The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning STUDENT: All

DATE: 20 July 2009

AUTHOR: Henry Mintzberg

THESIS:
There are indeed ways to couple the skills and inclinations of the planners with the
authority and flexibility of the managers to assure a strategy making process that is
informed, integrative, and responsive to changes in an organization’s environment
(Mintzberg, p 4) (Planning) must not be seen as decision making, not as strategy
making, and certainly not as management…but simply as the effort to formalize parts
of them-through decomposition, articulation, and rationalization (Mintzberg p 15)

1. Planning, in the context of strategy making, is a formalized procedure to

produce an articulated result, in the form of an integrated system of decisions
(Mintzberg, p12)
2. Strategy formation is the planning process, designed or supported by planners,
to plan in order to produce plans (Mintzberg, p 32)

SUPPORTING ARGUMENT:

1. Strategy formation is a process of conception. The most essential strategic

design idea is that of congruence, or fit, between external and organizational
factors (Mintzberg, p 36)
2. Strategy is created at the intersection of an external appraisal of the threats
and opportunities facing an organization in its environment, considered in
terms of key factors for success, and an internal appraisal of the strengths and
weaknesses of the organization itself, distilled into a set of competencies.
Outside opportunities are exploited by inside strengths, while threats are
avoided and weakness circumvented (Mintzberg, p 36).
3. Strategy formation should be controlled, conscious process of thought
(Mintzberg, p 38)
4. Responsibility for the process must rest with the chief executive officer: that
person is THE strategist. (Mintzberg, p 38)
5. A model of strategy formation must be kept simple and informal(Mintzberg, p
38)
6. Strategies should be unique; the best ones result from a process of creative
design. (Mintzberg, p 38)
7. Strategies must come out of the design process fully developed. (Mintzberg, p
39)
8. Strategies should be made explicit and, if possible articulated, which means
they have to be kept simple. (Mintzberg, p 38)
9. Once unique, full blown, explicit, and simple strategies are fully formulated,
they must be implemented. (Mintzberg, p 38)
10.The great divide of planning: performance control and action planning
(Mintzberg, p 78)
 a. Performance control: objectives and budgets, routine in nature, logically
carried out on a regular basis, quantitative in approach and largely the
concern of the accounting people, easily mapped onto the existing
structure, and geared to motivation and control (Mintzberg, p 78)
b. Action planning: before the fact specification of behavior; strategies are
supposed to evoke programs that are supposed to prescribe the
execution of tangible actions (Mintzberg, p78)

APPLICATION:
There is a natural tension between creativity and formalized planning processes.
Any application of strategic planning must allow for creativity to effect the process.
Understanding the differences between strategy and planning is a must in effective
strategic planning. Planners should clearly define their purpose in terms to
differentiate between planning to control or planning to stimulate action. These very
different functions should reside in different groups of strategic planners.
Mintzberg provides a clear representation that “planning” and “strategy” deserve
a more thorough treatment than they are usually given. Both are often overlooked or
misrepresented. In order to execute either effectively, they should be studied and
analyzed before being put into practice.
Mintzberg makes us look at our own formal methods of planning with a more
critical eye. Also has relevance for both operational and organizational strategy –
recognizing the importance of collective learning at all levels and how it contributes
to the ongoing development of emergent strategies. Adaptation as a function of
emergence.

1. Mintzberg helps us understand what planning is and maybe more importantly

what it is not.
2. He also helps us understanding how planning relates to strategy and strategic
formulation in general terms.
3. A planner can apply external appraisal (Mission analysis of the enemy) to
internal appraisal (staff estimate of yourself)…know you enemy, know yourself
within the Mintzberg context.
4. The discussion of performance control and action planning is very relevant if
couched in terms of assessments verse planning.

CONCLUSION:
Henry Mintzberg is skeptical about the overall strategic planning literature
available due to its failure to properly define planning and strategy. Despite this
skepticism on the strategic planning literature Mintzberg believes that strategic
planning is a useful activity when applied properly. This book should serve as a
caution to planners to balance the rigidity of planning models with the creativity and
skills of individuals to avoid common planning traps.

Planning and Strategy mean many things to many individuals. Studying, learning,
and then implementing the most appropriate definition of both is a key to ultimate
success.

Mintzberg provides some insights on strategy and planning that can aid us in
stripping away paradigms and look at our own planning methods and systems in a
more critical manner.

Mintzberg provides a model in general terms of the interaction of planning and

strategy. He also provides a general model of strategic formulation that can be used
in both the civilian and military sectors.

Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter STUDENT: All

DATE: 20 Jul 2009

AUTHOR: Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein

THESIS:
Existing theories of deterrence are incomplete and flawed. To develop theories with
predictive capability and policy relevance, scholars must go beyond deterrence and
rational choice to other theories of international behavior (Lebow and Stein, p 208).

SUPPORTING ARGUMENT:

1. Subjective expected utility will vary enormously depending on actors’ risk

propensity and relative emphasis on loss or gain, therefore models of
rational choice build in assumptions about risk propensities by turning to
other theories of behavior. (Lebow and Stein, p 209)
2. The assumption that a challenger is a risk prone gain maximize will create
serious problems in any deductive theory of deterrence due to the lack of
empirical weighting of loss or gain. (Lebow and Stein, p 211)
3. In some historical case studies the interrelationship among the variables
specified by rational deterrence theory did not produce the expected
outcome (Japan in 1941 and Sadat in 1973) therefore the calculus of
indicators depends on factors other than those identified by deterrence
which may include economic and domestic political variables. (Lebow and
Stein, p 211).
4. Theories of deterrence focus on the manipulation of an initiators estimates
of the cost of war, the probability of winning, and the probability of
retaliation through the credible threats reinforced by usable military options
(Lebow and Stein, p 212) Note: This is only true if you look at the
 problem through strictly a military lens so is it a fallacious theory
or a failure and/or limitation of specific research.
5. Deductive theories of deterrence do not define their scope conditions.
They do not identify all the variables at play. (Lebow and Stein, p213).
6. A strategy of deterrence and reassurance may be more effective in
avoiding war (Lebow and Stein). Note: Stein wrote a professional
paper called “Deterrence and Reassurance”.
7. Neither deterrence nor rational choice say anything about the all-important
psychological preferences that shape a leaders calculations (Lebow and
Stein, p 214). Note: Great book on that topic is Robert Jervis,
Perception and Misperception in International Politics.
8. Rational Deterrence theory omits misperception and miscalculation making
it an incomplete theory. (Lebow and Stein, p 216)
9. Deterrence theorists have failed to delineate the boundaries of rational
choice. Rational choice remains ill-defined (Lebow and Stein, p 217).
10.Deterrence theories assume that there is a clear analytical distinction
between challenger and defender that is obvious not only to scholars but to
actors themselves but in reality the distinction is generally blurred (Lebow
and Stein, p 221). Note: This is even more evident as the state
system of politics diminishes and non-state actors continue to gain
more power bouncing off one another and even state powers like
billiard balls.
11.Deterrence theories presuppose that leaders are (1) instrumentally rational,
(2) risk-prone gain maximizes, (3) free of domestic constraints, and (4) able
to correctly identify themselves as defenders of challengers. All of these
core assumptions are unrealistic and contradicted by thorough empirical
evidence.

APPLICATION:

1. Understand the importance of thorough research and the interrelationship of

all variable in a specific problem set in important for the researcher or anyone
attempting to make a cogent argument. Too often, poor research omits
important variables causing authors, researches and decision makers to reach
faulty conclusions. This is not only true in the application of rational
deterrence theory but in all applicable political and social science theory in
general.
2. Deterrence theory can be applicable if appropriate variables are identified and
utilized within the calculus. Omitting conclusion changing variables is
detrimental to any empirical analysis.
3. Deterrence is useful In clear cut cases of defender verses challenger measured
from a purely state on state equation but how many crystal clear cases are
 there like that?

CONCLUSION:
Lebow and Stein attack the heart of RD theory by citing the following as failings:

(1) Presupposition of rationale leaders

(2) Leaders are risk prone gain maximizers
(3) Leaders are free of domestic constraint
(4) Leaders are able to identify themselves as challengers or defenders

This leads them to state “Rational deterrence are accordingly “theories” about
nonexistent decision makers operating in nonexistent environments (Leboew and
Stein, p 224).

If one is to utilize rational deterrence theory it is very important to present

assumptions so a critical analysis of the use of the theory can present the utility.
This includes assumptions on perceptions and leader calculations which can fit into
deterrence theory.
Rational choice theory has value but only limited in the sense of predicting behavior.
It suffers from the same malady as other predictive analysis models as it is very
difficult to account for all the variables.
Crisis Management Primer STUDENT: All
DATE: 20 July 2009

AUTHOR: Carnes Lord

THESIS: Crises management is an essential portion of strategy that requires leaders

to have strategic vision and political competence. It should be ingrained as part of an
overall strategic plan. We (the United States) need carefully staffed and structured
crises management mechanisms that can operate independently of top government
leaders, yet at the same time be more closely integrated with national policy and
strategic decision making generally.

