Scientification of Religion. An Historical Study of Discursive Change, 1800-2000

On the long journey doubts were often my companions.
Ive always admired

those reporters who can descend on an area, talk to key people, ask key questions, take samplings of opinions, and then set down an orderly report very
like a road map. I envy this technique and at the same time do not trust it as
a mirror of reality. I feel that there are too many realities. What I set down
here is true until someone else passes that way and rearranges the world in
his own style. [] And in this report I do not fool myself into thinking I am dealing with constants.
John Steinbeck
Preface
On 1 May 2010, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an essay in which I presented the main argument of my inaugural lecture for the chair of the study of
religion, which had been delivered at the University of Groningen on 16 March
2010. The editors of Trouw chose the title De schepping in vier letters (Creation in Four Letters), because I argued that the metaphor of the four letters constituting the DNA code was taken (unknowingly, to be sure) from a long intellectual tradition in Europe, both in philosophy of nature and Kabbalah; by
decoding, reading, and writing DNA, the so-called life sciences partake in
a discourse that is inseparably tied to religious, metaphysical, and esoteric approaches to nature and the cosmos. Thus, the marriage between religion and science may not be a happy one, but the widespread idea that they were divorced
sometime in the eighteenth century seems to be untenable.
The readers responses to this article were mostly critical. A certain Henk
Timmerman from Oegstgeest was outraged and wrote in a letter to the editors
on 3 May that if four consonants that simply indicate chemical entities are
seen as language, many other things can be made into language, too. More interesting, though, was his response to my remark that it is common in contemporary Europe to ridicule religious, metaphysical, astrological, homeopathic,
or other approaches that are seen as completely irrational. What a strange
list of terms, Mr. Timmerman wrote. Yes, of course, homeopathy, metaphysical
approaches, and astrology do not have any scientific value; these are anachronisms that often lead to fraud. But religion? Does religion belong in that list? As a
(natural) scientist and a Christian I defy the thoughts of the scholar of religion,
von Stuckrad.
I doubt that Mr. Timmerman will read this book. He may be interested to hear
that his irritation is indicative of a complex cultural debate, in which the borders
between religion and science on the one hand, and between science and pseudo-science on the other, are constantly renegotiated. What makes the pseudosciences particularly interesting is the fact that they challenge the rational truthclaims of the secular sciences. In their long cultural history, disciplines such as
astrology, alchemy, and even magic subscribed in large part to standards of rationality and philosophy of nature; they formulated theories about nature and
the cosmos and thus have often been seen as competitors with modern science,
a concept that was introduced only in the nineteenth century. To be sure, the
competition between various cultures of knowledge and the polemics that go
with it is not as new as the modern age. But the specific constellation in
which astronomy is disjunctively separated from astrology, chemistry from al-
VIII
Preface
chemy, and science from magic is a European phenomenon of the past three
hundred years.
Polemics are always an indication of a problem. The problem with the pseudo-sciences is that it has not always been easy to identify the exact difference
between discarded and accepted forms of knowledge. What is more, these marginalized forms of knowledge continued to be attractive as an alternative to what
was perceived as reductionist knowledge of nature in the sciences. This led to an
intricate entanglement of various discourses in the large field of religion, science, and public culture. In the genealogy of the current situation, the institutionalization of knowledge about religion and science in a spectrum of new disciplines around 1900 (from religious studies to Indology and anthropology to
psychology and theoretical physics) played an important role. These secular disciplines became the major experts when it comes to what we know about religion, science, and culture. And their representatives engaged in a lively debate
not only with one another but also with a non-academic audience that was eager
to absorb this knowledge.
The Scientification of Religion attempts to disentangle this complex knot of
discourse strands. In a way, it is a follow-up to my Locations of Knowledge
(2010), because I am interested here in the further historical development of
the discursive constellations I described in that study with regard to the European situation between 1400 and 1700. But this volume also picks up data and considerations I engaged in my book on contemporary shamanism in Europe and
North America (Schamanismus und Esoterik, 2003). Finally, the present book is
an attempt to apply, as consistently as possible, the discursive approaches to
the study of religious and cultural history that I have been working on during
the past years. My object of study is not religion or science as a phenomenon
that can be defined and then submitted to scholarly analysis; my object of
study is the discursive construction of religion and science, i. e., the various
meanings that are attributed to religion and science in cultural communication
and practice. The meanings that are attributed to theseand relatedterms
change over time, and it is the advantage of discursive analyses to make these
changes visible in their historical contexts.
My analysis follows the changing combinations of discourses that have been
operative in our understanding of religion and science since the end of the eighteenth century. I untie the discursive knots that I find in the data and follow their
strands in changing constellations up to the end of the twentieth century. This
leads me to conclusions and groupings (Foucault) of discourse strands that
are difficult to match with the simplistic narratives still dominating the debate
about religion in secular Europe today. Particularly when it comes to the officially discarded knowledge systems of astrology, alchemy, metaphysics, and magic,
Preface
IX
we can see that many elements of their discursive systems have been prolonged
in secular (and thus accepted) forms of knowledge. The first part of this book reconstructs the changes in these discursive constellations. The second part describes the normative discursive power of academic constructions of knowledge
about religion; focusing on several influential academics from both the humanities and the natural sciences, I argue that secular discourses have not only
changed the understanding of what religion is, but that they have also produced
new forms of religious practice. Taken together, these two levels of analysis form
the basis of what I call the scientification of religion, i. e., the transformation and
perpetuation of religious discourses as a result of their entanglement with secular academic discourses.
Although my analysis addresses the discursive changes between roughly
1800 and 2000 (with occasional excursions into earlier periods when it seems
necessary to explain the prehistory of certain discourses), the most important period for this study turns out to be the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of
the twentieth century. My regional focus is Germany and Great Britain, with occasional excursions to other parts of Europe and to the United States of America. In
this period, the developments that characterize German and British academic
culture had decisive influence on other parts of the world, which makes such
a focus reasonable, even though the results of my study should of course not
be uncritically extrapolated and generalized.
Scientification of religion means that the borders between religion and science are constantly renegotiated in cultural processes. The concept challenges
overly simplistic binary constructions, not only between religion and science,
but also between etic and emic, professional and amateur, academic and vernacular, as well as between center and periphery. All of these binaries are united in
discursive communities that stabilize attributions of meaning to the world
around us in mutual dependence.
The major part of this book was written between January and August 2013
during a research stay at the Max Weber Center for Advanced Cultural and Social
Studies at the University of Erfurt. It would not have been possible to work
through all the material necessary for this research without the excellent support
I received in Erfurt. I want to thank all of the other fellows, students, and administrative staff, and particularly Jrg Rpke, for a stimulating and most pleasant
stay. I thank the University of Groningen for granting me eight months of sabbatical leave to finish this project. For a few chapters, I made use of material that
was published before. Chapter 1 is a revised version of Discursive Study of Religion: Approaches, Definitions, Implications, originally published in Method
and Theory in the Study of Religion (25/1 [2013]: 5 25). For Chapter 8, I made
use of The Only Game in Town? Or: Contested Masters in Modern Western Sha-
Preface
manism, from Meister und Schler in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Von Religionen
der Antike bis zur modernen Esoterik (edited by Almut-Barbara Renger, 363 382;
Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012). I thank the presses for permission to
use these publications in the present book.
From the many colleagues who helped me formulate the ideas presented in
this book, I want to thank especially Egil Asprem (whose forthcoming book will
be a major contribution to the debate about scientification of religion), Ulrike
Brunotte, Marjo Buitelaar, Alexandra Grieser, Jay Johnston, Hans G. Kippenberg,
Anders Klostergaard Petersen, Kim Knibbe, Jeffrey J. Kripal, Yme Kuiper, BerndChristian Otto, Almut-Barbara Renger, Lautaro Roig-Lanzillotta, Dave Vliegenthart, Laura J. Vollmer, Erin Wilson, and Frans Wijsen.
Thanks to the referees for their diligent and constructive critique, and to De
Gruyter for accepting the manuscript for publication and for the excellent handling of the editorial process. I especially thank Alissa Jones Nelson, who invited
me to submit the proposal and supported me in the long process from idea to
manuscript. Her professionalism, knowledge, wisdom, grace, and humor have
had a decisive influence on me and on my work. I will bow down to her on Sunday and salute her when her birthday comes.
Groningen, 20 January 2014
Kocku von Stuckrad
Contents
Religion and Science in Discursive Perspective

1
The Discursive Construction of Knowledge
3
5
Historical Analysis of Discourse
10
Discursive Study of Religion: Concepts and Definitions
Basic Concepts for Discourse Analysis
11
13
Consequences for a Discursive Study of Religion
15
Methodological Implications
15
Determining the Research Question
16
Selecting Data and Building a Corpus
Choosing the Most Suitable Method to Analyze the Data Sets
19
Beyond Binaries: An Outline of the Argument
18
Part One:
Discarded Knowledge and Its New Legitimacy in Secular
23
Discourse
From Polemical Disjunction to New Integration: The Science of the

Stars
25
The Differentiation of Branches of Knowledge
25
27
The Responses of the Astrologers
Polemical Disjunctions and their Complexities in the Eighteenth
Century
33
Astrological Semantics in the Secret Societies of the Eighteenth
36
Century
The Perpetuation of astrology in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Li38
terature and Philosophy
Astrology in Goethes Time
38
Aestheticization and Psychologization of Astral Powers in the Romantic
Period
43
47
Re-Enchantment of the Cosmos around 1900
The Marriage of Secular Psychology and Astrology: Carl Gustav Jung
49
The Dialogue between Wolfgang Pauli and Carl Gustav Jung and Its
52
Impact
56
Alchemical Quests in Modern Garb
58
Alchemy as the Occult Other
vitalism: A Mnage-a-Trois of Life, Spirit, and Matter
64
XII
Contents
Rearrangements in the Twentieth Century
70
76
Darwinism Turned into Religion: Monism
77
Ernst Haeckel: From Darwinism to Pantheistic Monism
80
Wilhelm Ostwald: Entanglements Personified
Discursive Implications: Holistic Thinking between new age science, Nature-Based Spirituality, and a New Philosophy of Nature
87
88
Fritjof Capra
Ilya Prigogine
89
Gregory Bateson
91
92
Rupert Sheldrake
92
David Bohm
Merging Occultism, Philosophy, Science, and the Academic Study of Reli94

gion: The Theosophical Society
Helena P. Blavatsky as a Discursive Hub
94
98
Unveiling the Hidden Knowledge of Isis
103
Secret Doctrines and Synthetic Discourse
Wars of Succession
107
110
The German Knot: Rudolf Steiner
Part Two:
Academics as Religious Pioneers
113
The Trouble with Europe: Academic Orientalism and New Mystical

Religions
115
Martin Buber, Gershom Scholem, and Dynamics of Jewish Self117
Orientalization
Martin Buber: In Search of the Eastern Urjudentum
118
Gershom Scholem: Jewish Mysticism as an Antidote to
122
Europe
Rudolf Otto and Gerardus van der Leeuw: Oriental Wisdom and the Ultimate
Access to the Sacred
124
125
Rudolf Otto
126
Gerardus van der Leeuw
Gender, Eroticism, and the Unveiling of an Orientalized Salome
129
132
Discursive Materializations: Globalized Sufism and Kabbalah
Kabbalistic Entanglements in the Life Sciences
134
Contents
In Search of the Great Goddess: How Academic Theories Generated

Paganism and Witchcraft
139
140
Matriarchy as an Historical Myth: Johann Jakob Bachofen
144
Archaeologists and Classicists Discover the Great Goddess
Charles G. Leland and Robert Graves: Popularizing the Idea of the
146
Goddess
Charles Godfrey Leland
146
149
Robert Graves
Discursive Materializations in (the Study of) Paganism and
Esotericism
152
Normatizing Shamanism: Academic Teachers as Religious Experts

Mircea Eliade: Scholar and Novelist of Shamanism
162
Shamanic and Academic Authorities: The Routinization of Charisma
167
Carlos Castaneda
Joan Halifax
169
170
Michael Harner
173
Authority Contested
Conclusion: The Scientification of Religion

Bibliography
Index
211
183
178
XIII
159
166
1 Religion and Science in Discursive Perspective

This book engages in a debate that cuts deep into contemporary European values
and self-images. How can we adequately describe the place of religion in European societies after the long process of what is usually referred to as secularization? In the following chapters, I want to convince you that discursive analyses
are particularly suitable in finding answers to this question. They also provide a
solution to critical issues in the study of religion more generally. Because the
academic study of religion is itself part of the process of what I will describe
as scientification of religion, it is helpful to look at the scholarly construction
of religion and its discursive entanglements with other cultural systems and academic disciplines; such an approach also contributes to the process of self-reflection that our discipline needs at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
For some time now, the academic study of religion has experienced fundamental challenges. Although established as an independent discipline at European universities more than one hundred years ago, the academic study of religion is still wrestling with severe problems of identity and legitimization. The
reasons for this challenging situation are partly related to developments in the
academic landscape that have influenced many small disciplines in the second
half of the twentieth century; but they are also related to the fact that religion
has played a very special role in the scientific, political, and cultural debates
of the past two hundred and fifty years. Unlike law, health, economy, and
other concepts that appear more innocent at first glance, the concept of religion
is charged with difficulties that have thrown its study into contestation. The
study of religion is particularly challenged in regard to its link to theology and
thus to confessional or experiential approaches to religion, its link to colonial
agendas that imposed a Eurocentric view on non-Western cultures, as well as
the tendencies in influential parts of the discipline to essentialize religion as
something sui generis. One of the most important theoretical and methodological
questions today is whether the discipline can respond to these fundamental
challenges in a way that takes these critiques seriously and is able to transform
the study of religion into an academic discipline that operates within a rigorous
and self-reflective interpretational framework. Given the ubiquitous presence of
religion in the global cultural worlds of the twenty-first century, there should be
no doubt that we need experts who are trained to scrutinize the history and present appearance of religion in a sound academic way.
There is a parallel with the discipline of philosophy here. Let me invoke Richard Rortys
famous remark of 1979: Professions can survive the paradigms which gave them birth. In any
I argue that the notion of discourse is of particular value if we are to establish such a self-reflective academic discipline. Although basic considerations
about a discursive study of religion were made already in the 1980s (Kippenberg
1983; Lincoln 1989; see also Kippenberg 1992 and Lincoln 2005 [1996]), these suggestions have not been picked up in a more general way as an attempt to build a
serious referential framework for a (self)critical study of religion. Recently, we
have witnessed a rich discussion in neighboring disciplines, mainly in sociology
and historiography, about the usefulness of discursive analysis. German and
French scholars, in particular, have readdressed the theories of discourse,
which were developed by Michel Foucault and others a generation earlier, and
made them fruitful for the study of cultural phenomena in the twenty-first century. The academic study of religion has only sporadically taken notice of these
new approaches to the study of discourse that break down the boundaries between academic disciplinesand even between the humanities and the natural
sciencesin a most productive and promising way. More recent publications
show that there is a growing interest in discourse theory, including its application to the study of religion, though most contributions still base themselves
on linguistic and textual analyses of discourse.
Systematically applying discursive approaches is an important contribution to a
discussion that is specific to the academic study of religion. It helps to resolve some
of the conceptual problems in the field, as mentioned above, and tries to provide a
coherent analytical framework for an academic study of religion that is capable of
countering the theoretical challenges the discipline has to face.
Two directions of scholarly thinking, both reaching back to the first half of the
twentieth century, are of specialand underestimatedimportance for a new understanding of discursive approaches. For one, the contributions from the sociology of knowledge should be more seriously incorporated in our theoretical framework; furthermore, the historical analysis of discourse is something that scholars
of religion need if they want to retain their strong basis in historical research. In
case, the need for teachers who have read the great dead philosophers is quite enough to insure
that there will be philosophy departments as long as there are universities (Rorty 1979, 393).
English contributions include van Dijk 1985; Potter 1996; Torfing 1999; Phillips and Hardy 2002;
Jrgensen and Phillips 2002; Fairclough 2003; Wodak and Meyer 2010. On discursive approaches in
the study of religion see Murphy 2000; Moberg 2009; Taira 2010 (without defining his concepts);
Wuthnow 2011 (unfortunately, despite the title, the author does not conceptualize discourse at all).
See now also Hjelm 2011 who follows Faircloughs definition of discourse as a way of speaking that
does not simply reflect or represent things out there, but constructs or constitutes them (Hjelm
2011, 135, referring to Fairclough 1992, 3; Hjelms explanation under Key concepts remains a bit
vague [Hjelm 2011, 149]). Hjelm consciously chooses a linguistically oriented approach to discourse.
For a more historically oriented approach see von Stuckrad 2003a and 2010b.
the following, I will introduce these lines of thought that are closely related to discussions in sociology and historiography. I will then clarify the most important
terms that constitute a discursive study of religion and will suggest a definition
of religious discourse as a clearly demarcated object of study. Discursive study
of religion provides a research perspective rather than a single method to study
religion. Nevertheless, this perspective has implications for the concrete scholarly
work of designing a research project, putting together a corpus of data, and interpreting this data with the use of appropriate methods. I will explain this research
strategy with reference to the themes that the present book engages.

One problem of the notion of discourse is the fact that the term is used in many,
and often conflicting, ways. It has further added to the confusion that many scholars
do not clearly define what they mean when they use the term discourse. This is not
the place to provide an overview of the many different usages of the term since the
nineteenth century (for such an overview see Keller 2011a, 97 177; Keller 2011b, 13
58; see also Landwehr 2009, 60 90). Rather, I want to highlight the crucial contributions that come from the sociology of knowledge and from historiographical approaches. Although they acknowledge the importance of language in the study of
discourse, both approaches move beyond classical linguistic analysis (in the field
of social linguistics discourse refers to the more minute and specific patterns of
speech in the everyday sense) and include the materiality of discursive structures.
This is of particular importance for the study of religion.
Since the 1960s, knowledge has been an important dimension in sociological and discursive theory. This is true for the influential contributions of Peter L.
Berger, Thomas Luckmann, and Alfred Schtz on the social construction of reality and knowledge (particularly Berger and Luckmann 1966; Schtz and Luckmann 1979 1984; applied to the study of religion and media in the overview
of Krger 2012, 11 162), but also for Michel Foucaults interest in the structures
that produce shared knowledge in a given societal and historical situation. Foucault put particular emphasis on the power-structures that distinguish approved
from non-approved knowledge (Foucault 1980), a focus that puts his work in a
Marxist line of interpretation that is still visible in some recent, post-socialist
or post-Marxist approaches to discourse theory, such as those of Ernesto Laclau
and Chantal Mouffe, who emphasize the primacy of politics and the importance
to solve urgent problems of our time. Jacob Torfing builds on this approach when
he defines a discourse as a relational totality of signifying sequences that determine the identity of the social elements, but never succeed in totalizing and ex-
hausting the play of meaning (1999, 87). Sociologists of knowledge still include
the dimension of power and the importance of politics in their analysis, but not
necessarily as the main and determining dimension of discursive practice or as
expression of the need to radically reform plural democracies (in the way Laclau
and Mouffe would have it; see Jrgensen and Phillips 2002, 24 59; Honneth and
Saar 2002; on the reception of Laclau and Mouffe in German-speaking sociology
see Stheli 1995).
Combining ideas about the social construction of reality with Foucaults understanding of discourse, this approach argues that everything we perceive, experience, and feel, but also the way we act, is structurally intertwined with socially
constructed forms of approved and objectified knowledge (I summarize Keller
2011b, 58 59; see also Landwehr 2009, 91 93). We do not have an unmediated
access to the world an sich, even though the robustness of its material quality
limits the spectrum of interpretation. Knowledge of the world is not a neutral understanding but the cultural response to symbolic systems that are provided by
the social environment. These symbolic systems are typically produced, legitimized, communicated, and transformed as discourses. Discourse analysis, from
the perspective of the sociology of knowledge, aims at reconstructing the processes of social construction, objectification, communication, and legitimization of
meaning structures. What is regarded as legitimate knowledge in a given society
is generated on the level of institutions, organizations, or collective actors.
There is a close parallel between this approach to the social organization of
knowledge and the poststructuralist positions that have reshaped postcolonial
and gender studies since the 1980s. If you allow me an excursus into gender studies, reference must be made to Joan Wallach Scott, who already in 1988 criticized
the binary construction of the sex-gender division and insisted on an examination
of that binary opposition itself (1988, 40). That brings her to a redefinition of gender: My definition of gender has two parts and several subsets. They are interrelated but must be analytically distinct. The core of the definition rests on an integral connection between two propositions: gender is a constitutive element of
social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and gender
is a primary way of signifying relationships of power (ibid., 42).
The close links between sociologies of knowledge and poststructuralist understandings of gender become fully visible when we look at Barbara Heys variation of Scotts definition of gender, now using the German word Geschlecht
See also Mills 2004, 69 115. An influential thinker in this field of research is Edward Said. As
Alissa Jones Nelson aptly points out, Said sees no opportunity for objective knowledge of other
social worlds. [] Knowledge is, in fact, a matter of hermeneutics (2012, 21).
(translatable as both sex and gender) as an analytical category that transgresses

the binary construction of sex and gender:
Geschlecht is knowledge of the societal relations between women and men and as such
never absolute or persistent, but always dependent on context; it is controversial and an
instrument of, as well as a result of, power relations. Knowledge as a way to order the
world is inseparable from societal organization. Consequently, Geschlecht is the societal organization of gender differences [Geschlechterdifferenz]. But this does neither mean that it
mirrors constant, natural differences nor that it enforces them. Rather, Geschlecht provides
different meanings for these distinctions in historical, cultural, and social regard. Viewed
from this perspective, the sex/gender distinction is misplaced (Hey 1994, 19 20; unless
noted otherwise, all translations of quotations are mine).
We can learn a lot from Heys definition of Geschlecht when it comes to the study
of religion. But at this point, let me emphasize that the notion of knowledge here
does not refer to an objective truth of the world but to the social communication, attribution, and legitimization of what is accepted in a given society as
knowledge. This knowledge can be explicit, but also implicit or tacit. An example of tacit knowledge would be the societal consensus in Europe that democracy is better than dictatorship, that magic does not work, or that astrology
is not scientific. Implicit or tacit knowledge is, generally, not tested or challenged (or even thematized) by agents in a given society; what is more, such
knowledge can change significantly from one society to another and from one
historical period to another. That is why historical analysis of discourse addresses not only the explicitly available forms of knowledge (for instance, in the natural sciences) but particularly the self-evident knowledge, the truth that is not
formalized but generally accepted (see Busse 1987, 40 41). This brings us to the
historical dimension of discourse analysis.
Historical Analysis of Discourse

Throughout his work, Michel Foucault was interested in the genealogy, or archaeology, of discursive structures, which naturally implies an historical dimension in
his analysis of discourse (Bieder 1998; Bublitz 1999; see Busse, Hermanns, and
Teubert 1994). Therefore, it is astonishing that Foucauldian approaches have
only rarely been adopted in the study of religion, arguably a discipline that has
This constructionist concept of truth goes back to Friedrich Nietzsche.
a strong historiographical focus. One reason for this may be that the notion of
history of religion is to a large extent associated with Eliadean phenomenology
of religion (as a critique see McCutcheon 1997), which led to a general disregard
of the category history in the study of religion, particularly in the United States
(see Kippenberg 2001; von Stuckrad 2003b; see also Lincoln 2005 [1996]). I will
address Mircea Eliades impact on twentieth-century attributions of meaning to
religion repeatedly in this book.
The so-called linguistic turn (programmatically Rorty 1967) has had far-reaching impact on all fields of cultural research. That our knowledge of the world is
constituted in language and linguistic structures and that the scholar is also an
author whose narrative account does not provide a privileged access to truth
was famously argued for historiography by Hayden White (1973) and for anthropology by Clifford Geertz (1988). To be sure, large parts of historical scholarship,
including scholars of religion, shunned the consequences of this reflective critique
(see Vann 1998). Even today, sources are still read as documents of a past realityperhaps they are read better, more diligently and critically, but nevertheless as
medium with sufficient transparency (Sarasin 2003, 32). That historical meaning
is generated in communicative processes is only insufficiently acknowledged (examples of this acknowledgment include Koselleck 2004 [1979] and Rsen 1997).
Even fewer scholars include the category of discourse in their historical analysis
or make the argument that historical meaning is not reconstructed from the
facts and sources in a hermeneutical process of understanding (Verstehen)
but discursively generated. This is exactly what Michel Foucault wanted to show
in his critical reflection on our presupposition that historical truth is attainable
in our accounts of it. Since Foucault, discourse analysis can be understood as
the attempt of scrutinizing the formal conditions that steer the production of
meaning (Sarasin 2003, 33; similarly Stheli 2000, 73).
In close reference to Foucaults work and in conversation with structuralist
approaches, several forms of discourse analysis have emerged (Maingueneau
1991, 15, distinguishes seven for the French academic discussion; see also Bublitz
et al. 1999; Bublitz 2003; Mills 2004, 1 25), some of them closer to linguistic and
textual analyses than others. What they have in common is the argument that
there is no thing in the world that determines what is being said but that the
meanings of things are generated by the chain of signifiers that the speaker is
introducing.
Talal Asad is a notable exception to this rule; see Asad 1993 and 2003. See also Masuzawa
2007 as an analysis of the history of the discourse on world religions; for ancient history see
Albinus 1997; Larmour, Miller, and Platter 1998; van den Heever 2006; methodologically Paul
Allen Miller 1999.
The thing that is meant, the referent, is as referent of a certain linguistic sign not prior to
language; rather, it is the system of signs that ultimately creates it as social reality from the
chaotic variety [chaotische Mannigfaltigkeit] (Kant) of all possible things in the world: It
is the world of words that generates the world of things [Jacques Lacan]. Something else is
fundamental for discourse analysis: This is not about the abstruse question whether there is
more than texts; it is about how the non-linguistic things gain their meaning. No discourse,
no grid of classification, however familiar it may appear, has ever been derived from the
things themselves; it is the other way round and discourse and classification generate
the order of things. [] Even though practices, gestures, and objects are themselves no longer constituted in language, they are relevant in the social world only because meaning has
been discursively attributed to them (Sarasin 2003, 36; see also Busse 1987, 23; on the related concept of empty signifier see Laclau 1994).
Or, in Achim Landwehrs apt remark, at the bottom [Grund] of realities and discourses there is no other fundament than their own historicity. Hence, the shortest possible definition of the function of discourses must be: discourses generate
realities (2009, 92). We can understand the working of discursive structures only
if we know their genealogy and formation. And only through comparisonin diachronic or synchronic perspectivewe can see the historicity and even singularity of discourses (see also Scott 2007, 8). There are no discourses that emerge
naturally or that are dictated by the working of some abstract reality; historical
and comparative analysis of how social communicational structures attribute
meaning to the world and organize explicit and implicit knowledge is the
basis of discursive approaches.
Discourses typically lead to a shortage of possible notions [Verknappung
von Aussagemglichkeiten] (we cannot say everything at all times) (Landwehr
2009, 92). Thus, the historicity of knowledge should not be misunderstood as arbitrariness. What a group of people in a given situation regards as accepted
knowledge is by no means arbitrary; it is the result of discursive formations
that critical scholarship can reconstruct and interpret.
This is even true for knowledge that is legitimized by empirical methods in
the exact sciences and thus based on what is seen as hard facts. Reconstructing the conditions of knowledge in the natural sciences is the goal of historical
epistemology, a division within the history of science that is closely related to
discursive approaches. The historicity of knowledge in the natural sciences
was famously discussed by Ludwik Fleck (Fleck 1935). Edmund Husserl, Gaston
Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem, and others have contributed to this debate and
helped us to understand that it is not nature that formulates natural laws but
that facts are produced in communicative and social processes (overview in
Rheinberger 2006, 21 72; see also Ashmore 1989; Ashmore, Myers and Potter
1995; Latour 2010). Under the label of discursive constructionism, Jonathan Potter and Alexa Hepburn summarize what is at stake here:
Discursive constructionism (DC) is most distinctive in its foregrounding of the epistemic position of both the researcher and what is researched (texts or conversations). It studies a
world of descriptions, claims, reports, allegations, and assertions as parts of human practices, and it works to keep these as the central topic of research rather than trying to move
beyond them to the objects or events that seem to be the topic of such discourse. It is radically constructionist in that it is skeptical of any guarantee beyond local and contingent texts,
claims, arguments, demonstrations, exercises of logic, procedures of empiricism, and so on.
In this sense it can be described as antifoundationalist and poststructuralist. It takes seriously the work in rhetoric and the sociology of scientific knowledge that highlights the contingent, normative, and constructive work that goes into, say, logical demonstrations, mathematical proofs, or experimental replications (Potter and Hepburn 2008, 275).
In a similar vein, Hans-Jrg Rheinberger, former director of the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin and one of the most influential authors in
the field, defines the concept of epistemology, with reference to the French
usage of the term, as the reflection on the historical conditions under which,
and the means with which things are made into objects that start up the process
of scientific inquiry [Prozess der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisgewinnung] and
that keep this process going (Rheinberger 2007, 11, italics original). Rheinberger
exemplifies this with the history and epistemology of experimentation in the life
sciences. One collaborative research project, on A Cultural History of Heredity,
aims at studying the juridical, medical, cultural, technical, and scientific practices and procedures in which knowledge of heredity became materially entrenched in different ways and by which it unfolded its often unprecedented effects over a period of several centuries (Mller-Wille and Rheinberger 2007, ix).
These discourses generate epistemic spaces in which shared knowledge is established and legitimized.
Put into the language of discourse theory, we can say that the practices and
procedures in the natural sciences are a materialization of a discourse on, in this
See Mller-Wille and Rheinberger 2007, 3 34; Rheinberger, Hagner, and Wahrig-Schmidt 1997.
Rheinberger uses the term infra-experimentality to indicate the close links between things and
acquired knowledge: Infra-experimentality seeks to understand the game of producing
knowledge effects under the hands of the experimenter, in the under-world beneath him. It seeks
to grasp and expose those momentschains of eventsin which matter is made to mean and
scientific meaning is made to matter. If we looked for a word that could convey the corresponding methodical effort, the choice would be subduction. It deals with the interface between
the agents of knowing and the objects of their desire (Rheinberger 2011, 337, italics original). As
an example of planetary theory as historical epistemology, see Schtte 2008, with the methodological explanation by Carrier 2008.
case, heredity. The discursive materializations, in their turn, stabilize and legitimize the discursive assumptions that have made them possible. By so doing,
discursive structures steer the attribution of meaning to things and establish
shared assumptions about accepted and unaccepted knowledge. The example
makes clear that discourse analysis breaks down the borders between the natural sciences and the social or cultural sciences. Despite their different methodologies to produce accepted knowledge, the natural sciences are no less discursively structured and thus socially steered than the humanities. As will be
demonstrated in this book, discursive approaches help us to overcome the conceptual boundaries between the natural sciences and the humanities in our attempt to understand the communal production of academic knowledge. It will
also become clear that academic producers of meaning form a discourse community with non-academic authors.
Consequently, discourse analysis argues that our knowledge is not about the
world out there (even if the existence of a world out there is not denied) and
that we should adopt a relativist rather than a realist position in the philosophical debate that is linked to these epistemological and ontological issues. The relativist position has led to many, often highly polemical objections. Derek Edwards, Malcolm Ashmore, and Jonathan Potter call the most prominent
rejection the Death and Furniture response:
Death and Furniture are emblems for two very common (predictable, even) objections to relativism. When relativists talk about the social construction of reality, truth, cognition, scientific
knowledge, technical capacity, social structure and so on, their realist opponents sooner or
later start hitting the furniture, invoking the Holocaust, talking about rocks, guns, killings,
human misery, tables and chairs. The force of these objections is to introduce a bottom line,
a bedrock of reality that places limits on what may be treated as epistemologically constructed
or deconstructible. There are two related kinds of moves: Furniture (tables, rocks, stones,
etc.the reality that cannot be denied) and Death (misery, genocide, poverty, powerthe reality
that should not be denied) (Edwards, Ashmore, and Potter 1995, 26, emphasis original; see also
Potter and Hepburn 2008, 287 288; Nikander 2008, 413; more generally Parker 1998).
What is at stake is not a lack of concern with that which may exist beyond discourse (Benavides 2010, 210, as a critique of my position) but an acknowledgment of the difference between something that simply happens (often without
being reported) and something that is made into a fact or event by discursive
and communicative procedures. As Antonio Gramsci reminds us, without an inventory that organizes our knowledge about ourselves and our history, understanding is impossible. The starting-point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and is knowing thyself as a product of the
historical process to date which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, with-
10
out leaving an inventory. Such an inventory must therefore be made at the outset (quoted from Forgacs 1988, 326).

I have explained so far how recent discussions in the sociology of knowledge
and the historical analysis of discourse have provided important new interpretational tools that make use of Foucauldian and poststructuralist approaches, at
the same time adjusting them to their own needs and research interests. Now
I turn to the question of how we can apply these considerations to the study
of religion. I argue that a discursive study of religion is the most convincing
form of analysis, if we want to avoid the traps and challenges that have confronted the study of religion during the twentieth century.
Before I discuss the most important concepts and definitions, it is necessary
to point out that discourse analysis is not itself a method. Sometimes harking
back to Ludwik Flecks notion of Denkstil (thought style, see Fleck 1935),
many theorists of discourse agree that discourse analysis is a research perspective or research style that applies a spectrum of possible methods in order to answer its guiding research question. This is in contrast to those approaches that
focus on linguistic analysis or what Norman Fairclough calls textually oriented
discourse analysis. Within the more historically oriented discourse theory that
I am advocating here, and which leans more heavily on Michel Foucaults work,
the methods that are considered useful can range from philological methods to
quantitative and qualitative methods, content analysis, etc. (for the study of religion, see the overview in Engler and Stausberg 2011). However, even if discourse analysis is not a specific method, it follows certain steps and rules that
have proven useful in concrete analytical work. As I will explain below, these
steps consist of the demarcation of the discourse under scrutiny, the collection
of relevant data, and the decision of which method would be most productive
See Sarasin 2003, 8 and 30; Bhrmann and Schneider 2008, 16; Nikander 2008, 414 (Specifying DA [=Discourse Analysis] as a method in any traditional way is difficult, if not impossible. Instead, DA is often described as a methodology or as a theoretical perspective rather than
a method); Landwehr 2009, 100; Keller 2011b, 9.
See Fairclough 1992, 37 61. If scholars choose the linguistic and textual orientation, it may be
easier to talk of a method, but it also means to limit the applicability of discourse theory.
Examples for such an understanding of discourse analysis are Schiffrin 1994; Schiffrin, Tannen,
and Hamilton 2001; Renkema 2009; Hjelm 2011 (this may be a reason why his chapter is
included in the section Methods of the Handbook).
11
in collecting and interpreting the data. I will explain these steps with direct reference to the argument and material of the present book.
Basic Concepts for Discourse Analysis

Let me now clarify the terms that are most relevant for our purpose here. Making
use of the recent discussion that I have outlined above, I define discourses as
follows: Discourses are communicative structures that organize knowledge in a
given community; they establish, stabilize, and legitimize systems of meaning
and provide collectively shared orders of knowledge in an institutionalized social
ensemble. Statements, utterances, and opinions about a specific topic, systematically organized and repeatedly observable, form a discourse. Hence, the concept
of discourse refers to the regularity of fields of statements, which regulate what
can be thought, said, and done (Stheli 2000, 73). When it comes to the link between several discourses, we can conceptualize these as intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, genres and discourses, as
well as extra-linguistic social/sociological variables, the history of an organization or institution, and situational frames (Reisigl and Wodak 2010, 90).
Consequently, discourse analysis addresses the relationship among communicational practices and the (re)production of systems of meaning, or orders of
knowledge, the social agents that are involved, the rules, resources, and material
conditions that underlie these processes, as well as their impact on social collectives (similarly Keller 2011b, 8).
Historical discourse analysis explores the development of discourses in
changing sociopolitical and historical settings, thus providing means to reconstruct
the genealogy of a discourse.
In addition to these fundamental terms, it is useful to introduce the concept
of dispositive, a term which was coined by Michel Foucault (le dispositif, often
translated as device, deployment, or apparatus), but which recently has been
defined more clearly in scholarly discussions. The concept moves beyond the
analysis of discursive practices to include non-discursive practices and materializations, tacit and implicit knowledge, as well as the relationship between these
dimensions of social action. A dispositive is here understood as the material,
practical, social, cognitive, or normative infrastructure in which a discourse develops. This can include governmental decisions and laws, new technologies and
On the notoriously difficult distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive see
Torfing 1999, 90 91.
12
media, museums, educational programs, television, or the healthcare system.

Dispositive analysis examines how assignments of meaning create reality
(Jger and Meier 2010, 39; as a detailed introduction see Bhrmann and Schneider 2008). The distinction between discourses and dispositives becomes clear
when we consider examples. Television, the Internet, a governmental decision,
and an institution such as the Nobel Prize are not discourses in themselves (discourses on what?), but they provide the communicative infrastructures in which
attribution of meaning becomes operative. That is why historical discourse analysis has to include these dimensions of communicative structure.
Discourses develop within cultural processes and dispositives. They form
around specific topics, but many discourses also contain strands from other discourses. For instance, the statement The preamble of the future constitution of
the European Union should refer to Christianity as Europes religious and philosophical roots is linked to several discourses, particularly discourses on European identity, on constitutional law, on religion, on Christianity, and on philosophy. What we see here is that several discourses can be entangled and form a
discursive knot (Jger and Meier 2010, 47). The notion of discursive knots reminds us of the fact that the borders of a discourse are flexible and dependent
on scholarly definition, which means that discourses do not exist out there.
They have no ontological status other than being analytical categories that the
analyst of cultural processes constructs to serve her or his interpretative goal.
This is entirely in line with Michel Foucaults understanding. What I do in
this book, namely looking at re-entanglements of discursive knots in historical
perspective, resembles Foucaults program of deconstructing and reconstructing
analytical frameworks:
The [] purpose of such a description of the facts of discourse is that by freeing them of all
the groupings that purport to be natural, immediate, universal unities, one is able to describe other unities, but this time by means of a group of controlled decisions. Providing
one defines the conditions clearly, it might be legitimate to constitute, on the basis of correctly described relations, discursive groups that are not arbitrary, and yet remain invisible.
[] [I]t is not therefore an interpretation of the facts of the statement that might reveal [the
relations], but the analysis of their coexistence, their succession, their mutual functioning,
their reciprocal determination, and their independent or correlative transformations (Foucault 2010 [1972], 29).
My project is Foucauldian in its analytical strategy as well. When I disentangle

and reconstruct discursive knots that have been tied around the concepts of religion and science, I suggest new unities:
I [] will do no more than this: of course, I shall take as my starting-point whatever unities
are already given (such as psychopathology, medicine, or political economy); but I shall
13
make use of them just long enough to ask myself what unities they form; by what right they
can claim a field that specifies them in space and a continuity that individualizes them in
time; according to what laws they are formed; against the background of which discursive
events they stand out; and whether they are not, in their accepted and quasi-institutional
individuality, ultimately the surface effect of more firmly grounded unities. I shall accept
the groupings that history suggests only to subject them at once to interrogation; to
break them up and then to see whether they can be legitimately reformed; or whether
other groupings should be made; to replace them in a more general space which, while dissipating their apparent familiarity, makes it possible to construct a theory of them (ibid.,
26).
Consequences for a Discursive Study of Religion

In a discursive framework of analysis, it does not make any theoretical difference
whether we study religion, politics, technology, cars, animals, music, masculinity, or any other topic of social and symbolic communication that is linked to an
identifiable discourse. But for the study of religion as a specialized area of research, discursive approaches have implications that need to be made explicit.
To begin with, religion completely loses its status of being something sui generis.
Rather, discursive approaches study the very claim that religion is sui generis
as part of a discourse on religion that has formed under identifiable historical
circumstances and that has materialized in university institutions and scholarly
programs, in turn stabilizing and legitimizing the attributed meaning of religion
as sui generis. We can historicize the discourse on sui generis religion; what is
more, we can scrutinize the dispositives and discursive knots, which characterize
this discourse and maintain the construction of meaning, until at some point in
the historical development other discourses determine the socially communicated knowledge about religion.
Discursive approaches provide a solution to another problem as well. It is no
longer necessaryin fact, it would be counterproductiveto apply a generic definition of religion (see also von Stuckrad 2010b, 165 167). Definitions of religion
are statements and utterances that attribute meaning to things and that provide
orders of knowledge. As contributions to a discourse on religion, these definitions are objects of discursive analysis rather than its tools.
Regarding the term religion as an empty signifier that can be activated with
definitions, meanings, and communicational practices does not compromise the
As a valuable attempt to provide a discursive analysis of sui generis religion see McCutcheon 1997. However, McCutcheon remains ambivalent in his use of the concept of discourse
and does not clearly distinguish it from, e. g., ideological strategies.
14
clarity of the object nor the scholarly rigor of the study of religion. It only moves
the obligation to define our objects from the level of communicational practices
to the level of discursive reflection. I make this distinction visible in a change of
typeface: religion refers to contributions to a discourse on religion, while religion refers to the discourse itself. After this clarification, we can go a step further and define religion simply as follows: religion is the societal organization
of knowledge about religion. In the same vein, science would be defined as the
societal organization of knowledge about science.
The definitions of discourse analysis and historical discourse analysis, as
given above, pertain to the discursive study of religion as well, only that now the
analysis is directed to the discourse on religion (i. e., to religion), the dispositives that serve as the infrastructure of religion, and possible entanglements
with other discourses. religion produces meanings and orders of knowledge
that materialize in concrete practices and institutions; these orders interact
with non-discursive practices and dispositives such as the organization of higher
education or the appearance of new media and technology. Moreover, as a discursive constellation religion is entangled with other discursive constellations,
which could be defined as law, science, spirituality, magic, health, economy, heredity, or any other discourse that may be of interest for scholarly analysis. Dispositives and discursive knots are subject to change, which means that
religion is fully historicized and open to intercultural comparison.
For the fact that scholars of religion are also agents in the field of religion and that discourse
analysis produces discourses on discourses, see von Stuckrad 2010b. As Achim Landwehr notes, this
is by no means a disadvantage of discourse analysis but the consequential application of its
research premises (2009, 98). On the discursive impact on the scholar of religion see also Bruce
Lincolns tenth thesis: Understanding the system of ideology that operates in ones own society is
made difficult by two factors: (i) ones consciousness is itself a product of that system, and (ii) the
systems very success renders its operations invisible, since one is so consistently immersed in and
bombarded by its products that one comes to mistake them (and the apparatus through which they
are produced and disseminated) for nothing other than nature (2005 [1996], 9). It should be noted
that Lincolns use of discourse is broader than Foucaults; for Lincoln, discourse refers to a wide
array of phenomena such as myth, ritual, and classification.
This resonates with Lincolns third thesis on method: To practice history of religions in a
fashion consistent with the disciplines claim of title is to insist on discussing the temporal,
contextual, situated, interested, human, and material dimensions of those discourses, practices,
and institutions that characteristically represent themselves as eternal, transcendent, spiritual,
and divine (2005 [1996], 8).
15
As noted above, we should not consider the study of discourse itself to be a
method. Rather, as a research perspective, or research style, the study of discourse is an interpretative endeavor and thus a hermeneutical strategy to scrutinize the organization of knowledge in a given societal and historical situation
(Keller 2005; Keller 2011a, 76 78). Nevertheless, despite the openness to apply
various methodological tools and the flexibility to adjust these tools to the research question that is at stake in a given project, there are a few basic considerations and implications that arise when one decides to engage a discursive research perspective. We can differentiate three important steps in designing and
carrying out an historical discourse analysis. I will briefly explain them, using
examples from the analysis of religion and science. This will also serve as
an introduction to the main argument of the present book.
Determining the Research Question

In principle, all research is intrinsically bound to a discursive construction of
meaning and the organization of knowledge. It is therefore a characteristic of discursive perspectives that they can lead to a better understanding of complex dynamics in the generation of approved knowledgewhether the research in question is itself explicitly discursive or not. But even if everything can be studied
from a discursive perspective, not all research is itself a discursive analysis. Discursive studies have concrete research questions that may differ from research
questions as they are typically framed in historical, philological, anthropological, or sociological perspectives.
Historical discourse analysis is interested in the processes of communicational
generation, legitimization, and negotiation of meaning systems. When we look at
the discursive field of religion and science, countless research questions are
possible. In an arbitrary selection, and limiting our focus to European contexts,
we can pose the following general questions that can be framed discursively:
(a) What are the structures that regulate public opinion about astrology as op-
Detailed discussions of how to do a concrete discourse analysis in the way that I am

advocating it here can be found in Bhrmann and Schneider 2008, 75 149; Landwehr 2009, 91
131; Reisigl and Wodak 2010, 93 120; Keller 2011b, 65 117; Keller and Truschkat 2011; Keller and
Truschkat 2012. The manuals for concrete research methods in Critical Discourse Analysis that
can be found elsewhere are too much focused on linguistic and textual analysis and thus less
appropriate for my understanding of historical discourse and dispositive analysis.
16
posed to astronomy in Europe? (b) Why is shamanism so attractive to many people in Europe and North America? (c) How can we explain the rise of psychological interpretations and their link to metaphysical and religious ideas in the twenthieth century? (d) What is the role of religion in the field of natural sciences
today? To be sure, these are general questions that have to be broken down
into more concrete sets of subquestions, but the examples should make clear
what kind of questions we typically ask in a discursive analytical framework,
and which questions will be addressed in the subsequent chapters of this book.
We can translate these questions into discursive language and design a project that reconstructs the discursive entanglements of religion on the one hand
and astrology, shamanism, psychology, and science on the other. All these
discourses lead to further discourse strands that characterize the respective entangled discourse. After a thorough screening of the available data (see the next
passage), it turns out that in the case of shamanism, these further discourse
strands include healing, soul, nature, therapy, and consciousness. It depends on our research focus whether we will need to include all of these discourse strands or only a selection of them.
Selecting Data and Building a Corpus

When we have formulated a research question and possible sets of subquestions
that concretize what we are interested in, the next step is the selection of the
data that is most suitable for finding an answer to our question. It is important
to note here that a sound discursive study has to start with a substantial reading
of the material under consideration, in the broadest possible sense. That contributions to a discourse must be repeatedly observable is a relevant detail in my
definition of discourse. This also means that the establishment of a discourse
for further analysis can be reasonably combined with methods of Grounded
Theory. For instance, to find the basis for my construction of the discourses of
science and religion, I had a close look at a large number of texts in which science and religion are used; subsequently, I noted down the other concepts that
were repeatedly used as entangled discourse strands in these documents; this
led to what can be called groupings of entangled discourse strands, such as
soul, vitalism, monism, power, energy, etc. Put differently, a discursive
study is a hermeneutical circle that starts with a broad reading of the most various documents, proceeds with heuristic groupings of discourse strands, and refines the construction of these groupings by revisiting the material and including
more documents; this circular refinement can be repeated until the understand-
17
ing of the respective discourse and its historical development will be good
enough to be put into a thesis that is clearly based on relevant material.
Since discursive approaches are not limited to textual sources, data can be
found in all forms of communication that are operative in the attribution of
meaning. With regard to the research questions formulated above, possible
data sets would include (but are not limited to): (a) books about astrology and
astronomy, media and newspaper coverage, Internet discussions, official statements about astrology in governmental documents or scientific organizations
(research organizations, Nobel Prize documents, etc.); (b) books on shamanism
(often popularizing academic theories), workshop programs, Internet forums, interviews with shamanic practitioners; (c) academic as well as popular publications in the field of psychology, academic correspondence and ego-documents,
governmental documents that regulate the psychological and therapeutic market; (d) books on contemporary science, presentation of research results in the
media and on the Internet, museum exhibitions. In order to address the genealogy of the discourses under scrutiny, it is important to add an historical dimension to the research outline as well. My analyses in this book are clearly focused
on the genealogy and thus the formation of the discursive entanglements that
are derived from the overall research questions.
In addition to concrete sets of data, the research should also include an analysis of dispositives that serve as the infrastructure of the discourse under scrutiny: for the present study I looked at new technologies and media (electricity, television, Internet); the history of associations and scholarly organizations (such as
the Theosophical Society, the German Monist League, and new book series for a
lay audience); governmental rules (for instance with regard to the juridical and
tax status of shamanic, astrological, or pagan practitioners); the funding of scientific research; programs in teaching and research at universities; etc.
The lists of possibleor even necessarysets of data make it clear that a
full-blown discursive analysis requires a lot of time and resources. The selection
of data and the building of a research corpus will thus be dependent on possible
constraints and practicalities. Individual projects can be part of a larger research
program or even consider themselves simply as a contribution to an overall analysis of a discourse. It is methodologically acceptable to design an exemplary
study that highlights one aspect of a discourse. What is more, within a larger
Exemplary research here means that the study meets all three conditions of an exemplum:
First, that the exemplum has been well and fully understood. This requires a mastery of both
the relevant primary material and the history and tradition of its interpretation. Second, that the
exemplum be displayed in the service of some important theory, some paradigm, some fundamental question, some central element in the academic imagination of religion. Third, that
18
research program it may be necessary to set up small projects first that make relevant data available for further discursive analysis (such as the critical edition of
a text or a social-scientific survey).
Choosing the Most Suitable Method to Analyze the Data Sets

As noted above, the methods that are applied in a discursive analysis can vary, depending on the most suitable way to interpret the research corpus. Typically, a discursive study of religion makes a selection of the following research methods: content analysis, conversation analysis, media analysis, participant observation, textual
interpretation, surveys and interviews, and historical methods (see Engler and
Stausberg 2011). For the research I needed to prepare the present book, I applied
a combination of historical methods, content analysis, and textual interpretation.
The generation and interpretation of data is not a goal in itself. It serves the
overall question that is formulated within a discursive referential framework. Consequently, the data is used and interpreted with reference to the organization of
knowledge in a given setting as well as to the attribution of meaning to things
and events. It is fully acknowledged that the research results are themselves elements of the discourse under scrutiny; hence, they do not represent the truth
about the issue at stake but provide insight into the mechanisms, historical dimensions, and implications of the construction of meaning in a discourse community.
Although the main argument of this book is based on an extensive reading of
documents, which gives me enough confidence about the relevance of the material under consideration, it would be presumptuous to claim that my (re)construction of the processes of changing entanglements of science and religion
during the past two-hundred years is the concluding result of an analysis that
would include many more sources than one author can possibly manage. If readers regard this book as a pilot study of the scientification of religion and test my
hypothesis against a rereading of the same material or against other contributions to the discursive knots under consideration, the goal of this book would
be accomplished.
there be some method for explicitly relating the exemplum to the theory, paradigm, or question
and some method for evaluating each in terms of the other (Smith 1982, xixii).
19

Often, analyses of the processes that I engage in this book operate within a binary pattern, juxtaposing religion and science, professional and amateur, or
modern and pre-modern. Discursive approaches are skeptical of these binary
constructions. In a way, discursive approaches are themselves discursive materializations of questions that have been raised with reference to binary models of
interpretation, such as true and false, insider and outsider, or culture and nature. The twentieth century has seen a fundamental break with these binaries,
and the new cultural studies have taken up the challenges that came with the
break. Self-consciously presented as a new paradigm in cultural studies, the
notion of the third has recently gained influence as a new way to think beyond
the binaries and to include the in-between as significant characteristic of contemporary culture. Albrecht Koschorke, one of the leading thinkers in this field,
explains that the third (das Dritte) as a way of thinking was developed in the
twentieth century and cannot be ignored anymore.
Here, the exceptional state is made permanent as it were. When in the encounter of two
parties none of the two sides can assert a hegemonic claima claim that brings back
the Other into the Own, viewing the opposite as derivate of a higher-level order that is identical with the ownthen a new grammar of cultural and epistemological negotiation is
needed, which traditional means cannot achieve (2010, 13, emphasis original).
Indeed, the intellectual discussions in various disciplines throughout the twentieth century have made unmistakably clear that notions of hybridity or the
third space (Bhabha 2004, 53 56; see Bhabha 1990) not only represent a critique of binary constructions but also a new vocabulary that is needed to understand processes of cultural transformation (see also de Certeau 2010 as discursive considerations on the Other). Thinking in triads, in which the third is
not the synthesis of one of the opposites, is a red thread that runs through
many disciplinary contexts, from philosophy to anthropology to sociology to
the study of religion, and even to economy and law (Elinger et al. 2010, 35
149, see 316 322 for a list of relevant literature; see also Breger and Dring
1998). Gender studies and (post)colonial studies are heavily influenced by
these theories. In a recent research program, scholars have identified new figures (or, rather, figurations) of the third that have left their pariah position
and have become central analytical instruments, among them the messenger,
the cyborg, the parasite, the laughing third, the trickster, and the rival (Elinger
et al. 2010, 153 315). In the context of the present book, the amateur would also
qualify as a third that is not adequately described as the overcoming of either
20
professional or pseudo knowledge. We may even reposition the intellectual in

new triadic constellations of twentieth-century culture.
Discursive approaches can provide the vocabulary we need for the new
grammar of cultural and epistemological negotiation that Koschorke calls
for. Legitimization, de-legitimization, construction, and reconstruction of
knowledge in changing entanglements of discourse strands form the basic structure of this epistemological negotiation.
The following chapters will develop and test such a vocabulary with regard
to the question of whether we can come to a better understanding of the complex
relationship between religious and secular discourses in Europe. I will reconstruct the genealogy of distinctions between religion and the secular, but I will
do so by focusing on subfields in which these distinctions become clearly visible.
Legitimization and de-legitimization of knowledge are particularly relevant for
the histories of astrology, alchemy, and magic. Often lumped together under
the rubric of occult sciences, these systems of knowledge have played a special
role in European imagination at least since the fifteenth century (see Zika 2003;
Hanegraaff 2012; on the concept of occult sciences see my introduction to Chapter 3 below). One reason for their ambivalent status as knowledge systems may
be the fact that they subscribe to rational philosophies of nature and that they
formulate theories about nature; thus, they are perceived as competitors to
what has become scientific knowledge after 1800.
In the previous section I already described the relevant steps that structure
the discursive analysis in this book. Based on this approach, Part One addresses
the discursive constellations in which the occult sciences, but also naturebased philosophies in general, have gained their meaning during the past centuries. Chapter 2 reconstructs the genealogy of discourses on astrology as a controversial system of knowledge that lost scientific legitimacy and at the same
time was re-entangled in scientific discourses after the nineteenth century. Chapter 3 does the same with alchemy, arguing that vitalism and related philosophies
of nature are relevant discursive entanglements that lent new legitimacy to alchemy in the twentieth century. The same is true for a pantheistic monism (Chapter 4) that was modeled by natural scientists at the beginning of the twentieth
century, thus propagating a veneration of nature that was fully compatible
When I talk of vocabulary I follow Richard Rortys understanding of the importance of

finding new vocabularies in order to express new analyses: On the view of philosophy which I
am offering, philosophers should not be asked for arguments against, for example, the correspondence theory of truth or the idea of intrinsic nature of reality. The trouble with arguments against the use of a familiar and time-honoured vocabulary is that they are expected to be
phrased in that very vocabulary (Rorty 1989, 8 9).
21
with a scientific worldview. Chapter 5 gives credit to the Theosophical Society,

which served as an important link between academic and non-academic interpretations of science and religion, with a special interest in occult or esoteric
forms of knowledge.
Part Two looks at concrete examples of academic experts whose writings
had a considerable impact on the attribution of meaning to religion. I address
them as religious pioneers of the twentieth century, not because they all intended to found new religions, but because they lent scientific authority to
new religious interpretations and religious practices. In other words, these scholars were catalysts of religious change and the emergence of new religious communities in the twentieth century. Chapter 6 contextualizes the work of Martin
Buber, Gershom Scholem, Rudolf Otto, and Gerardus van der Leeuw in their intellectual environments and describes the concrete impact these scholars had on
subsequent understandings of mysticism and religion. Chapter 7 analyzes the
academic construction of the Great Goddess and her veneration in European
history, which had a clear impact on religious practice in twentieth-century
witchcraft and nature-based spirituality. Chapter 8 is devoted to scholarly constructions of shamanism and how they were turned into religious practice in
the second half of the twentieth century.
The concluding chapter aggregates the historical material and links the analysis to recent discussions about secularism, secularization, the secular, and
modernization. I will argue that if we talk of scientification of religion as a discursive constellation we will be able to overcome the binaries that distort many
interpretations of the place of religion in contemporary Europe.
Part One: Discarded Knowledge and Its New

Legitimacy in Secular Discourse
2 From Polemical Disjunction to New Integration:

The Science of the Stars
That astrology is not scientific is tacit knowledge in Europe today. People usually do not know anything about astrology, but they can be sure that the overwhelming majority of the population shares this assumption; further inquiry
into astrology is superfluous. Tacit knowledge also means that if people act
against this unquestioned assumption, they arouse suspicion. At the same
time, astrological practice is a significant cultural phenomenon in European
countries, albeit usually not related to science but to psychology, spirituality,
and the search for meaning. How can we explain this constellation? The differentiation between astrology and astronomy as two different cultures of knowledge is a very recent one; in the wake of this recent change, new meanings
were attributed to astrology as a psychological and metaphysical discipline.
If we want to reconstruct the genealogy of the current situation, we will have
to go back into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is in this period that
the unity of the science of the stars fell apart into astronomyas the only representative of scienceand astrology. But this period also generated attributions of meaning that continued to be dominant in twentieth-century discourse
on astrology. That is why I will also present in this chapter contributions to the
discourse on astrology that predate the rise of secularism, as long as these are
relevant for our understanding of the present situation. Looking at the various
overlapping discourses makes it clear that the history of modernization is by
no means a linear one, and that the complexities of the boundary-work that
shaped current identities are to be taken seriously in our historical analysis.

In the second half of the seventeenth century an increasingly critical attitude toward traditional astrology could be seen in many parts of Europe. There are several reasons for this situation, and considerable regional differences also
strengthen the impression that a generalizable explanation for this development
is hard to justify.
The Thirty Years War (1618 1648), in which denominational conflicts and
arguments between countries, princes, imperial cities, and the future Holy
Roman emperor Ferdinand II ended in bloodbaths, had enormous consequences
for European culture. A great proportion of the population was killed, and the
provinces were devastated and impoverished. This triggered apocalyptic, mes-
26
2 From Polemical Disjunction to New Integration: The Science of the Stars
sianic, and astrological expectations. The bitter conflict between the Christian
denominations also had a direct influence on astrology, particularly in regard
to permitted practices in learned circles. In responses to the Reformation, the
Catholic Church increased its pressure on science and philosophy considerably.
Many universities were run by Jesuits or Dominicans who vehemently opposed
the rising Platonism and instead spread a new scholastic philosophy. The Spanish Jesuit Suarez had revised Aristotelian teachings, which were now taught in
this form at leading universities, including Oxford, Paris, Padua, and Cologne.
Due to this development, astrology was crushed between the fronts. On one
side there were the new scholastic traditionalists, who opposed Copernicus system and continued to stick to an Aristotelian model that assumed the separation
of the sublunar and the heavenly worlds and constructed a dimension of first
movement (Primum Mobile) beyond the planetary spheres, which was not empirically provable (the example of the University of Louvain is discussed in detail in
vanden Broecke 2003). This model was, however, a sticky wicket, for on the
other hand, discoveries were being made annually that were simply incompatible with the model (on the instrumental role of early modern astronomy in establishing a mathematical scientific method see also Schtte 2008). Moreover, traditional astrology was being criticized, from the point of view of mechanisticmathematical natural philosophy, because it still worked with qualitative principles that defied any empirical explanation and were based on unprovable assumptions. Astrology found itself in trouble under the primacy of the new teaching, which related to purely quantitative and perceptible matter.
What we are seeing here can best be described as a differentiation of branches of knowledge (on this process see also Schmidt-Biggemann 1996). Any astrological tradition, which in the sense of an occulta philosophia had been a fixed
part of the academic sciences since the Renaissance, was gradually phased out
of the scientific discourse (and the corresponding dispositives). At the universities astrology no longer had any opportunity to develop and subsequently moved
into other cultural areasin private study, in a simplified popular form, in art,
and in literature. Only a few people heeded Keplers advice, that as long as astrology limited itself consistently to the symbolic interpretation of heavenly
events and left the physical explanation of the subject to others, it could cope
with the new paradigm (Rosen 1984; Field 1987; von Stuckrad 2007, 255 259;
on the complex history of the Copernican system and its controversy, with the
amazing example of Athanasius Kircher, see Siebert 2006). Instead, many astrologers stuck to the traditional view of the world and made themselves laughingstocks. In the long term, though, and effectively only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, astrology was consistently distinguished from astronomy;
qualitative-interpretative astrology lost its status as a scientific discipline over
27
against the new quantitative-mechanistic astronomy, but it established itself, at

the same time, as a psychological discipline outside the universities. Before looking at these discursive changes in more detail, it is important to consider the varied responses by astrologers themselves.
The Responses of the Astrologers

