CAse Digests Article 1 73 of FC Jammy S Part

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine
June 23, 2009
Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Case Digests
Article 1- Definition of Marriage

Marriage is a special contract of a permanent union between a man and woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. Marriage is the foundation
of the family and an inviolable institution whose nature, consequences and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation except that marriage settlements may fix
property relations within the limits provided by the Family Code of the Philippines.
Case: Edwin A. Acebedo vs. Eddie P. Arquero
Nature: Administrative Case
Facts: On June 1, 1994, Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Brookes Point, Palawan for immorality.
Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the MTC
Brookes Point, and respondent unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife at
Bancudo Pulot, Brookes Point, Palawan as a result of which a girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero,
was born to the two on May 21, 1989. Attached to the letter-complaint was the girls Baptismal
Certificate reflecting the names of respondent and Dedje Irader as her parents
Respondent claimed that the immorality charge by the petitioner was just a mere harassment
and a product of complainnats hatred and jealousy. By respondents own admission however, he
had an illicit relationship with the petitioners wife for 8-9 months. The reason for having this
illicit relationship was explained by the respondent that the petitioner and his wife had a
kasunduan in writing and duly notarized. The Kasunduan indicated that they would sever their
marriage ties and allow themselves to live with other possible partner and that no one would go
to court to institute any action against the other.
Issue: Whether or not the Kasunduan is enough ground to sever the marriage tie.
Ruling: SC ruled that respondents justification fails, being an employee of the judiciary,
respondent ought to have known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the
validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife. Art 1 of the family code provides that
marriage is an inviolable social institution whose nature and consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation. It is an institution of public order and policy,
governed by rules established by law which cannot be made inoperative by stipulation of the
parties.
Respondent is suspended for 6 months.

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Case Digests
Article 3- Formal Requisites of Marriage/ Authority of Solemnizing Officer

Case: Zenaida Beso vs Judge Juan Daguman, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-TaranganPagsanjan
Nature: Administrative Complaint
Facts: Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr., for solemnizing marriage outside
of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the
marriage contract with the office of the Local Registrar. The respondent acting as a
solemnizing officer solemnized the wedding of the pertitioner and his fiance in Calbayog City.
The judge having jurisdiction only in Sta. Margarita, Samar.
After the wedding the husband abandoned the petitioner, Smelling something fishy
the petitioner went to the local civil registrar to search for the marriage documents
but to no avail her marriage was no registered. Petitioner went to the judge to search for
the marriage documents but said judge did not possess the documents, it was in fact within the
possession of the husband and he left no copy to the judge.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage was valid?
Whether or not the judge was authorized to solemnize the marriage in this case?
Whether or not the judge is duty bound to process the papers for registering the
marriage?
Ruling:
With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides, among
others, that
Art. 7. Marriage my be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction
In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the counselgeneral, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in
cases of marriages contracted at the point of death or in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 of this Code, or were both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in
which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement to that effect.
As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judge's
chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in
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remote places in accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing
in a sworn statement to this effect.
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fianc Yman was at the
point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the
contracting parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or
at a place other than his sala.
What, in fact, appears on record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to
solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was "an overseas worker, who,
respondent realized deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government
policy." Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question, "[h]e
believed in good faith that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that
it may not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married."
Considering that respondents Judge's jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta.
Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to
solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog.
Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should exercise
extra care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in its solemnization,
he is likewise commanded to observance extra precautions to ensure that the event is properly
documented in accordance with Article 23 of the Family Code which states in no uncertain terms
that
Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of
the contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in Article 6
and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen
days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage
was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing
officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his
file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in
proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage
in a place other than those mentioned in Article 8.
Case: Aranes vs. Judge Salavador M. Occiano

Facts: Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of
the Law. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines
Sur.

