SELECT SUPREME COURT RULINGS ON AGRARIAN LAW

2008
DELA CRUZ v. QUIAZON, G.R. No. 171961, November 28, 2008
Estela Dizon-Garcia, mother of Amelia G. Quiazon, was the registered owner of a
parcel of land brought under the coverage of PD 27. In 1981, Feliciano dela Cruz, a
tenant-farmer, was issued a CLT over a 3.7200-hectare portion of the said property.
In 1992, the heirs of Estela Dizon-Garcia executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Admission and Partition with Waiver adjudicating among themselves all the
properties left by both of their parents, except for the subject property, which was
adjudicated solely in favor of respondent.
In 1993, A, Quiazon filed a Complaint with the PARAD against petitioner Ferdinand
dela Cruz, alleging that in 1991, he entered into a leasehold contract with A. Quiazon,
by virtue of which he bound himself to deliver 28 cavans of palay as rental. Since
1991, petitioner F. dela Cruz allegedly failed to deliver the stipulated rental because
he had already abandoned the landholding. For this reason, respondent prayed for his
ejectment from the property and the termination of their tenancy relationship
1.

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

Citing Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169, 178-179 [1996]:
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases when
there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which
may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not
prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such
appeal, he cannot avail himself of this remedy. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks
avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own
negligence; otherwise, the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost
thru inexcusable negligence.

2.

CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER EFFECT

Citing Planters Development Bank v. Garcia, G.R. No. 147081, December 9,
2005, 477 SCRA 185, 199; Vinzons-Magana v. Estrella, G.R. No. 60269,
September 13, 1991, 201 SCRA 536, 540:

The issuance of a CLT does not vest full ownership in the holder.

Citing Martillano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148277, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA
195, 203-204:
The issuance of the CLT does not sever the tenancy relationship between the landowner and the tenant-farmer.
A certificate of land transfer merely evinces that the grantee thereof is qualified to avail himself of the statutory
mechanism for the acquisition of ownership of the land tilled by him as provided under P.D. No. 27. It is not a
muniment of title that vests in the farmer/grantee absolute ownership of his tillage.

Citing Pagtalunan v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 54281, March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA 252,
259:
It is only after compliance with the conditions which entitle a farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent that he
acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding a right which then would have become
fixed and established, and no longer open to doubt or controversy.
HTcDEa

3.

PERSONALITY OF LANDOWNER TO RAISE ABANDONMENT

Citing Estolas v. Mabalot, 431 Phil. 462, 469 [2002]:
For this reason, the landowner retains an interest over the property that gives him the right to file the
necessary action to evict the tenant from the landholding should there be an abandonment despite the fact
that land acquired under P.D. No. 27 will not revert to the landowner.

4.

ABANDONMENT
Citing Corpuz v. Grospe, 388 Phil. 1100, 1111 (2000):
Abandonment requires (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or
property; and (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect. The intention to
abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never returning, resuming or claiming the right and
the interest that have been abandoned.

Citing Verde v. Macapagal, G.R. No. 151342, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA 97, 106107; Romero v. Tan, 468 Phil. 224, 238 (2004); Palele v. Court of Appeals, 414
Phil. 417, 429 (2001):
The immigration of the original farmer-beneficiary to the U.S.A. did not necessarily result in the
abandonment of the landholding, considering that one of his sons, petitioner Renato dela Cruz, continued
cultivating the land. Personal cultivation, as required by law, includes cultivation of the land by the tenant
(lessee) himself or with the aid of the immediate farm household, which refers to the members of the
family of the tenant and other persons who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him
in the [agricultural] activities.

5. CERTIFICATE
OF
RETENTION/CANCELLATION

LAND

TRANSFER

Citing Daez v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 742, 754 (2000):

Without doubt, the landowner's right of retention may be exercised over tenanted land despite the issuance
of a CLT to farmer-beneficiaries. However, the cancellation of a CLT over the subject landholding as a
necessary consequence of the landowner's exercise of his right of retention is within the jurisdiction of the
DAR Secretary, not the DARAB, as it does not involve an agrarian dispute.