The shocks to astrological self-understanding, which arose, on the one hand,
with the questioning of the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic model of the cosmos and,
on the other, with the establishment of the mechanistic-quantitative method,
can be shown clearly in the biographies and works of the astrologers of the seventeenth century. The reactions to the challenge of Copernicus model took very
different courses in individual countries, to the extent that rough generalizations
should be avoided. However, it is basically true that the conflict between Aristotelianismmore accurately, new scholasticismand the new quantitative-mechanistic thinking was where the ways separated. Those astrologers who fought
against Copernicus view of the world and continued to seek agreement with
the Christian interpretation increasingly found themselves losing ground in arguments, whereas those who followed a path of mystical Platonism, foreseen by
Kepler, or who simply did not bother with heliocentric astronomy, created the
basis for the continued existence of astrological systems within the new worldview. Let us have a brief look at the most important astrologers of the second half
of the seventeenth century, some of whom wrote very extensive works.
We begin with Italy where, despite church bans, various astrological treatises and predictions still managed to appear, including the popular Almanaco perpetuo by Benincasa, which was extended to 700 pages in 1655 by the astronomer
Ansaleoni. Even in Rome, between 1672 and 1684 a series of forecasts was published, which shows the sometimes inconsistent handling of astrology by the
church. Most astrologers who were working at this time were accepted because
they tried to defend the Aristotelian-based scholastic system against the attacks
of scholars advocating the Copernican system. The best-known of them was P.
Placido de Titis (1603 1668). This scholar, who came from an Umbrian aristocratic family, at twenty-one entered the Olivetan Order, a branch of the Benedictine order with its headquarters in Siena. Later he became a lecturer in mathematics and physics at the University of Padua and professor at the Milanese
University of Pavia. Placidus, as he is still called today, wrote a great number
of works on astrology in which he set out the compatibility of scientific astrology
with Christian belief. He reacted in particular to the criticism of his countryman
Pico della Mirandola by trying to eliminate any qualitative branch of astrology.
28
He considered the zodiacal signs, houses, aspects, and all the other factors to be
physically real elements that must be derived from natural principles. These
principles were mediated by light, which meant a direct influence of astrological
factors and not a simple qualitative correspondence. Instead of geometric divisions and their Platonic-mystical charge, in Keplers sense, Placidus insisted
on the Aristotelian physical-causal interpretation of astral effects.
In his main work, Physiomathematica sive coelestis philosophia (Physiomathematics or the Philosophy of the Sky), which was first published under a
pseudonym in 1650 and then posthumously in an improved version in 1675 in
Milan, Placidus turned against the purely geometrically derived systems of houses and direction methods, such as those by Campanus and Regiomontanus. Following Ptolemy, he claimedsince the light represented the real influencea division of houses by two temporal hours, i. e., by the proportional division of the
movement of the heavenly points from one to the next cusp. Cardano and Magini had already taught this method, and for purely geometric reasons, something
the author did not mention. Placidus teaching on the division of houses soon
became widespread; even today his method is the most used worldwide. Its
strong influence can be put down not only to the Physiomathematica but mostly
to the widely read tables Tabulae primi mobilis, which contained the principles of
his teaching in seventy theses, expanded by house tables for reference, as well
as instructions for calculation and thirty sample horoscopes.
Most Italian astrologers argued that in astrology real causal influences are at
stake, which in the Aristotelian theory ultimately stemmed from the Primum Mobile beyond the spheres. This reassured them of the Churchs acceptance. Mention should be made here of A. Francesco Bonatti from Padua, Antonio Tattoni
from Terni, and P. Giambattista Riccioli, whose extensive Almagestum novum followed Ptolemy. Riccioli formulated a sharp criticism of Copernicus and Galileo
and published an astrological historical reflection listing all the so-called
great conjunctions from 3980 BCE to 2358 CE. The works of Placidus and his colleagues were published with the Churchs permission, but in 1688 the curia
changed its mind and put all astrological books on the index of prohibited
books (including those by Placidus). The ban was made stricter in 1709, and
this led to the center of astrological practice moving from Italy to England and
the Netherlands. A reason for this disdain for astrology may have been the
well-known astronomer Giovanni Montanari, who published a prognosticon in
Cum vero domus dispertit per binas temporales horas, sint partes proportionales quartarum,
sit vt secundum influxum quales sint omnes ad inuicem, etiam si quantitate extensionis, nimiru
Arcus, sint inquales in Hemisphrijs (Placidus 1675, 189).
29
1676 in Bologna, which was continued until 1686; the accurate predictions in it
brought him recognition everywhere. In 1685, however, Montanari admitted in
another publication that he came to his previous prognostications entirely arbitrarily in order to prove that one can get just as many hits by chance as one can
with learned astrology. That was quite a blow for the astrological community.
There was also strong resistance against the new worldview in France, but
there were reputable advocates, too. The discussion in the Parisian Collge de
France can be seen as paradigmatic, and the positions taken there bounced directly off each other. On one side stood Jean-Baptiste Morin de Villefranche
(1583 1656), who was introduced to astrology later in life through his friendship
with the Scottish alchemist and astrologer William Davison (1593 1669), and
who, after his appointment as professor of mathematics at the Collge de France
in 1630, soon rose to become the most famous astrologer of his time. Morin was
highly respected by the queens of France, Sweden, and Poland, as well as by the
cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin; he was the court astrologer to Louis XIII and,
in this function, attended the birth of Louis XIV in 1638. Although he published
numerous works in which he discussed Copernicus and Placidus critically, Morins fame is based on his 26-volume lifes work, the Astrologia gallica, written in
Latin (and, therefore, broadly received only after later translations), which he
worked on for thirty years. The master did not live to see its publication in
The Hague (1661), financed by Queen Marie Louise of Poland, who was one of
his former clients. This enormous work consists of over 800 pages, 39 tables,
and 80 sample horoscopes and is suggested by the author to be a complete encyclopedia of astrology as it is practiced in the style of Francesco Giuntini,
known as Junctinus (1522 1590?). I cannot here go into the many innovative
techniques and highly complex rules for interpretation that Morin developed
(books are available in French and English; for the revivalist reception in France
and Germany see Selva 1897; see also Schwickert and Wei 1925, vol. 2). Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that Morin also saw the Primum Mobile as the
central physical cause of all events, located beyond the planetary spheres. From
there the astral powers radiate down and influence the sublunar world that, for
its part, is made up of four original qualities. The zodiac is strongly linked to the
Primum Mobile; the tragedy of Morin is that with the collapse of this Aristotelian
system, his conclusions also lost their power of persuasion.
This weak point was an invitation to his adversaries at the Collge de France,
in particular its provost, the physicist and mathematician Peter Gassendi (1592
1655). Gassendi refuted the Aristotelian idea of a first space that is filled with
power and set against it an Epicurean-mechanistic model that saw God as the
first cause of all events. The bodies of the atoms move around in an empty
space and through this movement produce earthly events. So Gassendi followed
30
Copernicus worldview but with the toned-down compromise of Tycho Brahethe sun still revolved around the earth as the center, but the five planets revolved around the sunsince this did not seem to contradict the Bible. That was
also the opinion of his friend Marinus Mersenne (1588 1648), who worked closely with Descartes, Hobbes, and the astrologer Campanella. In his work Quaestiones celeberrimae in genesin, which was published in 1623, he developed a mystical Platonic position similar to Keplers, to whom he later explicitly referred
(Harmonie universelle, 1636).
Despite these attempts to adapt astrology to the new worldview, astrology
managed to acquire the reputation in France, as it had in Italy, of being old-fashioned and unscientific. In 1666, the founder of the French academy, Minister J. B.
Colbert, personally acted against astrology in that he strictly forbade the members of his academy to study this science. The discursive changes became fully
apparent in the figure of King Louis XIV: while Morin was allowed to interpret
his birth horoscope, on 31 July 1682 the king extended the ban on astrological
calendars and almanacs, which had been in force in several provinces already,
so that it now covered the whole of France. Astrology was finally excluded
from the learned discourse in France.
History proceeded very differently in England. Even though the universitiesboth those that followed the empiricists and those that followed the Cambridge Platonistsrejected astrology as a serious discipline, and a few scholars
occupied themselves with it only in secret, this did not lead to the disappearance
of astrology from public discourse. On the contrary: in no other European country was there such a wide engagement with astrology outside the universities as
in England (see Curry 1989). We will see that this continued interest would essentially contribute to astrology being re-adopted in other parts of Europe toward
the end of the nineteenth century.
A large number of so-called professionals practiced horoscope interpretation
and published political-economic forecasts. They were always in danger of falling victim to the law issued by James I in 1603 against magicians, fortunetellers,
and astrologers. However, the law only made punishable such behavior that
transgressed the boundaries of allowed astrology, or that took place with intent to defraud. And since the client who felt himself defrauded had to come before the courts her- or himself, which was embarrassing enough for most people,
this law was not totally effective. Furthermore, due to political upheavals, official
censorship was completely abolished in 1641, and consequently a big market for
astrological literature suddenly became visibleCurry speaks here of the halcyon days of English astrology (1989, 19 22). Before 1640 there were no newspapers with astrological content, but by 1645 there were several hundred; while in
1640 there were only 22 new astrological publications to register, in 1642 there
31
were suddenly 1,966; in the following decades there were, on average, three pamphlets published every day (Curry 1989, 19).
Even the most famous of all professionals, William Lilly (1602 1681), often
called the true father of British astrology, was taken to court repeatedly; but he,
too, profited from the boom in astrology after 1641 (on Lillys biography see Parker 1975). Lilly came from a simple background. He had to give up Latin school in
1620 because his father was arrested for being in debt, and he got by in London
as an errand-boy and servant. However, he was fortunate; after the death of his
master, he married the rich widow and managed to increase his new wealth considerably by speculating on property. When he was thirty, he became interested
in astrology; the first results of his interest in mundane astrological techniques
were the political almanacs published under his pseudonym, Merlinus anglicus, in 1644 and 1645. For this work he found himself before the courts but, because of his clever defense, was not punished.
Lilly, who was outstanding at Latin and thus could read all the available literature on the subject, completely dedicated his life to astrology and contributed
to the development of the seventeenth century as the golden century of astrology in England. He fostered contact with many specialists, including Sir Elias
Ashmole (1617 1692), with whom he soon became close friends (Curry 1989,
35 40). Lilly also dedicated his autobiography to the founder of the famous Ashmolean museum. His autobiography appeared, under the title Mr. William Lillys
History of his Life and Times, in 1715, and revealed such interesting details as a
treasure hunt in Westminster Abbey. However, Lillys main work was Christian
Astrology, modestly Treated of in three Books, which was published in London
in 1647 and reprinted in 1659. The work, which consists of nearly 900 pages, introduces in its first part the principles of astrology with the use of many tables;
the second part is a very detailed description of horary astrology with dozens of
sample horoscopes from the authors own praxis; in the third part, the author
deals with birth horoscopes. There is a bibliography appended that contains astrological works (all in Lillys library) and an index.
Lilly raised so-called horary astrology (or interrogation, the analysis and prediction of a sequence of events in hours) to a high art, and the following generationsincluding such astrologers as W.J. Simmonite and Zadkiel in the nineteenth
centurystill more or less copied from his works. Lillys fame is not only based on
his virtuoso mastery of horary astrology but also on his predictions. King Charles I
consulted him on more than one occasion, but he did not take to heart Lillys advice
that he should leave London immediately and thus was executed in London, at
Cromwells instigation, on 30 January 1649. Another of his predictions made even
greater waves: in 1651, Lilly published the work Monarchy or No Monarchy in England, in which he predicted a catastrophe for London. When the plague broke out
32
in 1665 and the capital fell prey to the Great Fire of London in the following year,
1666, Lilly was summoned before the commission investigating the fire and asked
about his prediction. He explained that he had not known the exact time in advance, but presented himself as convinced that the fire must have happened
through natural causes. The commission left it at that.
After the masters death, Lillys adopted son and pupil, Henry Coley, took over
responsibility for the almanacs. This genre maintained its popularity in England
into the nineteenth century (for a detailed overview see Capp 1979). It can be regarded as a dispositive that significantly stabilized the astrological attribution of
meaning in public discourse in Britain. In addition to Lilly and Coley, who
wrote two sophisticated manualsClavis astrologiae (London 1669) and Clavis astrologiae elimata (London 1676)there were other productive astrologers at the
time. John Gadbury (1627 1704) should be mentioned. At first he was a friend
and pupil of Lillys, but eventually he turned away from his successful teacher
and opened a counter school. This led to Londons astrologers having to decide
to which camp they wanted to belong. Even after Lillys death, the argument went
on and culminated in the publication of John Partridges polemical work Nebulo
Anglicanus, or the First Part of the Black Life of John Gadbury (London 1693).
John Partridge (1644 1715) was also the first English astrologer to spread the
system of the calculation of intermediate houses according to Placidus (Lilly knew
of the new system but continued to work with Regiomontanus system). In two
quite technical English booksOpus reformatum (London 1693) and Defectio geniturarum (London 1697)he described in detail why the new technique should be
preferred over the old ones. Moreover, Partridge wrote a very successful series of
almanacs, which from 1680 on appeared under the title Merlinus Liberatus. They
were continued until 1783 under his publishers pseudonym Merlinus redivivus.
It was not made easy for Partridge, though. Not only did he always have courts to
deal with, he also had to leave England for a while under the rule of King James II
until King William III reinstated him. In the public debate, another episode augured badly for him: under the pseudonym Isaac Bickerstaff, Jonathan Swift published a satirical almanac for the year 1708, in which he prophesized Partridges
infallible death at 23.00 hours on 29 March 1709. Subsequently, Swift made
things even worse by publishing the letter The Accomplishment of the First of
Mr. Bickerstaffs Predictions, in which he announced the death of Partridge as
well as his admission of failure, a description of the funeral, and the text of the
inscription on the gravestone. He added, Weep all you customers that use/His
pills, his almanacks, or shoes. Partridge was, of course, not amused, especially
as this joke cost him a lot of money to prove to the confused public that he
was still alive. But the episode offers a glimpse into the climate and the public
role astrology had in England at that time.
Polemical Disjunctions and their Complexities in the Eighteenth Century
33
Satire is an important discursive strategy that delegitimizes the truth-claims

of adversaries. But Swifts calculated attempt at diverting the English from their
gullibility with his satires did not work. In 1697 the doctor and astrologer Francis Moore (c. 1657 1715) received a license from King William III to publish a
loyal almanac, which first appeared as Francis Moores Vox Stellarum or a
loyal almanac for the year 1697 and continued publication until World War II.
Moores Almanac became the model for the many and very successful series of
astrological forecasts of the nineteenth century. Despite a growing negative attitude toward it, even respected astronomers continued to practice astrology. A
good example of this is John Flamsteed (1646 1719), the founder of the Greenwich Observatory and the first Royal Astronomer. The horoscope for the laying
of the foundation stone of the Observatoryon 10 August 1675 (according to the
Julian calendar) at 15.14was drawn up by Flamsteed personally and kept carefully in the records. The paper with the horoscope on it also carries the comment:
Risum teneatis amici (Hold back your laughter, friends). The identity of the person who added the comment remains a mystery to this day. Many suppose this
was a joke directed at Flamsteed, but it is more likely that Flamsteed wrote it
himself in order to express his inclination toward astrology without having to
own up to it in public. Flamsteed was a scientist well versed in all the astrological techniques (Oestmann 2002; cf. Hunter 1987).
Polemical Disjunctions and their Complexities

in the Eighteenth Century
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, astrology had truly and thoroughly
lost its reputation in scholarly circles in Europe. In the course of the efforts
that are generally described as the Enlightenment, the rejection gained further
momentum and led to the final elimination of astrology from the canon of subjects taught at universities. An astrology that adhered to the Aristotelian-based
scholarly model or that did not incorporate the new rational-scientific criteria
could simply no longer be taken seriously. What at first was still regarded as acceptable was the examination of the influence of the stars on the weather and on
the human body; however, after 1750, even these questions, together with astrology in general, were classified as superstition. When King Frederick the Great
wanted to ban astrological forecasts from the house calendars, he failed only
due to protests from the farmers, who did not want to give up this form of weather forecasting. Empress Maria Theresa was less prepared to compromise on this
point and, in 1756, she banned all astrological fortunetelling and superstitious
conjecturing in calendars. More important than the ban on annual forecasts
34
was the suppression of ephemerides, which are the most important tools for
practicing astrologers. The older tables were no longer published, and after
1710 no new lists came out. This was a major discursive shift, and without the
dispositive of ephemerides practical astrology was brought to its knees.
Enlightenment discourse constructed astrology from then on as pseudo-science or as superstition. When at the end of the eighteenth century Johann Christoph Adelung published his influential Geschichte der menschlichen Narrheit
(History of Human Folly, in 7 volumes), astrology was also on trial. Adelung
used Lucas Gauricus as his example and consigned the astrologers alleged competence to the derision of the eighteenth century. He explained that Gauricus
was known as a mathematician, but that this meant in fact that he was an astrologer. We can see how the discursive entanglement of mathematics and astrology
became a polemical comparison in this work. According to Adelung, in the Renaissance the astrologer had followers only because there were lots of fools in his
time who believed in [astrology]; hence it is no surprise that Gauricus became
famous through a few unsubstantiated prophecies that vaguely became true,
but which simplemindedness exaggerated after the fact.
A similar picture is given by one of the most important documents of the Enlightenment, the Encyclopedie, ou Dictionnaire raisonne des sciences, des arts, et
des mtiers (17 volumes, 1751 1765) published by Denis Diderot and others. The
article Astrology (vol. I, 780 783) distinguished between astrologie naturelle
and astrologie judiciaire. The article accepted more or less the natural variety,
such as the connection between the planets and the weather, but regarded horoscopic astrology as superstition with which, according to the authors, in previous centuries we ourselves were infected (p. 781). For the French followers of
the Enlightenment around Diderot and Voltaire, astrology was almost a delusionary science, which had been invented by priests in order to put the population under the yoke. The freedom of reason from the power claims of religious
doctrines inevitably led to freedom from astrological despotism. The condemnation of astrology was a confirmation of the times own enlightened progress.
If we want to understand the nuances of this polemic, it is helpful to include
scholarly discussion about esotericism and Hermeticism as an important component of European cultural discourse (von Stuckrad 2010a; Hanegraaff 2012). Despite the polemical character of the discourse on astrology, making a distinction
Allein unter der Mathematik mu man vornehmlich die Astrologie verstehen, denn die war
eigentlich seine Brotwissenschaft, und da es zu seiner Zeit eine Menge Thoren gab, welche an
dieselbe glaubten, so ist es kein Wunder, da Gauricus durch einige auf Schrauben gesetzte
Weissagungen, welche von ungefr eintrafen, und nach geschehener Sache von der lieben
Einfalt vergrert wurden, berhmt ward (Adelung 1785 1789, vol. 2, 256).
35
between reasonable science and unreasonable esotericism is far from accurate,

given the mutual penetration of these discursive fields. This did not begin in the
eighteenth century; as Erich Meuthen pointed out in his work on the fifteenth
century, the reception of antiquity in the Renaissance embraced to a large extent specifically not the enlightened sides of ancient paganism but the []
dark, secretive, and mythical sides (1996, 183). A similar dynamic can also be
seen in the discourses of the eighteenth century, a point which has been emphasized by many historians for some time. Increasingly, scholars recognize that talk
of the dark as the other of reason, which is often contrasted with the torch of
Enlightenment and the light of understanding, springs from a rhetoric of enlightened self-confirmation.
One of the first to follow this through consistently was the Germanist Rolf-Christian Zimmermann. Starting from the observation that the popular religious philosophy of the early Enlightenment tried to direct Jacob Bhmes Hermeticism onto
the path of reason (Zimmermann 1969, 129), Zimmermann developed the term reasonable Hermeticism (vernnftige Hermetik) to describe the intellectual streams
from which Goethe and others derived their insights (1969, 128 171). Historians argued similarly: already in 1959, Reinhart Koselleck noted that the secret (Arkanum)
of the Freemason lodges in the time of absolutism had the function of protecting the
new, self-assured citizens from the state. In this way the secret societies also contributed to the creation of democratic structures such as the critics of the followers of
the Enlightenment: From the start Enlightenment and secret appear as historical
twins (1973 [1959], 49). However, criticismthe battle cry of the eighteenth centurydeveloped its own dialectic dynamic, in that it undermined the basis on which it
was founded (Koselleck 1973 [1959], 103).
Recent research into esotericism sees in this dynamic a general structural element of Enlightenment discourse, in which the fascination with the dark and irrational, as well as its resolution in the light of understanding, represents a crucial
point (Neugebauer-Wlk 1999 and 2008; Trepp and Lehmann 2001; von Stuckrad
2012; see also Neugebauer-Wlk, Geffarth, and Meumann 2012; Classen 2011). It
shows that the glorification of enlightenment and knowledge as it was practiced
by many intellectuals in the eighteenth century in fact did not link up primarily
with Descartes models of reason or Kants limits of reason, but rather to Renaissance authors search for the Light of Truth. Through the linking of esotericism
and enlightenment we can see the entanglement of discourses of reason with discourses of higher knowledge, perfect knowledge, and a truth that transcended simple understanding for those who participated in it. In this discourse, the whole person was to be included in enlightenment processes, leading to a rebirth of
humanity. This thinking could then be applied to political and cultural contexts
as well.
36
The linking of enlightened discourses with the deification of reason during

the Renaissance occurred most clearly within the secret societies of the eighteenth century.
Astrological Semantics in the Secret Societies of the Eighteenth Century

The study of esoteric discourses includes more than the history of ideas; it looks
at the manifestations and materializations of these ideas in concrete social
worlds. From this perspective, the circle of the Freemasons, Rosicrucians, Illuminati, and other secret societies can be described as a new dispositive or as a form
of institutionalized esotericism in which Enlightenment and citizenship entered
into a specific relationship (Neugebauer-Wlk 1999). This was the place where
enlightened intellectuals such as Leibniz, Herder, and Goethe discussed their politico-philosophical ideals and extended rationality in the sense of reasonable
Hermeticism into an esoteric search for perfect knowledge.
In many aspects these secret societies adhered to the agenda of the Platonic
academies of the Renaissance. While the origins of Freemasonry lie in the High
Middle Ages and the oldest constitutional manuscripts date from the middle of
the fifteenth century, these groups first entered the public domain in the seventeenth century as individual lodges joined together into larger associations and
tried to put their systems in order. That is why the founding of the Great Lodge in
London, in 1717, is often regarded as the actual beginning of Freemasonry. In parallel fashion, the Rosicrucians became more and more noticeable. In their manifestos Fama Fraternitatis (1614) and Confessio (1615/1616), these circles introduced the legendary Christian Rosenkreutz as an adept who had read the
Book of the World (liber mundi) and had been initiated into the tradition of
Hermes and the Tabula Smaragdina. Moreover, the legends around the opening
of his grave, in 1604, are similar to the discovery of ancient writings in the tomb
of Hermes Trismegistus. This was how modern Hermeticism was linked to religious and political demands, which increasingly found resonance in the enlightened circles of the eighteenth century.
With reference to the historical significance of astrology, it is worth noting
that within these groupings a symbolism was developed which was influenced
by astrological elements. The initiation systems followed astrological semanticssimilarly to some ancient mysteriesand the initiations were carried out
with reference to pockets of tradition that are known from Hermetic-esoteric
and Neoplatonic cosmology. However, this cosmology had been widely psychologized in the wake of the scientific debate of the seventeenth century, so that it
became more acceptable to enlightened thinkers. For instance, in the Ancient
37
and Accepted Rite, known simply as the Scottish Rite of Freemasonry, the
seven planets represented the seven Cherubim: Michael was Saturn, Gabriel
was Jupiter, Uriel was Mars, Chamaliel was Venus, Raphael was Mercury, Tsaphiel was the moon, and Zerachiel was the sun. The adept, on his spiritual
path, had to know and to integrate the spiritual and ethical principles represented by the corresponding divinities and angels; in the rituals, these divinities were
also performed and represented.
In Egyptian Masonry this could take the following form: the walls of the
room in which the magician from Memphis observed his ritualsthe sanctuary decorated with red damask on which likenesses of Saturn, Osiris, Isis,
Horus, and Harpocrates were fastened. The room would be illuminated by fifteen
candles, which were arranged on the compass points. The altar stood in the east.
Of Saturn, dressed in black and visible over the entrance, it was said he was the
father of the gods grown out of a tree trunk, and the symbol of original matter.
Osiris, in yellow and painted on the wall in the south, was the symbol of the hidden fire of the sun, kingly son of Saturn, husband of Isis, and father of Horus. Isis,
portrayed in white and symbolizing moisture, nature, and earth (moon), was the
eldest daughter of Saturn, and as queen she was sister and wife of Osiris. Hermes
(Mercury or Thot) was her minister. Finally, in the east was Horus, as god of reason, holding the figures of fortune and death in his hands. To the left was the representation of Harpocrates, the brother of Horus and god of silence. On the right
side of his chest, Saturn wore the sign of the sun, and on the left, that of the
moon; in front of him he held the scepter of Mercury, which separated light and
darkness. In the middle of the sanctuary stood a coffin between two palm trees,
and at the head there was a tamarind branch, and over that the sign of Mercury.
In front of the coffin there lay a rug similarly covered in symbols.
Basically, the performance served to outwardly display and to allow the
adepts to experience physically what takes place internallyan initiation into
new levels of consciousness, into knowledge processes that might help them
on their way to higher reason. Astrological and alchemistic semantics are integrated into an overall cosmic-religious system, which no longer has anything
to do with birth horoscopes or mundane astrology; but it was particularly suitable for understanding the elements of astrological interpretation as psychic
powers. Works that come out of this contextsuch as Georg Wellings Opus
mago-cabbalisticum et theosophicum (1735, reprinted 1760 and 1785) or the
work Geheime Figuren der Rosenkreuzer aus dem 16. und 17. Jahrhundert (Secret
Figures of the Rosicrucians in the 16th and 17th Centuries) (1789)consistently
describe astrology as an Urwissenschaft, or original science. Not at all interested in arguments about helio- or geocentric cosmological systems, this discourse
38
links cosmic symbolism to psychic dispositions. In doing so, this discourse ultimately forms the basis of the higher knowledge of the Enlightenment.
The Perpetuation of ASTROLOGY in Eighteenth- and

Nineteenth-Century Literature and Philosophy
By the end of the eighteenth century, astrology had more or less disappeared
from scientific debate. Empirical natural science was in the throes of developing
itself into the leading discipline and eventually, in the nineteenth century,
gained the upper hand. This, however, is only one part of the equation. What
we also see is a critical response to the rationalization of cosmos and life that
generated new meanings with regard to astrology. Romantic philosophy of nature conceptualized a holistic integration of the living even in science. This
was one of the reasons why astrological discourse was transmitted even in secular frameworks, albeit with different meaning structures. Another reason was a
new enthusiasm for ancient Greece. The difference basically consisted in the fact
that now the stars, similar to the masonic practices mentioned above, were aestheticized and psychologized, that is, they were understood as symbolic representations of universal powers that influenced the inner human being as well
as the holistically conceived universe. What that meant can best be understood
with reference to the philosophy of nature between 1780 and 1850.
Astrology in Goethes Time

On the 28th of August, 1749, at mid-day, as the clock struck twelve, I came into the world, at
Frankfort-on-the-Maine. My horoscope was propitious; the sun stood in the sign of the Virgin, and had culminated for the day; Jupiter and Venus looked on with a friendly eye, and
Mercury not adversely; while Saturn and Mars kept themselves indifferent; the Moon alone,
just full, exerted her reflex power, all the more as she had then reached her planetary hour.
She opposed herself, therefore, to my birth, which could not be accomplished until this
hour was passed.
These good aspects, which the astrologers managed subsequently to reckon very auspicious for me, may have been the causes of my preservation, for, through the unskillfulness of the midwife, I came into the world as dead, and only after a great many difficulties
was enabled to see the light. The event, which had put our household into sore straits,
turned to the advantage of my fellow-citizens, inasmuch as my grandfather, the Schultheiss,
John Wolfgang Textor, was induced by it to make provision for a man-midwife (Geburts-
The Perpetuation of Astrology
39
helfer), and to introduce or revive the tuition of midwives, which may have done some good
to those who were born after me.
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe begins his autobiography Dichtung und Wahrheit
(Goethe 1811 1814) with these words. Starting with a description of his birth
horoscope puts him in a tradition that began in intellectual circles at the latest
with Girolamo Cardano (see von Stuckrad 2005a), and what he wrote shows a
positive attitude toward astrological interpretation. The gentle irony, evident in
the second paragraph, makes it clear that Goethe, like many of his contemporaries, did not rely on the interpretation of astrologers but rather dealt playfully
and creatively with astrology.
As noted before, Goethe was well versed in the esoteric, Hermetic tradition of
Europe from his youth. The esoteric branches of alchemy, magia naturalis, and
astrology are referred to explicitly in many places in his works, for instance in
Mrchen, in the fragment Die Geheimnisse, in Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre,
and, obviously, in Faust, the work which occupied the second half of his life.
His Orphische Urworte, which to this day continue to influence the self-understanding of astrologers, became famous for their expression of the connection
between determinism and creative freedom in a particularly successful way:
As stood the sun to the salute of planets
Upon the day that gave you to the earth,
You grew forthwith, and prospered, in your growing
Heeded the law presiding at your birth.
Sibyls and prophets told it: You must be
None but yourself, from self you cannot flee.
No time there is, no power, can decompose
The minted form that lives and living grows.
English translation quoted from The Auto-Biography of Goethe. Truth and Poetry: From My
Life, ed. by Parke Godwin. 2 vols., New York: John Wiley 1849, vol. 1, 1.
Translation by Christopher Middleton, see http://taimur.org/goethe/selected-poems-of-goethe/
(accessed 23 July 2013). The original runs:
Wie an dem Tag, der dich der Welt verliehen,
Die Sonne stand zum Grue der Planeten,
Bist alsobald und fort und fort gediehen
Nach dem Gesetz, wonach du angetreten.
So mut du sein, dir kannst du nicht entfliehen,
So sagten schon Sibyllen, so Propheten;
Und keine Zeit und keine Macht zerstckelt
Geprgte Form, die lebend sich entwickelt.
40
Goethe was not only a poet but also an intellectual who participated in almost
all areas of science, politics, and art. His scientific efforts are to be seen in the
context of what German language referred to as Naturforschung, i. e., research
into nature that did not recognize a strict distinction between empirical natural
science and speculative Naturphilosophie. Like Schelling and other philosophers,
Goethe was interested in das Weltganze, or the whole of the world. This was a
living intellectual principle, perceptible and scientifically accessible in material
reality but not at all reduced to that.
The context of this position is the critical reflection on the scientific transformation that started with Copernicus, Newton, and others, which many began to
see as a dissouling or disenchantment of the cosmos. At the end of the eighteenth century, people were looking for alternatives to this conception and found
themagainin ancient Greece. When Goethe exclaimed, Everyone should be a
Greek in his own way! But a Greek he should be (Jeder sei auf seine Art ein
Grieche! Aber er seis. Goethe 1960 ff, vol. 20, 232), he was expressing the position of many of his contemporaries, who saw ancient Greece as a formative experience, which held all kinds of golden alternatives for the present; Greece
was past, it is true, but could be revived. In addition to pure rational science,
something else was found to be guilty of the miseries of the present, namely Jewish and Christian monotheisms, which had deprived the cheerful Greek culture of
power and, with it, had created a bourgeoisie and a society that was hostile to
real experience. Goethes friend, Friedrich Schiller, directly attacked Christian
monotheism and started a great controversy with his poem Die Gtter Griechenlands (The Gods of Greece):
Whilst the smiling earth ye governed still,
And with raptures soft and guiding hand
Led the happy nations at your will,
Beauteous beings from the fable-land! []
There, where now, as were by sages told,
Whirls on high a soulless fiery ball,
Helios guided then his car of gold,
In his silent majesty, oer all. []
Beauteous world, where art thou gone? O, thou,
Natures blooming youth, return once more!
Ah, but in songs fairy region now
Lives thy fabled trace so dear of yore!
Cold and perished, sorrow now the plains,
Not one godhead greets my longing sight;
41
Ah, the shadow only now remains

Of yon living image bright!
In contrast to the soulless fiery ball of a Copernicus, here was the sun god, Helios, as a mythical countermeasure that could restore the lost unity of humankind with the cosmos.
As a result of the restoration of the ancient world of the gods, astrology also
gained a new literary respect since it seemed, at least in its scholarly philosophical
form, to be a model of the living cosmos that portrayed the dynamics of freedom
and necessity, of history and religion. How Schiller processed these dynamics can
be inferred from Wallenstein, whose horoscope, since Keplers famous interpretation, had repeatedly been the topic of public debate. Schiller was generally skeptical about astrology and asked Goethe and his friend from Jena, Christian Gottfried Krner, to tell him how a philosophically reflective astrology could be
The Gods of Greece, translation by E.A. Bowring, quoted from http://www.bartleby.com/

270/9/2.html (accessed 25 January 2013). The original, according to the first publication in Der
Teutsche Merkur, March 1788, 250 260 (facsimile at http://www.uni-due.de/lyriktheorie/scans/
1788_schiller.pdf, accessed 25 January 2013) runs as follows:
Da ihr noch die schne Welt regiertet,
an der Freude leichtem Gngelband
glcklichere Menschenalter fhrtet,
schne Wesen aus dem Fabelland! []
Wo jezt nur, wie unsre Weisen sagen,
seelenlos ein Feuerball sich dreht,
lenkte damals seinen goldnen Wagen
Helios in stiller Majestt. []
Schne Welt, wo bist du? Kehre wieder,
holdes Blthenalter der Natur!
Ach! nur in dem Feenland der Lieder
lebt noch deine goldne Spur.
Ausgestorben trauert das Gefilde,
keine Gottheit zeigt sich meinem Blik,
Ach! von jenem lebenwarmen Bilde
blieb nur das Gerippe mir zurck.
Alle jene Blthen sind gefallen
von des Nordes winterlichem Wehn.
Einen zu bereichern, unter allen,
mute diese Gtterwelt vergehn.
Traurig such ich an dem Sternenbogen,
dich, Selene, find ich dort nicht mehr;
Durch die Wlder ruf ich, durch die Wogen,
ach! sie wiederhallen leer!
42
possible and whether his understanding of astrology was correct (see Schielicke
2007, 66 70). Schiller revived the ancient art of astrological interpretation in
the character of the astrologer Seni. However, a new opinion of the role of astrology, which was to catch on in the nineteenth century, was also evident in Wallenstein, for instance in the figure of Max Piccolomini. Although Seni still represented
the strong power of fate perceptible in the stars, it was the critical position of enlightened intellectuals which now took the foreground. Astrology was no longer
science but rather playful art and religion, which claimed its cultural place as
the sign language of the living and ensouled universe, accessible to the loving
heart.
Schillers example was still received positively in the nineteenth century because it provided a discursive entanglement of science and astrology that fit understandings of German Geisteswissenschaft. The term Geisteswissenschaft
emerged in 1849 as a translation of moral science, but it had a meaning that
is not rendered correctly in the usual English translation of humanities or the
French sciences humaines (Regg 2004, 417). The meaning of Geisteswissenschaft
is linked to the fact that the term itself is a new discursive entanglement of spirit/
mind (Geist) and science (Wissenschaft). Regarding astrology, an example of a
positive evaluation along these lines is Robert Billwillers 1877 lecture On Astrology. Billwiller, who was the director of the Swiss Meteorological Station in
Zurich, opened his lecture with the apology that on the occasion of the 59th anniversary of the foundation of the Natural Scientific Association (Naturwissenschaftliche Gesellschaft) he would speak about astrology:
While following the kind invitation, which brought me today to this place, with thankful
appreciation, I start with the confession that my topic does not really intend to expand
the knowledge of positive results in the field of the natural sciences, but rather to illuminate the cultural historical relevance of a phenomenon, which to call by the name science
in our days is rightly seen as a profanation, but which for thousands of years has been regarded as the most desirable knowledge, and a knowledge that was without doubt the topic
of many of the best thinkers.
Indem ich der freundlichen Einladung, die mich heute an diesen Platz gerufen, in dankbarer
Anerkennung dieses Wohlwollens Folge leiste, beginne ich mit dem Gestndniss, dass mein
Thema nicht in erster Linie eine Erweiterung der Kenntnisse an positiven Ergebnissen auf dem
Gebiete der Naturwissenschaft anstrebt, sondern vielmehr den Zweck hat, die culturhistorische
Bedeutung eines Gegenstandes zu beleuchten, welchem den Namen Wissenschaft zu geben in
unsern Tagen mit Recht als Profanation erscheint, der aber doch Jahrtausende hindurch als das
begehrteste alles Wissenswerthem galt und an dem sich unstreitig auch viele der besten Kpfe
gebt haben (Billwiller 1878, 3).
43
While this constellation of science and astrology entirely follows the new understanding, Billwiller reminds the audience that astrology is called the mother
of astronomy (1878, 5) and thus belongs to the historical and cultural heritage of
todays sciences. Instead of blaming ourselves for this great historical form of
superstition (ibid., 32), we should rather be proud of the way the human spirit
has freed itself from the imprisonment of earlier periods. This self-liberation
should also be a reconciliation with the past (ibid., 32). And this is exactly
where Schiller comes into play. Billwiller ended his lecture with a quote from
The Gods of Greece, and he introduced that quote as follows:
What can liberate us from the urge of the earthly is the conscious elevation of the spirit
above imperfect reality into the realm of poetry and the ideal, into the realm of complete
perfectness, the most sublime symbol of which forever remains the starry sky. In the
realm of the ideal we want to give the old gods and the old religion a friendly welcome,
and thus we can conclude with the deeply profound words of Schiller.
Aestheticization and Psychologization of Astral Powers in the Romantic Period

The astheticization and psychologization of the astral powers became an element in art and natural research in the Romantic period, in which people
were searching for a whole and non-reducible explanation of the cosmos. Starting from Schellings (1775 1854) natural philosophy, which itself is linked to esoteric traditions, not a few philosophers of German Romanticism tried to reestablish astrology as a metaphysical science. In his 1802 General overview of the
current state of the German literature, August Wilhelm Schlegel complained
that, in the wake of the Enlightenment, people thought in categories of quantity
and usefulness and had lost a sense of the miraculous. It is worth quoting this
passage at length. Schlegel complains that
the mathematical forms of explanation have killed everything, and the mathematical physicists, who want to explain everything with a simple calculus, have themselves become machines of their own machine. As long as we stick to masses and distances and mechanical
forms of impact, I cannot see anything elevating or nourishing for the heart in astronomy.
In the same way as one could call Kepler the last great astrologer, astronomy has to become
Was uns vom Drang des Irdischen befreien kann, das ist die bewusste Erhebung des Geistes
ber die unvollkommene Wirklichkeit in das Reich der Dichtung und des Ideals, in das Reich
aller Vollkommenheiten, dessen erhabenstes Symbol ewig der gestirnte Himmel bleibt. Im
Reiche des Ideals wollen wir sie wieder freundlich willkommen heissen, die alten Gtter und den
alten Glauben, und so knnen wir denn mit den tief bedeutungsvollen Worten Schillers
schliessen (Billwiller 1878, 33).
44
astrology again. We do not want to only count the stars, measure them, and follow their
paths with our telescopes; rather, we long to know the meaning of all this. Astrology, due
to its presumptuous claim of being a science, which it could not assert, is sunk in contempt;
however, contempt of its practice cannot discredit the idea of astrology, which is based on
everlasting truths. The dynamic influence of the stars, that they are animated by intelligences, and that they as a kind of subdivinities exert their creative power on the spheres below
themthese are doubtlessly much higher forms of ideas than if we think of them as dead,
mechanically reacting masses. [] The planetary influence on metals and some other discarded astrological ideas are brought up again by more thorough physics.
In this passage, all of the discourse strands are put together, trying to turn back
the clock and re-introduce the soul into science, astrology into astronomy, and
dynamism into physics. Again, Kepler is the ultimate personification of this ideal
state that has been lost in the wake of the changes in scientific method and philosophy. Consequently, Schlegel also pointed out that astrology is an indispensible idea for poetry (1994 [1802], 56), thus linking the discourse to the emerging
Romantic blending of art and science. He did the same with physics and magic,
arguing that what astrology is for poetry, magic is for physics.
What do we mean with this word [magic]? The minds direct rule over matter, which leads
to wondrous, incomprehensible effects. Magic is also brought into disrepute by the bad sorcerers. But for us, nature should become magical again, i. e., in all bodily things we should
only see signs, codes of spiritual intentions; we must regard all natural effects as if they
were caused by a word of higher spirits, by secret magic spells; only then will we be initi-
Auf hnliche Art haben die mathematischen Erklrungsarten alles erttet, und die mathematischen Physiker, die alles durch den bloen Kalkl ausmachen wollen, sind wiederum
Maschinen dieser ihrer Maschine geworden. Solange man bei Massen und Entfernungen und
mechanischen Wirkungsarten stehenbleibt, kann ich nichts sonderlich Erhebendes und das
Gemt Nhrendes in der Astronomie finden. In dem Sinne, wie man Keplern den letzten groen
Astrologen nennen kann, mu die Astronomie wieder zur Astrologie werden. Wir wollen nicht
blo die Gestirne zhlen und messen und ihrem Laufe mit den Fernglsern folgen, sondern die
Bedeutung von dem allen begehren wir zu wissen. Die Astrologie ist durch anmaliche Wissenschaftlichkeit, wobei sie sich nicht behaupten konnte, in Verachtung geraten; allein durch
die Art der Ausbung kann die Idee derselben nicht herabgewrdigt werden, welcher unvergngliche Wahrheiten zum Grunde liegen. Die dynamische Einwirkung der Gestirne, da sie von
Intelligenzen beseelt seien und gleichsam als Untergottheiten ber die ihnen unterworfnen
Sphren Schpferkraft ausben: dies sind unstreitig weit hhere Vorstellungsarten, als wenn
man sie sich wie tote, mechanisch regierte Massen denkt. [] Die Beziehung der Planeten auf die
Metalle und so manche verworfne Vorstellungsarten der Astrologie werden durch grndlichere
Physik wieder emporgebracht (Schlegel 1994 [1802], 55 56, emphasis original).
45
ated into the mysteries, as far as our limitation allows for that, and only then will we develop at least a vague idea of the endlessly renewing creation of the universe from nothing.
We can clearly see here how the discourses of astrology and astronomy on the
one hand and magic and physics on the other are interconnected in an overall
polemical discourse of spirit and philosophy of nature versus rational science.
The same line of argumentation is also dominant in the work of Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg, 1772 1801), who talked of the qualitative significance of
numbers and called astronomy the true metaphysics and right astrology. Following the work of Franz Anton Mesmerwhose dissertation carried the characteristic title De influxu astrorum in corpore humano (The Influence of the Stars
on the Human Body)numerous scholars of nature, including the poet Justinus
Kerner, tried to find in the whole universe and in matter an original principle that
was also present in astrology. Philosophers like Gustav Theodor Fechner came up
with speculative thoughts on endowing the planets with souls and on the part that
the ever-reincarnated human soul plays in the divine world soul (Erdbeer 2010,
335 506). All of these options were alternatives to those scientific paradigms
that start from the primacy of pure reason and the mechanistic rationalization
of the cosmos. This re-evaluation of astrology based on natural philosophy as
metaphysical astronomy is easily distinguishable from the practical interpretative
art of casting horoscopes as it was practiced in England. As the quotes from Schlegel make clear, practical astrology was criticized even by those scholars who otherwise lamented the disappearance of the mind from science.
On the continent in the nineteenth century, there were few people who had
the confidence to come out into the open with serious astrological works in the
classical and practical sense. One exception was the prophet and astrologer J.
K. Vogt from Munich. He is supposed to have forecast the fall of Sebastopol and
the downfall of Napoleon III and to have shot himself in 1860 when a lottery win
he had calculated did not materialize. More important than Vogt was Professor
Johann W. Pfaff (1774 1835) from Erlangen, who, in a work called Astrologie
Ebenso wie die Astrologie fordert die Poesie von der Physik die Magie. Was verstehen wir
unter diesem Worte? Unmittelbare Herrschaft des Geistes ber die Materie zu wunderbaren,
unbegreiflichen Wirkungen. Die Magie ist ebenfalls durch die schlechten Zauberer in Mikredit
gekommen. Die Natur soll uns aber wieder magisch werden, d. h., wir sollen in allen krperlichen Dingen nur Zeichen, Chiffren geistiger Intentionen erblicken; alle Naturwirkungen mssen
uns wie durch hheres Geisterwort, durch geheimnisvolle Zaubersprche hervorgerufen erscheinen, nur so werden wir in die Mysterien eingeweiht, soweit unsre Beschrnktheit das
erlaubt, und lernen die unaufhrlich sich erneuernde Schpfung des Universums aus Nichts
wenigstens ahnden (Schlegel 1994 [1802], 56 57, emphasis original).
46
(1816), talked of astrology attempting to come home into the circle of must-belearned sciences and of it necessarily being successful in that attempt since its
traditions are honorable and true. In 1822 and 1823, Pfaff, in collaboration with
his university colleague G.H. Schubert, published Astrologische Taschenbcher,
which contained a complete German translation of Ptolemys Tetrabiblos and
several essays on great conjunctions, the Star of Bethlehem, and other traditional themes. Pfaff was also of the opinion that a singular spiritual principle flows
through the universe, of which everything is part. This he detailed in his collection of essays Der Mensch und die Sterne: Fragmente zur Geschichte der Weltseele
(1834) (The Human Being and the Stars: Fragments on the History of the World
Soul).
However, with the exception of these attempts at the restoration of astrology
in scholarly circles, nineteenth-century astrology constituted a socially despised
entity. Although some practicing astrologers still carried on with their activities,
in the public perception and in the universities they could in no way make their
influence felt. The discursive differentiation between mythological astrology and
scientific astronomy had come to a conclusion, which can also be seen in the
change of dispositives that characterizes the period. When we look at the historiography of scientific instruments, which links the history of objects to the history
of experience, it is remarkable that the 19th century is the century when instruments were first considered to be explicitly scientific (Staubermann 2007, 10).
Focusing on astro-photometric instruments, Staubermann demonstrates how
an instrument became scientific and how instruments contributed to the making
of a new scientific discipline (2007, 10). When the experiential implementation of
new instruments created a dispositive that legitimated astronomy as science in
the nineteenth century, the same occurred for astronomical observatories. In the
first half of the eighteenth century, there were only some 30 observatories worldwide; around 1850 this number had increased significantly, but there were still
only 80 or 90 observatories worldwide (Schielicke 2008, 10). That is why observatories such as that at the University of Jena were influential elements in the
changing entanglements of astrology and science. Interestingly enough, even
in the Romantic period some non-polemical links between astronomy and astrology were visible, for instance in the fact that Goethe, an advocate of astrology, was
instrumental in establishing the Jena observatory, thus preparing the prosperous
career of Carl Zei in Jena (Schielicke 2008, 10, 65, 73 76, 97 99); it is also indicative of a more nuanced discursive constellation that the search for supernatural
causes of astronomical phenomena and alternatives to the Copernican system
were still discussed at the time (Schielicke 2008, 53 54).
47

Particularly in Germany, the critical responses to rationalism and reductionism
found numerous expressions in the period between 1870 and 1930. The examples
of Schiller and Goethe but also of Kepler and others who combined strict science
with a sense of the numinous (Schleiermacher) were conjured up repeatedly in
the German discourse of the time. I already mentioned Robert Billwiller above.
Almost fifty years later, Robert Henseling followed the same direction in reconfiguring the discourse strands of science and astrology. In his popular book on
The Genesis and the Essence of Astrology, the historical content of which he
basically took from standard works available at the time (Boll 1918 and Gundel
1922), Henseling clearly formulated what he saw as the main problems of the period. While science advanced triumphantly and left behind all superstition and
imprisonment of the human being, the spiritual deficit of this triumph was painfully felt. It is worth quoting the last passages of his essay in full:
The knowledge, once not separated from opinion, subordinate to the power of belief, has
been following its own path more and more frenetically for two millennia; care for religion
here, knowledge therethey became more and more alienated from each other. The experience of an ultimate meaning of the world, as it still warmly radiates in the works of Kepler, or as Kant devoutly confessed it in the Universal Natural History and Theory of the
Heavens, modern exact research consciously and strictly keeps at a distance. And perhaps
with good natural reasons until now: the past centuries accumulated entirely too many experiences that were in need of purely logical treatment. But today the gulf between understanding of facts and sensual experience has become entirely too large. Parts we can control, but the spiritual ties are missing. Thus again we feel twice as deeply, full of longing,
that the human being only in the totality, from which humanity stems and to which it will
return, can really find its spiritual roots.
This search of our fermenting time lets all mysticism proliferate and lets many people
go astray again back to the astrological doctrine of the harmony of the world. However, bigger and brighter than in any other period, the experience of the all-unity will be revealed to
future religion. [] It depends on the form and power of our own inwardness, what the
world means to us and how deeply we can find delight in it. Angelus Silesius will prove
right: I myself have to be the sun; I have to paint the colorless ocean of the whole godhead
with my own rays.
Das Wissen, einst ungeschieden vom Meinen, dann der Macht des Glaubens untertan,
geht seit zwei Jahrtausenden immer ungebndigter auf selbstgebahnten Wegen; die Pflege des
Glaubens hier, des Wissens dort wurden einander fremd und fremder. Das Erlebnis eines
Weltsinnes, wie es noch die Werke eines Kepler warm durchstrahlt und wie es Kant in der
Naturgeschichte des Himmels glubig bekennt, hlt sich die moderne exakte Forschung bewut und strenge fern. Bisher wohl mit natrlichem Recht: die vergangenen Jahrhunderte
huften allzu viele Erfahrungen, die zunchst der rein logischen Bewltigung bedarf. Aber heute
48
Statements like these are clear examples of what Max Webernot by chance a
contemporary of Henseling and exposed to the same intellectual climate
would call the dialectic of disenchantment and re-enchantment. But discursive
analysis makes clear how this process is done concretely: it ultimately takes
the form of a re-entanglement of the discourse strands of knowledge, science,
astrology, and the spiritual (Geist). Robert Henseling was instrumental in popularizing this reconfiguration of knowledge. In his Umstrittenes Weltbild: Astrologie, Welteislehre, Um Erdgestalt und Weltmitte (Controversial Conception of the
World: Astrology, World Ice Theory, On the Form of the Earth and the Center of
the World), with a motto by Kepler, he again argued for a holistic interpretation
of astrology and criticized the world ice theory as unscientific (see Erdbeer 2010,
585 586; see also Erdbeers table 31 with astrological aesthetics linked to popularizing versions of the cosmic ice theory; cf. Wessely 2008). His book was published in 1939 and was good for no less than five reprints the same year.
Given this discursive impact, it is not surprising to find this blend of astrology, philosophy, and psychology also in other publications of that period. One
may think, for instance, of the paleontologist Edgar Dacqu (1878 1945) and
his speculation about the animistic character of the cosmos. Nature, the entire
cosmos, has in itself living meaning, an animate essence; it has soul; nowhere
can we see anything dead. With an implicit reference to Goethe, he noted
that the streaming of all of nature is not a formless flowing, even less a mechanistic collision; rather, these are powers that push to formation in animated
liveliness [zur Gestaltung drngen in seelenhafter Lebendigkeit] (Dacqu 1944
[1949], 147). This is what made the astrological symbol (Dacqu 1944 [1949],
147 166) a powerful metaphor for the animated cosmos.
German intellectuals around 1900 returned to Kepler as one of the greatest
and deepest thinkers of Germany (Zllner 1886, 5), as well as to Goethe, Schiller, and the Romantics in their search for a reconfiguration of the science of the
stars that would do justice both to scientific empiricism and spiritual quests. As I
ist die Kluft zwischen dem Tatsachenerkennen und dem Sinnerleben allzu gro geworden. Teile
haben wir in der Hand, am geistigen Bande fehlts. So fhlen wir denn wieder doppelt tief und
voller Sehnsucht, da der Mensch nur in der Totalitt, aus der er kommt und zu der er heimgehen wird, geistig wahrhaft zu wurzeln vermag.
Dies Suchen der grenden Zeit macht alle Mystik wuchern und lt auch manchen sich zur
astrologischen Lehre der Weltharmonie zurckverirren. Grer aber und lichter als irgend einer
vergangenen Zeit wird sich knftigem Glauben das Erlebnis der All-Einheit erschlieen. [] Von
Art und Kraft der eigenen Innerlichkeit hngt ab, was uns die Welt bedeutet und wie tief sie uns
zu beglcken vermag. Angelus Silesius wird recht behalten:
Ich selbst mu Sonne sein; ich mu mit meinen Strahlen
Das farbenlose Meer der ganzen Gottheit malen (Henseling 1924, 92, emphasis original).
49
have described elsewhere, this led to a renaissance of astrology in Germany, including new techniques and the formation of astrological associations at the beginning of the twentieth century. The center of learned astrology was slowly moving from Great Britain (Curry 1992) to the continent and the United States, but
particularly to Germany during that period (von Stuckrad 2007, 287 336).
What can be called the spiritualization of astrology was mainly fostered by
two important historical developments. The first was the foundation of the Theosophical Society in 1875, which marked a central turning point in preparation
for the discursive reconfiguration of religion, science, and esotericism in the
twentieth century. I will deal with these implications in Chapter 5 below (on Theosophical astrology see the overview in von Stuckrad 2007, 301 309; on Alan
Leo see Curry 1992, 122 159). The second development, which was discursively
linked to Theosophical movements, was the implementation of psychology as
an academic discipline on European universities, which further enhanced the
process of scientification of religion. When it comes to astrology, this is best exemplified in the work of Carl Gustav Jung.
The Marriage of Secular Psychology and Astrology:

Carl Gustav Jung
The attempt to link astrological symbols to psychological dispositions is perhaps
as old as the discipline of astrology itself. Intensive psychological studies have
been part of astrological research at least since the Renaissance (on Girolamo
Cardano see Grafton 1999; von Stuckrad 2007, 227 232), but the establishment
of psychology as an academic discipline was an important change in dispositives
that attributed new meanings to astrology and its relation to scientific research.
The empirical, medical paradigm was transferred to the study of the soul, which
added a new dimension to philosophical, literary, and artistic discussions of the
cosmic soul, the world soul, and similar concepts that were prominent in Germany beginning in the early modern period (Vassnyi 2011). Sigmund Freud
played an important role in this process with his quite mechanistic model of
human drives and instinctual structure. Important recent studies have demonstrated that the impact of occultist and Theosophical speculation, as well as Romantic fascination with the hidden powers of the human mind, were instrumental in the formation of psychology as an academic discipline (Treitel 2004;
Bhm, Jaeger, and Krex 2009; Gibbons 2001, 103 144; Erdbeer 2010, passim).
Theories of rays and electricity were discursively entangled with research into
psychic powers (Hahn and Schttpelz 2009; on art see Bauduin 2012).
50
But for astrology in particular (less so for academic psychology), the works
of Carl Gustav Jung (1875 1961) were of paramount importance. It was Jung who
combined religion, psychology, philosophy, and astrology in a way that has influenced astrological discourse until the present day. His depth psychology is
still authoritative for practical astrology to an astonishing degree, given the professional critique with which Jungs theory was confronted and which has more
or less excluded him from accepted knowledge in the field of academic psychology. One result of the primacy of symbolic and psychological interpretationparticularly in continental Europeis the fact that contemporary astrologers focus
on inner processes of the human soul rather than making prognostications
about future events. Individual psychological astrology is thus the most important branch in contemporary astrological practice, much more relevant than interrogations or mundane astrology.
Beginning at the turn of the twentieth century, Jung extensively exchanged his
ideas with Theosophists and other representatives of occult and esoteric discourse
(Noll 1994; Hakl 2001, 81 92 and 121 156; Hanegraaff 2012, 277 295). He integrated esoteric concepts into his psychology and was particularly interested in the
transfers between the individual psyche and collective, or transpersonal, dimensions that he described with reference to European cultural history. His importance for esoteric discourse in the twentieth century lies in the religious charging
of the soul, which sacralized the psychological and at the same time psychologized the sacred. The idea of the unconscious had already been discussed by
Carl Gustav Carus in the Romantic period (on Carus contribution to esoteric discourse see Erdbeer 2010, 167 255), but it gained full academic acceptance only
through the works of Freud and particularly Jung. Jungs concept of the collective
unconscious refers to a universal symbolic system that is available to the individual psyche and becomes visible in dreams or myths. With such a dehistoricization
of spiritual processes, myths, and dreams, Jung was part of a larger discourse that
was characterized by the search for ultimate essences in religion and philosophy.
This discourse materialized, e.g., in the Eranos meetings in which Jung took part
(Wasserstrom 1999; Hakl 2001), but also in theories of religion that were developed
against the background of two World Wars (von Stuckrad 2010c).
To systematize the timeless symbols, Jung developed the doctrine of archetypes, universal forms of cultural and religious ideas that, according to Jung,
have retained their continuity until the present day. One example is the archetype that is linked to the female and that reveals qualities such as passivity, reception, and emotions. Discursively speaking, the concept of archetypesin this
case, the anima as the female part of the male soulstabilized and legitimized
gendered knowledge about what is the ultimate and timeless female principle.
We will see in Chapter 7 how this attribution of meaning even succeeded in cre-
51
ating new religious identities. As for astrology, the doctrine of the archetypes
proved successful as well. Most contemporary astrologers conceptualize the
twelve signs of the zodiac and the planetary powers as cosmic principles that
manifest in the human psyche. Most commonly, the moon became the receiving
female principle, the sun became the active male principle, Mars became the dynamically aggressive principle, and so forth. Jung himself supported this reading
of his theory, and his own esoteric interests were also combined with a study of
astrology. Following the publication of Theosophical works on astrology in 1910,
Jung wrote in a letter to Sigmund Freud:
My evenings are very much occupied by astrology. I calculate horoscopes in order to trace the
psychological truthfulness. Up to now [there have been] some remarkable things that you certainly would find unbelievable. For one lady, the calculation of the planets showed a certain
character profile with some details of destiny; however, this did not belong to her but to her
mother, for whom the character profile fitted like a glove. The lady is suffering from an extraordinary mother complex. I have to say that by all means we may discover in astrology
someday a significant portion of knowledge about ways of foreboding, which happened to
be seen in the heavens. It seems, for instance, that the zodiacal signs are character images,
i.e., libido symbols, which picture the respective typical libido characteristics.
On 8 December 1928, Jung wrote to L. Oswald that astrology, like Theosophy etc.,
tries to satisfy an irrational urge for knowledge, which however leads to a wrong
path (Jung 1981, 81). Nevertheless, with Tbingen University professors embracing astrology and with Cardiff University offering a course about astrology the
year before, astrology is standing in front of the doors of our universities
(ibid.). Astrology, according to Jung, is not pure superstition but contains, like
Theosophy, some relevant psychological insights. As a matter of fact, astrology
has nothing to do with the stars; it is the 5,000-year-old psychology of the ancient
times and the Middle Ages (Jung 1981, 82; see also Jungs letter to B. Baur from 29
January 1934 [Jung 1981, 181], in which he explains the precession of the equinoxes
and concludes that time is a stream of events, filled with qualities).
Meine Abende sind sehr in Anspruch genommen durch die Astrologie. Ich mache Horoskopberechnungen, um dem psychologischen Wahrheitsgehalt auf die Spur zu kommen. Bis
jetzt einige bemerkenswerte Dinge, die Ihnen gewi unglaublich erscheinen werden. Bei einer
Dame ergab sich durch die Berechnung der Gestirnstellungen ein ganz bestimmtes Charakterbild
mit einigen detaillierten Schicksalen, das aber nicht ihr zugehrte, sondern ihrer Mutter; dort aber
sa die Charakteristik wie angegossen. Die Dame leidet an einem auerordentlichen Mutterkomplex. Ich mu sagen, da in der Astrologie eines Tages sehr wohl ein gutes Stck Wissens von
Ahnungswegen, das an den Himmel geraten ist, entdeckt werden knnte. Es scheint z. B., da die
Tierkreisbilder Charakterbilder sind, d. h. Libidosymbole, welche die jeweiligen typischen Libidoeigenschaften schildern (Letter to Sigmund Freud, 12 June 1911, in Jung 1981, 45).
52
Jungs relevance for contemporary astrology can hardly be overestimated.

After 1945, psychological astrology became the major branch of astrological
theory and practice. But for the process of scientification of religion, he was influential in another way, too.
The Dialogue between Wolfgang Pauli and Carl Gustav Jung and Its Impact
Jungs strong interest in the intersections between psychology, philosophy, religion, and science brought him repeatedly into contact with natural scientists of
his time. With the rise of the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, which
questioned the deterministic paradigm of the physical theories prevalent since
the time of Isaac Newton, many philosophical and scientific interpretations of
new models were discussed. In fact, Thomas Arzt may have been right when he
wrote that even at the end of the twentieth century the implications of the new
paradigm have not yet been fully understood and appreciated (Arzt, Hippius-Grfin Drckheim, and Dollinger 1992, 14). Among the most distinguished physicists
of the twentieth century, Wolfgang Pauli (1900 1958), winner of the Nobel Prize in
1945, deserves special attention, because his thinking on the interface of the natural sciences, philosophy, and psychology very much stimulated later generations
(see especially Pauli 1994). Astonishingly enough, his work is not as appreciated
as that of his colleagues, Einstein, Heisenberg, or Bohr. It is especially in discussions about holism and the religious dimensions of science that Pauli has been
rediscovered (Laurikainen 1988; Laurikainen and Montonen 1993).
For Pauli, metaphysical dimensions were an integral element of physics itself.
In a letter to Markus Fierz in 1952, Pauli wrote that the non-determinacy of this
singular experiment was a return of the anima mundi (world soul), which had
been forced away in the seventeenth century (see also Pauli in Jung and Pauli
1952, 115). This notion already hints at the dialogue Pauli had with Carl Gustav
Jung (Atmanspacher 2012; Tagliagambe and Malinconico 2011; Miller 2009; Sparks
2007; Gieser 2005; Atmanspacher, Primas, and Wertenschlag-Birkhuser 1995; for
a translation of the Pauli-Jung letters see Meier 2001). Besides the alchemical connotations of modern science, it was the concept Jung called synchronicity that
was a major topic of their conversations. It became part of a book they published
together in 1952. Naturerklrung und Psyche (The Interpretation of Nature and the
Psyche) contains Jungs essay Synchronizitt als ein Prinzip akausaler Zusammenhnge (Synchronicity: An A-causal Connecting Principle) and Paulis treatise on Der Einflu archetypischer Vorstellungen auf die Bildung naturwissenschaftlicher Ideen bei Kepler (translated as The Influence of Archetypal Ideas
on the Scientific Theories of Kepler). Again, we see how Keplers understanding
53
is influential in the reconfiguration of discourses on astrology and science, this

time by a leading representative of twentieth-century physics. This discursive connection remains valid even if it is important to remember that the real subject of
Paulis article was not primarily Kepler as a historical figure but rather Kepler as
an illustration of the problematic relationship between the observer and what is
observed (Westman 1984, 177, emphasis original).
Roughly speaking, Jung regarded the phenomenon of synchronicity as an
analogously interpreted coincidence [sinngeme Koinzidenz] or an a-causal
parallelism (Jung and Pauli 1952, 9, 26, 31). Hence synchronicity is the simultaneous occurrence of two events that are connected by meaning, not by causality.
These few catchwords already reveal the close link between Jungs vocabulary
and the Hermetic doctrine of as above, so below, which is one of the fundamental ideas of the science of the stars. Therefore, it comes as no surprise
that Jung in this essay also addressed astrology (Jung and Pauli 1952, 44 69).
Wolfgang Pauli never appreciated Jungs use of the theory of synchronicity as
a legitimization of astrology, but he was interested in the far-reaching implications
of quantum mechanics on the concept of nature. This theory refutes the Newtonian paradigm of determinism, causality, and objectivity. Pauli pointed out that the
observer played a significant role in every experiment; empirically discernible reality is dependent on the observers place and subjective condition. Thus, the freedom of the observing person implies that the human psyche cannot be separated
from the physical image of the world. In his 1952 essay, Pauli used alchemy as an
example of a system that acknowledges this connection (Jung and Pauli 1952, 166;
I will come back to this in the next chapter). Pauli was radical in his conclusions
and argued that there is no objective reality. Instead, reality consists of rational
and irrational elements. Not everything, therefore, can be explained with rational
theories. Pauli proved that the physical world is not fully determined and not even
necessarily built on causal relations with his famous Pauli Principle, which says
that the distribution of an atoms electrons, i.e., their mutual exclusion, is always
a-causal. From here it is but one step to the chaos theory that was discussed controversially in subsequent physical theory.
In addition to the Pauli Principle, brief mention must be made of the socalled EPR-Correlations (named after the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox).
In an influential paper in 1935, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen claimed that the
whole formalism of quantum mechanics, in addition to what they called a Reality Criterion, implies that quantum mechanics cannot be complete. They
speculated on the existence of some elements of reality that are not described
by quantum mechanics. There must be a more complete description of physical
reality involving some hidden variables that can characterize the state of affairs
54
in the world in more detail than the quantum mechanical state. This conclusion
leads to paradoxical results, as Lszl E. Szab explains:
As Bell proved in 1964, under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion
that there are hidden variables implies that, in some spin-correlation experiments, the
measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Belltype inequalities). The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy
these inequalities. And this paradoxical fact has been confirmed by several laboratory experiments since the 1970s.
Some researchers have interpreted this result as showing that quantum mechanics is
telling us nature is non-local, that is, that particles can affect each other across great distances in a time too brief for the effect to have been due to ordinary causal interaction. Others object to this interpretation, and the problem is still open and hotly debated among
both physicists and philosophers. It has motivated a wide range of research from the
most fundamental quantum mechanical experiments through foundations of probability
theory to the theory of stochastic causality as well as the metaphysics of free will (2008).
Steven Weinberg, another Nobel Prize winner, argued that an instantaneous

change of wave-function in the entire universe is at stake here (1992, 81). And
the physicist Nick Herbert claimed that the deeper reality of the world is maintained in an invisible quantum relation, the omnipresent influence being unmediated and direct (Herbert 1987). Not surprisingly, these interpretations have
been enthusiastically picked up by astrologers (see also Kaiser 2011, 68 69).
The Pauli-Jung dialogue and the related discussion legitimated the conviction
that matter and mind are by no means separate domains. Put differently: it is
in this dialogue that the discourse strands of science, mind, matter, and astrology where re-entangled. One of the most important popularizers of this
thinking is F. David Peat (b. 1938), who in many publications has contributed
to the popularization of theoretical issues of quantum mechanics and modern
science. His thinking is very much influenced by David Bohm (see Bohm and
Peat 1987) but also reveals the imprint of Prigogines and Sheldrakes holistic
theories (on whom see Chapter 4 below). Most recognized is his metaphysical expansion of the concept of synchronicity, which makes use of the indeterminacy
and simultaneity of phenomena as described in quantum mechanics. Peat, for
his part, did not restrict himself to the holistic implications of synchronicity
but elaborated a full-blown spiritual and metaphysical view of nature and reality, which is both imaginative and speculative (Briggs and Peat 1984; Peat 1987).
As a result, Peat expects a coming transformation of humanity and society that
will lead to a new integration of matter and mind, of nature and the human
being.
Another, though much less influential, thinker of astrological quantum discourse is Theodor Landscheidt (1927 2004). In 1994 he argued:
55
Thus, the astrological premise of the cosmos as a holistic fabric, connecting all subsystems
that are part of it, is not only compatible with modern natural science, but even proven by
it. [] The basic astrological assumption that the cosmos is an organic process that connects all microcosmic and macrocosmic sub-processes into one unit, [proves to be] a progressive concept (1994, 28; emphasis original).
Landscheidts book, the title of which combines science and astrology, is a

good example of a late twentieth-century configuration of these discourse
strands. However, his position is discursively much less influential than contributions by more popular authors, who argue that quantum mechanics should be
combined with the theory of relativity or that string theory would be a candidate
to answer the open questions that modern physics presents. David Deutsch, for
instance, a fellow of the Royal Society in London and physicist at the University
of Oxford, recently claimed that the world is a multiverse, in which time can no
longer be conceptualized as space-time but rather as a quantum concept, and in
which time-journeys and many other fascinating things are principally possible
(Deutsch 1997; Deutsch 2012; see also Greene 2003). David Deutsch is a good
bridge to the next chapter, and I will come back to him, because he refers to alchemy in order to make his point.
If we broaden our perspective and look at the genealogy of todays theories
of mind and matter, my research confirms what David Kaiser argued recently:
Many ideas that now occupy the core of quantum information science once
found their home amid an anything-goes counterculture frenzy, a mishmash of
spoon-bending psychics, Eastern mysticism, LSD trips, CIA spooks chasing
mind-reading dreams, and comparable Age of Aquarius enthusiasms (2011,
xiii). Instead of a mishmash, however, I would call these creative processes
the re-entanglement of discourse strands.
3 Alchemical Quests in Modern Garb

We have seen so far that astrology, or the science of the stars, applied hermeneutical methods that interacted explicitly with the field of rational interpretations of nature, a domain that has been claimed by modern science since the
nineteenth century. Although astrological knowledge had been discarded in
this discursive entanglement, the ingredients of the relevant discursive knots
were tied together again in new constellations during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Astrology was both a competitor with secular science and a representative of scientific thinking that was interested in an inclusive, qualitative
view of nature. This is the main reason why astrology could maintain its discursive influence in the twentieth century.
In this chapter, I will focus on related developments in the field of alchemy.
Astrology, magic (on which see Otto 2011), and alchemy have long been discussed under the rubric of occult sciences. This very term indicates the discursive entanglement of science and something that is not regarded as scientific, or
at least is seen as a qualification of the noun that changes its connotation significantly. The discourse of occultism or occult philosophy is a configuration
that combines cultures of knowledge that were no longer regarded as legitimate
in the emerging episteme of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Since
then, European discourses distinguished legitimate from illegitimate knowledge
in different ways than these had previously been distinguished, framing the debate polemically in terms of science versus pseudo-science (Rupnow et
al. 2008) and rationality versus superstition. These terms, which became instruments of analysis in subsequent academic disciplines, reflect the socio-professional identities and conceptual perspectives of modern people who view
themselves as progressive, rational, and enlightened, against which the Other
was constructed as a necessary counterpart. Systems of knowledge that had
been mainstream for centuries found themselves, often unexpectedly, labeled
as pseudo-science. A prominent example of this shift is scientific esotericism,
which in fact originated only through this shift of limits of normality (Zander
2008, 77).
The discourses of inclusion and exclusion that accompany processes of
modern identity formation have thus affected the way scholars have described
the status of astrology, magic, and alchemy in European cultural history. The
term occult science originated in the sixteenth century (Secret 1988), along
with notions of occulta philosophia. Occult, in this context, refers to hidden
or secret powers that inform a substantial part of the disciplines lumped together
under the rubric occult sciencesnotably astrology, alchemy, and (natural)
magic (Wayne Shumaker [1972] adds witchcraft to this mlange). Twentieth-cen-
57
tury scholars adopted such a configuration as their analytical concept, indicating a unity of these various disciplines. While Keith Thomas (1971, 631 632) believed that astrology formed the basis of the occult sciencesand that consequently the decline of astrology would inevitably lead to the decline of
magic and alchemyBrian Vickers (1988, 265) encouraged this tendency by arguing that [t]here are sufficient internal resemblances among astrology, alchemy,
numerology, iatromathematics, and natural magic for one to be able to describe
the occult sciences as forming a unified system. All occult sciences share a
common mentality, or mental habit (1988, 266), that is clearly distinguished
from a rational scientific mentality. For Vickers, science as open and progressive is distinguished from the occult as having a closed system designed
to ignore criticism (Vickers 1984, 39, endorsing the position of Charles
Schmitt). This evaluation was also an expression of Vickers highly critical reaction against Frances A. Yates famous thesis (1964) that the Hermetic tradition
had a decisive impact on the scientific revolution (Linden 2007, x).
Even though a critique of Yates exaggerated conclusions is necessary, the
distinction proposed by Vickers and others is problematic for several reasons.
First, although these disciplines overlap in varied and complex ways, they
each have distinct histories with quite different and complex, diverging and mutually interacting trajectories. Even during the heyday of Renaissance neoplatonism, astrology and alchemy lived independent lives, despite the vast inkwells
devoted to the rhetorical embellishment of occult philosophy (Newman and
Grafton 2001, 26; see the whole passage pp. 18 27). In fact, it was the more recent discourse that entangled these systems of knowledge and produced the understanding that they belong together. Second, in the case of astrology there are
other systems of knowledge and practices that had direct and longstanding links
to that discipline, notably, mathematics, philosophy of nature, ethics, medicine,
historiography, theology, and politics (von Stuckrad 2010a, 115 134). Configuring astrology with the other occult sciences tends strongly to distort our understanding of its relationship with these other (and to many scholars more legitimate) areas of knowledge. Third, the analytical notion of hidden powers
continues to remain important within the legitimate sciences from the scientific revolution to the present. Wouter J. Hanegraaff concludes:
[I]n a context that insisted on science as a public and demonstrable rather than secret and
mysterious knowledge, the very notion of science came to be seen as incompatible ex
principio with anything called occult. As a result, any usage of the term occult science(s) henceforth implied a conscious and intentional polemic against mainstream or establishment science. Such polemics are typical of occultism in all its forms (Hanegraaff
2005, 887; see also Hutchison 1982).
58
Indeed, as we have seen in the previous chapter, relating astrology closely to

magic or other occult sciences is a quite modern configuration, reflecting a
process of identity formation through strategies of distancing. But we will also
see that the discursive entanglements create a much more complex dynamic
than the simplifying talk of polemics suggests.