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Case Digests
Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to
her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at
Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
The judge executed the solemnization of the marriage out of compassion, according to the judge
that he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. However, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and
could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25
kilometers from his residence in Nabua.
Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which
request he acceded. Thereafter he carefully examined the documents submitted to him
by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite
marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to
another date.
However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of
provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion.
He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia
who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the
marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the
marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give
the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply,
respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance
that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage is valid?
Ruling: The territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines
Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not
amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. The court also said that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the
marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or
even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage
license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent
judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this
respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Case: Juvy Cosca, Edmundo Peralta, Ramon Sambo and Apollo Villamora vs. Hon. Lucio
Palaypayon and Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, MTC Tinambac, Camarines Sur
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Respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal
solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery
in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash
bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring
payment of filing fees from exempted entities.
Facts: Petitioners alleged that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the
requisite marriage license. Thus, the couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of
paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license.
As a consequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any marriage license
number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate
the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license
to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably,
the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P.
Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt
from the marriage license requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant
Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil
registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses
subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their
marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil registrar; that the other five marriages
alluded to in the administrative complaint were not illegally solemnized because the marriage
contracts were not signed by him and they did not contain the date and place of marriage; that
copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo; that the alleged
marriages were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the
absence of a marriage license; that one of the marriages was celebrated even without
the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order to avoid
embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage
contract which remains unsigned up to the present.
Issue: W/N the said marriages are valid for lacking the essential requisite of a valid
marriage license?
Ruling: With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin, Judge Palaypayon admitted that
he solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a
marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that
they have been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already.
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it was
stated that Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If he
and Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already before
they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve) been less than
thirteen (13) years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe.
Judge Palaypayon should have been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage
as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might
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Case Digests
have executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an instant marriage by avoiding
the marriage license requirement.The judge is warned and liable of penalty.
Case: Ireneo Geronimo vs. CA and Antonio Esman

Nature: Petition for Review on CA Decision (Affirming the decision of RTC declaring
the marriage of Graciana and Antonio is valid)
Facts: Petitioner contends that the marriage between Graciana Geronimo (his sister) and
oppositor Antonio A. Esman was null and void since there was no marriage license issued
to the parties at the time the marriage was celebrated. In fact, petitioner contends that a
certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Pateros shows that the marriage license
number was not stated in the marriage contract and that the marriage contract itself
does now show the number of the marriage license issued. Moreover, marriage license
number 5038770 which was issued to the deceased and the oppositor by the Civil Registrar of
Pateros, Rizal was not really issued to Pateros before the marriage was celebrated but to Pasig in
October 1959.
On the other hand, oppositor contends that the arguments raised by petitioner are mere
concoctions; that a close scrutiny of the aforementioned documents would show that except for
the phrases "not stated" and "not recorded" the two certified copies of the marriage
contract issued by the Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal (now Metro Manila) and the
Parish Church of San Roque were the same as the certified copy of the marriage
contract which was attached to the original petition which named the oppositor as the
husband of the deceased; that petitioner simply asked that these phrases be incorporated to
suit his ulterior motive; that even the omission of the marriage license number on the Registry of
Marriages in the Local Civil Registrar is not fatal in itself and is not conclusive proof that no
marriage license was actually signed on January 7, 1955 to Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A.
Esman; and that the marriage license form issued to the Municipality of Pateros are printed by
the Bureau of Printing with serialized numbers and distributed to various provinces or
municipalities thru proper requisitions which serial numbers even if already used in the printing
of the marriage license forms in the past years are used again in the printing of the same forms
in the succeeding years.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage was valid?
Ruling: It may be conceded that the evidences presented of the petitioner-appellant do not
bear the number of the marriage license relative to the marriage of Graciana
Geronimo and the herein oppositor-appellee. But at best, such non-indication of the
number could only serve to prove that the number was not recorded. It could not be accepted as
convincing proof of non-issuance of the required marriage license.
On the other hand, the marriage license number does appear in the certified archives
copy of the marriage contract. The non-indication of the license number in the certified
copies presented by the petitioner-appellant could not be deemed as fatal vis-a-vis the issue of
the validity of the marriage in question because there is nothing in the law which
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requires that the marriage license number would be indicated in the marriage
contract itself.
In Conclusion there was a valid marriage license issued, error in the recording of the serial
number of the license does not tantamount to an invalid marriage.
Case: Republic of the Philippines vs. CA and Angelina M. Castro (SECRET MARRIAGE)
Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari (RTC valid, CA not valid)
Facts:The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M.
Castro in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. As ground therefore, Castro claims that no marriage license was
ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil
ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The
marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas
personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the
marriage, including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself
states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on
June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
Trial court denied the petition but on appeal CA declared the marriage void for lacking the
essential requisite of a valid marriage license.
Issue: W/N a valid marriage license was issued? Whether or not the documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that
no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration
of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas?
Ruling: The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support
of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any
other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the
case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a
judge of a city court.
The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" a
legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the
knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The
records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown
to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held
against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the
proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore
the same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot
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be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was
absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion between private
respondent and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the
contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that
indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may
have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, SC hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established
the absence of the subject marriage license.The petition is DENIED there being no
showing of any reversible error committed by respondent appellate court
Case: Filipina Sy vs. CA, RTC of San Fernando Pampanga and Fernando Sy
Nature: Petition for Review on Decision of CA (affirmed RTC in denying for the declaration of
nullity of the marriage)
Facts: Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted
marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon
City. Both were then 22 years old.
Their union was blessed with two children. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for
legal separation, before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon
motion of petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the
grounds that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living
separately for more than one year.
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her
husband, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that one afternoon, she
went to the dental clinic at Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated by his
mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she was
talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the family
computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her son, and started
spanking him.
At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different
parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking her when she fell on the
floor, and released her only when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma
and contusions on different parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision convicted Fernando only of
the lesser crime of slight physical injuries.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent,
docketed as on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity;
(3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without
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justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court granted the petition on the
grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal
separation.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of
her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that
the final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for
separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her
which led to the conviction of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of
psychological incapacity.
She also cites as manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1)
habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his
mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy
himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband existed
from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest thereafter.
RTC and CA denied the declaration for nullity of the marriage of Filipina and Fernando based on
latters allegedly psychological incapacity. However, upon this petition, Filipina Yap-Sy contended
that the lower courts overlooked the dates of their marriage ceremony and the issuance of a
marriage license.
Issue: W/N marriage was valid due to absence of marriage license?
Ruling: Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment
of marriage before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and
the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando
was void from the beginning, she points out that these critical dates were contained in the
documents she submitted before the court.
The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17,
1974, is contained in their marriage contract in her petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court. The date of celebration of their
marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is
admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's
petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private
respondent's answer admitting it. This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on
January 22, 1993, during her direct examination.
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed
petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was
incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date
of the issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage
license was issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on
November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted
without a marriage license.
These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of
the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal
requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the
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marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in
Carmona.
Case: Jaime Sevilla vs. Carmelita Cardenas

Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari (RTC: invalid; CA reversed and declared it
valid)
Facts:
There are two facts given by both the plaintiff and the respondent:
-
There was a Civil Marriage contracted in the City Hall of Manila

Thereafter a Religious Ceremony was Conducted in Quezon City
Plaintiff averred that he was forced to enter into marriage with the respondent
Respondent averred that the plaintiff and took her away from her parents and arranged a
wedding for them
Plaintiff alleges that he did not procure a marriage license
Due to irreconcilable differences, plaintiff and respondent were separated, thereupon
plaintiff obtained a divorce decree and subsequently married in the US
It was attested by different witnesses that it was the plaintiffs family that arranged the
marriage.
RTC declared the marriage void for lack of a marriage license, because they found out that
there was no existing license on record
CA reversed the decision due to the fact that it was not substantially proven that there
was no marriage license issued. There were erratic problems with regard to the records
because records were not found due to the absence of the handling officer.
Issue: Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to
the parties herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question?
Held: SC agrees with the ruling of CA the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof
of non-issuance of Marriage License. It can also mean, as SC believed true in the case at
bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search
for the said logbook, SC cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means nonexistence or falsity of entries therein.
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Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the
validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon
this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of
the marriage.
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for
several years producing two offsprings, now adults themselves. It took Jaime several
years before he filed the petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another
individual sometime in 1991.We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his
marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit
and perfidy.
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a
social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor
than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage."
This
jurisprudential
attitude
towards
marriage
is
based
on
the prima
facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
Petition is Denied. Judgment of CA is affirmed by SC.
Marriage in Articulo Mortis (Article 27, 31, 32)