SUPPORTING ARGUMENT:

1. A key circumstance of crises management that shaped the matrix of the cold
war and the character of contemporary democracy is the emergence of
nuclear weapons (and from a post 911 perspective WMD in general).
2. Both WW II and the Gulf War of 1990-1991 provide clear evidence of the
consequences of failure on the part of an American President to recognize the
point at which considerations of the shape of the international political order
should take priority over the perceived requirements of the military endgame.
3. Crises – critical turning points in a conflict, demanding the engagement or
reengagement of a nations civilian leadership in strategic decision making –
occur before, during, and even after the shooting, regardless of the level of
violence involved or threatened.
4. Crises constituted by the perceptions of political leaders – perceptions of both
an objective threat and a more or less subjective set of national and personal
values and goals.
5. In the political arena, what distinguishes a crises mode of policy making is the
need for rapid judgment and decision by a nations political leadership.
6. US Japanese Crises of 1939-1941 – Roosevelt’s secretiveness, his chaotic
management style, and his contrast tactical maneuvers unconnected to any
strategic design, confused friends and enemies alike.
7. The most serious strategic error during the Cuban missile crises is its cavalier
dismissal of the significance of the larger Soviet military presence in Cuba and
its longer term implications for the security of the western hemisphere.
8. The single greatest failure of the Gulf conflict occurred at the end of the crises.
The end of hostilities demand the re-involvement of the supreme civilian
authority in national decision making in order to balance the requirements of
the military endgame with postwar political arrangements. Note: I do not
believe this necessarily indicates that at the end of hostilities we
must enter crises management mode.
9. The key requirement is to devise doctrine and procedures that will integrate
 political, strategic, and operational/crises perspectives while preserving and
appropriate balance among them.
10.At the operational level, the great challenge for crises management remains
the disciplined, rapid coordination and integration of diverse governmental
functions.

APPLICATION:
The nature of crisis always heightens the pressure on the decision making body
experiencing the crisis. The constraints of time, suitable options, and potentially
intense scrutiny can force a decision making body to forget the strategic implications
of their decisions. The crisis must be managed within the broader strategy and
linked to the key personnel and processes in strategy formulation and
implementation. Crisis typically involve military personnel formulating and executing
actions as part of the crisis management. However the results of these actions
always affect the strategy of US foreign and national security policy. Planners and
decision makers in a crisis must understand the broader strategies and take the time
to link the crisis management back to these policies.
Crisis management is an integral part of an effective planner’s toolkit. It has to be
considered, even anticipated in the modern strategic environment. Many lessons can
be learned from the unique successes and failures of US crisis management over the
past century.
Crises management is a viable component of strategy if handled appropriately as
the author suggests. Due to the amorphous nature of strategy, and its ever
evolving sets of variables, crises to some degree, will inevitably occur. Having a well
informed crises management team that clearly understands and can articulate the
strategic objectives will keep the strategic vision intact.

CONCLUSION:
Carnes Lord clearly demonstrates the close relationship of crisis management and
strategy. What may be viewed as a short term decision in a crisis may very well
impact the US’ long term strategy and needs to be analyzed in that context. This
requires crisis managers to link in with policy makers, strategists, and civilians across
the government to best support national and foreign policy objectives.
Crisis management is not a substitute to national strategy, but a complement to
it. It should be incorporated into effective national strategy to achieve the best
result.
Crisis management should be part of an overarching strategy. They should
warrant the attention of national leadership, who should address crisis situations with
strategic vision and political competence.
Obviously written before 911, crises management is even more applicable to
today than it was in the 1990s. Especially relevant is the requirement to apply the
whole of government approach in solving issues in a globalized context.
Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the STUDENT: CHAMBERS
Evidence of History DATE: 20 JUL 2009

AUTHOR: COLIN S. GRAY

THESIS: Strategy is understood as the use that is made of force and the threat of
force for the ends of policy. The purpose is to provide a theory usable for
understanding how RMAs might work (in the strategic context), and sufficiently
flexible so that it can grow with feedback from analysis and historical data (Gray, p
91). Using social science methods, strategists can attempt to account for variables
and predict outcomes (Gray, p99).