In Tenants of the Estate of Dr. Jose Sison v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 93045,
June 29, 1992, 210 SCRA 545), the Court sustained the authority or jurisdiction of
the DAR Secretary to cancel the CLT issued to tenant-beneficiaries after the
landowners' right to retain the subject landholding was upheld. The Court ruled
that the issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of land transfer falls within
the Secretary's administrative jurisdiction as implementor of P.D. No. 27.

6.

COLLATERAL ATTACK ON JUDGMENT

Citing Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 250, 264 (1997):
To conclude, respondent's remedy is to raise before the DAR Secretary the matter of cancellation of
petitioner's CLT as an incident of the order granting the landowners' application for retention over the said
landholding. In the same forum, petitioners can raise the issue of the validity of the DAR order granting the
application for retention based on their claim of denial of due process, or in a separate action specifically
filed to assail the validity of the judgment. A collateral attack against a judgment is generally not allowed,
unless the judgment is void upon its face or its nullity is apparent by virtue of its own recitals.

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2009
LAND BANK v. PACITA AGRICULTURAL MULTI-PURPOSE
COOPERATIVE, G.R. No. 177607, January 19, 2009
Eight parcels of land with an aggregate area of 34.96 hectare was placed under the
coverage of OLT. Between the years 1978 to 1983 CLTs were issued to farmer
beneficiaries. Between 1986 to 1990, EPs were issued. In 1986 and, LBP paid AAC
P35, 778, the amount of only two of the eight parcels of land. Thereafter, AAC sold
the landholding to Pacita. Pacita then inquired from LBP regarding the price of the
remaining six parcels. LBP valued the same at P148,172, which was refused by
Pacita. Upon the passage of DAR AO, Series of 1994, a 6% per year increment on
the value of land from the date it was taken up to October 1994 shall be imposed.
Hence, the value was increased to P537,538. However, the said value was still
refused by Pacita, which then filed a complaint for determination of just
compensation before the SAC. It asked that the value of the remaining parcels be
pegged at 2.7M.
1.

JUST COMPENSATION WHEN COMPUTED

The instant case involves a closely similar factual milieu as that
in Natividad and Meneses. The DAR acquired the subject property in 1972
through its Operation Land Transfer Program, pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
27. Since then, the subject property has already been distributed to the farmerbeneficiaries who, since then, have exclusively possessed the same and harvested
its produce. Eventually, the Emancipation Patents were issued in the beneficiaries'
favor. Even after the lapse of 23 years from 1972, when the DAR took the
subject land property, until 1995, when respondent filed its Petition before the
SAC the full payment of just compensation due respondent has yet to be made
by petitioner. These circumstances, the same as in Natividad and Meneses, make it
more equitable for the SAC to determine the just compensation due the respondent
for the remainder of the subject property using values at the time of its payment.
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LANDICHO v. SIA, G.R. No. 169472, January 20, 2009

The Aragons were the owners of a parcel of land tenanted by Arcadio Landicho. Upon
the latter's death, his son Francisco Landicho succeeded him in his tenancy. Francisco
Landicho cultivated the landholding with the help of his son Buenaventura Landicho
and his brother Federico Landicho. Subsequently, he surrendered his tenancy rights
over the landholding in favor of E. Zolota, wife of one of the Aragons as per
a Kasulatan. Despite the execution of the Kasulatan, F. Landicho, et al. continued in
the possession and cultivation of the landholding. Years after,
another Kasulatan evidencing the surrender of rights was executed. On the day of the
execution of the second Kasulatan, the Aragons sold the subject landholding to Sia
who managed to convert the use of the land for residential purpose without a DAR
clearance. Thus, the Landichos filed a complaint for disturbance compensation.
TcCSIa

1.

TENANCY ESTABLISHMENT
Citing RA 1199:
A tenancy relationship arises between a landholder and a tenant once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to
undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landholder, as a result of which relationship the
tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land.

2.

TENANCY QUANTUM OF PROOF

Citing Heirs of Jugalbot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170346, March 12, 2007,
518 SCRA 202, 214-215, citing Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L60287, August 17, 1988, 164 SCRA 431, 438-439:
The petitioners cannot rely on their self-serving statements to prove the existence of a tenancy relationship
because independent and concrete evidence, aside from self-serving statements, is needed to prove personal
cultivation, sharing of harvests, or consent of the landowner.

3.

CULTIVATION INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH TENANCY

Citing Danan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132759, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA
113, 126:
A tiller or a farmworker does not automatically become an agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian
laws by mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land.