Case: Arsenio De Loria and Ricarda De Loria and Felipe Apelan Felix
Nature: Review of a decision of CA involving the central issue of the validity of the
marriage in articulo mortis between Matea de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan Felix.
Facts:
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Fact appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two persons lived
together as wife and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired properties but
had no children. In the early part of the liberation of Manila and surrounding territory, Matea be
came seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition, two young ladies of legal age
dedicated to the service of God, named Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra visited
and persuaded her to go to confession.
They fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter, upon
learning that the penitent had been living with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of
marriage, asked both parties to ratify their union according to the rites of his Church. Both
agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the confession of the bed-ridden old woman, gave her Holy
Communion, administered the Sacrament of Extreme Unction and then solemnized her marriage
with Felipe Apelan Felix in articulo mortis, Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors
or witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945.
After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to be
denied, and in January 1946, she was interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista
performing the burial ceremonies.
On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to compel
defendant to an accounting and to deliver the properties left by the deceased. They
are grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim to be the only surviving forced
heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan Felix resisted the action, setting up his rights as widower. They
obtained favorable judgment in the court of first instance, but on appeal the Court of Appeals
reversed and dismissed the complaint.
Their request for review here was given due course principally to consider the legal questionwhich they amply discussed in their petition and printed brief whether the events which took
place in January 1945 constituted, in the eyes of the law, a valid and binding marriage.
Issue: W/N the marriage was celebrated in Articulo Mortis?
Does the failure to sign the "marriage certificate or contract" constitute a cause for
nullity?
Ruling:
Yes. There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to solemnize
marriage. There is also no question that the parties had legal capacity to contract
marriage, and that both declared before Fr. Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and Judith
Vizcarra that "they took each other as husband and wife."
The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it requires the priest
to make the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the data usually required for the issuance
of a marriage license. The first practically substitutes the latter. Now then, if a marriage
celebrated without the license is not voidable (under Act 3613) this marriage should not also be
voidable for lack of such affidavit.
In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates the causes for
annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of them.
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In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for marriage are the
legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent" (section 1), the latter being
manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage and of two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife"
which in this case actually occurred
In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the parties copies of such
marriage certificate (section 16) and punishing him for its omission (section 41) implies his
obligation to see that such "certificate" is executed accordingly. Hence, it would not be
fair to visit upon the wedded couple in the form of annulment, Father Bautista's omission, if any,
which apparently had been caused by the prevailing disorder during the liberation of Manila and
its environs.
Cohabitation for Five Years (Article 34)

Case: Engrace Nial vs. Norma Bayadog
Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on
April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license.
In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their
father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to
Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of
action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment
of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
The lower court dismissed the action on the ground that petitioners should have filed
the action to declare their fathers marriage to respondent before his death applying
by analogy of Article 47 of the FC (which enumerates the time and the persons who
could initiate fro annulment of marriage)
Issue: Whether or not the second marriage was void ab initio due to the absence of a
marriage license?
Ruling: There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent
Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. They executed an affidavit stating
that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other.
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The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five
year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license.
Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year
continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully
married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the
cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for
five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the
basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the
special contract of marriage to validate the union.
In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the
date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence
of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity
meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity that
is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction
as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage Ceremony (Article 6)
Case: Lucio Morigo y Cacho vs People of the Philippines
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari (RTC convicted Lucio of Bigamy guilty beyond
reasonable doubt)
Facts:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina
Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
Lucia worked in Singapore and Canada and maintained communication with Lucio.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join
her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at
the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect
on February 17, 1992.
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On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at

the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The
complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on
the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the
prosecution.
Issue: Whether or not there was a marriage ceremony validating the marriage of
Lucio and Lucia?
Held: The SC found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of
the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer.
The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles
3 and 4 of the Family Code. This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with;
and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage
In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the
first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused
was, under the eyes of the law, never married. The records show that no appeal was taken
from the decision of the trial court, hence, the decision had long become final and
executory.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere
private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus,
needs no judicial declaration of nullity.
Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid
marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in
favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to
ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner
has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the
validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
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Case: Rodolfo Navarro vs. Judge Hernando Domagtoy

Facts: The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific
acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he
contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of
the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from
his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27,
1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's
residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
Issue: Whether or not the judge has jurisdiction in the case at bar to solemnize
marriage?
Ruling:
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having
solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his
court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the
judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at
the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to
the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of
the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory
provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos,
he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao
del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his
misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic
principles of civil law.
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Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general,
consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law.
The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary
and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them
is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
Respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months
and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Marriage Certificate: Contents Thereof (Article 6, 22)

