P. Agustinos, 25 Phil. 447; Lichauco
v. Guzman,
38 Phil. 302)," then, interest "should be from the date of the decision." (Emphasis
supplied)

The case of Reformina vs. Tomol, 5 rendered on 11 October 1985, was for "Recovery
of Damages for Injury to Person and Loss of Property." After trial, the lower court
decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and third party
defendants and against the defendants and third party plaintiffs as follows:
Ordering defendants and third party plaintiffs Shell and Michael, Incorporated to
pay jointly and severally the following persons:
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Plaintiffs Pacita F. Reformina and Francisco Reformina the sum of P131,084.00
which is the value of the boat F B Pacita III together with its accessories, fishing gear
and equipment minus P80,000.00 which is the value of the insurance recovered and
the amount of P10,000.00 a month as the estimated monthly loss suffered by them
as a result of the fire of May 6, 1969 up to the time they are actually paid or
already the total sum of P370,000.00 as of June 4, 1972 with legal interest from the
filing of the complaint until paid and to pay attorney's fees of P5,000.00 with costs
against defendants and third party plaintiffs. (Emphasis supplied.)
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter modified the amount of damages
awarded but sustained the trial court in adjudging legal interest from the filing of
the complaint until fully paid. When the appellate court's decision became final, the
case was remanded to the lower court for execution, and this was when the trial
court issued its assailed resolution which applied the 6% interest per
annum prescribed in Article 2209 of the Civil Code. In their petition for review
on certiorari, the petitioners contended that Central Bank Circular
No. 416, providing thus
By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1 of Act 2655, as amended,
Monetary Board in its Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974, has prescribed that
the rate of interest for the loan, or forbearance of any money, goods, or credits and
the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of
interest, shall be twelve (12%) percent per annum. This Circular shall take effect
immediately. (Emphasis found in the text)
should have, instead, been applied. This Court 6 ruled:
The judgments spoken of and referred to are judgments in litigations involving
loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits. Any other kind of monetary
judgment which has nothing to do with, nor involving loans or forbearance of any
money, goods or credits does not fall within the coverage of the said law for it is not
within the ambit of the authority granted to the Central Bank.
xxx xxx xxx
Coming to the case at bar, the decision herein sought to be executed is one
rendered in an Action for Damages for injury to persons and loss of property and
does not involve any loan, much less forbearances of any money, goods or credits.
As correctly argued by the private respondents, the law applicable to the said case
is Article 2209 of the New Civil Code which reads
Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the
debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the
contrary, shall be the payment of interest agreed upon, and in the absence of
stipulation, the legal interest which is six percent per annum.
The above rule was reiterated in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.,
v. Cruz, 7 promulgated on 28 July 1986. The case was for damages occasioned by an
injury to person and loss of property. The trial court awarded private respondent
Pedro Manabat actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P72,500.00
with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until fully paid. Relying
on the Reformina v. Tomol case, this Court 8 modified the interest award from 12%
to 6% interest per annum but sustained the time computation thereof, i.e., from the
filing of the complaint until fully paid.
In Nakpil and Sons vs. Court of Appeals, 9 the trial court, in an action for the recovery
of damages arising from the collapse of a building, ordered,
inter alia, the "defendant United Construction Co., Inc. (one of the petitioners)
. . . to pay the plaintiff, . . . , the sum of P989,335.68 with interest at the legal rate
from November 29, 1968, the date of the filing of the complaint until full payment . .
. ." Save from the modification of the amount granted by the lower court, the Court
of Appeals sustained the trial court's decision. When taken to this Court for review,
the case, on 03 October 1986, was decided, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED and considering the
special and environmental circumstances of this case, we deem it reasonable to
render a decision imposing, as We do hereby impose, upon the defendant and the
third-party defendants (with the exception of Roman Ozaeta) a solidary (Art. 1723,
Civil Code, Supra.
p. 10) indemnity in favor of the Philippine Bar Association of FIVE MILLION
(P5,000,000.00) Pesos to cover all damages (with the exception to attorney's fees)
occasioned by the loss of the building (including interest charges and lost rentals)
and an additional ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) Pesos as and for
attorney's fees, the total sum being payable upon the finality of this decision. Upon
failure to pay on such finality, twelve (12%) per cent interest per annum shall be
imposed upon aforementioned amounts from finality until paid. Solidary costs
against the defendant and third-party defendants (Except Roman Ozaeta).
(Emphasis supplied)
A motion for reconsideration was filed by United Construction, contending that "the
interest of twelve (12%) per cent per annum imposed on the total amount of the

monetary award was in contravention of law." The Court 10 ruled out the
applicability of the Reformina and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines cases and, in its
resolution of 15 April 1988, it explained:
There should be no dispute that the imposition of 12% interest pursuant to Central
Bank Circular No. 416 . . . is applicable only in the following: (1) loans; (2)
forbearance of any money, goods or credit; and
(3) rate allowed in judgments (judgments spoken of refer to judgments involving
loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits. (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines
Inc. v. Cruz, 143 SCRA 160-161 [1986]; Reformina v. Tomol, Jr., 139 SCRA 260
[1985]). It is true that in the instant case, there is neither a loan or a forbearance,
but then no interest is actually imposed provided the sums referred to in the
judgment are paid upon the finality of the judgment. It is delay in the payment of
such final judgment, that will cause the imposition of the interest.
It will be noted that in the cases already adverted to, the rate of interest is imposed
on the total sum, from the filing of the complaint until paid; in other words, as part
of the judgment for damages. Clearly, they are not applicable to the instant case.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The subsequent case of American Express International, Inc., vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court 11 was a petition for review on certiorari from the decision, dated 27
February 1985, of the then Intermediate Appellate Court reducing the amount of
moral and exemplary damages awarded by the trial court, to P240,000.00 and
P100,000.00, respectively, and its resolution, dated 29 April 1985, restoring the
amount of damages awarded by the trial court, i.e., P2,000,000.00 as moral
damages and P400,000.00 as exemplary damages with interest thereon at 12% per
annum from notice of judgment, plus costs of suit. In a decision of 09 November
1988, this Court, while recognizing the right of the private respondent to recover
damages, held the award, however, for moral damages by the trial court, later
sustained by the IAC, to be inconceivably large. The Court 12 thus set aside the
decision of the appellate court and rendered a new one, "ordering the petitioner to
pay private respondent the sum of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as
moral damages, with
six (6%) percent interest thereon computed from the finality of this decision until
paid. (Emphasis supplied)
Reformina came into fore again in the 21 February 1989 case of Florendo
v. Ruiz 13 which arose from a breach of employment contract. For having been
illegally dismissed, the petitioner was awarded by the trial court moral and
exemplary damages without, however, providing any legal interest thereon. When
the decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, the latter held:
WHEREFORE, except as modified hereinabove the decision of the CFI of Negros
Oriental dated October 31, 1972 is affirmed in all respects, with the modification
that defendants-appellants, except defendant-appellant Merton Munn, are ordered
to pay, jointly and severally, the amounts stated in the dispositive portion of the
decision, including the sum of P1,400.00 in concept of compensatory damages,
with interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully
paid(Emphasis supplied.)
The petition for review to this Court was denied. The records were thereupon
transmitted to the trial court, and an entry of judgment was made. The writ of
execution issued by the trial court directed that only compensatory damages should
earn interest at 6% per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint. Ascribing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, a petition
for certiorari assailed the said order. This Court said:
. . . , it is to be noted that the Court of Appeals ordered the payment of interest "at
the legal rate" from the time of the filing of the complaint. . . Said circular [Central
Bank Circular No. 416] does not apply to actions based on a breach of employment
contract like the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court reiterated that the 6% interest per annum on the damages should be
computed from the time the complaint was filed until the amount is fully paid.
Quite recently, the Court had another occasion to rule on the matter. National
Power Corporation vs. Angas, 14decided on 08 May 1992, involved the expropriation
of certain parcels of land. After conducting a hearing on the complaints for eminent
domain, the trial court ordered the petitioner to pay the private respondents
certain sums of money as just compensation for their lands so expropriated "with
legal interest thereon . . . until fully paid." Again, in applying the 6% legal
interest per annum under the Civil Code, the Court 15 declared:
. . . , (T)he transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods
or credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public purpose, the
payment of which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the interest
adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The legal
interest required to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the properties
expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the delay in the
payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint
judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by way of
damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code
shall apply.
Concededly, there have been seeming variances in the above holdings. The cases
can perhaps be classified into two groups according to the similarity of the issues
involved and the corresponding rulings rendered by the court. The "first group"
would consist of the cases of Reformina v. Tomol (1985), Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines

v. Cruz(1986), Florendo v. Ruiz (1989)

and National Power Corporation v. Angas (1992). In the "second group" would
be Malayan Insurance Company v.Manila Port Service (1969), Nakpil and Sons
v. Court of Appeals (1988), and American Express International v.Intermediate
Appellate Court (1988).
In the "first group", the basic issue focuses on the application of either the 6%
(under the Civil Code) or 12% (under the Central Bank Circular) interest per annum.
It is easily discernible in these cases that there has been a consistent holding that
the Central Bank Circular imposing the 12% interest per annum applies only to loans
or forbearance 16 of money, goods or credits, as well as to judgments involving such
loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, and that the 6% interest under the
Civil Code governs when the transaction involves the payment of indemnities in the
concept of damage arising from the breach or a delay in the performance of
obligations in general. Observe, too, that in these cases, a common time frame in
the computation of the 6% interest per annum has been applied, i.e., from the time
the complaint is filed until the adjudged amount is fully paid.
The "second group", did not alter the pronounced rule on the application of the 6%
or 12% interest per annum, 17depending on whether or not the amount involved is a
loan or forbearance, on the one hand, or one of indemnity for damage, on the
other hand. Unlike, however, the "first group" which remained consistent in holding
that the running of the legal interest should be from the time of the filing of the
complaint until fully paid, the "second group" varied on the commencement of the
running of the legal interest.
Malayan held that the amount awarded should bear legal interest from the date of
the decision of the court a quo,explaining that "if the suit were for damages,
'unliquidated and not known until definitely ascertained, assessed and determined
by the courts after proof,' then, interest 'should be from the date of the
decision.'" American Express International v. IAC, introduced a different time frame
for reckoning the 6% interest by ordering it to be "computed from the finality of
(the) decision until paid." The Nakpil and Sons case ruled that 12% interest per
annum should be imposed from the finality of the decision until the judgment
amount is paid.
The ostensible discord is not difficult to explain. The factual circumstances may
have called for different applications, guided by the rule that the courts are vested
with discretion, depending on the equities of each case, on the award of interest.
Nonetheless, it may not be unwise, by way of clarification and reconciliation, to
suggest the following rules of thumb for future guidance.
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts,
delicts or quasi-delicts 18 is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for
damages. 19 The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern
in determining the measure of recoverable damages. 20
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of
money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which
may have been stipulated in writing. 21 Furthermore, the interest due shall itself
earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. 22 In the absence of
stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 23 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is
breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at
the discretion of the court 24 at the rate of 6% per annum. 25 No interest, however,
shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the
demand can be established with reasonable certainty. 26 Accordingly, where the
demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run
from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code)
but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the
demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of
the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to
have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal
interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction,
this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the legal interest to be paid is SIX PERCENT (6%) on
the amount due computed from the decision, dated
03 February 1988, of the court a quo. A TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu of
SIX PERCENT (6%), shall be imposed on such amount upon finality of this decision
until the payment thereof.
G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993
SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC., respondents.

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez, Gatmaitan for petitioners.

Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private-respondent.
NOCON, J.:
Disgruntled over TransWorld Airlines, Inc.'s refusal to accommodate them in TWA
Flight 007 departing from New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984 despite
possession of confirmed tickets, petitioners filed an action for damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145. Advocating petitioner's
position, the trial court categorically ruled that respondent TransWorld Airlines
(TWA) breached its contract of carriage with petitioners and that said breach was
"characterized by bad faith." On appeal, however, the appellate court found that
while there was a breach of contract on respondent TWA's part, there was neither
fraud nor bad faith because under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil
Aeronautics Board of the United States of America it is allowed to overbook flights.
The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:
Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter,
Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of
respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles on June
6, 1984. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were purchased at a discount of 75%
while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets represented
confirmed reservations.
While in New York, on June 4, 1984, petitioners received notice of the
reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On the appointed date, however,
petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m., an hour earlier than the scheduled flight at
11:00 a.m. but were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who
had checked in before them had already taken all the seats available on the flight.
Liana Zalamea appeared as the No. 13 on the wait-list while the two other Zalameas
were listed as "No. 34, showing a party of two." Out of the 42 names on the wait
list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles,
including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, at No. 34,
being ranked lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare
tickets were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who
was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane;
while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied
boarding. According to Mr. Zalamea, it was only later when he discovered the he
was holding his daughter's full-fare ticket.
Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could
not be accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were
constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American
Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred Eighteen ($918.00) Dollars.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based
on breach of contract of air carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila, Branch 145. As aforesaid, the lower court ruled in favor of
petitioners in its decision 1 dated January 9, 1989 the dispositive portion of which
states as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs
the following amounts:
(1) US $918.00, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the price
of the tickets bought by Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American Airlines, to
enable them to fly to Los Angeles from New York City;
(2) US $159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing the
price of Suthira Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(3) Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P8,934.50,
Philippine Currency, representing the price of Liana Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight
007,
(4) Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral
damages for all the plaintiffs'
(5) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), Philippine Currency, as and for
attorney's fees; and
(6) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 2
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals held that moral damages are
recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of
carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is a matter of record that
overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the United
States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil
Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on respondent
TransWorld Airlines.
Moreover, while respondent TWA was remiss in not informing petitioners that the
flight was overbooked and that even a person with a confirmed reservation may be
denied accommodation on an overbooked flight, nevertheless it ruled that such
omission or negligence cannot under the circumstances be considered to be so
gross as to amount to bad faith.
Finally, it also held that there was no bad faith in placing petitioners in the wait-list
along with forty-eight (48) other passengers where full-fare first class tickets were
given priority over discounted tickets.
The dispositive portion of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals 3 dated
October 25, 1991 states as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision under review is hereby
MODIFIED in that the award of moral and exemplary damages to the plaintiffs is
eliminated, and the defendant-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the
following amounts:
(1) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of the payment, representing the
price of Suthira Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(2) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of the payment, representing the
price of Cesar Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(3) P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
(4) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 4
Not satisfied with the decision, petitioners raised the case on petition for review
on certiorari and alleged the following errors committed by the respondent Court of
Appeals, to wit:
I.
. . . IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO FRAUD OR BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF
RESPONDENT TWA BECAUSE IT HAS A RIGHT TO OVERBOOK FLIGHTS.
II.
. . . IN ELIMINATING THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
III.
. . . IN NOT ORDERING THE REFUND OF LIANA ZALAMEA'S TWA TICKET AND
PAYMENT FOR THE AMERICAN AIRLINES
TICKETS. 5
That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not
allow petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets
cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking
has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved. 6 Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate
may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, viceconsul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office. 7
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its
customer service agent, in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of
Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from
said statement, no official publication of said code was presented as evidence.
Thus, respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US
Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not
applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci
contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was
issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and
nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant
airline. 8 Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law
in this case would be Philippine law.
Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith,
entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia
Airways v. Court of Appeals, 9 where passengers with confirmed bookings were
refused carriage on the last minute, this Court held that when an airline issues a
ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract
of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on
that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for
breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it
took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them
would show up for the check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of being
refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to an award
of moral damages.
Similarly, in Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 10 where private
respondent was not allowed to board the plane because her seat had already been
given to another passenger even before the allowable period for passengers to
check in had lapsed despite the fact that she had a confirmed ticket and she had
arrived on time, this Court held that petitioner airline acted in bad faith in violating
private respondent's rights under their contract of carriage and is therefore liable
for the injuries she has sustained as a result.
In fact, existing jurisprudence abounds with rulings where the breach of contract of
carriage amounts to bad faith. In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 11 where a would-be passenger had the necessary ticket, baggage
claim and clearance from immigration all clearly and unmistakably showing that she
was, in fact, included in the passenger manifest of said flight, and yet was denied
accommodation in said flight, this Court did not hesitate to affirm the lower court's
finding awarding her damages.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any
other contractual relation. So ruled this Court in Zulueta v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc. 12 This is so, for a contract of carriage generates a relation attended
with public duty a duty to provide public service and convenience to its