4.

ELEMENT OF TENANCY SHARING OF HARVESTS

Citing Cornelio de Jesus, et al. v. Moldex Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 153595,
November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 316:
Independent evidence, such as receipts, must be presented to show that there was a sharing of the harvest
between the landowner and the tenant. And, assuming the landowners received a share of the harvest, that
the fact of receipt, without an agreed system of sharing, does not ipso factocreate a tenancy.

5.

IMPLIED TENANCY
4

Acquiescence by the landowner of their cultivation of the land does not create an
implied tenancy if the landowners have never considered petitioners Federico and
Buenaventura as tenants of the land and if the essential requisites of a tenancy
relationship are lacking. There was no intention to institute the petitioners as
agricultural tenants.
Citing Epitacio Sialana v. Mary Y. Avila, et al., G.R. No. 143598, July 20, 2006,
495 SCRA 501:
For an implied tenancy to come about, the actuations of the parties taken in their entirety must be
demonstrative of an intent to continue a prior lease established by the landholder.

6.

CAPACITY TO GIVE CONSENT

Citing Mario J. Mendezona v. Julio H. Ozamiz, et al., 426 Phil. 888, 906 (2002):
A person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical
infirmities. It is only when such age or infirmities impair the mental faculties to such extent as to prevent
one from properly, intelligently, and fairly protecting her property rights, is she considered incapacitated.

7.

PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF PUBLIC INSTRUMENT

It is also important to note that both the 1976 and 1987 Kasulatan are duly
notarized and are considered as public documents evidencing the surrender of
Francisco's tenancy rights over the subject landholdings. They were executed with
all the legal formalities of a public document and thus the legal presumption of the
regularity and validity of the Kasulatan are retained in the absence of full, clear
and convincing evidence to overcome such presumption. Strong evidence is
required to prove a defect of a public instrument, and since such strong and
convincing evidence was not presented in the instant case, the 1976 and the
1987 Kasulatan are presumed valid.
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CASTILLO v. TOLENTINO, G.R. No. 181525, March 4, 2009

Tolentino was the owner of two parcels of land and a caretaker of another. The said
parcels were tenanted by Castillo who promised to remit lease rentals to Tolentino.
Castillo wrote the PARO informing the latter of his intention to construct a water
reservoir. Tolentino also received a copy of the letter and opposed the same. Despite
this, Castillo proceeded with the construction of the water dike. Tolentino filed a case
for ejectment. PARAD ruled for the ejectment of Castillo. DARAB initially affirmed
the Decision but reversed itself in a Motion for Reconsideration. CA reinstated the
Decision of the PARAD since it held that the appeal was filed out of time.

1. OBLIGATIONS
OF
A
TENANT
WITH
RESPECT
CONSTRUCTION OF IMPROVEMENTS ON THE LANDHOLDING

TO

Section 32 of R.A. No. 3844 specifically requires notice to and consent of the
agricultural lessor before the agricultural lessee may embark upon the construction
of a permanent irrigation system. It is only when the former refuses to bear the
expenses of construction that the latter may choose to shoulder the same. More
importantly, any change in the use of tillable land in the leasehold, e.g. through the
construction of a sizeable water reservoir, impacts upon the agricultural lessor's
share in the harvest, which is the only consideration he receives under the agrarian
law. This being the case, before the agricultural lessee may use the leasehold for a
purpose other than what had been agreed upon, the consent of the agricultural
lessor must be obtained, lest he be dispossessed of his leasehold.
The law (Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 3844) does not give blanket authority to the
agricultural lessee to construct an irrigation system at anytime and for any reason;
instead, it presupposes primarily that the same is necessary.
2.

IMPLIED OBLIGATION OF A TENANT

The fact that CASTILLO was convicted by final judgment of an offense against
TOLENTINO's son, George, demonstrates how relations between the two have
deteriorated. While R.A. No. 3844 authorizes termination by the agricultural
lessee of the lease for a crime committed by the agricultural lessor against the
former or any member of his immediate farm household, the same privilege is not
granted to the agricultural lessor. Yet, this does not mean that the courts should
not take into account the circumstance that the agricultural lessee committed a
crime against the agricultural lessor or any member of his immediate family. By
committing a crime against TOLENTINO's son, CASTILLO violated his
obligation to his lessor to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith, an obligation that is deemed included in his leasehold
agreement. Provisions of existing laws form part of and are read into every
contract without need for the parties expressly making reference to them.