What about alchemy as a discipline that is linked to discourses of science and
religion? In general, we can posit a similar development as with astrology, or,
in Bruce T. Morans words,
here is where lines separating the rational and the absurd get a little fuzzy, and also where
the well-defined intellectual image of science gets a bit scuffed up by rubbing against the
texture of real life. [] Alchemy, although motivated by assumptions about nature not
shared by many today, still occasioned an intense practical involvement with minerals,
metals, and the making of medicines. [] So, rather than cutting away the scientific lean
from the presumed pseudoscientific fat when carving up natural knowledge in the early
modern world, we should try to understand how both fat and lean worked together to support intellectual life and to promote the process of discovery (2005, 1 2).
Consequently, it took a long time to distinguish between the old alchemy and
the new chemistry, and this was achievedmore or less, as we will seeonly
in the eighteenth century. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, we encounter only a few scholars who tried to write an unbiased history of alchemy; Karl
Christoph Schmieder is one of them, and it comes as no surprise that his book
(Schmieder 1832), comprising more than 600 pages, was republished as a classic in 1997 by the biologist Wolfgang Roller in his Esoterischer Verlag Wolfgang
Roller, along with an invitation to the reader to report any practical alchemical
work to Roller himself.
But in general, at the end of the eighteenth century the domain of alchemy
was restricted to gold making or transmutational alchemy (alchemia transmutatoria or chrysopoeia in technical parlance). Indeed, for most writers and
thinkers of the eighteenth century, alchemy was synonymous with gold making
and fraud. [] These Enlightenment writers drew heavily on metaphors of light
and darkness to describe the dawning of chemistry out of the misty obscurity of
the medieval delusion of alchemy (Principe and Newman 2001, 386). This disjunctive strategy has led to a problematic historiographical framework of analysis that ultimately distorted the many links between empirical research into nature and metaphysical interpretations that both had been the characteristics of
59
so-called alchemy before it was pushed away in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. One may think of Brian Vickers remark that some of the occult
sciencesalchemy and astrology, for examplemade a partial use of observational techniques, but the results were then subordinated to some preformed interpretative model, often magical or mystical, which was neither derived from reality nor testable by it (1988, 266). As I will make clear in what follows, things
became even more complicatedand discursively entangledwhen psychological interpretations focused on transformational alchemy; Carl Gustav Jung is
the most influential author here, but Mircea Eliade also had his share in this reconfiguration. In a parallel development of astrological and alchemical discourse, the negative understanding of the term was positively charged by
these scholars as a metaphor of spiritual developmentthe disjunction turned
into a positive earmark.
Recent scholarship has critically revisited our knowledge of alchemy and the
emergence of contemporary chemistry in the context of the history of science and
religion. In fact, [r]evisionary interpretations of works of persons who previously
were not readily admitted to have had alchemical interests are some of the proudest achievements of scholarship of the last few decades (Linden 2007, xi). This
also changed the attribution of meaning to the emergence of scientific chemistry,
further legitimated in dispositive changes through the launching of new scholarly
journalsthe best journals appear to welcome alchemical and Hermetic submissions for publication consideration, as long as they fit the journals criteria and are
of high quality. This was not always the case! (Linden 2007, xii)
Being part of this revisionist movement in the history of science, Lawrence
M. Principe and William R. Newman attempt to overcome the dichotomy between religious or pseudo-scientific alchemy on the one hand and empiric-scientific chemistry on the other. They (re)introduced the term chymistry to refer to
a scholarly engagement of the natural world that was not yet dichotomized by
post-Enlightenment discourse (Newman and Principe 1998) or embraced in a
positive way by psychological and esoteric readings of the twentieth century.
From a discursive point of view, such a distinction makes perfect sense. chymistry can be regarded as a discourse that includes various and quite different
subfields. Besides scholars who were entirely focused on processes within the
natural world (natura naturata), there were others who saw the natural world
as revelation of and interacting with transcendent levels of reality and subsequently searched for the power behind these processes (natura naturans). Leading alchemists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries applied both scientificempirical strategies and metaphysical ones, such as communicating with angels
and superior beings or directly addressing the divine. Notable examples are John
Dee (Clucas 2006; von Stuckrad 2010a, 146 155) and Robert Boyle (Principe
60
1998; Newman and Principe 2002). William R. Newman has recently demonstrated that it was not the newly established dominance of physics and mathematics
that led to the scientific change of paradigm in the seventeenth century but rather the experiments of early modern chymists who elaborated medieval corpuscular theory (Newman 2006; see particularly pp. 1 20 on The Problematic Position of Alchemy in the Scientific Revolution).
In general, recent research has made it clear that the lines demarcating
chemistry from alchemy, and real science from pseudo-science, are much fuzzier than had long been assumed. The issue is not only that chymists of the seventeenth century helped develop new scientific paradigms; the polemical discussion about the differentiation between good science and bad science itself is
much older than has often been assumed (as, e. g., in McKnight 1992; see the editors introduction on p. vii). Over against this assumption, Ute Frietsch points
out that certain forms of alchemy already in the early modern period were evaluated as pseudo. In the context of Paracelsian medical alchemy of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, the buzzword pseudo was put forward in various
combinations (2008, 51 52; see also Moran 2005, 67 98). The seventeenth-century debate about Paracelsian medical alchemy, denoted by Libavius and others
as chymiatry, created the model that served to disavow competing forms of
knowledge using the Latin term pseudo-scientia. Even Galileos laws of falling
bodies were in 1645 attacked as pseudo-scientia. Thus, in the 1640s, the new alchemical medical doctrine and the new physics found themselves stigmatized
with the same pseudo-label (Frietsch 2008, 54; see also Schmitt-Biggemann
1996, 497). Institutional developments mirror this complex discursive configuration: Paracelsian medicine was introduced in several European university curricula around 1600, for instance at the Universities of Montpellier, Valencia, or Wittenberg. But the real shock for Libavius and other critics came when the
University of Marburg in 1609, at the instigation of the German prince Moritz
of Hesse-Kassel, hired Johannes Hartmann as professor of chymiatria. Hartmann
embraced divine mysteries and used a magical symbol as his personal letter
seal. This was the shocking part of Hartmanns appointment. A Paracelsian
was going to teach chymia with the university. [] Regardless of the ridicule,
Hartmanns instruction in the art of chymiatry (chemical medicine) was one of
the earliest examples of laboratory-based chemical teaching within a university
curriculum (Moran 2005, 108).
In general, when it comes to pseudo-science, Roger Cooter notes that the
eighteenth century had understood quackery as blatant fraud (especially in relation to medicine) but lacked a developed concept of pseudo-science. For the
stuff of belief (religion) and the stuff of experiment and analysis (science or natural philosophy) had not yet undergone their rhetorical separation and ranking
61
(2003, 683). Cooter draws the only feasible conclusion: From the history of phrenology and other such pseudo-sciences, it is clear there is more to be lost than
gained historically by seeking retrospectively to draw sharp distinctions between
the real and the pseudo in science (2003, 684). As a consequence of this conceptual thicket, I will avoid the terms alchemy and chemistry as generic analytical concepts, and rather will look at their respective configurations in scientific, philosophical, and religious discourse (for similar suggestions, see Cooter
2003). If we disassemble the discourse strands that constitute alchemy (or
chymistry) and do the same with chemistry, we will be able to see the transformations of meaning that have taken place since the eighteenth century. We
can then also identify at which point certain elements of this discourse have
adopted new meanings and in which form they perhaps have been continued
in contemporary science.
In this regard, the turn of the nineteenth century was an important break.
One of the major shifts in the evaluation of alchemy was the move away from
its understanding of the nature of matter. While alchemy had been linked to
the idea that the elements can be reduced to a proto hyleprima materia or primary matternow chemists held that the smallest particles were atoms (Keller
1983, 9 10). John Dalton set the new tone in his New System of Chemical Philosophy, which was published in two parts between 1808 and 1810. Interestingly
enough, the work originated from Lectures on Natural Philosophy at the
Royal Institution in London. The author has ever since been occasionally
urged by several of his philosophical friends to lose no time in communicating
the results of his enquiries to the public, alledging [sic], that the interests in science, and his own reputation, might suffer by delay (1808/1810, vvi). Dalton
still referred to his scholarship as natural philosophy, and throughout his
book he spoke of philosophical chemists, philosophers, experimental philosophy (already in the title), etc. At the same time, it is characteristic that the
terms alchemy, chymistry, transmutation, god, and related concepts were
completely absent in Daltons work. The new configurations were atom, elementary bodies, and the material basis of chemical science (see, e. g., page
474). Not surprisingly, then, Dalton dedicated the second part to Humphry
Davy and William Henry as a testimony to their distinguished merit in the promotion of chemical science. Dalton also introduced the genre of chemical tables: Nothing of the kind has been published to my knowledge; yet, such tables
appear to me so necessary to the practice of chemical enquiries, that I have wondered how the science could be so long cultivated without them (496). This new
aesthetic device changed the way the systematization of chemical knowledge
was (and still is) legitimized. Like tables of historical epochs (on which see Steiner 2008), this dispositive stabilized the new order of knowledge.
62
The author points out in his introduction to the second part that it took him
so long to write the almost 600 pages because he decided to rely as little as possible on other chemists work and instead to use his own experiments to test the
new theories. In order to convey a knowledge of chemical facts and experience, he begins with the most simple elements, subsequently looking at the
combination of two and then three simple elements. By elementary principles,
or simple bodies, Dalton explains, we mean such as have not been decomposed, but are found to enter into combination with other bodies. We do not
know that any one of the bodies denominated elementary, is absolutely indecomposable; but it ought to be called simple, till it can be analyzed (1808/
1810, 221 222).
The new ideas about the nature of matter and the new vocabulary that found
expression in works such as Daltonswith a total lack of terms that had been
related to alchemy, while retaining the link between science and philosophypaved the way for the new understanding of alchemy as the other of scientific chemistry. It was the same period that saw the general introduction of the
English terms pseudo-science and pseudo-scientist. After William Whewell had
coined the term scientist in 1840 (see Ross 1962; Yeo 1993), the term pseudo-science gained in popularity and was used to critique, e. g., Samuel Hahnemanns
homeopathy or Gustave Le Bons mass psychology (Hagner 2008, 24). But most
scientists, like Dalton, simply neglected the older vocabulary, and it was the job
of nineteenth-century historians to make the shift visible in explicit wordings.
When Heinrich Wilhelm Schaefer in 1887 defined alchemy as the art of transforming ignoble metal into silver and particularly into gold (1887, 1), he expressed the now-common understanding of alchemy as something distinct
from modern science. For these authors, alchemy only continues to be interesting from an historical point of view, for those who want to understand the psychology of human folly and the achievements of contemporary science.
Alchemy is of rich interest to the scholar in various regards. We may want to study it from a
psychological perspective, which offers particularly good insight into how, based on a few
facts, which were observed inaccurately, using a few unclear words behind which one suspected mysterious content that people thought they usefully interpreted, there developed a
huge network of false doctrines; these doctrines occupied the human mind for over a millennium and, in combination with mystical ideas, held it captive entirely. We may also discuss from a practical point of view the value of the chemical processes that alchemy applied to reach its goal; in doing soby reviewing from the perspective of scientific
chemistry the importance of the existing theoretical ideas and the results that alchemists
63
achieved as a preliminary stage of contemporary chemistrywe also contribute to the history of this science itself.
In Schaefers account, representative of the understanding of alchemy in his time

(other examples would include Kopp 1886 and von Lippmann 1919, who repeatedly referred to Kopp), this discipline is historically distinct from science, although maybe in some parts a forerunner of modern scientific chemistry and
physics. Schaefer is at pains to identify the Egyptian-Greek Hermes Trismegistus
as the imagined origin of alchemical thinking (1887, 2 12), which also links alchemy to its superstitious sister, astrology (p. 11). Terms that belong to the field
of religion, mysticism, and metaphysics, combined with discourse strands
such as fraud, trick, superstition, or credulity, legitimized the modern contempt of alchemy as a counter-concept of modern science.
Yet, although Schaefer noted that in the nineteenth century no serious alchemical practice could be observed anymore (1887, 33 34), he reminded his
readers of one structural parallel of modern chemistry with alchemical endeavors, because the chemical search for the smallest atoms offered the possibility to
recombine elementary particles and thus create new metals. As an example of
this transmutational quest, he referred to the British physicist Norman Lockyer
who, eight years earlier, had thought that he had transformed copper into calcium and nickel into cobalt with the use of electricity (1887, 34).
Sir Norman Lockyers spectroscopic studies of stars and his hypothesis that
the chemical elements were compound bodies, which he explained in a lecture
on 12 December 1878 at the Royal Society, had a mixed reception and were considered very controversial; it is characteristic of the discursive configuration of
the day that Lockyer was ridiculed as an alchemist by the popular press and
some colleagues (Brock 1985, 189). But Lockyers studies are also an indication
Die Alchemie bietet dem Forscher in mannigfacher Hinsicht reiches Interesse. Man kann sie
vom rein psychologischen Standpunkte aus betrachten wollen und findet grade hier besondere
Gelegenheit zu erkennen, wie aus wenigen Thatsachen, die man ungenau beobachtete, aus
wenigen unklaren Worten, hinter denen man geheimnisvollen Inhalt vermutete, welchen man
wertvoll herauszudeuten glaubte, sich ein umfangreiches Gewebe von Irrlehren entwickelte,
welche den menschlichen Geist weit lnger als ein Jahrtausend beschftigten und durch Hinzunahme mystischer Vorstellungen vollstndig gefangen hielten. Man kann andererseits aus
praktischen Rcksichten den Wert der chemischen Prozesse errtern, durch welche die Alchemie
ihr Ziel zu erreichen hoffte, und gewinnt dabei, indem man vom Standpunkte der wissenschaftlichen Chemie aus die Bedeutung der auftretenden theoretischen Ansichten prft und die
gewonnenen Resultate der Alchemisten als Vorstufen fr die heutige Chemie ansieht, zugleich
einen Beitrag zur Geschichte dieser Wissenschaft selbst (Schaefer 1887, 1).
64
that the neat distinction between alchemy and chemistry was not always easy to
maintain in the light of emerging theories of the nature of matter.
VITALISM:
A Mnage-a-Trois of Life, Spirit, and Matter
The discursive reconfiguration that has taken place since the eighteenth century
can also be framed as a conflict between Aristotelian philosophical tradition and
Greek atomic, corpuscular philosophy. The new development dramatically challenged the Aristotelian interpretation of material change that was common until
the seventeenth century, explaining alterations of chemical properties or substances by the addition or subtraction of forms. As mentioned above, underlying these processes was a speculative substrate of matter, called the proto hyle or
prima materia, that remained unchanged throughout the process. Linked to the
forms or qualities of wet, dry, hot, and cold, the proto hyle produced the four elements of earth, air, fire, and water, which in turn could be mixed to generate the
material substances that the chemists examined. Over against this Aristotelian
theory, the Greek corpuscular philosophy gained influence in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, speculating about atoms being the smallest units of
material substances, which may or may not be understood as unsplittable. However, as William H. Brock aptly remarks,
although enlivened by Boyle, Newton and their successors with gravitational force, chemical affinity and electrical properties, the earlier corpuscular philosophy or atomic theory
was of little use to chemists until it was married to the modern doctrine of elements by
John Dalton at the beginning of the nineteenth century. [] Dalton abandoned at a stroke
the age-old belief of philosophers in the simplicity of matterthat there was a unique, homogeneous primary matter (1985, viiviii).
For many, however, giving up the idea of a simple and unifying principle that
underlies the processes of nature was too high a price to pay for scientific progress (cf. also the detailed discussion in Asprem 2013, Chapters 4 and 5). One of
these was William Prout (1785 1850), who in 1816 put forward his hypothesis
that all of the elements and their constituent atoms were in fact compounds
of one basic homogeneous material. He coined the term protyle for this speculative basis, which he then identified with hydrogen, the lightest known element.
Prout became known for a second hypothesis as well, namely the idea that if we
accept that expression of the atomic weight of hydrogen as a unity, the relative
atomic weights of all the known elements are whole numbers. Consequently, hydrogen came to be regarded as the primary matter from which all of the elements
were composed. What was subsequently discussed as Prouts hypothesis had
65
an influence on nineteenth- and twentieth-century theories of matter that should

not be underestimated. William H. Brock, who wrote a fascinating account of this
hypothesis, following its reception all the way into the second half of the twentieth century, points out that [a]s a tantalizing and attractive simplifying view of
matter it was to be a continuous source of inspiration to chemists and physicists
until the work of F W Aston on isotopes in the 1920s (1985, viii).
Relevant to our analysis here is also the fact that the protyle became a favorite topic in Theosophical and occult discourse at the end of the nineteenth century. For instance, Wynn W. Westcott, a founding figure of the Hermetic Order of
the Golden Dawn and a noted authority on alchemy, in 1893 published a pamphlet under his Golden Dawn pseudonym Sapere Aude on The Science of Alchymy: Spiritual and Material. He argued that alchemy must be regarded as a science uniting ancient chemistry with a religious basis (1893, 4). But while he,
like Heinrich Wilhelm Schaefer and others, drew the historical line from ancient
and medieval alchemy to modern chemistry (1893, 5), he did not support the triumphant self-esteem of modern chemists. No modern science has shown more
intolerance towards its ancestors than the chemistry of our era has shown to the
discoveries of those Egyptian, Arabian and Medival sages who were the founders of chemistry in the dim and distant past (1893, 8). In his attempt to reconcile
alchemy with the most modern chemical findings, Westcott referred to Prouts
protyle as evidence of the unified quality of matter, or the prima materia of
the alchemists. He found support from the leading chemist Sir William Crookes.
In history books of modern science, it is usually not mentioned that Crookes also
was a member of the Theosophical Society and secretly a Golden Dawn initiate
(see Morrisson 2007, 39 40).
By the end of the nineteenth century, Theosophists and scientists, partly in
collaboration, developed a new entanglement of discourse strands. Indeed, as
Morrisson points out:
When scientists such as Crookes and Lodge, and Theosophists such as Besant and Leadbeater, melded physics with spiritual and psychic forces via theories of the ether (and
the additional particles that Theosophy added to the equation), they were lending scientific
credibility to spiritual ideas. Paradoxically, in their critique of scientific materialism, they
asserted a mechanical theory of spirituality. Theosophy thus required a form of vitalism
to counterbalance the mechanistic tendencies of its physics (2007, 83).
Along the same line of argumentation, what I call vitalism here is a collection of
discourse strands that are linked to the historical tradition of vitalism but not
limited to it. When it comes to historical vitalisma movement with many different branches in different countrieswe can identify as a common denominator
the critical attitude toward Newtonian mechanics, which is complemented by the
66
idea of a life force that explains the nature of living things. In this general form,
[v]italism seems to belong to the very origins of alchemy (Dobbs 1992, 58). Already part of scientific discourse in the eighteenth century (Rey 2000; Reill 2005;
on the Scottish Enlightenment, see Packham 2012), the search for the vital powers of nature in the nineteenth century was linked to the concept of natura naturans (as in Schellings philosophy of nature), to animal magnetism (as in
Franz Anton Mesmers theories and experiments), and later to the concept of
ether. It is the entanglement of these strands that constitute the discursive
knot of vitalism.
The form of scientific and philosophical vitalism that emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century took on features from various new disciplines.
Hans Driesch (1867 1941), the German biologist noted for his early experimental
work in embryology and one of the first to perform the cloning of an animal in
the 1880s, is certainly the best-known representative of what he himself called
neo-vitalism (Driesch 1922, 167). In various publications he positioned himself
against materialistic philosophies of science, particularly Darwinism. And he
made explicit what we see many times in the present studythe emergence of
psychology as an integrating factor between religion, philosophy, and science:
As is well known, writes Driesch, the problem of vitalism is expanded considerably when we include in it the question of the relations between the inner life
[Seelenleben] and nature. Against this background, Driesch is surprised that
psychologists do not really engage the issue: almost nobody has seen the
close relation between the body/mind problem and vitalism as such in its actual
sharpness; indeed, it is strange that not even physiologists such as Pflger and
Goltz have seen the close link that is operative here (1922, 157).
It is through psychology that Driesch also endorsed the work of another famous vitalistHenri Bergson (1859 1941; see Burwick and Douglass 2010). Both
scholars fought against mechanistic and finalistic philosophies of science, even
though their conclusions differed in some ways (Driesch 1922, 178 180). Driesch
was convinced of the relevance of occultism and psychology for the emergence
of a new understanding of science, and he used the label para for these sciences without the pejorative charging that this label assumes in other contexts.
Now at last a field seems to become science on which as yet only casuistic statements
were made, more guessing than knowing: the field of parapsychology and paraphysics,
i. e., those fields that are unfortunately still called occultism [Okkultismus], even though,
it seems to me, not much is still occult [verborgen] here. [] We state it frankly: Paraphysics is our hope when it comes to biology, just as parapsychology [Parapsychik] is our hope
when it comes to psychology. Together, however, they express our hope when it comes to a
well-founded metaphysics and worldview [Weltanschauung] (1922, 208 and 209, emphasis original).
67
Statements like these make it clear how closely this discourse is linked to the discourse of monism, which I will discuss in the next chapter. Even if we should
keep in mind that Drieschs notion of entelechy was ultimately a dualistic concept, which makes the discursive knot more complex, we can see the link between those discourses in what Monika Fick calls the sensualization of the spiritual (Versinnlichung des Geistigen) and the spiritualization of the physical
(Beseelung des Physischen); at the end of her study of fin de sicle literature,
in which Gustav Theodor Fechner and other Romantic authors were positively
received and linked to spiritualism as a biology of the beyond, she draws
the conclusion that we can even speak of (literary) modernity as a monistic
movement (Fick 1993, 354 365). It is noteworthy in this regard that Fechner
had decisive influence on Sigmund Freud and on psychoanalysis in general.
A large part of the theoretical framework of psychoanalysis would hardly
have come into being without the speculations of the man whom Freud called
the great Fechner (Ellenberger 1970, 218). In a parallel dynamic, vitalism has
powerfully inflected the literary sensibility of the last two centuries, and these
cultural effects were empowered by the residual prestige vitalism enjoyed from
its discursive apprenticeship in the scientific academy. The transition of vitalism
from science, to a scientific ideology, to a social ideology shows this complex historical dynamic in action (Clarke 1996, 28).
To be sure, in order to clearly see these discursive links we need to broaden
our perspective from historical monism and vitalism to monism and vitalism;
we can then see how influential this discourse indeed was in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. William Prout can also be addressed as a vitalist, since
he argued that living systems also contained vital principles. With this thesis,
Prout was part of a heated debate among chemists of his generation (Brock
1985, 70 80), long before occultists and Theosophists jumped on the bandwagon
and both spiritualized the life force and scientificized spirituality. Hence, there
are different forms of vitalist theory, and it is important to remember
that chemists like Prout were deploying the language of vitalism in order to explain the behaviour of organised living systems rather than of the organic substances which could be
extracted from them. The distinction is crucial, for whereas an organised body like a cat, or
a tree, or a stomach in vivo, is living and vital, an organic body like sugar, or urea, or even
albumin, which is a constituent of these bodies, is as lifeless as a mass of zinc oxide (Brock
1985, 74).
But despite these differences, the contribution of Prout and his chemical colleagues introduced the relevant terms to vitalism that prepared the discursive
changes. When we look at German Romanticism, we encounter many more driving forces of this discursive change. In critical conversation with German ideal-
68
ism and particularly with Schellings philosophy of nature, Romantic concepts of

nature and matter were picking up vitalist ideas and reconfiguring them with
spiritual overtones. This can already be seen in Goethes understanding of science, which Jeremy Naydler aptly summarizes: If we allow intuitive thinking,
feeling and imagination a place in our scientific method, thenproviding
these are deployed in conjunction with exact observation and clear thought,
and providing they are trained as thoroughly as our powers of observation
and thinkingthen a much fuller and more complete experience of nature will
become possible (Naydler 1996, 115; on Goethes pantheistic philosophy of nature see Naydler 1996, 110 114).
An example from Romanticism is Carl Gustav Carus, the influential scholar,
physician, and painter. In his Zwlf Briefe ber das Erdleben (Twelve Letters on
the Life of the Earth, 1841), and then in his main work Natur und Idee oder das
Werdende und sein Gesetz (Nature and Idea, or: The Becoming and Its Law,
1861), Carus attempted to overcome the materialist tendencies of contemporary science that alienated the human being from nature. That is the reason why healthough not embracing the practice of table-turningcould interpret the spiritualist
sances of his time as one of the most important chapters of physiology and a desideratum of scholarly research. In this endeavor, he did not stand alone.
What all mechanistic, magnetic, electric, vitalist, psychological, and physiological attempts
of interpretation that were propagated in the journalistic debate had in common was the
claim of an extended concept of knowledge in the natural sciences. Underlying this was
the central attempt to (re)unite the natural sciences with philosophical thinking. In relation
with this claim, we see the attempt to criticize the dominant natural-scientific discipline,
mechanical physics, for its exclusivity, and at the same time to complement it spiritually
(Bohley 2008, 111).
Carus was an early representative of this development. He contributed to the discussion by aestheticizing and psychologizing philosophical as well as scientific
concepts of nature in a discourse of Empfindsamkeit (sensitivity). As Robert
Matthias Erdbeer demonstrated (2010, 167 255), these works were a major contribution to a discursive change that prepared what the author calls the esoteric
modern. However, when Erdbeer describes these contributions judgmentally as
strategic dilettantism (see the title of his chapter, and passim), he strips such
discourses of their scientific legitimacy and thus adopts uncritically the dichotomizing structure that he is analyzing. That people like Carus were active both as
scientists and authors of popular works not only marks their discursive impact
(Erdbeer 2010, 170); it also reminds us of the fact that the world of scientists
and that of a popular audience are not so far apart as labels like dilettantism
and amateurism vis--vis exact science seem to suggest.
69
In this regard, the situation in England was not fundamentally different. People from various backgrounds responded to the Victorian crisis of faith and reassembled discourses of vitalism and others (on this topic see also the material presented in Renk 2012, even though her analysis is unfortunately too uncritical).
Critique of scientific naturalism was one of the driving forces behind these activities, as Frank Miller Turner (1974) demonstrated. Henry Sidgwick and James
Ward, both Cambridge philosophers; Alfred Russel Wallace and George John Romanes, both scientists; Frederic W. H. Myers, the poet, classicist, and founding figure of the Society for Psychical Research; and Samuel Butler, the novelistthey
were all united in their quest to link emotion and religion to scientific endeavors.
In his introduction to Phantasms of the Living, Myers put it thus:
[J]ust as the old orthodoxy of religion was too narrow to contain mens knowledge, so now
the new orthodoxy of materialistic science is too narrow to contain their feelings and aspirations; and consequently [] just as the fabric of religious orthodoxy used to be strained in
order to admit the discoveries of geology or astronomy, so now also the obvious deductions
of materialistic science are strained or overpassed in order to give sanction to feelings and
aspirations which it is found impossible to ignore (1886, 1; quoted from Turner 1974, 2).
What in German discourse was called Empfindsamkeit, or sensitivity, in British

discourse was discussed as feelings and aspirations and was linked to religion. Another term that we encounter in this discursive knot is spiritual.
Turner correctly notes that the word spiritual is one of the most difficult and important terms in late nineteenth-century thought (1974, 3), and he refers to Harald Victor Routh, who already in 1937 gave a precise definition of its meaning for
the nineteenth century:
It implies, in the first place, that the speaker has cultivated a system of principles, an edifice of ideas, an ideology, which gives shape and direction to his plexus and nexus of
thought. This framework, partly inherited, is cherished because it is congenial to the individuals aspirations; it helps him contemplate humanity as a force capable of growth even
to perfection; it suggests forms in which his own vitality can find imaginative self-expression. [] But in any case this comforting religion or philosophy, this reassuring theory of
existence is the soil in which the spirit germinates (Routh 1937, 4).
Routh remarked that the problem with the terms spirit and spiritual is that all
people use them but [n]one of them has explained what he means by the expression, but all use it as frequently and consistently as if they had privately
agreed on its significance (Routh 1937, 4). Indeed, this could have been written
at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The same is true for his comparison
of spirituality and religion:
70
Such an explanation does not exclude the idea of religion, but it does exclude the specially
doctrinal and pneumatological associations which once adhered to the word. In this secular, nineteenth-century sense, spirit might rise to the lips of any humanist (an agnostic,
or a pagan, no less than a saint) and would connote an impulse towards intellectual or
imaginative creativeness; not necessarily to the writing of poetry or the painting of pictures;
but to the identification of ones best self with the best things (1937, 4).
We see here the emergence of a new discourse of spirituality that became

highly influential in the 1960s and remains so today. For the discourse of religion and science as well, this reconfiguration of discourse strands is informative. Without dismissing science and progress as something useless, the new configuration embraced science and linked it to aspirations, emotions, imagination,
self-expression, and vitality. The last term also makes clear why these discourse
strands belong to the knot of vitalism.

If we want to understand the ambivalent role that alchemical discourse played in
the twentieth centurywavering between rejection and fascinationagain we
will have to include psychology in our analysis. And again, it is the intellectual
relationship between Wolfgang Pauli and Carl Gustav Jung that is particularly indicative of the discursive reconfiguration of alchemy between psychology and
modern science. This conversation had a lot of impact: Jung ultimately set
the terms of a psychological interpretation of alchemy for much of the rest of
the century (Morrisson 2007, 190). Jung was interested in alchemy early on,
after he had encountered this field through the works of Herbert Silberer in
1914; but his fascination with alchemy fully blossomed only later, at the end
of the 1920s, when he started to link the mandala symbolism to alchemical motives (Ellenberger 1970, 719 723; Gieser 2005, 198 200; Miller 2009, 47 50; see
Jung 1980, 118 260). Jung presented a lecture at the Eranos meeting, published
in the Eranos-Jahrbuch 1936 under the title Die Erlsungsvorstellungen in der
Alchemie (The Redemption Motives in Alchemy). This lecture was integrated,
although in a completely new form, as one part of Jungs monograph Psychologie
und Alchemie (Psychology and Alchemy), which was first published in 1944,
but of which a second edition was already necessary in 1952, much to the astonishment of the author (see his 1951 preface to the second edition in Jung 1980).
Jung was interested in alchemy particularly because he was struck by the apparent similarity between alchemical symbolism and the dreams of modern individuals. In a fairly eclectic way, Jung immersed himself seriously in the history
of alchemical literature and ideas, which led him to the construction of alchemy
71
as a tradition that is mainly interested in psychological and spiritual dimensions

(Jung 1980, 282 331). According to Jung, alchemical symbolism is concerned
with an evolutionary process that strives to attain its highest form. The maturing of the metals can be compared to the individuation of the human psyche
in its passing through various stages of purification. The Philosophers Stone
was essentially the psychological process of individuation (McLynn 1996, 428
432). The Great Work (opus) is the combination of conflicting forces into a
new and unified harmony. The basis of the opus is the materia prima, which
is one of the most famous secrets of alchemy, Jung noted (1980, 364, emphasis
added; see the entire chapter on prima materia in Jung 1980, 364 394). Jung described the prima materia as a universal category that is characterized by ubiquity: we can have it always and everywhere; i. e., the projection can take place
all the time and everywhere (Jung 1980, 371). The speculation about a primary
matter that underlies physical and spiritual processes is a reconfiguration of discourse strands that belong to the fields of science and psychology. The procedure of disintegration and reconstruction has its equivalent in purely experimental science and also in therapeutic work (Gieser 2005, 200). And this is where
Wolfgang Pauli enters the stage.
Pauli encountered alchemy as a powerful symbolism in his own dreams, and
he discussed the theory of alchemy and its implication with Jung in his own
analysis and also in extended conversation that we know of from their letters
(see the very good analysis in Gieser 2005, 198 211). Pauli thought that there
must be a fine structure (a recurring motif in his dreams) and a neutral language underlying the principles of both physics and psychology (see also
Jungs approval of the term neutral language in Jung and Pauli 1952, 99). In
his essay Science and Western Thought he asked whether modern science
would now be able to realise, on a higher plane, alchemys old dream of a psycho-physical unity, by the creation of a unified conceptual foundation for the scientific comprehension of the physical as well as the psychical (Pauli 1994, 146).
Pauli referred to Kepler as an antagonist of Fludd, Goethes Faust as an antagonist of Newton, as well as to Jung and the traditions of Hermeticism and Rosicrucianism (ibid.). In this short question, which Pauli regarded as vital for contemporary science (ibid.), the discursive combination of psyche/psychology,
physics, science, and alchemy materializes in a nutshell. What is more, Paulis unified language is nothing other than the language of nature that is known
from European intellectual history (Gieser 2005, 207, with reference to Paulis letter to Fierz, dating 21 August 1948). Suzanne Giesers conclusion is to the point:
Paulis vision is a unified worldview, in which the gap between psychological and physical
worlds is suspended, just as the gap between the chemical and the physical has been sus-
72
pended at the atomic level. The idea is that the closer one gets to the core of things, to their
intrinsic structure, the more the differences perceived on the everyday macro level are suspended. Here we recognize again the positivistic wish to create a unitary science. The important difference is, however, that Pauli did not want to see a reductionist model, in which
everything can be reduced to an existing science, like logic or physics. He sought rather a
wholly new scientific approach which does not disregard the unique character of the individual sciences, but which attempts to find certain common denominatorsa deep level
based on the belief in certain universal structural elements which reveal themselves in
all areas of experience (2005, 208).
It is no surprise that this reconfiguration of psychology and physics in a quest for

universal patterns of the cosmos was also of high interest to representatives of
occultist or magical discourse. An influential example is Israel Regardie
(1907 1985), who had a solid knowledge of Jungian psychoanalysis, which he
combined with his immersion in Golden Dawn and Enochian magic traditions.
In 1937, Regardie published his The Philosophers Stone: A Modern Comparative
Approach to Alchemy from the Psychological and Magical Points of View, followed
by a major publication entitled The Middle Pillar: The Balance between Mind and
Magic (1938). The author claimed that there is an intrinsic relation between ritual
magic and psychology, which finds expression in the alchemical work and the
Philosophers Stone, a symbol for spiritual illumination and expanded consciousness (quoted from Morrisson 2007, 191). He even recommended that psychotherapists should use the Lesser Banishing Ritual and the Middle Pillar exercise from the Golden Dawn in their sessions (Morrisson 2007, 191).
This interpretation is not far from Eliades construction of alchemy. Only a
few years after Regardie, Eliade published The Forge and the Crucible (French
original appeared in 1956). In his foreword he leaves no doubt about his real interests:
Wherever possible, the historic-cultural context of the various metallurgical complexes has
been taken into account; but my main concern has been to pierce through to the mental
world which lies behind them. Mineral substances shared in the sacredness attaching to
the Earth-Mother. [] To collaborate in the work of Nature, to help her to produce at an
ever-increasing tempo, to change the modalities of matterhere, in our view, lies one of
the key sources of alchemical ideology. [] what the smelter, smith and alchemist have
in common is that all three lay claim to a particular magico-religious experience in their
relations with matter; this experience is their monopoly and its secret is transmitted
through the initiatory rites of their trades. All three work on a Matter which they hold to
be at once alive and sacred, and in their labours they pursue the transformation of matter,
its perfection and its transmutation (Eliade 1978a, 8 9).
All of the ingredients of the new discursive constellation are clearly visible here;
Eliade, the professor of religion, lends authority to the combination of religion,
73
science, nature, magic, experience, mother earth, vitalism, transmutation, and alchemy. Eliades book is not without academic bloopers, such as
using the distillation of sperm as a link between spiritual alchemy, biology,
and what today is known as cognitive science of religion:
But cinnabar can also be made inside the human body, mainly by means of the distillation
of sperm. The Taoist, imitating animals and vegetables, hangs himself upside down, causing the essence of his sperm to flow up to his brain. The tan-tien, the famous fields of
cinnabar, are to be found in the most secret recesses of the brain and belly: there it is
that the embryo of immortality is alchemically prepared (Eliade 1978a, 117; as source of
the quote Eliade gives Rolf Stein, Jardins en miniature dExtrme-Orient, p. 86).
In his preface to the 1978 Phoenix Edition, Eliade expressed his thanks to historians of science who received his book favorably, among them A.G. Debus, J.
Needham, and W.-E. Peuckert (Eliade 1978a, 16). And indeed, the spiritual interpretation of alchemy was still en vogue in academic literature of the 1980s (see
Hoheisel 1986 as an example).
Another materialization of this discursive knot can be mentioned herethe
merging of occultist and psychological interpretations with new age and psychedelic discourses. From Helena P. Blavatsky to Arthur Machen and Alan Watts,
psychedelic experiences with drugs have repeatedly been linked to interpretations of alchemical processes (Morrisson 2007, 191 193; see also Hanegraaff
2013), and psychedelic alchemy is a recurring keyword on the Internet today.
Mark S. Morrisson notes:
Alchemy is no longer the central trope for discussing and understanding nuclear physics
and radiochemistry that it was through the 1930s, but its connection to atomic science persisted across the twentieth century and into the twenty-first in occult alchemy circles. Its
move into the realms of psychoanalysis and brain chemistry suggests that its ability to destabilize boundaries between religion and scienceand even between the sciencesremains alive and well (Morrisson 2007, 193).
This is only partly true, however. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, alchemy still resonates in the work of physicists and philosophers. One prominent
example is David Deutsch, mentioned already in the last chapter. Deutsch pioneered the field of quantum computation by formulating a description for a
quantum Turing machine as well as specifying an algorithm designed to run
I do not regard New Age or New Age religion as a useful analytical category (see von
Stuckrad 2005b, 140). In this book, I either refer to it as the discourse on New Age, which
certainly had a lot of impact (indicated as new age), or as a scholarly construct, the dubious
character of which I indicate as New Age.
74
on a quantum computer. But more importantly for us, he is one of the leading
intellectuals who are interested in the links between quantum mechanics and
philosophy. Being an advocate of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum
mechanics, Deutsch writes about the general implications of this theory, including time travel (Deutsch 1997, 289 320) and other things that appear counter-intuitive but are in accordance with the theories discussed by physicists today. In
The Beginning of Infinity, the author seeks to find the basis of progress in human
development. He describes this progress in very optimistic ways and argues that
from all fields of science and philosophy
we learn that, although progress has no necessary end, it does have a necessary condition
for it to take off and to thrive. Each of the beginnings is the beginning of infinity as viewed
from the perspective of that field. Many seem, superficially, to be unconnected. But they are
all facets of a single attribute of reality, which I call the beginning of infinity (Deutsch 2012,
viii, emphasis original).
The subtitle of this book is Explanations that Transform the World. The discourse
strand of transformation is not by chance woven into the authors narrative.
Deutsch explicitly links his project to the alchemical quest, though in a modernized form. He explains that the stars shine because they are powered by the nuclear energy that is released by transmutation, i.e., the conversion of one chemical
element (mainly hydrogen) into another (mainly helium). There are some forms of
transmutation that happen on earth, such as the decay of radioactive elements.
Scientifically demonstrated for radioactivity only in 1901, the concept of transmutation, however, was ancient. Alchemists had dreamed for centuries of transmuting base metals, such as iron or lead, into gold. They never came close to understanding what it would take to achieve that, so they never did so. But scientists in
the twentieth century did (Deutsch 2012, 1). With his narrative of a general transformation of the entire world and the quest for complete understanding of the
human being, Deutsch participates in the Dreams of a Final Theory (Weinberg
1992), but he also stands in a long tradition of esoteric discoursefrom the Further
Reformation of the seventeenth century (von Stuckrad 2010a, 178 179) to the New
Age movement speculating about the breakthrough of human consciousness
that has been reactivated by contemporary scientists.
Deutsch is very critical about the limits of reductionist approaches in physics
and the natural sciences, but he is as critical of their opposite, i. e., holism
(Deutsch 1997, 20 21). Perhaps this is what makes his contribution to alchemy
typical of the twenty-first century. With an awareness of the limits of science, he
nonetheless retains an ideology of progress and perfect knowledge. The universal laws are adopted and integrated into physical laws in the nascent Theory of
Everything. He argues that if we understand knowledge and adaptation as
75
structure which extends across large numbers of universes, then we expect the
principles of epistemology and evolution to be expressed directly as laws
about the structure of the multiverse. That is, they are physical laws, but at an
emergent level (Deutsch 1997, 345, emphasis original). Weaving together epistemology and physicsor knowledge and transmutationin a Fabric of Reality
(the title of his 1997 book), he reassembles the discourse strands of alchemy in a
creative way. For instance, he links the natural conditions to create an openended stream of explanatory knowledge (Deutsch 2012, 60) to the laws of physics, since many of the necessary transformations require energy: something
must power conjectures and scientific experiments and all those manufacturing
processes (Deutsch 2012, 61, emphasis original)energy here is the concept as
it is used in theoretical physics, but at the same time it is a general metaphor of
powering the progress of knowledge accumulation in the evolution of the multiverse. As we will see in the next chapter, the term energy plays a significant role
in monistic discourse as well.
4 Darwinism Turned into Religion: Monism

Using Max Webers terminology, one might describe the Romantic philosophy of nature as a dialogue with the processes of rationalization and disenchantment of the
cosmos. The underlying attempt to re-enchant the world continued to influence nature-oriented religious currents in the twentieth century. Although such a philosophy of nature came under increasing pressure owing to industrialization and the advance of new natural sciences, holistic, monistic, vitalist, and pantheistic ideas were
current in the first half of the twentieth century as an antidote to the mechanistic
view of nature. Even scientists such as Charles Darwin and Ernst Haeckel, later celebrated as protagonists of sober empirical science, can be cited as examples here.
Harold Victor Routh noted this fact already in 1937 (1937, 278 293).
In his fundamental work On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection (1859), Darwin set a view of nature brimming with life and fertility against
the Jewish and Christian doctrine of creation. As Hans G. Kippenberg says, Darwins travel valise helps us understand this metaphor (Kippenberg 2002, 33).
Darwin took Lyells Principle of Geology and, more importantly, Miltons Paradise
Lost in his luggage on his world voyages. Miltons account of creation as an act of
voluptuous love and fecundation brought Darwin to the idea of natura naturans.
Although Darwin did not imagine nature as a huge sacred organism, as did many
Romantics, he combined a religious sense of wonder towards the abundance of
nature with scientific empiricism. His notion that there was grandeur in the evolutionary view of life was embraced by many other scientists and philosophers;
it has influenced discourse on nature up to the present day, particularly in the
United States (Taylor 2010, 6, 142 143, 158, 177, 200, 206, 222).
A similar case is Darwins contemporary Ernst Commer, professor of philosophy at St. Edwards College in Liverpool. On the one hand, Commer strongly opposed Romantic philosophy and argued that the world did not have a unified substance and thus was not an individual in itself. Consequently, the notion of a world
soul was complete nonsense, and the idea of the world as a unified whole was
philosophically entirely unfounded. However, it seems in contradiction to this position that Commer stuck to a monistic interpretation in saying that the visible
world is a unity and that it is the task of the philosophy of nature to understand
the transcendent spirituality of the world. Commer concluded his System of Philosophy with the notion that a further treatment of the life of the pure mind cannot
be done in a philosophical work. It must be enough to describe the concept of life
with regard to materialized phenomena, stopping at the threshold of the higher
spiritual world, more assuming than knowing, and accepting our knowledge as a
77
narrow and poor not-knowing. Only the painstaking conclusions of our investigations will sometime make us similar to the pure mind.

Charles Darwin and Ernst Commer exemplify the ambivalent attitude of many
academics toward religion and science in the second half of the nineteenth century. They partook in a similar discourse as Ernst Haeckel (1834 1919; see the
biographical accounts in Keitel-Holz 1984 and Di Gregorio 2005), who offers perhaps the strongest evidence for the entanglement of religious and scientific discourse strands around 1900. Being one of the earliest proponents of Darwinian
theory in Germany, already in 1866in his Generelle Morphologie der Organismen
(General Morphology of Organisms)he explicitly stated that the human being
evolved from apes, just as these have evolved from lower animals, a statement
that Darwin had shunned in his On the Origin of Species. In his General Morphology, Haeckel also introduced the term ecology into academic and popular language, namely as the science that studies reciprocal relationships between
organisms and their environment (Haeckel 1866, vol. 2, 235 236; see Stauffer
1957; Hxtermann 2001; Jacobsen 2005, 103 106; Lenz and Mueller 2006).
Over against alternative names that were discussed in the nineteenth century
to designate the new field of inquiryfrom Carl von Linns oeconomia naturae to ethology, bionomy, or chorologythe term ecology had already
gained the upper hand around 1900 (Schurig and Nothacker 2001).
Over his long career, Haeckel popularized Darwinian theory and combined it
with a religious devotion to nature. Particularly influential was Die Weltrthsel,
published in 1899 and translated into English as The Riddle of the Universe one
year later. The German edition sold more than 250,000 copies within six years.
No doubt, Haeckels concept of monism, presented as a connecting link between
religion and science, struck the right chord around 1900 (Jacobsen 2005, 91 212;
on its influence on subsequent Nazi ideology see Gasman 1998).
Haeckel made it clear in his preface that he wants to overcome the regrettable separation between pure empiricism and metaphysical speculation prevail-
Es gengt, den Begriff des Lebens sowohl nach seinem Princip wie nach seiner Bethtigung
durch die drei Stufen des vegetativen, sensitiven und intellectuellen Lebens zu verfolgen, um an
der Schwelle einer hheren geistigen Welt mehr ahnend als wissend stehen zu bleiben und
unser Wissen selbst gleichsam als ein enges und armes Nichtwissen zu erkennen. Je weiter wir
aber durch mhsame Folgerung in unserer Erkenntniss fortschreiten, desto hnlicher werden wir
dem reinen Geiste, der mhelos seiner Erkenntniss geniesst (Commer 1884, 258).
78
ing in German universities. Only the reunion of both disciplines would be worthy
of the term philosophy of nature. Haeckel conceded that the doctrine of evolution is the major achievement of the nineteenth century, but he thought Darwin should be seen alongside Jean Lamarck and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
as a trio of brilliant philosophers of nature, three stars of the greatest magnitude among all other men of our century (Haeckel 1903, 8; see also p. 14 and
passim). Haeckel later would add Baruch Spinoza to his pantheon, as Spinoza
cogently developed pantheistic thought, juxtaposing it with Judeo-Christian anthropomorphism. Haeckel saw the hypostatization of the human being as the
center of the universe as the crucial problem facing contemporary philosophy
and religion, a position that surpassed Darwin. The human being should not
be regarded as the premeditated goal of organic creation nor as a creature similar to God (1903, 11), but as an organic component of the entire universe. He
concluded: Our pure monism is not identical with theoretical materialism,
which negates the mind and dissolves the world in a sum of dead atoms; nor
is it identical with theoretical spiritualism (now called Energetics by Ostwald),
which negates matter and regards the world simply as a spatially ordered
group of energies or immaterial powers of nature (1903, 14, emphasis original).
Such a monism excludes the existence of anthropomorphic deities, and
Haeckel never tired of polemicizing against monotheistic religions and even
against polytheistic ones, since they contradict monism. His monism led him
to a pantheism, which he conceived, contrary to the evolutionary models of comparative religion of his generation, as the overcoming of monotheistic religions
rather than their archaic predecessor. Pantheism is the product of a civilized
human beings refined observation of nature, in contrast to theism, whose
crudest forms were already evident among primitive peoples more than ten thousand years ago (1903, 116).
Like many natural scientists since his time, Ernst Haeckel found the divine
in nature (Gladigow 1986, 1989, Taylor 2010, 155 157). Far from personifying nature, he sought the solution to the world riddles in the mystical unity of spirit
and matter, which reveals itself in strict laws but without the evolutionary goal of
perfecting the human being. Creation always remains incomplete, because organic nature, like inorganic nature, is characterized only by a constant flow
of development (Haeckel 1903, 107). Here Haeckel echoes the supreme principle
described by Schelling, which would find later votaries in the philosophy of life.
In his last book, Kristallseelen (Crystal Souls), published two years before his
death, Haeckel sought to make this more concrete by combining crystallography
and psychology. Haeckel admired Goethe as a model sensitive natural scientistthree quotations formed the books epigraph. Referring to Goethe, Haeckel
79
regarded the year 1904 to be a crucial turning point of science, because that year
saw the publication of studies that realized Goethes prophetic program:
The artificial boundaries previously erected between inorganic and organic nature, between
death and life, between natural sciences and the humanities fell at a single blow. All substance possesses life, inorganic as well as organic; all things are animated, crystals as well
as organisms. The ancient conviction of the inner, unified linkage of all events, of the unlimited dominion of generally valid laws of nature reasserts itself as an unshakeable truth
(1917, viii, emphasis original).
But Haeckel went even further in his religious conception and constructs a causal relation between science, art, and religion. In Die Weltrthsel there is a section
entitled Monistic Churches in which the author explicitly states:
The modern human being who possesses science, art, and thus also religion, has no need
of a particular church, no narrow, enclosed space. For everywhere in open nature where his
gaze falls upon the infinite universe or a part of it, he finds the harsh battle for existence
but also the true, the beautiful, and the good. Everywhere he finds his church in magnificent nature itself (1903, 138, emphasis original).
With such utterances Haeckel enters the same field of discourse as had been
mapped out by German Romanticism (Jacobsen 2005, 9 89) and American transcendentalists like Henry David Thoreau or Ralph Waldo Emerson, albeit coming
from a different direction (Obuchowski 2005).
As this quotation shows, Haeckel is not only an example of the entanglement of discourses on religion and science, but also of the reconfiguration of
this discursive knot with art. Haeckel saw the power of creation active in nature,
which also links him to vitalism; from his first monograph on the aesthetics of
radiolars (1862) until his death, Haeckel was fascinated by what he used to call
the absolute beauty of nature (see Di Gregorio 2005, 515 519); he regarded nature in general, and animals in particular, as artists; for him, nature even has a
sense of art that had evolved to full consciousness in the human being. Since
1899, Haeckel had published several volumes on Art Forms of Nature (Kunstformen der Natur; see, e.g., Haeckel 1904) that significantly impacted the understanding of art in Germany around 1900 (Kockerbeck 1989; on literature and psychology see Fick 1993). Not surprisingly, then, in Die Natur als Knstlerin
(Nature as Artist, a sort of Festschrift, published with a print run of 30,000
This is an implicit reference to Goethes formulation: Wer Wissenschaft und Kunst besitzt,
hat auch Religion. Wer jene beiden nicht besitzt, der habe Religion (Those who have science
and art, also have religion; those who dont have them, should have religion; see also the
monistic interpretation in Ostwald 1911, 32).
80
one year before his eightieth birthday), a photograph of Haeckel is accompanied

by Schillers poetic words: Only through the morning gate of beauty / you entered the land of cognition (Nur durch das Morgentor des Schnen / Drangst
du in der Erkenntnis Land; Haeckel 1913, 7).
In addition to artistic representations of plants and crystals, Haeckel used
the dispositive of painting when he wanted to express the beauty of nature. During his travels he produced many watercolors; one of them was chosen as the
cover painting for the present book because it aestheticizes the programmatic
blending of nature and science in Haeckels thinking.

We have already seen that Ernst Haeckel differentiated his own philosophy from
the theoretical spiritualism or energetics of Wilhelm Ostwald (1853 1932),
because the latter negated matter and looked only at the spiritual or energetic
dimensions of the world and reality (see Braune 2009, 51 68). From a vitalist
perspective, Hans Driesch had also criticized Ostwalds energetics and later
called this the best part of his 1904 book Naturbegriffe und Natururteile (Driesch
1922, 182). These differences notwithstanding, both Haeckel and Ostwald where
united in their attempt to establish monism as the new bridge between religion
and science, between Geisteswissenschaft and Naturwissenschaft. Ostwald was
instrumental in the popularization of monism at the beginning of the twentieth
century (Daser 1980; Hakfoort 1992; Bchli and Petrus 2003; Braune 2009; Lenz
and Mueller 2012). In 1911 he was elected president of the Deutscher Monistenbund (German Monist League, founded under the influence of Haeckel in
1906), a position that he combined with his many other activities, from scientific
research (he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1909) to political activism in the peace movement of Berta von Suttner, to being a passionate amateur painter himself. His ideas about color theorywhich he, like Goethe before
him, considered the most important achievement of his lifeinfluenced artists
such as (the young) Paul Klee and members of the Dutch artist group De Stijl,
including Piet Mondrian (Gage 1993, 247 260). His published work comprises
more than forty thousand pages. As a representative of the monistic movement
he propagated social Darwinism, euthanasia, and eugenics, and after the lost
war in 1917 he linked his monism to a revanchist German nationalism.
Wilhelm Ostwald is a prime example of the entanglement of scientific and
religious discourses. While his biography seamlessly combines various societal
and cultural fields, his work explicitly contributes to the discourses of science,
religion, vitalism, alchemy, philosophy, psychology, and art. When we add
81
to this mlange the materialization of these discourses in dispositives such as the

Nobel Prize, Monistenbund, and political programs, we can rightly say that Ostwald is one of the personifications of the discursive entanglements that this book
is addressing. Let us have a closer look at some of his monistic writings.
In 1910, Ostwald published a collection of his work for a broad audience
under the title Die Forderung des Tages (The Requirement of the Day). In
eight parts, the book provides an overview of his understanding of science, culture, and religion, dealing explicitly with General Energetics (Energetik),
Methodology, Psychology and Biography, General Problems of Culture,
The International Auxiliary Language, and The Educational System. As a
red thread throughout the almost 600 pages of text, Ostwald criticized the mechanistic and materialist scientific understanding of his time, and he strove for a
monistic overcoming of the dualism of matter and mind, in which the terms
Kraft (power), Arbeit (work), and Energie (energy) take on meanings that
can be applied in various fields, from empirical science to psychology and art
(on the context and reception see Lenz 2012). He referred to Julius Robert
Mayer and his 1842 Bemerkungen ber die Krfte der unbelebten Natur (Observations regarding the powers of inanimate nature). Ostwald noted that
Mayer, who was a ships doctor and lay physicist, had put forward his theory
too early to be accepted by his contemporaries, and that only with the modern
terminology of Energetik could the truth of his ideas become fully visible (Ostwald 1910, 19 22, 28 29; see also Ostwald 1911, 82 85). It is the characteristic
of modern energetics to have overcome this dualism and to have introduced energy as the most general generic term. All phenomena are reduced to properties
and relations of energy, and matter in particularif such a term is useful in the
first placemust be defined on an energetic basis (Ostwald 1910, 22). This is exactly what Haeckel disapproved.
In his essay Moderne Mystik (Modern mysticism, 1907), Ostwald presented an understanding of mysticism as a phenomenon that always comes to the
fore in transitional phases of cultural development, when people have lost the
security of the old paradigm and have not yet gained the new one.
Now we are in the midst of the period of scientific mysticism. People try to revive Paracelsus
in Germany, Svedenborg is studied in England by a society founded under his name, and in
his homeland they prepare a new edition of his works. In France they announced the bankruptcy of science a few years ago, and in front of me I have the French edition of the English
alchemist and astrologer Robert Fludd (1574 1637) as the first volume of a Bibliothque des
sciences maudites (Paris: H. Darogon 1907). And to include modern authors, the Swede
Strindberg has tried to add to his fame as social-aesthetic writer that of a mystical physico-chemist, albeit as yet without having made the impression on scientists that was intended
(even though probably not expected). And in order not to forget the direct connection with
82
the early nineteenth-century philosophy of nature, which essentially was mysticism, people
have now begun to write new commentaries on Schelling, the leader of the former movement, and to publish his work as the leader of the new movement (1910, 87).
But this, of course, would only be a transitional phase prior to the real marriage
of science and philosophy under the umbrella of energetics and monism.
As part of this transition, the concept of energy can easily be applied to
psychological phenomena (see also Daser 1980, 39 188). Here, Ostwald enters
the same field of discourse that we have encountered already, which is an entanglement of occult and scientific discourse strands (see again Oppenheim 1985;
Crabtree 1993; Treitel 2004). The energetic approach to psychological phenomena, Ostwald explained, is a particularly striking example of the characteristic
of energetics, mentioned above, to unconsciously and almost against their will
infiltrate assumptions of presumably fully unrelated areas as a principle of explanation (1910, 211).
The monistic interpretation of energy led Ostwald to a critique of religion
that resembles his understanding of mysticism. Ironically, however, he used
for this critique a dispositive that is most directly linked to religionthe Sunday
sermon. In a book entitled Monistische Sonntagspredigten (Monistic Sunday Sermons), the monistic preacher gave words of exhortation and encouragement to
his followers. In short chapters, Ostwald mused about [w]hy [we are] monists,
[h]ow evil came into the world, [r]eligion and science, [t]he energetic imperative, [t]he development of God, [p]rayer, and other themes. In the
Fourth Sermon: Religion and Science, Ostwald provided a textbook example
of the optimistic belief in scientific progress that would overcome all forms of
religious superstition. About the general relationship between religion and science, he noted: The more our culture declines, the more cherished religion
proves to be; the more our culture rises, the more religion will take a backseat
and will be substituted by science. Will religion become completely dispensable
some day? (1911, 30). Later, he answered this question in the affirmative, but
without a clear prognosis: Hence, it is to be expected historically that one social
class after the other will rise from the sea of religious ideas and will form a fruitful land for humanity. That religion will slowly become dispensable is therefore a
process that develops in steps, and it is not yet clear when this process will have
reached all of humankind (1911, 32).
In a parallel argument, Ostwald envisaged a religion after religion (to borrow the apt formulation of Wasserstrom 1999) in the new form of a monistic understanding of god.
Looking at the entire development of the concept of god, we can conclude that now we can
ultimately leave behind the dualism of the past four centuries or so, and approach a mon-
83
ism. However, the earlier religious monism must be substituted today with a scientific monism. This is not the old monism that is organized on an animistic, anthropomorphic, or
priestly foundation, but a new monism based on the highest cognitive performances that
our brain, which is far more developed than in earlier stages, enables us to achieve (Ostwald 1911, 199, emphasis original).
What we see here is a creative re-entanglement of religion, science, and evolutionary biology (even the current fashion to return to biological, evolutionary explanations in the cognitive science of religion is prefigured in Ostwalds
discursive blending).
Like Haeckel and other scientists of his generation, Ostwald chose the
genre of popularizing books to convey his religious message to a broad audience,
and the discursive impact of this genre was significantly higher than his scientific writings. What is more, writing for a popular audience made the entanglement of seemingly disparate discourses much easier. We should not misinterpret
this as a less scientific or pseudo-scientific amateurism, but as a change of dispositive that multiplied the discursive reconfiguration of religion and science at
the beginning of the twentieth century and legitimated new meanings that were
shared by a large audience in Germany. This confirms the arguments that Peter J.
Bowler made for the British book market:
The early twentieth century was a period in which there were major developments within
both the publishing industry and the scientific community. Publishers thought that there
was a major revival of interest in science by ordinary readers. Mass-circulation newspapers
and the advent of photography transformed the way science (like many other topics) could
be presented to the public. The expansion of secondary education created a market for literature aimed at those seeking to improve themselves by home study or by taking evening
classes. Yet the scientific community had by this time become fully professionalizedand
there is a widespread belief that one consequence of professionalization was a reluctance
to engage with the general public (2009, 1 2).
As Bowler makes convincingly clear, however, this is a misconception, and British

scientists played an active role in satisfying the increased demand for information
about what they were doing (2009, 2). The same is true for Germany, where this
process was enhanced by the fact that between 1906 and 1914 many natural scientists joined the Monistenbund and related associations (Domschke 2012; see also the
contributions in Steinbach and Gerber 2005, 239 398).
On the neo-Romantic monist mysticism and the religion for the people of Bruno Wille
and Wilhelm Blsche see Jacobsen 2005, 231 328; see also Nthlich et al. 2005.
On the reception of these theories in science fiction and other literature see Clarke 2001, on
energetics pp. 140 141.
84
One such dispositive was the series Zellenbcherei (Cell Library) that was
published by Drr & Weber in Leipzig. The press advertised its series with the
slogan The Cell Library does without dry theory and profound scholarly wisdom. It is a cultural, aesthetical, and economical-political collection that gains
its materials from everyday life and presents knowledge and benefit, happiness
and instruction, in a cheerful, often humorous way, in a chatty and narrative
tone. This, the advertisement added, was particularly necessary in a period
that experienced dramatic educational damage due to war and revolution, particularly in Germany. In a discursive framework of analysis, it becomes clear how
discursive structures direct the emergence of new dispositives, and how in turn
the attribution of meaning is stabilized by dispositive changes.
Wilhelm Ostwald actively participated in this discourse. The first volume of the
Zellenbcherei was Ostwalds Das groe Elixier: Die Wissenschaftslehre (The great
elixir: Scientific epistemology), published with a print run of 5,000. For twenty
marks excluding tax, readers could also buy a numbered luxury edition, printed
on hand-made paper, with a hand-colored cover, and with the authors signature
(see the last page of Ostwald 1920). The cover of the standard edition aestheticized
the books content, depicting a bottle of alchemical elixir against a background pattern of a cell structure. Many times in this book, the author linked religion to science, alchemy to chemistry, and magic to cognition. He described [t]he scientist
as magician (Der Forscher als Zauberer; Ostwald 1920, 6 7) and referred to
the alchemical dream as a positive foundation of modern science.
Among the first dreams that inspired the beginning of scientific-technological thinking, the
great elixir plays a very significant role. The search for the Philosophers Stone or the tincture that was able to turn base metals into gold and to give eternal health to the human
body was a major source of chemistry, this science that reveals not less than in other sciences how much of these dreams can be made real, and in fact have become true. The
great elixir has not fully been found today, but we know large parts of it. [] All these realizations of old dreams of humankind have been achieved on one single path. This path is
called science.
Die Zellenbcherei verzichtet auf graue Theorie und tiefgrndige Gelehrtenweisheit. Sie ist eine
kulturelle, schngeistige und wirtschaftlich-politische Sammlung, die ihre Stoffe aus dem tglichen
Leben schpft und in frhlicher, oft humorvoller Weise, in Plauder- und Erzhlerton Wissen und
Nutz, Freude und Belehrung bietet (quoted from the advertisement in Ostwald 1920, 89).
Unter den ersten Trumen, welche das beginnende wissenschaftlich-technische Denken
erfllten, spielt das groe Elixier eine sehr hervorragende Rolle. Das Suchen nach dem Stein der
Weisen oder der Tinktur, die aus unedlen Metallen Gold zu machen und dem menschlichen
Krper dauernde Gesundheit zu verleihen vermochte, ist eine Hauptquelle der Chemie gewesen,
dieser Wissenschaft, in der sich nicht weniger deutlich wie in anderen darstellt, wieviel von
solchen Trumen erreichbar ist, da es tatschlich erreicht worden ist. Das groe Elixier ist heute
85
After having explained to his readers that such an elixir is particularly necessary
for the German people after the lost warand for the preparation of using Germanys scientific superiority against its enemiesOstwald gave a popular version of his understanding of a unified system of the natural and human sciences.
On the foundation of what he called the Ordnungswissenschaften (systematic
sciences), he described a pyramidal structure, consisting of Arbeitswissenschaften (sciences of work/energy), Lebenswissenschaften (life sciences), and Gesellschaftswissenschaften (social sciences). It is necessary to go through all
these sciences in exactly this order, otherwise the so-called Geisteswissenschaften will continue doing useless work and paper science (1920, 87, with diagram of the pyramid of scientific epistemology).
Ernst Haeckel and Wilhelm Ostwald were not the only academics who were
actively involved in public debate. In Germany between 1900 and 1930, there
emerged a whole movement of scientists, philosophers, and lay authors who
speculated about the spiritual dimensions of nature. This movement was to
some extent part of what is referred to as Kulturkampf, i.e., a nationalistic insistence on German cultural heritage vis--vis French rationalism. Three examples
stand for many others: in 1920, August Messer (1867 1937), professor of philosophy
in Gieen, published articles on Nature and Spirit (Messer 1920), popularized in
order to be read in philosophical coffee morning circles, work groups, adult education centers, and the like, as the preface tells us. In the same year, the medical
practitioner Franz Kleinschrod (1860 1934) dared to write an essay on The Problem of Life and the Positive Principle in Time and Space; and Einsteins Principle of
Relativity in Space and Time: A Principal Study, at the Same Time a New Way to
Solve the Problem of Life (Kleinschrod 1920). Kleinschrods earlier attempt to scientifically prove naturopathy was even translated into English (Kleinschrod 1910).
Finally, let me mention once more the paleontologist Edgar Dacqu who in 1926
published a book with the intriguing title Nature and Soul: A Contribution to
the Magical World Doctrine (Dacqu 1926; see Mildenberger 2009). In 1944, Dacqu collected revised versions of articles under the title From the Depth of Nature; the book could not be published before 1949 because of the dramatic situation at the end of World War II. Dacqu referred to these calamities in his preface
and linked this to his decision to include more chapters on religion than on natural
sciences. It cannot be stressed enough, he wrote, that worldview and religion
are two separate spheres of the general human life, but also the personal life
zwar noch nicht restlos, aber doch zu einem sehr groen Teile gefunden. [] Alle diese Verwirklichungen alter Menschheitstrume sind auf einem einzigen Wege gewonnen worden. Dieser
Weg heit Wissenschaft (Ostwald 1920, 7 8, emphasis original).
86
and experience; too many people today think that true religion can be substituted
with worldview (Dacqu 1944 [1949], 7).
Contributions like these have only rarely been looked at by historians, although they had decisive influence on how Germans of the Weimar Republic
and later periods conceptualized nature, science, and culture. These contributions to the discourse on nature and science stabilized frameworks of meaning
that informed religious movements and environmental policy after 1960 (both
in the Green Party and conservative milieus; on the background see Engels
2006; Bemmann 2012, 453 470).
Hence, the discourse on monism comprised more than the contributions of
representatives of the Monistenbund (see also Jacobsen 2005, 329 365 on monist musings in the twentieth century). An important link between various discourse strands was, again, the occultist and Theosophical movement of the
time. When Demeter Georgievitz Weitzer (1873 1949)who defined himself as
an occultist (Surya 1923, 6) and used the pseudonym G.W. Suryapublished a
1920 lecture in Munich as the first contribution to his Sammlung Geistiger Monismus (Collection of Spiritual Monism), he linked monistic philosophy to occultism, magic, mysticism, Oriental fascinations, and German nationalism. The
lecture started with the following statements:
We are living in an extraordinarily difficult, serious, and critical time. Every day confirms
this anew. What we experience, indeed what humanity will experience with a thousand
pains, is a global turning point as is not often seen in thousands of years. In the sea of
flames of the World War there began the downfall of all spiritual and material pseudo-values, of all hyper- and pseudo-culture. And if it now looks as if the evil, the low, and the
profane have fully gained power, in fact we should regard this downfall, this shifting of
human society, this re-evaluation of all values, as a great purification in which in every individual human soul, but also in entire nations the gold is separated from the slag.
As we have seen in C.G. Jungs psychology, the alchemical process of purification

and transmutation is applied here to the individual soul, but also to the national
identity of Germany after the lost war. Surya continued on this path in subse-
Wir leben in einer auerordentlich schweren, ernsten und kritischen Zeit. Jeder Tag besttigt
uns dies aufs Neue. Was wir erleben, ja was die ganze Menschheit noch unter tausend Schmerzen
erleben wird, ist eine Weltwende, wie solche sich in Jahrtausenden nur selten wiederholt. Mit dem
Flammenmeere des Weltkrieges begann der Zusammenbruch aller geistigen und materiellen
Scheinwerte, aller ber- und Scheinkultur. Und wenn es auch augenblicklich so aussieht, als ob
das Bse, Niedrige und Gemeine erst recht zur Herrschaft gelangt ist, so ist dieser Zusammenbruch, diese Umschichtung der menschlichen Gesellschaft, diese Umwertung aller Werte nur als
eine groe Luterung aufzufassen, durch welche in jeder einzelnen Menschenseele, sowie in
ganzen Nationen das Gold von der Schlacke geschieden wird (Surya 1923, 11).
Discursive Implications
87
quent publications in the Sammlung Geistiger Monismus. Volume 3 was devoted

to The supernatural and the World War (Das bersinnliche und der Weltkrieg,
1921), and in other works Surya addressed occult astrophysics or the triumph
of alchemy. His occult-scientific novel Moderne Rosenkreuzer (Modern Rosicrucians) went through eight editions, including a Volksausgabe (popular edition) in 1930.
Discursive Implications: Holistic Thinking between

NEW AGE SCIENCE, Nature-Based Spirituality, and
a New Philosophy of Nature
As I said, the concept of ecology came into use through Ernst Haeckels work
Generelle Morphologie der Organismen. In Weimar Germany, and still after World
War II, ecology remained a discursive field that was characterized by scientific,
hermeneutic, moral, and political forces, a constellation that Thomas Potthast
(2001) calls epistemic-moral hybrids. If one recalls Haeckels convictions
with regard to philosophy and religion of nature, links are apparent between
the debates of deep ecology and such religious overlays in scientific research.
They express in philosophical terms the result of a ritualized experience of nature in a spiritual respect. There is a recurrent overlap of deep ecological philosophy with spiritual concerns, which naturally accords with the self-understanding of leading deep ecologists. This is not just a matter of knowing about the
interconnectedness of all levels of being, but also its experience and sensual
communication. This has implications for the argument, as Dieter Birnbacher
critically observed: In the philosophical writings of deep ecology, the discursive
and argumentative element is largely sidelined by expressive and poetical formulations. Reverence for nature is no longer only described but invoked and visualized. Just as in the Romantic philosophy of nature, philosophy itself is assimilated into the intended process of a holistic, that is, no longer exclusively rational
realization of the individual self (Preface in Birnbacher 1997, 9). Theory and
practice are thus two sides of the same coin; accordingly, most deep ecology
publications contain not only theoretical discussions, but also invocations, meditations, and spiritual exercises (Seed et al. 1988).
Veneration of nature as a consequence of ecological and biological thinking
is widespread in Europe and North America today. Indeed, with Bron Taylor we
can even argue that nature-based spirituality is a form of religion that is spreading significantly on a global scale (Taylor 2010). The discursive constellations
that I describe in this book are the most important roots of contemporary nature
spirituality. And again, intellectuals who inhabit the third space between sci-
88
ence and religion have been instrumental in establishing new meanings that
are attributed to nature, ecology, religion, and science. The field that these intellectuals inhabit is often called New Age science (Hanegraaff 1996, 62 76), but
such a label is problematic. It participates in a discourse of separating real science from pseudo-science and professional knowledge about nature from
amateur knowledge. Interestingly enough, many of the authors writing in the
field of new age science had been distinguished scholars in their disciplines before they turned to theories that lack the approval of the majority of their peers;
it is this social aspect, rather than the empirical status of their adopted theories,
that allows scientists to transmutate into pseudo-scientists (cf. also Restivo
1983). In the following passage, I will give a brief overview of the most important
representatives of this discursive field.
Fritjof Capra
Theoretical physicist Fritjof Capra (b. 1939) is one of the most influential protagonists of new age science. His Tao of Physics (1975) made issues of global environmental crises and the requirement for new thinking in science and society
known to a wider public. The book has gone through 43 editions in 23 languages.
In it, Capra dwelled on the parallels between quantum mechanics and east Asian
mysticisma parallelism that became almost canonical in this discursive knot.
Furthermore, he referred to physicist Geoffrey Chew and his so-called bootstrap
philosophy, which appears to be very similar to Leibniz monadology. Using
the concept of self-organized individual entities, Capra developed a philosophy
of nature that comprises both science and the humanities, leading from theory to
action, from fundamental laws to dynamic events, and from separateness to mutual connectedness.
In the following years, Capra was heavily influenced by the systems theory
of Gregory Bateson, and he adjusted his former concept accordingly. In The Turning Point (1982) it was no longer the bootstrap philosophy or the model of quantum mechanics that grounded his argument, but the holistic and ecological systems view of reality, which he presented as the common denominator of both
modern science and ancient mysticism. According to Capra, Western society
is in need of a new paradigm, because the old mechanistic Newtonian and Cartesian paradigm has led modern society to an alienation from, if not a total destruction of, nature. This old paradigm is in a state of decline and the global crises are reaching their culminating point. At the same time the new holistic
paradigm is emerging rapidly, bringing forth a society that is holistic, open
to spiritual dimensions of life, and healthy for all its members. The juxtaposition
89
of those two paradigms serves as a universal key to interpret almost every part of
contemporary culture.
Generally speaking, Capras books are an easily accessible compilation of
two authors more complicated ideas, namely Ilya Prigogines and Gregory Batesons (see below). While Capra interprets their thinking in great detail (and sometimes eclectically), he omits references to the founders of systems theory, such
as Ervin Laszlo. This is also true for his most recent major book The Web of Life
(1997). Here, he establishes what he calls the Capra-synthesis, consisting of his
former contributions and an additional application of H. Maturana and F. Varelas so-called Santiago Theory, which Capra describes as a parallelism of learning and living, of knowledge and creativity. He also includes concepts of deep
ecology and sustainability.
Capras impact on new age, on environmentalism, and recently also on the
counter-movement against uncontrolled globalization has been decisive. Actively supporting political and economic efforts to arrive at a holistic and sustainable culture, he is the founder and president of the Elmwood Institute and the
Center for Ecoliteracy (founded in 1995) in Berkeley, California, an ecological
think tank dedicated to fostering new concepts and values for a sustainable future. Furthermore, he is a lecturer at the influential Schumacher College in Darlington, Devon (United Kingdom), an international center for ecological studies.
His course titles include Life, Mind and Society (2002), in which he attempts to
integrate deep ecological concerns into a general systems theory of culture.
Ilya Prigogine
Ilya Prigogine (1917 2003), a Belgian scientist of Russian descent, contributed
considerably to the contemporary discourse on physics, nature, religion, and
the humanities. Although Prigogine, who won the Nobel Prize in 1977 for his
work on the thermodynamics of nonequilibrium systems, writes in a very sophisticated scientific style, his books gained enormous influence in a wider context
of nature spirituality and philosophy.
The starting point to understand Prigogines theory is his new reading of
thermodynamics. Newtonian dynamics is purely mechanical and treats time as
reversible, while classical thermodynamics talks of an arrow of time that
moves toward increased entropy and loss of energy. Prigogine refuted both models and proposed his theory of dissipative structures. Dynamic and open systems that are far from equilibrium (such as organic systems), he argued, bring
forth new orders of higher complexity. In so doing, they do not follow universal
laws, but develop according to their own systems dynamics. And what is more,
90
such open systems advance in constant exchange with the environment (dissipation) and are able to repair themselves on their evolutionary path (this process is
totally different and much more complex than Darwins paradigm had suggested). Prigogines well-received discovery was the birth of a new discipline: synergetics. Although living organisms are the most obvious examples of thisin contrast to apparently closed systems such as clockworkPrigogine, like other
adherents to systems theories, maintained that dissipative structures can also
be found in human artifacts that show a considerable capacity for self-organization. Consequently, he applied this model to social systems and human interaction. In this view, the human place is within nature, since human culture is a
subsystem with countless interrelations to neighboring systems. Hence, humanitys role is neither domination nor stewardship, but involvement and empathy
(Prigogine and Stengers 1984; Prigogine 1997).
It is important to note that dissipative structures do not necessarily tend to
gain a state of increased structure; they just reach higher orders of instability and
fluctuation. Indeed, similar to other philosophies (for instance, Schelling or
Bergson), it is the becoming and not the being that is essential for Prigogines
theory (Prigogine 1980). Therefore, he was critical of belief in cosmic harmony
or eternal laws and looked at the universe as always endangered, fragile, and
uncertain. This attitude brought Prigogine into opposition with both scientists
who strive for a Grand Unified Theory (Steven W. Hawking, for instance,
whom Prigogine sees as clinging to the old paradigm of being) and with teleological models prominent in New Age milieus. There is no telos, Prigogine argued; instead of being a simple consequence of the present, the future must be
addressed as a lively process with a whole spectrum of possibilities.
The theory of dissipative structures and the interdependence of natural and
social subsystemshence, the entanglement of mind and matter in self-organizing systemsleads to the assumption that small systems are able to influence
the overall structure of nature and the universe. Humanity and even the individual are no longer passive objects but acknowledge their responsibility and power
to influence the whole system. This in particular has attracted New Age thinkers
who at the same time played down the more disconcerting features of Prigogines theory, like his refutation of teleological or causal assumptions, which
goes along with his notion of contingency and the possibility of failure. As a consequence, Prigogine has gained a selective reception by authors such as Erich
Jantsch, Fritjof Capra, David Bohm, and Marilyn Ferguson, all of them bringing
into his theory a more mystical and teleological understanding.
91
Gregory Bateson
The work of Gregory Bateson (1904 1980), anthropologist, psychiatrist, biologist, sociologist, and philosopher, is a highly original and thought-provoking
contribution to the interface of a number of different academic disciplines.
While psychologists use his concept of double-bind (a kind of communicative
entanglement of two persons), authors who are linked to new age and naturebased spirituality refer to his philosophical and ecological concepts as testimony
for their own thoughts. The latter is due to Batesons time at the Human Potential
Center Esalen in the last years of his life (Kripal 2007, 306 308). Bateson himself
never accepted his being associated with the New Age movement.
As far as the discourses on nature and religion are concerned, Batesons
most important ideas can be seen in his concept of mind and substance,
which is part of a larger systems theory (Bateson 1979, 2000). Making use of
C.G. Jungs notion of the two worlds, pleroma and creatura, Bateson argued
that the former is the realm of undifferentiated causal relations, whereas the latter views the same phenomena in a contextual way that makes visible the differences. The creatura is analogous to mind. It is the world, seen from a certain
perspective. If mind in general is characterized as such, the question arises:
what does its relation to individual minds look like? At this point, Bateson introduced a cybernetic model. The individual me is not limited to body or sensual perceptions, but must be addressed as a subsystem of the encompassing
mind system. It is a unity set up by an analysis of the circumstances and not explainable by intrinsic characteristics. Furthermore, the individual minds unity is
identical with the unity of evolutionary survival; it cannot be separated from the
surrounding life-systems.
This perhaps is the most radical consequence, because it puts the relation
between humanity and nature in a context of mutual dependence. When
mind is immanent to the ecological system, human thought and action have decisive impact on the whole of nature. Conversely, humanity is totally dependent
on nature and its own survival is linked to the survival of nature. Therefore, Bateson advised a fundamental new orientation in several disciplines: ecology and
psychology have to acknowledge that the human mind transgresses the borders
of its body and is present in ideas and artifacts that can even survive the physical
death of a person (Bateson talked of the ecology of ideas). Theology, likewise,
has to overcome the dichotomy of transcendent versus immanent deities and can
approach the human being as part of the gods, who need the human mind just as
the human being needs the gods (Bateson and Bateson 1987).
In sum, Bateson called for a shift of paradigm, because otherwise the human
being will be extinct within a short span of time. It is this claim that made Ba-
92
teson an influential thinker in contemporary nature discourse, environmentalism, and religion.
Rupert Sheldrake
Biologist Rupert Sheldrake (b. 1942) has become another famous author of new
age science since he proposed his controversial theory of morphogenetic fields
in the early 1980s (Sheldrake 1981). The hypothesis of formative causation postulates the existence of invisible organizing fields that are able to transmit information to seemingly independent parts of reality, for instance to the genes of other
members of the species on another continent. This is made possible by what Sheldrake terms morphic resonance (Sheldrake 1988). Although his theory has been
refuted by the majority of empirical scientists, a set of independent experiments
show it to be at least not improbable. Like Wolfgang Paulis doctrine of synchronicity, the concept of morphogenetic fields is able to explain phenomena that
seem to be mysterious to traditional physics and biology. If the theorys propositions were accepted, the consequences would totally change our view of nature
and the cosmos. Therefore, Sheldrake elaborated a vitalist, holistic theory that
is empirical at the start and purely metaphysical in its implications (Sheldrake
1990). In the end, the universe for Sheldrake is a conscious and creative power,
which brings forth morphogenetic fields. All single, yet resonating, entities take
part in this cosmic dance of creativity, including the human mind.
As can easily be imagined, this proposition enthralled environmentalists
and theorists of ecological concerns. First, it provides an explanation for the mutual dependence of all levels of nature; second, it places the human in a cosmos
of encompassing energy and the vitality of cosmic intelligence; third, it appreciates all forms of lifehumans, animals, and plantsas equally intelligent and
therefore as carrying intrinsic value. All three conclusions are crucial elements
of deep ecology as well as of the discursive knot that we have encountered
many times in the present book.
David Bohm
Also in the 1980s, acclaimed physicist David Bohm (1917 1992) presented the socalled holographic paradigm, which was the result of thirty years research into
quantum mechanics and its philosophical implications. While his early work focused on the strictly scientific aspects of quantum mechanicsalthough from
the beginning he refused to separate science and philosophyBohms perspec-
93
tive changed when he met the Indian thinker Jiddu Krishnamurti in 1961, after
the latters separation from the Theosophical Society. Bohms Wholeness and
the Implicit Order (1980), although presented as a work in progress, became influential in modern philosophy of nature and the debates on holism. In this
book, Bohm presented a theory that describes the phenomenal world as the unfolding of a more fundamental implicit order. This implicit order is characterized by an unbroken dynamic wholenessa holomovementthat comprises
both matter and consciousness.
In later publications, Bohm expanded his theory, describing a hierarchy of
orders beyond the implicate (the super-implicate order, the generative order,
etc.) and presented a theory of soma-significance, which intends to reconcile
the domains of matter and meaning. As can easily be recognized, his later
thought carries strong metaphysical and mystical connotations (Bohm and
Hiley 1993). This led to a kind of alienation from the traditional physicists
and, simultaneously, to a broad appreciation in a philosophical, theological,
and esoteric field of discourse. It is important to note that his theories are in
fact deterministic and thus in opposition to other strands of quantum mysticism
that focus on a-causality and indeterminacy. While Bohm did not engage in direct political or environmental activities, his influence is nevertheless important
because he provided those endeavors with a theoretical holistic framework that
can easily be attached to environmental concerns (see also Forstner 2008).
I conclude my overview at this point. It should have become clear by now that
the discursive entanglement of monism, vitalism, science, philosophy, and religion has been a significant contribution to intellectual discourse of the twentieth
century and beyond. We are not dealing with a marginal movement here. The discursive knot under consideration is one of the most important reasons for the steady
growth of concerns about nature in Europe as well as of religious options that seek
an alternative to traditional monotheistic interpretations.
5 Merging Occultism, Philosophy, Science, and

the Academic Study of Religion:
The Theosophical Society
In previous chapters I have repeatedly referred to the crucial role of Theosophists
in the discursive reconfiguration of religion and science at the end of the nineteenth century. Now it is time to address this influence more directly and identify
the discursive contribution of Theosophical authors. Indeed, many scholars of
religion regard the year 1875 as the birth of modern esotericism (see, most recently, Hammer and Rothstein 2013). That year witnessed the foundation of the Theosophical Society, without whose influence twentieth-century esotericism would
have looked very differently. There are several reasons why the Theosophical Society, and Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (1831 1891) in particular, were the most
important recurrent stimulus of esoteric discourses into the twentieth century.
First, the modern esoteric traditions were mustered and repackaged in Blavatskys writings. Second, Blavatsky assimilated Asian doctrines in a Romantic
view of the Orient, whereby the purest form of ancient wisdom was rumored
to lie in India and Tibet. Third, Blavatskys charismatic personality ensured her
writings widespread acknowledgment as a revelation. Fourth, Blavatskys Esoteric School became the model for many other initiatory societies and magical
orders in the Rosicrucian and Masonic tradition. Last, the Theosophical Society
offers an outstanding example of the mixture of religious and scientific thought
in contemporary societies, as the Theosophists had a lively dialogue with leading
philologists and scholars of religion and so popularized academic theories and
knowledge. It is this last dynamic that renders the Theosophical Society a crucial
element of the present study. In my analysis, I will combine an historical description of the early phase of the Theosophical Society with a study of Helena P. Blavatskys use of academic theories and her reconfiguration of discourse strands
that are important for the analyses of this book.