passengers which must be paramount to self-interest or enrichment. Thus, it was

also held that the switch of planes from Lockheed 1011 to a smaller Boeing 707
because there were only 138 confirmed economy class passengers who could very
well be accommodated in the smaller planes, thereby sacrificing the comfort of its
first class passengers for the sake of economy, amounts to bad faith. Such
inattention and lack of care for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its
utmost consideration entitles the passenger to an award of moral damages. 13
Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, respondent TWA is still guilty
of bad faith in not informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the
contract of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there was overbooking.
Respondent TWA should have incorporated stipulations on overbooking on the
tickets issued or to properly inform its passengers about these policies so that the
latter would be prepared for such eventuality or would have the choice to ride with
another airline.
Respondent TWA contends that Exhibit I, the detached flight coupon upon which
were written the name of the passenger and the points of origin and destination,
contained such a notice. An examination of Exhibit I does not bear this out. At any
rate, said exhibit was not offered for the purpose of showing the existence of a
notice of overbooking but to show that Exhibit I was used for flight 007 in first class
of June 11, 1984 from New York to Los Angeles.
Moreover, respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its
alleged policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets. While the petitioners had
checked in at the same time, and held confirmed tickets, yet, only one of them was
allowed to board the plane ten minutes before departure time because the full-fare
ticket he was holding was given priority over discounted tickets. The other two
petitioners were left behind.
It is respondent TWA's position that the practice of overbooking and the airline
system of boarding priorities are reasonable policies, which when implemented do
not amount to bad faith. But the issue raised in this case is not the reasonableness
of said policies but whether or not said policies were incorporated or deemed
written on petitioners' contracts of carriage. Respondent TWA failed to show that
there are provisions to that effect. Neither did it present any argument of substance
to show that petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked condition of the
flight or that there is a hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is
evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of respondent
TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets represented
confirmed seats without any qualification. The failure of respondent TWA to so
inform them when it could easily have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold
on to them as passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith. Evidently,
respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the rights of petitioners under their
contracts of carriage. Such conscious disregard of petitioners' rights makes
respondent TWA liable for moral damages. To deter breach of contracts by
respondent TWA in similar fashion in the future, we adjudge respondent TWA liable
for exemplary damages, as well.
Petitioners also assail the respondent court's decision not to require the refund of
Liana Zalamea's ticket because the ticket was used by her father. On this score, we
uphold the respondent court. Petitioners had not shown with certainty that the act
of respondent TWA in allowing Mr. Zalamea to use the ticket of her daughter was
due to inadvertence or deliberate act. Petitioners had also failed to establish that
they did not accede to said agreement. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that
both petitioners and respondent TWA agreed, albeit impliedly, to the course of
action taken.
The respondent court erred, however, in not ordering the refund of the American
Airlines tickets purchased and used by petitioners Suthira and Liana. The evidence
shows that petitioners Suthira and Liana were constrained to take the American
Airlines flight to Los Angeles not because they "opted not to use their TWA tickets
on another TWA flight" but because respondent TWA could not accommodate them
either on the next TWA flight which was also fully booked. 14 The purchase of the
American Airlines tickets by petitioners Suthira and Liana was the consequence of
respondent TWA's unjustifiable breach of its contracts of carriage with petitioners.
In accordance with Article 2201, New Civil Code, respondent TWA should,
therefore, be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to
the non-performance of its obligation. In the previously cited case of Alitalia
Airways v. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court explicitly held that a passenger is entitled
to be reimbursed for the cost of the tickets he had to buy for a flight to another
airline. Thus, instead of simply being refunded for the cost of the unused TWA
tickets, petitioners should be awarded the actual cost of their flight from New York
to Los Angeles. On this score, we differ from the trial court's ruling which ordered
not only the reimbursement of the American Airlines tickets but also the refund of
the unused TWA tickets. To require both prestations would have enabled
petitioners to fly from New York to Los Angeles without any fare being paid.
The award to petitioners of attorney's fees is also justified under Article 2208(2) of
the Civil Code which allows recovery when the defendant's act or omission has
compelled plaintiff to litigate or to incur expenses to protect his interest. However,
the award for moral damages and exemplary damages by the trial court is excessive
in the light of the fact that only Suthira and Liana Zalamea were actually "bumped
off." An award of P50,000.00 moral damages and another P50,000.00 exemplary
damages would suffice under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED to the extent of adjudging respondent
TransWorld Airlines to pay damages to petitioners in the following amounts, to wit:
(1) US$918.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the price
of the tickets bought by Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American Airlines, to
enable them to fly to Los Angeles from New York City;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(4) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(5) Costs of suit.
G.R. No. 127569 July 30, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SENEN PRADES, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court for automatic review is the August 13, 1996 judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36, in Criminal Case No. IR-3666, finding
accused-appellant Senen Prades guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer the
supreme penalty of death. The judgment likewise ordered appellant to pay private
complainant P50,000.00 by way of moral damages, as well as the costs. 1
The information in Criminal Case No. IR-3666 alleges:
That on or about the 24th day of March, 1994, at about 12:00 o'clock midnight, at
San Vicente Ogbon, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a handgun, by means of force
and intimidation and with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said Emmie R. Rosales against the
latter's will, and that the accused perpetrated the offense charged at the dwelling
of herein complainant and with the use of a firearm in threatening complainant, to
the latter's damage and prejudice in such amount as may be proven in court. 2
With the assistance of counsel de oficio, appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charge. 3 The defense waived the pre-trial 4 and the case proceeded to trial in due
course.
The private complainant and the physician who conducted a medical examination
on her were presented in the trial court to establih the case for the People. After
the physician had testified as the first witness, appellant absconded. The records of
the case reveal that appellant escaped from his escort guard while he was being
transported from a hearing at the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City to the Tinangis
Penal Farm in Pili, Camarines Sur on March 29, 1995 5 Trial accordingly continued in
absentia.
Private complainant Emmie R. Rosales was seventeen years old when the dastardly
outrage befell her on March 24, 1994. She testified that she and her younger sister,
Melissa, were asleep in a room in their house and were then the only persons at
home because their grandfather, who lived with them, was in the hospital at that
time. 6
At around midnight, complainant suddenly awoke as she felt a heavy weight
pressing down upon her. She thereupon realized that a man, clad only in his
underwear, lay on top of her. She was about to shout when he poked a gun at her
neck and warned her not to create any noise or he would kill her. 7
Although the house lights were off, moonlight streamed through the sawali door of
the room, enabling complainant to see the intruder. 8 She recognized him as
appellant Senen Prades, her barrio mate. It appears that he had gained entry into
the house through a passageway in the kitchen. 9
Appellant attempted to remove complainant's pants and underwear even as he
continued to jab the gun at her neck. Complainant resisted him and struggled for
twenty to thirty minutes until she was overcome by his strength.10 He knelt on her
knees and succeeded in removing her clothing. 11 He then spread her legs apart,
forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina, 12 and bodily pinned her down. He
fondled her breasts and private parts and made push and pull movements with his
genital organ for about two minutes. 13 Complainant was resultantly in pain as she
felt blood ooze out of her vagina. 14 She continued to struggle against appellant but
to no avail.
After satisfying his lust, appellant pulled away from complainant and once again
nudged her with the gun. He warned her not to tell anyone about the event or he
would kill her and her family. 15 Appellant left complainant stunned and in tears.
She did not inform anyone about the incident.
Several days later, complainant received two letters from appellant. 16 She saw
appellant hand the first letter to her grandmother who later gave it to her. 17 The
other letter was given by appellant to complainant through the latter's
sister. 18Aggrieved by all these circumstances, complainant decided to disclose to
her grandfather the sexual assault that transpired on March 24.
Complainant and her grandfather forthwith reported the matter to the Barangay
Captain who advised them to proceed to the police headquarters of Nabua,
Camarines Sur. 19 After filing a report with the police, complainant underwent
physical examination at a rural health center in Sto. Domingo. 20 She then instituted
a complaint for rape against appellant.
Pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Nabua,
Camarines Sur, 21 appellant was arrested and detained at the municipal jail of

Nabua. He filed a motion for bail but the same was denied by the lower
court. 22 Trial commenced in Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court on December 14,
1994.
Dr. Stephen A. Beltran, 23 the Rural Health Physician of Nabua, Camarines Sur,
testified that he conducted a physical examination on complainant on April 8, 1994
and found indications of sexual intercourse. 24 The medical certificate issued by said
physician revealed the following:
FINDINGS: VAGINAL EXAMINATION
(+) Hymenal laceration scar at
6:00 o'clock
(-) Gross blood
(-) (S)eminal fluid
IMPRESSION: VAGINAL PENETRATION, COMPLETE. 25
As earlier noted, appellant escaped from confinement before the prosecution had
completed the presentation of its evidence. A general warrant of arrest was issued
for his apprehension and it was ordered that he be included in the list of wanted
criminals. 26 Appellant, however, has not been recaptured up to now.
Fearing for her life and for the safety of her family members, complainant left her
home in San Vicente, Nabua, Camarines Sur, and moved to Naga City. 27 All she
hoped for was to begin a new life, away from the stigma created by the crime on
her name and her family, and away from the dread of possibly being killed by
appellant who was at large and, perhaps, lurking in the shadows.
After the presentation of its evidence, the prosecution rested its case. Because
appellant had taken flight, he was deemed to have waived his right to adduce
evidence hence counsel for the defense was unable to introduce evidence to
dispute the charge. 28
In its decision dated August 13, 1996, the court a quo found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, aggravated by the circumstance of dwelling,
and imposed upon him the penalty of death. The lower court issued another
warrant of arrest for the capture of appellant. 29 It has not been served to date as
he remains at large, a fugitive from justice. Because appellant was condemned to
suffer the principal penalty of death, his conviction is now before the Court on
automatic review.
As its lone assignment of error, the defense alleges that the court below erred in
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It is
contended that the testimony of complainant on the identity of appellant as the
author of the crime is doubtful not only because there was insufficient lighting in
the room of complainant, where the alleged act of rape took place, but also
because complainant had never been face to face with appellant prior to the
incident. 30
The Court has exhaustively reviewed and objectively analyzed the records of this
case, especially so because a capital offense is involved, and sees no cogent reason
to depart from the findings and conclusions of the court below. We consequently
affirm the conviction of appellant.
The contention that the identity of appellant has not been established deserves
exiguous consideration because it is undisputed that appellant was known to the
victim long before the assault. They lived in the same barrio 31 and the wife of
appellant was the goddaughter of complainant's grandmother. 32 Appellant also
used to periodically pass by the house of complainant. 33
The defense adverts to the fact that on the night of the occurrence, there were no
lights in the room where the rape took place. It is further claimed that it was
impossible for moonlight to penetrate the sawali door and enable complainant to
identify her assailant because the spaces in the sawali were "as small as the
diameter of a mungo bean . . . (a)nd these small spaces are set wide apart between
the slats." 34
This contention must fail. The evidence shows that the crime scene was not in total
darkness. As already stated, complainant was able to identify appellant because the
room was lit by moonlight that filtered through the sparse, woven bamboo slats of
the sawali door. The amount of light emitted by the moon is relative. While there
are evenings of pitch darkness, there are moonlit nights when the brightness of the
moon is sufficient to enable one to see distinct details of objects.
In addition to this consideration, the house of complainant was a typical provincial
home made of bamboo, 35usually consisting of bamboo stilts, interwoven slats of
bamboo forming walls of sawali, and similar materials. Such constructional pattern
naturally allowed light to penetrate into the house and this fact reasonably induces
the conclusion that complainant was truthful in claiming that there was sufficient
illumination in the room which permitted her to identify her aggressor.
Furthermore, complainant had an extended and adequate look at the features of
appellant during the assault, with ample opportunity to recognize him. As this Court
has repeatedly held, a man and a woman cannot be physically closer to each other
than during the sexual act. 36 Not surprisingly, therefore, complainant readily and
positively identified appellant in court during the trial as the man who raped her on
March 24, 1994.
Doctrinally, the credibility of a rape victim is augmented when, as in the instant
case, she has no motive to testify against the accused or where there is absolutely
no evidence which even remotely suggests that she could have been actuated by
such motive. 37 We are thus convincingly assured that the lower court prudently
fulfilled its obligation as a factual assessor and a legal adjudicator. We accordingly

give due respect to the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of the
complaining witness.
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by, inter alia, force or
intimidation. The degree of the force or intimidation required is relative. It need not
be overpowering or irresistible because all that is necessary is that it is sufficient to
consummate the purpose which appellant had in mind. 38
It is indubitable that complainant put up a struggle when appellant forced himself
upon her. She was inevitably subdued by his strength and she ultimately
succumbed to his venery. Even assuming arguendo that complainant did not repel
the physical aggression of appellant, this does not preclude a finding that she was
raped. It is well settled that physical resistance need not be established in rape
when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself,
against her will, to the rapist's advances because of fear for her life and personal
safety.39
In the case now before us, although complainant had a companion who was asleep
in the room when she was attacked by appellant, she could not have dared risk her
life by screaming for help because appellant pressed a handgun at her neck and
threatened to kill her and her family if she would resist him or report the incident.
The evidence establishes that the sexual intercourse between appellant and
complainant was consummated through force and intimidation and ineluctably
constituted the crime of rape. The fact that it was committed in a room where
there was another occupant does not rule out the crime. 40
In addition, and virtually foreclosing further chicanery by appellant, it is conceded
that after the rape, he sent complainant two letters in which he implored her
forgiveness and offered to leave his wife so that he could be with her. In fine,
appellant sealed his own fate by admitting his crime under the seal of a virtual
confession in fact, if not in law.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to
be settled through mutual concessions, an offer of compromise by the accused may
be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.41 For this rule to apply, it is
not necessary that a complaint be first filed by the victim because all that is
required is that after committing the crime, appellant or his representative makes
an offer to compromise and such offer is proved. 42
Evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong
and a plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to
compromise. 43 The letters of appellant containing an appeal for condonation of his
acts cannot but be construed as an implied admission of his guilt.
The Court is persuaded that appellant sent complainant the letters introduced in
evidence by the prosecution and that said letters contained an admission of his
guilt, thus confirming his culpability. If appellant did not forcibly rape complainant
on the night of March 24, 1994, complainant may possibly have accepted
appellant's offer to live with her. At the very least, she would not have revealed her
misfortune so as not to expose the despoliation of her virtue. That complainant
chose to divulge the incident and subject herself to the disgrace of public scrutiny
and scandal buttresses the charge that she had been criminally ravished by
appellant.
Further, because no evidence was presented by the defense to discredit this
affirmation of guilt derived from the contents of the letters, the authenticity of said
letters is no longer open to question. The letters thus bolster and corroborate
complainant's testimony on the identity and guilty of appellant. 44
Another factor supporting appellant's conviction is his flight. By escaping from
confinement during trial and failing to turn himself in despite his subsequent
conviction by the trial court, and despite the standing warrant of arrest, appellant
has become a fugitive from justice.
Flight is the evasion of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in
order to avoid arrest, detention or the institution or continuance of criminal
proceedings. 45 It is considered an indication of guilt. 46 A "fugitive from justice," on
the other hand, is one who flees after conviction to avoid punishment, as well as
one who, after being charged, flees to avoid prosecution. 47 By his flight and
thereafter becoming a fugitive, appellant waived his right to adduce evidence and
consequently denied himself the opportunity to dispute the charge against him.
It is a fundamental rule that criminal cases rise and fall on the strength of the
evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness or, as in this case, the
absence of evidence of the defense. We emphasize that the flight of appellant, by
itself, does not sustain his conviction because the law requires therefor no less than
the proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the case before us, however,
complainant's testimony and positive identification of appellant were sufficiently
corroborated by the testimony of the physician who examined her, the medicolegal report, and the letters of appellant in which he acknowledged his guilt and
sought complainant's mercy. These considerations convince the Court that
appellant was the perpetrator of the crime. His flight and status as a fugitive from
the law merely dispel any remaining shred of doubt on his guilt.
Incidentally, to obviate any question as to the propriety of the course of action we
have taken in this case, that is, of subjecting the judgment of conviction of the trial
court to automatic appellate review despite the fact that appellant was partially
tried and convicted by said court in absentia, and is and has been a fugitive from
justice since then and up to the present, we draw upon our ruling in People vs.
Esparas, et al. 48 which declared:

. . . On August 20, 1996, we issued an extended resolution upholding the power of

this Court to review all death penalty cases regardless of the escape of the accused
from confinement prior to the judgment of the trial court, thus:
We hold, however, that there is more wisdom in our existing jurisprudence
mandating our review of all death penalty cases, regardless of the wish of the
convict and regardless of the will of the court. . . . . Ours is not only the power but
the duty to review all death penalty cases. No litigant can repudiate this power
which is bestowed by the Constitution. . . . .
On the question as to whether or not the Court can validly promulgate this
judgment in the case at bar, the answer is in the affirmative. As graphically
elucidated in Florendo vs. Court of Appeals, et al.: 49
The last paragraph of Section 6 of Rule 120 * is a new provision introduced by the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides for the promulgation of
judgment in absentia (Gupit Jr., Rules of Criminal Procedure 362-363 [1986]). The
amendment was intended to obviate the situation in the past where the judicial
process could be subverted by the accused jumping bail to frustrate the
promulgation of judgment. In explaining the amendment, Justice Florenz D.
Regalado commented:
Without this amendatory provision, the ends of public justice would be set at
naught and, where the civil liability ex-delicto was instituted with the criminal
action, the offended party could not enforce either the primary liability of the
accused or any subsidiary liability, where proper and involved in the case, as no
judgment could be promulgated. Since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions only
require prior arraignment as an indispensable requisite and the trial may thereafter
proceed in the absence of the accused, the judgment in this case being merely the
procedural culmination of the trial, the promulgation thereof can justifiably be
made in absentia in the manner set out in this section (II Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium 369, [6th ed., 1989]).
If, for any reason, it should be claimed that the provision under discussion is
intended to be the procedure in the trial courts, the simple rejoinder is that there is
no reason why, on considerations of its rationale and procedural expediency, the
same should not apply to the same factual situation in the appellate courts. In the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the judgment is promulgated by merely
filing the signed copy thereof with the Clerk of Court who causes true copies of the
same to be served upon the parties, 50 hence the appearance of the accused is not
even required there as his presence is necessary only in the promulgation of the
judgments of trial courts. 51 Thereafter, when the judgment of the appellate court
becomes executory, the records of the case together with a certified copy of the
appellate court judgment are returned to the court a quo for execution of the
judgment. 52 On this issue, however, one member of this Court has submitted a
separate opinion.
At this juncture, we also note that when the rape was committed the governing law
was Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4111
and 7659, 53 under which the use of a deadly weapon in committing the felony of
rape was, as it still is, punished by reclusion perpetua to death.
Reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible penalties and Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code provides the rules for their application, one of which, pertinent to this
case, is that when in the commission of the deed there is present only one
aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
Two aggravating circumstances were alleged in the information, namely, nocturnity
and dwelling. We agree with the court below that nocturnity cannot be appreciated
as an aggravating circumstance in this case because although the crime was
committed late that night, the evidence does not positively establish that nighttime
facilitated the commission of the crime, or that it was especially sought by the
offender to ensure its commission, or that the offender took advantage thereof for
impunity. It cannot, therefore, be considered herein under either the so-called
objective or subjective tests for determining the existence of this circumstance.
It is clear, however, that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is attendant in
the commission of the crime. Article 14(5) of the Revised Penal Code provides that
this circumstance aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling
of the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation. In the instant case,
the aforesaid circumstance of dwelling was definitely present in the commission of
the crime of rape with the use of a deadly weapon. From all the foregoing
considerations, the presence of this aggravating circumstance mandates that the
supreme penalty of death be imposed.
The lower court, however, erred in classifying the award of P50,000.00 to the
offended party as being in the character of moral damages. Jurisprudence has
elucidated that the award authorized by the criminal law as civil indemnity ex
delicto for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial
policy and aside from other proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or
compensatory damages in civil law 54 For that matter, the civil liability ex
delicto provided by the Revised Penal Code, that is, restitution, reparation and
indemnification, 55all correspond to actual or compensatory damages in the Civil
Code, 56 since the other damages provided therein are moral, nominal, temperate
or moderate, liquidated, and exemplary or corrective damages 57 which have
altogether different concepts and fundaments.
We reiterate here that said civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact
of rape; it is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages which

are based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of
sound discretion. 58 Evidently, therefore, the lower court actually intended the
award of P50,000.00 as indemnification to be paid to the victim.
On this score, we have to take note of a new policy adopted by the Court. The
recent judicial prescription is that the indemnification for the victim shall be in the
increased amount of P75,000.00 if the crime of rape is committed or effectively
qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized
by the applicable amendatory laws. 59 Applying the foregoing policy, the civil
indemnity to be awarded to the offended party in the case at bar is and should be
P75,000.00.
One other cognate development in the case law on rape is applicable to the present
disposition. The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under
consideration, moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in the
criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems just, without the need for
pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice. Indeed
the conventional requirement ofallegata et probata in civil procedure and for
essentially civil cases should be dispensed with in criminal prosecutions for rape
with the civil aspect included therein, since no appropriate pleadings are filed
wherein such allegations can be made.
Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical
and psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages 60 are
too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial by the victim, since the
Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony on her part as a gauge of
her credibility. What exists by necessary implication as being ineludibly present in
the case need not go through the superfluity of still being proved through a
testimonial charade.
The People having established the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt, his
conviction and the penalty imposed by the court a quo is correct and must
consequently be affirmed. Withal, four Members of this Court maintain their
position that Republic Act No. 7659 insofar as it prescribes the death penalty is
unconstitutional; but they nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the
law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be imposed in this case.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of lriga City, Branch 36, in
Criminal Case No. IR-3666 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant Senen Prades is ordered to indemnify the offended party. Emmie
R. Rosales, in the amount of P75,000.00 as compensatory damages, and to pay the
additional amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, with costs in all instances.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25
of Republic Act No. 7659, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case
be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the
pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 88561 April 20, 1990

DR. HERMAN ARMOVIT, DORA ARMOVIT and JACQUELINE ARMOVIT, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioners.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondent.
GANGAYCO, J.:
This is a case which involves a Filipino physician and his family residing in the United
States who came home to the Philippines on a Christmas visit. They were bumped
off at the Manila International Airport on their return flight to the U.S. because of
an erroneous entry in their plane tickets relating to their time of departure.
In October 1981, the petitioners decided to spend their Christmas holidays with
relatives and friends in the Philippines, so they purchased from private respondent,
(Northwest Airlines, Inc.) three (3) round trip airline tickets from the U.S. to Manila
and back, plus three (3) tickets for the rest of the children, though not involved in
the suit. Each ticket of the petitioners which was in the handwriting of private
respondent's tickets sales agent contains the following entry on the Manila to
Tokyo portion of the return flight:
from Manila to Tokyo, NW flight 002, date 17 January, time 10:30 A.M. Status, OK. 1
On their return trip from Manila to the U.S. scheduled on January 17, 1982,
petitioner arrived at the check-in counter of private respondent at the Manila
International Airport at 9:15 in the morning, which is a good one (1) hour and
fifteen (15) minutes ahead of the 10:30 A.M. scheduled flight time recited in their
tickets. Petitioners were rudely informed that they cannot be accommodated
inasmuch as Flight 002 scheduled at 9:15 a.m. was already taking off and the 10:30
A.M. flight time entered in their plane tickets was erroneous.
Previous to the said date of departure petitioners re-confirmed their reservations
through their representative Ernesto Madriaga who personally presented the three
(3) tickets at the private respondent's Roxas Boulevard office. 2 The departure time
in the three (3) tickets of petitioners was not changed when re-confirmed. The

names of petitioners appeared in the passenger manifest and confirmed as

Passenger Nos. 306, 307, and 308, Flight 002. 3
Herein petitioner Dr. Armovit protested in extreme agitation that because of the
bump-off he will not be able to keep his appointments with his patients in the U.S.
Petitioners suffered anguish, wounded feelings, and serious anxiety day and night
of January 17th until the morning of January 18th when they were finally informed
that seats will be available for them on the flight that day.
Because of the refusal of the private respondent to heed the repeated demands of
the petitioners for compensatory damages arising from the aforesaid breach of
their air-transport contracts, 4 petitioners were compelled to file an action for
damages in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
After trial on the merits, a decision was rendered on July 2, 1985, the dispositive
part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs actual, moral, exemplary and nominal damages,
plus attorney's fees, as follows:
a) Actual damages in favor of Dr. Herman Armovit in the sum of P1,300.00, with
interest at the legal rate from January 17, 1982;
b) Moral damages of P500,000.00, exemplary damages of P500,000.00, and
nominal damages of P100,000.00 in favor of Dr. Herman Armovit;
c) Moral damages of P300,000.00, exemplary damages of P300,000.00, and nominal
damages of P50,000.00 in favor of Mrs. Dora Armovit;
d) Moral damages of P300,000.00, exemplary damages of P300,000.00, and
nominal damages of P50,000.00 in favor of Miss Jacqueline Armovit; and
e) Attorney's fees of 5% of the total awards under the above paragraphs.
plus costs of suit. 5
Not satisfied therewith, private respondent interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals wherein in due course a decision was rendered on June 20, 1989, the
relevant portion and dispositive part of which read as follows:
Plaintiffs-appellees had complied with the "72-hour reconfirmation rule." They had
obtained reconfirmation from defendant-appellant of the time and date of their
flight, as indicated in their tickets. The trial court said so and We find nothing
significance to warrant a disturbance of such finding.
On the allowance of damages, the trial court has discretion to grant and fix the
amounts to be paid the prevailing party. In this case, there was gross negligence on
the part of defendant-appellant in reconfirming the time and date of departure of
Flight No. 002 as indicated in the three (3) tickets (Exhibits A, A-1 and A-2). And, as
admitted by defendant-appellant, plaintiffs-appellees had arrived at the airport at
9:15 A.M. or one (1) hour before departure time of 10:30 A.M.
Appellees' actual damages in the amount of P1,300.00 is maintained for being
unrebutted by the Appellant.
However, We modify the allowance of the other awards made by the trial court.
The moral damages of P900,000.00 awarded to Appellees must be eliminated
considering the following:
1. That the appellees did not take the witness stand to testify on their "social
humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety" and the breach of contract was not
malicious or fraudulent. (Art. 2220, Civil Code). It has been held that:
Nor was there error in the appealed decision in denying moral damages, not only on
account of the plaintiffs failure to take the witness stand and testify to her social
humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety, etc., as the decision holds, but primarily
because a breach of contract like that of defendant not being malicious or
fraudulent, does not warrant the award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the
Civil Code (Ventilla vs. Centeno, L-14333, 28 Jan. 1961; Fores vs. Miranda, L-12163;
4 March 1959 Francisco vs. GSIS, 7 SCRA 577).
2. Furthermore, moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in
the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury
suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer (San Andres vs. Court of
Appeals, 116 SCRA 85). In a later case, the Supreme Court held that moral damages
are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of the
defendant (R & B Surety vs. IAC, 129 SCRA 745) citing Grand Union Supermarket,
Inc. vs. Espino, Jr. 94 SCRA 966).
However, there is no question that appellant acted with negligence in not informing
appellees about the change of hour of departure. To provide an example or
correction for the public good, therefore, the award of exemplary damages is
proper (Art. 2229 & 2231 Civil Code; Lopez v. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA
431; Prudenciado vs. Alliance Transport, 148 SCRA 440). Nonetheless, the awards
granted by the trial court are far too exhorbitant and excessive compared to the
actual loss of P1,300.00. The authority of the Court of Appeals to modify or change
the amounts of awards has been upheld in a long line of decisions. We reduce the
award of exemplary damages from P500,000.00 to P100,000.00 in favor of Dr.
Herman Armovit, from P500,000.00 to P50,000.00 in favor of Mrs. Dora Armovit;
and from P300,000.00 to P20,000.00 in favor of Miss Jacqueline Armovit. (Gellada
vs. Warner Barnes, 57 O.G. (4) 7347, Sadie vs. Bachrach, 57 O.G. (4) 636,
Prudenciado vs. Alliance Transport, supra). The award of nominal damages has to
be eliminated since we are already awarding actual loss. Nominal damages cannot
co-exist with actual or compensatory damages (Vda. de Medina, et al. v. Cresencia,
et al., 99 Phil. 506).
The award of 5% of the total damages as attorney's fees is reasonable.

3. WHEREFORE, with the above modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in all other respects. 6
A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by the petitioners was denied in a
resolution dated May 29, 1989. 7
Both petitioners and private respondent elevated the matter to this Court for
review by certiorari.
The petition of private respondent was docketed as G.R. No. 86776. It was denied in
a resolution of this Court dated July 10, 1989, and the motion for reconsideration
thereof was denied in a resolution dated September 6, 1989. On October 12, 1989
this Court ordered the entry of judgment in this case and for the records to be
remanded to the court of origin for prompt execution of the judgment.
In the herein petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner they claim that the
questioned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals should be struck down
as an unlawful, unjust and reasonless departure from the decisions of this Court as
far as the award for moral damages and the drastic reduction of the exemplary
damages are concerned.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The appellate court observed that private respondent was guilty of gross negligence
not only in the issuance of the tickets by the erroneous entry of the date of
departure and without changing or correcting the error when the said three (3)
tickets were presented for re-confirmation. Nevertheless it deleted the award of
moral damages on the ground that petitioners did not take the witness stand to
testify on "their social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, and that the
breach of contract was not malicious or fraudulent." 8
We disagree.
In Air France vs. Carrascoso, 9 Lopez vs. Pan American World Airways, 10 and Zulueta
vs. Pan American World Airways,11 this Court awarded damages for the gross
negligence of the airline which amounted to malice and bad faith and which tainted
the breach of air transportation contract.
Thus in Air France, this Court observed:
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any
other contractual relation. And this, because of the relation which an air carrier
sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the traveling public. It invites
people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air
carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action
for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have the right to be
treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that
any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger
gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. 12
The gross negligence committed by private respondent in the issuance of the tickets
with entries as to the time of the flight, the failure to correct such erroneous entries
and the manner by which petitioners were rudely informed that they were bumped
off are clear indicia of such malice and bad faith and establish that private
respondent committed a breach of contract which entitles petitioners to moral
damages.
The appellate court observed that the petitioners failed to take the witness stand
and testify on the matter. It overlooked however, that the failure of the petitioner
to appear in court to testify was explained by them. The assassination of Senator
Benigno Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 following the year they were bumped off
caused a turmoil in the country. This turmoil spilled over to the year 1984 when
they were scheduled to testify. However, the violent demonstrations in the country
were sensationalized in the U.S. media so petitioners were advised to refrain from
returning to the Philippines at the time.
Nevertheless, Atty. Raymund Armovit, brother of petitioner Dr. Armovit, took the
witness stand as he was with the petitioners from the time they checked in up to
the time of their ultimate departure. He was a witness when the check-in officer
rudely informed the petitioners that their flight had already taken off, while
petitioner Dr. Armovit remonstrated that their tickets reflected their flight time to
be 10:30 A.M.; that in anger and frustration, Dr. Armovit told the said check-inofficer that he had to be accommodated that morning so that he could attend to all
his appointments in the U.S.; that petitioner Jacqueline Armovit also complained
about not being able to report for work at the expiration of her leave of absence;
that while petitioner had to accept private respondent's offer for hotel
accommodations at the Philippine Village Hotel so that they could follow up and
wait for their flight out of Manila the following day, petitioners did not use their
meal coupons supplied because of the limitations thereon so they had to spend for
lunch, dinner, and breakfast in the sum of P1,300.00 while waiting to be flown out
of Manila; that Dr. Armovit had to forego the professional fees for the medical
appointments he missed due to his inability to take the January 17 flight; that the
petitioners were finally able to fly out of Manila on January 18, 1982, but were
assured of this flight only on the very morning of that day, so that they experienced
anxiety until they were assured seats for that flight. 13
No doubt Atty. Raymund Armovit's testimony adequately and sufficiently
established the serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation that