3. VIOLATION OF OBLIGATION OF A TENANT GROUND FOR

DISPOSSESSION
In sum, we hold that the construction of the reservoir constitutes a violation of
Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844, an unauthorized use of the landholding for a purpose
other than what had been agreed upon, and a violation of the leasehold contract
between CASTILLO and TOLENTINO, for which the former is hereby penalized
with permanent dispossession of his leasehold.
SEAHcT

4.

SOCIAL JUSTICE POLICY

Citing Bautista v. Mag-isa, G.R. No. 152564, September 13, 2004, 438 SCRA
259; Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110335, June 18, 2001, 358 SCRA
598:
Agrarian laws were enacted to help small farmers uplift their economic status by providing them with a
modest standard of living sufficient to meet their needs for food, clothing, shelter and other basic
necessities. It provides the answer to the urgent need to alleviate the lives of the vast number of poor
farmers in our country. Yet, despite such laws, the majority of these farmers still live on a hand-to-mouth
existence. This can be attributed to the fact that these agrarian laws have never really been effectively
implemented. Certain individuals have continued to prey on the disadvantaged, and as a result, the farmers
who are intended to be protected and uplifted by the said laws find themselves back in their previous plight
or even in a more distressing situation.

Citing De Jesus v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72282, July 24, 1989,
175 SCRA 559:
R.A. No. 3844, or the Agricultural Land Reform Code, was enacted by Congress to institute land reforms
in the Philippines. It was passed to establish owner-cultivatorship and the family size farm as the basis of
Philippine agriculture; to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious industrial
restraints and practices; as well as to make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible
citizens and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society.

R.A. 3844 and R.A. 6389, being social legislations, are designed to promote
economic and social stability and must be interpreted liberally to give full force
and effect to their clear intent, not only in favor of the tenant-farmers but also of
landowners.
5. SOCIAL JUSTICE POLICY NOT INTENDED TO COUNTENANCE
WRONGDOING
We cannot allow a situation where despite the one-sided nature of the law
governing agricultural leasehold tenancy (R.A. No. 3844), which exceedingly
favors the agricultural lessee/tenant and farmworker the agricultural lessee has
shown lack of courtesy to the landowner and, instead, abused his rights under said
law, at the same time neglecting or willfully refusing to take advantage of his
rights under the comprehensive agrarian reform law which would have otherwise
fulfilled its mandate to provide land for the landless. The primary purpose,
precisely, of agrarian reform is the redistribution of lands to farmers and regular
farmworkers who are landless, irrespective of tenurial arrangement.
The law recognizes and condones that a leasehold tenant may have his own land
while he tills that of another, but certainly we cannot see any justification why a
tenant should give away for free and sell his own agricultural land until nothing is
left, and then insist himself on someone else's without giving the landowner the
proper respect and regard that is due him, acting presumptuously and beyond his
stature as mere agricultural lessee.

Citing Cecilleville Realty and Service Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120363,
September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 819:
The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by
the underprivileged. Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the
recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege.

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MERCADO v. MERCADO, G.R. No. 178672, March, 19 2009

The grandfather of Edmundo Mercado was the owner of a parcel of land tenanted by
Julio Mercado. J. Mercado was issued a CLT, and subsequently, an EP covering the
landholding. Having been designated in his grandfather's Huling Habilin, E. Mercado
was able to obtain a Certificate of Retention. Thus, he filed a complaint for the
cancellation of the EP, alleging that the same had been irregularly issued, and
ejectment on the ground of deliberate non-payment of lease rentals. The PARAD
declared the validity of the EP. The said Decision was reversed by the DARAB,
ordering the ejecment of J. Mercado. No appeal having been taken within the
reglementary period, the DARAB Decision became final and executory.
1.

IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT
Citing Biglang-awa v. Philippine Trust Company, G.R. No. 158998, March 28,
2008, 550 SCRA 160, 177:
The DARAB decision in DARAB Case No. 4389 had long become final and executory, hence, immutable
and unalterable. It may thus no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. Excepted from this rule is when the modification involves
correction of 1) clerical errors, 2) nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and 3) void
judgments. None of these exceptions is present in the case at bar, however.