Case: Leoncia Balogbog and Gaudisio Balogbog vs. CA, Ramonito Balogbog and
Generoso Balogbog
Nature: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu City (Branch IX), declaring private respondents
heirs of the deceased Basilio and Genoveva Balogbog entitled to inherit from them.
Facts: Petitioners are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died
intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935,
predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso
Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming
that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they
were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents. After which
there were witnesses presented that corroborated the story of Ramonito and Generoso that
Gavino and Catalina were indeed married.
Most of the witnesses said that they were present during the marriage ceremony.
Catalina testified that there was a marriage certificate but it was burned during the
war.
Private respondents presented Priscilo Y. Trazo, then 81 years old, mayor of the municipality of Asturias from 1928 to 1934, who
testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and Ramonito to be their first child. On crossexamination, Trazo
explained that he knew Gavino and Catalina because they performed at his campaign rallies, Catalina as "balitaw" dancer and Gavino
Balogbog as her guitarist. Trazo said he attended the wedding of Gavino and Catalina sometime in 1929, in which Rev. Father Emiliano
Jomao-as officiated and Egmidio Manuel, then a municipal councilor, acted as one of the witnesses.
The second witness presented was Matias Pogoy, a family friend of private respondents, who testified that private
respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina. According to him, the wedding of Gavino and Catalina was solemnized in the
Catholic Church of Asturias, Cebu and that he knew this because he attended their wedding and was in fact asked by Gavino to
accompany Catalina and carry her wedding dress from her residence in Camanaol to the poblacion of Asturias before the wedding day.
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He testified that Gavino died in 1935 in his residence at Obogon, Balamban, Cebu, in the presence of his wife. (This contradicts
petitioners' claim made in their answer that Gavino died in the ancestral house at Tag-amakan, Asturias.) Pogoy said he was a
carpenter and he was the one who had made the coffin of Gavino. He also made the coffin of the couple's son, Petronilo, who died
when he was six.
Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino. She testified that after the wedding, she was handed a "receipt,"
presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned during the war. She said that she and Gavino lived together
in Obogon and begot three children, namely, Ramonito, Petronilo, and Generoso. Petronilo died after an illness at the age of six. On
crossexamination, she stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived in common law relation with a man for a year and then they
separated.
Issue: Whether or not the absence of a marriage certificate would rebut the
presumption of marriage?
Held:
Evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the
marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the
failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place.
Other
evidence
may
be
presented
to
prove
marriage. Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino
and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in
infancy; that their marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their
children, private respondents herein, were recognized by Gavino's family and by the
public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed
because there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence
of two witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husband and wife. An exchange
of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses
who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is
to exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding
without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence. The law
favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of
the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern.
Case: In Re: Intestate Estates of Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided
into two groups:
(1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews
and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and
(2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,his nephews and nieces,his
illegitimate child, and the de facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
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Facts: Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a
marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived
together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners
point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry.
Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her
as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage
certificate did not of necessarily means that no marriage transpired. They maintain that
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived
together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this
period spanning more than half a century, they were known among their relatives and
friends to have in fact been married.
Issue: W/N there was a valid marriage?
Held:
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its
absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of
marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not
necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the
presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as
Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration
under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa
Delgado and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to
Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These
are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. No clear and
convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein
was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness whose testimony they primarily relied
upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed
marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as
husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered
by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and
statements contained therein, such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Seorita") civil status of
Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.Petitioners failed to rebut the
presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction,
every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of
things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be
living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. Always presume marriage.
Case: Antonietta Garcia VDA De Chua vs. CA, Hon. Japal Guiani and Florita Vallejo, as
administrator of the Estate of the late Roberto L. Chua
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Facts: During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981.
Out of this union, the couple begot two illegitimate children, namely, Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo.On 28 May
1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.
This is a case regarding the distribution of the property of the late Roberto Chua and the
resolution of the designation of the Adminitratrix of his Estate
Sometime from 1970 up to late 1981 petitioner lived with Roberto Lim Chua as husband
and wife and out of said union they begot two (2) children, namely, Robert Rafson Alonzo
Chua who was born in General Santos City on April 28, 1977 and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua who
was born in Davao City on August 30, 1978.
It was found that the deceased Roberto Lim Chua died single and without legitimate
descendants or ascendants, hence, the above named minors Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and
Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua, his children with herein petitioner shall succeed to the entire estate
of the deceased.
At the hearing of the motion to dismiss on August 19, 1992, counsel for movant Antonietta G.
Chua presented 18 Exhibits in support of her allegation that she was the lawful wife
of the decedent and that the latter resides in Davao City at the time of his death. Exh.
"1" was the xerox copy of the alleged marriage contract between the movant and the
petitioner.
This cannot be admitted in evidence on the ground of the timely objection of the
counsels for petitioner that the best evidence is the original copy or authenticated
copy which the movant cannot produce.
Further, the counsels for petitioner in opposition presented the following: a certification
from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that no such marriage contract was ever
registered with them; a letter from Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have
solemnized the alleged marriage that he has not solemnized such alleged marriage. Exhibit "2"
through "18" consist among others of Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of
Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; Residence
Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and was
born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the
status of the decedent was stated as married; passport of the decedent specifying that he
was married and his residence was Davao City. Petitioner through counsels, objected to the
admission in evidence of Exhibits "2" through "18" if the purpose is to establish the truth of the
alleged marriage between the decedent and Antonietta Garcia. The best evidence they said
is the marriage contract. They do not object to the admission of said exhibit if the
purpose is to show that Davao City was the business residence of the decedent.
Petitioner through counsels, presented Exhibit "A" through "K" to support her allegation that the
decedent was a resident of Cotabato City; that he died a bachelor; that he begot two illegitimate
children with the petitioner as mother. Among these exhibits are Income Tax Returns filed in
Cotabato City from 1968 through 1979 indicating therein that he was single; birth certificates of
the alleged two illegitimate children of the decedent; Resident Certificates of the decedent
issued in Cotabato City; Registration Certificate of Vehicle of the decedent showing that his
residence is Cotabato City.
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Case Digests
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is the legal wife of the deceased?