petitioners suffered upon having been bumped off. However, considering the
circumstances of this case whereby the private respondent attended to the plight of
the petitioners, taking care of their accommodations while waiting and boarding
them in the flight back to the U.S. the following day, the Court finds that the
petitioners are entitled to moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 each.
By the same token to provide an example for the public good, an award of
exemplary damages is also proper. 14The award of the appellate court is adequate.
Nevertheless, the deletion of the nominal damages by the appellate court is welltaken since there is an award of actual damages. Nominal damages cannot co-exist
with actual or compensatory damages. 15
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned judgment of the Court of
Appeals is hereby modified such that private respondent shall pay the following:
(a) actual damages in favor of Dr. Armovit in the sum of P1,300.00 with interest at
the legal rate from January 17, 1982;
(b) moral damages at P100,000.00 and exemplary damages and P100,000.00 in
favor of Dr. Armovit;
(c) moral damages of P100,000.00 and exemplary damages of P50,000.00 in favor
of Mrs. Dora Armovit;
(d) moral damages of P100,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of
P20,000.00 in favor of Miss Jacqueline Armovit; and
(e) attorney's fees at 5% of the total awards under the above paragraphs, plus the
cost of suit.
G.R. No. L-22425
August 31, 1965
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NICOLAS L. CUENCA and COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL SIXTH
DIVISION), respondents.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner.
Bengzon, Villegas and Zarraga for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an action for damages for alleged breach of contract. After appropriate
proceedings the Court of First Instance of Manila, in which the case was originally
filed, rendered judgment sentencing defendant Northwest Airlines, Inc.
hereinafter referred to as petitioner to pay to plaintiff Cuenca hereinafter
referred to as respondent the sum of P20,000 as moral damages, together with
the sum of P5,000 as exemplary damages, with legal interest thereon from the date
of the filing of complaint," December 12, 1959, "until fully paid, plus the further
sum of P2,000 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation." On appeal taken by
petitioner, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except as to the
P5,000.00 exemplary damages, which was eliminated, and the P20,000.00 award
for moral damages, which was converted into nominal damages. The case is now
before us on petition for review by certiorari filed by petitioner, upon the ground
that the lower court has erred: (1) in holding that the Warsaw Convention of
October 12, 1929, relative to transportation by air is not in force in the Philippines;
(2) in not holding that respondent has no cause of action; and (3) in awarding
P20,000 as nominal damages.
We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the first assignment of error because the
same is the basis of the second assignment of error, and the latter is devoid of
merit, even if we assumed the former to be well-taken. Indeed the second
assignment of error is predicated upon Articles 17, 18 and 19 of said Convention,
reading:
ART. 17. The carrier shall be liable for damages sustained in the event of the death
or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if
the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft
or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
ART. 18. (1) The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any checked baggage, or any goods, if the
occurrence which caused the damage so sustained took place during the
transportation by air.
(2) The transportation by air within the meaning of the preceding paragraph shall
comprise the period during which the baggage or goods are in charge of the carrier,
whether in an airport or on board an aircraft, or, in the case of a landing outside an
airport, in any place whatsoever.
(3) The period of the transportation by air shall not extend to any transportation by
land, by sea, or by river performed outside an airport. If, however, such
transportation takes place in the performance of a contract for transportation by
air, for the purpose of loading, delivery, or transhipment, any damage is presumed,
subject to proof to the contrary, to have been the result of an event which took
place during the transportation by air.
ART. 19. The carrier shall be liable for damage occasioned by delay in the
transportation by air of passengers, baggage, or goods.
Petitioner argues that pursuant to those provisions, an air "carrier is liable only" in
the event of death of a passenger or injury suffered by him, or of destruction or loss
of, or damage to any checked baggage or any goods, or of delay in the
transportation by air of passengers, baggage or goods. This pretense is not borne
out by the language of said Articles. The same merely declare the carrier liable for
damages in the enumerated cases, if the conditions therein specified are present.
Neither said provisions nor others in the aforementioned Convention regulate or

exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier. Under petitioner's
theory, an air carrier would be exempt from any liability for damages in the event of
its absolute refusal, in bad faith, to comply with a contract of carriage, which is
absurd.
The third assignment of error is based upon Medina vs. Cresencia (52 Off. Gaz.
4606), and Quijano vs. Philippine Air Lines (CA-G.R. No. 21804-R). Neither case is,
however, in point, aside from the fact that the latter is not controlling upon us. In
the first case, this Court eliminated a P10,000 award for nominal damages, because
the aggrieved party had already been awarded P6,000 as compensatory damages,
P30,000 as moral damages and P10,000 as exemplary damages, and "nominal
damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages." In the case at bar, the
Court of Appeals has adjudicated no such compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages to respondent herein.
Moreover, there are special reasons why the P20,000.00 award in favor of
respondent herein is justified, even if said award were characterized as nominal
damages. When his contract of carriage was violated by the petitioner, respondent
held the office of Commissioner of Public Highways of the Republic of the
Philippines. Having boarded petitioner's plane in Manila with a first class ticket to
Tokyo, he was, upon arrival at Okinawa, transferred to the tourist class
compartment. Although he revealed that he was traveling in his official capacity as
official delegate of the Republic to a conference in Tokyo, an agent of petitioner
rudely compelled him in the presence of other passengers to move, over his
objection, to the tourist class, under threat of otherwise leaving him in Okinawa. In
order to reach the conference on time, respondent had no choice but to obey.
It is true that said ticket was marked "W/L," but respondent's attention was not
called thereto. Much less was he advised that "W/L" meant "wait listed." Upon the
other hand, having paid the first class fare in full and having been given first class
accommodation as he took petitioner's plane in Manila, respondent was entitled to
believe that this was a confirmation of his first class reservation and that he would
keep the same until his ultimate destination, Tokyo. Then, too, petitioner has not
tried to explain or even alleged that the person to whom respondent's first class
seat was given had a better right thereto. In other words, since the offense had
been committed with full knowledge of the fact that respondent was an official
representative of the Republic of the Philippines, the sum of P20,000 awarded as
damages may well be considered as merely nominal. At any rate, considering that
petitioner's agent had acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner, said
award may also be considered as one for exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 85161 September 9, 1991
COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION and ENRIQUE SY, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR VENTANILLA ENTERPRISES
CORPORATION, respondents.
Esteban C. Manuel for petitioners.
Augusta Gatmaytan for OVEC.
MEDIALDEA, J.:p
Petitioners seek a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 09504 "Enrique Sy and Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Oscar
Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation" affirming in toto the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, Branch XXV, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the complaint of the plaintiff Enrique F. Sy is dismissed, and on the
counterclaim of the defendant O. Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation, judgment is
hereby rendered:
1. Declaring as lawful, the cancellation and termination of the Lease Agreement
(Exh. A) and the defendant's re-entry and repossession of the Avenue, Broadway
and Capitol theaters under lease on February 11, 1980;
2. Declaring as lawful, the forfeiture clause under paragraph 12 of the Id Lease
Agreement, and confirming the forfeiture of the plaintiffs remaining cash deposit of
P290,000.00 in favor of the defendant thereunder, as of February 11, 1980;
3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P289,534.78, representing
arrears in rentals, unremitted amounts for amusement tax delinquency and accrued
interest thereon, with further interest on said amounts at the rate of 12% per
annum (per lease agreement) from December 1, 1980 until the same is fully paid;
4. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant the amount of P100,000.00,
representing the P10,000.00 portion of the monthly lease rental which were not
deducted from the cash deposit of the plaintiff from February to November, 1980,
after the forfeiture of the said cash deposit on February 11, 1980, with interest
thereon at the rate of 12% per annum on each of the said monthly amounts of
P10,000.00 from the time the same became due until it is paid;
5. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant through the injunction bond, the sum
of P100,000.00, representing the P10,000.00 monthly increase in rentals which the
defendant failed to realize from February to November 1980 result from the
injunction, with legal interest thereon from the finality of this decision until fully
paid;

6. Ordering the plaintiff to pay to the defendant the sum equivalent to ten per
centum (10%) of the above-mentioned amounts of P289,534.78, P100,000.00 and
P100,000.00, as and for attorney's fees; and
7. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs. (pp. 94-95, Rollo)
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent Oscar Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation (OVEC), as lessor, and the
petitioner Enrique F. Sy, as lessee, entered into a lease agreement over the Avenue,
Broadway and Capitol Theaters and the land on which they are situated in
Cabanatuan City, including their air-conditioning systems, projectors and
accessories needed for showing the films or motion pictures. The term of the lease
was for six (6) years commencing from June 13, 1977 and ending June 12,1983.
After more than two (2) years of operation of the Avenue, Broadway and Capitol
Theaters, the lessor OVEC made demands for the repossession of the said leased
properties in view of the Sy's arrears in monthly rentals and non-payment of
amusement taxes. On August 8,1979, OVEC and Sy had a conference and by reason
of Sy's request for reconsideration of OVECs demand for repossession of the three
(3) theaters, the former was allowed to continue operating the leased premises
upon his conformity to certain conditions imposed by the latter in a supplemental
agreement dated August 13, 1979.
In pursuance of their latter agreement, Sy's arrears in rental in the amount of
P125,455.76 (as of July 31, 1979) was reduced to P71,028.91 as of December 31,
1979. However, the accrued amusement tax liability of the three (3) theaters to the
City Government of Cabanatuan City had accumulated to P84,000.00 despite the
fact that Sy had been deducting the amount of P4,000.00 from his monthly rental
with the obligation to remit the said deductions to the city government. Hence,
letters of demand dated January 7, 1980 and February 3, 1980 were sent to Sy
demanding payment of the arrears in rentals and amusement tax delinquency. The
latter demand was with warning that OVEC will re-enter and repossess the Avenue,
Broadway and Capital Theaters on February 11, 1980 in pursuance of the pertinent
provisions of their lease contract of June 11, 1977 and their supplemental letteragreement of August 13, 1979. But notwithstanding the said demands and warnings
SY failed to pay the above-mentioned amounts in full Consequently, OVEC
padlocked the gates of the three theaters under lease and took possession thereof
in the morning of February 11, 1980 by posting its men around the premises of the
Id movie houses and preventing the lessee's employees from entering the same.
Sy, through his counsel, filed the present action for reformation of the lease
agreement, damages and injunction late in the afternoon of the same day. And by
virtue of a restraining order dated February 12, 1980 followed by an order directing
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction issued in said case, Sy regained
possession and operation of the Avenue, Broadway and Capital theaters.
As first cause of action, Sy alleged that the amount of deposit P600,000.00 as
agreed upon, P300,000.00 of which was to be paid on June 13, 1977 and the
balance on December 13, 1977 was too big; and that OVEC had assured him that
said forfeiture will not come to pass. By way of second cause of action, Sy sought to
recover from OVEC the sums of P100,000.00 which Sy allegedly spent in making
"major repairs" on Broadway Theater and the application of which to Sy's due
rentals; (2) P48,000.00 covering the cost of electrical current allegedly used by
OVEC in its alleged "illegal connection" to Capitol Theater and (3) P31,000.00 also
for the cost of electrical current allegedly used by OVEC for its alleged "illegal
connection" to Broadway Theater and for damages suffered by Sy as a result of
such connection. Under the third cause of action, it is alleged in the complaint that
on February 11, 1980, OVEC had the three theaters padlocked with the use of force,
and that as a result, Sy suffered damages at the rate of P5,000.00 a day, in view of
his failure to go thru the contracts he had entered into with movie and booking
companies for the showing of movies at ABC. As fourth cause of action, Sy prayed
for the issuance of a restraining order/preliminary injunction to enjoin OVEC and all
persons employed by it from entering and taking possession of the three theaters,
conditioned upon Sy's filing of a P500,000.00 bond supplied by Country Bankers
Insurance Corporation (CBISCO).
OVEC on the other hand, alleged in its answer by way of counterclaims, that by
reason of Sy's violation of the terms of the subject lease agreement, OVEC became
authorized to enter and possess the three theaters in question and to terminate
said agreement and the balance of the deposits given by Sy to OVEC had thus
become forfeited; that OVEC would be losing P50,000.00 for every month that the
possession and operation of said three theaters remain with Sy and that OVEC
incurred P500,000.00 for attorney's service.
The trial court arrived at the conclusions that Sy is not entitled to the reformation of
the lease agreement; that the repossession of the leased premises by OVEC after
the cancellation and termination of the lease was in accordance with the stipulation
of the parties in the said agreement and the law applicable thereto and that the
consequent forfeiture of Sy's cash deposit in favor of OVEC was clearly agreed upon
by them in the lease agreement. The trial court further concluded that Sy was not
entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction issued in his favor after the
commencement of the action and that the injunction bond filed by Sy is liable for
whatever damages OVEC may have suffered by reason of the injunction.
On the counterclaim of OVEC the trial court found that the said lessor was deprived
of the possession and enjoyment of the leased premises and also suffered damages
as a result of the filing of the case by Sy and his violation of the terms and

conditions of the lease agreement. Hence, it held that OVEC is entitled to recover
the said damages in addition to the arrears in rentals and amusement tax
delinquency of Sy and the accrued interest thereon. From the evidence presented,
it found that as of the end of November, 1980, when OVEC finally regained the
possession of the three (3) theaters under lease, Sy's unpaid rentals and
amusement tax liability amounted to P289,534.78. In addition, it held that Sy was
under obligation to pay P10,000.00 every month from February to November, 1980
or the total amount of P100,000.00 with interest on each amount of P10,000.00
from the time the same became due. This P10,000.00 portion of the monthly lease
rental was supposed to come from the remaining cash deposit of Sy but with the
consequent forfeiture of the remaining cash deposit of P290,000.00, there was no
more cash deposit from which said amount could be deducted. Further, it adjudged
Sy to pay attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the amounts above-mentioned.
Finally, the trial court held Sy through the injunction bond liable to pay the sum of
P10,000.00 every month from February to November, 1980. The amount represents
the supposed increase in rental from P50,000.00 to P60,000.00 in view of the offer
of one RTG Productions, Inc. to lease the three theaters involved for P60,000.00 a
month.
From this decision of the trial court, Sy and (CBISCO) appealed the decision in
toto while OVEC appealed insofar as the decision failed to hold the injunction bond
liable for an damages awarded by the trial court.
The respondent Court of Appeals found no ambiguity in the provisions of the lease
agreement. It held that the provisions are fair and reasonable and therefore, should
be respected and enforced as the law between the parties. It held that the
cancellation or termination of the agreement prior to its expiration period is
justified as it was brought about by Sy's own default in his compliance with the
terms of the agreement and not "motivated by fraud or greed." It also affirmed the
award to OVEC of the amount of P100,000.00 chargeable against the injunction
bond posted by CBISCO which was soundly and amply justified by the trial court.
The respondent Court likewise found no merit in OVECS appeal and held that the
trial court did not err in not charging and holding the injunction bond posted by Sy
liable for all the awards as the undertaking of CBISCO under the bond referred only
to damages which OVEC may suffer as a result of the injunction.
From this decision, CBISCO and Sy filed this instant petition on the following
grounds:
A
PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO UNJUSTLY ENRICH OR BE
BENEFITTED AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PETITIONERS.
B
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS CO D SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT SETTING OFF THE P100,000.00 SUPPOSED DAMAGE
RESULTING FROM THE INJUNCTION AGAINST THE P290,000.00 REMAINING CASH
DEPOSIT OF PETITIONER ENRIQUE SY.
C
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW
AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
COUNTER-CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO PAY THE NECESSARY DOCKET FEE. (p. 10, Rollo)
We find no merit in petitioners' argument that the forfeiture clause stipulated in
the lease agreement would unjustly enrich the respondent OVEC at the expense of
Sy and CBISCO contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy. A provision which calls for the forfeiture of the remaining deposit still in the
possession of the lessor, without prejudice to any other obligation still owing, in the
event of the termination or cancellation of the agreement by reason of the lessee's
violation of any of the terms and conditions of the agreement is a penal clause that
may be validly entered into. A penal clause is an accessory obligation which the
parties attach to a principal obligation for the purpose of insuring the performance
thereof by imposing on the debtor a special presentation (generally consisting in
the payment of a sum of money) in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is
irregularly or inadequately fulfilled. (Eduardo P. Caguioa, Comments and Cases on
Civil Law, Vol. IV, First Edition, pp. 199-200) As a general rule, in obligations with a
penal clause, the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the
payment of interests in case of non-compliance. This is specifically provided for in
Article 1226, par. 1, New Civil Code. In such case, proof of actual damages suffered
by the creditor is not necessary in order that the penalty may be demanded (Article
1228, New Civil Code). However, there are exceptions to the rule that the penalty
shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of
non-compliance with the principal obligation. They are first, when there is a
stipulation to the contrary; second, when the obligor is sued for refusal to pay the
agreed penalty; and third, when the obligor is guilty of fraud (Article 1226, par. 1,
New Civil Code). It is evident that in all said cases, the purpose of the penalty is to
punish the obligor. Therefore, the obligee can recover from the obligor not only the
penalty but also the damages resulting from the non-fulfillment or defective
performance of the principal obligation.
In the case at bar, inasmuch as the forfeiture clause provides that the deposit shall
be deemed forfeited, without prejudice to any other obligation still owing by the
lessee to the lessor, the penalty cannot substitute for the P100,000.00 supposed
damage resulting from the issuance of the injunction against the P290,000.00
remaining cash deposit. This supposed damage suffered by OVEC was the alleged