So many rumors and myths have gathered around the biography of Helena P.
Blavatskyor HPB, as she liked to be calledthat a description of her character
and life very much depends on the individual viewpoint (see Meade 1980; Campbell 1980; Godwin 1994, 277 331; Cranston 1994 [biased but useful as a collection of sources]; Goodrick-Clarke 2004). She was born on 12 August 1831 as Helena Petrovna von Hahn in Ekaterinoslav in the Ukraine and spent her childhood
95
surrounded by Russian nobility. Her father, Peter A. von Hahn, was descended
from a noble German family and served in the army, while her mother, Helena
A. de Fadeyev (von Hahn), achieved renown as a novelist but died young, so Blavatsky grew up with her aristocratic maternal grandparents. In 1849 she married
the vice-governor of Erevan, Nikifor Blavatsky, but their union was unhappy and
brief. She soon left her husband and embarked on an adventurous life of travels
that are still not fully documented. She visited Turkey, Greece, Egypt, and
France, arriving in London in 1851, the year of the Great Exhibition.
According to her own account, it was in Hyde Park that Blavatsky met her
Master, whom she had known in her dreams since childhood. He came toward
her in the company of an Indian delegation. Later she wrote to A.P. Sinnet, [I]
saw Master in my visions ever since my childhood. In the year of the first Nepaul
Embassy (when?) saw and recognised him. Saw him twice. Once he came out of
the crowd, then He ordered me to meet Him in Hyde Park. I cannot, I must not
speak of this. I would not publish it for the world (Barker 1999 [1926], 150 151).
Henceforth, Blavatsky claimed to live in continuous contact with these Masters.
Who they exactly were is not easy to establish, even within the Theosophical Society. Sometimes they are simply distinguished individuals who can materialize
and incarnate at various places; sometimes they are subtle forces of energy that
only assume corporeal form in order to appear visible to humans.
The first model was Blavatskys choice (see also Johnson 1994), for she described her teachers as Indian gurus, namely Mahatma Moryaknown as Master Mborn in the Punjab, and Mahatma Koot Hoomi (Master KH), from Kashmir. The Theosophist of October 1907 printed Blavatskys following account:
There is beyond the Himalayas a nucleus of Adepts, of various nationalities, and the Teshu
[Panchen] Lama knows them, and they act together, and some of them are with him and yet
remain unknown in their true character even to the average lamaswho are ignorant fools
mostly. My Master and KH and several others I know personally are there, coming and
going, and they are all in communication with Adepts in Egypt and Syria, and even Europe
(quoted in Cranston 1994, 83).
The idea of a White Brotherhood, long current in Europe, merges here with mystical notions of the Orient. The notion of a mysterious community of sages has
recurred in esoteric discourse ever since Platos philosopher-kings gave rise to
utopias with an ideal and sometimes transcendent government. The Renaissance
conceived of a succession of distinguished world teachers bearing the prisca theologia, an idea further elaborated by the Rosicrucians as a secret society. This
tradition was now supplemented by European fantasies concerning sages of
the Orient, the Mahatmas (Great Souls) who, either from the mythical paradise
of Shambala or from spheres beyond the material world, mysteriously directed
96
5 Merging Occultism, Philosophy, Science, and the Academic Study of Religion
the destinies of human beings. I will come back to this idea, which was taken up
by others at the end of the nineteenth century.
After the first contact with her Master, Blavatsky led an extremely turbulent
life, which led her on journeys to Canada, Mexico, Latin America, the West Indies, Ceylon, and India. In 1854 she allegedly crossed the Rocky Mountains
with settlers in covered wagons. Many biographers accept her account of journeys to India, Kashmir, Russia, the Caucasus, France, Germany, Egypt, and
Italy, but her alleged visit to Tibet, where she claimed to study secret documents
in Lamaist monasteries, is not confirmed by scholarship. Whatever ones view,
these extensive journeys to mythically charged places in the history of humankind represent an important instrument for the legitimization of esoteric knowledge (Hammer 2001). Even if Blavatsky had undertaken only half of these journeys, it would have been a clear indication of her extraordinary character and
her driving ambition to abandon bourgeois mores and to achieve an education
and self-emancipation denied to most women of her generation. Her whole
life was a provocation to the guardians of Victorian etiquette.
Blavatskys public career really began in 1872 with her attempt to found a
magical club or a socit spirite in Cairo and her arrival in New York in 1873.
By this time Blavatsky was already an experienced medium, and she soon
made contact with the spiritualist scene, increasingly popular in America
since the 1850s. The development of American spiritualism is usually reckoned
to date from the events that occurred at Hydesville, New York, in 1847. Soon
after John D. Fox, his wife, and six children had moved into their new house
in Hydesville, they began to hear mysterious rapping sounds. These raps were
attributed to the ghost of a murdered peddler, whose body had been buried in
the cellar of the house. Two of the daughters, Margaret and Kate, developed a
form of communication with the ghost, and more importantly, they discovered
the commercial success of such conversations with spirits. The novelty spread
like wildfire in the United States, and the Fox sisters became national celebrities
who could charge for their performances.
Other mediums lost no time in jumping on the bandwagon. By 1855 two
million Americans were said to be convinced of the truth of the observed phenomena, which were now reported from many farms. Research groups were
founded in order to study the matter scientifically, and the famous Society for
Psychical Research, which became even better known for its clash with Madame
Blavatsky, owed its origin to these inquiries. Many of the alleged spirit communications were unmasked as hoaxes, and when Margaret Fox, some forty years
after the Hydesville incident, publicly confessed that she and her sister had staged the whole affair, the movement suffered a severe blow (Jenkins 2000, 39 41).
97
Of course, spiritualism did not begin with the events at Hydesville. The only
novelty in these circumstances was their becoming an object of public debate
(Godwin 1993, 187 204). Communication with ascended beingswhether the
souls of the deceased or with other spiritshas a long history, in which the mysticism of Emanuel Swedenborg is an important chapter. But spiritualism was significant for the history of American religion, as it influenced many Christian denominations and led to a series of new religions. Under the name of Allen
Kardec, Hyppolyte Leon Denizard Rivail (1804 1869), well versed in magnetism,
Mesmerism, and esoteric traditions, founded an important new religion, after a
Druid spirit source had revealed messages to him. His work, Le livre des esprits
(The Book of Spirits, 1857), became a fundamental text of the colorful spiritualist movement, which according to conservative estimates today numbers over
one hundred million followers worldwide, the majority living in Latin America.
Spiritualism was also an important factor for religious seekers outside the institutional churches, which Robert C. Fuller calls the emergence of unchurched
America (Fuller 2001, 38 44). What is more, in conjunction with Mesmerism
and animal magnetism, it had a strong impact on the emergence of psychology
as an academic discipline (Ellenberger 1970, 53 102).
Blavatsky was in any case very interested in the spiritualist debates of her
time. In October 1874 she met Colonel Henry Steel Olcott (1832 1907), who
was at that moment publishing a series of newspaper articles on spiritualist phenomena taking place at a farm in Vermont. For all their differences of personality, a close relationship developed between Blavatsky and her Theosophical
twin. Olcott was a lawyer with a flourishing practice specializing in commercial
law, and had earlier undertaken the public inquiry into the assassination of
Abraham Lincoln. He had long been interested in esoteric subjects and was
close to the Freemasons. He became Blavatskys principal partner and was chiefly responsible for organizing what would become the Theosophical Society.
On 9 March 1875, Colonel Olcott received a mysterious letter, written in golden
ink and addressed to the Neophytos Olcott. The sender identified himself as a certain Tuitit Bey, Grand Master of the mystical Brotherhood of Luxor. Further letters
followed from the Masters, in which Olcott was summoned to publish various articles in a New York newspaper about occultism and similar topics. Later he was
encouraged to concern himself with Blavatsky and her public influence.
In May 1875, Olcott founded the Miracle Club, without knowing that a group
of that name already existed in London. Blavatsky was probably not a member of
this club, but wrote in her scrapbook in July 1875: Orders received from India
direct to establish a philosophic-religious Society & choose a name for italso
to choose Olcott (quoted from Cranston 1994, 143). This commission was shortly
fulfilled, for at a lecture by the architect and engineer George H. Felt on The lost
98
canon of proportion of the Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans, held on 7 September 1875 in Blavatskys apartment before an audience of seventeen persons, Olcott had the idea of founding a new society. At successive meetings Olcott was
elected president, and after some leafing through a dictionary it was decided
to call it the Theosophical Society.
The goals of the organization were later defined as follows: (1) to form the
nucleus of a universal brotherhood of humanity, without distinction of race,
creed, sex, caste, or color; (2) to study ancient and modern religions, philosophies, and sciences; and (3) to investigate the unexplained laws of nature and
psychical powers latent in humankind. These very goals demonstrate that the
Theosophical Society bridged esotericism, the comparative study of religion,
and the heritage of the Enlightenment.
Unveiling the Hidden Knowledge of Isis

Shortly after the foundation of the Theosophical Society, Blavatsky, now sharing
an apartment with Olcott, began working feverishly on her first major book.
Many myths of doubtful truth have gathered around the composition of Isis Unveiled. Frequently, dozens of pages of good English in a neat hand, as if written
by a spirit, were discovered in the morning on her writing desk. Olcott claimed
that the work was entirely written in the astral light and that the Mahatmas
rather than Blavatsky were its real authors.
On the one hand, we have no reason to doubt that Blavatsky possessed mediumistic powers, which could have played a certain role in the creation of her
major works. Blavatskys account that she almost daily felt the presence of her
Master, who was within her body and communicated knowledge otherwise inaccessible to her, describes a widespread phenomenon known today as channeling. On the other hand, and more importantly, there is almost nothing in Isis Unveiled that could not have been gathered from contemporary literature. Critics of
the Theosophical Society who were close to the Society for Psychical Research
took much trouble to prove that Blavatskys works offered gleanings from
about a hundred books, which were mostly available in Olcotts library (Coleman
1895). One might thereby suppose that Olcott also had a share in the composition
of the extensive works of his Theosophical twin. From a discursive point of
view, we can say that Blavatskys work is a quite ingenious example of plagiarism, in which the author entangled all relevant discourse strands that make
up the knot of science, religion, and occultism. That is probably the reason
why the criticism did not harm the books success or its discursive impact.
The first edition of Isis Unveiled: A Master Key to the Mysteries of Ancient and
99
Modern Science and Theology (1877), with a print run of one thousand, had sold
out within ten days, and some 500,000 copies have been sold up to the present
day.
For the purpose of this study, it is particularly interesting to have a closer
look at the discursive re-entanglement that Blavatsky achieved in her writing.
Sheand the Theosophical Society in generalis certainly not the founder of
these discourses, but she played a significant role in the multiplication of discursive constellations that had influence in the twentieth century and are still in
place today. Isis Unveiled collects the knowledge of the nineteenth century and
assembles it in a way that intends to demonstrate the anti-materialist truth of
eternal Eastern wisdom. Even the books title was anticipated by others. It
was none other than Carl Gustav Carus who wrote in his Zwlf Briefe ber das
Erdleben (1841):
To be sure, when after learning about Oersteds discovery I understood this view of the magnetic life of the earth, it felt as if I suddenly got much closer to the secret of this whole planetary being.Hence, if this particular view as yet has not been your own, I hope that its
realization will now be a welcome enrichment of your inner vision and thinking.Indeed,
we can hardly enjoy a higher and purer pleasure than when one veil after the other is stripped off the deeply covered image of Isis, and we thus learn to increasingly perceive ourselves as being part of a general divine life.
Carus here refers to Hans Christian rsted (1777 1851), the Danish physicist and
chemist who discovered that electric currents create magnetic fields, which was
an important step in the development of electromagnetism. rsted influenced
post-Kantian philosophy and nineteenth-century interpretation of science. Blavatsky was familiar with this research and interpreted it in a similar fashion
as Carus, but her undertone is less Romantically inspired and less eroticized,
and much more polemical in its anti-Christian and anti-materialist attack.
Gewi, als mir damals durch das Studium der Oerstedschen Entedeckung diese Ansicht
vom magnetischen Leben der Erde aufging, was es mir, als wre ich mit einem Male dem
Geheimnis dieses ganzen planetarischen Daseins um ein groes Teil nhergekommen.Ist
daher Dir gerade diese Betrachtungsweise bisher noch nicht eigen gewesen, so hoffe ich, da
nun auch Dir deren Aufnahme eine erfreuliche Bereicherung des innern Schauens und Denkens
sein werde.Knnen wir doch berhaupt kaum einer hhern und reinern Freude genieen, als
indem ein Schleier nach dem andern von dem tiefverhllten Isisbilde sich lst und wir somit
mehr und mehr im Innern eines allgemeinen gttlichen Lebens uns fhlen lernen (Carus 1926
[1841], 241, emphasis original). German Romanticism is not mentioned in Coleman 1895 as a
source of inspiration for Blavatsky.
100
These guerilla-skirmishes between the champions of the clergy and the materialistic Academy of Science, prove abundantly how little the latter has done toward uprooting blind fanaticism from the minds of even very educated persons. Evidently science has neither completely conquered nor muzzled theology. She will master her only on that day when she will
condescend to see in the spiritual phenomenon something besides mere hallucination and
charlatanry. But how can she do it without investigating it thoroughly? Let us suppose that
before the time when electro-magnetism was publicly acknowledged, the Copenhagen Professor Oersted, its discoverer, had been suffering from an attack of what we call psychophobia, or pneumatophobia. He notices that the wire along which a voltaic current is passing
shows a tendency to turn the magnetic needle from its natural position to one perpendicular to the direction of the current. Suppose, moreover, that the professor had heard much
of certain superstitious people who used that kind of magnetized needles to converse with
unseen intelligences. That they received signals and even held correct conversations with
them by means of the tippings of such a needle, and that in consequence he suddenly
felt a scientific horror and disgust for such an ignorant belief, and refused, point-blank,
to have anything to do with such a needle. What would have been the result? Electro-magnetism might not have been discovered till now, and our experimentalists would have been
the principal losers thereby (Blavatsky 2006 [1877], vol. 1, 92, emphasis original).
This is a typical example of how Blavatsky presents her reading of the history of
religion, science, and culture. Later in her narrative, she states that electromagnetism, the so-called discovery of Professor Oersted, had been used by Paracelsus three centuries before (2006 [1877], vol. 1, 146, emphasis original). Paracelsus, Giordano Bruno, Johannes Kepler (the forerunner of Newton in many great
truths, 2006 [1877], vol. 1, 185), Robert Fludd, Cagliostro, Eliphas Lvi, and other
well-known persons in what is presented by Blavatsky and other occultists as an
anti-clerical tradition, are the major authorities when it comes to the legitimization of genuine science, astrology, alchemy, Kabbalah, and Hermetic philosophy (see, e. g., Blavatsky 2006 [1877], vol. 1, xl).
The discourse strands of alchemy, vitalism, and astrology are omnipresent in Isis Unveiled (on kabbalah see Huss 2010, 184 187 and Chapter 6
below). A few examples stand for an abundance of others. As regards alchemy
and chemistry, Blavatsky notes:
The Rosicrucians of the middle ages, such as Robertus de Fluctibus (Robert Fludd), Paracelsus, Thomas Vaughan (Eugenius Philalethes), Van Helmont, and others, were all alchemists, who sought for the hidden spirit in every inorganic matter. Some peoplenay, the great
majorityhave accused alchemists of charlatanry and false pretending. Surely such men as
Roger Bacon, Agrippa, Henry Kunrath, and the Arabian Geber (the first to introduce into
Europe some of the secrets of chemistry), can hardly be treated as impostorsleast of all
as fools. Scientists who are reforming the science of physics upon the basis of the atomic
theory of Demokritus, as restated by John Dalton, conveniently forget that Demokritus, of
Abdera, was an alchemist, and that the mind that was capable of penetrating so far into
101
the secret operations of nature in one direction must have had good reasons to study and
become a Hermetic philosopher (vol. 1, xxxiixxxiii).
Blavatsky directly refers to the polemical disjunction that accompanied the emergence of modern chemistry through the works of Dalton and others. To bridge
over the narrow gulf which now separates the new chemistry from old alchemy, is
little, if any harder than what they have done in going from dualism to the law of
Avogadro (vol. 1, 145, emphasis original, with link to Paracelsus). This non-dualism is also a discursive link to monism.
When we look at vitalism, we find passages such as the following ones.
The unprofitableness of modern scientific research is evinced in the fact that while we have
a name for the most trivial particle of mineral, plant, animal, and man, the wisest of our
teachers are unable to tell us anything definite about the vital force which produces the
changes in these several kingdoms. It is necessary to seek further for corroboration of
this statement than the works of our highest scientific authorities themselves (vol. 1, 212).
Light is the first begotten, and the first emanation of the Supreme, and Light is Life,
says the evangelist. Both are electricitythe life-principle, the anima mundi, pervading the
universe, the electric vivifier of all things. Light is the great Protean magician, and under
the Divine Will of the architect, its multifarious, omnipotent waves gave birth to every
form as well as to every living being. From its swelling, electric bosom, springs matter
and spirit. Within its beams lie the beginnings of all physical and chemical action, and
of all cosmic and spiritual phenomena; it vitalizes and disorganizes; it gives life and produces death, and from its primordial point gradually emerged into existence the myriads of
worlds, visible and invisible celestial bodies (vol. 1, 231, emphasis original).
It has been the speculation of men of science from time immemorial what this vital
force or life-principle is. To our mind the secret doctrine alone is able to furnish the
clew. Exact science recognizes only five powers in natureone molar, and four molecular;
kabalists, seven; and in these two additional ones is enwrapped the whole mystery of life.
One of these is immortal spirit, whose reflection is connected by invisible links even with
inorganic matter; the other, we leave to every one to discover for himself (vol. 1, 419, emphasis original; see also vol. 2, 540).
Finally, there are long passages and dozens of references to astrology, in which
the author links astrological doctrine and tradition to the other esoteric lines of
thought. Blavatsky also includes the new discipline of psychology in her conceptualization of astrology:
Astrology is to exact astronomy what psychology is to exact physiology. In astrology and
psychology one has to step beyond the visible world of matter, and enter into the domain
of transcendent spirit. It is the old struggle between the Platonic and Aristotelean schools,
and it is not in our century of Sadducean skepticism that the former will prevail over the
latter (vol. 1, 232, spelling original).
102
As references, the author invokes the heroes of what is constructed as esoteric tradition, but also contemporary authors such as Johann W. Pfaff and his Astrologie
(1816; see Chapter 2 above; see Blavatsky 2006 [1877], vol. 1, 45 46). Indeed, it is
of crucial importance for the discursive impact of Blavatskys work that she not
only polemically attacked what she thought was a wrong understanding of science,
but that she actively engaged the academic discourse of her time, entirely in line
with the goals of the Theosophical Society. Quotes and counter-quotes abound in
Isis Unveiled and The Secret Doctrine, and the author demonstrates an acquaintance
with the discussions in the natural sciences, Indology, and history. The Indologist
Friedrich Max Mller is one of the major references when it comes to Blavatskys
construction of an ancient Indian (Aryan) wisdom tradition. John Dalton was mentioned earlier. A third example is Thomas Wright:
As a commentary on this, the modern historian remarks: This may be taken as a sort of
exemplification of the class of exhibitions which were probably the result of a superior
knowledge of natural sciences. No one ever doubted that it was the result of precisely
such a knowledge, and the hermetists, magicians, astrologers and alchemists never claimed anything else. It certainly was not their fault that the ignorant masses, under the influence of an unscrupulous and fanatic clergy, should have attributed all such works to the
agency of the devil (vol. 1, 58, emphasis original, with a reference in a footnote without
page number to Wrights Narratives of Sorcery and Magic, i. e., Wright 1855).
Mark S. Morrisson correctly remarked that much of the success of the Theosophical
movement stemmed from Blavatskys imaginative synthesis of Western occultism
and Eastern religions, especially Buddhism, and her efforts to situate the new religion as essentially an ancient science (Morrisson 2007, 70, emphasis original). In its
formal appearance, Blavatskys work is a mixture of genres that combines elements
of academic argumentation (with footnotes being an aesthetic device that adds to
authority), philosophical essay, and religious polemics. Undoubtedly, this combination has added to the discursive impact of her writings.
After the publication of Isis Unveiled, Blavatsky travelled to India and settled
in Bombay, where the Theosophical Society enjoyed an extremely positive response. Its construction of an Oriental spirituality as the ancient wisdom of
humankind significantly contributed to the strengthening of an anti-colonial
identity in India (on the link between the academic study of religion, Orientalism, and Indian politics see King 2011; Lubelsky 2012, 1 76). In 1882, the headquarters of the Society were moved to Adyar, near Madras. The wave of sympathy
embracing the Theosophists in India and Ceylon had strong political implications. One may cite the example of S. Radhakrishnan, the philosopher and president of India, who stated:
103
When, with all kinds of political failures and economic breakdowns we (Indians) were suspecting the values and vitality of our culture, when everything round about us and secular
education happened to discredit the value of Indian culture, the Theosophical Movement rendered great service by vindicating those values and ideas. The influence of the Theosophical
Movement on general Indian society is incalculable (quoted in Cranston 1994, 192).
The most prominent example of this influence is Mahatma Gandhi, who became
acquainted with the Theosophical Society during his law studies in London in
1889. In his autobiography he describes how, like many other intellectuals of
his time, he first gained access to his own culture through his encounter with
the Theosophical Society. For the first time he read the Bhagavad Gita, which
later became a central reference point in his philosophy and politics (Cranston
1994, 194 195; cf. now the much more academic analysis in Lubelsky 2012,
270 284). During their time in India the Theosophists would also experience serious setbacks. There were increasing accusations of fraud, whereby the Mahatma letters were alleged to be forgeries, and Blavatsky was supposed to have supplemented her mediumistic powers with all sorts of tricks, which led to a loss of
prestige for the Theosophical Society in Europe and North America. Space does
not permit a detailed account here of how the relationship between Blavatsky
and Olcott deteriorated. More important is Blavatskys major work, which she
wrote as if possessed in the last years of her life.
Secret Doctrines and Synthetic Discourse

Following her return to Europe, Blavatsky published The Secret Doctrine: The
Synthesis of Science, Religion and Philosophy in the autumn of 1888. The first volume was entitled Cosmogenesis, the second Anthropogenesis, while the
third volume, Esotericism, was published posthumously in 1897 (with its authenticity being controversially discussed by Theosophists up to the present
day). Here Blavatsky elaborated the foundations of her complex Theosophical
theory of the creation of the human being, the structure of the universe, and
the ancient truth of all the religions, derived from a single common source.
She referred particularly to notions drawn from Hindu and Buddhist religions,
which she fashioned into the embodiment of the (Aryan) religion. Quotes from
and references to academic experts such as Friedrich Max Mller abound
throughout the work and lend it an aura of scientific authority.
In the preface to the first edition, the author, who refers to herself rather as
the writer, explains that these two volumes (with the third being entirely
ready, and the fourth almost so) were initially planned as an extended version
104
of Isis Unveiled. It was, however, soon found that the explanations which could
be added to those already put before the world in the last-named and other
works dealing with esoteric science, were such as to require a different method
of treatment (Blavatsky 2013 [1888], vol. 1, vii, emphasis added). As to esoteric
discourse, it is noteworthy that Blavatsky points out that
[t]hese truths are in no sense put forward as a revelation; nor does the author claim the position of a revealer of mystic lore, now made public for the first time in the worlds history.
For what is contained in this work is to be found scattered throughout thousands of volumes
embodying the scriptures of the great Asiatic and early European religions, hidden under
glyph and symbol, and hitherto left unnoticed because of this veil (2013 [1888], vol. 1, vii).
Blavatsky claims instead that she is presenting the translation of an ancient

document of Asian occult literature, which she alone has been allowed to
read. Originally transmitted only orally as the Book of Dzyan but hinted at
in the almost countless volumes of Brahminical, Chinese and Tibetan temple-literature (Blavatsky 2013 [1888], vol. 1, xxiii), the original text, written in an unknown language, is in the safekeeping of initiated adepts in the East. Subsequently, many philologists felt challenged to investigate the oracular language
of the Book of Dzyan, but apart from an echo of Sanskrit and other languages
they could give no definite explanation. If one cannot accept the Theosophical
view, one would have to say that the Stanzas within The Secret Doctrine are
an extremely creative production of their ingenious author.
As a document in the history of twentieth-century religion, the significance
of The Secret Doctrine can scarcely be overstated. On the one hand, this work simultaneously summarizes and popularizes the basic assumptions of major esoteric currents; on the other hand, it introduces the trend toward Eastern spirituality, which is still very influential in todays esoteric scene. As before in Isis
Unveiled, we can observe a highly creative configuration of the discourses of science, religion, philosophy, astrology, alchemy, occultism, and vitalism.
Sometimes all of the strands come together in a single passage, such as in her
discussion of the solar theory:
This mystery, or the origin of the LIFE ESSENCE, Occultism locates in the same centre as
the nucleus of prima materia (for they are one) of our Solar system. [] Thus, there is a regular circulation of the vital fluid throughout our system, of which the Sun is the heartthe
same as the circulation of the blood in the human bodyduring the manvantaric solar period, or life; the Sun contracting as rhythmically at every return of it, as the human heart
does. Only, instead of performing the round in a second or so, it takes the solar blood ten of
its years, and a whole year to pass through its auricles and ventricles before it washes the
lungs and passes thence to the great veins and arteries of the system.
105
This, Science will not deny, since Astronomy knows of the fixed cycle of eleven years
when the number of solar spots increases,* which is due to the contraction of the Solar
HEART. The universe (our world in this case) breathes, just as man and every living creature, plant, and even mineral does upon the earth; and as our globe itself breathes
every twenty-four hours. The dark region is not due to the absorption exerted by the vapours issuing from the bosom of the sun and interposed between the observer and the photosphere, as Father Secchi would have it (Le Soleil II., 184), nor are the spots formed by
the matter (heated gaseous matter) which the irruption projects upon the solar disc (ibid).
It is similar to the regular and healthy pulsation of the heart, as the life fluid passes through
its hollow muscles (2013 [1888], vol. 1, 540 541).
The asterisk refers to a footnote saying:

Not only does it not deny the occurrence, though attributing it to a wrong cause, as always,
each theory contradicting every other, (see the theories of Secchi, of Faye, and of Young),
the spots depending on the superficial accumulation of vapours cooler than the photosphere (?), etc., etc., but we have men of science who astrologize upon the spots. Professor
Jevons attributes all the great periodical commercial crises to the influence of the Sun spots
every eleventh cyclic year. (See his Investigations into Currency and Finance.) This is worthy of praise and encouragement surely (vol. 1, 541).
Let me refer here to Blavatskys article Kosmic Mind in Lucifer, which clearly
expresses what is at stake for our analysis.
Now to lay at rest once for all in the minds of Theosophists this vexed question, we intend
to prove that modern science, owing to physiology, is itself on the eve of discovering that
consciousness is universalthus justifying Edisons dreams. But before we do this, we
mean also to show that though many a man of science is soaked through and through
with such belief, very few are brave enough to openly admit it, as the late Dr. Pirogoff of
St. Petersburg has done in his posthumous Memoirs. Indeed that great surgeon and pathologist raised by their publication quite a howl of indignation among his colleagues. How
then? the public asked: He, Dr. Pirogoff, whom we regarded as almost the embodiment of
European learning, believing in the superstitions of crazy alchemists? He, who in the words
of a contemporary:
was the very incarnation of exact science and methods of thought; who had dissected hundreds and thousands of human organs, making himself as acquainted
with all the mysteries of surgery and anatomy as we are with our familiar furniture;
the savant for whom physiology had no secrets and who, above all men was one to
whom Voltaire might have ironically asked whether he had not found immortal soul
between the bladder and the blind gut, that same Pirogoff is found after his death
devoting whole chapters in his literary Will to the scientific demonstration (Novoye Vremya of 1887)
of what? Why, of the existence in every organism of a distinct VITAL FORCE independent of any physical or chemical process. Like Liebig he accepted the derided and
tabooed homogeneity of naturea Life Principlethat persecuted and hapless teleology,
106
or the science of the final causes of things, which is as philosophical as it is unscientific, if

we have to believe imperial and royal academies (Blavatsky 2013 [1887 1891]).
In other passages in The Secret Doctrine we see Blavatsky adding even more discourse strands to her already complex knot. In her musings on Ancient and
Modern Prophecies, she adds paganism and Asian religion to the mlange
and makes sure to use this in her sideswipe at modern materialist science.
But with the pagans, with whom, as Coleridge has it Time, cyclical time, was their abstraction of the Deity that Deity manifesting co-ordinately with, and only through
Karma, and being that KARMA-NEMESIS itself, the cycles meant something more than a
mere succession of events, or a periodical space of time of more or less prolonged duration.
For they were generally marked with recurrences of a more varied and intellectual character than are exhibited in the periodical return of seasons or of certain constellations. Modern wisdom is satisfied with astronomical computations and prophecies based on unerring
mathematical laws. Ancient Wisdom added to the cold shell of astronomy the vivifying elements of its soul and spiritASTROLOGY. And, as the sidereal motions do regulate and
determine other events on Earthbesides potatoes and the periodical disease of that useful
vegetable(a statement which, not being amenable to scientific explanation, is merely derided, while accepted) those events have to be allowed to find themselves predetermined
by even simple astronomical computations. Believers in astrology will understand our
meaning, sceptics will laugh at the belief and mock the idea. Thus they shut their eyes, ostrich-like, to their own fate (Blavatsky 2013 [1888], vol. 1, 645).
Blavatskys ability to weave together all of these diverse discourse strands into
one historical narrative and to lend it authority in different directions with her
mixing of genresmost prominently academic argument, philosophical musings, religious polemics, and presumed contact with the astral planeare doubtless the main reasons for the success of her writing. Whether we call this fraud,
chutzpa, or genius is beside the point. What is important is the discursive impact
that this construction exerted on subsequent readings of religious history and
esoteric claims of knowledge.
Blavatskys final years were marked by conflict, and even after her death the
Theosophical Society was riven by disputes over succession. Moreover, the ascended Masters were by no means free of such earthbound emotions. The Mahatma letters, which were sent beginning in 1880 to leading members of the Society, chiefly A.P. Sinnett and A.O. Hume, reflected the only too human. The
Masters complain about a lack of paper, take sideswipes at other rival Masters,
deprecate human weakness, and evince a misogyny that seems astonishing
given Blavatskys prominent role. For instance, Sinnett received a letter that ridiculed Blavatsky as the gifted editor of the Theosophist, who has been off her
107
head since the accusation. Verily womanis a dreadful calamity in this fifth
race! (Barker 2013 [1923], Letter No. 93).
After her move to London in 1887, Blavatskys activities demonstrate the increasing tension between individual wings of the Theosophical Society, but also between
herself and Olcott. She was still busy writing in her final years. In 1889 she published The Key to Theosophy and The Voice of Silence (for which the Dalai Lama wrote a
warm acknowledgment in 1993), but much of her energy was directed toward securing her own position. The power struggle between Olcott and Blavatsky was initially
defused by Blavatsky founding her own Esoteric Section (or Esoteric School) in England, whose members were chiefly drawn from the previously formed Blavatsky
Lodge, while Olcott was responsible for the affairs of the Indian Section (Adyar).
The Esoteric School effectively acted as an inner circle of Blavatskys closest male
and female followers, and its teachings, initiations, and courses of instruction remained largely secret. By re-founding a British Section, Blavatsky claimed yet
more authority for herself, which Olcott, as president of the Society, would no longer
tolerate. Blavatsky therefore declared her own British lodges independent of Adyar
in 1890, simultaneously claiming to represent all of Europe. The break was thereby
complete and would continue to influence the later history of the Theosophical Society, after Blavatsky passed away on 8 May 1891.
Wars of Succession
After Blavatskys death the Theosophical Society continued to be led by Olcott
and other disputants. At this time Annie Besant (1847 1933) came to the fore.
Besant had first joined the Society after writing a review of The Secret Doctrine.
Her discovery of this book marked the close of a painful time in her life, when the
quest for religious fulfillment had led her to break away from her marriage to an
Anglican clergyman. Parallels with the life of Blavatsky will be evident. Besant
strengthened the orientation toward India during the whole period of her leadership of the Society, which led to further schisms (on Steiner see below; on the
response from the Toronto Theosophical Society see McCann 2012, 135 136).
In 1917, Besant was elected president of the Indian National Congress. This parliament was instrumental in leading India to independence under the guidance
of Mahatma Gandhi (see the detailed analysis in Lubelsky 2012, 190 284).
Katherine Tingley (1847 1929) pursued a very different agenda by placing
practical and social interests at the heart of her teachings. Supported by W.Q.
Judge, a co-founder of the Theosophical Society, Tingley sought to give this movement an institutional basis by founding her own center in 1897 in Pasadena near
Los Angeles. Its guiding principle was the foundation of a new global society with
108
new educational systems, new forms of horticulture, and provision for theater and
the arts. Many ideas of the later New Age movement, especially in their political
aspects, are borrowed from Tingleys brand of Theosophy. The Pasadena center
still publishes the magazine Sunrise, and according to its own report there are almost fifty centers with approximately one hundred groups worldwide.
Joy Dixon remarked about the change within the Theosophical Society:
In the 1890s a new variant of eastern mysticism, the East as the locus of a manly and rational spirituality, became a key element in the scientific spirituality of the Theosophical
Society in England. This scientific spirituality was used to authorize a particular kind of spiritual authority and spiritual experience. Scientific spirituality was modeled on the academic study of religions: techniques developed within the emerging sciences of anthropology and the comparative study of religions (especially through philology) were redeployed
in the service of a more modern spirituality (2001, 42 43).
The gendered configuration of discourses of mysticism and Orientalism is of crucial importance, and in Chapter 6 I will come back to this in more detail. However, one may doubt whether there really was a significant change from Blavatsky to her followers in this regard. Dixons argument that after Blavatskys death
the Theosophical Society in England became something like a self-consciously
gentlemanly variant of theosophy, which emphasized above all theosophys rational, scholarly, and scientific character (Dixon 2001, 41), may also be attributed to the Societys crisis of reputation rather than to a fundamental break with
Theosophys esoteric sideletters from the Masters, precipitations and materializations, initiations and Masonic rites (ibid.). In 1903, when Rudolf Steiner
tried to counter the critique that Theosophy was a female philosophy, noting
that this could be changed and that in critical Germany Theosophy could be
turned into a male philosophy, he dramatically underestimated the emancipated Theosophical women (Zander 2011, 167).
Another aspect of scientific spirituality is at stake here. We have seen above
that Blavatsky herself was keen to present Theosophy as an ancient science. To understand the changes in Theosophical discourse, it is also important to keep in
mind that major discoveries in the natural sciences were made after Blavatskys
death. In Morrissons words: If Blavatsky meant to make Theosophy a science
whose ultimate goal was spiritual wisdom, her methods of scientific engagement
were beginning to show their limitations within a few years after her death (2007,
70). That is why around 1900, the Theosophical journals augmented the work of
sanitizing Blavatskys doctrines. They acted as clearinghouses for information
about the latest scientific discoveries gleaned from newspapers, scientific journals,
and current science books (ibid., 71).
109
At this point, yet another schism should be mentioned, which became particularly important in the United States because of its strong Christian bent.
Born into a Christian fundamentalist milieu, Alice Ann Bailey (1880 1949)
joined the Theosophical Society in 1915 but was expelled in 1923 on account
of her Christian creed, whereupon she founded the Arcane School, which is
still internationally active today. The objective of Arcane School Theosophy,
which only admits adults according to strict criteria, is the recognition of the individual balance of karma. At the heart of its teachings lies the Great Invocation, a sort of mantra or magical formula, which should be recited as often
as possible by the adepts. This serves to restore cosmic harmony and prepare
for the Second Coming of Christ.
Like Blavatsky before her, Bailey also claimed that her writings had been
written by an ascended Master (in her case the Tibetan Dhwal Khul) and
only received by her. Bailey also practiced a form of astrology mystically influenced by Theosophy. She published a five-volume work under the title A Treatise
on the Seven Rays, whose third volume, Esoteric Astrology, was devoted entirely to
this mystical astrology. Even if there are few readers who have worked right
through this extensive and often impenetrable book, the influence of esoteric astrology was immense. The work has the authority of revelation for many spiritually minded astrologers, and it is still available in esoteric bookshops today.
The impact of Baileys Arcane School upon esoteric discourse in the second
half of the twentieth century can be deduced from the fact that it maintains centers in New York, London, Geneva, and Buenos Aires. A leaflet entitled What Is
an Esoteric School? published around 1998 by the Lucis Trust in Geneva reads
as follows: Today there exists no esoteric school which prepares individuals for
initiation. Those that claim this are deceiving the public. One can teach followers
in an academic sense, but by contrast initiation is always an individual goal,
which each person can reach only by contact with the world of spiritual
being (p. 12, quoted from the German edition). An esoteric school comes into
existence, the leaflet continues, as advanced disciples recognize their task
in the world. The life of the disciple thereby becomes magnetic, radiant, and
dynamic, whereby he attracts and gathers those whom he can help. He thereby
becomes the living center of a vital organism, but not the leader of an organization (ibid., emphasis original). In New Age jargon such disciples are frequently
called light workers. This reflects the notion that the world will be transformed
into light by a group of elect persons playing a key role.
A final schism from the parent Adyar movement should be mentioned here.
The United Lodge of Theosophists, founded in 1919 by Robert Crosby (1849
1919) as a reaction to the disputes between the various Theosophical splinter
groups, is still active today. The United Lodge attempts to avoid any kind of per-
110
sonality cult and the tendency toward bureaucracy; there is no membership, and
lectures and publications are largely anonymous. One might describe this as the
anarchistic section of the Theosophical Society.
There is a whole range of further groups close to the Theosophical Society, but
as institutionalized associations they have little significance. Today the total membership of the Adyar Society is estimated at 40,000, the Pasadena Society deriving
from Tingley at 2,000, and the United Lodge at 1,000 persons worldwide.

The history of the Theosophical Society clearly shows an increasing Orientalization
of esoteric discourse at the beginning of the twentieth century. While the first generation of Theosophists, with Helena P. Blavatsky at its center, was still closely connected to the ideas of Romantic science, philosophy, and historiography, engaging
in an embittered fight against materialism and reductionism, Blavatskys successors
opened up Theosophy to a more spiritual reading of religious history, with a strong
focus on Buddhist and Hindu traditions. These new orientations of major parts of
the Theosophical Society led to internal schisms and a differentiation of various
forms of Theosophy (Godwin 1994, 363 379). For the development of this discursive
knot in western Europe, the work of Rudolf Steiner (1861 1925) is of special importance. More than other representatives of Theosophy, Steiner remained tied to German Romanticism and nineteenth-century philosophy, and it is through his construction of esotericism that this discursive knot was transmitted into German
culture in the twentieth century (on the details of Theosophical societies in the German-speaking countries see Zander 2007, 75 432).
In his biography of Rudolf Steiner, Helmut Zander correctly notes that the
tension between materialism and idealism, between matter and mind, is a red
thread that runs through Steiners entire life. It can even be seen in the contradictory information that he gave about the day of his birth; in his autobiography
he noted that he was born on 27 February 1861, whereas he otherwise also gave
25 February as his date of birth. The gap of two days is a key to Steiners autobiography, indeed to his whole life. 27 February is Steiners baptismal day. Real
life, we can interpret Steiners credo, does not start with the biological birth but
with baptism, which makes the human into a spiritual being (Zander 2011, 13).
The turn to Christianity, however, was a later development in Steiners work.
Until the turn of the century, Steiners philosophical, scientific, and religious
identity had been determined by his fascination with Goethe, Nietzsche, and
Haeckel (Zander 2007, 435 542). When he was only twenty-one, Steiner was invited to work as an editor of Goethes natural scientific work in the new edition
111
of that giants Collected Works. In combination with German Romanticism and

the intellectual tradition of nineteenth-century Vienna, the scientific and philosophical impact of Goethes thinking is clearly visible in Steiners formative period and beyond (Raub 1964; Zander 2011, 43 60). Steiner tried to turn his reception of Goethes thinking into a philosophical dissertation that ultimately
became his Die Philosophie der Freiheit (The philosophy of freedom, 1893, officially 1894). During this period, Steiner was heavily influenced by the philosophy of Max Stirner and particularly Friedrich Nietzsche (Zander 2011, 83 100; cf.
the detailed critique in Traub 2011). His love for Goethe and his critique of major
parts of contemporary science and philosophy brought Steiner into contact with
Ernst Haeckel in 1892. Haeckels evolutionary thinking was a major influence on
Steiner. Again and again, behind Steiners Theosophical anthropology and cosmology we discern the grand master of popular evolutionary theory, Professor
Ernst Haeckel (Zander 2011, 96; see also Zander 2007, 881 886).
A representative example of this discursive knot is Steiners Aus der AkashaChronik (a collection of contributions published between 1904 and 1908), in
which he joined the group of intellectuals who wanted to combine the natural
sciences and the human sciences into one large Geisteswissenschaft. However,
he was to add esoteric knowledge from the astral plane, which clearly transgressed the ideas of Haeckel and others.
Nowhere do the results of the human sciences [Geisteswissenschaft] contradict the factual
research [Tatsachenforschung] of the natural sciences. In all cases in which one looks unbiased at the relationship between the two, something very different reveals itself for our
period. It turns out that this factual research is heading toward the goal of bringing itself
in the not-too-distant future into full harmony with what the spiritual research [Geistesforschung] for certain areas must conclude from its supernatural sources (Vorurteile aus vermeintlicher Wissenschaft, in Steiner 1986 [1904 1908], emphasis original).
Steiner is turning the argument of pseudo-science around and criticizes those

systems of knowledge that do not open themselves to the existence of spiritual
and supernatural dimensions of reality as alleged science (vermeintliche Wissenschaft).
After some earlier contact with the Theosophical milieu, in 1902 Steiner
joined the Theosophical Society and became, together with his soon-to-be wife
Marie von Sivers, the first General Secretary of the Theosophical Society in Germany. Steiner was also a member of the Esoteric Section, founded by Blavatsky,
and led its German branch. His later claim that he was the first to establish such
a section is clearly false. Indeed, his account of events is strongly slanted to suggest that his Theosophical phase had no impact on his formation of ideas,
which led him to found the Anthroposophical Society in 1913. However, if one
112
examines his lectures prior to 1910, the close relationship between their contents
and the writings of Blavatsky are apparent. The borrowing of the magazine title
Luzifer (Light Bringer), from Blavatskys London journal founded in September
1887, demonstrates Steiners proximity to Theosophy. Even in this case, Steiner
advertised the idea as his own.
Nevertheless, Steiner subsequently developed his own particular combination of discourse strands. The Theosophical idea of initiated adepts that line
up in a long historical tradition was part of Anthroposophical thinking too.
Steiner took this from Blavatsky, but also from Edouard Schur (1841 1929). In
his book Les grands initis (1889, translated into English as The Great Initiates),
Schur presented a tradition that replaced Persia with India, as might be expected at this time, giving the lineage Rama, Krishna, Hermes, Moses, Orpheus, Pythagoras, Plato, and Jesus. The German edition of The Great Initiates, with a foreword by Rudolf Steiner, appeared in its twentieth edition in 1992. Schur was
friendly with Rudolf Steiner and his wife Marie Steiner-von Sivers, who not
only translated the book from French into German, but also produced Schurs
mystery-dramas on the stage (Zander 2007, 1019 1028; Zander 2011, 155 156,
291 300). Helmut Zander notes that the historical value of Schurs drama is
of secondary importance. More important is that he used the medium of archaizing [antikisierend] drama to take a stand in the problems of self-positioning of
alternative-religious dissenters around 1900 (Zander 2007, 1027).
Steiners involvement in the philosophical and intellectual debates of Germany,
however, represented an important difference between his interests and the BritishIndian brand of Theosophy. In the course of time he found himself at odds with the
Theosophical emphasis on Oriental wisdom-teachings. He opposed this with his
own Christian worldview, which interpreted the development of human history as
the product of so-called Christ impulses, a scheme that combined the doctrine
of successive world-teachers with the Christian mystical tradition. But whether in
the Theosophical form or in the garb of Anthroposophical Christ impulses, the
idea of a transcendent world of sages who safeguard the memory of ancient wisdom
has cardinal importance for twentieth-century esoteric discourse. This discourse reappears, for instance, in the many channeled messages of those entities, which
make their knowledge available to select individuals.
In sum, there can be no doubt that the specific constellation of discourse
strands that representatives of Theosophy and Anthroposophy provided to various milieus was instrumental in establishing new meanings of religion and science in the twentieth century. It is of relevance for the present study that the
same discursive knots reappear in academic writings of the same period, thus
stabilizing and further legitimizing the underlying attributions of meaning. To
these academics I will turn in the next chapters.
Part Two: Academics as Religious Pioneers
6 The Trouble with Europe: Academic

Orientalism and New Mystical Religions
So far, I have discussed the discursive entanglement of scientific and religious
attributions of meaning, with a special focus on the success of seemingly marginalized forms of knowledge. Alchemy, astrology, magic, and mysticism were
gaining new legitimacy in their combination with popularized psychology and
science at the beginning of the twentieth century. They were stigmatized as
the Other of reason, but at the same time they provided a non-materialistic antidote to developments in European culture which were perceived as dangerous.
As a result, these forms of knowledge could lose their status as the Other and
could be integrated in complex constellations of discourse and identityagain,
the binary construction of Other and Own would give a distorted impression of
the negotiations that underlie these processes.
In this chapter I will go back to the turn of the twentieth century again, but I
will analyze the discourses with a different lens. If we want to understand the
formation of new religious meanings and practices in that period, it is necessary
to have a closer look at aspects of nationalism, gender, and Orientalism. Around
1900, the tension between the Romantic idealization and the colonial disparagement of an Orientalized Other shaped individual and national identities and became a vehicle of self-fashioning for women, Jews, and European intellectuals.
At a time when Europe was being divided along ethnic lines, rearranging itself
evermore into political entities according to hitherto unacknowledged criteria
such as history, language, culture, and ethnicity, the Orient or East became an
important point of reference as an ultimate Elsewhere (Peleg 2005, 3). Social
groups in Europe negotiated their identities often in the third space between
diverse binary poles, and what they created was not a simple synthesis but a
new constellation of discourses that enjoyed a sustainable existence in the twentieth century. It was particularly the figure of the Jew, described by Klaus Holz as
the third of the nations (Holz 2010; see also Peleg 2005, 5), that assumed new
meanings in the discursive entanglement with gender constructions, Orientalism, and the emerging nation-states (see also Boyarin and Boyarin 1997; Parfitt
2005; Beller and Leerssen 2007, 202 208 [uncritically filing Jews in the list of
Images of Nations Surveyed]).
Four intellectuals stand at the center of my analysis. While Martin Buber and
Gershom Scholem represent what can be called the self-Orientalization of European Jews in that period, Rudolf Otto and Gerardus van der Leeuw contributed to
the glorification of Oriental wisdom as an antidote to European modernity. All
four are closely connected with discourse communities that we have encoun-
116
6 The Trouble with Europe: Academic Orientalism and New Mystical Religions
tered alreadyfrom the Theosophical Society to the Eranos conferencesand all

of them were instrumental in the popularization of academic knowledge about
religion and mysticism, leading to new forms of religious practice in the second
half of the twentieth century.
But there is more to it. In going back to the beginning of the twentieth century,
we can reconstruct the origins of Orientalist and Occidentalist discourses as they
are operative in Europe today. Issues of Muslim veiling, Jewish and Muslim rituals
of male circumcision, and right-wing accusations of Muslim homophobia have
aroused much debate (Duding 2011; for the Netherlands see Mepschen et
al. 2010; for the genealogy of French discourse on controlling female Arab sexuality in colonial fantasies see Scott 2007, 54 61). These discussions draw on colonial
stereotypes, a phenomenon that has been termed neo-Orientalism (Dietze 2009).
Gender and sexuality play a pivotal role in nationalist discourses that combine
anti-Islamic and anti-Semitic stereotypes. These become manifest in the resilience
of the motif of an inner Orient that depicted Jews as a degenerated Asian race
(particularly in Germany, see Rohde 2005; Pollock 1993), but also produced the
icon of the beautiful Jewess (Gilman 1993) and the idea that male circumcision
is the feminization of Jews (Anidjar 1997; Geller 2007; Davison 2010, 36 and 86)
and Muslims. Research into the differences between and the interchangeability
of the Muslim and the Jew in European pre-Holocaust imagination has only just
begun (Kalmar and Penslar 2005; Dving 2010; exhibition Les juifs dans lorientalisme, Muse dart et dhistoire du Judasme, Paris 2012).
Current politics of the veil (Scott 2007) are a European obsession, which
carries the traces of an enduring religious and cultural tradition of unveiling
the female body as a metaphor for unveiling a hidden body of knowledge,
which links the discourse of gender and nationalism to esoteric discourses. Present neo-Orientalist discourses in Europe are dominated by the motif of the (un)
veiled female body as an iconic focal point for the construction of sameness and
otherness. In the Netherlands, for instance, we may think of Theo van Gogh and
Ayaan Hirsi Alis 2004 film Submission, with its voyeuristic gaze at an (un)veiled
woman whose naked body is inscribed with suras from the Quran; comic strips
in the daily paper De Volkskrant that polemically sexualize the burqa bodies of
Muslim women; and Adelheid Roosens play Veiled Monologues (premiered in
the Netherlands in 2001, subsequently performed in other European countries,
the Middle East, and before the Dutch Parliament and national convention of
the Dutch law enforcement agencies).
The study of political discourse, writes Joan W. Scott in her excellent analysis of the politics of headscarf controversies in France, is best undertaken
through close readings of arguments advanced in their specific political and historical contexts. Without history we arent able to grasp the implications of the
Martin Buber, Gershom Scholem, and Dynamics of Jewish Self-Orientalization
117
ideas being advanced; we dont hear the resonances of words; we dont see all of
the symbols containedfor examplein a piece of cloth that serves as a veil
(Scott 2007, 8). So, let us turn to the origin of this discourse.
Martin Buber, Gershom Scholem, and

Dynamics of Jewish Self-Orientalization
When Abraham Geiger, Immanuel Wolf, Leopold Zunz, and other representatives
of the newly established Wissenschaft des Judentums in the first half of the nineteenth century presented the academic study of Judaism as an instrument of
emancipation for German Jews, the subsequent debate among Jewish intellectuals in Europe was dominated by issues of Jewish identity. Discourses of nationalism, Germanness, gender, Orientalism, but also mysticism and Gnosticism
were combined in an effort to determine what it means to be Jewish and whether
Judaism can be, and should be, assimilated to European culture.
The professionalization of knowledge about Jewish history went hand in
hand with the establishment of historical scholarship and Protestant theology
at German universities, with close ideological links to German colonial fantasies.
In a critique of Edward Saids (1979) neglect of the German contribution to colonial discourse, Susanne Zantop pointed out that
it was precisely the lack of actual colonialism that created a pervasive desire for colonial
possessions and a sense of entitlement to such possessions in the minds of many Germans.
Since a colonial discourse could develop without being challenged by colonized subjects or
without being tested in a real colonial setting, it established itself not so much as intellectual authority (Said) over distant terrains, rather than as mythological authority over the
collective imagination (1997, 7).
The Jews and the so-called Jewish question were vehicles of mythologized colonialism in Germany, and Jewish emancipation could assume the function of an
internal colonization (Hess 1998). To be sure, this was not a uniquely German
phenomenon; one may think of the United States when, after the end of slavery,
colonial imagination was looking for a new colonized Other; Ireland would also
be an example, with its unique combination of Orientalism, nationalism, and occultism (Lennon 2004; Nally 2010, 146 148, and 223 227 on Yeats anti-Semitism). But in Germany a special constellation developed in which the Jewish
question was linked to anti-Semitism and the search for national identity after
1871 (Geller 2011; Davis 2012; Rash 2012).
Jewish historians and Christian (mainly Protestant) theologians were actively
involved in this debate, constructing a historical narrative that served their respec-
118
tive identities. Jewish scholarship in that period was an attempt to subversively

create a third space for Jews in nineteenth-century Germany. The Wissenschaft
des Judentums did not want the study of Judaism merely to be added to the curriculum, but wanted to radically revise that curriculum, in an effort to resist
and even overthrow the standard portrayal of Western history (Heschel 1999,
63; see also p. 64). In this third space, the debate about Haskalah, the Jewish Enlightenment, and mystical, ecstatic, and Kabbalistic forms of Jewish tradition became highly fruitful. Gnosticism, a seemingly remote and obscure religious phenomenon of late antiquity, became another disputed topic in Jewish scholarship
where present interests and conceptions often overshadowed the research into
the past (Brenner 1999, 46). While Heinrich Graetz regarded Gnosticism as a dangerous element alien to real Judaism, Moriz Friedlnder stressed the Jewish origins of Gnosticism, andas we will see later in more detailGershom Scholem
saw the integration of Gnosticism in ancient Judaism as an important stepping
stone to what he believed to be the only true Judaism (see Brenner 1999; cf.
Krech 2002, 286 292, who does not mention the Jewish context).
In the course of the nineteenth century, Jewish scholars became increasingly
interested in east European Jewish traditions, and many authors stylized shtetl
Jewry as a more authentic form of Judaism than what could be found in the western parts of Europe. Around 1900, a fin de sicle Orientalist discourse was manifest in the writings of Franz Kafka, Alfred Dblin, Joseph Roth, Lion Feuchtwanger, Arnold Zweig, and others (Gilman 1979; Aschheim 1982; Mendes-Flohr
1991; Brenner 1996; Levesque 1998). These widely read publications had a decisive discursive impact. But their authors also communicated with scholars and
historians of religion, thereby further engaging in a discursive formation that
idealized the eastern Jew, or Ostjuden, as an antidote to sanitized rational
forms of Judaism in the west. One example is the communication between Arnold Zweig (1887 1968) and Martin Buber (1878 1965).
Martin Buber: In Search of the Eastern Urjudentum

In 1918 Zweig was stationed in a German Press Division in Lithuania, where for
the first time he personally experienced east European Jewry. To Martin Buber he
announced that he was going to write an account of eastern Jews as representatives of pure and authentic Judaism (Isenberg 2005, 94). The result was Zweigs
Das ostjdische Antlitz (The face of east European Jewry, 1920), published with
lithographs by Hermann Struck (who was stationed with Zweig in Lithuania) that
underscored the aesthetic representation of east European Jews. It is worth quoting one passage from this publication at length:
119
Yes, prayer is still loud in the East. In each hour of praying, bit by bit, the embers from the
charge toward the height of the Lord are kindled. And for superficial and Western eyes and
ears, this leaves an embarrassing and tasteless impression: these relentless voices, these jolting figures, these foreign articulated, wailing, groaning melodies that storm together in a
wild, screaming chorus and that resonate like the rush of a distant surge, like the shouting
of a wild mass, even outside the buildings walls. Yet anyone who has been able to experience
an Islamic mosque during prayer would recognize the oriental in the Jew. The rhythm that
moves the body there is more despiritualized, less personal, more structured by order; it
has left its mark on the more objective part of prayer. With the Jew, it remained more subjective, more formed by the drive of prayer and out of the individual soul of the worshiper according to the force of the hour. But this, too, exists in the Orient: put briefly, the praying
eastern Jew in his most extreme rapture is more closely related to the dervish than to any
kind of modern Jew. That form of prayerthe self-absorption, the opening of oneself silently,
in the Western gesture, to receiving heavenly peaceis exactly the opposite of the praying
eastern Jews essence, motorized, dynamically driven like an arrow shot from a bow
(Zweig 1922, 46 47; translation quoted from Isenberg 2005, 101).
Indeed, to pray like an eastern Jew, as Zweig would have it, is to pray like a dervish (Isenberg 2005, 103). Martin Buber fully embraced this interpretation. Already in 1909, he had published his collection of ecstatic confessions, mystical
documents ranging from ancient Gnosticism and Platonism to Hinduism, Sufism, Christian medieval mysticism (with a clear focus on female mystics), and
mystical documents from the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, including
evidence from ecstatics who could count as mentally ill (Buber 1923 [1909]).
As the bibliographical references make clear, Buber here summarized the academically accepted knowledge of his generation regarding these mystical traditions (ibid., 196 200). In his introduction to the highly diverse documents,
Buber tried to establish a common pattern of the ecstatic form of being in the
world, an experiential form of myth: But is myth a phantasm? Isnt it a revelation of the final reality of being? Isnt the experience of the ecstatic a synonym
for the original experience of the World Spirit? Arent both an experience? We
listen into ourselvesand we dont know which rushing sea we are listening to.
Bubers interest in Hasidic mysticism was not historical or scholarly. This led
to criticism, most famously by Gershom Scholem. But Buber had an agenda that
was different from that of the historian of Jewish mysticism. The Hasidic legend,
he explained, is a category of meaning anchored in transformative religious values or qualities, and as such it promotes an ethos of action. The historical-phi-
Aber ist der Mythus ein Phantasma? Ist er nicht eine Offenbarung der letzten Wirklichkeit des
Seins? Ist nicht das Erlebnis des Ekstatikers ein Sinnbild des Urerlebnisses des Weltgeistes? Ist
nicht beides ein Erlebnis? Wir horchen in uns hineinund wissen nicht, welches Meeres Rauschen wir hren (ibid., 22).
120
lological method, he contended, brackets off questions of meaning (Urban

2008, 1; see also Koren 2010, 31 183). In this period of his life, Buber propagated
experiential mysticism as an antidote to the loss of spiritual qualities, which was
due to the rise of bourgeois civilization, positivism, and empiricism (MendesFlohr 1978, 55 110; Davidowicz 1995, 22 57, 89 103). Buber was clearly inspired by Nietzsches philosophy (Roemer 2010). In a draft of his dissertation,
he described Jakob Bhmes mysticism in Nietzschean terms of the Dionysian:
God and nature are one for him, just as soul and body, or, rather, as energy and organism
[] What we call God is the idea of life in action. But because the unity of all power
is only revealed in the work of the powers of nature [] the world is not a being but a becoming. [] Reality itself, however, is new every day, and every morning it offers itself anew
to our forming hands. [] Hence, we are not the slaves of the world but its lovers.
Buber wove together the discourse strands that we have identified as the main
ingredients of the transformation of religion and sciencevitalism, monism,
energy, power (Kraft), biology, soul, nature (natura naturans)and linked
them to his understanding of experiential mysticism. In his conceptualization
it was the essence of Judaism that carried in it the full realization of this mystical
completion of the human being. As he explained in his Reden ber das Judentum
(Speeches about Judaism), original, essential Judaism was characterized by the
ideas of unity, deed (Tat), and future. This Urjudentum was also Oriental Judaism. In his speech Das Judentum und die Menschheit, Buber praised Asia as
the origin of this spirit:
Because this is the primordial process [Urproze] of the Jew, the primordial process that the
great Jews, in whom the deepest Judaism became alive, in their personal life have demonstrated with the profound power of Asian ingenuity: the unification of the soul. Great Asia
was the living model for the Occident, the Asia of boundlessness and sacred unity, the Asia
of Laotse and Buddha, which is also the Asia of Moses and the Isaiahs, of John, Jesus, and
Paul. The search for unity ignites the Jews creative power.
Gott und Natur sind ihm eins, wie Seele und Krper, oder vielmehr wie Energie und Organismus Was wir Gott nennen, ist die wirkende Lebensidee. Weil aber die Einheit aller
Kraft nur durch das Wirken der Krfte in der Natur offenbar wird, darum ist die Welt kein Sein,
sondern ein Werden. Die Wirklichkeit selbst aber ist neu an jedem Tag und an jedem Morgen
bietet sie sich aufs Neue unseren gestaltenden Hnden dar. So sind wir nicht die Sklaven,
sondern die Geliebten unserer Welt (handwritten manuscript among Bubers notes on his
dissertation; quoted from Mendes-Flohr 1978, 67).
Denn das ist der Urproze des Juden, der Urproze, den die groen Juden, in denen das
tiefste Judentum lebendig wurde, an ihrem persnlichen Leben mit der ganzen Gewalt asiatischer Genialitt zur Erscheinung gebracht haben: das Einswerden der Seele. Das groe Asien
lebte sich in ihnen dem Okzident vor, das Asien der Schrankenlosigkeit und der heiligen Einheit,
121
Consequently, Buber regarded everything creative in Christianity as fundamentally Jewish, and everything that was not Jewish in Christianity as fundamentally
uncreative. A dialogue between Christianity and Judaism is therefore futile
(Die Erneuerung des Judentums, Buber 1919, 85). In its pure, original form, Judaism was the Orients apostle for humanity [der Apostel des Orients vor der
Menschheit]; it was the Orients apostle because from its experience of inner rupture and the redemption from it Judaism received the power and the passion to
teach humankind what was necessary (Das Judentum und die Menschheit,
Buber 1919, 56). In Die Erneuerung des Judentums he claimed: This must legitimately be regarded as the fundamental difference between Orient and Occident: for the Oriental it is deed, for the Occidental it is belief that provides the
decisive link between the human being and God. This difference has taken
shape in the Jew in a most significant way (Buber 1919, 79).
With his presentation of Oriental Judaism as the essential teacher of humanity, Buber participated in an Orientalist discourse as it crystallized around the
writings of Helena P. Blavatsky and other Theosophists, but in contrast to the
at times anti-Jewish attitudes in their writings, Buber glorified an Asian Jewish
tradition. Although he regarded Judaism as a nation, the unity of which was
based on blood (Buber 1919, 14 22, describing blood as the deepest level of
power in the soul [das Blut als die tiefste Machtschicht der Seele], p. 22), Oriental Judaism could serve as a model for all human beings. In the great process
of Judaism everyone partakes who achieves the unity of his soul, who internally
chooses the pure over the impure, the free over the not free, the fruitful over the
fruitless, everyone who drives the hagglers out of his temple. This ideal type is
what Buber called the Urjude in contrast to the Galuthjude (i. e., the Jew living in
the diaspora). Urjude I call the person who becomes conscious of the great
power of the original Judaism [der groen Krfte des Urjudentums] and who
opts for it, for its activation, for its working [Werkwerden] (Das Judentum
und die Menschheit, Buber 1919, 52 53). It is remarkable that Buber here
opens the theoretical opportunity for non-Jews to participate in the essentialized
idea of the Urjudentum. Exactly this interpretation gained currency in the course
of the twentieth century, when the Jewish Kabbalistic tradition was increasingly
globalized and extended beyond the confines of the Jewish community.
das Asien Laotses und Buddhas, welches das Asien des Moses und der Jesaiasse, des Johannes,
des Jesus und des Paulus ist. Am Streben nach Einheit entznden sich im Juden die schpferischen Krfte (Buber 1919, 48).
122
Gershom Scholem: Jewish Mysticism as an Antidote to Europe