Held:
It is clear from the foregoing that the movant failed to establish the truth of her allegation
that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage
contract which the movant failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence
Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when
the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the
alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized
the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage. Consequently, she
has no personality to file the subject motion to dismiss.
The petitioner has no standing to be the administrator of the properties of her
children with the deceased. PETITION is denied.
Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of administration. An interested person is one who would be
benefited by the estate such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; his interest is material and direct,
and not one that is only indirect or contingent. 21
Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife of the decedent. The best proof of marriage between man and
wife is a marriage contract which Antonietta Chua failed to produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the photostat copy
of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless
pieces of evidence. The trial court correctly ruled in its 21 August 1992 Order that:
Marriage by Proxies/ Common- Law Marriages

Case: Tomas Eugenio Sr. v.s. Judge Velez
Nature: Petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for restraining order and/or
injunction seeking to enjoin respondent Judge from proceeding with the Habeas Corpus case
Facts:
On 28 August, 1988, unaware of the death of Vitaliana Vargas , the VARGASES, her full
blood brothers and sisters (the private respondents) filed on September 27, 1988, a
petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that Vitaliana was
forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by Eugenio in his
residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.
Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any
legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25
years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
The respondent court in an order dated September 28 1988 issued the writ of
habeas corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied.
Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to
the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus
proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit
from the Undersecretary of the Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the palace
quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered
religious sect, of which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.
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Case Digests
Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in
his residence on 28 August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal
custody of her body.
Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents were granted leave to amend
their petition.
Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only on 28 September 1988 (or after
the filing of the habeas corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged that
petitioner Tomas Eugenio who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully
interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her.
Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, the Vargases contended that, as
the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body
of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. The motion to
dismiss was finally submitted for resolution on 21 October 1988.
Issue: Whether the petitioner has the right for the legal custody of the dead body of
his common-law wife (Vitaliana)?
Ruling: No. Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and
woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent
themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in
the community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions
but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present
in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed
by law, 20 authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that
the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage.
21
When referring to a "spouse" it contemplates a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis

Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to
marry her in her lifetime. Because, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman,
a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
Ratio: Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers
and sisters (the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. The immediate duty of burying the
body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense
thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified:
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and
left any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of
the deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines and in
possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.
Case: Imelda Pilapil vs. Hon. Corona Somerah
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Case Digests
Nature: Special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to
quash (Petitioner being charged of adultery)
Facts:
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and
private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal
Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived
together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was
born on April 20, 1980.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in
private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before
the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation
of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983
where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866.
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of
Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses.
The custody of the child was granted to petitioner.
The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally
competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally
founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree,
private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain
William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named JamesChua sometime in
1983".
The case was filed in court but a Motion to Quash was filed but which was denied.
Hence, a petition was filed before the Supreme Court contending that the complainant
cannot be qualified as an offended party since he has already obtained a final divorce
under his national law prior to the filing of the case.
Issue: Whether the adultery case against the petitioner can prosper even after she
and her former foreign husband had divorce in Germany?
Ruling: No. In case of adultery or concubinage, the complainant must be the offended spouse
and by this is meant that the complainant is still married to the accused. Since they are already
divorced, he has no more capacity to file such action because said divorce and its effects are
recognized in the Philippines insofar as he is concerned.
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband
of the petitioner, has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that
he was not the offended spouse at the time of the suit.
Case: Paula T. Llorente vs. CA and Alicia Llorente
Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of CA
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Facts:
Lorenzo and Paula Llorente were married in Nabua, Camarines Sur. Lorenzo was enlisted
to the US Army and became an American citizen
His wife was left in the Philippines but when he came back, he found out that Paula is
living in with the brother of Lorenzo
He went back to the USA and filed a petition for divorce which was granted
When he came back to the Philippines, he married Alicia with whom he had children
He executed a will bequeathing all his properties to his wife Alicia and their children
When his will was submitted to probate, Paula filed a petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary in her favour contending that is the surviving spouse; that various properties
were acquired during their marriage and that his will encroached on her legitime and
shares in the conjugal property
The petition was given due course
The RTC declared one of the children of Lorenzo as only an illegitimate child entitling her
to 1/3 of the estate and 1/3 of the free portion.
The CA modified the decision declaring Alicia as a co-owner of whatever properties she
and the deceased husband may have acquired during their converture
Issue: Is Alicia entitled to inherit? Why?

Ruling: Yes, because it is clear from his will that he intended to bequeath his properties to his
second wife and children. His wishes cannot be frustrated since he was a foreigner, not covered
by the Philippine Laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity. As to who
inherits from him is governed by foreign law, his national law.
Is the divorce decree obtained by Lorenzo valid? Why?
Yes, owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15, NCC which covers only Philippine
nationals. Such policy covers foreign divorces which are valid in the Philippines even though
obtained abroad, provide they are valid according to their national law. And since the man
was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce, the former wife lost her
right to inherit.
Case: Republic of the Philippines vs. Cipriano Orbecido III

Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari regarding the declaration of the capacity of Orbecido III
to remarry by RTC
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Facts:
Cipriano married Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981

In 1986 Myros left for the US, a few years later, Cipriano discovered that Lady Myros had
been naturalized as an American citizen
It was in the year 2000 that Cipriano learned from his son that Lady obtained a divorce
decree and then remarried
Cipriano thus filed a petition for authority to remarry invoking paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code
The RTC granted the petition
Hence the present recourse where the Solicitor General argues that the subject provision
only applies in the case of a valid mixed marriage- between a Filipino citizen and an alien
Issue: Does par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code apply in the case of Cipriano?
Ruling: The twin requisites for the application of Par 2 of Art. 26 of the FC are both present in
the case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
The intent of paragraph 2, Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.
The subject provision includes cases involving parties who at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
The respondent must prove to the said divorce as a fact and in accordance with the foreign law,
where Lady is naturalized.
Case: Weigel vs. Sempio-Dy

GUYS SORRY HINDI KO MAHANAP SA NET YUNG CASE NA TO. SO I PASTED ONLY SOME
CITATIONS FROM OTHER CASES RELATED.
Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986), the Court held that there is a need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she
married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court
to declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid marriage. The Court,
expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that:
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal
intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted
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Case Digests
her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and
respondent would be regarded VOID under the law
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,i[15] the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that case, Karl
Heinz Wiegel filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on
the ground that the latter had a prior existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be
allowed to present evidence to prove, among others, that her first husband had previously been
married to another woman. In holding that there was no need for such evidence, the Court
ruled: x x x There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage
of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void
still needs, according to this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel;
Case: Mercado vs. Tan
Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts:
Accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27,
1991
As entered in their marriage contract the status of accused was single.