P10,000.00 a month increase in rental from P50,000.00 to P60,000,00), which OVEC

failed to realize for ten months from February to November, 1980 in the total sum
of P100,000.00. This opportunity cost which was duly proven before the trial court,
was correctly made chargeable by the said court against the injunction bond posted
by CBISCO. The undertaking assumed by CBISCO under subject injunction refers
to "all such damages as such party may sustain by reason of the injunction if the
Court should finally decide that the Plaintiff was/were not entitled thereto." (Rollo,
p. 101) Thus, the respondent Court correctly sustained the trial court in holding that
the bond shall and may answer only for damages which OVEC may suffer as a result
of the injunction. The arrears in rental, the unmeritted amounts of the amusement
tax delinquency, the amount of P100,000.00 (P10,000.00 portions of each monthly
rental which were not deducted from plaintiffs cash deposit from February to
November, 1980 after the forfeiture of said cash deposit on February 11, 1980) and
attorney's fees which were all charged against Sy were correctly considered by the
respondent Court as damages which OVEC sustained not as a result of the
injunction.
There is likewise no merit to the claim of petitioners that respondent Court
committed serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing
private respondent's counterclaim for failure to pay the necessary docket fee,
which is an issue raised for the first time in this petition. Petitioners rely on the rule
in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75919, May 7,
1987, 149 SCRA 562 to the effect that all the proceedings held in connection with a
case where the correct docket fees are not paid should be peremptorily be
considered null and void because, for all legal purposes, the trial court never
acquired jurisdiction over the case. It should be remembered however, that
in Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. v. Dinopol, G.R. 75195, August 19, 1988, 164
SCRA 748, this Court took note of the fact that the assailed order of the trial court
was issued prior to the resolution in the Manchester case and held that its strict
application to the case at bar would therefore be unduly harsh. Thus, We allowed
the amendment of the complaint by specifying the amount of damages within a
non-extendible period of five (5) days from notice and the re-assessment of the
filing fees. Then, in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, G.R. 79937-38, February
3, 1989, 170 SCRA 274, We held that where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the
fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglemen tary period.
Nevertheless, OVEC's counterclaims are compulsory so no docket fees are required
as the following circumstances are present: (a) they arise out of or are necessarily
connected with the transaction or occurrence that is subject matter of the opposing
party's claim; (b) they do not require for their adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has
jurisdiction to entertain the claim (see Javier v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
75379, March 31, 1989, 171 SCRA 605). Whether the respective claims asserted by
the parties arise out of the same contract or transaction within the limitation on
counterclaims imposed by the statutes depends on a consideration of all the facts
brought forth by the parties and on a determination of whether there is some legal
or equitable relationship between the ground of recovery alleged in the
counterclaim and the matters alleged as the cause of action by the plaintiff (80
C.J.S. 48). As the counterclaims of OVEC arise from or are necessarily connected
with the facts alleged in the complaint for reformation of instrument of Sy, it is
clear that said counterclaims are compulsory.
ACCORDINGLY, finding no merit in the grounds relied upon by petitioners in their
petition, the same is hereby DENIED and the decision dated June 15, 1988 and the
resolution dated September 21, 1988, both of the respondent Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 116279
January 29, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO CRISTOBAL, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury
to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and
moral integrity to which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can
mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act,1 an outrage upon
decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself.
The pain rape causes becomes more excruciating when the victim carries the life of
an unborn within her womb. That tender and innocent life, born of love and its
parents' participation in the mystery of life, is thereby placed in undue danger. Such
was the case of Cherry Tamayo, a married woman. She was twenty-eight years old,
with one child and another on the way, when tragedy struck. She was sexually
assaulted on 31 March 1986. Fortunately, the life in her womb survived.
She accused Rogelio Cristobal of rape in a sworn complaint2 filed with the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Maddela, Quirino, on 8 April 1986.
Having found sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime
charged has been committed and the accused was probably guilty thereof, the
court ruled that the accused should be held for trial.3 Accordingly, it issued a
warrant for his arrest4 and fixed his bail bond at P17,000.00. 5 The accused was

arrested but was later released on bail.6 Thereafter, the court increased the amount
of bail to P30,000.00 and, consequently, ordered the rearrest of the
accused.7 Unfortunately, by this time, he was nowhere to be found.
On 26 August 1986, the MTC ordered the case to be "sent to the files without
prejudice to its subsequent prosecution as soon as the defendant is
apprehended." 8 Almost a year after, or specifically on 24 August 1987, the said
court ordered the records of the case to be forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal for
proper disposition. 9
On 15 September 1987, the Provincial Fiscal of Quirino filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cabarroguis, Quirino, an information10 charging accused Rogelio
Cristobal with the crime of rape committed as follows:
That between the hours of 12:00 to 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of March 31, 1986
in Barangay San Dionisio I, Municipality of Maddela, Province of Quirino, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by
means of force, threat and intimidation and with lewd design, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one CHERRY A. TAMAYO against the
will of the latter.
That the aggravating circumstance of the accused having committed the crime in
uninhabited place attended the commission of the crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 604 and assigned to Branch 32 of the
said court.
A warrant of arrest was issued on 18 October 1987. Because it was returned
unserved, an alias warrant of arrest was issued on 1 February 1988, which was also
returned unserved. The trial court then ordered the archival of the case and the
arrest of the accused. 11
It was only on 27 July 1993 when accused Rogelio Cristobal was arrested and
detained at the provincial jail. 12 On 21 October 1993, the Provincial Prosecutor filed
a Manifestation for the revival of the case,13 which the court favorably acted
upon.14
Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits
ensued.
The prosecution presented the offended party, Cherry Tamayo, and the physician
who conducted a medical examination on her, Dr. Mercedita S. Erni-Reta. The
defense presented the accused Rogelio Cristobal and his employer, Wilfredo
Manzano, who is married to the accused's cousin, Emilia Manzano. Being merely
corroborative to the testimonies of the first two defense witnesses that at the time
of the alleged commission of the crime the accused was hired by the Manzano
spouses to plow their field,15 the testimony of Mrs. Emilia Manzano was admitted
by the prosecution to expedite the disposition of the case.16
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:
In the morning of 31 March 1986, Cherry Tamayo, a resident of Barangay San
Dionisio I, Maddela, Quirino, went to the nearby Bilala Creek to wash her family's
clothes. She was alone. At around midday, between the hours of 12:00 and 1:00
and after accomplishing her task, she decided to take a bath in the creek. She was
about to start when somebody held her neck from behind and thereafter forcibly
laid her down the ground. Only then did she recognize her attacker, the accused
Rogelio Cristobal. Cherry managed to stand up and run away, but Rogelio caught up
with her and delivered two fistblows to her stomach. Not content with this, Rogelio,
while viciously holding her hair, pressed down Cherry's face into the water. Rogelio
then took her three meters away from the creek and forcibly laid her down on the
ground. Because of her weakened and pregnant state, Cherry could not struggle
any further. Rogelio removed her clothes and panties. He then went on top of her,
inserted his private organ into hers, and succeeded in satisfying his lust on
her.17 Afterwhich, he slapped and threatened Cherry with death if she would talk.18
The threat went unheeded as Cherry, upon reaching her home, immediately told
her husband of what had happened to her. Her husband accompanied her to the
police station of Maddela, Quirino, to report the incident and then to Dr. Mercedita
Erni-Reta for medical examination.19
Dr. Erni-Reta found that Cherry's vaginal canal had a laceration at the erythematous
border at 2:00 and chemoses at 3:00 at the vaginal os.20 On the witness stand, Dr.
Erni-Reta confirmed these findings.21 She added that, upon internal examination,
she found seminal fluid in the vaginal canal which must have been there for no
longer than twenty-four hours.22
The defense, on the other hand, established the following to refute the version of
the prosecution:
On 31 March 1986, Rogelio Cristobal was plowing the land of the spouses Wilfredo
and Emilia Manzano located in Salay, San Agustin, Isabela. He started plowing at
7:00 a.m. and went with Wilfredo to the latter's home for lunch at around 11:00
a.m.. Emilia was with them for lunch. The three of them talked until 2:00 p.m.. He
went home thereafter, attended to his children, and then brought out his carabao
to graze in Talaytay, Dagubog Grande, which is about 200 meters away from his
house.23 Then he went to the house of Melchor Cristobal. While he was at
Melchor's house, a policeman by the name of Jimmy Benedicto arrested him for the
crime of rape and brought him to Councilor Benjamin Dumlao. He was subsequently
taken to the 166th PC Detachment in San Dionisio, Maddela, Quirino, where he was
interrogated and where he spent the night. In the morning, he was brought to the
municipal court to face the charges filed against him.24

In its decision25 dated 28 March 1994, the trial court found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the complainant, Cherry Tamayo, in
the amount of P30,000.00.
The trial court found clear and convincing the categorical testimony of Cherry
Tamayo of having been accosted from behind, knocked to the ground, boxed,
submerged in water, taken three meters from the creek, and raped.26In view of her
positive identification of the accused, it disregarded the defense of alibi set up by
the latter, which it found to be a weak one. It ruled that for the defense of alibi to
prosper the accused must show physical impossibility to be at the scene of the
crime at the time it was committed. The accused was within three kilometers only
from Bilala Creek where the rape was committed. Such distance is near enough to
cover by walking in a matter of thirty minutes.27 It was not, therefore, physically
impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time the crime was committed.
In this appeal, the accused contends that the trial court erred in (1) convicting him
on the basis of the private complainant's inconsistent testimony, and (2) not giving
due weight to his defense of alibi.28
The Appellee disagrees with him and prays that the assailed decision be affirmed
with modification of the award for moral damages, which should be increased from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.29
Central to the accused's assigned errors is the issue of the credibility of the
complainant. It has long been settled that when the issue is one of credibility of
witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court,
considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.30 It has been aptly said:
In the resolution of the factual issues, the Court relies heavily on the trial court for
its evaluation Of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to
observe them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line
between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal
record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that
will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted
assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a
reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if
the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with
a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears
were shed in anger, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge
trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an
informed and reasoned verdict.31
This rule admits of exceptions, such as when the evaluation was reached arbitrarily,
when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which could affect the result of the
case. 32 None of these exceptions exists in this case.
It is also settled that when a woman Says that she has been raped, she says in effect
all that is necessary to show that she has been raped, and if her testimony meets
the test of credibility the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.33
Moreover, the accused was unable to prove any ill motive on the part of the
complainant. In fact, in his answer to the court's questions, he categorically stated
that there was no grudge between him and the complainant.34Where there is no
evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a prosecution
witness should testify falsely against the accused or falsely implicate him in a
heinous crime, the said testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. 35
Additionally, no married woman in her right mind, like Cherry Tamayo, would
subject herself to public scrutiny and humiliation in order to perpetuate a
falsehood. Neither would she take the risk of being alienated from her husband and
her family. If Cherry Tamayo then resolved to face the ordeal and relate in public
what many similarly situated would have kept secret, she did so simply to obtain
justice.
To cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant, the accused cites an
inconsistency in the testimony of the complainant. He points out that at first, the
complainant said that her panties were removed by the accused while she was
already lying down, but later she said that it was before she was laid down on the
ground that the accused stripped her of her panties. The accused failed to elevate
this inconsistency to the level of a major one sufficient to strip the complainant of
credibility. Being too trivial, such inconsistency does not rock the pedestal upon
which the complainant's credibility rests. In fact, it enhances her credibility, as it
manifests spontaneity and lack of scheming. 36
As to the second assigned error, the accused submits that although as a general rule
alibi is a weak defense, it gained strength in this case in the light of the
aforementioned inconsistency in the complainant's testimony. We are not
persuaded. Since, as discussed above, such inconsistency does not pierce the
complainant's credibility, the, second assigned error has therefore no leg to stand
on.
The alibi of the accused thus maintains its weak and impotent state. For the
defense of alibi to prosper, it must establish the physical impossibility for the
accused to be present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.37 The
accused's testimony placing himself somewhere else was corroborated by the