2.

JURISDICTION DARAB
Citing Hermoso v. C.L. Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 140319, May 5, 2006, 489
SCRA 556, 563:
Jurisdiction over a case does not thus disappear the moment a certificate of title is issued, for the issuance
of such certificate is not a mode of transfer of property but merely an evidence of such transfer.

3.

JURISDICTION BY ESTOPPEL
Citing Hermoso v. C.L. Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 140319, May 5, 2006, 489
SCRA 556, 563:
IN ANY EVENT, petitioner may not question the jurisdiction of the DARAB and its adjudicative arm at
this late juncture of the proceedings, he having actively participated in the proceedings below.
acADIT

4.

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

Respecting the affirmance by the appellate court of the denial by the DARAB of
petitioner's Petition for Relief from Judgment, Rule XVI of the 2003 DARAB
Rules of Procedure provides the following conditions for availing of such relief:
Section 1.
Petition for Relief from Decision/Resolution/Final Order. When a decision/resolution/final
order is rendered by the adjudicator against any party, through fraud, accident, mistake, and excusable
negligence and such party has no other adequate remedy available to him in the ordinary course of law, he
may file a petition for relief with said adjudicator, praying that the decision/resolution/final order be set
aside. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2.
Form and Time of Filing of Petition. A petition for relief must be verified and a copy thereof
together with its annexes and supporting affidavits, if any, must be furnished to the adverse party or parties
and filed within sixty (60) days from the time the fraud, mistake or excusable negligence was discovered
and within six (6) months after the decision/resolution/final order was rendered. (Underscoring supplied)

Relief from judgment is thus available only against the decision of an adjudicator,
to be filed before the adjudicator, when the party seeking it has no other adequate
remedy available to him in the ordinary course of law.
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REYNALDO v. YATCO, G.R. No. 165494, March 20, 2009

DCN 3361
Belizario was the owner of a 4.3 hectare parcel of land which she donated to Tomas
Yatco as evidence by a Deed of Donation inter vivos. Said land was tenanted by
Aguido Levardo who subsequently executed a Pinanumpaang Salaysay signed by him
and his children, waiving his rights as tenant. A. Levardo received 2M as disturbance
compensation. T. Yatco sold the landholding to Gonzalo Puyat and Sons. The
Levardos filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the Deed of Donation,
Deed of Sale and the waiver of rights.
DCN 3362
Leoncio Yatco was the owner of a 4.2 hectare parcel of land which was tenanted by
Francisco and his son Hernando Levardo. F. Levardo likewise executed a
similar Pinanumpaang Salaysay waiving his rights as tenant. F. Levardo received
2.4M as disturbance compensation. L. Yatco thereafter sold the landholding to
Gonzalo Puyat and Sons. The Levardos filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity
of the Deed of Donation, Deed of Sale and the waiver of rights.
In both cases, the plaintiffs grounded their causes of action on the claim that the land
in dispute was covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 27 (P.D. No. 27). They contend that they were already deemed the owners
of the land on the basis of an alleged Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) in the name
of their father Aguido, which was never issued by the DAR, but on the basis of an
alleged certified xerox copy of a Masterlist of tenants wherein his name appeared.

1.

PD 27 COVERAGE
P.D. No. 27 should be read in conjunction with Letter of Instruction No. 474 (LOI
No. 474) and the DAR Memorandum on the "Interim Guidelines on Retention by
Small Landowners" dated July 10, 1975 (DAR Memorandum). The pertinent
portion of LOI No. 474 is as follows:
1.
You shall undertake to place the Land Transfer Program of the government pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners
who own other agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas or lands used for
residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to
support themselves and their families. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The pertinent portion of the DAR Memorandum is as follows:

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5.
Tenanted rice and/or corn lands seven (7) hectares or less shall not be covered by Operation Land
Transfer. The relation of the land owner and tenant-farmers in these areas shall be leasehold . . . (Emphasis
supplied)

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the lands in dispute do not fall under the
coverage of P.D. No. 27. The DAR Memorandum is categorical that lands with
seven hectares or less shall not be covered by OLT.
2. TERMINATION OF LEASEHOLD BY PAYMENT OF DISTURBANCE
COMPENSATION
Based on the evidence on record, respondents paid Aguido P2,000,000.00 and
Hernando P2,417,142.00 as disturbance compensation. A reading of
the Pinanumpaang Salaysay executed by petitioners show that they gave up their
leasehold rights"dahil sa aming kagustuhang umiba ng hanap buhay ng higit ang
pagkikitaan kaysa panakahan." The money given by respondents as disturbance
compensation was indeed advantageous to the families of petitioners, as it would
have allowed them to pursue other sources of livelihood.
3.

CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER EFFECT

Citing Pagtalunan v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 54281, March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA 252:
Moreover, assuming arguendo that CLTs were actually issued to petitioners, a CLT does not vest in
the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein. At most, the CLT merely evidences the
government's recognition of the grantee as partly qualified to await the statutory mechanism for the
acquisition of ownership of the land titled by him as provided in P.D. No. 27. Neither is this
recognition permanent or irrevocable.

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LAKEVIEW GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC. v. LUZVIMIN

SAMAHANG NAYON, G.R. No. 171253, April 16, 2009
Lakeview was the owner of a 60-hectare parcel of land. The DAR issued a Notice of
Coverage and served a Notice of Acquisition upon Lakeview. The latter opposed the
coverage alleging that: (1) the subject property is not agricultural having been
projected as a golf course prior to 1988; (2) that the development for its conversion
and utilization has already been commenced; (3) that it is generally mountainous with
major portions having a slope of over 18% and minimal topsoil; and (4) that it has no
tenant or farmworker since the alleged farmer-beneficiaries are mere intruders who
entered the subject property. OSEC denied the protest and directed the acquisition of
the landholding. CLOAs were then issued and registered.
1. JURISDICTION OVER DETERMINATION OF CARP COVERAGE
DAR SECRETARY
Citing Aninao v. Asturias Chemical Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 160420, July 28,
2005, 464 SCRA 526, 540:
Noteworthy, the afore-cited Section 2 of DAR Administrative Order No. 06-00 also provides that the DAR
Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction to classify and identify landholdings for coverage under the CARP,
including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of coverage. The matter of CARP
coverage is strictly an administrative implementation of the CARP whose competence belongs to the DAR
Secretary. Significantly, the DAR Secretary had already denied petitioner's protest and determined that the
subject property was covered by the CARP. Such ruling was even affirmed by the Court of Appeals and
this Court. Absent palpable error by these bodies, of which this Court finds none, their determination as to
the coverage of the subject property under the CARP is controlling.
HAaDcS

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HERMOSO v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 166748, April 24, 2009

Two lots which form part of a bigger parcel of land were tenanted. The tenants filed
an application for the coverage of the landholding under PD 27. The said application
was granted but the issuance of EP in favor of the applicants was suspended because a
separate case for the declaration of tenancy relationship was filed by the said
applicants with the DARAB. In the latter case, the DARAB ruled that tenancy
relationship existed. Subsequently, the applicants moved for the issuance of EPs in
their favor. The OSEC approved the same. However, upon review by the OP where
the owners raised the issue that the landholding was not within the ambit of PD 27, it
having been previously reclassified by the OSEC as suited for residential, commercial,
industrial and urban purposes.
1.

CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS
The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types, i.e., primary
classification and secondary classification. The primary classification comprises
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. These are lands
specifically mentioned in Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution. The same

11

provision of the Constitution, however, also states that agricultural lands of the
public domain may further be classified by law according to the uses to which
they may be devoted. This further classification of agricultural lands is referred to
as secondary classification. Under existing laws, Congress has granted authority to
a number of government agencies to effect the secondary classification of
agricultural lands to residential, commercial or industrial or other urban uses.
2.

COVERAGE UNDER PD 27
For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come within the coverage of P.D.
No. 27, it is necessary to determine whether the land is agricultural. Section 3 (c)
of R.A. No. 6657 defines agricultural land, as follows:
(c) Agricultural Land refers to the land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.

and Section 3 (b) specifies agricultural activity as:

(b) Agriculture, Agriculture Enterprise or Agricultural Activity means cultivation of the soil,
planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other
farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done
by persons whether natural or juridical.