Not unlike Arnold Zweig, Martin Buber had created a third space by negotiating
Jewishness in critical distinction from western European spiritual identity. In this
endeavor, Buber can even be compared to the historians of the Wissenschaft des
Judentums, despite their different ideological agendas. When I now turn to Gershom Scholem (1897 1982), the same dynamic of boundary-work will become
visible. Scholem, however, propagated a spiritualized form of Zionism as the
most suitable response to the failed emancipation and assimilation of Jews in
Europe. Kabbalah, Gnosticism, and esotericismwhich he used vaguely and interchangeably (see Yamauchi 1973, 14 and 150)became the main categories for
Scholem to construct a counter-history (Biale 1979), which we, again, can describe as a third space for German Jews in the twentieth century. His personal
political agenda led him to a furious critique of the Wissenschaft des Judentums.
In highly polemical words he denigrated Geiger, Zunz, and Steinschneider as
demonic figures who rape the facts and sap Judaism of any authenticity
for the sake of their hypocrite, even satanic ideology (see the references in
Heschel 1999, 67 68; see also Davidowicz 1995, 1 21). As Susannah Heschel
demonstrated, Scholems evaluation of the Wissenschaft des Judentums was
based on a misunderstanding of both its political motivations and its intellectual accomplishments (1999, 68). This does not mean that the Wissenschaft des
Judentums requires a eulogy, but Scholems ignominious characterization of it
[] must be given its burial (ibid., 85).
In Scholems work a fundamental tension is operative. On the one hand, he
harshly refuted any attemptin the context of Wissenschaft des Judentums or
elsewhereto describe an essence of Judaism that would be an a-historical category outside of serious scholarship; on the other hand, he wanted to integrate
marginalized traditions such as Gnosticism and Kabbalah into normative rabbinical Judaism. The idea that Kabbalah represented the inner aspect of the Jewish religion was not new. Franz Molitor (1779 1861) had made this point earlier,
arguing that Kabbalah used to be a part of normative Judaism until the rationalism of Maimonides and Josef Karo excluded mysticism from Jewish religion
(Mertens 2007, 67 132). Scholem read Molitor in 1915 and was deeply impressed
by Molitors presentation of Kabbalah as the lost original wisdom of humanity
(Davidowicz 1995, 72 73). As Harold Bloom noted, Scholem desired Kabbalah
to be wholly Gnostic and yet wholly Jewish, which resulted in his shrewdly desperate insistence that Gnosticism was essentially Jewish in its origin (Bloom
1987, 215; see Brenner 1999, 54 59; Lazier 2002 and 2008; on the anti-Jewish context of this discussion in the light of Ferdinand Christian Baurs nineteenth-century construction of Gnosticism see ORegan 2001, 84 85 with note 134 on p.
123
264). Scholems dilemma was that his Gnostically inspired Zionism constructed
Judaism in just as essentialist a way as did the scholars whom he abhorred.
His Zionist inclination was early on linked to an Occidentalist discourse. As
a young man, Scholem noted in his diaries:
If you look deep below the surface, youll see that all truly valuable people are in one way
or another sunk into the inescapable abyss of misery. They live among others, cut off from
the Teaching and Tradition. To change this would be the first and most essential task to be
accomplished among men. In its deepest strata, Zionism shall bring Tikkun to our lives
(Scholem 2007, 213).
Zionism is a movement within the Torah. Zionism can only be grounded within the
world of the Teaching. Zion is the collective loneliness of all people, and hence the source
for the messianic community of men and of mankind. Zionism makes just one claim:
that the final center of mans loneliness is the place where all men can meet together,
and there can be no other such gathering place. All of us can succeed in restoring a connection to the Teaching through this loneliness, a connection we lost after we sold ourselves to
Europe. The community of men requires everyone to be given an identical foundation.
This foundation has two names: Silence and Revelation. [] Tradition is the only absolute
object of mysticism. [] The only organization Zionism haswhich is identical with the
truthis the unification of all those who possess the truth. What is commonly called the
Zionist organization has nothing in common with Zionism as a spiritual entity (Scholem
2007, 217 219, emphasis added).
Scholems third space was constructed around the concepts of exile and loneliness,
in German Verlorenheit (state of being lost). This experience is linked to a nihilism
that Scholem, like Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig, took from a reading of
Nietzsche (Roemer 2010): I glide ever more beautifully into the arms of nihilism
[] I believe, I must admit, I believe in nothing, in nothing more at all. No longer
in God, world, parents, family, friendsgirlfriends!and all the ideological and material things that go with them (quoted in Lazier 2002, 39 40).
When Scholem found a new homeland in spiritual Zionism, which would restore the authentic Gnostic Judaism, this ideal was constructed as an alternative
to Europe. Interestingly enough, Scholem himself was aware of the dilemma
into which this brought him. On 4 January 1916 he noted in his diary:
By the way, it seemsdoes it only seem so or is it really the case?to be a paradox that I,
being a complete and unchanged enemy of Europe [Europafeind] and follower of the new
Orient, which will bear on its strong wave also the new Juda, for the time being must be
content with making the move [to Palestine] precisely as the teacher of European science
[Wissenschaft] (Scholem 1995, vol. 1, 226).
This was also an element of political Zionism, as in Erwin Rosenbergers and Theodor Herzls
idealization of the prototype of a handsome Oriental in 1896, on which see Peleg 2005, 7.
124
Hence, with Klaus Samuel Davidowicz we can call Scholems Zionism a utopian
retreat into the history of the Jews as a whole, compared to Bubers Zionism as a
gaze into his own person in order to dig up the other tradition (Davidowicz
1995, 67; see also Aschheim 2001, 9 40 [Gershom Scholem and the Creation
of Jewish Self-Certitude]). Later in his life, after being disillusioned with political Zionism, Scholem still clung to a nihilistic theology that paradoxically argued for a total absence of God, who nevertheless was the ultimate horizon of
human existence. He found this expressed not only in Kabbalistic texts but
also in literary ones, particularly in Kafka (Moses 1999, 157). Again, as we saw
in Buber, access to the absolute ground of Jewish existence is an awareness of
the existential crisis of the human being, which also means that the Jewish mystical tradition can be a teacher for all humankind. Kabbalah provided the most
sophisticated response to the drama of the conditio humana, and while Jews with
their Gnostic spiritualityreceived from outside Europe and cherished as the
heart of their teachingwere the guardians of tradition, their wisdom could be
opened up for the benefit of others.
Jewish Mysticism (note the capital M) became the key to solve the plight
of modernity. This construction of Jewish history left its mark on subsequent
practices of Kabbalah, but it also inspired intellectuals who came after Scholem.
For instance, it is by no means clear whether David Biale in his 1979 Epilogue
only summarized Scholems view, or whether Biale was actually presenting his
own views:
The failure of the secular sciences of Marxism and psychoanalysis may itself be a sign of the
hidden dialectic of the divine. Only now, in full awareness of the crisis of secularism, can the
potential in tradition be unearthed from under the debris of centuries. The study of esoteric
Jewish mysticism is perhaps the best preparation for the contemporary search for the religious spark that is now so well hidden. By presenting Jewish mysticism in a modern and accessible idiom while preserving the archaic and foreign intonation of its voice, Scholem has
put us in touch with forces at once alien and yet paradoxically familiar (Biale 1979, 211).
Rudolf Otto and Gerardus van der Leeuw:

Oriental Wisdom and the Ultimate Access to the Sacred
As we can see from the material presented so far, Gnostic, mystical, and esoteric
discourses gained new momentum around 1900. Volkhard Krech noted in his analysis of academic theorizing about religion between 1871 and 1933 that the concept
of mysticism, prominent since the seventeenth century, was now extended in two
directions: For one, it had become customary to apply the terminology related to
western antiquity and its early modern continuation to other religions as well. []
Rudolf Otto and Gerardus van der Leeuw
125
In addition, a religious-historical and terminological link was established with the

ancient mystery religions (Krech 2002, 259; see his whole chapter, 259 285; see
also Kippenberg 2002). It is certainly true that the mystery religions of the ancient
Mediterranean played a significant role in theoretical reflections around 1900 (I
will come back to this context in the next chapter). But to argue that the terminology that scholars used to describe ancient religions was transferred to non-European religions is a simplification of the discursive processes. The analysis of Orientalist and Occidentalist dynamics makes it clear that the attribution of meaning
to non-European religious phenomena could also be the starting pointOrientalist constructions of eastern mysticism could be applied to ancient religious phenomena in an attempt to construct eastern origins of, for instance, shamanic
roots of Dionysian cults (see von Stuckrad 2003c, 106 116). A triadic interpretation of these constructions and their attempts to create third spaces between
east and west, or ancient and modern, better serves our goals here. Non-European
mysticism as an ideal for Jewish third spaces was only one form that this discourse
could take on. Another form became manifest in the scholarly movement that is
usually referred to as the phenomenology of religion. I will deal with Mircea Eliade, one of the leading protagonists of this movement, in Chapter 8. At this
point in my argument, two other scholars are of major importanceRudolf Otto
and Gerardus van der Leeuw.
Rudolf Otto
When it comes to discursive impact, the work of the Protestant theologian Rudolf
Otto (1869 1937) is of special importance. His contributions to a comparative
study of religion influenced not only academic theories but also public understanding of religion and mysticism. Being part of a larger academic transition
from functionalism to existentialism (Krech 2002, 60 83), Otto used Friedrich
Schleiermachers nineteenth-century Romantic understanding of religion and
adapted it to the demands of his own generation. In 1917, when World War I
was reaching its final phase, he published his famous Das Heilige: ber das Irrationale in der Idee des Gttlichen und sein Verhltnis zum Rationalen. The book
went through 30 editions before 1936 and is still reprinted with thousands of
copies; translations into many languages made it known to an international audience. Ottos book, due to its enormous spread, managed not only to influence
the zeitgeist [] it also concretely determined the hypotheses and methodological consideration of almost the entire study of religion during the Weimar period (Flasche 1982, 267; see also Gooch 2000, 1 8, 104 159). Central to Ottos
analysis of the sacred is the concept of the numinous as a pre-rational expe-
126
rience of infinity (see also his collection of essays published in 1923). Religion
as a category sui generis refers to the ultimate experience of the sacred that reveals itself to the human being in what Otto called mysterium tremendum and
mysterium fascinans. With such a configuration, Otto certainly touched a nerve
in his generation.
Ottos contribution to European Orientalist discourses becomes visible in depictions such as the following:
The desire for and the experience of salvation is also typical of Islam, not only as a mere
hope (namely for the pleasures in paradise); rather, the most important aspect of Islam is
Islam itself, the loyalty to Allah, which is not only devotion of the will but also the desired
and intended state of being full of Allah; this state is a salvation that is owned and enjoyed as a kind of drunkenness, and in its progression it can almost become a mystical frenzy of bliss.
In 1926 Otto published his attempt to systematically compare Eastern and Western mysticism. The book was based on the Haskell Lectures that the author had
delivered at Oberlin College in Ohio in the year 1924, when Rudolf Otto was already a well-known academic author on mysticism outside the German-speaking
world. In this work, Otto focused on the German mystic Meister Eckhart, the Indian mystic ankara, the Greek philosopher Plotinus, and several mystics from
the Buddhist Mahyna tradition. These persons were mainly used to exemplify
the categories that Otto had outlined earlier in Das Heilige and his 1923 book on
the numinous (see the preface in Otto 1979 [1926], viiiix).
Gerardus van der Leeuw

Rudolf Ottos thinking influenced many other academics in Europe. For our concerns here, Gerardus van der Leeuw (1890 1950) presents a particularly interesting example of this influence. Van der Leeuw studied theology at the University
of Leiden (1908 1913), with a focus on Egyptology, before he continued his studies in 1913 1914 in Berlin and Gttingen. His 1916 doctoral dissertation in Leiden
was devoted to the gods of ancient Egypt. After service for the Reformed Church
Heils-Verlangen und -Erlebnis ist auch der Islam und dieses nicht nur in Hoffnung,
nmlich auf die Lust des Paradieses: vielmehr das Wichtigste im Islam ist eben der Islam selber,
die Ergebenheit an Allah die nicht nur Willenshingabe ist sondern zugleich die gewnschte und
erstrebte Allah-Erflltheit ist und als solche ein Heil, das wie eine Art Trunkenheit besessen
und genossen werden und in ihrer Steigerung geradezu zum mystischen Seligkeits-Rausch
werden kann (2004 [1917], 193).
127
in the Netherlands (1916 1918), in 1918 he was appointed Professor of Geschiedenis van de godsdiensten in t algemeen en de Geschiedenis van de leer aangaande God (History of religions in general and the history of theology) in
the Faculty of Theology at the University of Groningen; after 1945, the chair
was renamed as Phenomenology of Religion.
Van der Leeuw was instrumental not only for the phenomenology of religion
in Europe; his work also comprised political and cultural activities (Hofstee 1997;
Waardenburg 1978, 187 192). He served as Minister of Education, Arts, and Sciences in the first Dutch cabinet after World War I (1945 1946) and was instrumental in the foundation of the Dutch Association for the Study of Religion (Nederlands Genootschap voor Godsdienstgeschiedenis) in 1947. In the last year of his
life, the International Association for the History of Religion was founded at the
Seventh International Congress of the History of Religions in Amsterdam. He was
also the president of the Dutch Bach Society, the Groningen Orchestra Society,
and other cultural organizations. He played the organ and was active as a singer
as well; as Minister of Education, Arts, and Sciences he actively supported Dutch
artists. We can justifiably conclude that his work had a decisive discursive impact
on the attribution of meaning regarding religion in the Netherlands and abroad.
For our concerns here, it is also of relevance that van der Leeuw participated in
the 1948, 1949, and 1950 Eranos meetings at Ascona.
The breadth of his scholarly and cultural interests is reflected in the books
that he published during his long career. Important stepping stones were Inleiding tot de godsdienstgeschiedenis (Introduction to the history of religions,
1924); Mystiek (Mysticism, 1924); La structure de la mentalit primitive (The
structure of primitive mentality, 1928); Phnomenologie der Religion (Phenomenology of religion, 1933); Inleiding tot de Theologie (Introduction to theology,
1935); Uren met Novalis (Hours with Novalis, 1943); De godsdienst van het oude
Aegypte (The religion of ancient Egypt, 1944); Wegen en grenzen: Een studie
over de verhouding van religie en kunst (Roads and boundaries: A study of the
relation between religion and art, 1932, third edition 1955).
Phenomenology of religion was a broad and diverse movement in the twentieth-century study of religion. As a reception of Romantic aestheticization of religion as experience (Friedrich Schleiermacher), scholars interpreted the phenomena as the results of the working of a transcendent Sacred, or Holy, that
manifests itself in the history of religion. Despite their different approaches,
these scholars were united in their critique of reductionist approaches in sociology or empiricism and in their assumption that religion is a category sui generis.
While van der Leeuw agreed with the basic ideas of this interpretation, his theoretical insights were much more nuanced than those of other phenomenologists, particularly those of Rudolf Otto. Van der Leeuw reflected critically on
128
the place of theology in the study of religion, and he clearly differentiated between the role of the scholar and the role of the theologian. In his understanding, phenomenology is not a form of theology. The phenomenologist first and
foremost studies the action of people; even if a power drives the phenomena,
scholars study the acts of religious people, not the power (see James 1995,
203 263; Waardenburg 1978, 222 241).
Van der Leeuw conceptualized religion as part of cultural processes. In particular, it was religion as an aesthetically communicated phenomenon that
found his interest. That is why he looked in detail at the media in which religion
is transmitted and made accessible. Highly relevant for the discursive analysis of
this book, van der Leeuw was a representative of his generations huge fascination with mysticism, Romanticism, ecstatic forms of religion, and art (an aspect
that is neglected in James 1995). In his book on mysticism, he again invoked
Goethe as a culmination of scholarly understanding of religion and mysticism:
There is a sort of international and interconfessional theory of mysticism, an
own interpretation of the mystical process, which Goethe, in succession of
Plato and Plotinus, formulated in a classical way (van der Leeuw 1924, 4; on
Goethe as the thinker who said practically everything that has been said in
the 19th and 20th centuries in more or less clear opposition to Christianity, see
van der Leeuw 1959, 164).
As a public intellectual, van der Leeuw often mixed the genres of his writing
and made it clear that his scholarship was also an answer to the pressing issues
of his time. His fascination with dance, eroticism, and mysticism was clearly
linked to his diagnosis of modernity. In Wegen en grenzen he mentioned the
fact that in Germany around 1700 it was customary that on the occasion of a
doctoral graduation in theology the dean and the professors would perform a
dance around the new Doctor Theologiae. Is it by chance that it was theology
that applied the dance as a ritual? The dance that in essence is a ritus? And
he adds: For us the graduation dance seems a little bit strange. But this is
only because we have almost completely lost dancing as an element of civilization (1955, 34, emphasis original). For van der Leeuw, however, dance was the
oldest human language with which to express and contact the divine. This could
take on an Orientalized and eroticized form, as in van der Leeuws adoration of
the Californian dancer Isadora Duncan (1877 1927), who made a career in Europe dancing in Wagners Tannhuser in Bayreuth and in other well-known productions. She reflected on her art in her autobiography My Life, published in
1927. This is what van der Leeuw had to say about her:
In this context let me mention again with reverence the name of her who has revealed to us
the grandeur of dance for the first time again: ISADORA DUNCAN. She has already had a
129
number of excellent successors, but she was the beginning. Only if dance fully regains its
honor as art, if the possibility of universal expression that it offers is demonstrated by pure
examples, only then will it again be a manifestation of the Sacred (1955, 78).
In the original Dutch version of his study of religion and art, an appendix with 26
pages of photographs and illustrations was added to the text. This important element of van der Leeuws book was left out of the German edition Vom Heiligen
in der Kunst. It was particularly Duncans Grecian-inspired pose and her signature Grecian tunic that found approval with the Dutch professor. He probably
saw in her what he described elsewhere, with reference to Rudolf Otto, as the
sacramental as the opposite pole of the technical (van der Leeuw 1959, 151). Sacramental sexuality in general and sexual intercourse in particular were endangered by the processes of technological modernity, a danger that threatens
the entire modern life (ibid.). But van der Leeuw also abhorred the PlatonicChristian idea, paralyzed in prudery, of the sexual act as the sin. He goes on:
Luckily, the modern world looks at the sexual in a more relaxed way, and this in particular
gives us hope that our times will rediscover the sacramental. Today this is easier than in the
Victorian age, whenaccording to Punchit was an unresolved question whether women
had legs, and when the sexual was an issue that people kept silent or smiled to themselves
about (ibid., emphasis original).
Van der Leeuw described bodily movement as the most elementary performance
in life, and it is apparent that no sacramental action is thinkable without movement. Movement is even more important for the sacrament than the word
(1959, 162). And again, he mentioned dance as the oldest of all arts (ibid.)
that with its fixed and structured rhythmhere van der Leeuw subsumed procession under the category of danceconnects the human being with the Sacred.
Gender, Eroticism, and the Unveiling of an Orientalized Salome

We have seen already that the metaphor of unveiling esoteric secrets was a significant thread of Theosophical writing. But the metaphor itself was older, with
Knorr von Rosenroths Kabbalah denudata (Kabbalah Unveiled, 1684) being a
very influential predecessor of Blavatskys writings. The Kabbalah denudata provided a blueprint for the Christian reception of Jewish mysticism in Europe.
Christian interpretation attributed the notion of unveiling to the female quality
of this Jewish mystical body of knowledge. Exposing and unveiling Oriental
wisdom was a metaphor of appropriation and domination, which became a
widespread theme in aesthetic representations of unveiling female beauty as
130
the naked truth in racist discourse around 1900 (Frietsch 2012). In 1887, the occultist Samuel Liddel MacGregor Mathers translated the Kabbalah denudata as
Kabbalah Unveiled (see Kilcher 2006).
The neo-Orientalist discourse, mentioned above, which is visible in contemporary European societies, is a late expression of this dynamic. But to understand the discursive knot in its complexity, we will have to add to the setting
the self-Orientalization of Jewish and non-Jewish intellectuals, the construction
of national identities, as well as the academic fascination with religious and erotic dance. All these aspects crystallized around the biblical figure of Salome.
Around 1900, Salome was the most famous (un)veiled woman in Europe.
The biblical figure of this Jewish princess represented an imaginary Muslim or
inner Jewish Orient. It was linked to the history of womens emancipation,
which ultimately shaped the figure of the New Woman. In visual arts, music,
literature, and popular culture her veil-dance unleashed a veritable Salomania.
Salome played an important role in European Orientalist, anti-Semitic, and aesthetic discourses (Koritz 1994; Walkowitz 2003; Brunotte 2012). Salome and her
lethal dance can be seen as a focal point of the ambivalence of the Orientalist
stereotype of the (un)veiled woman that connected the Jewish with the Oriental
Other. Interestingly enough, Salome was received differently in various European
countries. In France and the Netherlands, she was embodied by the Dutch and
presumed Jewish dancer Mata Hari, representing the seductive Oriental femme
fatale; in Great Britain, Salome personified the Oriental transgender icon of
crime and perversion; in Germany, she dominated anti-Semitic discourse as
the dangerous schne Jdin.
Besides the odalisque and the desired Oriental male, the figure of the belle
Juive loomed large in nineteenth-century Orientalism (Ludewig 2008; Fournier
2012). Around 1900, an Asian-Oriental stereotype became dominant and
merged with that of the femme fatale. This figure became a homosexualized
third sex through the discursive conflation of Oscar Wilde and Salome (Gilman
1993). Like Flaubert and Huysmans before him, Wilde depicted Salome not only
as a femme fatale, but also as a mystic, the sister of Salammb, a Sainte Thrse
who worships the moon (Koritz 1994, 78; see also Dierkes-Thrun 2011, 42). Chiming in with leading esoteric and mystical notions of his time, Wilde connected
Salomes veil to the veil that covered the holy of holies in the Jewish temple,
and her dance to Ishtars descent into the underworld (Ziolkowski 2008; Brunotte 2012, 104). This resonates with Georges Batailles philosophical and pornographic novella Madame Edwarda (published under a pseudonym in 1937).
Both writers put forward a vision of erotic transgression and physical obscenity
as a kind of secular ecstasy [] it is a secular modernist transformation of the
religious ecstasy of the Christian mystics (Dierkes-Thrun 2011, 50; see also 54
131
with use of Rudolf Ottos vocabulary, though unacknowledged). Depicted as a

sister of the Dionysian Maenads, Salome even experienced a pagan revival in
the academic study of religion (Harrison 1916 1917; Brunotte 2013).
Judith R. Walkowitz has shown that Salomes (un)veiled dance was a way of
expressing cosmopolitanism and sexual independence for women of the generation. Maud Allan (who was inspired by Isadora Duncan; see Dierkes-Thrun
2011, 83 124), Mata Hari, Sarah Bernhardt, and other international stars were
self-actualizing, speaking subjects and agents (Walkowitz 2003; McPherson
1999). This agency could even integrate academic forms of knowledge, thus resonating with the theories of dance and mysticism that we have encountered
above. Maud Allan, for instance, was reported to have assumed her seductive
grace in a cosmopolitan way, since she learned the poetry of motion in Berlin
and had studied old Greek and Assyrian manuscripts and tablets to include
ancient dance lore in her performance (New York World 1908, quoted from
Walkowitz 2003, 337).
There is a clear link between these gendered understandings of Salome as a
non-European Jewish princess and positive constructions of Islamic alternatives
to Europe. In the milieu that Mark Sedgwick defines as neo-Sufism this is
clearly attested, for instance by the journalist and writer Isabelle Eberhardt,
who joined the Qadiriyya tariqa in Algeria in 1899 or 1900. It resonates with
the Orientalist/Occidentalist discourse of Isadora Duncan and Maud Allan that
Eberhardt not only retained her cultural connections with Europe, but also continued her distinctly un-Islamic lifestyledressing in male clothes, consuming
hashish and alcohol, and practicing free love. Islam was clearly not her only
path, which distinguishes her from earlier European Sufis (Sedgwick 2008,
184; see also Sedgwick 2004, 63 65). Sedgwicks analysis of neo-Sufism leaves
no doubt that this movement is a discursive entanglement of esotericism, orientalism, occidentalism, art, philosophy, and religion. Thus, what Sedgwick calls postmodern religious pluralism (2008, 185 190) I rather would
frame as a discursive entanglement that is the result of Europe and modernity
having become doubtful categories. This entanglement is perhaps not more pluralistic than earlier constructions of meaning, but differently so.
Neo-Sufism may be defined as any form of Sufism that differs significantly from regular
Sufism the standard models found in the Islamic world, especially when the differences result
from factors extraneous to the Islamic world. Neo-Sufis are generally born into religions other
than Islam, but this need not be the case (Sedgwick 2008, 183).
132
Discursive Materializations: Globalized Sufism and Kabbalah

It is indicative of the re-entanglement of discourse strands that most of the representatives of neo-Sufism or Sufistical milieus (Sedgwick 2008, 190) are directly or indirectly dependent on Helena P. Blavatsky and the Theosophical Society; that they construct a positive Orientalist notion of Islam as the origin of
esoteric wisdom; that they use this as an antidote to what they regard as problematic in modern Europe; that they are affiliated to (often avant-garde) movements in art and literature; and, finally, that they propagate Sufism as an individual path to spiritual self-realization independent from a more traditional
concept of God. All of these characteristics can be found to a significant degree
in the work of Isabelle Eberhardt, Ivan Aguli, Etienne Dinet, Idries Shah, Inayat
Khan, Frithjof Schuon, Rudolf von Sebottendorff, Georges Gurdjieff, and Meher
Baba (on all these figures see Sedgwick 2004 and 2008). Sedgwick concludes:
As an aspect of todays globalised Islam, neo-Sufism is not statistically significant. Its roots
in European modernity, however, make it more important than numbers alone would. As
more and more European Muslims, of whatever origin, enter the social classes to which
inter-war neo-Sufism appealed, neo-Sufism may prove to be one possible future direction
for the development of European Islam (2008, 215).
Indeed, the discursive blending of the religious, esoteric, and Orientalist/Occidentalist stereotypes created a third space that has been inhabited by many people in Europe after World War II. Gurdjieff and Schuon still have a considerable
amount of followers and their books are widely read. Idries Shah (1924 1996)
had even more impact. A personal friend of Gerald Gardner and Robert Graves
(who will return in the next chapter) and inspiration to the celebrated German
author and Nobel Prize winner Doris Lessing, Shah became a major representative of esoteric Islam in Europe. His Oriental Magic (1956) communicated the entanglement of the discourse strands discussed above to a wide audience. We also
see institutionalizations and the establishment of new dispositives that stabilize
the related attributions of meaning. In 1965, Shah founded the Society for Understanding Fundamental Ideas (SUFI), later renamed the Institute for Cultural Research (ICR). The ICR, according to its website, is an educational charity which
aims to stimulate study, debate, education and research into all aspects of
human thought, behaviour and culture (http://www.i-c-r.org.uk/, accessed 26
April 2013). It is not by chance that this mission statement is reminiscent of
the motto of the Theosophical Society, as is the case with the Society for Sufi
Studies (SSS), another dispositive introduced by Shah.
When we turn our focus to the discursive impact of Kabbalah and Jewish
mysticism, the picture is very similar. To begin with, the Theosophical Societys
133
influence blurred the differences between Kabbalah and Sufism. Already at the
end of the nineteenth century, A.D. Ezekiel (whose full name was Abraham
David Salman Hai Ezekiel) called the Theosophical Society the Sufi Society
from America. Having a Jewish Baghdadi family background and being a member of the Theosophical Society most likely since 1882, Ezekiel published a translation of the Idra Zuta (translated into English as The Lesser Holy Assembly) in
1887, the same year that Samuel Liddel MacGregor Mathers published his translation of the same text from the Kabbalah Denudata (see Huss 2010). The blurring of borders between different wisdom traditions remained a characteristic
of religious history in Europe and North America also in the twentieth century.
And despite the fact that influential scholarsmost prominently Gershom Scholem and Moshe Idelwere convinced that nineteenth-century Hasidism was the
last expression of Jewish mysticism and Kabbalah (see the critique in Huss
2005), there emerged a broad and diverse movement of new forms of Kabbalistic
spirituality and practice in the second half of the twentieth century. Again, dispositives legitimated these new interpretations of Kabbalah, particularly the
Kabbalah Centre (founded in 1969) and Bnei Baruch (founded in 1991). It is
only recently that these forms of Kabbalah have been taken seriously by scholars
of religion (see Myers 2007; Huss, Pasi, and von Stuckrad 2010).
Jody Myers (2011) identified a number of pathways to the revival of Kabbalah that partly correspond with the discursive reconfigurations that I have elaborated so far. Although her analysis focuses on North American fields of discourse, and hence the American Metaphysical Religion (Albanese 2007)
figures more prominently than in Europe, it is true that the influence of the Theosophical Society and the impact of academic scholarship itself are of crucial importance. Gershom Scholems Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (1954) was (and
still is) widely read. Already in the 1960s, Jewish artists and poets in Los Angeles
and the San Francisco Bay area utilized academic constructions of Kabbalah;
they took the symbols and Hebrew letter combinations for their artwork directly
from Scholems book (Myers 2011, 179).
The argument that Kabbalah could be used to provide a Jewish option for
non-theistic alternatives to traditional readings of the cosmos (Myers 2011, 181)
can also be turned around; as we have seen, already in Bubers and Scholems
writings there was an option present to open up the Jewish tradition to a nonJewish audience as a universal wisdom tradition and metaphysical interpretation
of the conditio humana. This interpretation could easily be linked to the search
for universal wisdom in Theosophy and Traditionalism.
Finally, Myers is right when she points out that Kabbalists from the thirteenth through the eighteenth centuries
134
believed that Kabbalah provided an accurate guide to the operations of the universe, and
[that] this belief has reappeared in the modern era as the conviction that Kabbalah contains
within it the most advanced scientific knowledge and is the authoritative guide to the mysteries of the universe. This is not simple biblical fundamentalism or the explicit rejection of
science; on the contrary, it is an expression of the desire to equate ones faith with science
(Myers 2011, 184).
On the basis of my analysis in the present book, it is by no means accidental that

todays Kabbalists refer to Jungs theory of the collective unconscious and the
souls archetypes as a scientific proof of Kabbalah (Myers 2011, 185), or that Kabbalah is seen as a forerunner of modern science. These modern phenomena are
clear indications of the scientification of religion that has been operative since
the nineteenth century.
Kabbalistic Entanglements in the Life Sciences

The discursive constellations that have been responsible for the growth of interest in Kabbalah, however, have even more impact. When we look at the influence
of the so-called life sciences in the twentieth century, we can see the growing
influence of a paradigm of life, in which ecology, biology, and genetics play
a decisive role. The influence of these disciplines is so strong that it exerts its impact on various other domains of modern societies. Metaphors of coding and decoding have captured the imagination of a wide publicfrom the Bible Code to
the Da Vinci Codeand are also part and parcel of genetic language.
That DNA chromosomes are to be described as a code is not self-evident.
Among the first scholars who used this metaphor for the smallest units of
human life was the famous mathematician Erwin Schrdinger. In a 1927 lecture
he said:
It is these chromosomes, or probably only an axial skeleton fibre of what we actually see
under the microscope as the chromosome, that contain in some kind of code-script the entire pattern of the individuals future development and of its functioning in the mature
state. Every complete set of chromosomes contains the full code [] (Schrdinger 1944, 20).
When Marshall Nirenberg and Heinrich Matthaei at the National Institutes of

Health in Bethesda (USA) succeeded in explaining the correlation between the
bases of the nucleic acid and the amino acids in proteinsa problem known
as the problem of molecular codingthis scientific breakthrough very soon entered the fields of literature and public discourse.
135
It is not coincidental that these developments set in at the same time in

which the discourse strands of vitalism, energy, alchemy, nature, kabbalah,
religion, and science were significantly re-entangled. In the context of the
modern life sciences, including the deciphering of the human genome, we can
see the blending of this discourse with an approach that employed literary
tools of reading and writing in the Book of Nature (Kay 1999; Brandt 2004; on
the genealogy of this discourse see von Stuckrad 2010a, 89 113). Metaphors
of coding and decoding have entered the public debate in regard to the progress
of the life sciences and the possibilities of creating life in the future. We should
not forget here thatas has been shown by Philipp Sarasin, who builds on Ludwik Flecks sociology of knowledgescientific metaphors are not just metaphors but clear indications of how a society structures what it regards as reality
(Sarasin 2003, 191 230; see also the classic study by Lakoff and Johnson 2003).
Let me illustrate this discursive impact with two scientific incidents that reached
a wide audience after the turn of the twenty-first century.
On 26 June 2000, the White House organized a news conference to celebrate
the finalization of the first phase of the Human Genome Project that resulted in
the deciphering of the entire structure of the human genome. The speakers at
this conference included the US President at the time, Bill Clinton; the head of
the Human Genome Project, Dr. Francis S. Collins; and Dr. J. Craig Venter,
head of Celera Genomics, a company that also participated in the race to decipher the human genome. The then British Prime Minister Tony Blair participated
via satellite. Bill Clinton addressed the scientific breakthrough as follows:
Todays announcement represents more than just an epoch-making triumph of science and
reason. After all, when Galileo discovered he could use the tools of mathematics and mechanics to understand the motion of celestial bodies, he felt, in the words of one eminent
researcher, that he had learned the language in which God created the universe.Today we
are learning the language in which God created life. We are gaining ever more awe for the
complexity, the beauty, the wonder of Gods most divine and sacred gift (Anonymous 2000).
Clinton was aware of the transgressive potential of the Human Genome Project
vis--vis theologically defined borders. Learning the language of God means
that we can also write it. So he warned his audience:
The third horizon that lies before us is one that science cannot approach alone. It is the
horizon that represents the ethical, moral and spiritual dimension of the power we now
possess. We must not shrink from exploring that far frontier of science. But as we consider
how to use new discoveries, we must also not retreat from our oldest and most cherished
human values (ibid.).
136
Francis S. Collins was also very much aware of the transgressive potential of his
endeavor. In his speech at the same conference, he addressed this potential right
away: Alexander Pope wrote: Know then, thyself. Presume not God to scan. The
proper study of mankind is man. What more powerful form of study of mankind
[sic] could there be than to read our own instruction book? (ibid.) It may be
questioned whether Alexander Popes prescription is a solution to the transgressive danger that Collins intended to avoid, but it clearly shows his concerns. Collins then proclaimed, Today we celebrate the revelation of the first draft of the
human book of life. But again, he felt the need to put forward an ethical disclaimer: It is humbling for me and awe-inspiring to realize that we have caught
the first glimpse of our own instruction book, previously known only to God.
What a profound responsibility it is to do this work. Historians will consider
this a turning point (ibid.).
I now come to a more recent event in the history of science. This event is
closely related to J. Craig Venter, who is a representative of the field of synthetic
biology. As we have seen already, Venter was involved with the Human Genome
Project, though in a competitive research group. After 2000, Venter took his career in various directions. Using 100 million US-dollars from Celera and other
stock holdings, he started a non-profit organization, the J. Craig Venter Science
Foundation. This organization freed him to do any kind of science he wanted
without obligation to an academic review panel or other constraints. In 2002,
the foundation launched the Institute for Biological Energy Alternatives in Rockville, Maryland. In May 2010, Venters team succeeded in creating, for the first
time, a fully synthetic new cell; in other words, a new life form. In The New
York Times we read:
At a press conference Thursday, Dr. Venter described the converted cell as the first self-replicating species weve had on the planet whose parent is a computer. This is a philosophical advance as much as a technical advance, he said, suggesting that the synthetic cell
raised new questions about the nature of life. [] Its very powerful to be able to reconstruct and own every letter in a genome because that means you can put in different
genes, said Gerald Joyce, a biologist at the Scripps Research Institute in La Jolla, Calif.
In response to the scientific report, President Obama asked the White House bioethics commission on Thursday to complete a study of the issues raised by synthetic biology within
six months and report back to him on its findings. He said the new development raised
genuine concerns, though he did not specify them further (Wade 2010).
The discursive entanglements of religion, science, creation, and coding have

even more dimensions in this event. When they synthesized their cell, Venter and
his team introduced several distinctive markers into its genome. All of them were
found in the synthetic cell when it was sequenced. These markers do not make
137
any proteins, but they contain the names of 46 scientists that were involved with
the project, as well as several quotations written out in a secret code. The markers also contain the key to the code. It is necessary to crack the code in order to
read the messages. But Venter provided some hints as to the content of these
quotations: To live, to err, to fall, to triumph, to recreate life out of life,
which is taken from James Joyces A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man;
See things not as they are but as they might be, which comes from American
Prometheus, a biography of nuclear physicist Robert Oppenheimer; and the famous words by physicist Richard Feynman: What I cannot build I cannot understand (Callaway 2010).
These examples from contemporary life sciences and synthetic biology are
clear evidence of the scientification of religion; they reveal how scientific knowledge is aesthetically represented and communicated; and they take place in a
public sphere that includes political actors, scientists, and a large audience
that is interested in popularized forms of scientific claims. These truth claims
transgress the borders of scientific thinking in immanent and empirically testable models. They stand in the line of esoteric quests to unlock the ultimate secrets of the cosmos and to reveal the hidden meaning of human history.
In their quest, J. Craig Venter and Francis S. Collins have embarked on the
same journey as Stephen W. Hawking, celebrated physicist and successful author
of many works of popularized science. Hawking also transgresses the borders of
science and takes on the role of religious expert and esoteric teacher:
Ever since the dawn of civilization, people have not been content to see events as unconnected and inexplicable. They have craved an understanding of the underlying order in the
world. Today we still yearn to know why we are here and where we have come from. Humanitys deepest desire for knowledge is justification enough for our continuing quest.
And our goal is nothing less than a complete description of the universe we live in (Hawking 1988, 15).
The discursive impact of books such as A Brief History of Time lies in the blending of the discourses of science, religion, quest, understanding, and cosmos. With his search for a Grand Unified Theory, Hawking also partakes in
the discourse of monism that has dominated much of early twentieth-century intellectual debate (see Asprem 2013, Chapter 6, for a detailed analysis of this earlier discourse, particularly the contributions by James Jeans and Arthur Eddington, who attributed philosophical and religious signficance to cosmology and
wrote about it in popular publications). Later, Hawking adds human existence
to this discursive knot, making his claims even more metaphysical: A complete,
consistent, unified theory is only the first step: our goal is a complete understanding of the events around us, and of our own existence (ibid., 187).
138
It seems we have come a long way from German Jewish intellectual circles, from
scholars of religion theorizing about the mystic East and the Sacred, to representatives of the life sciences and contemporary physics. Indeed, the journey from academic Orientalism to monistic discourses in physics almost a hundred years later
may appear as a tour de force when framed in conventional groupings of historical
events and narratives. However, the reconstruction of discursive links is an historical
exercise that leads to new and sometimes unexpected unities (Foucault). These
unities have the potential to tell us more about the role of religion in twentieth-century Europe than the more conventional unities and narratives.
7 In Search of the Great Goddess:

How Academic Theories
Generated Paganism and Witchcraft
In his influential History of Modern Pagan Witchcraft, Ronald Hutton remarked
that pagan witchcraft is the only new religion that England has given the
world (Hutton 1999, vii). With regard to the process of the scientification of religion, we may add that the godmothers and godfathers of this new religion were
academics. Indeed, goddess spirituality and the emergence of many different
forms of pagan religious practices in the twentieth century would have been impossible without the impact of academic theories and concepts that described
the role of the female in the history of religions. At the end of the nineteenth century, we can speak of a complex discursive knot that consisted of contributions
from historians of religion, anthropologists, classicists, artists, and writers. Enthusiastic appropriation of the classical ideals of Greek culturemigrating
from Germany to England in the nineteenth centurybecame a positive identity
marker for women writers in Victorian England (Hurst 2006; Fiske 2008), but
also for historians, anthropologists, and philosophers (Schlesier 1994).
We have seen already that this discursive change went hand in hand with a
new focus on experience and self-expression. In theater, we can observe a parallel
development in the transit from the text-model to the performance-model, which
fostered integration of feasts, rituals, or events in performative arts (FischerLichte 2002). The establishment of comparative anthropology at Cambridge University was a discursive materialization and the introduction of a new dispositive
that lent legitimacy to the new theories of religion, ritual, and experiential art,
with a clear link to colonial transfers of knowledge. The attribution of new meanings to religion and ritual was, as Catherine M. Bell remarked, coded in self-reflective responses to European modernity, because historically, the whole issue of
ritual arose as a discrete phenomenon to the eyes of social observers in that period
in which reason and the scientific pursuit of knowledge were defining a particular
hegemony in Western intellectual life (Bell 1992, 6).
Similarly to the other themes that I engage in this book, witchcraft and paganism constitute a discursive knot in which theory and practice go seamlessly
together. Academic attributions of meaning were both results and carriers of discourse, which renders the binary understanding of expert and amateur, of insider and outsider, obsolete again. These demarcations are themselves produced in discursive negotiations. It is the third space that is much more
interesting for our understanding of historical development. This third space
was provided and inhabited by academics and practitioners alike.
140
7 In Search of the Great Goddess

According to a persistent prejudice about the nineteenth century, the idea of evolution was evidence of an unbroken belief in the progress of civilization. This
false assumption can still be found today, although already in 1936 Margret T.
Hodgen had shown that evolutionism emerged in a period of doubt (Hodgen
1936, 9 35). She based her argument on the fact, still underrated today, that Edward Burnett Tylor, arguably one of the strongest representatives of evolutionism, had particular interest in the survival of earlier stages of civilization. In
1966, John W. Burrow picked up this thread. In contrast to the evolutionism of
the eighteenth century, which indeed was characterized by an unshakable belief
in the law of progress, the nineteenth century revealed a self-reflective and broken attitude toward progress; the existence of the non-rational as an integral
part of progressive civilization was clearly recognized by the intellectual discourse of the period (1966, 2).
This insight is helpful if we want to understand Johann Jakob Bachofens
construction of a development from matriarchy to patriarchy and the huge impact that this construction had on subsequent generations (see the excellent
and thorough analysis of Davies 2010). Or, as Lionell Gossman notes in his
study of unseasonable ideas in nineteenth-century Basle in general, and regarding Bachofen, Jacob Burckhardt, and Friedrich Nietzsche in particular:
As we read Burckhardt and Bachofen, we find ourselves having to review some of our most
tenaciously held beliefs. Our belief in progress, for instanceseemingly inextinguishable,
until quite recently at least, despite the terrible experiences of the twentieth century. Challenging that belief, Bachofen and Burckhardt urge us to take a more detached view of the
past and to evaluate calmly the characteristics of different ages, cultures, and political systems (2000, 10).
Bachofen (1815 1887), a well-situated jurist from Basle, was convinced that the
current patriarchal order was preceded by a matriarchal one. Strangely enough,
he came to this thesis through the examination of the symbolism of ancient
tombs. Fascinated by the newly discovered wall paintings in a columbarium of
the Villa Pamfili in Romewhich he visited in 1842Bachofen had the idea
that these tomb paintings were evidence of the oldest cult of humankind, and
he believed it was his duty to decipher these cults. A good example of his way
of academic reasoning is the interpretation he gave to the picture of Ocnus
the rope plaiter. Ocnus, being punished by pursuing futile works in the underworld, appears in the funerary images as being free and relaxed (Bachofen
1984, 53 74). Originally, the penitent and his rope-plaiting represented the working of the natural powers, while the accompanying donkey that eats up the rope
141
stood for the inherent destructive principle. The Roman tomb paintings, wrote
Bachofen, turned this symbol of an unwept creation into an image of salvation,
thus expressing liberation from the meaningless cycle of nature.
In his description of a culture dominated by material understandings of natural symbols Bachofen followed Plutarch, who claimed that the creating male
principle was giving form, while the receiving female principle was the material
for this form (Gossman 2000, 171 200). Bachofens study, published as Das Mutterrecht, with its enigmatic subtitle Eine Untersuchung ber die Gynaikokratie der
alten Welt nach ihrer religisen und rechtlichen Natur (1861; Maternal law: A
study of gynaecocracy in the ancient world with reference to its religious and juridical nature), was based on a ridiculously small foundation of evidence from
ancient sources (Wesel 1980)Herodotus report on the Lycians from Asia Minor
and Aeschylus Oresteia. His main argument, entirely lacking evidence, was that
ancient mother goddesses represented a matriarchal juridical system.
Herodotus (1.173) tells us that the Lycians transmitted the right of citizenship
and property through the line from mother to daughter (matrilinearity), rather
than from father to son (patrilinearity). Anthropologists conceded that Bachofen
was right that this was a unique order of social structure; however, such an order
only very rarely led to the formation of local female communities, and never to
the formation of a matriarchal system (gynaecocracy in Greek). In most cases,
these women lived in the social communities of their husbands and were governed by male rule (Kippenberg 1984, xxvxxxvi).
Aeschylus Oresteia, Bachofens second witness, tells the story of Clytemnestra who, together with her lover Aegisthus, kills her husband Agamemnon after
his return from Troy. Their son Orestes, sent abroad by Clytemnestra, returns as
an adult to take revenge for the murder of his father. Together with his sister Electra, he kills his mother and her lover. Subsequently, the Erinyes haunt and torture him in his flight until he is taken to Athens to stand trial for killing his mother. The issue in court was whether the son was more closely linked to the father
or to the mother. Only because Athena, who chaired the sitting, voted for Orestes,
he was finally released. For Bachofen, this result demonstrated the victory of paternal law over maternal law in ancient Attica, which brought the previous age of
matriarchy to an end (Wesel 1980, 58 59).
Although Bachofens work was immediately criticized for its methodological
shortcomings and eccentric claims, it exerted an enormous influence. This impact was often more indirect than direct, especially because Bachofen was regularly used without being explicitly quoted. The major reason for Bachofens success may be that his culture-critical interpretation struck a right chord in the
nineteenth century, such as in the following sentences:
142
Into the life of these [gynaecocratic] peoples the conflict between the positive setting of
rules and the natural order of things, in which all great revolutions have their origins,
did not intrude. The human being was not yet put outside of this harmony, which rules
all material life on earth. The law that these humans follow is not exclusively human,
but a general law of the entire creation. Law presents itself as an expression of physical
life (Bachofen 1975, 252).
In his interpretation, Bachofen is in line with the British evolutionists. They, too,
were convinced that the early stages of human evolution were not simply assimilated into higher stages, but that they re-asserted themselves. Another similarity
is Bachofens implicit evaluation of progress; natural symbols and maternal law
express human relations with nature that rational, male, nature-controlling
progress can suppress but not eliminate. Ancient myth had become the mirror
of the repressed features of Bachofens own time.
Bachofen coded the matriarchal culture of antiquity in the discourse of the
day. In the assumed freedom from despotism he saw the ideal of a future juridical order (Bachofen 1984, 228 229). Just as symbol and concept are dependent
on each other, matriarchal and patriarchal systems need each other as a correcting force. Freedom from despotismthis characteristic of maternal lawwill and
should be re-established at the end of juridical progress. Bachofens thinking follows the same logic as in the case of the natural symbols: just as the natural
symbol remains present, even if it is interpreted differently, the maternal law
claims its influence. History does not obey dialectics. The defeated retains its
honor (Bumler 1965, 337). This is reminiscent of the talk of the third in cultural
studies, but Bachofen did not make that step 150 years ago. For him, it was selfevident that the female had to be defeated by the male. By projecting his own
generations battle of the sexes onto the early stages of human evolution, he
codified the antagonism between male and female (Wagner-Hasel 1992, 295
373; Lanwerd 1993, 72 109; Borgeaud 1999).
Bachofens historical imagination exerted unexpected influence. Even Marxist theoreticians were taken with it, although of course Bachofen was not at all
interested in political work for womens rights. But Friedrich Engels celebrated
him in his 1884 essay Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des
Staats (The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State) as the discoverer of pre-bourgeois family structures. The history of the family dates to 1861,
the publication of Bachofens Mutterrecht, Engels wrote (Engels 1970 [1884],
12); but he was critical about Bachofen deducing the family orders from religion
rather than from real-life conditions (ibid., 40; see Davies 2010, 64 66). The assumption of Friedrich Engels and other Marxists that we can speak of a universal
matriarchy was still influential in the thinking of Walter Benjamin and the Frank-
143
furt School (Drr 2007, 142; see his entire chapter on Myth and the Dialectic of
Enlightenment, 104 184; Davies 2010, 49 106 and 397 414).
The link to the Frankfurt School already indicates that Bachofens full impact became visible in the first decades of the twentieth century among German
intellectuals. The circle of the Munich Kosmiker played a significant role in this
(Drr 2007, passim; Davies 2010, 163 216). For one of them, Ludwig Klages,
Bachofen was the discoverer of a primordial state of consciousness (Klages
1930, 238). The rationally thinking bearer of world history was preceded by
a humankind that was thinking in symbols [] whose entire worldviews, including all manners and concepts of law, were totally different from those of
the historical human being (Klages 1937, 177 178). With this interpretation Klages served an anti-Intellectualism that surrendered Bachofen to national-socialist ideology (Davies 2010, 351 388).
Bachofen was of particular importance for the newly established discipline of
psychology (Davies 2010, 217 242). The influences of Bachofens ideas reached
psychiatric circles through various channels, and his influence on dynamic psychiatry has been immense (Ellenberger 1970, 222). There are many striking parallels between Freud and Bachofen, while Alfred Adler was influenced by Bachofen
indirectly (Ellenberger 1970, 222 223). Carl Gustav Jung used Bachofens work directly, for instance in his perhaps most important early work Wandlungen und
Symbole der Libido (1912, translated as Symbols of Transformation), which also
marked his break with Sigmund Freud; but he did not make his dependence on
Bachofen explicit in this book (Davies 2010, 240 242). Jungs teaching is filled
with concepts that may at least partly be ascribed to Bachofens influence, such
as those of the Anima and Animus, the old wise man, and the magna mater
(Ellenberger 1970, 223). We can assume that Jung knew Bachofens theory through
his acquaintance with the Munich Kosmiker and his connection to Basle (Noll
1994, 169 176; on Jungs Basle connection see Gossman 2000, 53). Jung was
part of what Georg Drr calls a Basle mythology; this consisted of Bachofen,
Nietzsche, some members of the Kosmiker group, and also the classical philologist
Karl Kernyi. In 1945, Kernyi published the essay Bachofen und die Zukunft des
Humanismusmit einem Intermezzo ber Nietzsche und Ariadne (Bachofen
and the future of humanismwith an intermezzo on Nietzsche and Ariadne),
in which he not only constructed a male Nietzsche and a female Bachofen,
but also the ideal of a new Bachofen who would integrate the female and the
male. This ideal future scholar, Kernyi proclaimed, was Carl Gustav Jung (see
Drr 2007, 46 48). The future humanist will give his reverence not only to Apollo
[i.e. Nietzsche] and Dionysus [i.e. Bachofen], but also to Asclepius [i.e. Jung] (Kernyi 1945, 39, quoted from Drr 2007, 47).
144
Interestingly enough, Jung projected Bachofens historical construction onto

the realm of the human soul, using Ernst Haeckels theory of recapitulation. As
we saw above, Haeckel attempted to combine the ideas of Lamarck and Goethe
with Darwins evolutionary model. He came up with a biogenetic lawheld as
untenable todaythat he formulated simply as ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.
Ontogeny is the growth (size change) and development (shape change) of an individual organism; phylogeny is the evolutionary history of a species. Haeckel, and
Jung with him, thought that the development of advanced species passes through
stages represented by adult organisms of more primitive species. For Jung, the
great religious-historical process of maternal law being overcome by paternal
law finds its repetition in the conflict between the powers of the (male) animus
and the (female) anima (on this theory see Ellenberger 1970, 708 710).
In Jungs work, it is easy to see how religious-historical data are turned into
unchangeable symbols inside the human psyche. As archetypes they are fully
detached from historical contexts; in this thinking, Jung was on the same line as
Eliade and other scholars of the Eranos circle. What we see in this process is a
psychologization of the sacred and the sacralization of the psyche. The conceptualization of the female divine was (and is) a mirror of social conditions and
discourses of the day.

The theory of matriarchy did not originate with Bachofen. It had already been
presented by the Jesuit scholar Joseph Franois Lafitau (1681 1746), who spent
five years among the Iroquois, where he heard from Father Julien Garnier
about the matriarchal customs of the Algonquin, Huron, and Iroquois. Lafitau
compared this system with that of the Lycians and other ancient civilizations
and concluded that gynaecocracy was a widespread phenomenon in the ancient
Mediterranean and Asia Minor (see Ellenberger 1970, 219). But the first to put forward the thesis of an all-encompassing primordial mother goddess was Eduard
Gerhard (1795 1865; see Hutton 1999, 35 36). In a lecture at the Royal Academy
of Sciences in Berlin, he argued in 1849 that not only for Dia-Dione, Eileithyia
and Theia, Themis and Artemis, Tyche and Praxidike, Chryse and Basileia, but
also for Demeter and Cora, Aphrodite and Hestia, Hera and Athena it can reasonably be argued that
in all these goddesses we must recognize the changing names and attributes of one and the
same Hellenized earth- and creation goddess, equivalent to Gaia; this Gaia is conceptualized
not only as fermenting primordial matter, linked to Uranus, but mythically as Chronos wife,
145
conceptually a mother goddess of the Olympian world order, who works together with Zeus,
juxtaposed to the concept of Urania as a Gaia Olympia. [] In all these goddesses we can see
the concept of a world order that precedes the Olympian powers, a concept of a goddess of
fate to whom, as Homer tells us, even Zeus had to pay respect (Gerhard 1851, 463).
Gerhards idea of a matriarchal monotheism was later picked up by other scholars, including the classicist Jane E. Harrison (1850 1928), who acknowledged
that [t]he fundamental unity of all the Greek goddesses was, I think, first observed by Gerhard (Harrison 1991 [1903], 263 note 1; see Brunotte 2013, 132
133).
In her new study of the life and work of Harrison, Ulrike Brunotte points out
that Harrisons discovery of a pre-Greek religion of the goddesswhich was
connected to Asia Minor, Africa, the Orient, and primitive religionwas part
of a larger discourse around 1900 (Brunotte 2013, 127; see also Schlesier 1994,
177 183). It is particularly in the chapter The Making of a Goddess in her Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion (1903) that Harrison developed the thesis
of a primordial veneration of the goddess that was destroyed by gender wars and
the subjugation of autochthonous religions by patriarchal tribes that intruded on
the Peloponnese from the North (Brunotte 2013, 128 134). Harrisons contribution to this discourse was distinctive:
It is Harrisons unique accomplishment that she was the first scholar to analyze in detail the
often violent process of the making of a goddess, reported in myths and visual evidence,
from the local mother cults to the patriarchal Olympus. This critical and feminist approach
had deep impact on the artistic and literary avant-garde of her time. With some delay, it
also gained significance for a study of religion that took gender seriously as an epistemological category. However, an essentialization of female origins in archetypes, as well as the neopagan conjuration of the female sexs assumed healing quality and its close links to nature,
are only rarely found in the work of Jane E. Harrison (Brunotte 2013, 132).
The discourse that Harrison responded to was determined by James G. Frazer

and later particularly by archaeologists. Sir Arthur Evans excavations on Knossos were a revelation for many English scholars, including Harrison. Evans concluded that the entire island of Crete must have venerated a Great Goddess; this
goddess, as he pointed out later, was identical with all other goddesses and even
with the Mother of God (Evans 1921 1935, vol. 1, 45 52). In 1903, Sir Edmund
Chambers claimed that pre-historical Europe knew a Great Earth Mother and
venerated her in two aspects of creatrix and goddess of destruction. This goddess later became known under many different names (Chambers 1903, vol. 1,
264). As recently as 1989, the Lithuanian-American archeologist Marija Gimbutas
(1921 1994) clung to this narrative in her book Language of the Goddess, the academic authority of which influenced many practitioners in pagan and feminist
146
milieus (Gimbutas 2001 [1989]). The story of archaeological construction of the

Mother Goddess is well known and fundamentally critiqued by recent scholarship (see particularly Rder, Hummel, and Kunz 2001).
The same is true for the discussion in Egyptology. Here it was Margaret Murray (1863 1963) who in her book The Witch Cult in Western Europe (1921) sketched the powerful image of a continuous European paganism that centered on the
Goddess (Hutton 1999, 194 201).
Charles G. Leland and Robert Graves:

Popularizing the Idea of the Goddess
Thanks to archaeologists and historians of religion, the idea that people in Europe,
especially women, had been followers of the Great Goddess throughout the centuries was extremely popular in the period around 1900. In addition to the academic
discussion that had already had an impact on the formation of historical understanding, we also find a number of authors writing for a broad audience and
thus popularizing the idea of the Great Goddess. Although they were acquainted
with major parts of the academic debate, these authors mixed the genres of communication and blended academic argument with poetry, personal accounts, and
novelistic writing. In doing so, they reached many more readers and thus stabilized the attribution of historical meaning to a higher extent than academic writing
alone could have done. For our purposes here, Charles Godfrey Leland (1824
1903) and Robert Graves (1895 1985) are of special importance.
Charles Godfrey Leland

Born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Charles G. Leland enjoyed an academic education in the United States and attended college at Princeton University. He studied
languages and soon became known as a poet and author of humoristic literature.
For his later career, it is also significant that at an early stage he was already interested in Hermetic philosophy and Platonism as well as in contemporary literature
(Rabelais, Villon, German Romanticism). Leland continued his studies in Europe,
first in Heidelberg and Munich, then in 1848 at the Sorbonne in Paris, where he
also got involved in the revolution that year. Back in the United States, he started
a career in journalism, with some success. He returned to Europe in 1869, where
he travelled widely and ultimately settled in London. During these travels he studied
the Gypsies and got particularly interested in folklore, ethnography, and magic. In
1888, Leland became president of the English Gypsy-Lore Society.
Charles G. Leland and Robert Graves: Popularizing the Idea of the Goddess
147
It was this interest that also determined his contribution to the discourse on
the Great Goddess. In 1899, four years before he died, Leland published Aradia,
or the Gospel of the Witches, which has remained a classic in its own right until
today. Although most scholars and practitioners agree that it is doubtful whether
Leland ever met the persons he introduces in Aradia (see Hutton 1999, 148), the
narrative of the coven of witches performing the rituals and liturgies of the ancient goddess Diana in nineteenth-century Northern Italy was persuasive and
fascinating for many readers. The information provided in Aradia was based
on a manuscript that Leland received from a woman called Maddalena (Leland
1899, 101). In his preface, Leland pictured the implications of modernization in
a humoristic way: [] both priest and wizard are vanishing now with incredible
rapidityit has even struck a French writer that a Franciscan in a railway carriage is a strange anomalyand a few more years of newspapers and bicycles
(Heaven knows what it will be when flying-machines appear!) will probably
cause an evanishment of all (Leland 1899, vivii). He then presents his main argument about the persistence of the old in the new:
However, they die slowly, and even yet there are old people in the Romagna of the North
who know the Etruscan names of the Twelve Gods, and invocations to Bacchus, Jupiter,
and Venus, Mercury, and the Lares or ancestral spirits, and in the cities are women who
prepare strange amulets, over which they mutter spells, all known in the old Roman
time, and who can astonish even the learned by their legends of Latin gods, mingled
with lore which may be found in Cato or Theocritus. With one of these I became intimately acquainted in 1886, and have ever since employed her specially to collect among her sisters of the hidden spell in many places all the traditions of the olden time known to them. It
is true that I have drawn from other sources, but this woman by long practice has perfectly
learned what few understand, or just what I want, and how to extract it from those of her
kind (Leland 1899, vii).
The text presents the main theological ideas of the worship of Diana as it is practiced by these women in Italy. Leland made links to ancient sources and provided additional information as to how these rituals and magic spells can be used
by uninitiated readers of his time (see, e. g., Leland 1899, 43). In the appendix, he
presented the historical construction that served as a template for subsequent
witches. The Christian repression of alternatives resulted in
a vast development of rebels, outcasts, and all the discontented, who adopted witchcraft or sorcery for a religion, and wizards as their priests. They had secret meetings in desert places,
among old ruins accursed by priests as the haunt of evil spirits or ancient heathen gods, or
in the mountains. To this day the dweller in Italy may often find secluded spots environed
by ancient chestnut forests, rocks, and walls, which suggest fit places for the Sabbat, and
are sometimes still believed by tradition to be such (Leland 1899, 106, emphasis original).
148
Leland announced in the appendix to Aradia that this publication would only be a
small part of a larger collection of ancient religious practices that are still part of
northern Italian culture. This larger collection would also contain his 1892 publication Etruscan Roman Remains in Popular Tradition (Leland 1899, 109). For the
discourse on gender, the goddess, witchcraft, and the history of religion, it is fruitful to have a look at this voluminous book as well. Representative of many other
lines in Lelands narrative, let me quote what the author takes from the report of
the Bavarian collector of folklore, Friedrich Panzer (1794 1854):
Witches on earth sometimes pay visits to this Magonia, or Cloud City land, but they run a
risk of being caught or killed in the storms of their own raising. Thus Friedrich Panzer tells
us in his Bavarian Tales, that during the first half of the last century there was such a tremendous tempest, with hail, in Forchheim in Upper Franconia, that the people feared lest
the whole town should be destroyed. Then the Franciscan brothers met in their cloister garden, when, just as the first blessing was pronounced, lo! a beautiful woman, stark-naked,
was thrown headlong from a passing thunderstorm on the grass in their midst; and the
holy brothers, greatly amazed at this, doubtless to them, utterly novel sight [sic], drew
near, when they recognized in her who had indeed dropped in on them so suddenly, the
wife of the town miller, a woman long suspected of witchcraft (Leland 2002 [1892], 216).
Apparently, Leland tells us, the Franciscan monks were so impressed by the
beauty of this proie inattendue (unexpected prey) that they saved her from
being burned at the stake (ibid.). The male gaze at the naked witch is a metaphor
of control and domination. It resonates with the discursive mechanisms that we
have encountered earlier, from the unveiling of the truth of the feminine to the
fascination with ecstatic forms of religion. Leland, for his part, was inspired by
the manifestation of old forms of religion in contemporary society.
So from old days these hardened stories live as if trenched in ice, like mammoths in Siberia,
to the world unknown till some discoverer reveals them, and then there is marveling here
and there that such things could have been so long frozen up. So into time old time returns
again, and the ancient medals, thus disinterred, are all the more beautiful for their rust.
And it went deeply to my heart that after I had read the story of Magonia, and thought it
was a tale utterly dead on earth and embalmed in a chronicle, to find a sorceress in
whose faith it lives. It was as if an Egyptian mummy, revived, had suddenly spoken to
me, and told me a tale of Thebes, or declared that Cloud-Cuckoo land was a reality
which he had known [] (Leland 2002 [1892], 217, emphasis original).
When Kegan Paul, a respected academic press, reprinted Lelands work in 2002
in The Kegan Paul Library of Arcana, no mention was made of the fact that the
book was first published in 1892. Rather than contextualizing the publication,
the cover text presents Lelands findings as a document of historical evidence
and accurate information about contemporary religious practice. The Etruscans
149
are one of historys great mysteries, we are told, and they were more concerned
with religious matters than any other nation. They were adept at magic and it is
known that Etruscan books of spells were common among the Romans, but they
have not survived. It says a lot about the discursive impact of academic publications on religious practice when the cover text continues: Recorded over
many years at a time when many of these secret beliefs and practices were beginning to pass away, this remarkable volume deals with ancient gods, spirits,
witches, incantations, prophecy, medicine, spells and amulets, giving full descriptions, illustrations and instructions for practice.
Theoretical academic and practical approaches to religion constitute a common field of discourse on which the borders between inside and outside are
constantly negotiated. This impression is confirmed by the discursive knot that
Google generates on the basis of its algorithm. A search for Charles Leland
on 9 May 2013 resulted in the additional information by Google that People
also searched for Gerald Gardner, Margaret Murray, Doreen Valiente, Raven Grimassi, and Ronald Hutton.
Robert Graves
Born in Wimbledon seventy-one years after Leland was born in Philadelphia,
Robert Graves is another example of the creative blending of academic and poetic work in the construction of twentieth-century goddess veneration. His mother was a great-niece of the German historian Leopold von Ranke, and Robert
Graves was enrolled in school under the name Robert von Ranke Graves,
which he also used in German editions of his work. Several times in his early
life Graves went through severe illnesses, one of them being the result of a
war wound during World War I, in which he served as soldier of the Royal
Welch Fusiliers. He became known as a war poet. However, while these existential crises certainly had influence on his oeuvre, it is his later career that is of
special interest to our concerns here. Graves established himself as a writer of
poetry and historical novelsI, Claudius (1934) and the sequel Claudius the
God and his Wife Messalina (1934) became his economically most successful
publicationsand after 1945 he focused on what he would subsequently describe as the historical grammar of poetic myth, which is the apt subtitle of
his influential The White Goddess, first published in 1948. Graves was then living
with his second wife Beryl Hodge in a small village in the Majorca mountains, a
detail that he explicitly mentioned as part of his creative work (on how he came
to write The White Goddess, see the authors Postscript 1960 in Graves 1981
150
[1948], 488 492; on Graves biography see Seymour 1995 and King 2008; on his
work see Quinn 1999 and Mounic 2012).
The White Goddess is a discursive knot in itself (Vickery 1972; Lanwerd 1993,
18 70; Seymour 1995, 306 318; Firla 2003; King 2008, 139 149; Mounic 2012,
53 78). In this book, Graves creatively wove together the discourse strands of religion, myth, nature, goddess veneration, matriarchy, poetry, philosophy, history, sexuality, rationality, magic, mysticism, science, europe,
and the west. This intricate knot is described from ever-changing perspectives
in all 26 chapters of the book, culminating in The Return of the Goddess (chapter 26). In his foreword, the author leaves no doubt about his program and the
main argument:
My thesis is that the language of poetic myth anciently current in the Mediterranean and
Northern Europe was a magical language bound up with popular religious ceremonies in
honour of the Moon-goddess, or Muse, some of them dating from the Old Stone Age,
and that this remains the language of true poetrytrue in the nostalgic modern sense
of the unimprovable original, not a synthetic substitute. The language was tampered
with in late Minoan times when invaders from Central Asia began to substitute patrilinear
for matrilinear institutions and remodel or falsify the myths to justify the social changes.
Then came the early Greek philosophers who were strongly opposed to magical poetry
as threatening their new religion of logic, and under their influence a rational poetic language (now called the Classical) was elaborated in honour or their patron Apollo and imposed on the world as the last word in spiritual illumination: a view that has prevailed
practically ever since in European schools and universities, where myths are now studied
only as quaint relics of the nursery age of mankind (1981 [1948], 9 10).
Despite the devastating influence of Greek rational philosophy, Graves tells us,
the ancient language survived purely enough in the secret Mystery-cults of Eleusis, Corinth,
Samothrace and elsewhere; and when these were suppressed by the early Christian Emperors it was still taught in the poetic colleges of Ireland and Wales, and in the witch-covens of
Western Europe. As a popular religious tradition it all but flickered out at the close of the
seventeenth century: and though poetry of a magical quality is still occasionally written,
even in industrialized Europe, this always results from an inspired, almost pathological, reversion to the original languagea wild Pentecostal speaking with tonguesrather than
from a conscientious study of its grammar and vocabulary (ibid., 12).
The White Goddess, consequently, is both an attempt to historically reconstruct this

grammar of true poetry and a manifesto to re-establish the veneration of the goddess and the ultimate function of poetry in modern, industrialized Europe: The
function of poetry is religious invocation of the Muse; its use is the experience of
mixed exaltation and horror that her presence excites (ibid., 14). If this goal is to
be achieved, modern Europe must radically break with Greek rational understand-
151
ing of life and poetry. For Graveswho had read James G. Frazer, Jane E. Harrison,
and the Cambridge anthropologists probably before 1917 (Vickery 1972, 10; on Frazers link to this discourse see also Lanwerd 1993, 112 146)the most severe damage
to the true original forms of poetic life was caused by Socrates. It was Socrates who
turned his back on the Moon-goddess and betrayed her poetic inspiration and sexual powerwhat is called Platonic love, the philosophers escape from the power
of the Goddess into intellectual homosexuality, was really Socratic love (ibid., 11).
Graves blending of mythology, sexuality, and goddess veneration is clearly related
to Jungs archetypal theory, even if Graves did not use Jung directly (Seymour 1995,
303; Mounic 2012, 49). This link is also what interested Ted Hughes in Graves writing; read Graves through Jung, Hughes wrote to Nick Gammage in 1995 (Gammage
1999, 150). Both authors shared what Gammage summarizes as follows:
The biology of the White Goddess can be located in Gravess exploration of the vigorous,
irrational but supremely pure raw energy of both the external and internal world, which
primitive man [sic] used mythic systems and their rituals to dramatize and control. What
Graves dramatizes in the image of the White Goddess is the tension between two principal
aspects of that life impulseboth the creative and destructive potential. These are the two
key possibilities of human behavior and are functions of the organisms most fundamental
drives: to survive and to reproduce (Gammage 1999, 150).
When it comes to Graves scholarly networks, his long friendship with Raphael
Patai (1910 1996) is also noteworthy. Patai devoted the third volume of his autobiography entirely to his friendship with Graves (Patai 1992, 10). In terms of the
formation and development of the discourse of the Great Goddess, this collection
of letters and Patais biographical statements are important documents. It proves
the close relationship between Graves historical imagination and its application
to issues of ancient Jewish history. Despite Graves focus on what he considered
to be Old European tradition, both scholars agreed that the deepest strata of
the Bible still provide hints regarding a veneration of the goddess in Jewish tradition as well (Patai 1992, 48). Patai put forward this argument in his The Hebrew
Goddess (1967), which appeared in an enlarged third edition in 1990. Strongly
criticized by many scholars, Patais historical construction of a matriarchal heritage of the biblical tradition nevertheless became an influential book for a broad
audience and among practitioners of goddess devotion. For our analysis here it
provides a significant link between the discourse strands that construct an ancient Greek and pan-European Great Goddess on the one hand, and the scholarly
fascination with mystical Judaism on the other (on their communication on Kabbalah see, for example, Patai 1992, 355 366; as a collection of Hebrew myths
that Patai and Graves co-published, see Graves and Patai 1983).
152
But more is at stake in Graves discursive re-entanglement. Anticipating the

self-understanding of twentieth-century pagans, Graves noted that it was Socrates
problem that he was a confirmed townsman who in Platos Phaedrus admitted
that fields and trees will not teach me anything, but men do. Graves response
is radical: The study of mythology, as I shall show, is based squarely on tree-lore
and seasonal observation of life in the fields (ibid., 11). The binary construction of
(Greek) rationality versus mythological experiential knowledgetypically linked to
the binaries of culture versus nature, or male versus femalehas become a strong
element of contemporary pagan discourse. Rather than deconstructing and criticizing binary constructions, these interpretations by academics and other authors
legitimized the attributions of meaning to rationality and irrationality, or male and
female. Contemporary pagan spirituality is still dependent on these stereotypical
constructions of gender, even in its feminist branches.
Discursive Materializations in (the Study of) Paganism and