testimony of Wilfredo and Emilia Manzano. But he failed to establish physical

impossibility because the alibi places him within only three kilometers from where
the crime was committed, a manageable distance to travel in a few minutes.
For sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman, the accused has shown moral
corruption, perversity, and wickedness. He has grievously wronged the institution
of marriage. The imposition then of exemplary damages by way of example to deter
others from committing similar acts or for correction for the public good38 is
warranted. 39We hereby fix it at P25,000.00.
Pursuant to the current policy of this Court, the moral damages awarded by the trial
court should be increased from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the decision of Branch 32 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cabarroguis, Quirino, in Criminal Case No. 604 convicting the
accused ROGELIO CRISTOBAL of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED, subject to the
foregoing modifications. As modified, the award of moral damages is increased
from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00, and the accused is further ordered to pay
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00. Costs against the accused.
G.R. No. L-31931 August 31, 1988
FORTUNATO DE LEON & JUANA F. GONZALES-DE LEON, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Sixth Division composed of Justices Concepcion,
Serrano & San Diego) DR. CORNELIO S. TANTOCO and JUAN BRIONES represented
by Administratrix MAGDALENA BERNARDO, respondents-appellees.
Fortunato de Leon, Celso B. Jamora and Guillermo B. Ilagan for petitionersappellants.
Jose B. Puerto for respondent-appellee Juan Briones.
Diogracias T. Reyes & Associates and Jose M. Luison for respondent-appellee
Cornelio S. Tantoco.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision * of the Court of Appeals (Sixth
Division) in C.A., G.R. No. 40201-R promulgated on February 21, 1970 affirming the
judgment ** of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, with modification of the
amount of moral and exemplary damages from P100,000.00 to P60,000.00 and the
amount of attorney's fees from P10,000.00 to P5,000.00 the dispositive portion of
which appellate court's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified as above indicated
respecting the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.
The rest are hereby affirmed with costs against plaintiffs-appellants. (pp. 6-7,
Decision of the Court of Appeals; pp. 61-62, Rollo)
The facts of the case as drawn by respondent court from the evidence on record are
quoted as follows:
The third-party defendants spouses Juan Briones and Magdalena Bernardo were
the former registered owners of the fishpond situated at San Roque, Paombong,
Bulcacan, which was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 28296 (Exhibit 2).
This fishpond was the subject of a deed of mortgage executed by the spouses
Briones on January 22, 1954, in favor of Hermogenes Tantoco involving the
consideration of P20,000.00 (Exh. 2), which amount was later assigned by the
mortgagee to his father herein defendant and thirdparty plaintiff Dr. Cornelio S.
Tantoco (Exh. 10). Apart from this first mortgage, the spouses Briones likewise
executed a deed of second mortgage for P68,824.00 with 10% interest per annum
in favor of Cornelio S. Tantoco dated May 26, 1959 (Exh. 1). Both mortgages were
duly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan and duly annotated
at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 28296 (Exh. 2) of the Briones. While
these two mortgages were still subsisting the Briones spouses sold the fishpond,
which is the subject matter of said two mortgages, to plaintiff spouses Fortunato de
Leon and Juana F. Gonzales de Leon in the amount of P120,000.00 (Exh. 5). Of the
amount of P120,000.00, the Briones spouses actually received only the amount of
P31,000.00 on June 2, 1959, as the amount of P89,000.00 was withheld by the
plaintiff de Leon who assumed to answer the mortgage indebtedness of the Briones
to the Tantocos (Exhs. 3, 3-a, 3-a-1 to 3-b). After the sale plaintiffs de Leon satisfied
the mortgage loan of P20,000.00 including 10% interest per annum to Hermogenes
Tantoco who then accordingly executed a deed of discharge of mortgage (Exhs. Z &
Z-1), but the mortgage in favor of Cornelio S. Tantoco in the amount of P68,824 was
not satisfied. On February 5, 1962 plaintiffs made payment of P29,382.50 to the
defendant Cornelio Tantocos." (Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 23).
In his letter to private respondent Cornelio Tantoco dated February 5, 1962,
petitioner Fortunato de Leon made it clear that he was tendering the sum of
P29,382.50, represented by PNB Cashier's Check No. 119874 in full discharge of the
legitimate obligation of his clients, the spouses Juan Briones and Magdalena
Bernardo. He requested acknowledgment of the receipt of his letter and the
execution of the necessary document (Exhibits, p. 103). Through counsel private
respondent, trying to set the records straight for petitioners, made the clarification
that the principal obligation of the Briones as of May 25, 1959 was P68,824.00 and
on January 26, 1962 when a letter of demand was sent to them their total
obligation including the agreed interest amounted to P88,888.98. Hence the above
mentioned PNB check will be held in abeyance pending remittance of the total
obligation after which the necessary document will be executed (Exhibits, p. 105).

On April 5, 1962 Juan Briones executed an affidavit denying ever having hired
petitioner Fortunato de Leon as counsel nor having authorized petitioner to pay any
obligation of his to private respondent for as a matter of fact all obligations he had
with private respondent had been assumed by petitioner in a document executed
by petitioner himself in his own handwriting (Exhibits, p. 108).
On May 8, 1962 the spouses Fortunato de Leon and Juana F. de Leon, petitioners
herein, filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan against
defendant Cornelio S. Tantoco, respondent herein, Civil Case No. 2554, for
discharge of mortgage (Record on Appeal, p. 4). On May 31, 1962 defendant filed
his answer with counterclaim and third party complaint against the Briones spouses
with petition for leave to file third party complaint (Record on Appeal, p. 7). He
alleged by way of special and affirmative defenses, among others, that the true and
real amount of obligation of the Briones spouses is the sum of P68,824.00,
Philippine currency, with 10% interest secured by a second mortgage in favor of
defendant, executed and signed by the Briones spouses on May 26,1959, which
deed of second mortgage was duly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Malolos, Bulacan on May 27, 1959 and properly annotated at the back of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 28296 issued in the names of Juan Briones and
Magdalena Bernardo; that the amount of P29,382.50 sent by plaintiff as alleged
counsel of the spouses Juan Briones and Magdalena Bernardo was accepted by the
said defendant as part payment or partial extinguishment of the mortgage loan of
P68,824.00 with 10% interest thereon per annum from May 22, 1959, and plaintiffs
have been informed of the tenor of said acceptance and application thereof as
partial payment of the mortgage obligation in question; and, that defendant did not
accede to the demand of the plaintiff to have the mortgage lien on the property in
question cancelled or discharged because the full amount of the mortgage debt of
P68,824.00 plus the 10% interest thereon from May 22, 1959 has not yet been fully
paid either by the plaintiffs or by the spouses Juan Briones and Magdalena
Bernardo. Defendant prayed under the counterclaim that plaintiffs be ordered to
pay defendant the following amounts:
(1) P62,245.04 plus lO% interest thereon per annum from May 22, 1962 until the
full amount thereon has been paid in the event that the assumption of obligation
(Annex "2") is found by the Court to be true, valid and binding between the parties
thereto;
(2) P100,000.00 for moral damages with 6% interest thereon from the date of the
filing of the counterclaim until full payment thereof;
(3) P10,000.00 for exemplary damages with 6% interest thereon from the date of
the filing of the counterclaim until full payment thereof; and
(4) P5,000.00 for attorney's fee with 6% interest thereon from the date of the filing
of the counterclaim until full payment thereof."
On June 8, 1962 plaintiffs filed an answer to defendants' counterclaim, by way of
counterclaim to the counterclaim and praying for judgment (Record on Appeal, p.
24) as follows:
A. Dismissing defendants' counterclaim with costs against them;
B. Sentencing defendants to pay unto the plaintiffs the sum of P200,00o.oo by way
of moral damages with legal interest thereon from date hereof;
C. Sentencing defendants to pay not less than P20,000.00 to Plaintiffs by way of
exemplary damages with legal interest from date hereof;
D. Sentencing defendants to pay unto plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00 by way of
actual damages;
E. Declaring the lien on Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25079 of plaintiffs duly
discharged;
F. Ordering defendant Cornelio S. Tantoco to execute the covering Release and
Discharge of Mortgage;
G. Ordering defendant Cornelio S. Tantoco to return his mortgagee's copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25079 to the Register of Deeds of Bulacan;
H. Sentencing defendant Cornelio S. Tantoco to pay unto the plaintiffs the sum of
P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees;
I. Plaintiffs further pray for such additional relief just and proper in the premises.
On June 22, 1962, long before defendant's third party complaint was admitted, the
Briones spouses filed an answer to the third-party complaint (Record on Appeal, p.
32) which was stricken out by order of the trial court dated September 3, 1962
(Record on Appeal, p. 35) on petition of plaintiffs dated July 18, 1962 (Record on
Appeal, p. 33). Third-party defendants filed their second answer to third-party
complaint on October 6, 1962, virtually confessing judgment in behalf of third-party
plaintiff (Record on Appeal, p. 35). They alleged by way of special and affirmative
defense that plaintiff Fortunato de Leon at the time of the sale knew of the
obligations of herein third-party defendants to third-party plaintiff and as a matter
of fact said plaintiff assumed said obligations.
On July 29,1963 Magdalena Bernardo Vda. de Briones was substituted third-party
defendant as administratrix of the estate of Juan Briones who died in the course of
the proceedings, upon petition of defendant Tantoco (Record on Appeal, p. 64).
On September 16, 1963 plaintiffs filed a petition for leave to intervene in
defendant's third-party complaint, with their answer in intervention, which was
granted by the Court on October 14, 1963 (Record on Appeal, p. 64).
On May 16, 1967 the trial court rendered its decision on the case (Record on
Appeal, p. 74) the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering: the dismissal of the complaint;

payment by its plaintiffs to the defendant Third-party plaintiff by way of
counterclaim the sum of P64,921.00 wth interest thereon at 10% per annum from
February 5, 1962 until fully paid; payment by plaintiff to defendant the sum of
P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and the further sum of P10,000.00
as attorney's fees; payment of costs of plaintiff.
On appeal respondent Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with
modification respecting the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney's fees. Petitioner spouses filed on March 7, 1970 their motion for
reconsideration of the decision of respondent court which motion was denied on
April 20, 1970. On April 23, 1979 petitioners filed their motion for leave to file a
second motion for reconsideration.
On July 5, 1970, barely two days before the expiration date of the period of appeal
with their motion still unacted upon, petitioners filed with this Court their motion
for extension of time to file petition for certiorari by way of appeal (Rollo, p. 1)
which motion was granted in the Resolution of May 8, 1970 (Rollo, p. 2). The
motion to file a second motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent Court
on May 15, 1970 (Rollo, p. 53).
The instant petition for certiorari by way of appeal with preliminary injunction was
filed with this Court on May 20, 1970 (Rollo, P. 7).
In the resolution of June 8, 1970 the petition was given due course solely on the
issue of the propriety of the award made by the respondent Cornelio S. Tantoco in
"the amount of P60,000 in the concept of moral and exemplary damages" (Rollo, p.
75).
On June 20, 1970 petitioners moved for reconsideration of the Resolution of the
Court dated June 8, 1979 (Rollo, p. 82), to include other issues.
On the same date private respondent Corn elio Tantoco moved for the issuance of
partial entry of final judgment with respect to the portion of the decision appealed
from which is not the subject of the instant appeal by certiorari (Rollo, p. 102).
On June 25, 1970 the Court resolved to require respondents to comment on the
aforementioned motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 101). Said comment was filed
on July 8, 1970 (Rollo, p. 109).
On July 8, 1970 petitioner spouses filed a consolidated opposition to private
respondent Tantoco motion for partial entry of final judgment and reply to his
manifestation-motion (Rollo, p. 121) and on July 9, 1970 filed a reply to respondent
Tantoco's motion to dismiss appeal (Rollo, p. 128).
On July 20, 1970 the Court resolved among others to deny: (1) respondent
Tantoco's motion to dismiss appeal; (2) petitioners motion for reconsideration of
the Court's resolution of June 8, 1970; and (3) respondent Tantoco's motion for
partial entry of judgment insofar as the portion of the decision appealed from
which is not the subject of the instant appeal by certiorari is concerned, without
prejudice to respondent's presenting the same motion to respondent Court of
Appeals for consideration and action at the proper time (Rollo, p. 133).
Respondent Cornelio S. Tantoco filed with this Court on July 21, 1970 reply to
consolidated opposition and rejoinder to reply to respondent Tantoco's motion to
dismiss appeal (Rollo, p. 134).
Brief for petitioners was filed on August 5, 1970 (Rollo, p. 159); brief for
respondents was filed on October 28, 1970 (Rollo, p. 187).
On November 14,1970 petitioners filed an "Urgent Petition ex-parte For Issuance of
Restraining Order and To Declare Respondent Cornelio S. Tantoco Guilty of
Contempt of Court" stating that respondent Tantoco filed with the Court of Appeals
on August 14, 1970 the same motion for partial entry of judgment which was filed
with this Court and denied in the resolution of July 20, 1970 but which was granted
by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of October 31, 1970 over petitionersappellants' objection (Rollo, p. 192). On November 18, 1970 respondents were
required to comment thereon (Rollo, p. 197) and the required comment was filed
by private respondent on November 26, 1970 (Rollo, p. 200).
On December 2, 1970 a partial remanding of the records of this case to the Court of
Appeals was made in compliance with Section 11 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court
(Rollo, P. 220).
The Reply brief of the petitioners was filed on December 3, 1970 (Rollo, p. 210). On
the same date petitioners-appellants' "Urgent Petition for Issuance of Restraining
Order and To Declare Respondent Cornelio's Tantoco Guilty of Contempt of Court"
was denied. (Rollo, p. 212).
On February 12, 1971 petitioners spouses again filed a petition for issuance of a
restraining order (Rollo, p. 227) and private respondent was required to comment
thereon (Rollo, p. 233). Said comment was filed on February 23, 1971 (Rollo, p.
236).
On February 24, 1971 petitioner spouses filed an urgent manifestation informing
the Court of the urgency of the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction because the Court of First Instance of Bulacan had presumably granted
respondent Cornelio S. Tantoco's motion for partial execution of judgment in an
order dated February 11, 1971 which petitioners had not yet received,
notwithstanding petitioners' urgent motion to postpone hearing of same scheduled
for February 15, 1971 because of the pendency of petitioner's motion before this
Court for issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunctions filed on
February 11, 1971 (Rollo, p. 241). In the resolution of February 26, 1971 private
respondent Cornelio S. Tantoco was required to comment thereon (Rollo, p. 248)

and said comment was filed by respondent on March 6, 1971 (Rollo, p. 251). In the
resolution of March 10, 1971 petitioners' petition for issuance of a restraining order
was denied (Rollo, p. 265).
Petitioners assign the following errors (Brief for Petitioners, p. 1):
I.
The respondent Court erred in awarding in favor of respondent Cornelio S. Tantoco
moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P60,000.00 in the absence of
supporting evidence and reasons notwithstanding that no actual and compensatory
damages have been allegedly proved and awarded in respondent's favor.
II.
The respondent Court erred in awarding P5,000.00 attorney's fees in favor of
respondent Cornelio S. Tantoco and in sentencing petitioners de Leons to pay same;
instead of awarding the latter (Petitioners) reasonable attorney's fees as prayed for
in their complaint.
III.
The respondent Court erred in sentencing herein petitioners de Leons to pay
respondent Tantoco P60,000.00 moral and exemplary damages and P5,000.00
attorney's fees when there exist no contractual or juridical relations whatsoever
between them.
IV.
That the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of February 21, 1970 and its
adverse Resolutions of April 20, 1970 and of May 15, 1970 are all nullities.
In accordance with the Resolution of the Court dated June 8, 1970 (Rollo, p. 75) the
sole issue that has to be resolved by the Court is the question of whether or not the
award of P60,000.00 in the concept of moral and exemplary damages is proper.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or
omission (People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 625 [1984]; Bagumbayan Corporation v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 132 SCRA 441 [1984]; Guita v. Court of Appeals, 139
SCRA 576 [1985]); (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440
[1987]). On the other hand, jurisprudence sets certain conditions when exemplary
damages may be awarded, to wit: (1) They may be imposed by way of example or
correction only in addition, among others, to compensatory damages and cannot be
recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of
compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (2) the claimant must
first establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages;
and (3) the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the award would
be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolant manner (Octot v. Ybaez, III SCRA 79 [1982]); Sweet Lines,
Inc., v. Court of Appeals, 121 SCRA 769 [19831); Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment
Corporation v. Reyes, 145 SCRA 713 [1985]); Tan Kapoc v. Masa, 134 SCRA 231
[1985]). It may be awarded for breach of contract or quasicontract as when a
telegraph company personnel transmitted the wrong telegram (Radio
Communication of the Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 359 [1981].
Respondent Court found malice in petitioners'refusal to satisfy respondent
Tantocos lawful claim and in their subsequent filing of the present case against
respondent, and took into consideration the worries and mental anxiety of
respondent as a result thereof. In the words of respondent court:
The evidence shows that plaintiff-appellants'refusal to satisfy appellee's lawful
claims clearly amounted to malice on their part when they filed the present case
resulting as it were in worries and mental anxiety of the defendant Tantoco who
was dragged to court to litigate this case for almost 10 years up to now. He was
even branded as a money lender, and accused forgery and of entering into collusion
with the end in view of extracting extra amount ... from the herein plaintiff. All
these tried to picture defendant Cornelio Tantoco with alleged dishonesty who
respecting the legitimate obligation of the Briones to defendant Cornelio Tantoco,
thereby blemishing his honor, integrity and reputation as a prominent doctor and a
businessman. With all these extant circumstances which served as a guidepost for
us in determining the reasonable amount of damages sustained by the defendantappellee, this Court hereby fixes the amount of P60,000.00 representing moral and
exemplary damages and the further sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, which
plaintiffs-appellants should pay the defendant-appellee. (Rollo, p. 61)
As a lawyer in the practice of law since his admission to the Bar in 1929, who has
held several important positions in the government (TSN, April 22, 1965, p. 127)
petitioner Fortunato de Leon could not have missed the import of the annotation at
the back of TCT No. 28296 regarding the second mortgage for the sum of sixty eight
thousand eight hundred twenty-four pesos (P68,824.00) of the property he was
buying, in favor of respondent Cornelio Tantoco, entry No. 54835 in the registry of
deeds of Bulacan (Exhibits, p. 93). The same annotation was transferred to TCT No.
T-25079 in the name of petitioner after the sale of the property was effected and
entered in the registry of deeds of Bulacan on June 3, 1959 (Exhibits, p. 102).
Furthermore, petitioners cannot deny having assumed the mortgage debts of the
Briones spouses amounting to P89,000.00 in favor of the Tantocos. The "Patunay"
(Exhibits 3-a) executed by the Briones spouses on June 3, 1959 gives the
information that their property, and fishpond, was sold by them to the spouses