On the basis of these definitions, the subject parcels of land cannot be considered
as within the ambit of P.D. No. 27. This considering that the subject lots were
reclassified by the DAR Secretary as suited for residential, commercial, industrial
or other urban purposes way before petitioner filed a petition for emancipation
under P.D. No. 27.
3.

CONVERSION UNDER RA 3844 AS AMENDED BY RA 6389

Citing De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156965, October 12, 2006, 504
SCRA 238, 249:
Under R.A. No. 6389, the condition imposed on the landowner to implement the conversion of the
agricultural land to non-agricultural purposes within a certain period was deleted. With the enactment of
the amendatory law, the condition imposed on the landowner to implement the conversion of the
agricultural land to a non-agricultural purpose within a certain period was deleted. The remedy left
available to the tenant is to claim disturbance compensation.

xxx

xxx

xxx

SOLIMAN v. PASUDECO, G.R. No. 169589, June 16, 2009

Dalmacio Sicat was the owner of a 10 hectare parcel of land. He offered to sell the
subject property to PASUDECO to be used as a housing complex for PASUDECO's
laborers and employees. The land was initially offered for sale at the price of P8.00
per square meter. This was later reduced to P5.00 per square meter. The Board of
Directors of PASUDECO issued Board Resolution authorizing the purchase of the

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subject property at P4.00 per square meter. Thereafter, Dalmacio and his tenants
jointly filed a Petition seeking approval of the voluntary surrender of the subject
property with payment of disturbance compensation. The voluntary surrender was
approved and the tenancy relation was extinguished on the date they entered into the
agreement. A Deed of Sale with Mortgage was executed between Dalmacio and
PASUDECO. Thereafter, the documents needed for the conversion of the land to
residential purposes were prepared. TCT in favor PASUDECO was then issued and
registered. However, due to financial distress, PASUDECO did not complete the
construction. For the meantime, though, it did not authorize any person to occupy the
landholding.
Petitioners alleged that in 1970, the manager of PASUDECO made one Ciriaco
Almario his overseer/caretaker, tasked to collect lease rentals from petitioners. In turn,
C. Almario remitted the rentals to the manager. In May 1990, C. Almario certified that
petitioners were the actual tenant-tillers of the subject property. Moreover, petitioners
deposited their alleged rentals with the LBP.
The real controversy arose when PASUDECO decided to pursue the development of
the property into a housing project for its employees in the latter part of April 1990. In
May 1990, petitioners filed a Complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession
before the PARAD to restrain him from harassing and molesting petitioners in their
respective landholdings. Petitioners together with armed men, entered the property
and destroyed some of their crops. Traversing the complaint, the manager raised as
one of his defenses the fact that PASUDECO was the owner of the subject property.
1.

TENANCY ESTABLISHMENT
Citing Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 140164, September 6, 2002, 388 SCRA 471, 481482:
Under R.A. 3844, two modes are provided for in the establishment of an agricultural leasehold relation: (1)
by operation of law in accordance with Section 4 of the said act; or (2) by oral or written agreement, either
express or implied.
By operation of law simply means the abolition of the agricultural share tenancy system and the conversion
of share tenancy relations into leasehold relations. The other method is the agricultural leasehold contract,
which may either be oral or in writing.

2.

IMPLIED TENANCY
Petitioners' assertion that they were allowed to cultivate the subject property
without opposition, does not mean that PASUDECO impliedly recognized the
existence of a leasehold relation. Occupancy and continued possession of the land
will not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant, because the principal factor in
determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.

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3.

ELEMENT OF TENANCY CONSENT

Citing Masaquel v. Orial, G.R. No. 148044, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 51,
63 and Bautista v. Araneta, G.R. No. 135829, February 22, 2000, 326 SCRA
234, citing Lastimoza v. Blanco, 110 Phil. 835, 838 [1961]).
Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder who is either
the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the property, and not through the acts of the supposed
landholder who has no right to the property subject of the tenancy. To rule otherwise would allow collusion
among the unscrupulous to the prejudice of the true and lawful landholder.
cCaSHA

4. ACTUAL
AND
CONTINUED
DETERMINATIVE OF TENANCY

POSSESSION

NOT

Citing Nicorp Management and Development Corporation v. Leonida de Leon,

G.R. No. 176942 and G.R. No. 177125, August 28, 2008:
Occupancy and continued possession of the land will not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant, because the
principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.