Esotericism
Graves influence on contemporary pagan discourse has been direct and indirect.
One important reason for the impact of the historical construction that he and
others propagated is the fact that academics accepted this narrative uncritically.
For instance, in 1999 Dionysious Psilopoulos argued that [t]he influence of the
occult has been undervalued in Gravess prose and poetry (Psilopoulos 1999,
159). While it is correct to state the importance of reconstructing occultisms influences on this line of thoughtthe present book is a contribution to that reconstructionit is highly doubtful whether the existence of an age-old esoteric-occult tradition has been proven by scholars such as Richard Reitzenstein,
Edwin Hatch, Gerald Massey, G.R.S. Mead, and Carl Gustav Jung (ibid.); from
an historical point of view it is untenable to conclude with Psilopoulos that
we must acknowledge the existence of an uninterrupted esoteric-occult tradition through the ages, and we must give credence to occultists claim of an uninterrupted pre-Christian lineage (ibid., 159 160). With this claim, the author
moves far beyond Leon Surettes argument that the roots of literary modernism
are to be found in occult discourses (Surette 1993), and it is in this extension
where the argument derails. Rather than being a proof of the continuous existence of the esoteric-occult tradition, Psilopoulos article is evidence of the discursive unity of academic theories and religious practice. This unity is stronger in
the study of paganism and esotericism than in other fields of academic research
(except perhaps Christian theology), which has to do with the history of these
discourses themselves. Let us have a closer look at these entanglements.
Discursive Materializations in (the Study of) Paganism and Esotericism
153
During the second half of the twentieth century, European and North American
intellectuals became increasingly skeptical of the master narratives that seemed to
legitimize the superiority of modern Europe and to link European values to a Christian cultural heritage (see Perkins 2004). They insisted on the ambivalence, multiplicity, and the social and religious plurality of European culture. This critique of
a superior unity of the West can only be understood if we take into account the
discursive changes that I address in this book. People were looking for alternative
models of interpreting European history, models that seemed more fit to explain
the plurality and ambiguity of European values and identities. They turned to the
seemingly marginalized parts of European culture and paid special attention to aspects of European identity that seemed to represent its shadow.
These scholars were looking for a new vocabulary with which to analyze European cultural history. One of the terms that has gained currency since the
1990s is the concept of Western esotericism (see von Stuckrad 2010a, 43 64;
Hanegraaff 2012, 334 362). Although closely linked to older concepts that had
been part of scholarly debate for a long time (mysticism, Gnosis, occultism, Hermeticism, etc.), the term esotericism seemed to provide a basis for interpreting
Western culture that was more neutralor even positivewith reference to the
ambivalences, undercurrents, and margins of the West. The attraction of this
new vocabulary is part of a change of epistemea changing agreement regarding what can be true about Europe and North America.
If we want to understand the origins of such a discursive change, it seems
that the influences of the American counter-culture of the 1960s and the New
Age movement are significant (see also Kaiser 2011). This remains true, even if
it can be argued that the major elements of New Age discourse originate in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century religious and philosophical thought. The
1960s and 1970s can be seen as a cultural turntable that disseminated these
ideas in a wider context. Many religious beliefs and practices that we witness
in North America and western Europe today can be interpreted as popularized
forms of new age. It is not surprising that scholarly instruments of analysis likewise reveal the influence of re-entanglement of discourse strands. The popularity
of concepts such as esotericism, paganism, or occultism are both the result
and further stabilization of the new discursive knot. Ronald Hutton pointed
out a similar dynamic when it comes to the inclusion and exclusion of Druids
in contemporary pagan milieus; the history of the construction of Druidism
since the sixteenth century is at the same time a history of cultural developments
in Europe, with the imagination of the Victorian period determining the discourse even today (Hutton 2013, 36).
The discursive changes that we see operative in culture and scholarship are visible in an application of analytical terms that are taken from the object level of anal-
154
ysis. Emic termseven those that used to have very strong evaluative connotationscan be turned into etic categories. In fact, this process deconstructs the
very distinction between emic and etic. What makes these terms etic is the simple
fact that scholars use them; thus, calling something etic is perhaps not more than a
rhetorical device to give an emic term scholarly power and blessing. This dynamic
can also work the other way round, with so-called etic concepts being turned into
emic ones; examples include paganism, pantheism, animism, and even heathendom. The concept of the Great Goddess is another case in point: is it an
etic or an emic term? When did it change from being an etic term (i.e., used by
scholars) to becoming an emic one as well (i.e., used by practitioners)? Or consider
the term synchronicity, discussed in Chapter 2 above. Is Jungs use of it an etic or
an emic one? And if astrologers take over the concept from Jung and Pauli, does it
automatically change into an emic concept then? And does it make a difference if
those astrologers are themselves versed in quantum physics or depth psychology?
With these questions, I do not deny the analytical difference between object language and analytical language; but I doubt that the polarity of emic and etic clarifies this differentiation, as it tends to underestimate the fact that the very difference
between emic and etic is constantly renegotiated and dependent on power relations
and discursive constellations.
Let me exemplify this process of adaptation with the concept of altered states
of consciousness (ASC), which is taken directly from new age and the psychedelic counter-culture of the 1960s. Wouter J. Hanegraaff, a renowned scholar of Western esotericism, recently introduced the concept of altered states of consciousness
in order to analyze the Hermetic tractates of late antiquity. The concept seems so
well known that the author does not even see the need to define it; he simply
states that [i]t is quite common for trance-like altered states to be loosely referred
to as sleep (2008, 142). Hanegraaff criticizes scholars of an earlier generation
(particularly Andr-Jean Festugire) who rejected the possibility of having revelatory experiences during altered states of consciousness. In an all-inclusive comparison that resembles an Eliadean understanding of shamanic ecstasy (which I will
discuss in the next chapter), he notes that the idea that people cannot possibly
have had such experiences, and must therefore have invented them, reflects a peculiar blindness on Festugires partquite on the contrary, people have such experiences so frequently that they have been reported through all periods of history
and all over the world (Hanegraaff 2008, 160; no proof is provided for this general claim). Another example of a popularized new age vocabulary is the following statement about the experiential dimensions of the Hermetic text: Admittedly
the difference is a very ambiguous one, and perhaps deliberately so, because the
text keeps suggesting that the external cosmos paradoxically (or, if one wishes,
holographically) exists inside the visionarys own mind. In a footnote Hane-
155
graaff explains that the association [of holography] with New Age should not
keep us from perceiving the applicability of this concept in a context such as
the present one (2008, 149, note 76).
With statements like these Hanegraaff lends scholarly authority to the discursive knot of trance, mind, cosmos, new age, philosophy, hermeticism,
gnosis, and experience; this knot overlaps in many ways with the entangled
discourse strands that have been at work since the nineteenth century. What
we see here is the academic stabilization of the attribution of meaning to certain
experiences, or, more generally, the legitimization of knowledge claims in the
dispositive of academic writing. Recently, Hanegraaff also introduced the term
entheogenic esotericism (2013), which is another example of the same dynamic;
similar to Michael Harner (whom I will introduce in the next chapter), the positive attribution of religious meaning to the use of ayahuasca and other psychoactive plants is discursively stabilized in the genre of academic publication. In a
discourse community that comprises practitioners and academic observers, as
well as intertextual links to discourses that have been formed earlier, the strict
differentiation between emic and etic turns out to be analytically useless.
In a recent review article, Markus Altena Davidsen (2012) asked, What is
Wrong with Pagan Studies? He argued that pagan studies (which is the self-description of many scholars, programmatically contrasting the academic study of
paganism) are dominated by the methodological principles of essentialism, exclusivism, loyalism, and supernaturalism, and he demonstrates that these principles promote normative constructions of pure paganism, insider interpretations of the data, and theological speculations about gods, powers, and a
special magical consciousness. Much of what Davidsen argues also holds
true when we look at publications in the field of Western esotericism. There
can be no doubt that essentialism, exclusivism, loyalism, and supernaturalism
are methodological principles that we also encounter in esotericism research.
Two examples by leading scholars in the field may suffice.
Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, in his introductory book on The Western Esoteric
Traditions (2008), wrote:
My own perspective on this debate is that definitions of the esoteric in terms of discourse,
social constructions, and legitimacy lack a hermeneutic interpretation of spirit and spirituality as an independent ontological reality. By seeking to define the esoteric in terms of
human behavior and culture, it becomes a reflective cultural category rather than a philosophical or spiritual insight, which remains the essential component of any claims to real
or absolute knowledge (2008, 12 13).
Thus, Goodrick-Clarke loyally joins the ontological claims of primary sources in

the field of esotericism, which becomes even more apparent when we read that
156
these perennial characteristics of the esoteric worldview suggest to me that this

is an enduring tradition which, though subject to some degree of social legitimacy and cultural coloration, actually reflects an autonomous and essential aspect
of the relationship between the mind and the cosmos (ibid., 13). Hence, the professor of religion reinforces the legitimacy of a discursive entanglement that I
have described as one of the most influential constellations in the European religious history of the twentieth century. He even adds the discourse strands of
archetypal forms and energy to his essentialist attribution of meaning:
the historical evidence suggests that esotericism also involves a return to sources, to some archetypal forms of thought and energy which generate a fresh
round of cultural and spiritual development. In this regard, esotericism is an essential element of renewal in the historical process (ibid., 14).
What critics may see as a lack of reflection on the methodological basis of
academic research is likewise visible in the work of another leading exponent
of the field, the musicologist Joscelyn Godwin. In an interview for the European
Society for the Study of Western Esotericism in 2011, he remarked:
There will always be a tension between the academic study of Western esotericism and personal commitment to its paths and doctrines. A similar situation arose long ago, when Theology diversified into the Study of Religions, and scholars set barriers between their faith (if
present) and their academic work. But esoteric studies [sic] are inherently different from any
other academic discipline, even religionthey are, after all, esoteric. To pretend that they can
and must be treated with strict objectivity leads to a kind of policing and exclusion for which
I have never felt the need. I hope that our field can keep something of its eccentric and provocative nature, and not become a compliant cog in an increasingly legalistic machine
(http://esswe.org/uploads/ESSWE_Newsletter_Spring_2011.pdf, accessed 1 August 2013).
This self-description of the academic field is a direct materialization of countercultural discourses. While Christian theology has gone through hundreds of
years of pluralistic criticism and refinement, many pagans and esotericists (including those who are academics) construct their identity through narratives of exclusion and persecution. This can lead to unexpected revelations. When asked what
were the worst things about having this [Western esotericism] as your specialty,
Godwin responded: Having to listen to papers or read articles and dissertations
that accommodate it to current and fashionable academic trends. But this is my
problem. If I was academically trained in philosophy, history, or the study of religions, or if I had bothered to read the authors sanctified by those trends, I might
feel less bored and excluded (ibid.). The result of this lack of theoretical reflection
is what I call methodological solipsism, which is a characteristic of many publications in the academic study of paganism and esotericism.
157
One reason for methodological solipsism is the lack of common ground

when it comes to disciplinary training. Scholars of esotericism often proudly
present their field as interdisciplinary, and indeed, the interdisciplinary potential
is one of the most attractive features of the study of esotericism. The problem is,
however, that we have not yet arrived at an interdisciplinary study of esotericism;
what we see, instead, is a multidisciplinary study of esoteric themes and topics.
What is the difference? Interdisciplinarity means that the research results of one
discipline are actively exposed to the criticism of another discipline, which leads
to new insights and to the refinement of research questions and methods (see
Kocka 1987; Joas and Kippenberg 2005). This also means that scholars will
have to read and be interested in the approaches of other disciplines, not just
accept them as being different. In contrast, multidisciplinarity is the peaceful coexistence of various, at times even conflicting, research methods and results; it is
more like I am OK, you are OK, and there is no need to really bother about
what others have to say. We can call this the encounter group situation.
Methodological solipsism can also be encountered in Wouter J. Hanegraaffs
work. Regarding his approach, he states clearly that [t]he study of Western esotericism should be firmly grounded, first and foremost, in a straightforward historiographical agenda: that of exploring the many blank spaces on our mental maps and
filling them in with color and detail, so that they become integral parts of the wider
landscape that we already knew, or thought we knew (Hanegraaff 2012, 378). This
approach is constructed as an antidote to what Hanegraaff calls eclecticism, namely the ideological selection of historical data to confirm a polemical narrative of exclusion. But how should anti-eclectical historiography look concretely? His book
on Esotericism and the Academy does not give an indication of the methodology
that underlies its analyses. As Hereward Tilton points out:
Despite its debt to post-structuralist discourse analysis, at heart this work remains a neo-Lovejovian history of ideas so unwaveringly internalist in orientation that agency is ascribed to historiographical categories: variously the Enlightenment (pp. 141, 278, 373), modern chemistry (p. 212), Protestantism (p. 221) and modernity (p. 374) are said to define their own
identities through the production of alterity. In this manner the history and historiography
of esotericism are conflated and presented as free-floating superstructures, torn from their
moorings in socio-economic tumult, cultural interchange, and the experiential wellsprings of
doctrine in biography and esoteric praxis (2013, 491 492, emphasis original).
Hanegraaff does not refer to the huge intellectual debate that is raging in historiography since the challenges of Hayden White, Michel Foucault, Reinhart Koselleck, and others, or to the new responses that scholars have formulated to cope
with these challenges. A more serious engagement with this critical debate
would lead to the realization that it is impossible to apply an anti-eclectical his-
158
toriography; the questions, rather, are: What interests and circumstances drive
the selection of historical data (including our own)? How is historical knowledge
constructed in social communication? It is these questions that need to be included in serious historical research. Hanegraaffs argument would be much
stronger if he incorporated the methodological considerations of scholars who
are reflecting on the social construction of knowledge. Poststructuralist approaches actually provide ammunition for a critical analysis of the complexities
of European culture and its historiography (see also Otto 2013).
Even if Hanegraaff, Godwin, and Goodrick-Clarke simply state that poststructuralist and discursive approaches cannot solve the problems of academic
research after the fact (to use Clifford Geertz expression), then the challenges
of older paradigms still hold and must be answered, instead of returning to an
understanding of historiography and scientific truth that predates the important
turns of the twentieth century. There are examples of scholars who are also critical of so-called postmodern approaches but who actually take the challenges
seriously and respond to them on a high level of reflection. One example is
Geertzs book After the Fact: Two Countries, Four Decades, One Anthropologist
(1995), to which I will return in the next chapter. Another prominent example
is the historian Carlo Ginzburg. In his recent book Threads and Traces: True,
False, Fictive, Ginzburg notes:
Against the tendency of postmodern skepticism to blur the borders between fictional and
historical narrations, in the name of the constructive element they share, I proposed a
view of the relation between the two as a competition for the representation of reality.
But rather than trench warfare, I hypothesized a conflict made up of challenges and reciprocal, hybrid borrowings. If this was how things stood, one could not combat neoskepticism
by going back to old certitudes. We have to learn from the enemy in order to oppose it more
efficaciously (2012, 2).
If scholars of paganism and esotericism want to leave the niche into which the
discursive entanglements of their study have brought them, they will have to join
the theoretical discussion that is going on in historiography, sociology, anthropology, cultural studies, and the academic study of religion.
In sum, and closing my brief methodological excursus, this chapter has
shown the direct discursive impact of academic theorizing on religious practice;
it has also shown the mutual dependence and ultimately the inseparability of
academic and non-academic as well as emic and etic perspectives. Again, it
makes sense to talk of discourse communities if we want to grasp the underlying
processes. The next chapter will address another example of such a community,
this time linked to shamanism.
8 Normatizing Shamanism:
Academic Teachers as Religious Experts
Shamanism has fascinated European and North American societies for the past
four hundred years. Missionaries, traders, and travelers were the first who
brought news from the large steppes of northern Eurasia to the west, along
with stories describing exotic rituals. During the eighteenth century, there had
already developed a more or less fixed image of shamanism as a specific
type of religion. For most enlighteners the shaman was a model for irrational behavior, and Catherine the Great even wrote a comedy entitled Der sibirische Schaman, ein Lustspiel (1786), in which she tried to ridicule shamanism and lead her
subjects to a new age of enlightenment. But this was only one side of the coin,
and the counter-reaction was soon to emerge. For quite a few European enlightenersamong them J.G. Herder, J.W. von Goethe, or V. Hugothe shaman was a
religious virtuoso, a reminder of those ancient ecstatics and artists who were
able to transgress ordinary reality by means of music and poetry. The most prominent figure in this European imagination was Orpheus (on the formation of this
shamanic discourse in Europe see von Stuckrad 2012; see also the more detailed
treatment in von Stuckrad 2003c, 35 83; Znamenski 2007, 3 38).
Roberte N. Hamayon labeled the three-step history of approaches to the shamans behavior during the past three hundred years devilization, medicalization, and idealization (Hamayon 1998, 179 181). However, the discursive entanglements and re-entanglements that have led to the present situation are much
more complex than this model suggests. It also neglects the fact that European attitudes toward shamanism have been ambivalent from the beginning. To reflect
this ambivalence, Karl-Heinz Kohls notion of refutation and desire is much
more suitable for understanding the characteristics of European intellectual appropriation of shamanism. In several publications, Kohl defined this dialectic as
the major pattern in the engagement of European culture with everything foreign
and unknown, and subsequently also as the constituting dimension of the discipline of ethnology or cultural anthropology (Kohl 1987; see also Kohl 1981). Each
era, writes Kohl, has what we can call its own mark of obsession [Besessenheitsmerkmal] (Kohl 1987, 3, emphasis original) that reveals the main topics in the encounter with the Other in a given period. But while the marks of obsession may
differ from one period to another, the dynamics of observation and interpretation
of the Other have remained the same. What European observers perceived in the
foreign civilization was essentially determined by the limited horizon of experience of their own civilization (ibid., 4).
160
8 Normatizing Shamanism: Academic Teachers as Religious Experts
Descriptions of shamanism always carried with them an element of fascination that became apparent when Eliade in 1951 put forth his new construction of
the shaman as a trance specialist. Now shamanism appeared as a kind of anthropological constant, an ensemble of religious practices and doctrines that enabled certain socially discernible persons to interrelate with spiritual entities on
behalf of their community. Eliade must be addressed as the major turntable between nineteenth-century intellectual discourse and the popular appropriation
of shamanism in the second half of the twentieth century (Noel 1997, 26 41;
von Stuckrad 2003c, 123 135).
The problems connected to definitions of shamanism are enormous, but they
are not my primary concern here. What is important for my analysis is the reentanglement of discourse strands of shamanism, nature, psychology, and
religion that went along with a new appreciation of shamanism. It was in
the 1960s that the shamanic discourse in North America made a decisive step
in a new direction when the New Age movement discovered shamanism and
made it a major reference tool for its worldview. Inspired by Eliade, Jung, and
Joseph Campbell, the shaman became an indication of a new understanding
of humanitys relation to nature, of the human ability to access spiritual levels
of reality, and of leading a respectful life toward the sacred web of creation.
Henceforth, shamanism was no longer regarded as a spiritual path limited
only to classical shamanic cultures. Instead, by substituting the European positivistic and mechanistic attitude toward reality and nature for a holistic or vitalist one, shamanism was considered available to everyoneeven to those in
urban contexts that are estranged from nature (von Stuckrad 2003c, 137 174).
The phenomenon was soon to become known in academic parlance as neoshamanism or modern Western shamanism, in more negative depictions also
as urban shamanism, New Age shamanism, or even plastic shamanism. Because of their biased tone, practitioners usually do not feel comfortable with
these labels. As Annette Hst from the Scandinavian Center for Shamanic Studies argues, modern Western shamanism (or, for her part, even modern European shamanism) would be much more appropriate (Hst 2001). From a discourse-historical perspective we can go a step further and simply talk of a
shamanic discourse that has a long genealogy in European and North American
intellectual history. This discourse includes the scholarly biases and polemical
refutation of plastic shamanism, as well as the idealization of shamanism as
A good survey of previous work is presented by Siikala and Hoppl 1992. For a critical
evaluation see Taussig 1991 and Hutton 2001. See also the collection of important contributions
in Znamenski 2004.
161
a primordial technique for connecting to nature and the sacred. Theoreticians,

practitioners, supporters, and critics together constitute the discourse community on shamanism.
Shamanic discourse in twentieth-century Europe and North America shows a
number of characteristics that are particularly relevant for the concerns of this
book. Starting with the seminal work of Carlos Castaneda, the popularization of academic knowledge became an important feature of the popularity of shamanism.
Most major shamanic protagonists hold a degree in anthropology (in addition to
Castaneda, this is also true for Michael Harner, Joan Halifax, Nevill Drury, Steven
Foster, Jonathan Horwitz, Felicitas Goodman, and Gala Naumova); they try to combine their anthropological education with a spiritual practice outside academia.
Furthermore, what can be called the interference between academic research and religious practice entailed a transformation of classical, indigenous
shamanism (if there is such) when native people began to read ethnographic accounts and reacted to anthropological systematization. As a result, it is no longer possible to make a watertight distinction between traditional shamanistic
societies (a mainstay of the old ethnographic literature and of comparative religion), and the new wave of neo-shamanist movements (still barely studied in
depth). [] [T]he shamanic revival is now reappearing in the present of some
of these remote tribesonly now these are neither remote nor tribal (Vitebsky
1995, 184, emphasis original; see also Atkinson 1992, 322 323).
Finally, given their shared genealogy, it is not surprising to see many links
between shamanic discourse and contemporary pagan discourse. Many features
of Native American traditions or Celtic and North European religions, along with
Wiccan chants and the rituals of natural magic, form the spiritual background of
this new shamanic ritual practice. For instance, in her shamanic workshops Annette Hst includes divination and trance rituals adopted from northern European pagan tradition, such as Seidr (see Lindquist 1997, 122 183; Hst 1997; cf. Pike
2001, 211).
After these more general remarks, let us have a closer look at how academics
attributed meaning to shamanism and how these meanings were discursively legitimized and turned into religious practice. This analysis has to start with Mircea Eliade.
162

Eliades influence on the formation of modern understandings and practices of
religion has already been discussed with relation to alchemy and the search for
alternatives to European modernity. Let me here focus on a specific characteristic of Eliades oeuvre, which lies in its plurality of genres, comprising academic, literary, and biographical publications. Because the genres are intertwined
they should not be studied separately. It was Eliade himself who noted that
such an oscillation between research of a scientific nature and literary imagination had always been of crucial importance for him (from an essay from 1978,
quoted from Carrasco and Swanberg 1985, 19).
This oscillation partly originates in the very topic that can be seen as the
center of gravity of Eliadean thinkinga metaphysical interpretation of history
that often transgresses the boundaries of academic argumentation. Already in
his short study Le mythe de lternel retour: archtypes et rptition (1949), on
which he started to work in May 1945 when Europe faced the horrors of World
War II, he argued for the generalization of archaic concepts of history. In the
preface to the French edition that he wrote in 1952, he expressed his conviction
that it is justifiable to read in this depreciation of history (that is, of events without transhistorical models), and in this rejection of profane, continuous time, a
certain metaphysical valorization of human existence (1965, ix). There can be
no doubt that this is a reaction to the horrors of twentieth-century Europe that
Eliade experienced directly. In his search for an escape from history into the
illud tempusdescribed in Cosmos and History and other workshe joined the
Eranos circle and corresponded in friendly terms with Carl Gustav Jung, Henry
Corbin, and other intellectuals of his generation who were looking for religion
after religion (Wasserstrom 1999).
During the same years, Eliade also worked on his large study of shamanism,
which was published in French in 1951. Mac Linscott Ricketts, a follower of Eliade and biographer of his Romanian years (see McCutcheon 1997, 83 84), pro-
Of the multitudinous publications on Eliade, I only mention Dudley III 1977; Ellwood 1999,
79 126; Rennie 2001 and 2007; Allen 2002. On Eliades Romanian roots see Ricketts 1988; on the
discussion about his fascist inclinations and involvements see Junginger 2008, particularly Part
II.
This position is part of a larger development during the first decades of the twentieth century,
usually discussed under the slogan of the crisis of historicism. In addition to the links already
established in previous chapters, particularly for the German context, mention should be made
of Oexle 2007 (with Oexles long introductory chapter, pp. 11 116) and Laube 2004; see also
Raulff 1999.
163
vides the information that Eliade postponed the writing of that book on 21 June
1949 to start working on a novel. The novels Romanian title Noaptea de Snziene
(The Night of St. John) alludes to this date (Ricketts 1982; see also Noel 1997,
30 38). The summer solstice was a turning point not only for the author but
also for the protagonist of this long novel that was published in English as
The Forbidden Forest. The plot that focuses on the main character Stefan begins
on this date of the year 1936 and ends exactly twelve years later with Stefans
escape from history, when he and his lover Ileana are killed in a car accident.
Between these dates the novel tells the story of a group of Romanian intellectuals trying to keep up the realm of truth and beauty within the chaos of World
War II and its ugly destructive face. The narrative is not without Romanian nationalistic overtones that experienced fresh impetus between the World Wars.
Stefanwriter, philosopher, and painterhas a characteristic gift to perceive
the hidden dimensions of the ultimate truth behind the deceptive superficial
world of history.
The entire novel circulates around the themes of history and time, of imaginative spaces and mysterious synchronicities, and of predestination and fate.
From the outset it is clear what is at stake for Stefan: To escape from Time,
to go out of Time. Look well around you. Signs come to you from all sides.
Trust the signs. Follow them. (Eliade 1978b, 25). This time is plagued by persecution, war, and destruction; but beyond the outer history there is a cosmic
time without limits. And for some people, like Anisiesaint, magician, and emperorit is only the time of the planetary cycles and the phases of the sun and
the moon that is important.
He accepts no time other than cosmic time, and he especially rejects historic time; for example, the time during which parliamentary elections take place, or Hitlers arming of Germany, or the Spanish Civil War. He has decided to take account only of the time in which
cosmic events occur []. Hes content to exhaust the significance of each of these phenomena, living thereby an uninterrupted revelation. [] For him Nature begins to become not
only transparent but also a bearer of values. Its not a case of a regression, lets say, to the
animal-like state of primitive man. Hes discovered in Nature not that absence of the Spirit
that some of us seek, but the key to fundamental metaphysical revelationsthe mystery of
death and resurrection, of the passage from non-being to being (ibid., 69).
Eliade here constructs the same discursive knot as in his analysis of alchemy,
discussed above. He again reassembles nature, religion, spirit, cosmos,
and metaphysics, now combined with politics, historiography, the spiritual evolution of humanity, andin the next quotemyth. In The Forbidden
Forest, Anisie is the protagonists metaphysical teacher, giving him lectures
about the essence of time and of history that will have an apocalyptic end for
164
humanity in the near future. Another war will follow this one, and then another, until nothing of all that has been will remain, not even the ruins! (ibid., 313).
But this, Anisie says, is only part of the truth.
[F]or historic man, for that man who wants to be and declares himself to be exclusively a
creator of history, the prospect of an almost total annihilation of his historic creations is
undoubtedly catastrophic. But there exists another kind of humanity besides the humanity
that creates history. There exists, for instance, the humanity that has inhabited the ahistoric
paradises: the primitive world, if you wish, or the world of prehistoric times. This is the
world that we encounter at the beginning of any cycle, the world which creates myths. It
is a world for whom our human existence represents a specific mode of being in the universe, and as such it poses other problems and pursues a perfection different from that of
modern man, who is obsessed by history (ibid., 313, emphasis original).
At this point it becomes clear that Anisie represents Eliades conviction that humanity has to transform into a new epoch and that such a transformation can
happen only after a return to the mythical illud tempus. But maybe he also felt
like Stefan, who held a somewhat softer position: I too dream of escaping
from time, from history, someday, Stefan had replied. But not at the price of
the catastrophe you forecast [] (ibid., 314).
In The Forbidden Forest, Eliade introduced a concrete way to escape from
historical time into mythical non-time. Even as a child, the clairvoyant Stefan
knew of a secret chamber that initiates called Sambo. This room was above
us, somewhere overhead on the second floor (ibid., 74). When Stefan dared to
open the room he was struck by an experience of enlightenment.
And just then, at that moment I understood what Sambo was. I understood that here on
earth, near at hand and yet invisible, inaccessible to the uninitiated, a privileged space exists, a place like a paradise, one you could never forget in your whole life if you once had
the good fortune to know it. Because in Sambo I felt I was no longer living as I had lived
before. I lived differently in a continuous inexpressible happiness. I dont know the source
of this nameless bliss (ibid., 75).
In this timeless mythical room of sacred cheerfulness Stefan was no longer able
to move his tongue; he did not feel any hunger or thirst, and he lived, purely
and simply, in paradise (ibid.). As an adult Stefan reserved an additional secret
room in his hotel where he could work as a painter. He created mystical pictures,
drawn on the canvas but invisible to others, and it is by means of art that he
again entered that ecstatic mystical state. Painting, I had no past (ibid., 58).
In this secret place, time had a different quality. When I returned home, sometimes very late at night, I seemed to be returning from a journey to a distant
place. I seemed to have come from another city where the customs were different
165
and where I met other kinds of people (ibid.). This mode of time, Stefan added,
felt more real to him than the time at home or at the Ministry.
Clearly, Sambo is a literary adaptation of the topics of ascent of the soul, the
contact with the other world, the motif of the journey, and the function of art
and ecstasy that Eliade engaged in his academic book on shamanism, which
he was working on at the same time. What is more, the primacy of ascent, making the issue of descent to the underworld a secondary one in his understanding
of shamanism, has a clear parallel in his shamanism study. As Daniel Noel puts
it: The escape from history sought by Stefan is an escape upward, reversing the
fall into history (1997, 32, emphasis original). Noel continues: [I]t is only the
elevated spaces of the novels world that offer any hope of a way out of the history that so tormented Stefan, Ileana, Biris, Anisie, and the other charactersas
it tormented their creator and his fellow Romanians in the period between 1936
and 1948 (1997, 34).
The novel culminates dramatically with the death of the lovers Stefan and
Ileana. The car accident was predetermined long before, but their love triumphs
over death. Eliade let the novel end with the sentence: He had known that this
last moment, this moment without end, would suffice (1978b, 596). Hence, the
Orphic dimension of the triad of love, art, and death is a prominent element of
The Forbidden Forest, as it was part and parcel of Eliades interpretation of shamanism.
It is noteworthy that in his academic book on shamanism Eliade called Orpheus a Great Shaman: his healing art, his love for music and animals, his
charms, his power of divination. Even his character of culture hero is not in
contradiction to the best shamanic tradition. After having reviewed a number
of parallels in the ancient worldfrom Hermes Psychopompos to Er the PamphylianEliade argued that
[the] situation of man remains constant. [] The enormous gap that separates a shamans
ecstasy from Platos contemplation, all the difference deepened by history and culture,
changes nothing in this gaining consciousness of ultimate reality; it is through ecstasy
that man fully realizes his situation in the world and his final destiny. We could almost
speak of an archetype of gaining existential consciousness, present both in the ecstasy
of a shaman or a primitive mystic and in the experience of Er the Pamphylian and of all
the other visionaries of the ancient world, who, even here below, learned the fate of
man beyond the grave (1972a, 394).
Eliade 1972a, 391; see also Eliade 1972b, 34, where he addresses the ecstatic experiences of
Orpheus that were shamanic in type.
166
Anisie in The Forbidden Forest could not have summarized Eliades position
more precisely. These sentences by far transgress the limits of historical or scholarly argument. They reflect Eliades existential questioning of the human condition after World War II. The Orphic myth was a blueprint for his presentation of
shamanism as a technique that is most suitable even for modern humankind to
renew its bond with the ultimate reality in illo tempore.
Shamanic and Academic Authorities:

The Routinization of Charisma
As noted, one of the remarkable aspects of shamanism in Europe and North
America is the fact that the most influential actors in shamanic fields of discourse have an academic background. At one point in their careerusually
through personal encounters with the irrational (on which see Drr
1985)they switched from being academic experts to becoming religious experts, often combining both cultures of knowledge in their work and in the legitimization of their authority.
Before I turn to Carlos Castaneda, Joan Halifax, and Michael Harner as my
key examples, it is necessary to clarify the terms that I apply in this analysis.
When it comes to legitimization and contestation of authority, it is most useful
to combine the analytical tools developed by Max Weber and Pierre Bourdieu.
In fact, most theories of authority derive from Max Webers tripartite classification that distinguishes rational-legal, traditional, and charismatic authority (see Renger forthcoming 2014). For our current purposes, the charismatic authority is most important (Riesebrodt 2001). As Weber points out, charismatic
authority is based on the attribution of special qualities to an individual person,
often a belief in the supernatural or intrinsic gifts of the charismatic leader. For
Weber, charismatic authority is resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity,
heroism or exemplary character of a person, and of the normative patterns or
order revealed or ordained by him [sic] (1968, 215). Since charisma is attributed
by followers or by an audience, this kind of authority is not intrinsic to the charismatic leader but is rather the result of social communication. What is more, for
the charismatic leader it is necessary to routinize charismatic power in order to
make the movement sustainable; this Veralltglichung of charisma is typically
achieved through institutionalization and bureaucratization.
When we combine Webers understanding of authority and charisma with
Pierre Bourdieus sociology, we see that charismatic authority goes along with
a high level of symbolic capital. This capital is negotiated and attributed in discursive fields. Bourdieu defines a field as a social arena within which struggles
167
or maneuvers take place over specific resources and the access to them (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97; Wacquant 1989, 39; Bourdieu 1990, 52 65). The
field, hence, is a structured system of social positions, occupied either by individuals or institutions, the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants. Put differently: the field is a space of action or struggle; the struggle is
over forms of capital in the field. What is important is the fact that any individual
or institutiona player in the fieldoccupies a certain position in the various
fields of their society, a position that is determined by the agents access to
forms of capital. Each field, by virtue of its defining content, has a different
logic and an axiomatic structure of necessity and relevance that is both the product and producer of the habitus that is specific and appropriate to the field.
With these analytical tools, which can easily be combined with an analysis
of discourse, let us now have a closer look at the authorities that strove for recognition in shamanic fields of discourse in late twentieth-century Europe and
North America.
Carlos Castaneda
Much has been written about Carlos Castaneda, also known as Carlos Arana (or
Aranha). Questions regarding his biography are as difficult to answer as questions pertaining to the authenticity of his writings. During his study of anthropology at the University of California, Los Angeles, between 1959 and 1973, Castaneda undertook several research trips to Mexico, where he said he met a Yaqui
brucho, that is a sorcerer, who would soon gain worldwide fame under the
name of Don Juan Matus. Don Juanaccording to unverified sources born in
1891 in Sonora, Mexicobecame Castanedas teacher and introduced his apprentice during the following years (intermittently) to the secret wisdom of the Yaqui.
Normally, the knowledge of these secrets was reserved for a nagual, a spiritual
leader of a generation of sorcerers.
In four books, Castaneda made his experiences with Don Juan known to a
wide audience: The Teachings of Don Juan; A Separate Reality; Journey to Ixtlan;
and Tales of Power. The Teachings of Don Juan was published by the University of
California Press. Even more astonishing was that Journey to Ixtlan was accepted
by the University of California, Los Angeles, as a doctoral thesis for anthropology, which soon led to some irritation in the academic world. Nobody except Castanedanot even the members of the PhD committeehad ever seen Don
Juan, and there were no photographs of him. Hence, many people concluded
that Castanedas books were entirely fictitious or even fraudulent. Such suspicion was further fed by certain discrepancies in Castanedas narrative, which in-
168
cluded elements that were difficult to trace in the Yaqui spiritual tradition. One
scholar in particular, Richard de Mille, spent years on his attempt to prove the
fictitious character of the Don Juan books (de Mille 1976 and 1980).
This is not the place to engage in a discussion of the Castaneda controversy.
More than thirty years after this debate, it is more interesting to see how Castanedas presentation of his methodology became more and more linked to relativistic positions in anthropology and to questions of scholarly objectivity in the
writing culture debate. Time and again, Castaneda insisted that there is no substantial difference between his virtual informant Don Juan and the just-as-invisible informants of other ethnographers; or between his problem of translating
sentences that originate from a different interpretation of reality into languages
of the Western world (cf. Silverman 1975). Compare, for instance, Clifford
Geertzs remarks about narrating the past after the fact:
What we can construct, if we keep notes and survive, are hindsight accounts of the connectedness of things that seem to have happened: pieced-together patternings, after the fact. To
state this mere observation about what actually takes place when someone tries to make
sense out of something known about from assorted materials encountered while poking
about in the accidental dramas of the common world is to bring on a train of worrying
questions. What has become of objectivity? What assures us we have things right? Where
has all the science gone? It may just be, however, that all understanding (and indeed, if
distributive, bottom-up models of the brain are right, consciousness as such) trails life in
just this way. Floundering through mere happenings and then concocting accounts of
how they hang together is what knowledge and illusion alike consist in (1995, 2 3).
Shortly before his death in 1998, Castaneda published The Active Side of Infinity
as a final reflection on his life, teachings, and experiences. The title refers to the
realm of the dead to which the Yaqui shamans gain access after having collected
the memorabilia of their life journey. According to Castaneda, this land is called
The Active Side of Infinity. Many statements in this book are reminiscent of
Geertzian anthropological relativism, even though Castaneda did not bother to
respect the methodological difference between imagination and invention (a difference that is essential for Clifford Geertz). The Active Side of Infinity was published by Harper Collins, which presented it on the cover as the ultimate Castaneda: In this book written immediately before his death, anthropologist and
shaman Carlos Castaneda gives us his most autobiographical and intimately revealing work ever, the fruit of a lifetime of experience and perhaps the most moving volume in his oeuvre. It is generally noteworthy that later works of Castaneda, such as the 1984 publication The Fire From Within, have been presented in
some editions as novels (see also Drury 1989, 87).
169
Castanedas work assumes a monumental place in European and North

American shamanic discourse. That his scholarly work is questionable has not
diminished his reputation. It seems as if the habitus of scholarly knowledge
based on university education, fieldwork, and publishing with respected academic pressesis enough to confirm his symbolic capital and his authority in
the field. We may even say that in the perception of his audience the fact that
Castaneda overcame the limitations of scholarly methodology added another dimension to his oeuvre; it is seen as his investiture as a real charismatic leader.
Joan Halifax
For studying the close link between anthropological research, personal experiences, and an attempt to describe shamanic worlds of knowledge in a way that
transgresses cultural borders, the work of Joan Halifax (b. 1942) is particularly
interesting. Halifax started her career with a study of anthropology and a research project under Alan Lomax at New Yorks Columbia University in the
1960s. Subsequently, she spent some time at the Muse de lHomme in Paris,
where she prepared for a research trip to the Dogon in Mali. Her experiences
with the Dogona deep questioning of her life, new insights, illness, and healingchanged her life forever. The world I had come fromNew York, Miami,
North Carolinalooked quite disordered as I sat in the quiet shadow of the cliffs
above Banani, but I eventually realized that most of us have to return to the
world from which we started (Halifax 1994, xxiii).
It is reports like these that significantly add to her symbolic capital and her
authority in the field. Back in the United States, she worked at the University of
Miami School of Medicine and moved on to the Maryland Psychiatric Research
Center to work with Stanislav Grof on his LSD projects. About this phase she
says: My world had shifted radically when I left New York and Paris for Africa.
From cross-cultural studies in archives to fieldwork in Africa and the Dogons
great rite of passage, the Sigui, I switched from mind to body. My world was
again to shift, this time from body to psyche, when I married the psychiatrist Stanislav Grof (ibid., xxiv).
But working on anthropology, shamanism, and transpersonal psychology
was only the prelude for yet another shift in Halifaxs spiritual and academic
journey. This happened when she met the Korean Zen master Dae Soen sa
Mim, who introduced her to Buddhism. Subsequently, she intensified her
study of Buddhism and worked for years with the Vietnamese teacher Thich
Nhat Hanh. All these experiences she tried to combine in the spiritual center
she founded in the late 1970s in Ojai, California.
170
At Ojai, I tried to replicate the experience of intimacy with place that I had known with Ogobara, Don Jos, and other tribal peoples. I wanted to live as close to the Earth as possible. I also
wanted to create a place where people from various cultures and traditions could meet together
and exchange with one another in an environment that was sacred, friendly, and wild. Ojai was
a refuge where shamanism and Buddhism interacted in an earthy way (ibid., xxvii).
The Ojai Foundation is still an important hub for shamanic activities in North Americaa good example of the routinization of Halifaxs charismatic authority.
Halifaxs work on the interface of shamanism, nature-based spirituality, and
Buddhism influenced the development of the shamanic milieus. Her volume on
Shamanic Voices: A Survey of Visionary Narratives (1991 [1979]) was one of the
first scholarly volumes that intended to present the voice of shamans themselves.
The fact that her career combines scholarship and personal spiritual experiences
has enhanced Halifaxs reputation considerably.
Michael Harner
Michael (James) Harner (b. 1929) is arguably among the most prominent authorities in the modern shamanic field. He became involved in the debate about the
authenticity of the works of his friend, Carlos Castaneda. He was convinced that
Castanedas work was 110 per cent valid since it conveys a deep truth, though
his specific details [could] often be justifiably questioned (quoted from de Mille
1980, 22). It is also said that Harner personally offered assistance in helping
Castaneda place his manuscript in the 1960s, after a notable New York publisher
declined it (Dury 1989, 86).
In 1963, Harner earned his PhD in anthropology at the University of California, Berkeley, and worked as a professor at Columbia, Yale, Berkeley, and at the
New School for Social Research in New York. Between 1959 and 1961, he had led
a research project on behalf of the American Museum of Natural History to study
the Conibo Indians of the Peruvian Amazon basin. During thisand laterfieldwork, Harner was introduced to shamanic rituals involving the entheogenic
vine ayahuasca.
The website reports that Over the past year, The Ojai Foundation has played host to Joanna
Macy, Malidoma Som, Starhawk, Hector Aristizabal, Paul Cummins, the annual Gathering of
Council Leaders, Gigi Coyle and the Beyond Boundaries pilgrimage and 80 other programs for
individuals, schools, nonprofits, social service agencies, corporations and the community
(www.ojaifoundation.org/About-Us, accessed on 8 May 2011).
171
Since his first ritual use of ayahuasca, Harner already had extraordinary visionary experiences that both confused and fascinated him; these experiences
included visions of the Book of Revelation (see Harner 1980, 2 7). He was
eager to learn more about the world that he had entered, and so he asked
the most supernaturally knowledgeable of the Indians, a blind shaman who
had made many excursions in the spirit world with the aid of the ayahuasca
drink (ibid., 7). When he told this blind shaman of the dragon-like creatures
he had encounteredanimals similar to great bats who said that they were
the true masters of the worldthe response was astonishing:
He stared up toward me with his sightless eyes, and said with a grin, Oh, theyre always
saying that. But they are only the Masters of Outer Darkness. He waved his hand casually
toward the sky. I felt a chill along the lower part of my spine, for I had not yet told him that
I had seen them, in my trance, coming from outer space. I was stunned. What I had experienced was already familiar to this barefoot, blind shaman. Known to him from his own
explorations of the same hidden world into which I had ventured. From that moment on
I decided to learn everything I could about shamanism. And there was something more
that encouraged me in my new quest. After I recounted my entire experience, he told me
that he did not know of anyone who had encountered and learned so much on their
first ayahuasca journey. You can surely be a master shaman, he said (ibid., 7 8).
These passages are indicative of the rhetoric of Harners books. With such a narrative, Harner not only proves that he was an anthropologist who really was
therecontrary to Castaneda, who was not able to provide evidence for his encounter with real shamansthe author is also introduced as an authority for
various shamanic traditions of the Americas, which he as an initiateeven as
a potential master shamanknows from within. This knowledge he can
bring to a Western audience, thus serving as a bridge between native tradition
and non-native modernity. With respect to authorization and legitimization of
knowledge, this initiation in two cultures is highly important.
After extensive research both in the field and through literature, Harner elaborated what he felt to be the cross-cultural common denominators of shamanism. These he referred to as core shamanism, which he describes as a spiritual
technique instead of a religious concept. Employing rhythmic instruments
mostly a large frame drum or rattlea slightly altered state of consciousness
is induced (not necessarily a trance), which allows the practitioner to focus
his or her attention on non-ordinary realities. In this state the shamanic practitioner journeys into the lower or upper worlds in order to meet spiritual entities
See Geertz 1988, 1 24 (chapter 1 entitled Being There: Anthropology and the Scene of
Writing).
172
such as power animals and spirit helpers. Submitting as an apprentice to the spirits, the shaman can then ask for help or advice in order to heal her-/himself,
other people, animals, plants, or places. The relationship between shaman
and spirits is further strengthened by ritual activities like dancing and singing,
or through power objects that bring immaterial power into visible form.
In 1979 a step toward institutionalization and routinization of core shamanism took place when Harner and others founded the Center for Shamanic Studies. Having resigned his professorship, Harner renamed this non-profit organization in 1987 as the Foundation for Shamanic Studies (FSS). Subsequently, a
global network was established in order to secure the quality of the core shamanism techniques, to facilitate grassroots networking, and to distribute literature, music, and shamanic paraphernalia. The constitutional aims of the FSS are
threefold: preservation of shamanic cultures and wisdom around the world;
study of the original shamanic peoples and their traditions; and teaching shamanic knowledge for the benefit of our planet. This last objective has been especially controversial because the foundation offers scholarships to natives to regain their own shamanic heritage (Urgent Tribal Assistance). Critics regard
this as a sincere act of colonial suppression, whereas natives who work as certified counselors for the Harner methodlike the Lakota Carol Proudfoot Edgarembrace the FSSs techniques as a cross-cultural shamanic tradition.
With branches on most continents, the FSS has established the Harner method as a standard way of teaching shamanic practice. Several other groups have
adopted it as a model. The foundation organizes workshops, and it also encourages participants to gather into drumming-groups, where the skills learned
through the workshops are practiced and shared.
It is time to sum up the discussion so far: I have presented Carlos Castaneda,
Joan Halifax, and Michael Harner as examples of charismatic leadership in the
first generation of shamanic practitioners in North America and Europe. Despite
differences in their work, all three have been instrumental in processes of institutionalization of this spiritual practice; all three have succeeded in having their
charisma routinized in foundations and group networks; and all three based
their authority on claims of knowledge that combine academic teaching and personal initiation in native contexts. In all three cases the charismatic authority
See www.shamanism.org, with information, films, etc. (accessed 1 August 2013).

This is a feature that differs from the success of other shamanic authorities in the field. See,
e. g., Lynn Andrews, who was initiated by the Canadian Cree Agnes Whistling Elk and wrote
many books on her spiritual journey. I have described this narrative situation as Learning from
the Natives, see von Stuckrad 2003c, 145 149; yet another narrative situation is Speaks to the
Authority Contested
173
originates from a mixture of extraordinary biographypresented in an elaborate

plot that convinces their audiencesand the attribution of extraordinary knowledge and skills by their supporters.
In one case at least, we even come across Max Webers idea that followers
attribute supernatural capacities to charismatic leaders. On the opening page
of the Foundation for Shamanic Studies we read: Shamans are often called
seers or people who know in their tribal language because they are involved
in a system of knowledge based on first hand experience. Shamanism is not a
belief system. Its based on personal experiments conducted to heal and to get
information. And then Michael Harner is quoted, presumably talking about
himself: People ask me, How do you know if somebodys a shaman? I say,
Its simple. Do they journey to other worlds? And do they perform miracles?
(Fehler! Hyperlink-Referenz ungltig. [accessed 1 August 2013]).
Authority Contested
The modern shamanic field is no exception to the rule that struggles for recognition and social capital lead to contestation and competition with regard to authority and charisma. Processes of inclusion and exclusion, of normatization and
the challenging thereof, of legitimization and delegitimization, or what Max
Weber called social closure (soziale Schlieung), are easily recognizable
when we take a closer look at the shamanic scene. That the last decades have
seen an increasing competition in the field certainly enhanced such processes.
The Foundation for Shamanic Studies is a good example of the dynamics
that are at stake here. As we have seen, since its inception in 1979 the FSS
has established itself as a focal point for the shamanic scene, and the Harner
method has become a well-known label. The term Shamanic Counseling is
protected by copyrights in the United States, as is the diploma Certified Shamanic Counselor. The FSSs distinction between a basic course to learn the shamanic techniques and several advanced courses has been taken over by many
shamanic groups in the United States and Europe, which illustrates the process
of normatization that Harner initiated. In discursive terms, what we see here is
the legitimization of knowledge and the attribution of meaning through publications and through dispositives such as the FSS.
West, examples of which are Sun Bear, Harley Swift Deer, or Hyemeyohsts Storm; see von
Stuckrad 2003c, 149 152. On Lynn Andrews see also Drury 1989, 87 92.
174
At the same time, leading figures in the field contest Harners authority, as
can be gathered from the interviews that Loren Cruden conducted in preparation
for her book Coyotes Council Fire. Many respondents could not really relate to
Crudens question, Do you think that core shamanism can replace or be a useful adjunct to cultural shamanism? Grey Wolf, for instance, replied: I am not
sure what is meant by core shamanism. For that matter, I am not sure what
shamanism is. I think of it as being in contact with the Oneness of All (Cruden
1995, 32). And Brooke Medicine Eagle responded: By core shamanism I assume
you mean a generic shamanism, such has been practiced throughout the world
and is viable and useful in all cultures today (ibid., 50; finally, she answered in
the affirmative). Only Sandra Ingerman, a leading representative of the FSS,
frankly and self-consciously remarked that [t]here is no cultural shamanism.
Core shamanism is the only game in town (ibid., 60).
Harners authority has also been contested by some of his followers. With the
growth of Harners workshops, fierce debates came up concerning the commercial aspect of his work. Critics from outside charge Harner with having appropriated native traditions for personal profit, while participants frequently express
their disappointment about the workshops sterile or impersonal atmosphere.
One reason for this may be that Harner conceptualizes shamanism as a mere
technique; others (particularly Harners former colleague Jonathan Horwitz
from the Scandinavian Center for Shamanic Studies in Copenhagen) stress the
animistic aspect and talk of shamanism as sacred work. All aspects of this debate can be followed in the journal Spirit Talk. In the rubric Workshop Reviews, authors repeatedly criticize Michael Harners workshops, despite their
appreciation of his overall efforts for the revival of shamanism. A participant
in a course in London wrote:
I went to this workshop excited to meet the man who both began the shamanic renaissance
and who was my teachers teacher. I left feeling that I never met the man. I was disappointed by the impersonal nature of this workshop, which for many may have been a first experience of shamanism. The site and food were super and Michael Harner is undoubtedly an
excellent teacher. But somehow I felt like a customer of a big business rather than someone
learning a spiritual practice. Im glad I went, but wouldnt repeat the experience (Spirit Talk
3 [Spring/Summer 1997], 14 [page number after print-out of document www.users.dircon.co.uk/~snail/ST/ST3.htm; accessed on 17 June 2002]).
The mixture of great respect for the legendary founder of the shamanic revival
movement and his missing presence in an impersonal workshop context is typical of these course reports. Karen Kelly, editor of Spirit Talk and herself experienced in a number of spiritual workshops, presented a similar picture:
Authority Contested
175
Michael Harner is the man who is largely responsible for the re-birth of shamanism in the
West. In summer 1997 he taught a Foundation for Shamanic Studies basic course to some
seventy people in London. Michael is a larger than life figurehe has a[n] Indiana Jones
feeling to himand the depth of his experience of shamanism clearly shows. His anecdotes
drawn from both his own practise and his anthropological field study were both funny and
effective and his utter [sic] certainty was re-assuring. However it was also clear that Michael
had taught he [sic] course many, many times and occasionally he seemed almost blas in
the way he held the circle. This particularly struck me when he was rattling the circle togethersomething I had previously experienced as a deeply sacred moment. With seventy
people present, there was also almost no personal contact between the [sic] Michael and
the course participantssomething I really missed. However almost everyone seemed to
be having a good time and there were some really miraculous journeys happening. For
me though I felt something of the sacredness of this practise was missing. Its clear for
Harner that shamanism is a useful and interesting series of techniques, it is not clear to
me whether it is more than that to him.
In addition to a critique of the increased commercialization of Harners workshops, parts of his doctrines have been submitted to critical reflection as
well. One example is the debate about the status of the Middle World, i. e., the
normal world we are living in. While Harner and the FSS used to argue that shamanic journeys into the Middle Worldfor instance, by walking through a wood
in a shamanic state of consciousness, or by communicating with rivers, plants, or
stonescan enrich shamanic practice, representatives of the FSS later warned
against such journeys. The reason they gave was that the entities populating
these spaces were less wise and compassionate.
Such reasoning aroused much irritation among other practitioners. Annette
Hst, who was asked about this many times during her own workshops, felt the
need to clearly distance herself from Harner and the FSS. After acknowledging
that I consider Michael Harner my first ordinary reality, Middle World teacher
in shamanism, and I will always be grateful for what I received from him
(Hst 2000, 19), Hst expressed her concern that Michael Harners personal opinion can become a firm dogma that subsequently prevents people from having
Spirit Talk 8 (Winter/Spring 1999), 17 (page number after print-out of document www.users.dircon.co.uk/~snail/ST/ST8.htm, accessed on 17 June 2002). Kelly reported three other basic
courses she went to, concluding that working with Harner was interesting, if impersonal. For
myself Ive been working with Jonathan [Horwitz] for the last seven years which I guess reflects
my own choice (p. 18). See also Kellys interview with Horwitz, published under the title
Shamanism, Death and Life online at www.shamanism.dk/Article-on-death-and-life.htm
(accessed 22 May 2011).
For a similar critique, this time regarding Lone Wolf, a shaman of Nordic descent, see
Taylor 1997, 193 195; see also Jocks 2000.
176
important experiences. Such a dogma is the same doctrine the Church has
preached to my ancestors for the last thousand years. It taught people to fear
the spirits of Nature, to fear the night, to fear the unploughed land. It preached
that all those nature spirits were actually bad, the devils companions, and best
avoided. Hst concluded: I cant use the foundations Middle World doctrine. It
would stand between me and Life. I prefer to trust my own experience.
Trusting ones own experience is a major doctrinal feature of contemporary
European and North American shamanismperhaps of contemporary paganism
in generalthat renders a simple master-pupil relation difficult or contested.
Even Harner himself argues this way:
[] I practice shamanism myself; not because I understand in OSC [Ordinary State of Consciousness] terms why it works, but simply because it does work. But dont take my word for
it: truly significant shamanic knowledge is experienced, and cannot be obtained from me or
any other shaman. Shamanism is, after all, basically a strategy for personal learning and
acting on that learning. I offer you a portion of that strategy and welcome you to the ancient shamanic adventure.
Another aspect of contemporary shamanism that makes a simple relation between master and pupil complicated is the fact that, according to shamanic doctrine, people should only trust their power animals and spirit helpersentities
they encounter in a shamanic state of consciousness and who are described
as real powers rather than projections of the psyche. The Middle World teachers
only provide the intellectual and technical means for shamanic practitioners to
journey into the other world and become the spirits apprentice (Horwitz 1999).
With reference to our initial question, what can we conclude from these dynamics of legitimization and contestation of authority? First of all, the shamanic
field of discourse that I have described in this chapter is dominated by doctrinal
assumptions of individual self-realization and non-hierarchical social structures
that are also prevalent in contemporary paganism, Wicca, and nature-based spiritualities. Whether such a doctrine represents social reality is of course debatable
Ibid., 20. On Annette Hsts contribution to this discourse see also the articles published on
the website www.shamanism.dk (accessed 1 August 2013).
Space does not allow me to address this topic in detail, but it seems that the focus on
personal experience is the result of a Protestant cultural discourse, which explains why paganism, New Age doctrines, and shamanism are attractive to people raised in cultures dominated by such a mindset.
Harner 1980, xviii. Note that, despite this disclaimer, Harner here implicitly calls himself a
shaman; other authorities in the field tend to be more modest, calling themselves shamanic
practitioners.
Authority Contested
177
(see, for instance, Hammer 2010 for a critical reading of New Age individualism).
But the doctrine makes it more difficult for masters and authorities to establish
themselves as charismatic leaders. In shamanism, charisma is particularly achieved by the symbolic capital of both academic and spiritual knowledge, legitimized in biographical narratives that are read widely among followers and pupils.
We can also conclude that the most successful way of responding to the
many refutations of and challenges to authority in a diverse field such as contemporary shamanism is the institutionalization of charisma and, in Webers
terms, its Veralltglichung. It is because Harners authority had been routinized
that Sandra Ingerman can self-consciously call core shamanism the only
game in town (Cruden 1995, 60; see above). This does not explain the attractiveness of this form of shamanism in toto, but it throws some light on the extraordinary success of institutions such as the Foundation for Shamanic Studies and
the Ojai Foundation. In the end, and despite some peculiarities, the dynamics
that structure and organize the religious scene do not differ much from what
we know from other processes of contemporary group formation.
When it comes to the analysis of shamanism in general, this chapter again
has demonstrated the difficulty in distinguishing between emic and etic, because
the academic and the practitioner form a discourse community in which all actors mutually inform and stimulate one another. What is more, contemporary
shamanism in Europe and North America is a clear example of scientification
of religion because shamanism as a religious practice would be impossible without the meaning that academics have attributed to this religious phenomenon.
It is time to drive my argument home.