Fortunato de Leon and Juana F. Gonzales for the amount of one hundred twenty
thousand pesos (Pl20,000.00), payment made to them, as follows:
Pinanagutan na aming pagkakautang kay
G. Hermogenes Tantoco hanggang Mayo 1959

P 89,000.00

Cash na tinanggap namin PBC Check No. 57040

11,000.00

Pagare No. 1 Junio 1, 1959

10,000.00

Pagare No. 2 Junio 1, 1959

10,000.00

Kabuuan

P 120,000.00

At the bottom of the "Patunay" in the handwriting of petitioner Fortunato de Leon

is a statement signed by him (Exh. 3b) signifying that he was assuming the
spouses'debt of P89,000.00 to respondent Tantoco, in the following words:
Ang pagkautang na P89,000.00 sa mga Tantoco ay aking inaasumihan. (Exhibits, p.
97).
Petitioner retained P89,000.00 out of the P120,000.00, representing the mortgage
loan of the Briones spouses to the Tantocos, including interest. Immediately after
the sale of the fishpond was effected and registered with the registry of deeds of
Bulacan petitioner paid the P20,000.00 loan of the Briones spouses to Hermogenes
Tantoco including 10% interest on the loan, covered by a first mortgage on the
property. Accordingly, Hermogenes Tantoco executed a deed of discharge from the
mortgage. Out of the P68,000.00 mortgage loan of the Briones spouses from
respondent Cornelio Tantoco, petitioner, however made only a payment of
P29,382.50 but would want respondent to execute the necessary discharge
document. The documents speak for themselves. They are mute but plain and
visible evidence of the deliberate intent of petitioner to defraud respondent of the
amount withheld from the Briones spouses to cover the amount of the mortgage
loan in favor of respondent.
The filing of the case against respondent being unfounded and maliciously
prosecuted satisfactorily proves the existence of the factual basis for moral
damages and the causal relation to petitioners' acts (Hawpia v. Court of Appeals, 20
SCRA 535 [1967]; Ventura v. Bernabe, 38 SCRA 587 [1971]; Enervida v. de la Torre,
55 SCRA 340 [1974]; Tan Kapoe v. Masa, 134 SCRA 231 [1985]). Private respondent
has a good name to protect. He is a surgeon by profession, had been Chief of the
Bulacan Provincial Hospital since 1946 until he put up a hospital of his own, the
Rosary General Hospital.He is a member of the Knights of Columbus, a Cursillista, a
member of the Lions, a fellow of the Philippine College of Surgeons in good
standing from 1946 up to the present, a member of the Philippine Medical
Association and of the Bulacan Medical Association. He has been humiliated,
embarrassed, maligned and has been charged in bad faith as a money lender in
petitioner's complaint accusing him of defrauding the Briones spouses (TSN, pp.
227-250).
The entitlement to moral damages having been established the award of exemplary
damages is proper (Bert Osmea & Associates v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 395
[1983]; Tan Kapoe v. Masa, 134 SCRA 231 [1985]).
While the award of moral and exemplary damages in an aggregate amount may not
be the usual way of awarding said damages there is no question of respondent's
entitlement to moral and exemplary damage (Tan Kapoe v. Masa, supra). The
amount should be reduced, however, for being excessive compared to the actual
losses sustained by the aggrieved party (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System,
Inc., 148 SCRA 440 [1987]). Moral damages though incapable of pecuniary
estimations, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant
for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty of the wrongdoer (San Andres
v. Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA 85 [1982] cited in Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport
System, Inc. supra).
Time and again the Court has ruled that "moral damages are emphatically not
intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded
only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will
serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the
defendants' culpable action" (Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., 94 SCRA
966 [1979]); R & B Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129
SCRA 736 [1984]; Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc.,supra).
In the case of Miranda Ribaya v. Bautista (95 SCRA 672 [1980]), this Court
considered 25% of the principal amount as reasonable. In the case at bar, the Court
of Appeals found on February 21, 1970 that the outstanding balance of the disputed
loan was P64,921.69. Twenty five percent thereof is P16,230.00 but considering the
depreciation of the Philippine peso today, it is believed that the award of moral and
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is reasonable.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
but the aggregate award of moral and exemplary damages is reduced to
P25,000.00.
G.R. No. 171271 August 31, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ELBERTO TUBONGBANUA y PAHILANGA, Appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua was charged with the crime of murder in an
amended Information 1 that reads:
That on or about the 12th of February, 2001, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation, treachery,
taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab Evelyn Kho y Sua on the different parts of her
body with the use of a deadly weapon, thereby inflicting upon said Evelyn Kho y Sua
stab wounds, which directly caused her death; that the act was committed inside
the dwelling of Evelyn Kho y Sua and with insult or in disregard of the respect due
to the offended party on account of his (sic) rank, age or sex.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are as follows:
Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho since 1998. The
latter worked as the managing partner of the Lawyers Advocate Circle, a law firm
operated as a sole proprietorship, and located at 2302 Atlanta Center, 31 Anapolis
St., Greenhills, San Juan, M.M. Accused was initially paid P6,000.00 a month as
wages, aside from boarding, food, overtime and extra pay, which he received when
he did extra driving and other work for Atty. Sua-Khos family.
On February 12, 2001, at around 6:00 oclock in the evening, the accused drove
Atty. Sua Kho to her condominium unit at 1702 Platinum 2000, Anapolis St.,
Greenhills, San Jun M.M. After handing his employers bag to Marissa Hiso, the
housemaid, accused proceeded to the kitchen where he drank a glass of water. Also
in the condominium unit were Atty. Sua-Khos three year old daughter Issa and her
nanny, Nelie Maglasang. After talking and playing with her daughter for a few
minutes, Atty. Sua-Kho emerged from the bedroom to talk with the accused.
Shortly thereafter, Marrisa heard her employer screaming, and she saw the accused
stabbing her with their kitchen knife. She tried to stop the accused, shouting "Kuya
Bert!", but the latter continued to stab Atty. Sua-Kho. Meanwhile, Nelie also heard
her employers screams, and locked herself with Issa in the masters bathroom.
When she peeped-out from her hiding place, she saw Marissa, whom she signaled
to go downstairs for help. The latter did so, and sought help from the security
guard. Nellie, meanwhile called Atty. Sua-Khos father, Marcelino Sua, and husband,
Daniel Kho, on the bedroom phone.
When Marcelino Sua arrived, he saw Marissa and a security guard in front of the
condominium unit. When they entered, they saw the bloodied and unmoving body
of Atty. Sua-Kho sprawled on the floor. Marcelino then brought his daughter to the
Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital, where doctors tried to revive her, but failed.
The accused, meanwhile, fled, using the victims car. He was arrested soon
afterwards in Calapan, Mindoro, while on his way to his home province.
Upon examination of the victims body, Dr. Edgardo Rodriguez Vida found that she
suffered eighteen (18) stab wounds and three (3) incise wounds aside from other
minor injuries. The stab wounds on her chest were considered fatal as they affected
both lungs, the main blood vessel of the heart and the heart itself. There were four
stab wounds on the heart, one on the right lung and four on the left lung. According
to the doctor, the wounds could have been caused by a sharp single-bladed object
and that the incise wounds found on the left forearm, right wrist and left leg could
have been inflicted while Atty. Sua-Kho tried to parry the blows.
Marian Aquino, legal secretary of the Lawyers Advocate Circle, where the victim
worked, related that prior to the killing of Atty. Sua-Kho, the accused had confided
to her about his grudges against the victim, such as being given spoiled food, that
his meals were being measured, that he worked long hours of the day and served
many bosses. On February 11, 2001, accused spent the day at her boarding house
where he told her he could no longer take the way Atty. Sua-Kho treated him. Later
he said "nadedemonyo na ako" and that he would finish Atty. Sua-Kho. He would hit
her at the back, very deep, and he would make sure that she would die. Then he
would go to the province, his territory, where he could not be followed.
Atty. Joel Baguio, an associate at the Lawyers Advocate Circle, also testified that
before the killing, the accused told him of his grudges against Atty. Sua-Kho, like his
being scolded for being late, and being called a thief, a killer, and ex-convict and
other bad names. On February 12, 2001, the accused also told him not to get too
close, as he might get involved in what was going to happen.
The accused, on the other hand, raised the defense of self-defense. Atty. Sua-Kho,
he testified, didnt want her husband to know that she had been taking trips with a
company guest, a certain Phillip Robinson, to Puerto Azul and Daranak Falls in
Tanay. She warned the accused that something bad would happen to him if her
husband would learn about it. In the evening of February 12, 2001, Atty. Sua-Kho
urged accused to go to her fathers house, because her husband Daniel Kho would
be arriving. As she and the accused argued about Phillip Robinson, the former got a
knife and stabbed him with it, catching him on the wrist. Accused managed to wrest
control of the knife, and with it, stabbed Atty. Sua-Kho three or four times. After he

stabbed her he was shocked and left the place using the victims car. He fled to
Mindoro where he allegedly surrendered to the police. 2
On March 26, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163, rendered
judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused, Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga, is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code and is sentenced to suffer the severe penalty of death by lethal injection with
all the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.
On the civil liability of the accused, he is ordered to pay the legal heirs of the victim
actual, moral, nominal, exemplary and temperate damages in the respective sums
of P298,202.25, P50,000.00, P200,000.00, P200,000.00 and P50,000.00. He is also
ordered to pay the victims heirs P50,000.00 for the loss of the victims life, all with
interest thereon at the legal rate of 6 percent per annum from this date until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED. 3
The case was elevated to this Court because the penalty imposed was death.
However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo, 4 the case was transferred and
referred to the Court of Appeals. 5
On October 21, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision
of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, in that, the accused-appellant, having been found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, is hereby sentenced to Death. He is
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the following:
(1) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P298,202.25 as actual damages; and
(4) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
The awards of temperate and nominal damages are hereby DELETED.
Since the imposition of the death penalty in this case was affirmed, this Decision
and the complete records of this case are hereby ordered TRANSMITTED to the
Supreme Court on automatic review, immediately upon the promulgation of this
Decision.
SO ORDERED. 6
The Court of Appeals disregarded appellants claim of self defense for lack of
evidence and for being incredible considering the number and location of wounds
sustained by the victim and his flight from the crime scene. It also noted that
treachery did not attend the commission of the crime as there were no particulars
as to how the killing began or executed.
However, the appellate court found that evident premeditation was adequately
established which qualified the killing to murder. Likewise, it appreciated abuse of
superior strength as an aggravating circumstance.
As regards the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to the rank, sex and
age of the victim, the Court of Appeals noted that these circumstances were
included as amendments to the information after the presentation by the
prosecution of its evidence. As such, the same should not be allowed because it will
prejudice the rights of the appellant.
In a Resolution dated March 7, 2006, we required both parties to file supplemental
briefs. The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it will no longer be filing a
supplemental brief. On the other hand, appellant insisted on his theory of self
defense and prayed for his acquittal.
We agree with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
appellants claim of self-defense is self-serving hence should not be given credence.
In Cabuslay v. People, 7 we ruled that:
One who invokes self defense admits responsibility for the killing. Accordingly, the
burden of proof shifts to the accused who must then prove the justifying
circumstance. He must show by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted
in self-defense, or in defense of a relative or a stranger. With clear and convincing
evidence, all the following elements of self defense must be established: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person claiming self defense.
Appellants version of the stabbing incident does not inspire belief. His testimony
that it was Atty. Sua-Kho who attacked him is uncorroborated and improbable.
Appellants alleged use of reasonable means to repel the aggression is also
untenable considering the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim
which demonstrate a determined effort to kill the victim and not just defend
oneself. 8 We note that the victim suffered 18 stab wounds which were all directed
to her chest, heart and lungs. She also had incised wounds which were inflicted
while she was parrying the blows coming from the appellant. In fact, appellant
testified that Atty. Sua-Kho was running away from him but he still pursued her and
inflicted the fatal wounds:
Q: According to you, Atty. launched at you and you covered and cut on your left
hand and that was the time you got the knife and what happened after that?
A: What I remember is that she went inside.
Q: So, she run (sic) away from you, is that what you are saying?
A: When I was hit and I was able to stab her, she ran towards the room.
Q: So she was trying to avoid [you] after she stabbed you the first time?

A: I do not know, what I know is that when I stabbed her, she went inside the room.
Q: What part of the body did you hit her the first time?
A: At the abdominal area, sir.
Q: After that initial wound, Atty. Kho run (sic) towards the room, is that correct?
A: What I remember, she run (sic), sir. 9
Moreover, appellants act of fleeing from the crime scene instead of reporting the
incident to the police authorities is contrary to his proclaimed innocence but highly
indicative of guilt and negate his claim of self defense. 10
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treachery
was not present. Treachery under paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code is defined as the deliberate employment of means, methods, or forms in the
execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the intended
victim might raise. For treachery to be present, two conditions must concur: (a) the
employment of means of execution which would ensure the safety of the offender
from defensive and retaliatory acts of the victim, giving the victim no opportunity to
defend himself; and (b) the means, method and manner of the execution were
deliberately and consciously adopted by the offender. 11 Treachery cannot be
presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as
the killing itself. 12
In the instant case, there is no proof on how the attack was commenced. Where no
particulars are known as to the manner in which the aggression was made or how
the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and developed, it can in no
way be established from mere suppositions that the killing was perpetrated by
treachery. 13
We find however that evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior
strength attended the killing.
Like any other circumstance that qualifies a killing as murder, evident premeditation
must be established by clear and positive evidence; 14 that is, by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. 15 The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the act
was preceded by cool thought and reflections upon the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. To be
considered, the following elements must be proven: (1) the time when the accused
decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has
clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision
and the execution, to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his
act. 16
Prosecution witnesses Marian Aquino and Atty. Joel Baguio testified as to
appellants state of mind and predisposition to avenge the alleged maltreatment by
the victim. Both witnesses testified on appellants ill-plans against his employer the
day prior to the crime. Absent evidence showing any reason or motive for the
witnesses to falsely testify against the appellant, the logical conclusion is that no
such improper motive exists and their testimonies should be accorded full faith and
credit. Thus, the lower courts correctly concluded that evident premeditation
attended the commission of the crime.
Appellant likewise took advantage of his superior strength to perpetuate the
criminal act. He killed Atty. Sua-Kho by overpowering her and driving the murder
weapon into her body several times, despite her attempts to parry the blows. He
could not have executed the dastardly act without employing physical superiority
over the victim. InPeople v. Espina, 17 we have ruled that an attack by a man with a
deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the
circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the
act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself.
We find, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the amendments
in the information regarding the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or
disregard of the respect due to rank, age or sex. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, 18 provides that an amendment after the plea of the accused is permitted
only as to matters of form, provided leave of court is obtained and such
amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial amendment
is not permitted after the accused had already been arraigned. 19
In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, 20 we had the occasion to distinguish between
substantial and formal amendments:
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are
merely of form. Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal
amendments, viz.: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty
that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which
does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the
original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions theory
of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he
has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any
substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.
The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not
prejudiced by such amendment is whether or not a defense under the information
as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and
whether or not any evidence which the accused might have would be equally
applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the
affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance. 21