5. QUANTUM OF PROOF TO PROVE SHARING SUBSTANTIAL

EVIDENCE
Citing Valencia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122363, April 29, 2003, 401 SCRA
666, 690-691:
Substantial evidence necessary to establish the fact of sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere scintilla of
evidence; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate to prove the element of sharing. Thus, to
prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other credible evidence must be presented, because self-serving
statements are inadequate.

6. CERTIFICATION ATTESTING TO TENANT STATUS NOT

BINDING UPON JUDICIARY
Citing Salmorin v. Zaldivar, G.R. No. 169691, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 564, 571572:
The certifications attesting to petitioners' alleged status as de jure tenants are insufficient. In a given
locality, the certification issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or an authorized representative, like
the MARO or the BARC, concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship between the
contending parties, is considered merely preliminary or provisional, hence, such certification does not bind
the judiciary.

xxx

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TARONA v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 170182, June 18, 2009

Respondents Leanos were the owners of the landholding which was registered in the
name of their now deceased mother. They filed a complaint for recovery of the
landholding against the Taronas who claimed to be successor-tenants (their uncle
allegedly having been recognized by the respondents' father as such tenant as per a

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leasehold agreement between the two). The Leanos denied such claim arguing that the
Taronas could not have been tenants because they were not even residents of the place
where the landholding was located.
1.

ELEMENT OF TENANCY PERSONAL CULTIVATION

Clearly, private respondents' evidence, which significantly the petitioners failed to
refute, more than substantially proved the impossibility of personal cultivation.
Petitioners (intervenors) have already left the place where the subject land lies in
Morong, Bataan, and now live in another locality which is in Caloocan City. Since
Bataan is of a considerable distance from Caloocan City, it would undeniably be
physically impossible for the petitioners to personally cultivate the landholding.
Citing Deloso v. Marapao, G.R. No. 144244, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 585:
While a tenant is not required to be physically present in the land at all hours of the day and night,
such doctrine cannot be stretched to apply to a case wherein the supposed tenant has chosen to reside
in another place so far from the land to be cultivated that it would be physically impossible to be
present therein with some degree of constancy as to allow the tenant to cultivate the same.

Citing Verde v. Macapagal, G.R. No. 151342, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA 97, 106107:
It has been held that personal cultivation is an important factor in determining the existence of an
agricultural lease relationship such that in its absence, an occupant of a tract of land, or a cultivator
thereof, or planter thereon, cannot qualify as a de jure lessee.

2.

JURISDICTION OVER DETERMINATION OF CARP COVERAGE

The power to determine whether a property is subject to CARP coverage lies with
the DAR Secretary pursuant to Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657. Verily, it is explicitly
provided under Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB Revised Rules that matters
involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP and other
agrarian laws and regulations, shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable
by the Secretary of the DAR. Moreover, under the Rules of Procedure for
Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases, set forth in Administrative Order No.
06-00, it is provided that the DAR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over
classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the CARP,
including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of coverage. This
being so, the CA's declaration regarding CARP coverage of the subject land was
premature considering that the Order of the DAR Regional Director in A.R. Case
No. LSD 015703, entitled In Re Protest from CARP Coverage . . . upon which the
CA based its questioned declaration, was still pending review with the Office of
the DAR Assistant Secretary, as per Certification dated February 18, 2005 by the
Legal Affairs Office of the DAR.

3. IRRELEVANCE OF THE ISSUE OF CARP COVERAGE TO

TENANCY ISSUES

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In any event, the resolution of the issue of whether the entire property or only part
of it is subject to CARP coverage has no bearing on the issue in this
case, i.e. whether petitioners can be considered bona fide tenants of herein private
respondents.
xxx

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xxx

OCTAVIO v. PEROVANO, G.R. No. 172400, June 23, 2009

Perovano was the owner of a landholding which was entered into and planted on by
Octavio, et al. Perovano filed a complaint for ejectment with the RTC. Octavio
alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case since the land was subjected
to CARP coverage.
HTCDcS

1.

JURISDICTION IN GENERAL
Citing Rimasug v. Martin, G.R. No. 160118, November 22, 2005, 475 SCRA 703,
712:
At the outset, let us be clear that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action is commenced, irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. It cannot
be made to depend upon the defenses

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