The many themes that have been discussed throughout this book have as their
common denominator the question of how we can come to a better understanding of religion in the secular environment of twentieth-century Europe. It can be
argued that at the beginning of the twenty-first century, religion still presents
huge challenges to European identities. Jos Casanova even speaks of Europes
fear of religion (Casanova 2009; see Kippenberg 2008). Since the rise of secularism and the modern forms of empirical natural sciences in the late eighteenth
century, many Europeans have seen themselves as rational, democratic, and tolerant inhabitants of modernity. It was broadly expected that scientific progress would undoubtedly lead to a decline of religion. But this did not happen.
religion has retained its individual and social influence and is still a major
issue in politics and media today; clashes between religious claims and scientific
or atheist counter-claims determine much of the current societal debate.
Theories of secularization, developed during the long 1960s (Brown 2001),
have dominated academic discussions for decades (see the overview in Swatos
and Olson 2000). While from the outset critics have noted the ideological component of this theory (Lbbe 1965; Blumenberg 1974), it remained one of the
most important interpretations of religion and modernity (as a critique of the
ideology of modernity see Latour 1993 and 2010; see also Dressler and Mandair
2011). It is noteworthy that the concept of secularism itself did not emerge in the
eighteenth century; it was introduced later by the freethinker George Holyoake
(1817 1906). The religious and the secular may have been relevant concepts
in themselves already in Enlightenment discourse. However, their rhetorical
charging as secularism, i. e., as an ideology that favors secularization and secular philosophies, is a subsequent development. This fact renders links between
Enlightenment and secularism simplistic and problematic (see Roetz 2013, 9
10, with a critique of Charles Taylors notion of a secular age). The same can be
said about the binary construction of the secular versus the religious. As Lucian Hlscher notes:
Not until the middle of the nineteenth century was [this semantic dichotomy] established as
a semantic pattern, and even then it was limited to a small part of the public discourse of
religion, that is, the discourse of radicals on both sides of the religious spectrum: orthodox
Christians on the one side, socialists and freethinkers on the other. In Germany it was only
after World War One that the dichotomy of religious and secular, i. e. the opportunity for
institutions, people, mentalities to be either religious or secular, became popular with the
wider public (2013, 36).
179
Recently, a consensus has emerged among theorists of secularization that the

variables that define this cultural process must be adjusted, though scholars
draw different conclusions from this observation (see Berger 2012 and the various responses in Pollack 2013). In an attempt to rethink the dynamics of secularization, it has been noted that the formations of the secular are directly linked
to the formations of the religious in processes of religious change (Asad 2003;
see also Beckford and Walliss 2006; Taylor 2007; Modern 2011, 1 47; Calhoun,
Juergensmeyer, and VanAntwerpen 2011). Given the enormous influence of secularization theories, and also of secularism as an ideological program,
it is perhaps surprising how quickly secular, secularism, and secularization have recently come to be seen as highly unstable terms in academic discourse. Whether it is their
etymological and discursive origins, their present definition, or their inseparability from dubious projects of modernity and the West, these categories have been called into question
by an ever-expanding number of books, articles, and conferences (Fallers Sullivan, Yelle,
and Taussig-Rubbo 2011, 1).
Rethinking the relation between the religious and the secular is an important
starting point. Such a critique of dominant secularization theories, however,
has not yet led to alternative models of interpretation with full currency in todays academic debate. We have to conclude that it is still unclear what model
of interpretation would come after secularization.
If we want to move beyond the secularization paradigm, it is useful to start
with the observation that the very idea of secularization is more explanandum
than explanans: the theory of secularization is itself an integral part of the formation of contemporary European identities. As the material studied in this
book makes clear, secular discourses have not brought the end of religion; rather, they have established the religious in a new framework of meaning. The new
faces of religion in contemporary European societies are co-produced by secular
dynamics. Consequently, it is important to problematize and supersede the clearcut distinction between religion and the secular (see also Krech 2013 and Bangstad forthcoming 2014). Framed in an analysis of discursive changes, this approach helps to develop a more suitable theoretical grid for understanding the
dynamics that have shaped the religious in secular environments.
If we change our object of study and look at the entanglements of religious
and secular discourses that have produced new meanings and new realities in
European societies, we will find a way out of the impasse of secularization theories. When it comes to cultural and political changes during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, we now can describe these simply as reconfigurations of the
religious and secular fields of discourse. It is in discursive re-entanglements and
cultural negotiations of meaning that European societies generate the conceptu-
180
al borders between the religious and the non-religious and between religion and
science. Academics have played a significant role in this dynamic, a role that this
book tries to understand.
The discursive organization of knowledge about religion in secular environments is what I call the scientification of religion. Theoretically, one could also
talk of a religionization of science, but the discursive entanglements of religion
and science are historically inseperable from changes in dispositives and the
emergence of science in its new understanding. That is why I prefer to speak
of scientification of religion to describe this process. My analysis has shown
that the institutional establishment of new disciplines in the nineteenth century,
such as anthropology, classics, Indology, Jewish studies, psychology, and the academic study of religion, led to a professionalization of knowledge about religion
that in turn attributed new meanings to religion (as related approaches see Kippenberg 2002; Krech 2002; von Stuckrad 2003c, 279 284). This attribution of
meaning resulted in the emergence of new religious identities and practices,
such as paganism, new forms of shamanism, astrological practices, environmental
activism, or new variants of Jewish mysticism. In a closely related dynamicand
often in direct correspondence with academics from the humanitiesnatural scientists adopted religious and metaphysical claims and integrated these in their
work, resulting in a new discursive knot of religion and scienceoften combined with a reverence for naturethat gained much influence in the twentieth
century.
Thus, the discursive generation of new meanings and practices of religion in
European societies before and after 1900 was closely tied to intellectual debates
and the emergence of new institutionalized ways of organizing knowledge about
religion. The transformation of discourses and dispositives that went along with
these changes had its core in academic culture, but was by no means limited to
these milieus. Indeed, we should abandon the analytical distinction between
academic and non-academic knowledge, between science and pseudo-science, and between professional and amateur when we study the most important
contributions to discourses of religion and science (Alissa Jones Nelson makes a
similar case for the distinction between academic and vernacular as two rhetorically separated forms of knowledge; see Jones Nelson 2012, 1 3). These distinctions are themselves the results of discursive re-entanglements, of borderwork that determines what it means to be modern and European. Abandoning
the distinctions as analytical categories does of course not mean neglecting their
existence; quite the contrary: it means taking their existence and discursive
power seriously, but without subscribing to the power of persuasion that is discursively attributed to them. In other words, we should not place ourselves in-
181
side these dubious unities in order to study their internal configuration or their
secret contradictions (Foucault 2010 [1972], 26).
This argument is linked to a more fundamental observation. Throughout this
book I have argued that binary constructions such as religion and sciencebut
also others such as emic and etic, East and West, and science and pseudoscienceshould be abandoned if we want to understand the dynamic structures
in which these concepts have gained their meaning. Again, this does not mean
that binary concepts are worthless in general terms; it only means that we
should not trust their power of explanation and that we should critically investigate the realities that these binaries create rather than describe.
If we leave behind binary constructions as analytical categories and look at
them in their function of creating identities through the attribution of meaning,
we will have to find a new vocabulary that seems to be more suitable to serve as
an analytical instrument in our interpretation of historical processes. The vocabulary that comes with discursive analyses provides such an instrument. Talking of discourse strands, which can be entangled in manifold ways, enables us to
see how binary constructions emerge in concrete historical settings, how they are
supplemented with other discourse strands, and how they change their meaning
and constellation over time. Similar to what Bruno Latour calls networks (Latour 1993, 3), these discourses do not have a fixed center around which they
are organized; they are a moving target of scholarly analysis, creating new centers in shifting alliances, dispositives, and discursive configurations.
The discursive constellations that I have followed through the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries clearly demonstrate the strong impact of religious discourses on contemporary societies in Europe. Breaking down religion and science into groups of discursive knots that ascribe new meanings to religion and
science is a useful analytical step. Based on the historical sources presented in
this study, we can identify the major discursive knots that have determined the
place of religion in European culture in the last two hundred years.
My analysis has a deconstructive and a constructive dimension. The deconstruction lies in the critical evaluation and contextualization of what is regarded
as historical and academic knowledge. The constructive element is the re-evaluation of discourse strands that together form the cultural place of religion and
science in contemporary Europe. This re-evaluation does not claim to present
the only valid history of religion and science in Europe; not being an adherent
of the representation model of truth, I do not follow an understanding of historiography as a discipline that strives to represent reality. However, as scholars of
religion we are fully accountable for our constructions of historical developments. It is a grossthough very commonmisunderstanding when critics of
discursive approaches argue that the analysis of discourse opens the door to ar-
182
bitrary and ultimately meaningless scholarship. I hope this book has demonstrated that discourse analysis must be based on a screening of representative
historical material and not on an arbitrary selection of a few sources that fit
the preconceived theory, and also that the power of discursive structures clearly
limits the ways in which scholars can construct meaningful narratives that convince their discourse community. This is the opposite of anything goes.
Focusing on discourses rather than the realities they pretend to represent
means being careful with the application of analytical categories such as modernity, Western esotericism, secularization, or any other concept that is used
in academic parlance to make sense of the world around us. These concepts gain
their meaning only in discursive contexts, and it is in these contexts that we can
see their ideological agenda.
Bibliography
Adelung, Johann Christoph. 1785 1789. Geschichte der menschlichen Narrheit, oder
Lebensbeschreibungen berhmter Schwarzknstler, Goldmacher, Teufelsbanner, Zeichenund Liniendeuter, Schwrmer, Wahrsager, und anderer philosophischer Unholden. 7
vols. Leipzig: Weygandsche Buchhandlung.
Albanese, Catherine L. 2007. A Republic of Mind and Spirit: A Cultural History of American
Metaphysical Religion. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Albinus, Lars. 1997. Discourse Analysis within the Study of Religion: Processes of Change in
Ancient Greece. Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 9: 203 232.
Allen, Douglas. 2002. Myth and Religion in Mircea Eliade. New York: Routledge.
Anidjar, Gil. 1997. On the (Under)Cutting Edge: Does Jewish Memory Need Sharpening? In
Jews and Other Differences: The New Jewish Cultural Studies, edited by Jonathan Boyarin
and Daniel Boyarin, 360 396. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.
Anonymous. 2000. Reading the Book of Life; White House Remarks On Decoding of
Genome. The New York Times online, 27 June 2000.
www.nytimes.com/2000/06/27/science/reading-the-book-of-life-white-house-remarks-on-decoding-of-genome.html?pagewanted=all (accessed 23 February 2011).
Arzt, Thomas, Maria Hippius-Grfin Drckheim, and Roland Dollinger, eds. 1992. Unus
mundus: Kosmos und Sympathie. Beitrge zum Gedanken der Einheit von Mensch und
Kosmos. Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang.
Asad, Talal. 1993. Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity
and Islam. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
2003. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
Aschheim, Steven E. 1982. Brothers and Strangers: The East European Jew in German and
German Jewish Consciousness, 1800 1932. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
2001. Scholem, Arendt, Klemperer: Intimate Chronicles in Turbulent Times. Bloomington
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Ashmore, Malcolm. 1989. The Reflexive Thesis: Writing Sociology of Scientific Knowledge.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ashmore, Malcolm, G. Myers, and Jonathan Potter. 2002. Discourse, Rhetoric and Reflexivity:
Seven Days in the Library. In Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, revised ed.,
edited by Sheila Jasanoff et al., 321 342. London: Sage.
Asprem, Egil. 2013. The Problem of Disenchantment: Scientific Naturalism and Esoteric
Discourse, 1900 1939. Doctoral dissertation, University of Amsterdam. A revised
version of the dissertation is forthcoming with Brill (Leiden and Boston).
Atkinson, J.M. 1992. Shamanisms Today. Annual Review of Anthropology 21: 307 330.
Atmanspacher, Harald. 2012. Dual-Aspect Monism a la Pauli and Jung. Journal of
Consciousness Studies 19: 96 121.
Atmanspacher, Harald, Hans Primas, and Eva Wertenschlag-Birkhuser, eds. 1995. Der
Pauli-Jung-Dialog und seine Bedeutung fr die moderne Wissenschaft. Berlin: Springer.
Bchli, Andreas, and Klaus Petrus, eds. 2003. Monism. Frankfurt/M.: Ontos.
Bachofen, Johann Jakob. 1975. Das Mutterrecht: Eine Untersuchung ber die Gynaikokratie
der alten Welt nach ihrer religisen und rechtlichen Natur (1861), eine Auswahl. Ed. by
Hans-Jrgen Heinrichs. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
184
Bibliography
1984. Mutterrecht und Urreligion. Mit einer Einleitung Bachofen-Lektre heute. Ed. by
Hans G. Kippenberg. 6th edition. Stuttgart: A. Krner.
Bangstad, Sindre. Forthcoming 2014. Secular Religion. In Vocabulary for the Study of
Religion, edited by Robert Segal and Kocku von Stuckrad. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
Barker, A. Trevor, ed. 1999 [1926]. The Letters of H.P. Blavatsky to A.P. Sinnett. and other
Miscellaneous Letters Transcribed, Compiled and with Introduction by A.T. Barker.
Quoted from the Theosophical University Press Edition, available online at
http://www.theosociety.org/pasadena/hpb-aps/bl-hp.htm.
2013 [1923]. The Mahatma Letters to A.P. Sinnett. From the Mahatmas M. & K. H.
Transcribed, Compiled, and with an Introduction by A.T. Barker. Quoted from the
Theosophical University Press Edition, available online at
http://www.theosociety.org/pasadena/mahatma/ml-con.htm.
Bateson, Gregory. 1979. Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity. New York: Dutton.
2000. Steps to an Ecology of Mind. New ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. First
edition 1972.
Bateson, Gregory, and Mary Catherine Bateson. 1987. Angels Fear: Towards an Epistemology
of the Sacred. New York: Macmillan.
Bauduin, Tessel M. 2012. The Occultation of Surrealism: A Study of the Relationship
between Bretonian Surrealism and Western Esotericism. Doctoral dissertation,
University of Amsterdam.
Bumler, Alfred. 1965. Das mythische Weltalter: Bachofens romantische Deutung des
Altertums. Munich: C.H. Beck.
Beckford, James A., and John Walliss, eds. 2006. Theorising Religion: Classical and
Contemporary Debates. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Bell, Catherine M. 1992. Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice. New York: Oxford University Press.
Beller, Mandfred, and Joep Leerssen, eds. 2007. Imagology: The Cultural Construction and
Literary Representation of National Characters. Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi.
Biale, David. 1979. Gershom Scholem: Kabbalah and Counter-History. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Bemmann, Martin. 2012. Beschdigte Vegetation und sterbender Wald: Zur Entstehung eines
Umweltproblems in Deutschland 1893 1970. Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Benavides, Gustavo. 2010. Response: Theory, Quasi-Theory and Pseudo-Theory in the Study
of Religion. Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 22: 207 219.
Berger, Peter L. 2012. Further Thoughts on Religion and Modernity. Society 49: 313 316.
Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. 1966. The Social Construction of Reality. Garden
City: Doubleday.
Bhabha, Homi. 1990. The Third Space: Interview with Homi Bhabha. In Identity: Community,
Culture, Difference, edited by Jonathan Rutherford, 207 221. London: Lawrence and
Wishart.
2004. The Location of Culture. With a new preface by the author. London: Routledge.
First published 1994.
Biale, David. 1979. Gershom Scholem: Kabbalah and Counter-History. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Bieder, Ulrich. 1998. Die Unerbittlichkeit der Historizitt: Foucault als Historiker. Cologne,
Weimar, and Vienna: Bhlau.
Bibliography
185
Billwiller, Robert. 1878. Ueber Astrologie: Vortrag, gehalten am 23. Januar 1877, dem 59.
Stiftungstag der naturwissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft in St. Gallen. Basel:
Schweighauserische Verlagsbuchhandlung (Hugo Richter).
Birnbacher, Dieter, ed. 1997. kophilosophie. Stuttgart: Philip Reclam jun.
Blavatsky, Helena Petrovna. 2006 [1877]. Isis Unveiled: A Master-Key to the Mysteries of
Ancient and Modern Science and Theology. 2 vols. Quoted from the digital version
prepared by the Theosophy Trust in Easy-Read format.
2013 [1887 1891]. Studies in Occultism: A Collection of Articles from Lucifer, H. P.
Blavatskys Magazine, between 1887 1891. Quoted from the digital version without
diacritics, prepared by the Theosophical University Press and downloaded from
http://www.theosociety.org/pasadena/hpb-sio/sio-hp.htm.
2013 [1888]. The Secret Doctrine: The Synthesis of Science, Religion, and Philosophy.
London: The Theosophical Publishing Company. 2 vols. Quoted from the digital version
without diacritics, prepared by the Theosophical University Press and downloaded from
http://www.theosociety.org/.
Bloom, Harold. 1987. Scholem: Unhistorical or Jewish Gnosticism. In Gershom Scholem,
edited by Harold Bloom, 207 220. New York: Chelsea House.
Blumenberg, Hans. 1974. Skularisierung und Selbstbehauptung. Erweiterte und
berarbeitete Neuausgabe von Die Legitimitt der Neuzeit, erster und zweiter Teil.
Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
Bohm, David. 1980. Wholeness and the Implicit Order. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Bohm, David, and Basil J. Hiley. 1993. The Undivided Universe: An Ontological Interpretation
of Quantum Theory. London: Routledge.
Bohm, David, and F. David Peat. 1987. Science, Order, and Creativity: A Dramatic New Look at
the Creative Roots of Science and Life. Toronto: Bantam Books.
Bhm, Steffen, Philip Jaeger, and Alexander Krex. 2009. Verdrngte Ursprnge: Skizze einer
langen Liaison zwischen Hypnose, Okkultismus und Psychoanalyse. Jahrbuch fr
Universittsgeschichte 12: 13 40.
Bohley, Johanna. 2008. Klopfzeichen, Experiment, Apparat. Geisterbefragungen im
deutschen Spiritismus der 1850er Jahre. In Pseudowissenschaft: Konzeptionen von
Nichtwissenschaftlichkeit in der Wissenschaftsgeschichte, edited by Dirk Rupnow,
Veronika Lipphardt, Jens Thiel, and Christina Wessely, 100 126. Frankfurt/M.:
Suhrkamp.
Borgeaud, Philippe. 1999. La mythologie du Matriarcat: Latelier de Johann Jakob Bachofen.
Geneva: Droz.
Boll, Franz (in collaboration with Carl Bezold). 1918. Sternglaube und Sterndeutung: Die
Geschichte und das Wesen der Astrologie. Leipzig: Teubner.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. The Logic of Practice. Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge and
Oxford: Polity Press.
Bourdieu, Pierre, and L. Wacquant. 1992. An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Bowler, Peter J. 2009. Science for All: The Popularization of Science in Early
Twentieth-Century Britain. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
Boyarin, Jonathan, and Daniel Boyarin, eds. 1997. Jews and Other Differences: The New
Jewish Cultural Studies. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.
Brandt, Christina. 2004. Metapher und Experiment: Von der Virusforschung zum genetischen
Code. Gttingen: Wallstein.
186
Bibliography
Braune, Andreas. 2009. Fortschritt als Ideologie: Wilhelm Ostwald und der Monismus.
Leipzig: Leipziger Universittsverlag.
Breger, Claudia, and Tobias Dring, eds. 1998. Figuren der/des Dritten: Erkundungen
kultureller Zwischenrume. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Brenner, Michael. 1996. The Renaissance of Jewish Culture in Weimar Germany. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
1999. Gnosis and History: Polemics of German-Jewish Identity from Graetz to Scholem.
New German Critique 77: 45 60.
Briggs, John P., and F. David Peat. 1984. Looking Glass Universe: The Emerging Science of
Wholeness. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Brock, William H. 1985. From Protyle to Proton: William Prout and the Nature of Matter,
1785 1985. Bristol and Boston: Adam Hilger.
Broecke, Steven vanden. 2003. The Limits of Influence: Pico, Louvain, and the Crisis of
Renaissance Astrology. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
Brown, Callum G. 2001. The Death of Christian Britain. London: Routledge.
Brunotte, Ulrike. 2012. Unveiling Salome 1900Entschleierungen zwischen Sexualitt,
Pathosformel und Oriental Dance. In Verschleierter OrientEntschleierter Okzident:
(Un)Sichtbarkeit in Politik, Recht, Kunst und Kultur seit dem 19. Jahrhundert, edited by
Bettina Dennerlein, Elke Frietsch, and Therese Steffen, 93 116. Paderborn: Fink.
2013. Dmonen des Wissens: Gender, Performativitt und materielle Kultur im Werk Jane
E. Harrisons. Wrzburg: Ergon.
Buber, Martin. 1919. Drei Reden ber das Judentum. Frankfurt/M.: Literarische Anstalt Rtten
& Loening.
1923 [1909]. Ekstatische Konfessionen. Gesammelt von Martin Buber. Berlin:
Schocken. 1st edition Jena: Diederichs 1909.
1923 [1912]. Der Geist des Orients und das Judentum (1912). In Reden ber das
Judentum, 68 99. Frankfurt/M.: Rtten & Loening.
Bublitz, Hannelore. 1999. Foucaults Archologie des kulturellen Unbewuten: Zum
Wissensarchiv und Wissensbegehren moderner Gesellschaften. Frankfurt/M. and New
York: Campus
2003. Diskurs. Bielefeld: Transcript.
Bublitz, Hannelore et al., eds. 1999. Das Wuchern der Diskurse: Perspektiven der
Diskursanalyse Foucaults. Frankfurt/M. and New York: Campus.
Bhrmann, Andrea D., and Werner Schneider. 2008. Vom Diskurs zum Dispositiv. Bielefeld:
Transcript.
Burrow, John W. 1966. Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory. Cambridge
and London: Cambridge University Press.
Burwick, Frederick, and Paul Douglass, eds. 2010. The Crisis in Modernism: Bergson and the
Vitalist Controversy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (first published in 1992).
Busse, Dietrich. 1987. Historische Semantik: Analyse eines Programms. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
Busse, Dietrich, Fritz Hermanns, and Wolfgang Teubert, eds. 1994. Begriffsgeschichte und
Diskursgeschichte: Methodenfragen und Forschungsergebnisse der historischen
Semantik. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Calhoun, Craig, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan VanAntwerpen, eds. 2011. Rethinking
Secularism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Callaway, Ewen. 2010. Immaculate Creation: Birth of the First Synthetic Cell. New Scientist,
20 May 2010.
Bibliography
187
www.newscientist.com/article/dn18942-immaculate-creation-birth-of-the-first-synthetic-cell.html (accessed 23 February 2011).

Campbell, Bruce F. 1980. Ancient Wisdom Revived: A History of the Theosophical Movement.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Capp, Bernard. 1979. English Almanacs 1500 1800: Astrology and the Popular Press. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Capra, Fritjof. 1975. The Tao of Physics: An Exploration of the Parallels between Modern
Physics and Eastern Mysticism. Berkeley: Shambhala.
1982. The Turning Point: Science, Society, and the Rising Culture. London: Wildwood
House.
1997. The Web of Life: A New Synthesis of Mind and Matter. London: Flamingo.
Carrasco, David, and Jane Marie Swanberg, eds. 1985. Waiting for the Dawn: Mircea Eliade in
Perspective. Boulder and London: Westview.
Carrier, Martin. 2008. Historische Epistemologie, oder: der Wandel der wissenschaftlichen
Erkenntnisformen. Preface to Gesetze am Himmel: Die Astronomie der Frhen Neuzeit
als Wegbereiterin moderner Naturwissenschaft by Christian Schtte, 9 22. Zurich:
Chronos.
Carus, Carl Gustav. 1926 [1841]. Zwlf Briefe ber das Erdleben. Nach der Erstausgabe von
1841, edited by Christoph Bernoulli and Hans Kern. Celle: Kampmann.
1861. Natur und Idee oder das Werdende und sein Gesetz: Eine philosophische
Grundlage fr die specielle Naturwissenschaft. Vienna: Braumller. Quoted from the
reprint Hildesheim: Olms 1975.
Casanova, Jos. 2009. Europas Angst vor der Religion. Berlin: Berlin University Press.
Certeau, Michel de. 2010. Heterologies: Discourse on the Other. 8th print (1st edition 1986).
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Chambers, Edmund K. 1903. The Mediaeval Stage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clarke, Bruce. 1996. Dora Marsden and Early Modernism: Gender, Individualism, Science.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
2001. Energy Forms: Allegory and Science in the Era of Classical Thermodynamics. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Classen, Albrecht, ed. 2011. Religion und Gesundheit: Der Heilkundliche Diskurs im
16. Jahrhundert. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.
Clucas, Stephen, ed. 2006. John Dee: Interdisciplinary Studies in Renaissance Thought.
Dordrecht: Springer.
Coleman, Emmette. 1895. The Sources of Madame Blavatskys Writings. In A Modern
Priestess of Isis, edited by Vsevolod Sergyeevich Solovyoff, 353 366. London:
Longmans, Green, and Co. Online available at http://www.blavatskyarchives.com/cole
mansources1895.htm
Commer, Ernst. 1884. System der Philosophie. Zweite Abtheilung. Mnster: Nassesche
Verlagsbuchhandlung.
Cooter, Roger. 2003. Pseudo-Science and Quackery. In The Oxford Companion to the History
of Modern Science, edited by John L. Heilbron, 683 684. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Crabtree, Adam. 1993. From Mesmer to Freud: Magnetic Sleep and the Roots of Psychological
Healing. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Cranston, Sylvia. 1994. HPB: The Extraordinary Life and Influence of Helena Blvatsky, Founder
of the Modern Theosophical Movement. New York: G.P. Putnams Sons.
188
Bibliography
Cruden, Loren. 1995. Coyotes Council Fire: Contemporary Shamans on Race, Gender &
Community. Rochester: Destiny Books.
Curry, Patrick. 1989. Prophecy and Power: Astrology in Early Modern England. Cambridge:
Polity Press.
1992. A Confusion of Prophets: Victorian and Edwardian Astrology. London: Collins &
Brown.
Dacqu, Edgar. 1926. Natur und Seele: ein Beitrag zur magischen Weltlehre. Munich:
Oldenbourg.
1944 [1949]. Aus den Tiefen der Natur. Bdingen: Pfister & Schwab (written in 1944 but
published in 1949).
Dalton, John. 1808/1810. A New System of Chemical Philosophy. 2 parts. Manchester and
London: Bickerstaf. Online available at http://ia700402.us.archive.org/31/items/news
ystemofchemi01daltuoft/newsystemofchemi01daltuoft.pdf
Daser, Eckard. 1980. Ostwalds energetischer Monismus. Doctoral dissertation, University of
Konstanz.
Davidowicz, Klaus Samuel. 1995. Gershom Scholem und Martin Buber: Die Geschichte eines
Miverstndnisses. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag.
Davidsen, Markus Altena. 2012. What is Wrong with Pagan Studies? Method and Theory in
the Study of Religion 24: 183 199.
Davies, Peter. 2010. Myth, Matriarchy and Modernity: Johann Jakob Bachofen in German
Culture, 1860 1945. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter.
Davis, Christian S. 2012. Colonialism, Antisemitism, and Germans of Jewish Descent in
Imperial Germany. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Davison, Neil R. 2010. Jewishness and Masculinity from the Modern to the Postmodern. New
York: Routledge.
Deutsch, David. 1997. The Fabric of Reality. London: Allen Lane.
2012. The Beginning of Infinity: Explanations that Transform the World. London: Penguin
Books.
Dierkes-Thrun, Petra. 2011. Salomes Modernity: Oscar Wilde and the Aesthetics of
Transgression. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Dietze, Gabriele, ed. 2009. Kritik des Okzidentalismus: Transdisziplinre Beitrge zu (Neo)
Orientalismus und Geschlecht. Bielefeld: Transcript.
Dijk, Teun van. 1985. Handbook of Discourse Analysis. London: Academic Press.
Dixon, Joy. 2001. Divine Feminine: Theosophy and Feminism in England. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Dobbs, Betty Jo Teeter. 1992. Alchemical Death and Resurrection: The Significance of
Alchemy in the Age of Newton. In Science, Pseudo-Science, and Utopianism in Early
Modern Thought, edited by Stephen A. McKnight, 55 87. Columbia: University of
Missouri Press.
Domschke, Jan-Peter. 2012. Die Mitwirkung von Naturwissenschaftlern im Deutschen
Monistenbund und in anderen freidenkerisch orientierten Organisationen zwischen 1906
und 1914. In Wilhelm Ostwald: Monismus und Energie, edited by Arnher E. Lenz and
Volker Mueller, 155 187. Neu-Isenburg: Angelika Lenz Verlag.
Drr, Georg. 2007. Muttermythos und Herrschaftsmythos: Zur Dialektik der Aufklrung um die
Jahrhundertwende bei den Kosmikern, Stefan George und in der Frankfurter Schule.
Wrzburg: Knigshausen & Neumann.
Bibliography
189
Dving, C.A. Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: A Comparison of Imposed Group Identities.

Tidsskrift for Islamforskning 2010: 52 76.
Dressler, Markus, and Arvind-Pal S. Mandair, eds. 2011. Secularism and Religion-Making.
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Driesch, Hans. 1922. Geschichte des Vitalismus. 2nd, improved and enlarged version of the
first part of Der Vitalismus als Geschichte und als Lehre (1905). Leipzig: Johann Abrosius
Barth.
Drury, Nevill. 1989. The Elements of Shamanism. Longmead: Element Books.
Duding, St. 2011. Homosexuality, Race, and the Rhetoric of Nationalism. History of the
Present: Journal of Critical History 1: 259 264.
Dudley III, Gilford. 1977. Religion on Trial: Mircea Eliade and His Critics. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press.
Drr, Hans Peter, ed. 1985. Der Wissenschaftler und das Irrationale, new ed., 4 vols.
Frankfurt/M.: DTV.
Edwards, Derek, Malcolm Ashmore, and Jonathan Potter. 1995. Death and Furniture: The
Rhetoric, Politics and Theology of Bottom Line Arguments against Relativism. History of
the Human Sciences 8: 25 49.
Eliade, Mircea. 1965. The Myth of the Eternal Return or, Cosmos and History, trans. from the
French by Willard R. Trask. 2nd printing, with corrections. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
1972a. Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy, trans. from the French by Willard R.
Trask. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1972b. Zalmoxis: The Vanishing God. Comparative Studies in the Religions and Folklore
of Dacia and Eastern Europe. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
1978a. The Forge and the Crucible: The Origins and Structures of Alchemy. 2nd ed.
Translated from the French by Stephen Corrin. Chicago and London: The University of
Chicago Press.
1978b. The Forbidden Forest, trans. from the Romanian by Mac Linscott Ricketts and
Mary Park Stevenson. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Ellenberger, Henry F. 1970. The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of
Dynamic Psychiatry. New York: Basic Books.
Ellwood, Robert S. 1999. The Politics of Myth: A Study of C.G. Jung, Mircea Eliade, and Joseph
Campbell. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Engels, Friedrich. 1970 [1884]. Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des
Staats. Berlin: Dietz.
Engels, Jens Ivo. 2006. Naturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik: Ideenwelt und politische
Verhaltensstile in Naturschutz und Umweltbewegung, 1950 1980. Paderborn and
Munich: Schningh.
Engler, Steven, and Michael Stausberg, eds. 2011. The Routledge Handbook of Research
Methods in the Study of Religion. London: Routledge.
Erdbeer, Robert Matthias. 2010. Die Signatur des Kosmos: Epistemische Poetik und die
Genealogie der Esoterischen Moderne. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.
Elinger, Eva et al., eds. 2010. Die Figur des Dritten: Ein kulturwissenschaftliches Paradigma.
Evans, Arthur J. 1921 1935. The Palace of Minos. 5 vols. London: Macmillan.
Fairclough, Norman. 1992. Discourse and Social Change. Oxford: Polity Press.
2003. Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research. London: Routledge.
190
Bibliography
Fallers Sullivan, Winnifred, Robert A. Yelle, and Mateo Taussig-Rubbo. 2011. Introduction. In
After Secular Law, edited by Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Robert A. Yelle, and Mateo
Taussig-Rubbo, 1 19. Stanford: Stanford Law Books.
Fick, Monika. 1993. Sinnenwelt und Weltseele: Der psychophysische Monismus in der
Literatur der Jahrhundertwende. Tbingen: Niemeyer.
Field, J.V. 1987. Astrology in Keplers Cosmology. In Astrology, Science and Society:
Historical Essays, edited by Patrick Curry, 143 170. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press.
Firla, Ian, ed. 2003. Graves and the Goddess: Essays on Robert Gravess The White Goddess.
Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press.
Fischer-Lichte, Erika. 2002. Grenzgnge und Tauschhandel: Auf dem Weg zu einer
performativen Kultur. In Performanz: zwischen Sprachphilosophie und
Kulturwissenschaften, edited by Uwe Wirth, 277 300. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
Fiske, Shanyn. 2008. Heretical Hellenism: Women Writers, Ancient Greece, and the Victorian
Popular Imagination. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.
Flasche, Rainer. 1982. Religionsmodelle und Erkenntnisprinzipien der Religionswissenschaft
in der Weimarer Zeit. In Religions- und Geistesgeschichte der Weimarer Republik,
edited by Hubert Cancik, 261 276. Dsseldorf: Patmos.
Fleck, Ludwik. 1935. Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache:
Einfhrung in die Lehre vom Denkstil und Denkkollektiv. Basel: Benno Schwabe.
Forgacs, David. 1988. An Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings, 1916 1935. New York:
Schocken Books.
Forstner, Christian. 2008. Ein Auenseiter und Pseudowissenschaftler? David Bohms
Quantenmechanik im Kalten Krieg. In Pseudowissenschaft: Konzeptionen von
Veronika Lipphardt, Jens Thiel, and Christina Wessely, 371 394. Frankfurt/M.:
Suhrkamp.
Foucault, Michel. 1980. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings,
1972 1977. Ed. by Colin Gordon. Brighton: The Harvester Press.
2010 [1972]. The Archaeology of Knowledge. And The Discourse on Language. Translated
from the French by A.M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Vintage Books. First English
ed. 1972.
Fournier, Eric. 2012. La belle Juive: dIvanho la Shoah. Seyssel: Champ Vallon.
Frietsch, Elke. 2012. Die nackte WahrheitDer entschleierte weibliche Krper im deutschen
Rassendiskurs und in der Kunst seit der zweiten Hlfte des 19. Jahrhunderts. In
Verschleierter OrientEntschleierter Okzident: (Un)Sichtbarkeit in Politik, Recht, Kunst
und Kultur seit dem 19. Jahrhundert, edited by Bettina Dennerlein, Elke Frietsch, and
Therese Steffen, 201 224. Paderborn: Fink.
Frietsch, Ute. 2008. Hresie und pseudo-scientia. Zur Problematisierung von Alchemie,
Chymiatrie und Physik in der Frhen Neuzeit. In Pseudowissenschaft: Konzeptionen von
Veronika Lipphardt, Jens Thiel, and Christina Wessely, 51 76. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
Fuller, Robert C. 2001. Spiritual, But Not Religious: Understanding Unchurched America.
Gage, John. 1993. Color and Culture: Practice and Meaning from Antiquity to Abstraction.
Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
Bibliography
191
Gammage, Nick. 1999. The Nature of the Goddess: Ted Hughes and Robert Graves. In New
Perspectives on Robert Graves, edited by Patrick J. Quinn, 149 158. Selinsgrove:
Susquehanna University Press and London: Associated University Presses.
Gasman, Daniel. 1998. Haeckels Monism and the Birth of Fascist Ideology. New York: Lang.
Geertz, Clifford. 1988. Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
1995. After the Fact: Two Countries, Four Decades, One Anthropologist, Cambridge and
London: Harvard University Press.
Geller, Jay. 2007. On Freuds Jewish Body: Mitigating Circumcisions. New York: Fordham
University Press.
2011. The Other Jewish Question: Identifying the Jew and Making Sense of Modernity.
New York: Fordham University Press.
Gerhard, Eduard. 1851. ber das Metroon zu Athen und ber die Gttermutter der
griechischen Mythologie. Gelesen in der Akademie der Wissenschaften am 26. Juli
1849. Abhandlungen der Kniglichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (1849):
459 490.
Gibbons, Brian J. 2001. Spirituality and the Occult: From the Renaissance to the Modern Age.
London: Routledge.
Gieser, Suzanne. 2005. The Innermost Kernel: Depth Psychology and Quantum Physics.
Wolfgang Paulis Dialogue with C. G. Jung. Berlin: Springer.
Gilman, Sander L. 1979. The Rediscovery of the Eastern Jews: German Jews in the East,
1890 1918. In Jews and Germans from 1860 to 1933: A Problematic Symbiosis, edited
by David Bronsen, 338 365. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.
1993. Salome, Syphilis, Sarah Bernhardt and the Modern Jewess. The German
Quarterly 66: 195 211.
Gimbutas, Marija. 2001 [1989]. The Language of the Goddess: Unearthing the Hidden
Symbols of Western Civilization. London: Thames & Hudson. First ed. 1989.
Ginzburg, Carlo. 2012. Threads and Traces: True, False, Fictive. Berkeley etc.: University of
California Press.
Gladigow, Burkhard. 1986. Wir glubigen Physiker. Zur Religionsgeschichte physikalischer
Entwicklungen im 20. Jahrhundert. In Der Untergang von Religionen, edited by Hartmut
Zinser, 158 168. Berlin: Reimer.
1989. Pantheismus als Religion von Naturwissenschaftlern.In Die Religion von
Oberschichten, edited by Peter Antes and Donate Pahnke, 219 239. Marburg: Diagonal.
Godwin, Joscelyn. 1994. The Theosophical Enlightenment. Albany: State University of New
York Press.
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. 1811 1814. Aus meinem Leben: Dichtung und Wahrheit. 3
vols. Stuttgart and Tbingen: Cotta. Online available at www.zeno.org. English
translation: The Auto-Biography of Goethe. Truth and Poetry: From My Life, ed. By Parke
Godwin. 2 vols. New York: John Wiley 1849.
1960 ff. Berliner Ausgabe. Kunsttheoretische Schriften und bersetzungen [vol. 17 22],
vol. 20. Berlin: Aufbau Verlag.
Gooch, Todd A. 2000. The Numinous and Modernity: An Interpretation of Rudolf Ottos
Philosophy of Religion. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter.
Goodrick-Clarke, Nicholas. 2008. The Western Esoteric Traditions. Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press.
192
Bibliography
Goodrick-Clarke, Nicholas, ed. and introduction. 2004. Helena Blavatsky. Berkeley: North
Atlantic.
Gossman, Lionel. 2000. Basel in the Age of Burckhardt: A Study in Unseasonable Ideas.
Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
Grafton, Anthony. 1999. Cardanos Cosmos: The Worlds and Works of a Renaissance
Astrologer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Graves, Robert. 1981 [1948]. The White Goddess: A Historical Grammar of Poetic Myth.
Amended and enlarged edition. 14th reprint of the 1966 edition. First edition New York:
Faber and Faber 1948. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Graves, Robert, and Raphael Patai. 1983. Hebrew Myths: The Book of Genesis. New York:
Greenwich House.
Greene, Brian. 2003. The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the Quest
for the Ultimate Theory. New York: Norton.
Gregorio, Mario A. di 2005. From Here to Eternity: Ernst Haeckel and Scientific Faith.
Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Gundel, Wilhelm. 1922. Sterne und Sternbilder im Glauben des Altertums und der Neuzeit.
Bonn: Schroeder.
Haeckel, Ernst. 1866. Generelle Morphologie der Organismen: allgemeine Grundzge der
organischen Formen-Wissenschaft, mechanisch begrndet durch die von Charles Darwin
reformierte Descendenz-Theorie. Vol. 2: Allgemeine Entwicklungsgeschichte der
Organismen: kritische Grundzge der mechanischen Wissenschaft von den entstehenden
Formen der Organismen, begrndet durch die Descendenz-Theorie. Berlin: Reimer.
1903. Die Weltrthsel: Gemeinverstndliche Studien ber Monistische Philosophie.
Volksausgabe (151.170. Tausend). Stuttgart: Krner. First ed. 1899.
1904. Kunstformen der Natur: Hundert Illustrationstafeln mit beschreibendem Text,
Allgemeine Erluterungen und Systematische bersicht. Leipzig and Vienna:
Bibliographisches Institut. English as Art Forms in Nature. New York: Dover 1974.
1913. Die Natur als Knstlerin. Nebst: Dr. W. Breitenbach: Formenschatz der Schfpung.
Berlin: Vita Deutsches Verlagshaus.
1917. Kristallseelen: Studien ber das anorganische Leben. Leipzig: Krner.
Hagner, Michael. 2008. Bye-bye science, welcome pseudoscience? Reflexionen ber einen
beschdigten Status. In Pseudowissenschaft: Konzeptionen von
Hahn, Marcus, and Erhard Schttpelz, eds. 2009. Trancemedien und Neue Medien um 1900:
Ein anderer Blick auf die Moderne. Bielefeld: Transcript.
Hakfoort, Casper. 1992. Science Deified: Wilhelm Ostwalds Energeticist World-View and the
History of Scientism. Annals of Science 49: 542 544.
Hakl, Hans Thomas. 2001. Der verborgene Geist von Eranos: Unbekannte Begegnungen von
Wissenschaft und Esoterik. Eine alternative Geistesgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts.
Bretten: Scientia Nova.
Halifax, Joan. 1994 [1979]. The Fruitful Darkness: Reconnecting with the Body of the Earth.
San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco.
Halifax, Joan, ed. 1991. Shamanic Voices: A Survey of Visionary Narratives. New York etc.:
Penguin Arkana. 1st ed. 1979.
Bibliography
193
Hamayon, Roberte N. 1998. Ecstasy or the West-Dreamt Siberian Shaman. In Tribal

Epistemologies: Essays in the Philosophy of Anthropology, edited by Helmut Wautischer,
175 187. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Hammer, Olav. 2001. Claiming Knowledge: Strategies of Epistemology from Theosophy to the
New Age. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
2010. I Did It My Way? Individual Choice and Social Conformity in New Age Religion.
In Religions of Modernity: Relocating the Sacred to the Self and the Digital, edited by
Stef Aupers and Dick Houtman, 49 67. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
Hammer, Olav, and Mikael Rothstein, eds. 2013. Handbook of the Theosophical Current.
Leiden and Boston: Brill.
Hanegraaff, Wouter J. 1996. New Age Religion and Western Culture: Esotericism in the Mirror
of Secular Thought. Leiden: Brill.
2005. Occult/Occultism. In Dictionary of Gnosis and Western Esotericism, edited by
Wouter J. Hanegraaff in collaboration with Antoine Faivre, Roelof van den Broek, and
Jean-Pierre Brach, 2 vols., 884 889. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
2008. Altered States of Knowledge: The Attainment of Gnsis in the Hermetica.
International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 2: 128 163.
2012. Esotericism and the Academy: Rejected Knowledge in Western Culture. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
2013. Entheogenic Esotericism. In Contemporary Esotericism, edited by Egil Asprem
and Kennet Granholm, 392 409. London: Acumen.
Harner, Michael. 1980. The Way of the Shaman: A Guide to Power and Healing. San
Francisco: Harper & Row.
Harrington, Anne. 1996. Reenchanted Science: Holism in German Culture from Wilhelm II to
Hitler. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Harrison, Jane E. 1916 1917. The Head of John Baptist. The Classical Review 30 31:
216 219.
1991 [1903]. Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion. 3rd edition. Princeton:
Princeton University Press. First edition Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1903.
Hawking, Stephen W. 1988. A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes.
London: Bantam Press.
Heever, Gerard van den. 2006. Making Mysteries: From the Untergang der Mysterien to
Imperial MysteriesSocial Discourse in Religion and the Study of Religion. Religion
and Theology 12: 262 307.
Henseling, Robert. 1924. Werden und Wesen der Astrologie. Stuttgart: Kosmos, Gesellschaft
der Naturfreunde/Franckhsche Verlagsbuchhandlung.
1939. Umstrittenes Weltbild: Astrologie, Welteislehre, um Erdgestalt und Weltmitte.
Leipzig: Philipp Reclam jun.
Herbert, Nick. 1987. Quantum Reality: Beyond the New Physics. Garden City, NY: Anchor
Books.
Heschel, Susannah. 1999. Revolt of the Colonized: Abraham Geigers Wissenschaft des
Judentums as a Challenge to Christian Hegemony in the Academy. New German Critique
77: 61 85.
Hess, Jonathan. 1998. Sugar Island Jews? Jewish Colonialism and the Rhetoric of Civic
Improvement in Eighteenth-Century Germany. Eighteenth-Century Studies 32: 92 100.
194
Bibliography
Hey, Barbara. 1994. Die Entwicklung des gender-Konzepts vor dem Hintergrund
poststrukturalistischen Denkens. LHomme: Europische Zeitschrift fr feministische
Geschichtswissenschaft 5: 7 27.
Hjelm, Titus. 2011. Discourse Analysis. In The Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in
the Study of Religion, edited by Steven Engler and Michael Stausberg, 134 150.
London: Routledge.
Hodgen, Margaret T. 1936. The Doctrine of Survivals: A Chapter in the History of Scientific
Method in the Study of Man. London: Allenson & Co.
Hofstee, Wim. 1997. Goden en Mensen: De godsdienstwetenschap van Gerardus van der
Leeuw 1890 1950. Kampen: Kok Agora.
Hoheisel, Karl. 1986. Christus und der philosophische Stein: Alchemie als ber- und
nichtchristlicher Heilsweg. In Die Alchemie in der europischen Kultur- und
Wissenschaftsgeschichte, edited by Christoph Meinel, 61 84. Wiesbaden: Otto
Harrassowitz.
Hlscher, Lucian. 2013. The Religious and the Secular: Semantic Reconfigurations of the
Religious Field in Germany from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century. In Religion
and Secularity: Transformations and Transfers of Religious Discourses in Europe and
Asia, edited by Marion Eggert and Lucian Hlscher, 9 33. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
Holz, Klaus. 2010. Der Jude: Dritter der Nationen. In Die Figur des Dritten: Ein
kulturwissenschaftliches Paradigma, edited by Eva Elinger et al., 292 303.
Honneth, Axel, and Martin Saar, eds. 2002. Michel Foucault: Zwischenbilanz einer Rezeption.
Horwitz, Jonathan. 1999. Apprentice to the Spirits: The Shamans Spiritual Path. In Was ist
ein Schamane? Schamanen, Heiler, Medizinleute im Spiegel westlichen Denkens. What is
a Shaman? Shamans, Healers, and Medicine Men from a Western Point of View, edited
by A. Schenk and Ch. Rtsch, 215 221. Berlin: Diederichs.
Hst, Annette. 1997. The Staff and the Song: Using the Old Nordic Seidr in Modern
Shamanism. Sacred Hoop 17 and 18, quoted from separate print-out.
2000. On Middleworld Attitudes. Spirit Talk 12: 18 20 (page numbers following
printout of http://www.shamaniccircles.org/spirittalk/Issue12.html, accessed 17 June
2002).
2001. Whats In a Name? Neo Shamanism, Core Shamanism, Urban Shamanism,
Modern Shamanism or What? Spirit Talk 14: 3 6 (page numbers following printout of
http://www.shamaniccircles.org/spirittalk/newsletter14/issue14.html; accessed 28
August 2002).
Hxtermann, Ekkehard, ed. 2001. Berichte zur Geschichte und Theorie der kologie und
weitere Beitrge zur 9. Jahrestagung der Deutschen Gesellschaft fr Geschichte und
Theorie der Biologie in Neuburg a. d. Donau 2000. Berlin: Verlag fr Wissenschaft und
Bildung.
Hunter, Michael. 1987. Science and Astrology in Seventeenth-Century England: An
Unpublished Polemic by John Flamsteed. In Astrology, Science and Society: Historical
Essays, edited by Patrick Curry, 261 300. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press.
Hurst, Isobel. 2006. Victorian Women Writers and the Classics: The Feminine of Homer. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Huss, Boaz. 2005. Ask No Questions: Gershom Scholem and Contemporary Jewish
Mysticism. Modern Judaism 25: 141 158.
Bibliography
195
2010. The Sufi Society from America: Theosophy and Kabbalah in Poona in the Late
Nineteenth Century. In Kabbalah and Modernity: Interpretations, Transformations,
Adaptations, edited by Boaz Huss, Marco Pasi, and Kocku von Stuckrad, 167 193.
Huss, Boaz, Marco Pasi, and Kocku von Stuckrad, eds. 2010. Kabbalah and Modernity:
Interpretations, Transformations, Adaptations. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
Hutchison, Keith. 1982. What Happened to Occult Qualities in the Scientific Revolution? Isis
73: 233 253.
Hutton, Ronald. 1999. The Triumph of the Moon: A History of Modern Pagan Witchcraft.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2011. Revisionism and Counter-Revisionism in Pagan History. The Pomegranate: The
International Journal of Pagan Studies 13: 225 256.
2013. Druids in Modern British Fiction: The Unacceptable Face of Celticism. In
Mysticism, Myth and Celtic Identity, edited by Marion Gibson, Shelley Trower, and Garry
Tregidga, 23 37. London: Routledge.
Isenberg, Noah. 2005. To Pray Like a Dervish: Orientalist Discourse in Arnold Zweigs The
Face of East European Jewry. In Orientalism and the Jews, edited by Ivan Davidson
Kalmar and Derek J. Penslar, 94 108. Waltham: Brandeis University Press.
Jacobsen, Eric Paul. 2005. From Cosmology to Ecology: The Monist World-View in Germany
from 1770 to 1930. Oxford etc.: Peter Lang.
Jger, Siegfried, and Florentine Maier. 2010. Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of
Foucauldian Critical Discourse Analysis and Dispositive Analysis. In Methods of Critical
Discourse Analysis, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, 34 61. 2nd ed., London:
Sage.
James, George Alfred. 1995. Interpreting Religion: The Phenomenological Approaches of
Pierre Danil Chantepie de la Saussaye, W. Brede Kristensen, and Gerardus van der
Leeuw. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press.
Jenkins, Philip. 2000. Mystics and Messiahs: Cults and New Religions in American History.
Joas, Hans, and Hans G. Kippenberg, eds. 2005. Interdisziplinaritt als Lernproze:
Erfahrungen mit einem handlungstheoretischen Forschungsprogramm. Gttingen:
Wallstein.
Jocks, R. Ch. 2000. Spirituality for Sale: Sacred Knowledge in the Consumer Age. In Native
American Spirituality: A Critical Reader, edited by L. Irwin, 61 77. Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press.
Johnson, K. Paul. 1994. The Masters Revealed: Madame Blavatsky and the Myth of the Great
White Lodge. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Jones Nelson, Alissa. 2012. Power and Responsibility in Biblical Interpretation: Reading the
Book of Job with Edward Said. Sheffield: Equinox.
Jrgensen, Marianne, and Louise Phillips. 2002. Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method.
London: Sage. Original Danish edition 1999.
Jung, Carl Gustav. 1980. Psychologie und Alchemie. Gesammelte Werke vol. 12. 3rd ed. Olten
and Freiburg: Walter.
1981. Briefe. Edited by Aniela Jaff, Zurich, in collaboration with Gerhard Adler, London.
First vol.: 1906 1945. 3rd ed. Olten and Freiburg: Walter.
Jung, Carl Gustav, and Wolfgang Pauli. 1952. Naturerklrung und Psyche. Studien aus dem
C.-G.-Jung-Institute Zrich, vol. 4. Zurich: Rascher.
196
Bibliography
Junginger, Horst, ed. 2008. The Study of Religion under the Impact of Fascism. Leiden and
Boston: Brill.
Kaiser, David. 2011. How the Hippies Saved Physics: Science, Counterculture and the
Quantum Revival. New York: W.W. Norton.
Kalmar, Ivan Davidson, and Derek J. Penslar, eds. 2005. Orientalism and the Jews. Waltham:
Brandeis University Press.
Kay, Lily E. 1999. In the Beginning was the Word? The Genetic Code and the Book of Life.
In The Science Study Reader, edited by Mario Biagioli, 224 233. London: Routledge.
Keitel-Holz, Klaus. 1984. Ernst Haeckel: Forscher, Knstler, Mensch. Eine Biographie.
Frankfurt/M.: Fischer.
Keller, Alex. 1983. The Infancy of Atomic Physics: Hercules in His Cradle. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Keller, Reiner. 2005. Wissenssoziologische Diskursanalyse als interpretative Analytik. In Die
diskursive Konstruktion von Wirklichkeit: Zum Verhltnis von Wissenssoziologie und
Diskursforschung (Erfahrung Wissen Imagination), edited by Reiner Keller, Andreas
Hirseland, Werner Schneider, and Willy Viehver, 49 76. Konstanz: UVK.
2011a. Wissenssoziologische Diskursanalyse: Grundlegung eines
Forschungsprogramms. 3rd ed. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fr Sozialwissenschaften.
2011b. Diskursforschung: Eine Einfhrung fr SozialwissenschaftlerInnen. 4th ed.
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fr Sozialwissenschaften / Springer Fachmedien.
Keller, Reiner, and Inga Truschkat, eds. 2011. Wissenssoziologische Diskursanalyse:
Exemplarische Anwendungen. Vol. 1. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fr Sozialwissenschaften.
2012. Methodologie und Praxis der Wissenssoziologischen Diskursanalyse: Band 1:
Interdisziplinre Perspektiven. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fr Sozialwissenschaften.
Kernyi, Karl. 1945. Bachofen und die Zukunft des Humanismusmit einem Intermezzo ber
Nietzsche und Ariadne. Zurich: Rascher.
Kilcher, Andreas. 2006. Verhllung und Enthllung des Geheimnisses im Okkultismus der
Moderne. Morgen-Glantz 16: 343 383.
King, Bruce. 2008. Robert Graves: A Biography. London: Haus Publishing.
King, Richard. 2011. Imagining Religions in India: Colonialism and the Mapping of South
Asian History and Culture. In Secularism and Religion-Making, edited by Markus
Dressler and Arvind-Pal S. Mandair, 37 61. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kippenberg, Hans G. 1983. Diskursive Religionswissenschaft. Gedanken zu einer
Religionswissenschaft, die weder auf einer allgemein gltigen Definition von Religion
noch auf einer berlegenheit von Wissenschaft basiert. In Neue Anstze in der
Religionswissenschaft, edited by Burkhard Gladigow and Hans G. Kippenberg, 9 28.
Munich: Ksel.
1984. Bachofen-Lektre heute. In Johann Jakob Bachofen, Mutterrecht und Urreligion,
edited by Hans G. Kippenberg, IXXL. 6th edition. Stuttgart: A. Krner.
1992. Pragmatic Meanings as a Particular Source for the History of Religion. In
Interpretation in Religion, edited by Shlomo Biderman and Ben-Ami Scharfstein, 53 67.
Leiden: Brill.
2001. Religious History, Displaced by Modernity. Numen 47: 221 243.
2002. Discovering Religious History in the Modern Age. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
2008. Europe: Arena of Pluralization and Diversification of Religions. Journal of
Religion in Europe 1: 133 155.
Bibliography
197
Klages, Ludwig. 1930. Vom kosmogonischen Eros. 3rd edition. Jena: Diederichs.
1937. Bachofen als Erneuerer des symbolischen Denkens. In Corolla: Ludwig Curtius
zum 60. Geburtstag dargebracht, edited by Heinrich Bulle, 177 179. Stuttgart:
Kohlhammer.
Kleinschrod, Franz. 1910. The Inherent Law of Life: A New Theory of Life and of Disease.
Transl. from the German and ed. by Louise C. Appel. London: Bell.
1920. Das Lebensproblem und das Positivittsproblem in Zeit und Raum und das
Einsteinsche Relativittsprinzip in Raum und Zeit. Eine prinzipielle Untersuchung, zuleich
ein neuer Weg zur Lsung des Lebensproblems. Frankfurter Zeitgeme Broschre 40.
Hamm: Breer & Thiemann.
Kocka, Jrgen, ed. 1987. Interdisziplinaritt: Praxis Herausforderung Ideologie.
Kockerbeck, Christoph. 1986. Ernst Haeckels Kunstformen der Natur und ihr Einflu auf die
deutsche bildende Kunst der Jahrhundertwende: Studie zum Verhltnis von Kunst und
Naturwissenschaften im Wilhelminischen Zeitalter. Frankfurt/M.: Lang.
Kohl, Karl-Heinz. 1981. Entzauberter Blick: Das Bild vom Guten Wilden und die Erfahrung der
Zivilisation. Berlin: Medusa.
1987. Abwehr und Verlangen: Zur Geschichte der Ethnologie. Frankfurt/M. and New York:
Edition Qumran im Campus Verlag.
Kopp, Hermann. 1886. Die Alchemie in lterer und neuerer Zeit: Ein Beitrag zur
Culturgeschichte. Heidelberg: Winter.
Koren, Israel. 2010. The Mystery of the Earth: Mysticism and Hasidism in the Thought of
Martin Buber. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
Koritz, Amy. 1994. Dancing the Orient for England: Maud Allans The Vision of Salome.
Theatre Journal 46: 63 78.
Koschorke, Albrecht. 2010. Ein neues Paradigma der Kulturwissenschaften. In Die Figur des
Dritten: Ein kulturwissenschaftliches Paradigma, edited by Eva Elinger et al., 9 31.
Koselleck, Reinhart. 1973 [1959]. Kritik und Krise: Eine Studie zur Pathogenese der
brgerlichen Welt. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. 1st ed. Freiburg: Alber 1959. Engl. as Critique
and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society. Cambridge: MIT
Press 1988.
2004 [1979]. Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time. 2nd ed. New York:
Columbia University Press. Original German edition 1979.
Krech, Volkhard. 2002. Wissenschaft und Religion: Studien zur Geschichte der
Religionsforschung in Deutschland 1871 bis 1933. Tbingen: Mohr Siebeck.
2013. Secularization, Re-Enchantment, or Something in between? Methodical
Considerations and Empirical Observations Concerning a Controversial Historical Idea.
In Religion and Secularity: Transformations and Transfers of Religious Discourses in
Europe and Asia, edited by Marion Eggert and Lucian Hlscher, 77 108. Leiden and
Boston: Brill.
Kripal, Jeffrey J. 2007. Esalen: America and the Religion of No Religion. Chicago and London:
Chicago University Press.
Krger, Oliver. 2012. Die mediale Religion: Probleme und Perspektiven der
religionswissenschaftlichen und wissenssoziologischen Medienforschung. Bielefeld:
Transcript.
198
Bibliography
Laclau, Ernesto. 1994. Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics? In The Lesser Evil and
the Greater Good: The Theory and Politics of Social Diversity, edited by Andrew Weeks,
167 178. London: Rivers Oram Press.
Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 2003. Metaphors We Live By. 2nd, updated ed. (first
ed. 1980). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Landscheidt, Theodor. 1994. Astrologie: Hoffnung auf eine Wissenschaft? Innsbruck: Resch.
Landwehr, Achim. 2009. Historische Diskursanalyse. 2nd ed. Frankfurt/M. and New York:
Campus.
Lanwerd, Susanne. 1993. Mythos, Mutterrecht und Magie: Zur Geschichte
religionswissenschaftlicher Begriffe. Berlin: Reimer.
Larmour, David H. J., Paul Allen Miller, and Charles Platter, eds. 1998. Rethinking Sexuality:
Foucault and Classical Antiquity. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Latour, Bruno. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
2010. On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods. Durham and London: Duke University
Press.
Laube, Reinhard. 2004. Karl Mannheim und die Krise des Historismus: Historismus als
wissenssoziologischer Perspektivismus. Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Laurikainen, Kalervo Vihtori. 1988. The Philosophical Thought of Wolfgang Pauli. Berlin etc.:
Springer.
Laurikainen, Kalervo Vihtori, and C. Montonen, eds. 1993. The Copenhagen Interpretation
and Wolfgang Pauli (Symposia on the Foundations of Modern Physics 1992, Helsinki,
Finland June August 1992). Singapore etc.: World Scientific.
Lazier, Benjamin. 2002. Writing the Judenzarathustra: Gershom Scholems Response to
Modernity, 1913 1917. New German Critique 85: 33 66.
2008. God Interrupted: Heresy and the European Imagination between the World Wars.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Leeuw, Gerardus van der. 1924. Mystiek. Baarn: Hollandia-Drukkerij.
1955. Wegen en Grenzen: een studie over de verhouding van religie en kunst. 3rd ed.
Amsterdam: Paris.
1959. Sakramentales Denken: Erscheinungsformen und Wesen der auerchristlichen und
christlichen Sakramente. Kassel: Johannes Stauda-Verlag.
Leland, Charles Godfrey. 1899. Aradia: The Gospel of the Witches. London: David Nutt.
Available online at http://archive.org/details/aradiaorgospelw00lelagoog.
2002 [1892]. Etruscan Roman Remains and the Old Religion: Gods, Gobelins, Divination
and Amulets. London: Kegan Paul. Reprint of Etruscan Roman Remains in Popular
Tradition, London: T. Fisher Unwin 1892.
Lennon, Joseph. 2004. Irish Orientalism: A Literary and Intellectual History. New York:
Syracuse University Press.
Lenz, Arnher E. 2012. Wilhelm Ostwald: Die Energiefrage in historischer PerspektiveDas
Thema unserer Zeit. In Wilhelm Ostwald: Monismus und Energie, edited by Arnher E.
Lenz and Volker Mueller, 188 220. Neu-Isenburg: Angelika Lenz Verlag.
Lenz, Arnher E., and Volker Mueller, eds. 2006. Darwin, Haeckel und die Folgen: Monismus in
Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. Neustadt am Rbenberge: Angelika Lenz Verlag.
2012. Wilhelm Ostwald: Monismus und Energie. Neu-Isenburg: Angelika Lenz Verlag.
Levesque, Paul. 1998. Mapping the Other: Lion Feuchtwangers Topographies of the Orient.
The German Quarterly 71: 145 165.
Bibliography
199
Lincoln, Bruce. 1989. Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative Studies of
Myth, Ritual, and Classification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2005 [1996]. Theses on Method. Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 17:
8 10. (First published in Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 8 (1996):
225 227).
Linden, Stanton J. 2007. Introduction: Recent Scholarship in Alchemy and Hermeticism. In
Mystical Metal of Gold: Essays on Alchemy and Renaissance Culture, edited by Stanton
J. Linden, viixviii. New York: AMS Press.
Lindquist, Galina. 1997. Shamanic Performances on the Urban Scene: Neo-Shamanism in
Contemporary Sweden. Stockholm: Gotab.
Lippmann, Edmund O. von. 1919. Entstehung und Ausbreitung der Alchemie. Mit einem
Anhange: Zur lteren Geschichte der Metalle. Ein Beitrag zur Kulturgeschichte. Berlin:
Julius Springer.
Lbbe, Hermann. 1965. Skularisierung: Geschichte eines ideenpolitischen Begriffs. Freiburg
and Munich: Alber.
Lubelsky, Isaac. 2012. Celestial India: Madame Blavatsky and the Birth of Indian Nationalism.
Sheffield and London: Equinox.
Ludewig, Anna-Dorothea. 2008. Schnste Heidin, seste Jdin! Die Schne Jdin in der
europischen Literatur zwischen dem 17. und 19. Jahrhundertein Querschnitt. Medaon
3: 1 15.
Maingueneau, Dominique. 1991. Lanalyse du Discours: Indroduction aux lectures de
larchive. Paris: Hachette.
Masuzawa, Tomoko. 2007. Theory without Method: Situating a Discourse Analysis on
Religion. In Religion and Society: An Agenda for the 21st Century, edited by Gerrie ter
Haar and Yoshio Tsuruoka, 173 204. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
McCann, Gillian. 2012. Vanguard of the New Age: The Toronto Theosophical Society,
1891 1945. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press.
McCutcheon, Russell T. 1997. Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion
and the Politics of Nostalgia. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McKnight, Stephen A., ed. 1992. Science, Pseudo-Science, and Utopianism in Early Modern
Thought. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
McLynn, Frank. 1996. Carl Gustav Jung. New York: St. Martins.
McPherson, Heather. 1999. Sarah Bernhardt: Portrait of the Actress as Spectacle.
Nineteenth-Century Contexts 20: 409 454.
Meade, Marion. 1980. Madame Blavatsky: The Woman behind the Myth. New York: Putnams.
Meier, C.A., ed. 2001. Atom and Archetype: The Pauli/Jung Letters, 1932 1958. Transl. from
the German by David Roscoe. London: Routledge and Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Mendes-Flohr, Paul. 1978. Von der Mystik zum Dialog: Martin Bubers geistige Entwicklung bis
hin zu Ich und Du. Translated from the English by Dafna A. von Kries. Knigstein:
Jdischer Verlag. English as From Mysticism to Dialogue: Martin Bubers Transformation
of German Social Thought. Detroit 1989.
1991. Fin de Sicle Orientalism, the Ostjuden, and the Aesthetics of Jewish
Self-Affirmation. In Divided Passions: Jewish Intellectuals and the Experience of
Modernity, edited by Paul R. Mendes-Flohr, 77 132. Detroit: Wayne State University
Press.
200
Bibliography
Mepschen, P. et al. 2010. Sexual Politics, Orientalism and Multicultural Citizenship in the
Netherlands. Sociology 44: 437 474.
Mertens, Bram. 2007. Dark Images, Secret Hints: Benjamin, Scholem, Molitor and the Jewish
Tradition. Oxford etc.: Peter Lang.
Messer, August. 1920. Natur und Geist: Philosophische Aufstze. Osterwieck: Zickfeldt.
Meuthen, Erich. 1996. Das 15. Jahrhundert. 3rd, updated ed. Munich: Oldenbourg.
Mildenberger, Florian. 2009. Drachen und Dmonen: der Palontologe Edgar Dacqu
(1878 1945) zwischen Wissenschaft und Mythologie. Zeitschrift fr
Geschichtswissenschaft 57: 869 890.
Mille, Richard de. 1976. Castanedas Journeys: The Power and the Allegory. Santa Barbara:
Capra Press.
Mille, Richard de, ed. 1980. The Don Juan Papers: Further Castaneda Controversies. Santa
Barbara: Ross-Erikson.
Miller, Arthur I. 2009. Deciphering the Cosmic Number: The Strange Friendship of Wolfgang
Pauli and Carl Jung. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Co.
Miller, Paul Allen. 1999. Toward a Post-Foucauldian History of Discursive Practice.
Configurations 7: 211 225.
Mills, Sara. 2004. Discourse. 2nd, updated ed. London: Routledge.
Moberg, Markus. 2009. Faster for the Master! Exploring Issues of Religious Expression and
Alternative Christian Identity within the Finnish Christian Metal Music Scene. bo: bo
Akademi University Press (= Doctoral dissertation bo Akademi University). Available
online at https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/59443/MobergMarcus.pdf?se
quence=2 (accessed 3 May 2012).
Modern, John Lardas. 2011. Secularism in Antebellum America. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Moran, Bruce T. 2005. Distilling Knowledge: Alchemy, Chemistry, and the Scientific
Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Morrisson, Mark S.. 2007. Modern Alchemy: Occultism and the Emergence of Atomic Theory.
Moses, Stphane. 1999. Gershom Scholems Reading of Kafka: Literary Criticism and
Kabbalah. New German Critique 77: 149 167.
Mounic, Anne. 2012. Counting the Beats: Robert Graves Poetry of Unrest. Amsterdam and
New York: Rodopi.
Mller-Wille, Staffan, and Hans-Jrg Rheinberger, eds. 2007. Heredity Produced: At the
Crossroads of Biology, Politics, and Culture, 1500 1870. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Murphy, Tim. 2000. Discourse. In Guide to the Study of Religion, edited by Willi Braun and
Russell T. McCutcheon, 396 408. London and New York: Cassell.
Myers, Frederic W.H. 1886. Introduction. In Phantasms of the Living, by Edmund Gurney,
Frederic W.H. Myers, and Frank Podmore, vol. I, livv. London: Trubner & Co.
Myers, Jody. 2007. Kabbalah and the Spiritual Quest: The Kabbalah Centre in America.
Westport: Praeger.
2011. Kabbalah at the Turn of the 21st Century. In Jewish Mysticism and Kabbalah: New
Insights and Scholarship, edited by Frederick E. Greenspahn, 175 190. New York and
London: New York University Press.
Nally, Claire. 2010. Envisioning Ireland: W.B. Yeatss Occult Nationalism. Oxford etc.: Peter
Lang.
Bibliography
201
Naydler, Jeremy. 1996. Goethe on Science: A Selection of Goethes Writings edited and
introduced by Jeremy Naydler. Edinburgh: Floris Books.
Neugebauer-Wlk, Monika, ed. 1999. Aufklrung und Esoterik. Hamburg: Meiner.
2008. Aufklrung und Esoterik: Rezeption, Integration, Konfrontation. Tbingen:
Niemeyer.
Neugebauer-Wlk, Monika, Renko Geffarth, and Markus Meumann, eds. 2012. Aufklrung und
Esoterik: Wege in die Moderne. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.
Newman, William R. 2006. Atoms and Alchemy: Chymistry and the Experimental Origins of
the Scientific Revolution. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
Newman, William R., and Anthony Grafton. 2001. Introduction: The Problematic Status of
Astrology and Alchemy in Premodern Europe. In Secrets of Nature: Astrology and
Alchemy in Early Modern Europe, edited by William R. Newman and Anthony Grafton,
1 37. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Newman, William R., and Lawrence M. Principe. 1998. Alchemy vs. Chemistry: The
Etymological Origin of a Historiographic Mistake. Early Science and Medicine 3: 32 65.
2002. Alchemy Tried in the Fire: Starkey, Boyle, and the Fate of Helmontian Chymistry.
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
Nikander, Pirjo. 2008. Constructionism and Discourse Analysis. In Handbook of
Constructionist Research, edited by James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium, 413 428.
New York: The Guilford Press.
Noel, Daniel C. 1997. The Soul of Shamanism: Western Fantasies, Imaginal Realities. New
York: Continuum.
Noll, Richard. 1994. The Jung Cult: Origins of a Charismatic Movement. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Nthlich, Rosemarie, Olaf Breidback, and Uwe Hofeld. 2005.Was ist Natur? Einige Aspekte
zur Wissenschaftspopularisierung in Deutschland. In Klassische Universitt und
akademische Provinz: Studien zur Universitt Jena von der Mitte des 19. bis in die
dreiiger Jahre des 20. Jahrhunderts, edited by Matthias Steinbach and Stefan Gerber,
239 250. Jena and Quedlinburg: Bussert & Stadeler.
Obuchowski, Peter A. 2005. Emerson and Science: Goethe, Monism, and the Search for Unity.
Great Barrington: Lindisfarne Books.
Oestmann, Gnther. 2002. John Flamsteeds Horoskop fr die Grundsteinlegung der
Sternwarte Greenwich. Sudhoffs Archiv fr Geschichte der Medizin und der
Naturwissenschaft 86: 129 137.
Oexle, Otto Gerhard, ed. 2007. Krise des Historismus, Krise der Wirklichkeit: Wissenschaft,
Kunst und Literatur 1880 1932. Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Oppenheim, Janet. 1985. The Other World: Spiritualism and Psychical Research in England,
1850 1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
ORegan, Cyril. 2001. Gnostic Return in Modernity. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Ostwald, Wilhelm. 1910. Die Forderung des Tages. Leipzig: Adademische Verlagsgesellschaft.
1911. Monistische Sonntagspredigten. Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft.
1920. Das groe Elixier: Die Wissenschaftslehre. Leipzig-Gaschwitz: Drr & Weber.
Otto, Bernd-Christian. 2011. Magie: Rezeptions- und diskursgeschichtliche Analysen von der
Antike bis zur Neuzeit. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.
2013. Discourse Theory Trumps Discourse Theory: Wouter Hanegraaffs Esotericism and
the Academy. Religion 43: 231 240.
Otto, Rudolf. 1923. Aufstze, das Numinose betreffend. Gotha: Klotz.
202
Bibliography
1979 [1926]. West-stliche Mystik: Vergleich und Unterscheidung zur Wesensdeutung.