Tested against these guidelines, the insertion of the aggravating circumstances of

dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or sex of the victim
is clearly a formal, not a substantial, amendment. These amendments do not have
the effect of charging another offense different or distinct from the charge of
murder as contained in the original information. They relate only to the range of the
penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction. The amendment did
not adversely affect any substantial right of appellant. 22 Besides, appellant never
objected to the presentation of evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on
account of rank, age or sex. 23 Without any objection by the defense, the defect is
deemed waived. 24
There is no dispute that Atty. Sua-Kho was killed in her home. Appellant could have
killed her elsewhere but he decided to commit the crime at her home; thus we
appreciate the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. However, it was not
convincingly shown that appellant deliberately intended to offend or disregard the
respect due to rank, age, or sex of Atty. Sua-Kho. The motive for the murder was his
grudge against the victim and not because she was a lawyer and his employer.
Neither did appellant took into consideration the age of Atty. Sua-Kho and the fact
that she is a woman when he killed her.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, 25 as amended by R.A. No. 7659, 26 prescribes
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Considering the
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation and the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling, and taking advantage of superior strength without any
mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty would have been death. 27
However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting
the Imposition of Death Penalty on June 24, 2006 28, the penalty that should be
meted is reclusion perpetua, thus:
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited.
Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No.
8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby
repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659),
otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other laws, executive orders and
decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly.
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of
the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Pursuant to the same law, appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.
4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Regarding damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be
recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest, in proper cases. 29
We affirm the monetary awards granted by the Court of Appeals but modify the
amount of actual damages and exemplary damages.
The award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim
without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. Hence, based on
recent jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto of P75,000.00 for the
heirs Atty. Sua-Kho is in order.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to compensate a
party for an injury or loss he suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice
and are aimed at repairing the wrong done. 30 To be recoverable, actual and
compensatory damages must be duly proved with reasonable degree of
certainty. 31 In the present case, the award of actual damages of P298,210.25 32 is
correct, considering that the said amount has been duly proven.
The Court of Appeals correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 in view of the violent death of the victim and the resultant grief of her
family.
Article 2230 of the Civil Code specifically states that exemplary damages may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances, as in this case. Moreover, as an example and deterrent to future
similar transgressions, the Court finds that an award of P25,000.00 for exemplary
damages is proper.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01366,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga
isfound GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt ofMURDER as defined in Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by evident
premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of taking
advantage of superior strength and dwelling, with no mitigating circumstances. The
proper imposable penalty would have been death. However, pursuant to Republic
Act No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
without possibility of parole. The appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Atty.
Evelyn Sua-Kho, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P298,210.25 as
actual damages; 50,000.00 as moral damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages; all with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from this
date until fully paid.

G.R. No. 175924

March 14, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ERLAND SABADLAB y BAYQUEL, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On October 28, 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 140, in Makati City
pronounced Erland Sabadlab y Bayquel guilty of forcible abduction with
rape committed against AAA,1 a 16-year old domestic helper, and penalized him
with reclusion perpetua.2 On April 26, 2006, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
conviction and the penalty, but modified the civil damages.3 Hence, Sabadlab
appeals.
Antecedents
Both the RTC and the CA agreed on the factual antecedents.
AAA was then walking at around noon of March 12, 2002 on Dapitan Street in
Makati City, proceeding towards MA Montessori to fetch her employers son who
was studying there. Suddenly, a man (later identified as Sabadlab) grabbed her by
the shoulder and ordered her to go with him. She recognized him to be the man
who had persistently greeted her every time she had bought pandesal at 5 oclock
am near her employers house in the past two weeks. Alarmed, she refused to do
his bidding, but Sabadlab poked a gun at her throat. Two other men whom she did
not recognize joined Sabadlab at that point. They forced her into the backseat of a
parked car, and one of Sabadlabs cohorts blindfolded her with a handkerchief. The
car moved forward, and stopped after twenty minutes of travel. Still blindfolded,
she was brought out of the car. Sabadlab said that he would remove her clothes.
Sabadlab then undressed her, leaving only the blindfold on her. One of them tied
her hands behind her back. Sabadlab began kissing her body from the neck
downwards. Although blindfolded, she knew that it was Sabadlab because his
cohorts were calling out his name as he was kissing her body. Then they made her
lie flat on the ground with her hands still tied behind her back. Sabadlab raped her
in that position. The others took their turns in raping her after Sabadlab. To prevent
her from shouting for help, Sabadlab stuffed her mouth with crumpled newspapers.
The three ravished her again and again, that she could not remember the number
of times they did so.
At around 3:00 oclock pm, Sabadlab and his cohorts returned a blindfolded AAA by
car back to Dapitan Street, but let her go only after sternly warning that they would
surely kill her if she told anyone about the rapes. Once they left, she proceeded to
MA Montessori to fetch her ward. She waited there until 5:30 pm.
Upon her arrival at the house, AAAs employer noticed the kiss marks on her neck.
AAA at first lied about the kiss marks, but she ultimately disclosed the rapes
because her irritated employer slapped and boxed her on the stomach to force her
to disclose.
On March 13, 2002, her employer brought AAA to the Makati Police Station to
report the rapes. AAA underwent medico-legal examination later that day at the
PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame Quezon City. The results of the medico-legal
examination were embodied in Medico-Legal Report No. M-797-02 issued by
medico-legal officer Dr. Mary Ann P. Gajardo, viz:
PHYSICAL INJURIES:
1. Ecchymosis, right mandibular region, measuring 2.5 x 2.5 cm, 8 cms from the
anterior midline.
2. Ecchymosis, neck, measuring 3 x 2.5 cms, 6 cms right of the anterior midline.
3. Ecchymosis, neck, measuring 3 x 2.5 cms, 4.5 cms left of the anterior midline.
4. Ecchymosis, nape, measuring 3.5 x 2.5 cms, 4 cms right of the posterior midline.
5. Ecchymosis, nape, measuring 4.5 x 3 cms, 4 cms left of the posterior midline.
6. Ecchymosis, right breast, measuring 4 x 3.5 cms. 10 cms from the anterior
midline.
7. Ecchymosis, sternal region, measuring 9 x 3 cms, bissecting the anterior midline.
8. Ecchymosis, left breast, measuring 3.5 x 2.5 cms, 9 cms from the anterior midline.
9. Ecchymosis, left breast, measuring 3.5 x 3 cms, 11 cms from the anterior midline.
10. Abrasion, left scapular region, measuring 3.5 x 0.5 cms. 14 cms from the
posterior midline
GENITAL:
PUBIC HAIR: Moderate
LABIA MAJORA: Full, convex and slightly gaping.
LABIA MINORA: Pinkish brown slightly hypertrophied labia minora in between.
HYMEN: Presence of shallow fresh lacerations at 7 oclock position and deep fresh
lacerations at 6 and 9 oclock position. Congested.
POSTERIOIR FOURCHETTE: Abraded/Congested
EXTERNAL VAGINAL ORIFICE: Offers strong resistance upon introduction of the
examiners index finger.
VAGINAL CANAL: Narrow with prominent rugosities.
CERVIX: Soft and close
PERIURETHRAL AND VAGINAL SMEARS: Negative for spermatozoa and negative for
gram (-) diploxocci.
CONCLUSION: Findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity. Barring
unforeseen complications, it is estimated that the above injuries will heal within 3-5
days.4

Afterwards, AAA and the policemen went to the vicinity where she had usually
bought pandesal to look for the suspects. She spotted Sabadlab in one of the
nearby restaurants and pointed to him. The policemen apprehended Sabadlab and
brought him to the station, where he gave his name as Erland Sabadlab y Bayquel.
That was her first time to know the name of Sabadlab.
These antecedents impelled the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati to
immediately charge Sabadlab and two John Does with forcible abduction with rape
via the information dated March 13, 2002, alleging:
That on or about the 12th day of March of 2002, in the City of Makati, Philippines a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
together with two (2) John Does whose names and whereabouts are still unknown,
with lewd designs and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away AAA, 16 years of age,
against her will from Dapitan St., Barangay Guadalupe, Makati City and brought her
to an undisclosed place, where accused by means of force, violence and
intimidation had carnal knowledge of complainant against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
In his defense, Sabadlab denied the charge and asserted alibi, claiming that on
March 12, 2002, he was at Billiard M where he worked as a spotter; that he stayed
there until noon, leaving the place only to have lunch; and that he returned to
Billiard M at 12:30 pm and stayed there until he was arrested at 7:00 pm of March
12, 2002. Frederick Dionisio and Nathaniel Salvacion corroborated Sabadlabs alibi.
As stated, the RTC convicted Sabadlab for forcible abduction with rape as charged
based on AAAs positive identification of him as one of the rapists, observing that
her physical injuries and fresh hymenal lacerations were consistent with her
account of the rapes, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ERLAND SABADLAB y BAYQUEL GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of forcible abduction with rape
charged in this case, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay the costs.
On the civil aspect, the accused is ordered to pay AAA the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) as EXEMPLARY DAMAGES and ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P100,000.00) as MORAL DAMAGES.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal in the CA, Sabadlab assigned the following errors,7 to wit:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
THE HIGHLY INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Nonetheless, the CA sustained his conviction and the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
holding that the supposed inconsistencies referred to trivial matters or innocent
lapses that did not affect the credibility of AAA as a witness but were instead
badges of veracity or manifestations of truthfulness of the material points of her
testimony. The CA thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision of
the RTC dated October 28, 2003 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows:
1. The award of moral damages is REDUCED to P50,000.00;
2. The award of exemplary damages is DELETED;
3. Appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Pursuant to Section 13 (C), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, appellant may appeal this case to the Supreme Court via a Notice of
Appeal filed before this Court.
SO ORDERED.8
Upon the denial of his motion for reconsideration on August 2, 2006, Sabadlab is
now before the Court to seek the final review.
In addition to the arguments and submissions made in his appellants brief in the
CA, Sabadlab indicates in his supplemental brief9 that AAAs version was ambiguous
and implausible, and conflicted with human experience as borne by the following,
namely: (a) the State did not present any torn apparel; (b) no bodily injuries were
shown to prove that AAA had resisted the sexual intercourse; (c) AAA did not cry for
help; and (d) AAA did not escape despite several opportunities to do so. He
contends, moreover, that the States evidence established only simple seduction.10
Ruling
We affirm the conviction.
First of all, Sabadlab continues to assail the credibility of AAAs recollections. We
understand why he does so, because the credibility of the victims testimony is a
primordial consideration in rape.11 Yet, because both the RTC and the CA
unanimously regarded AAA as a credible and spontaneous witness, he has now to
present clear and persuasive reasons to convince us to reverse both lower courts
determination of credibility and to resolve the appeal his way.
Our review reveals, however, that Sabadlab has not tendered any clear and
persuasive reasons that may warrant the reversal or modification of the findings of
both lower courts on the credibility of AAA and his criminal liability. The supposed
inconsistencies dwelled on minor details or collateral matters that the CA precisely

held to be badges of veracity and manifestations of truthfulness due to their

tendency of demonstrating that the testimony had not been rehearsed or
concocted. It is also basic that inconsistencies bearing on minor details or collateral
matters should not adversely affect the substance of the witness declaration,
veracity, or weight of testimony.12The only inconsistencies that might have
discredited the victims credible testimony were those that affected or related to
the elements of the crime. Alas, that was not true herein.
The supposed inconsistencies were inconsequential to the issue of guilt. For one,
the matter of who of the three rapists had blindfolded and undressed AAA was
trifling, because her confusion did not alter the fact that she had been really
blindfolded and rendered naked. Nor did the failure to produce any torn apparel of
AAA disprove the crime charged, it being without dispute that the tearing of the
victims apparel was not necessary in the commission of the crime charged. In fact,
she did not even state that her clothes had been torn when Sabadlab had forcibly
undressed her. Verily, details and matters that did not detract from the commission
of the crime did not diminish her credibility.
We hardly need to remind that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of
witnesses and of weighing their credibility is best left to the trial judge by virtue of
the first-hand impressions he derives while the witnesses testify before him.13 The
demeanor on the witness chair of persons sworn to tell the truth in judicial
proceedings is a significant element of judicial adjudication because it can draw the
line between fact and fancy. Their forthright answers or hesitant pauses, their
quivering voices or angry tones, their flustered looks or sincere gazes, their modest
blushes or guilty blanches - all these can reveal if the witnesses are telling the truth
or lying in their teeth.14 As the final appellate reviewer in this case, then, we bow to
the age-old norm to accord the utmost respect to the findings and conclusions on
the credibility of witnesses reached by the trial judge on account of his unmatched
opportunity to observe the witnesses and on account of his personal access to the
various indicia available but not reflected in the record.15
Secondly, AAAs recollection of the principal occurrence and her positive
identification of the rapists, particularly Sabadlab, were firm. It is reassuring, too,
that her trustworthiness in identifying Sabadlab as one of the rapists rested on her
recognition of him as the man who had frequently flirted with her at the store
where she had usually bought pandesal for her employers table. As such, the
identification of him as one of the rapists became impervious to doubt.
Thirdly, AAAs failure to shout for help and her failure to escape were not factors
that should diminish credibility due to their being plausibly explained, the first by
the fact that her mouth had been stuffed by Sabadlab with crumpled newspaper,
preventing her from making any outcry, and the second by the fact that the culprits
had blindfolded her and had also tied her hands behind her back.
And, lastly, Sabadlabs allegation that AAA did not sustain any bodily injuries was
actually contrary to the medical certification showing her several physical injuries
and the penetration of her female organ.16 This should debunk without difficulty his
submission that she did not offer any resistance to the sexual assaults she suffered.
Her resistance to Sabadlabs order for her to go with him was immediately stifled by
his poking of the gun at her throat and by appearance of his two
cohorts.1wphi1 At any rate, it is notable that among the amendments of the law
on rape introduced under Republic Act No. 8353 (The Anti-Rape Act of 1997) is
Section 266-D, which adverts to the degree of resistance that the victim may put up
against the rapist, viz:
Article 266-D. Presumptions. - Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against
the act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or where the offended party
is so situated as to render her/him incapable of giving valid consent, may be
accepted as evidence in the prosecution of the acts punished under Article 266-A.
We next deal with the characterization of the crime as forcible abduction with rape.
The principal objective of Sabadlab and his two cohorts in abducting AAA from
Dapitan Street and in bringing her to another place was to rape and ravish her. This
objective became evident from the successive acts of Sabadlab immediately after
she had alighted from the car in completely undressing her as to expose her whole
body (except the eyes due to the blindfold), in kissing her body from the neck
down, and in having carnal knowledge of her (in that order). Although forcible
abduction was seemingly committed,17 we cannot hold him guilty of the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape when the objective of the abduction was to
commit the rape. Under the circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible
abduction.18
The penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly prescribed. Article 266-A and
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
8353,19 respectively define and punish simple rape as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article
shall be punished byreclusion perpetua.

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Although the CA deleted the RTCs award of exemplary damages because of the
"absence of aggravating circumstance (sic),"20 we reinstate the award in view of the
attendance of the aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon in the
commission of the crime. The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be
imposed in a criminal case as part of the civil liability "when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances."21 The Civil Code allows
such damages to be awarded "by way of example or correction for the public good,
in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages."22 Present here was the need for exemplarity. Thus, the CA should have
recognized the entitlement to exemplary damages of AAA on account of the
attendance of use of a deadly weapon. It was of no moment that the use of a
deadly weapon was not specifically alleged in the information. As fittingly explained
in People v. Catubig:23
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having
specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The
commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it
breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes
personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of
heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the
victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances,
whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which
is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not
primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little
sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party
when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance
is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to
the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the
offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of
Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
Accordingly, the Court grants the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in
addition to the civil indemnity ofP50,000.00 and the moral damages of P50,000.00
the CA awarded to AAA. Sabadlab is further liable for interest of 6% per annum on
all the civil damages.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 26,
2006, with the MODIFICATION that ERLAND SABADLAB y BAYQUEL is: (a) DECLARED
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of SIMPLE RAPE as defined under Article 266A and as penalized with reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353; and (b) ORDERED TO PAY to the
victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00
as exemplary damages, plus interest of 6% per annum on each of the amounts
reckoned from the finality of this decision.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.