SUPPORTING ARGUMENT:

1. Strategy has a permanent nature but an ever changing character (Gray, p 94).
a. Premodern strategy prior to the formation of states could not serve their
ends of objectives. This is due to the waging of war by the aristocracy
as wars of the right (customary legal and religious) (Gray, p 94)
b. Postmodern includes an unstable equilibrium among magnetic pulls of
people, army and commander (Gray, p 94).
2. Changing warfare including nuclear and cyber-war could threaten to sever
links (Ends, ways, means links) that make strategy work. Yet, it must be
acknowledged that there is more to strategy than just the military element just
as there is more to war than the military forces (Gray, p 95) Note: This does
not support Gray’s definition of Strategy (as he acknowledges) unless
the definition of force can include the application methods such as
cyber tactics in support of the threat of the use of force. There is also
the concept of the whole of government approach to waging war.
3. The conduct of war, in its great outlines, is therefore policy itself and
paradoxically, policy has to serve war, if not always the war it thought it had
chosen (Gray, p 97)
4. If the essence of strategy is instrumentally, the essence of instrumentally is
predictability. Strategists predict the achievement of desired outcomes
through the threat or use of particular qualities and quantities of force.
Strategy requires prediction at many levels. (Gray, p 98)
5. The social scientist (and strategist) needs to decide what aids understanding
and what does not (Gray, p 99).
6. Due to Chaos, complexity and nonlinearity theories, accurate prediction has
become impracticable (Gray, p 99-100) yet even though war is essentially non-
linear and chaotic, war is also essentially economic, political and even
substantially predictable just as modern economics are (Gray p 101).
7. History, logic, and intuition all combine to advise that although war is a
gamble, it is not in the realm of pure chance, increasing your ability to account
and manipulate variables can increase your chances (Gray, p 102).
 8. Strategy is complex in the sense conveyed by the notion of complexity
employed by chaos theorists. Strategy has several or many dimensions which
function synergistically in intricate ways (Gray, p 105). Strategy is non-linear
in that strategic consequences, effectiveness, can show radical discontinuities
(Gray, p 106). Strategy is chaotic because it can register both the radical
discontinuities in outcomes characteristic on nonlinearity, as well as
consequences that differ on a range apparently wholly disproportionate to the
scale of initial impetus. (Gray, p 106).
9. Though certainly complex, strategy is not beyond meaningful planning and
execution. Chaos can be confounded (Gray, p 110)
10.The RMA practitioner develops and possibly employs the military instrument
that in the hands of the strategist delivers strategic performance. (Gray, p
117).
11.The dimensions of strategy are also dimensions of RMA. The conduct of RMA,
pre-planned or not, is an exercise in strategy (Gray, p 120)
12.Strategy’s dimensions are analytically distinctive, but in practice, each effects,
or certainly could effect, the performance of the others synergistically for net
positive or negative results (Gray, p 122).
13.There is no hierarchy among the dimensions of strategy (Gray, p 123).
14.Strategy is comprised of many inalienable elements (Gray, p 124).
15.Historical reference for each dimension must be locally specific and to some
degree variable (Gray, p 124).
16.Strategy is a synergistic, sometimes even a chaotically non-linear, enterprise
wherein strength or weakness on any dimension con influence the strength or
weakness of other dimensions (Gray, p 125).
17.Strategy’s dimensions can be manipulated, purposefully (Gray, p 125).
18.Strategic behavior is generally possible, even though the true whole structure
and dynamics of strategy are literally beyond comprehension (Gray, p 130).

APPLICATION:
Strategists can us the Gray model to help inform and possible predict behavior for
strategic theory. Understanding the variables and how their relationship with one
another can help strategists manipulate them to their advantage. Understanding the
RMA and how it can help/hinder the application of strategy is especially beneficial if
attempting to make a breakthrough in a strategic impasse.
CONCLUSION:
The author successfully supports his thesis by examining the impact of chaos,
complexity, and nonlinear aspects of war on strategy. These aspects play a large
role in the outcome of war, but do not reduce the need for strategy in war. Strategy
provides a broad vision for the conduct of war that synchronizes diverse variables to
reduce the impact of the chaotic aspects. Innovation nested within this strategy
contributes to the synchronization of these elements and sets the condition for the
innovation to be an RMA.
Chaos in strategic development is real, ever-present and must be accounted for
when conceiving plans and strategy. It does not overwhelm the planning
environment to the level that traditional, linear planning and strategy can or should
be abandoned. Sound, robustly developed, and well executed planning and strategy
will provide the best results over the long term.
Gray updates Clausewitz’s theories to accommodate RMA theory and theories of
strategy; of how an RMA is strategic behavior and how although strategy is generally
non-linear, [planned] strategic behavior is generally possible.
Colin Gray is one of the foremost thinkers in strategic theory. His understands the
value of predictive analysis in a highly complex, chaotic and nonlinear world. His
model only adds tools to the kit bag of the formulation of a relevant, coherent
strategy.