Gtersloh: Gtersloher Verlagshaus Mohn.
2004 [1917]. Das Heilige: ber das Irrationale in der Idee des Gttlichen und sein
Verhltnis zum Rationalen. Munich: C.H. Beck.
Packham, Catherine. 2012. Eighteenth-Century Vitalism: Bodies, Culture, Politics. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Parfitt, Tudor. 2005. The Use of the Jew in Colonial Discourse. In Orientalism and the Jews,
edited by Ivan Davidson Kalmar and Derek J. Penslar, 51 67. Waltham: Brandeis
University Press.
Parker, Derek. 1975. Familiar to All: William Lilly and Astrology in the Seventeenth Century.
London: J. Cape.
Parker, Ian, ed. 1998. Social Constructionism, Discourse and Realism. London: Sage.
Patai, Raphael. 1990. The Hebrew Goddess. 3rd, enlarged edition. Detroit: Wayne State
University Press. First edition New York: Ktav 1967.
1992. Robert Graves and the Hebrew Myths: A Collaboration. Detroit: Wayne State
University Press.
Pauli, Wolfgang. 1994. Writings on Physics and Philosophy. Ed. by Charles P. Enz and Karl
von Meyenn. Berlin etc.: Springer.
Peat, F. David. 1987. Synchronicity: The Bridge between Matter and Mind. Toronto: Bantam
Books.
Peleg, Yaron. 2005. Orientalism and the Hebrew Imagination. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Perkins, Mary Anne. 2004. Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand
Narrative since 1789. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter.
Phillips, Nelson, and Cynthia Hardy. 2002. Discourse Analysis: Investigating Processes of
Social Construction. Thousand Oaks and London: Sage.
Pike, Sarah M. 2001. Earthly Bodies, Magical Selves: Contemporary Pagans and the Search
for Community. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Placido Titi. 1675. Physiomathematica, sive coelestis philosophia naturalibus hucusq;
desiderates ostensa principijs. Mediolani: Ex Typographia Francisci Vigoni.
Pollack, Detlef, ed. 2013. Peter L. Berger: Nach dem Niedergang der Skularisierungstheorie.
With comments by Detlef Pollack, Thomas Groblting, Thomas Gutmann, Marianne
Heimbach-Steins, Astrid Reuter, and Ulrich Willems; with a reply by Peter L. Berger.
Mnster: Centrum fr Religion und Moderne.
Pollock, Sheldon. 1993. Deep Orientalism? Notes on Sanskrit and Power beyond the Raj.
In: Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia, edited by
Carol A. Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer, 76 133. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press.
Potter, Jonathan. 1996. Representing Reality: Discourse, Rhetoric, and Social Construction.
London: Sage.
Potter, Jonathan, and Alexa Hepburn. 2008. Discursive Constructionism. In Handbook of
Constructionist Research, edited by James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium, 275 293.
New York: The Guilford Press.
Potthast, Thomas. 2001. Gefhrliche Ganzheitsbetrachtung oder geeinte Wissenschaft von
Leben und Umwelt? Epistemisch-moralische Hybride in der deutschen kologie
1925 1955. In Berichte zur Geschichte und Theorie der kologie und weitere Beitrge
zur 9. Jahrestagung der Deutschen Gesellschaft fr Geschichte und Theorie der Biologie
Bibliography
203
in Neuburg a. d. Donau 2000, edited by Ekkehard Hxtermann, 91 113. Berlin: Verlag fr

Wissenschaft und Bildung
Prigogine, Ilya. 1980. From Being to Becoming: Time and Complexity in the Physical Sciences.
San Francisco: Freeman.
1997. (In collaboration with Isabelle Stengers). The End of Certainty: Time, Chaos, and
the New Laws of Nature. New York etc.: The Free Press.
Prigogine, Ilya, and Isabelle Stengers. 1984. Order out of Chaos: Mans New Dialogue with
Nature. New York: Bantam Books.
Principe, Lawrence M. 1998. The Aspiring Adept: Robert Boyle and His Alchemical Quest.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Principe, Lawrence M. and William R. Newman. 2001. Some Problems with the
Historiography of Alchemy. In Secrets of Nature: Astrology and Alchemy in Early Modern
Europe, edited by William R. Newman and Anthony Grafton, 385 431. Cambridge: MIT
Press.
Psilopoulos, Dionysious. 1999. Robert Graves, the Esoteric Tradition, and the New Religion.
In New Perspectives on Robert Graves, edited by Patrick J. Quinn, 159 171. Selinsgrove:
Susquehanna University Press and London: Associated University Presses.
Quinn, Patrick J., ed. 1999. New Perspectives on Robert Graves. Selinsgrove: Susquehanna
University Press and London: Associated University Presses.
Rash, Felicity J. 2012. German Images of the Self and the Other: Nationalist, Colonialist and
Anti-Semitic Discourse 1871 1918. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Raub, Wolfgang. 1964. Rudolf Steiner und Goethe: Literatur und Wissenschaftstheorie im
Werk Steiners. Doctoral dissertation, University of Kiel.
Raulff, Ulrich. 1999. Unsichtbare Augenblicke: Zeitkonzepte in der Geschichte. Gttingen:
Wallstein.
Regardie, Israel. 1937. The Philosophers Stone: A Modern Comparative Approach to Alchemy
from the Psychological and Magical Points of View. Reprint. Kila: Kessinger Publishing,
n.d.
2004 [1938]. The Middle Pillar: The Balance between Mind and Magic. Reprint, edited by
Chic Cicero and Sandra Tabatha Cicero. St. Paul: Llewellyn.
Reill, Peter Hanns. 2005. Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Reisigl, Martin, and Ruth Wodak. 2010. The Discourse-Historical Approach. In Methods of
Critical Discourse Analysis, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, 2nd ed., 87 121.
London: Sage.
Renger, Almut-Barbara. Forthcoming 2014. Authority. In Vocabulary for the Study of
Religion, edited by Robert Segal and Kocku von Stuckrad. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
Renk, Kathleen J. 2012. Magic, Science, and Empire in Postcolonial Literature: The Alchemical
Literary Imagination. New York: Routledge.
Renkema, Jan. 2009. The Texture of Discourse: Towards and Outline of Connectivity Theory.
Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Rennie, Bryan, ed. 2001. Changing Religious Worlds: The Meaning and End of Mircea Eliade.
Albany: State University of New York Press.
ed. 2007. The International Eliade. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Restivo, Sal. 1983. The Social Relations of Physics, Mysticism, and Mathematics: Studies in
Social Structures, Interests, and Ideas. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
204
Bibliography
Rey, Roselyne. 2000. Naissance et dveloppement du vitalisme en France de la deuxime

moiti du 18e sicle la fin du Premier Empire. Oxford: Voltaire Foundation.
Rheinberger, Hans-Jrg. 2006. Epistemologie des Konkreten: Studien zur Geschichte der
modernen Biologie. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. English as An Epistemology of the
Concrete: Twentieth-Century Histories of Life. Durham: Duke University Press 2010.
2008. Historische Epistemologie zur Einfhrung. 2nd ed. Hamburg: Junius.
2011. Infra-Experimentality: From Traces to Data, from Data to Patterning Facts. History
of Science: An Annual Review of Literature, Research and Teaching 49: 337 349.
Rheinberger, Hans-Jrg, Michael Hagner, and Bettina Wahrig-Schmidt, eds. 1997. Rume des
Wissens: Reprsentation, Codierung, Spur. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Ricketts, Mac Linscott. 1982. Mircea Eliade and the Writing of The Forbidden Forest. In
Imagination and Meaning: The Scholarly and Literary Worlds of Mircea Eliade, edited by
Norman J. Girardot and Mac Linscott Ricketts, 104 112. New York: Seabury.
1988. Mircea Eliade: The Romanian Roots. 2 vols. New York: Columbia University Press.
Riesebrodt, Martin. 2001. Charisma. In Max Webers Religionssystematik, edited by Hans
G. Kippenberg and Martin Riesebrodt, 151 166. Tbingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Rder, Brigitte, Juliane Hummel, and Brigitta Kunz. 2001. Gttinnendmmerung: Das
Matriarchat aus archologischer Sicht. Klein Knigsfrde/Krummwisch: Knigsfurt.
Roemer, Nils. 2010. Reading NietzscheThinking about God: Martin Buber, Gershom
Scholem, and Franz Rosenzweig. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 84:
427 441.
Roetz, Heiner. 2013. The Influence of Foreign Knowledge on Eighteenth Century European
Secularism. In Religion and Secularity: Transformations and Transfers of Religious
Discourses in Europe and Asia, edited by Marion Eggert and Lucian Hlscher, 9 33.
Rohde, A. 2005. Der innere Orient: Orientalismus, Antisemitismus und Geschlecht im
Deutschland des 18. bis 20. Jahrhunderts. Die Welt des Islams, New Series, V. 45, I.3
(Facets of Orientalism): 370 411.
Rorty, Richard. 1979. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
1989. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rorty, Richard, ed. 1967. The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Rosen, Edward. 1984. Keplers Attitude toward Astrology and Mysticism. In Occult and
Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance, edited by Brian Vickers, 253 270. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Ross, Sydney. 1962. Scientist: The Story of a Word. Annals of Science 18: 65 85.
Routh, Harald Victor. 1937. Towards the Twentieth Century: Essays in the Spiritual History of
the Nineteenth. London: Cambridge University Press.
Regg, Walter. 2004. Theology and the Arts. In A History of the University in Europe, vol.
III: Universities in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries (1800 1945), edited by
Walter Regg, 393 458. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rupnow, Dirk, Veronika Lipphardt, Jens Thiel, and Christina Wessely. 2008. Einleitung. In
Pseudowissenschaft: Konzeptionen von Nichtwissenschaftlichkeit in der
Wissenschaftsgeschichte, edited by Dirk Rupnow, Veronika Lipphardt, Jens Thiel, and
Christina Wessely, 7 20. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
Bibliography
205
Rsen, Jrn. 1997. Was heit: Sinn der Geschichte? (Mit einem Ausblick auf Vernunft und
Widersinn). In Historische Sinnbildung: Problemstellungen, Zeitkonzepte,
Wahrnehmungshorizonte, Darstellungsstrategien, edited by Klaus E. Mller and Jrn
Rsen, 17 47. Reinbek: Rowohlt.
Said, Edward. 1979. Orientalism. New York: Vintage.
Sapere Aude see Westcott, W. Wynn.
Sarasin, Philipp. 2003. Geschichtswissenschaft und Diskursanalyse. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
Schaefer, Heinrich Wilhelm. 1887. Die Alchemie: Ihr gyptisch-griechischer Ursprung und ihre
weitere historische Entwicklung. Flensburg: Funke.
Schielicke, Reinhard E. 2008. Von Sonnenuhren, Sternwarten und Exoplaneten: Astronomie in
Jena. Jena and Quedlinburg: Dr. Bussert & Stadeler.
Schiffrin, Deborah. 1994. Approaches to Discourse. Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell.
Schiffrin, Deborah, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, eds. 2000. The Handbook of
Discourse Analysis. Oxford: Blackwell.
Schlegel, August Wilhelm. 1994 [1802]. Allgemeine bersicht des gegenwrtigen Zustandes
der deutschen Literatur. In ber Literatur, Kunst und Geist des Zeitalters: Eine Auswahl
aus den kritischen Schriften, 3 94, edited by Franz Finke. Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam Jun.
Schlesier, Renate. 1994. Kulte, Mythen und Gelehrte: Anthropologie der Antike seit 1800.
Frankfurt/M.: Fischer.
Schmieder, Karl Christoph. 1832. Geschichte der Alchemie. Halle: Verlag der Buchhandlung
des Waisenhauses.
Schmidt-Biggemann, Wilhelm. 1996. New Structures of Knowledge. In A History of the
University in Europe, vol. II: Universities in Early Modern Europe (1500 1800), edited by
Hilde de Ridder-Symoens, 489 530. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Scholem, Gershom. 1954. Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism. 3rd, revised edition. New York:
Schocken Books.
1995. Tagebcher, nebst Aufstzen und Entwrfen bis 1923. Vol. 1, edited by Karlfried
Grnder and Friedrich Niewhner, in collaboration with Herbert Kopp-Oberstebrink.
Frankfurt/M.: Jdischer Verlag.
2007. Lamentations of Youth: The Diaries of Gershom Scholem 1913 1919. Cambridge
and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Schrdinger, Erwin. 1944. What is Life? The Physical Aspect of the Living Cell. Based on
Lectures Delivered under the Auspices of the Institute at Trinity College, Dublin, in
February 1943. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schurig, Volker, and Rita Nothacker. 2001. Von der Oeconomia naturae zur Oecologie:
historische Begrndungsversuche einer biologischen Umweltlehre vor 1866. In Berichte
zur Geschichte und Theorie der kologie und weitere Beitrge zur 9. Jahrestagung der
Deutschen Gesellschaft fr Geschichte und Theorie der Biologie in Neuburg a. d. Donau
2000, edited by Ekkehard Hxtermann, 221 235. Berlin: Verlag fr Wissenschaft und
Bildung.
Schtte, Christian. 2008. Gesetze am Himmel: Die Astronomie der Frhen Neuzeit als
Wegbereiterin moderner Naturwissenschaft. Mit einem Vorwort von Martin Carrier.
Zurich: Chronos.
Schtz, Alfred, and Thomas Luckmann. 1979 1984. Strukturen der Lebenswelt. 2 vols.
Schwickert, Friedrich, and Adolf Wei. 1925. Bausteine der Astrologie. 2 vols. Leipzig etc.:
Barth.
206
Bibliography
Scott, Joan W. 1988. Gender and the Politics of History. New York: Columbia University Press.
2007. Politics of the Veil. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Secret, Franois. 1988. Du De Occulta Philosophia loccultisme du XIXme sicle. Charis:
Archives de lUnicorne 1: 5 30 (orig. 1973).
Sedgwick, Mark. 2004. Against the Modern World: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual
History of the Twentieth Century. New York: Oxford University Press.
2008. European Neo-Sufi Movements in the Interwar Period. In Islam in Inter-War
Europe, edited by Nathalie Clayer and Eric Germain, 183 215. London and New York:
Hurst.
Seed, John, Joanna Macy, Pat Fleming, and Arne Naess, eds. 1988. Thinking Like a Mountain:
Towards a Council of All Beings. Philadelphia: New Society.
Selva, Henri. 1897. La thorie des dterminations astrologiques de Morin de Villefranche.
Paris: Bodin.
Seymour, Miranda. 1995. Robert Graves: Life on the Edge. New York: Henry Holt and
Company.
Sheldrake, Rupert. 1981. A New Science of Life: The Hypothesis of Formative Causation. Los
Angeles: Tarcher.
1988. The Presence of the Past: Morphic Resonance and the Habits of Nature. New York:
Random House.
1990. The Rebirth of Nature: The Greening of Science and God. London: Century.
Shumaker, Wayne. 1972. The Occult Sciences in the Renaissance: A Study in Intellectual
Patterns. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Siebert, Harald. 2006. Die groe kosmologische Kontroverse: Rekonstruktionsversuche
anhand des Itinerarium exstaticum von Athanasius Kircher SJ (1602 1680). Stuttgart:
Franz Steiner.
Siikala, Anna-Leena, and Mihly Hoppl. 1992. Studies on Shamanism. 2nd ed. Budapest:
Akaprint.
Silverman, David. 1975. Reading Castaneda: A Prologue to the Social Sciences. London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Smith, Jonathan Z. 1982. Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown. Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press.
Sparks, J. Gary. 2007. At the Heart of Matter: Synchronicity and Jungs Spiritual Testament.
Toronto: Inner City Books.
Stheli, Urs. 1995. Gesellschaftstheorie und die Unmglichkeit ihres Gegenstandes:
Diskurstheoretische Perspektiven. Schweizerische Zeitschrift fr Soziologie 21:
361 390.
2000. Poststrukturalistische Soziologien. Bielefeld: Transcript.
Staubermann, Klaus. 2007. Astronomers at Work: A Study of the Replicability of 19th Century
Astronomical Practice. Acta Historica Astronomiae Vol. 32. Frankfurt/M.:
Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Harri Deutsch.
Stauffer, Robert C. 1957. Haeckel, Darwin, and Ecology. The Quarterly Review of Biology 32:
138 144.
Steinbach, Matthias, and Stefan Gerber, eds. 2005. Klassische Universitt und
akademische Provinz: Studien zur Universitt Jena von der Mitte des 19. bis in die
dreiiger Jahre des 20. Jahrhunderts. Jena and Quedlinburg: Bussert & Stadeler.
Steiner, Benjamin. 2008. Die Ordnung der Geschichte: Historische Tabellenwerke in der
Frhen Neuzeit. Cologne: Bhlau.
Bibliography
207
Steiner, Rudolf. 1986 [1904 1908]. Aus der Akasha-Chronik. Rudolf Steiner Gesamtausgabe
vol. 11, published by Rudolf Steiner Verlag (Dornach). Quoted from the online edition,
available through the Rudolf Steiner Archive at
http://wn.rsarchive.org/Books/GA011/German/GA011_index.html.
Stuckrad, Kocku von. 2003a. Discursive Study of Religion: From States of the Mind to
Communication and Action. Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 15: 255 271.
2003b. Relative, Contingent, Determined: The Category History and Its Methodological
Dilemma. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 71: 905 912.
2003c. Schamanismus und Esoterik: Kultur- und wissenschaftsgeschichtliche
Betrachtungen. Leuven: Peters.
2005a. The Function of Horoscopes in Biographical Narrative: Cardano and After. In
Horoscopes and Public Spheres: Essays on the History of Astrology, ed. by Gnther
Oestmann, H. Darrel Rutkin, and Kocku von Stuckrad, 225 240. Berlin and New York:
De Gruyter.
2005b. Western Esotericism: A Brief History of Secret Knowledge. Translated and with a
Foreword by Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke. London and Oakville: Equinox.
2007. Geschichte der Astrologie: Von den Anfngen bis zur Gegenwart. Munich: C.H.
Beck.
2010a. Locations of Knowledge in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Esoteric Discourse
and Western Identities. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
2010b. Reflections on the Limits of Reflection: An Invitation to Discursive Study of
Religion. Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 22: 156 169.
2010c. Utopian Landscapes and Ecstatic Journeys: Friedrich Nietzsche, Hermann Hesse,
and Mircea Eliade on the Terror of Modernity. Numen: International Review for the
History of Religions 57: 78 102.
2012. Refutation and Desire: European Perceptions of Shamanism in the Late
Eighteenth Century. Journal of Religion in Europe 5: 100 121.
Surette, Leon. 1993. The Birth of Modernism: Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot, W.B. Yeats and the
Occult. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press.
Surya, G.W. (pseudonym of Demeter Georgievitz Weitzer). 1923. Die Kraft der Gedanken, des
Wunsches und Gebetes. 2nd, improved and enlarged version. Freiburg etc.: Peter
Hofmann.
1930. Moderne Rosenkreuzer, oder Die Renaissance der Geheimwissenschaften: Ein
okkult-wissenschaftlicher Roman. 8th, enlarged edition. Volksausgabe. Pfullingen: Baum.
Swatos, Jr., William H., and Daniel V. A. Olson, eds. 2000. The Secularization Debate.
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Szab, Lszl E. 2008. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument and the Bell Inequalities.
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Online available at http://www.iep.utm.edu/epr/
(accessed 6 February 2013).
Tagliagambe, Silvano, and Angelo Malinconico. 2011. Pauli e Jung: un confronto su materia e
psiche. Milan: R. Cortina.
Taira, Teemu. 2010. Religion as a Discursive Technique: The Politics of Classifying Wicca.
Journal of Contemporary Religion 25: 379 394.
Taussig, Michael. 1991. Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man. A Study in Terror and
Healing. 2nd edition. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
Taylor, Bron. 1997. Earthen Spirituality or Cultural Genocide?: Radical Environmentalisms
Appropriation of Native American Spirituality. Religion 27: 183 215.
208
Bibliography
2010. Dark Green Religion: Nature Spirituality and the Planetary Future. Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Taylor, Charles. 2007. A Secular Age. Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press.
Thomas, Keith. 1971. Religion and the Decline of Magic. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.
Tilton, Herward. 2013. Review Wouter Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy: Rejected
Knowledge in Western Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Journal of
Religion in Europe 6: 491 493.
Torfing, Jacob. 1999. New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and iek. Oxford: Blackwell.
Traub, Hartmut. 2011. Philosophie und Anthroposophie: Die philosophische Weltanschauung
Rudolf SteinersGrundlegung und Kritik. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer.
Treitel, Corinna. 2004. A Science for the Soul: Occultism and the Genesis of the German
Modern. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Trepp, Anne-Charlott, and Hartmut Lehmann, eds. 2001. Antike Weisheit und kulturelle Praxis:
Hermetismus in der Frhen Neuzeit. Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Turner, Frank Miller. 1974. Between Science and Religion: The Reaction to Scientific
Naturalism in Late Victorian England. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Uhlenhoff, Rahel, ed. 2011. Anthroposophie in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Berlin: BWV
Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag.
Urban, Martina. 2008. Aesthetics of Renewal: Martin Bubers Early Representation of
Hasidism as Kulturkritik. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Vann, Richard T. 1998. The Reception of Hayden White. History and Theory 37: 143 161.
Vassnyi, Mikls. 2011. Anima Mundi: The Rise of the World Soul Theory in Modern German
Philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer.
Vickers, Brian, 1984. Introduction. In Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance,
edited by Brian Vickers, 1 55. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1988. On the Function of Analogy in the Occult. In Hermeticism in the Renaissance,
edited by Allen G. Debus and Ingrid Merkels, 265 292. Washington: Folger Books.
Vickery, John B. 1972. Robert Graves and the White Goddess. Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press.
Vitebsky, Piers. 1995. From Cosmology to Environmentalism: Shamanism as Local Knowledge
in a Global Setting. In Counterworks: Managing the Diversity of Knowledge, edited by
Richard Fardon, 182 203. London and New York: Routledge.
Waardenburg, Jacques. 1978. Reflections on the Study of Religion: Including an Essay on the
Work of Gerardus van der Leeuw. The Hague etc.: Mouton.
Wacquant, L.J.D. 1989. Towards a Reflexive Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu.
Sociological Theory 7: 26 63.
Wade, Nicholas. 2010. Researchers Say They Created a Synthetic Cell. The New York Times
online, 20 May 2010. www.nytimes.com/2010/05/21/science/21cell.html?ref=science
(accessed 23 February 2011).
Wagner-Hasel, Beate, ed. 1992. Matriarchatstheorien der Altertumswissenschaft. Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Walkowitz, Judith R. 2003. The Vision of Salome: Cosmopolitanism and Erotic Dancing in
Central London, 1908 1918. The American Historical Review 108: 2 48.
Walsh, David. 1992. A Mythology of Reason: The Persistence of Pseudo-Science in the
Modern World. In Science, Pseudo-Science, and Utopianism in Early Modern Thought,
edited by Stephen A. McKnight, 141 166. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
Bibliography
209
Wasserstrom, Steven M. 1999. Religion after Religion: Gershom Scholem, Mircea Eliade, and
Henry Corbin at Eranos. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Weber, Max. 1968. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. New York:
Bedminster Press.
Weinberg, Steven. 1992. Dreams of a Final Theory. New York: Pantheon Books.
Weitzer, Demeter Georgievitz see Surya, G.W.
Wesel, Uwe. 1980. Der Mythos vom Matriarchat: ber Bachofens Mutterrecht und die Stellung
von Frauen in frhen Gesellschaften vor der Entstehung staatlicher Herrschaft.
Wessely, Christina. 2008. Welteis. Die Astronomie des Unsichtbaren um 1900. In
Pseudowissenschaft: Konzeptionen von Nichtwissenschaftlichkeit in der
Wissenschaftsgeschichte, edited by Dirk Rupnow, Veronika Lipphardt, Jens Thiel, and
Christina Wessely, 163 193. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
Westcott, W. Wynn [as Sapere Aude]. 1893. The Science of Alchymy: Spiritual and Material.
London: Theosophical Publishing Society.
Westman, Robert S. 1984. Nature, Art, and Psyche: Jung, Pauli, and the Kepler-Fludd
Polemic. In Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance, edited by Brian
Vickers, 177 229. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
White, Hayden. 1973. Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Wodak, Ruth, and Michael Meyer, eds. 2010. Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. 2nd ed.
London: Sage.
Wright, Thomas. 1852. Narratives of Sorcery and Magic, from the Most Authentic Sources.
New York: Redfield.
Wuthnow, Robert J. 2011. Taking Talk Seriously: Religious Discourse as Social Practice.
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 50: 1 21.
Yamauchi, Edwin M. 1973. Pre-Christian Gnosticism: A Survey of the Proposed Evidences.
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
Yates, Frances A. 1964. Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Yeo, Richard R. 1993. Defining Science: William Whewell, Natural Knowledge and Public
Debate in Early Victorian Britain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zander, Helmut. 2007. Anthroposophie in Deutschland: Theosophische Weltanschauung und
gesellschaftliche Praxis 1884 1945. 2 volumes, continuous pagination. Gttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
2008. Esoterische Wissenschaft um 1900. Pseudowissenschaft als Produkt ehemals
hochkultureller Praxis. In Pseudowissenschaft: Konzeptionen von
2011. Rudolf Steiner: Die Biografie. Munich and Zurich: Piper.
Zantop, Susanne. 1997. Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family, and Nation in Precolonial
Germany, 1770 1879. Durham: Duke University Press.
Zika, Charles. 2003. Exorcising our Demons: Magic, Witchcraft and Visual Culture in Early
Modern Europe. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
Zimmermann, Rolf-Christian. 1969/1979. Das Weltbild des jungen Goethe: Studien zur
hermetischen Tradition des deutschen 18. Jahrhunderts. 2 vols. (vol. 1 published in
1969, vol. 2 in 1979). Munich: Fink.
210
Bibliography
Ziolkowski, Theodore. 2008. The Veil as Metaphor and as Myth. Religion and Literature 40:
61 81.
Znamenski, Andrei A. 2007. The Beauty of the Primitive: Shamanism and the Western
Imagination. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Znamenski, Andrei A., ed. 2004. Shamanism: Critical Concepts in Sociology. 3 vols. London
and New York: RoutledgeCurzon.
Zllner, Friedrich, ed. 1886. Kepler und die unsichtbare Welt: Eine Hieroglyphe von Dr. Ernst
Gottfried Fischer []. Mit Einleitung und Ergnzungen von Friedrich Zllner. 2nd ed.
Leipzig: Gustav Fock.
Zweig, Arnold. 1922. Das ostjdische Antlitz. 2nd edition. Berlin: Welt-Verlag. English as The
Face of East European Jewry, translated by Noah Isenberg. Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press 2004.
Index
academic study of religion 1, 2, 102, 108,
131, 158, 180
academics / academy 1, 9, 21, 26, 30, 49,
67, 77, 85, 94, 102, 103, 106, 112, 116,
117, 119, 125, 126, 130, 131, 133, 138,
139, 140, 145, 146, 149, 152, 155, 156,
158, 161, 162, 165, 166, 167, 169, 172,
177, 180, 181
Academy of Science 100, 144
actors 4, 137, 166, 177
Adelung, Johann Christoph 34
Adler, Alfred 143
Adyar 102, 107, 109, 110
Aegisthus 141
aesthetics / aestheticization 38, 48, 61, 68,
79, 80, 84, 102, 118, 127, 128, 129, 130,
137
Agamemnon 141
Age of Aquarius 55
Agrippa of Nettesheim 100
Aguli, Ivan 132
Albanese, Catherine 133
Alchemy 20, 39, 53, 55, 56 75, 80, 84, 87,
100, 101, 104, 115, 135, 162, 163
spiritual alchemy 73
Algonquin 144
Allah 126
Allan, Maud 131
almanacs 27, 30, 31, 32, 33
altered states of consciousness 154, 171
alterity 157
amateur 19, 68, 80, 83, 88, 139, 180
American metaphysical religion 133
American Museum of Natural History 170
amulets 147, 149
anatomy 105
Andrews, Lynn 172, 173
angels 37, 59
Angelus Silesius 47, 48
Anima / Animus 50, 143, 144
animal magnetism 66, 97
animals 13, 66, 73, 77, 79, 92, 101, 163,
165, 171, 172, 176
anima mundi see world soul
animism 44, 48, 79

anti-Islamism 116
antiquity 35, 36, 38, 40, 41, 42, 51, 65, 74,
79, 88, 94, 98, 102, 103, 104, 106, 108,
112, 118, 119, 124, 125, 126, 127, 131,
140, 141, 142, 144, 147, 148, 149, 150,
151, 154, 159, 165, 176
anti-Semitism 116, 117, 121, 122, 130
anthropology 6, 15, 19, 91, 108, 139, 141,
151, 158, 159, 161, 167, 168, 169, 170,
171, 175, 180
anthropomorphism 78, 83
Anthroposophical Society 111, 112
apocalyptic / apocalypticism 25, 163
Apollo 143, 150
Arcane School 109
archaeology (academic discipline) 145, 146
archaeology (of discursive structures) 5
archetypes 50, 51, 52, 134, 144, 145, 151,
156, 162, 165
Aristizabal, Hector 170
Aristotelianism 26, 27, 28, 29, 33, 64, 101
art 26, 31, 40, 43, 44, 49, 79, 80, 81, 108,
127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 139,
145, 164, 165
Arzt, Thomas 62
Asad, Talal 6
ascent of the soul 165
Ashmole, Elias 31
Asclepius 143
aspects (in horoscopes) 28, 38
Ashmore, Malcolm 9
Aston, F.W. 65
astral light 98
astral plane 106, 111
astrology 5, 15, 16, 17, 20, 25 55, 56, 57,
58, 59, 63, 81, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105,
106, 109, 115, 154, 180
astronomy 16, 17, 25, 26, 27, 33, 43, 44, 45,
46, 69, 101, 105, 106
atom 29, 53, 61, 63, 64, 72, 73, 78, 100
autobiography 31, 39, 103, 110, 128, 151,
168
212
Index
authority 21, 72, 102, 103, 106, 108, 109,

117, 145, 155, 166, 169, 170, 171, 172,
173, 174, 176, 177
ayahuasca 155, 170, 171
Baba, Meher 132
Bacchus 147
Bachelard, Gaston 7
Bachofen, Johann Jakob 140 144,
Bailey, Alice Ann 109
Bataille, Georges 130
Bateson, Gregory 88, 89, 91, 92
Baur, Ferdinand Christian 122
beauty 79, 80, 129, 135, 148, 163
beautiful Jewess 116
belief 47, 60, 72, 90, 100, 106, 121, 134,
140, 149, 153, 166, 173
Bell, Catherine M. 139
Benjamin, Walter 142
Berger, Peter 3
Bergson, Henri 66, 90
Bernhardt, Sarah 131
Besant, Annie 65, 107
Bhagavad Gita 103
Biale, David 122, 124
Bible 30, 130, 134, 151
Bickerstaff, Isaac see Swift, Jonathan
Billwiller, Robert 42, 43, 47
binaries 4, 5, 19, 21, 115, 139, 152, 178, 181
bioethics 136
bionomy 77
Blair, Tony 135
Blavatsky, Helena P. 73, 94 109, 110, 111,
112, 121, 129, 132
Blavatsky Lodge 107
blood 104, 121
Bnei Baruch 133
body 33, 67, 73, 84, 91, 98, 104, 116, 119,
120, 129, 169
body/mind problem 66
Bohley, Johanna 68
Bohm, David 54, 90, 92, 93
Bhme, Jacob 35, 120
Blsche, Wilhelm 83
Bon, Gustave Le 62
Bonatti, A. Francesco 28
book of life 136
Book of Nature 135

bootstrap philosophy 88
Bourdieu, Pierre 166, 167
bourgeoisie 40, 96, 120, 142
Bowler, Peter J. 83
Boyle, Robert 59, 64
Brahe, Tycho 30
brain 73, 83, 168
Brenner, Michael 118
Brock, William H. 64, 65, 67
Brook Medicine Eagle 174
Bruno, Giordano 100
Brunotte, Ulrike 145
Buber, Martin 21, 115, 118 121, 122, 123,
124, 133
Buddhism 102, 103, 110, 120, 121, 126, 169,
170
Burckhardt, Jacob 140
bureaucratization 110, 166
burqa 116
Burrow, John W. 140
Butler, Samuel 69
Cagliostro, Alessandro 100
calendars 30, 33
Cambridge Platonists 30
Campanella 30
Campanus 28
Campbell, Joseph 160
Canguilhem, Georges 7
capital, symbolic 166, 169, 177
Capra, Fritjof 88, 89, 90
Cardano, Girolamo 28, 39, 49
Carus, Carl Gustav 50, 68, 99
Casanova, Jos 178
Castaneda, Carlos 161, 167 169, 170, 171,
172
Catherine II (the Great)
159
causality 28, 52, 53, 54, 79, 90, 91, 93
Celera Genomics 135, 136
Center for Ecoliteracy 89
Center for Shamanic Studies 172
Chambers, Edmund 145
channeling 98
chaos theory 53
charisma 94, 166, 169, 170, 172, 173, 177
Charles I, king of England 31
Index
chemistry 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 73,
80, 84, 100, 101, 157
Chew, Geoffrey 88
Christianity 12, 26, 27, 31, 40, 76, 78, 97,
109, 110, 112, 117, 119, 121, 128, 129,
130, 147, 150, 152, 153, 156, 178
chorology 77
Christ impulses 112
Chronos 144
chrysopoeia 58
chymiatry 60
chymistry 59, 60, 61
circumcision (male) 116
Clarke, Bruce 67, 83
classification 7, 14, 166
Clinton, Bill 135
cloning 66
Clytemnestra 141
code / coding / de-coding 44, 134, 135,
136, 137
cognition 9, 11, 80, 83, 84
cognitive science of religion 73, 83
Coley, Henry 32
collective unconscious 50, 134
Collge de France 29
Collins, Francis S. 135, 136, 137
colonialism 1, 4, 19, 102, 115, 116, 117, 139,
172
color theory 80
Commer, Ernst 76, 77
commercialization 96, 97, 174, 175
communication 4, 5, 6, , 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 17, 59, 61, 87, 95, 96, 97, 98, 128,
132, 137, 146, 158, 166, 175
Conibo 170
consciousness 9, 14, 16, 37, 72, 74, 79, 93,
105, 143, 154, 155, 165, 168, 171, 175,
176
content analysis 10, 18
contingency 8, 90
Copernicus, Nicolas 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 40,
41, 46
Corbin, Henry 162
core shamanism 171, 172, 174, 177
corpuscular philosophy and science 60, 64
correspondence theory of truth 20
cosmology 36, 37, 111, 137
213
cosmopolitanism 131
cosmos 27, 38, 40, 41, 43, 45, 48, 55, 72,
76, 92, 133, 137, 154, 155, 156, 162, 163
counterculture 55, 156
Coyle, Gigi 170
creation 45, 76, 78, 79, 103, 136, 141, 142,
144, 160
Cree 172
Cromwell, Oliver 31
Crookes, William 65
Crosby, Robert 109
Cruden, Loren 174, 177
crystallography 78
crystals 78, 79, 80
cultural studies 19, 142, 158, 169
Cummins, Paul 170
cybernetics 91
Dacqu, Edgar 48, 85, 86
Dae Soen sa Mim 169
Dalai Lama 107
Dalton, John 61, 62, 64, 100, 101, 102
dance 92, 128, 129, 130, 131
Darwin, Charles 76, 77, 78, 144
Darwinism 66, 77, 80, 90
Davidsen, Markus Altena 155
Davison, William 29
Davy, Humphry 61
death 79, 91, 101, 163, 165, 175
Debus, Allen G. 73
Dee, John 59
deep ecology 87, 89, 92
depth psychology 50, 154
dervish 119
Descartes, Ren 30, 35
De Stijl 80
determinism 12, 39, 52, 53, 54, 93, 106, 165
Deutsch, David 55, 73, 74, 75
Deutscher Monistenbund (German Monist
League) 17, 80, 81, 83, 86
devil 102, 176
Diana 147
Diderot, Denis 34
dilettantism 68
Dinet, Etienne 132
Dionysian 120, 125, 131, 143
discourse 1 19 and passim
214
Index
discourse analysis 4 13, 15, 157, 182

discourse community 9, 18, 155, 161, 177,
182
discourse strands 16, 20, 44, 47, 48, 54, 55,
61, 63, 65, 70, 71, 74, 75, 77, 82, 86, 94,
98, 100, 106, 112, 120, 132, 135, 150,
151, 153, 155, 156, 160, 181
discursive constructionism 8
discursive entanglement 1, 16, 17, 20, 34,
42, 56, 58, 81, 93, 115, 131, 136, 156,
158, 159, 180
discursive knots 12, 13, 14, 18, 56, 66, 67,
69, 73, 79, 88, 92, 93, 110, 111, 112, 130,
137, 139, 149, 150, 153, 155, 163, 180,
181
discursive study of religion 2, 3, 10, 14, 18
disenchantment 40, 48, 76
dispositive 11 13, 14, 15, 17, 26, 32, 34, 36,
46, 49, 59, 61, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 132,
133, 139, 155, 173, 180, 181
dispositive analysis 12, 15, 17
divination 161, 165
divine 14, 45, 59, 60, 78, 99, 101, 124, 128,
135, 144
DNA 134
Dobbs, Betty Jo Teeter 66
Dblin, Alfred 118
Dominicans 26
Drr, Georg 143
dreams 50, 55, 70, 71, 74, 84, 95, 105, 164
Driesch, Hans 66, 67, 80
drugs 73
Druidism / Druids 97, 153
Drury, Nevill 161
Duncan, Isadora 128, 129, 131
dynamism 44
earth 30, 37, 40, 43, 48, 64, 68, 73, 74, 99,
105, 106, 142, 164, 170
Earth Mother 72, 144, 145
Eberhardt, Isabelle 131, 132
Eckhart, Meister 126
ecology 77, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 134
economy 1, 12, 14, 19, 30, 77, 84, 89, 103,
157
ecstasy 118, 119, 128, 130, 148, 154, 159,
164, 165
Eddington, Arthur 137

Edison, Thomas 105
education / education programs 12, 14, 81,
83, 84, 85, 96, 103, 108, 127, 132, 161,
169
Edwards, Derek 9
Egyptology 126, 146
Einstein, Albert 52, 53, 85
Einstein-Podolski-Rosen Paradox 53
Electra 141
electricity 17, 49, 63, 64, 68, 99, 101
electromagnetism 99, 100
element / elementary bodies 28, 61, 62, 63,
64, 74
Eleusis 150
Eliade, Mircea 6, 59, 72, 73, 125, 144, 154,
160, 161, 162 166,
elixir 84, 85
Ellenberger, Henry F. 67, 143
emancipation of Jews 117, 122
Elmwood Institute 89
embryology 66
Emerson, Ralph Waldo 79
emic and etic 154, 155, 158, 177, 181
emotion 50, 69, 70
empathy 90
empiricism 7, 8, 26, 30, 38, 40, 48, 49, 53,
58, 59, 76, 77, 81, 88, 92, 120, 127, 137,
178
energetics 78, 80, 81, 82, 83
energy 16, 74, 75, 81, 82, 85, 89, 92, 95,
120, 135, 151, 156
Engels, Friedrich 142
English Gypsy-Lore Society 146
Enlightenment 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 43, 58,
59, 66, 98, 118, 143, 157, 159, 178
entelechy 67
entheogenic plants 155, 170
entropy 89
environmental crisis 86, 88, 93
environmentalism 89, 92, 93, 180
ephemerides 34
Epicureanism 29
epistemology 7, 8, 9, 19, 20, 75, 84, 85, 145
Eranos conferences 50, 70, 116, 127, 144,
162
Erdbeer, Robert Matthias 68
Index
eroticism 128, 130

Erinyes 141
Er the Pamphylian 165
Esalen 91
esoteric 21, 36, 39, 43, 50, 51, 59, 68, 74,
93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 101, 102, 104, 106,
107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 116, 124,
129, 130, 132, 137, 152, 155, 156, 157
esotericism 34, 35, 36, 49, 56, 98, 103, 110,
122, 131, 152, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158
Western esotericism 153, 154, 155, 156,
157, 182
Esoteric Section / Esoteric School 94, 107,
109, 111
essentialism 1, 121, 123, 145, 155, 156
ether 65, 66
ethics 37, 57, 135, 136
ethnicity 115
ethnology 159; see also anthropology
ethology 77
eugenics 80
European Society for the Study of Western
Esotericism 156
euthanasia 80
Evans, Arthur 145
evolution 71, 75, 76, 78, 83, 90, 91, 111,
140, 142, 144, 163
exact sciences 7, 68, 101, 105
exile 123
exclusion 56, 153, 156, 157, 173
existentialism 125
experience 1, 4, 37, 40, 46, 47, 62, 68, 72,
73, 86, 87, 108, 119, 120, 121, 126, 127,
139, 150, 152, 154, 155, 157, 159, 164,
165, 168, 169, 170, 171, 173, 174, 175,
176
experiment / experimental 8, 52, 53, 54,
60, 61, 62, 66, 71, 75, 92, 100, 173
experts 1, 21, 103, 137, 139, 166
Ezekiel, A.D. (Abraham David Salman Hai Ezekiel) 133
facts 6, 7, 12, 62
fate 42, 106, 145, 163, 165
Fairclough, Norman 2, 10
Fallers Sullivan, Winnifred 179
215
fascination 35, 49, 70, 86, 128, 130, 148,

151, 159, 160
Fechner, Gustav Theodor 45, 67
Felt, George H. 97
feminism 145, 152
femme fatale 130
Ferguson, Marilyn 90
Festugire, Andr-Jean 154
Feuchtwanger, Lion 118
Feynman, Richard 137
Fick, Monika 67
fieldwork 169, 170
Flamsteed, John 33
Flasche, Rainer 125
Flaubert, Gustave 130
Fleck, Ludwik 7, 10, 135
Fludd, Robert 71, 81, 100
folklore 146, 148
fortunetelling 30, 33
Foster, Steven 161
Foucault, Michel 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 14,
138, 157, 181
Foundation for Shamanic Studies 172, 173,
174, 175, 177
four original qualities, theory of 29, 64
Fox, Margaret and Kate 96
Frankfurt School 143
fraud 30, 58, 60, 63, 103, 106, 167
Frazer, James G. 145, 151
Frederick the Great, king of Prussia 33
Freemasonry 35, 36, 37, 38, 94, 97, 108
freethinkers 178
free will 54
frenzy 126
Freud, Sigmund 49, 50, 51, 67, 143
Friedlnder, Moritz 118
Frietsch, Ute 60
Fuller, Robert C. 97
Gadbury, John 32
Gaia 144, 145; see also Mother Earth
Galileo 28, 60, 135
Gammage, Nick 151
Gandhi, Mahatma 103, 107
Gardner, Gerald 132, 149
Garnier, Julien 144
Gassendi, Peter 29
216
Index
Gauricus, Lucas 34
Geertz, Clifford 6, 158, 168
Geiger, Abraham 117, 122
Geisteswissenschaft 42, 80, 85, 111; see
also humanities
gender 4, 5, 50, 108, 115, 116, 117, 130, 131,
145, 148, 152
gender studies 4, 19
genealogy (discursive) 5, 7, 11, 17, 20, 25,
55, 116, 135, 160, 161
genes / genetics 92, 134, 135, 136, 144
geology 69, 76
Gerhard, Eduard 144, 145
Gieser, Suzanne 71, 72
Gimbutas, Marija 145, 146
Ginzburg, Carlo 158
Giuntini, Francesco see Junctinus
globalization 89, 121, 132
Gnosticism 117, 118, 119, 122, 123, 124, 153,
155
God / gods 29, 37, 40, 41, 43, 47, 61, 78,
82, 91, 120, 121, 123, 124, 126, 127, 132,
135, 136, 147, 149, 155
goddess 21, 139, 141, 144, 145, 146, 147,
148, 149, 150, 151, 154
goddess spirituality / goddess veneration
21, 139, 145, 149, 150, 151
Godwin, Joscelyn 156, 158
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von 35, 36, 38,
39, 40, 41, 46, 47, 48, 68, 71, 78, 79,
80, 110, 111, 128, 144, 159
Gogh, Theo van 116
Goodman, Felicitas 161
Google 149
Gossman, Lionell 140
Gramsci, Antonio 9
Grand Unified Theory 90, 137
Graves, Robert 132, 146, 149 152,
great conjunctions 28, 46
Green Party 86
Greenwich Observatory 33
Grey Wolf 174
Grimassi, Raven 149
Grof, Stanislav 169
Grounded Theory 16
groupings (discursive) 12, 13, 16, 36, 138
Gurdjieff, Georges 132
guru
95
habitus 167, 169

Haeckel, Ernst 76, 77 80, 81, 83, 85, 87,
110, 111, 144
Halifax, Joan 161, 166, 169, 170, 172
Hanegraaff, Wouter J. 57, 154, 155, 157, 158
Hahnemann, Samuel 62
Harley Swift Dear 173
harmony (of the cosmos) 47, 71, 90, 109,
142
Harner, Michael 155, 161, 166, 170 173,
174, 175, 176, 177
Harner method 172, 173
Harper Collins 168
Harpocrates 37
Harrison, Jane E. 145, 151
Hartmann, Johannes 60
Hasidism 119, 133
Haskalah 118
Hatch, Edwin 152
Hawking, Steven W. 90, 137
healing 16, 145, 165, 169
health 1, 14, 84, 88, 105, 134
healthcare system 12
heliocentric astronomy 27
Helios 40, 41
Helmont, Jan Baptist van 100
Henry, William 61
Henseling, Robert 47, 48
Hepburn, Alexa 8
Herbert, Nick 54
Herder, Johann Gottfried 36, 159
heredity 8, 9, 14
hermeneutical circle 16
hermeneutics 4, 6, 15, 56, 87, 155
Hermes Psychopompos 165
Hermes (Trismegistus) 36, 37, 63, 112
Hermeticism 34, 35, 36, 39, 53, 57, 59, 71,
100, 101, 146, 153, 154, 155
Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn 65
Herodotus 141
Herzl, Theodor 123
Heschel, Susannah 118, 122
Hey, Barbara 4, 5
Hinduism 103, 110, 119
Hirsi Ali, Ayaan 116
Index
historical discourse analysis 11, 12, 14, 15

historical epistemology 7, 8
historiography 2, 3, 6, 46, 57, 58, 110, 157,
158, 163, 181
Hjelm, Titus 2, 10
Hobbes, Thomas 30
Hodge, Beryl 149
Hodgen, Margret T. 140
holism 38, 48, 52, 54, 55, 74, 76, 87, 88,
89, 92, 93, 160
Holocaust 9, 116
holography 154, 155
holy 127, 130
Holyoake, George 178
homosexuality 130, 151
horary astrology 31
horoscope / horoscopic astrology 28, 29,
30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 38, 39, 41, 45, 51
Horus 37
Horwitz, Jonathan 161, 174, 175
Hst, Annette 160, 161, 175, 176
houses (in horoscopes) 28, 32
Hughes, Ted 151
Hugo, Victor 159
Human Genome Project 135, 136
humanities 2, 9, 42, 79, 88, 89, 180; see
also Geisteswissenschaft
Huron 144
Husserl, Edmund 7
Hutton, Ronald 139, 149, 153
Huysmans, Joris-Karl 130
hybridity 19, 87, 158
iatromathematics 57
idealism 110
ideology 14, 67, 69, 72, 74, 77, 122, 143,
178
illud tempus 162, 164, 166
Illuminati 36
Indian National Congress 107
individuation 71
industrialization 76, 150
infinity 74, 126, 168
Ingerman, Sandra 174, 177
initiation 36, 37, 65, 72, 94, 104, 107, 108,
109, 112, 164, 171, 172
insider and outsider 19, 139, 155
217
Institute for Biological Energy Alternatives

136
Institute for Cultural Research 132
institution / institutionalization 4, 11, 12,
13, 14, 36, 60, 97, 107, 110, 132, 150,
166, 167, 172, 177, 178, 180
instruments (scientific) 46
intellectual, the 20, 35, 36, 39, 40, 42, 48,
74, 87, 88, 103, 111, 115, 117, 124, 128,
130, 138, 140, 143, 153, 159, 162, 163
interdisciplinarity 157
interference 161
International Association for the History of
Religion 127
Internet 12, 17, 73
interrogations (astrology) 13, 31, 50
Iroquois 144
irrationalism 35, 51, 53, 125, 151, 152, 159,
166
Ishtar 130
Isaiah 120
Isis 37, 99
Islam 126, 131, 132
isotopes 65
James I, king of England 30
James II, king of England 32
Jantsch, Erich 90
J. Craig Venter Science Foundation 136
Jeans, James 137
Jesuits 26, 144
Jesus 112, 120, 121
Jewish question 117
Jones Nelson, Alissa 4, 180
journey of the soul 165, 171, 172, 173, 175,
176
Joyce, James 137
Judaism 40, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122,
123, 151
Judge, William Q. 107
Junctinus (Francesco Giuntini) 29
Jung, Carl Gustav 49 52, 53, 54, 59, 70, 71,
72, 86, 91, 134, 143, 144, 151, 152, 154,
160, 162
Jupiter 37, 38, 147
218
Index
Kabbalah 100, 118, 121, 122, 124, 129, 130,

132, 133, 134, 135, 151
Kabbalah Centre 133
Kafka, Franz 118, 124
Kaiser, David 55
Kant, Immanuel 7, 35, 47, 99
Kardec, Allen (Hyppolyte Leon Denizard Rivali) 97
karma 106, 109
Karo, Josef 122
Kelly, Karen 174, 175
Kepler, Johannes 26, 27, 28, 30, 41, 43, 44,
47, 48, 52, 53, 71, 100
Kernyi, Karl 143
Kerner, Justinus 45
Khan, Inayat 132
Kippenberg, Hans G. 76
Kircher, Athanasius 26
Klages, Ludwig 143
Klee, Paul 80
Kleinschrod, Franz 85
Knorr von Rosenroth, Christian 129
knowledge 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14,
15, 18, 20, 21, 25, 26, 35, 36, 37, 38, 42,
47, 48, 50, 51, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62,
68, 69, 72, 74, 75, 76, 84, 88, 89, 94,
96, 98, 99, 102, 106, 111, 112, 115, 116,
117, 119, 129, 131, 134, 135, 137, 139,
152, 155, 158, 161, 166, 167, 168, 169,
171, 172, 173, 176, 177, 180, 181
perfect knowledge 35, 36, 38, 74, 155
Kohl, Karl-Heinz 159
Krner, Christian Gottfried 41
Koschorke, Albrecht 19, 20
Koselleck, Reinhart 6, 35, 157
Kosmiker 143
Krech, Volkhard 124, 125
Krishna 112
Krishnamurti, Jiddu 93
Kulturkampf 85
Kunrath, Henry 100
Lacan, Jacques 7
Laclau, Ernesto 3, 4, 7
Lafitau, Joseph Franois 144
Lakota 172
Lamarck, Jean 78, 144
Landscheidt, Theodor 54, 55

Landwehr, Achim 7, 14
language 3, 6, 7, 8, 42, 71, 115, 128, 134,
135, 150, 154, 168
Laotse 120, 121
Laszlo, Ervin 89
law 1, 11, 12, 14, 19, 30, 39, 68, 88, 89, 90,
141, 142, 143, 144
Leadbeater, Charles 65
Leeuw, Gerardus van der 21, 115, 126 129,
legitimization 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 20,
33, 50, 53, 61, 63, 69, 100, 112, 152, 153,
155, 161, 166, 171, 173, 176, 177
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von 36, 88
Leland, Charles G. 146 149
Lessing, Doris 132
Lvi, Eliphas 100
Libavius, Andreas 60
libido 51, 143
Liebig, Justus von 105
life force 66, 67
life sciences 8, 85, 134, 135, 137, 138
light 28, 35, 37, 38, 58, 98, 101, 109, 112
light workers 109
Lilly, William 31, 32
Lincoln, Abraham 97
Lincoln, Bruce 14
Linden, Stanton J. 59
linguistic analysis 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 15; see
also text / textual analysis
Linn, Carl von 77
literature 26, 67, 83, 98, 130, 132, 134, 146
Lockyer, Norman 63
Lomax, Alan 169
Lone Wolf 175
Louis XIII, king of France 29
Louis XIV, king of France 29, 30
LSD 55, 169
Luckmann, Thomas 3
Lyell, Charles 76
MacGregor Mathers, Samuel Liddel 130, 133
Machen, Arthus 73
machine 43, 73, 147
Macy, Joanna 170
Maenads 131
magia naturalis see natural magic
Index
magic 5, 14, 20, 30, 37, 44, 45, 56, 57, 58,
59, 60, 72, 73, 84, 85, 101, 102, 109,
115, 132, 146, 147, 149, 150, 155, 161,
163
magna mater 143
Mahatmas (in Theosophy) 95, 98, 103, 106
Maimonides 122
Maria Theresa, archduchess of Austria, queen
of Hungary and Bohemia 33
Marie Louise, queen of Poland 29
Mars 37, 38, 51
Maryland Psychiatric Research Center 169
Massey, Gerald 152
Mata Hari 130, 131
mathematics 8, 26, 27, 28, 29, 34, 43, 44,
57, 60, 106, 134, 135
matriarchy 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 150, 151
matrilinearity 141, 150
matter 8, 26, 37, 44, 45, 54, 55, 61, 62, 64,
65, 68, 71, 72,78, 80, 81, 90, 93, 100,
101, 105, 110, 144
Matthaei, Heinrich 134
Maturana, Humberto 89
Mayer, Julius Robert 81
Mazarin, cardinal 29
Mead, George R.S. 152
meaning / meaning structures 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25,
32, 38, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 53, 59, 61,
81, 83, 84, 86, 88, 112, 115, 119, 120,
125, 127, 131, 132, 137, 139, 146, 152,
155, 156, 161, 173, 177, 179, 180, 181,
182
mechanistic science / mechanistic models
26, 27, 29, 45, 48, 49, 65, 66, 68, 76,
81, 88, 160
media 3, 12, 14, 17, 18, 128, 178
medicine 12, 57, 58, 60, 149
mediumism 98, 103
Mercury 37, 38, 147
Mersenne, Marinus 30
Mesmer, Franz Anton 45, 66
Mesmerism 97
Messer, August 85
messianism 123
metals 44, 58, 62, 63, 71, 72, 74, 84
methodological solipsism 156, 157
219
Meuthen, Erich 35
microcosm and macrocosm 55
Middle World 175, 176
Mille, Richard de 168
Milton, John 76
mind 42, 44, 45, 49, 54, 55, 62, 67, 72, 76,
77, 78, 81, 89, 90, 91, 92, 110, 155, 156,
169; see also body/mind problem
minerals 58, 72, 101, 105
miracle / miraculous 43, 173, 175
Miracle Club 97
modern 19, 56, 63, 68, 108, 132, 150, 180
modernization 21, 25, 147
modernity 67, 115, 124, 128, 129, 131, 132,
139, 157, 162, 171, 178, 179, 182
Molitor, Franz 122
monadology 88
Mondrian, Piet 80
monism 16, 10, 67, 76 87, 93, 101, 120,
137
monotheism 40, 78, 93, 145
Montanari, Giovanni 28, 29
moon 37, 38, 51, 130, 163
moon goddess 150, 151
Moore, Francis 33
Moran, Bruce T. 58, 60
Moritz of Hesse-Kassel 60
morphogenetic fields 92
Morrisson, Mark S. 65, 70, 73, 102, 108
Moses 112, 120, 121
mosque 119
Mother Earth 73; see also Gaia
mother goddess 141, 144 m 145, 146
Mouffe, Chantal 3, 4
Mller, Friedrich Max 102, 103
multiverse 55, 75
mundane astrology 31, 37, 50
Murray, Margaret 146, 149
muse 150
music 13, 130, 159, 165, 172
Myers, Frederic W.H. 7, 69
Myers, Jody 133, 134
mysteries 36, 45, 60, 112, 149; see also
mysticism
mystery religions 125, 150
mysterium fascinans 126
mysterium tremendum 126
220
Index
mysticism 21, 27, 28, 30, 47, 55, 59, 62, 63,
78, 81, 82, 83, 86, 88, 90, 93, 95, 97,
104, 108, 109, 112, 115 132, 133, 138,
150, 151, 153, 164, 165, 180
myth 14, 35, 41, 46, 50, 95, 96, 119, 142,
143, 144, 145, 149, 150, 151, 152, 162,
163, 164
nagual 167
Napoleon III 45
National Institutes of Health 134
National Socialism 143
Native American traditions 161
natural magic 39, 56, 57, 161
natural philosophy 26, 40, 43, 45, 60, 61
natural sciences 20, 42, 52, 68, 78, 83, 110,
180
natura naturans 59, 66, 76, 120
natura naturata 59
nature 7, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21, 37, 38, 40, 44,
45, 48, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 64, 66,
68, 71, 72, 73, 76 80, 81, 82, 85, 86,
87 93, 98, 101, 105, 120, 135, 141, 142,
145, 150, 152, 160, 161, 163, 170, 176,
180
veneration of
20, 77, 87
nature-based spirituality 21, 87, 170, 176;
see also nature, veneration of
naturopathy 85
Naturphilosophie see natural philosophy
Naturwissenschaftliche Gesellschaft (Natural
Scientific Association) 42
Naumova, Gala 161
Naydler, Jeremy 68
Nederlands Genootschap voor Godsdienstgeschiedenis (Dutch Association for the History of Religion) 127
Needham, Joseph 73
neopaganism see paganism
Neoplatonism 36, 57
neo-shamanism 161
neo-Sufism 131, 132
neo-vitalism 66
New Age 73, 74, 89, 90, 91, 108, 109, 153,
154, 155, 159, 160, 176, 177
New Age science 88, 92
Newman, William R. 57, 58, 59, 60
New School for Social Research 170

newspapers 17, 30, 83, 97, 108
Newton, Isaac 40, 52, 53, 64, 65, 71, 88,
89, 100
Nietzsche, Friedrich 5, 110, 111, 120, 123,
140, 143
nihilism 123
Nirenberg, Marshall 134
Nobel Prize 12, 17, 52, 54, 80, 81, 89, 132
Noel, Daniel 165
Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg) 45
novel / novelists 69, 87, 95, 146, 149, 163,
165, 168
nuclear physics 73, 137
numerology 57
numinous, the 47, 125, 126
Obama, Barack 136
objectivity 4, 5, 53, 156, 168
observatory (astronomical) 33, 46
occult 21, 50, 56, 57, 65, 66, 82, 104, 152
occulta philosophia see occult philosophy
occultism 49, 56, 57, 66, 67, 72, 73, 86, 87,
97, 98, 100, 102, 104, 117, 130, 152, 153
occult philosophy 26, 57
occult sciences 20, 56, 57, 58, 59
Ocnus 140
oeconomia naturae 77
Occidentalism 116, 120, 121, 123, 125, 131,
132
Ojai Foundation 169, 170, 177
Olcott, Henry Steel 97, 98, 103, 107
Old Europe 151
ontology 9, 12, 155
Oppenheimer, Robert 137
Orestes 141
organic processes 55, 67, 78, 79, 89, 100
organisms 76, 77, 79, 87, 90, 105, 109, 120,
144, 151
Orientalism 102, 108, 110, 115, 116, 117, 118,
121, 125, 126, 128, 130, 131, 132, 138
Orpheus 112, 159, 165
rsted, Hans Christian 99, 100
Osiris 37
Ostjude 118
Ostwald, Wilhelm 78, 79, 80 85
Otto, Rudolf 21, 115, 125, 126, 127, 129, 131
Index
pagan / paganism 17, 35, 70, 106, 131, 139,

145, 146, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 161,
176, 180
pagan studies 155, 156, 158
painting 68, 70, 80, 163, 164
pamphlets 31, 65
pantheism 20, 68, 76, 78, 154
Panzer, Friedrich 148
Paracelsianism 60
Paracelsus 81, 100, 101
paraphysics 66
parapsychology 66
Partridge, John 32
Patai, Raphael 151
patriarchy 140, 142, 145
patrilinearity 141, 150
Pauli, Wolfgang 52 54, 70, 71, 72, 92, 154
Pauli Principle 53
Peat, F. David 54
perennialism 156
performative arts 139
persecution 156, 163
Peuckert, Will-Erich 73
Pfaff, Johann W. 45, 46, 102
phenomenology of religion 6, 125, 127, 128
Philosophers Stone 71, 72, 84
photography 83
phrenology 61
physiology 66, 68, 101, 105
Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni 27
Pirogoff, Nikolay Ivanovich 105
Placidus (P. Placido de Titis) 27, 28, 29, 32
planetary spheres 26, 28, 29, 44
planets 30, 34, 37, 39, 44, 45, 51, 163
plants 80, 92, 155, 172, 175
Plato 95, 112, 128, 152, 165
Platonic academies 36
Platonic love 151
Platonism 26, 27, 28, 30, 101, 119, 129, 146
Plotinus 126, 128
pluralism 131, 156
poetry 40, 43, 44, 45, 69, 70, 87, 131, 133,
146, 149, 150, 151, 152, 169
polemics 9, 32, 34, 45, 46, 56, 57, 58, 60,
78, 99, 101, 102, 106, 116, 122, 157, 160
politics 1, 3, 4, 11, 12, 13, 30, 31, 35, 36, 40,
57, 80, 81, 84, 87, 89, 93, 102, 103, 108,
221
115, 116, 122, 123, 124, 127, 137, 140,

142, 163, 178, 179
polytheism 78
Pope, Alexander 136
popularization 17, 48, 54, 77, 80, 83, 85,
94, 104, 115, 116, 137, 146, 153, 154, 161
positivism 72, 120, 160
postcolonialism 4
poststructuralism 4, 8, 10, 158
Potter, Jonathan 8, 9
power (discursive) 3, 4, 5, 9, 135, 136, 154,
180, 182
power (physics, philosophy of nature, etc.)
16, 29, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 44, 47,
48, 49, 51, 56, 57, 59, 66, 74, 75, 78, 79,
81, 92, 98, 101, 120, 121, 128, 140, 145,
155, 167, 172, 176
power animals 172, 176
prayer 82, 119
precession of the equinoxes 51
predestination 163
predictions (astrological) 27, 29, 31, 32
pre-modern 19
Prigogine, Ilya 54, 89, 90
prima materia see primary matter
primary matter 17, 61, 64, 71
primitive religion 145
Primum Mobile 26, 28, 29
Principe, Lawrence M. 58, 59
prisca theologia 95
procession 129
professional 19, 20, 30, 31, 56, 88, 180
professionalization 83, 117, 180
prognostications (astrological) 28, 29, 50
progress 34, 56, 57, 64, 70, 74, 75, 82, 135,
140, 142, 178
proto hyle see primary matter
protyle 64, 65
Proudfoot Edgar, Carol 172
Prout, William 64, 65, 67
pseudo (knowledge, science, etc.) 20, 34,
56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 83, 86, 88, 111,
180, 181
Psilopoulos, Dionysious 152
psyche 50, 51, 53, 71, 144, 169, 176
psychedelic experiences 73, 154, 155
psychoanalysis 67, 72, 73, 124
222
Index
psychologization 36, 37, 38, 43, 50, 68, 144

psychology 16, 17, 25, 27, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52,
59, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72,
73, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 86, 91, 97, 101,
115, 143, 154, 160, 169, 180
psychopathology 12
purification 71, 86
Pythagoras 112
quackery 60
qualitative principles in science 26, 27, 28,
45, 56
quantum computation 73
quantum mechanics / quantum physics 52,
53, 54, 55, 73, 74, 88, 92, 93, 154
Quran 116
rabbinical Judaism 122
race 98, 107, 116
radiochemistry 73
Rama 122
Ranke, Leopold von 149
Ranke Graves, Robert von see Graves, Robert
rationality 20, 33, 36, 40, 45, 47, 53, 56, 57,
58, 85, 87, 108, 118, 122, 125, 140, 142,
143, 150, 152, 166, 178
rationalization of the cosmos 38, 45, 76
realism 9
reason 34 35, 36, 37, 45, 115, 135, 139; see
also rationality
recapitulation, theory of 144
redemption 70, 121
reductionism 47, 72, 74, 110, 127
Reformation 26, 74
Regardie, Israel 72
Regiomontanus 28, 32
Reisigl, Martin 11
Reitzenstein, Richard 152
relativism 9, 168
religion passim
as sui generis 1, 13, 126, 127
definition of 13, 14
religious studies see academic study of religion
resurrection 163
revelation 59, 94, 104, 109, 119, 123, 136,
154, 163, 171
revolution 84, 142 146

Rheinberger, Hans-Jrg 8
rhetoric 8, 35, 57, 60, 154, 171, 178, 180
Riccioli, P. Giambattista 28
Richelieu, cardinal 29
ritual 14, 37, 72, 87, 116, 128, 139, 147, 151,
159, 161, 170, 171, 172
Roller, Wolfgang 58
Romanes, George John 69
Romanticism 38, 43, 44, 46, 48, 49, 50, 67,
68, 76, 79, 83, 87, 94, 99, 110, 111, 115,
125, 127, 128, 146
Roosen, Adelheid 116
Rorty, Richard 1, 2, 20
Rosenberger, Erwin 123
Rosenkreutz, Christian 36
Rosicrucianism 36, 37, 71, 87, 94, 95, 100
Roth, Joseph 118
Routh, Harald Victor 69, 76
routinization 166, 170, 172, 177
Royal Institution London 61
Royal Society 55, 63
sacred 50, 72, 76, 120, 125, 126, 127, 129,
135, 138, 144, 160, 161, 164, 170, 174,
175
Said, Edward 4, 117
Salome 130, 131
ankara 126
Sanskrit 104
Sapere Aude see Westcott, Wynn W.
Sarasin, Philipp 6, 7, 135
satire 32, 33
Saturn 37, 38
Scandinavian Center for Shamanic Studies
160, 174
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 40, 43,
66, 68, 78, 82, 90
Schiller, Friedrich 40, 41, 42, 43, 47, 48, 80
Schlegel, August Wilhelm 43, 44, 45
Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst 47,
125, 127
Schmieder, Karl Christoph 58
Schmitt, Charles 57
scholasticism 26, 27
Scholem, Gershom 21, 115, 118, 119, 122
124, 133
Index
Schrdinger, Erwin 134

Schumacher College 89
Schuon, Frithjof 132
Schur, Edouard 112
Schtz, Alfred 3
science passim; see also exact sciences; natural sciences
definition of 14
scientific revolution 57, 60
scientification of religion 1, 18, 21, 49, 52,
134, 137, 139, 177, 180
Scott, Joan W. 4, 116, 117
Scripps Research Institute 136
Sebottendorff, Rudolf von 132
secrets / secrecy 30, 35, 36, 37, 44, 57, 71,
72, 96, 99, 100, 101, 105, 107, 129, 137,
147, 149, 150, 164, 167
secret societies 36, 95
secular, the 20, 21, 38, 56, 70, 103, 124,
130, 178, 179, 180
secularization 1, 21, 178, 179, 182
secularism 21, 25, 124, 178, 179
Sedgwick, Mark 131, 132
Seidr 161
sex 4, 5, 98, 130, 142, 145, 151
sexuality 116, 129, 131, 150
Shah, Idries 132
shamanism 16, 17, 21, 125, 154, 158, 159
178, 180
Shambala 95
Sheldrake, Rupert 54, 92
shtetl 118
Sidgwick, Henry 69
Sigui 169
Silberer, Herbert 70
Simmonite, W.J. 31
Sivers, Marie von 111, 112
Smith, Jonathan Z. 17, 18
social Darwinism 80
Society for Psychical Research 69, 96, 98
Society for Sufi Studies 132
Society for Understanding Fundamental Ideas
132
Socrates 151, 152
Som, Malidoma 170
223
soul 16, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50,
52, 76, 78, 85, 86, 95, 97, 105, 106, 119,
120, 121, 134, 144, 165
socialism 3, 178
sociology 2, 3, 8, 15, 19, 91, 127, 158, 166
sociology of knowledge 3, 4, 10, 135
spells 44, 147, 149
Spinoza, Baruch 78
spirit helpers 172, 176
spirits 44, 96, 97, 147, 149, 172, 176
spiritualism 67, 68, 78, 80, 96, 97
spirituality 14, 21, 25, 65, 67, 69, 70, 76, 87,
89, 91, 102, 104, 108, 124, 133, 139, 152,
155, 170
Stheli, Urs 11
Starhawk 170
Stirner, Max 111
Stone Age 150
Storm, Hyemeyohsts 173
string theory 55
Strindberg, August 81
Struck, Hermann 118
Sufism 119, 131, 132, 133
sun 30, 37, 38, 39, 41, 47, 51, 104, 105, 163
Sun Bear 173
sun spots 105
supernaturalism 46, 87, 111, 155, 166, 171,
173
superstition 33, 34, 43, 47, 51, 56, 63, 82,
100, 105
Surette, Leon 152
Surya, G.W. see Weitzer, Demeter Georgievitz
sustainability 89
Suttner, Berta von 80
Swedenborg, Emanuel 81, 97
Swift, Jonathan 32, 33
synthetic biology 136, 137
systems theory 88, 89, 90, 91
synchronicity 52, 53, 54, 92, 154, 163
synergetics 90
Szab, Lsl E. 54
Tattoni, Antonio 28
Taussig-Rubbo, Mateo 179
Taylor, Bron 87
Taylor, Charles 178
technology 11, 13, 14, 17, 84, 129
224
Index
teleology 90, 105

telescope 44
television 12, 17
texts / textual analysis 2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15,
16, 17, 18, 139; see also linguistic analysis
theater 108, 139
theology 1, 57, 91, 93, 99, 100, 117, 124,
125, 126, 127, 128, 135, 147, 152, 155, 156
Theory of Everything 74; see also Grand
Unified Theory
theory of relativity 52, 55, 85
Theosophical Society 17, 21, 49, 65, 93, 94,
95, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 106, 107, 108,
109, 110, 111, 116, 132, 133
Theosophy 49, 50, 51, 65, 67, 86, 94 112,
121, 129, 133
thermodynamics 89
Thich Nhat Hanh 169
third, the 19, 115, 130, 142
third space 19, 87, 115, 118, 122, 123, 125,
132, 139
Thomas, Keith 57
Thoreau, Henry David 79
Thot 37
Tikkun 123
time travel 74
Tingley, Katherine 107, 108, 110
Torah 123
Torfing, Jacob 3
Toronto Theosophical Society 107
Traditionalism 26, 133
trance 154, 155, 160, 161, 171
transcendentalism 79
transmutation 58, 61, 63, 72, 73, 74, 75, 86
transmutational alchemy 58
triads 19, 20, 125
truth / truth claims 5, 6, 9, 18, 20, 33, 35,
44, 79, 99, 100, 103, 104, 123, 130, 137,
148, 158, 163, 164, 170, 181
Turner, Frank Miller 69
Tylor, Edward B. 140
unconscious, the 50, 134
United Lodge of Theosophists 109, 110
unities 12, 13, 57, 138, 145, 181
universe 38, 42, 45, 46, 54, 75, 77, 78, 79,
90, 92, 101, 103, 105, 134, 135, 137, 164;
see also cosmos
unveiling see veil / veiling
Uranus 144
Urban, Martina 120
Valiente, Doreen 149
values 1, 86, 89, 92, 103, 119, 135, 153, 163
Vaughan, Thomas 100
veil / veiling 99, 104, 116, 117, 129, 130,
131, 148
Venter, J. Craig 135 137
Venus 37, 38, 147
Vickers, Brian 57, 59
Victorian period 69, 96, 129, 139, 153
Villefranche, Jean-Baptiste Morin de 29
vitalism 16, 20, 64 70, 73, 76, 79, 80, 92,
93, 100, 101, 104, 120, 135, 160
Vitebsky, Piers 161
Vogt, J.K. 45
Voltaire 34, 105
Wade, Nicholas 136
Walkowitz, Judith R. 131
Wallace, Alfred Russel 69
Wallenstein, Albrecht von 41
Ward, James 69
Watts, Alan 73
Weber, Max 48, 76, 166, 173, 177
Weinberg, Steven 54
Weitzer, Demeter Georgievitz 86
Welling, Georg 37
Westcott, Wynn W. 65
Whewell, William 62
Whistling Elk, Agnes 172
White, Hayden 6, 157
Wicca 161, 176
Wilde, Oscar 130
Wille, Bruno 83
William III, king of England 32, 33
Wissenschaft des Judentums 117, 118, 122
witchcraft 21, 56, 139, 146, 147, 148, 149,
150
Wodak, Ruth 11
Wolf, Immanuel 117
wonder 76, 135
Index
world ice theory 48

world soul 45, 46, 49, 52, 76
world spirit 119
Wright, Thomas 102
writing culture debate 168
Yaqui 167, 168
Yates, Frances A. 57
Yelle, Robert 179
Zadkiel 31
Zander, Helmut 56, 108, 110, 111, 112

Zantop, Susanne 117
Zei, Carl 46
Zeus 145
Zimmermann, Rolf-Christian 35
Zionism 122, 123, 124
zodiac / zodiacal signs 28, 29, 51
Zunz, Leopold 117, 122
Zweig, Arnold 118, 119, 122
225

Scientification of Religion. An Historical Study of Discursive Change, 1800-2000

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Scientification of Religion. An Historical Study of Discursive Change, 1800-2000

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

On the long journey doubts were often my companions.

Ive always admired

Kocku von Stuckrad

Religion and Science in Discursive Perspective

From Polemical Disjunction to New Integration: The Science of the

Rearrangements in the Twentieth Century

Merging Occultism, Philosophy, Science, and the Academic Study of Reli94

The Trouble with Europe: Academic Orientalism and New Mystical

In Search of the Great Goddess: How Academic Theories Generated

Normatizing Shamanism: Academic Teachers as Religious Experts

Conclusion: The Scientification of Religion

1 Religion and Science in Discursive Perspective

1 Religion and Science in Discursive Perspective

The Discursive Construction of Knowledge

The Discursive Construction of Knowledge

1 Religion and Science in Discursive Perspective

The Discursive Construction of Knowledge

(translatable as both sex and gender) as an analytical category that transgresses

Historical Analysis of Discourse

This constructionist concept of truth goes back to Friedrich Nietzsche.

1 Religion and Science in Discursive Perspective

The Discursive Construction of Knowledge

1 Religion and Science in Discursive Perspective

The Discursive Construction of Knowledge

1 Religion and Science in Discursive Perspective

Discursive Study of Religion: Concepts and Definitions

Discursive Study of Religion: Concepts and Definitions

Basic Concepts for Discourse Analysis

1 Religion and Science in Discursive Perspective

media, museums, educational programs, television, or the healthcare system.

My project is Foucauldian in its analytical strategy as well. When I disentangle

Discursive Study of Religion: Concepts and Definitions

Consequences for a Discursive Study of Religion

1 Religion and Science in Discursive Perspective

Determining the Research Question

Detailed discussions of how to do a concrete discourse analysis in the way that I am

1 Religion and Science in Discursive Perspective

Selecting Data and Building a Corpus

1 Religion and Science in Discursive Perspective

Choosing the Most Suitable Method to Analyze the Data Sets

Beyond Binaries: An Outline of the Argument

Beyond Binaries: An Outline of the Argument

1 Religion and Science in Discursive Perspective

professional or pseudo knowledge. We may even reposition the intellectual in

When I talk of vocabulary I follow Richard Rortys understanding of the importance of

Beyond Binaries: An Outline of the Argument

with a scientific worldview. Chapter 5 gives credit to the Theosophical Society,

Part One: Discarded Knowledge and Its New

2 From Polemical Disjunction to New Integration:

The Differentiation of Branches of Knowledge

2 From Polemical Disjunction to New Integration: The Science of the Stars

The Differentiation of Branches of Knowledge

against the new quantitative-mechanistic astronomy, but it established itself, at

The Responses of the Astrologers

2 From Polemical Disjunction to New Integration: The Science of the Stars

The Differentiation of Branches of Knowledge

2 From Polemical Disjunction to New Integration: The Science of the Stars

The Differentiation of Branches of Knowledge

2 From Polemical Disjunction to New Integration: The Science of the Stars

Polemical Disjunctions and their Complexities in the Eighteenth Century

Satire is an important discursive strategy that delegitimizes the truth-claims

Polemical Disjunctions and their Complexities

2 From Polemical Disjunction to New Integration: The Science of the Stars