There is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with
complainant, accused was actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma.
Thelma Oliva
Both marriages were consummated when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva
bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with
complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.
Bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City,
which eventually resulted in the institution of the present case before this Court against
said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in information dated January 22,
1993.
On November 13, 1992, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio.
Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code, but she points out that that declaration came only
after the Information had been filed.
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of bigamy because of entering into a subsequent
marriage without a judicial declaration of the nullity of his first marriage?
Ruling: Yes. Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
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When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. It
is undisputed that petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that
marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma.
Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy.
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first
marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with
bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the
acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view
effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a
prejudicial question in the criminal case. Under the circumstances of the present case, he is
guilty of the charge against him.
Ratio: The Elements of Bigamy are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity
Conflicting Decisions of SC:
People vs. Mendoza and People vs. Aragon: The ruled that there was no need for a judicial
declaration of its nullity. Hence, the accused did not commit bigamy when the accused married
for the third time
In subsequent cases: the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of nullity.
In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which
provided:
Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of
the first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive,
or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage as
contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent
court."
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from
mere annullable marriages.
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Case: SUSAN NICDAO CARIO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent

Nature: Petition for Certiorari in the Decision made by CA
Facts:
The deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario contracted two marriages,
o 1st: June 20, 1969 with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario( 2 Kids: Sahlee and Sandee
Cario)
o 2nd: November 10, 1992 with respondent Susan Yee Cario (had no children in
their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982)
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated
by pulmonary tuberculosis.
He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his
medical and burial expenses.
Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig, while respondent Susan Yee received a total of
P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum
of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, that petitioner be ordered to return to
her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00)
Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court
to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge
of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the
deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased.
To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was
solemnized without the required marriage license.
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee
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On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
Issue: Whether the second spouse of the deceased will be entitled of death benefits
even though there is no declaration of the nullity of the deceaseds first marriage?
Ruling: No. (Death Benefits are not considered common to the deceased and to his
second wife)
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where
both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man,
... Only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual
joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by
each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of
care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are
excluded in this regim
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan
Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or
industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by
respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the
deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased
is not one of them.
As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are
presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall
go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the
deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan
Nicdao.
Ratio:
The Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate
declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of
remarriage.
However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money
anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is
necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that
would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the
court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the
marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the
applicable laws and jurisprudence.
29
Case: Herminia Borja-Manzano vs. Judge Roque Sanchez, MRC, Infanta,

Pangasinan
Nature: Administrative Complaint against Judge Sanchez for Gross Ignorance of Law
Facts:
Herminia Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano,
having been married to him on May 21, 1966 in Caloocan City. Four children were
born out of that marriage.
On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda
Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage,
he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage
contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he
officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano
was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as
husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as
manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late
Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again;
otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass
him.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal
of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention
of the Court to two separate affidavits of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were
allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits,
both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to
Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective
marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and
had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge
alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in
question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether the subsequent marriage of the deceased husband is valid?
Whether the Judge can be charged of Gross Ignorance of Law?
Ruling: No. The subsequent marriage of the late David Manzano with
Luzviminda Payao is null and void, because, even though the two cohabited for seven
years, still both of them had legal impediments to be married again because of their
previous valid marriages. Not all of the requirements of Article 34 (Provision on Legal
Ratification of Marital Cohabitation) are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note
that in the affidavits of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge
himself, expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage.
Yes. Judge Sanchez is guilty of Gross Ignorance of Law. Respondent Judge knew or
ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would
make the subsequent marriage null and void
Note: Article 34 of the Family Code:
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following
requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at
least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at
the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at
least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal
impediment to their marriage
Case: Tsoi Chi Ming vs. CA and Gina Lao-Tsoi
Nature: Petition to Review CA Decision
Facts: On May 22, 1988, Tsoi Chi Ming and Gina Lao married in Manila
Cathedral. After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South
Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
As newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse,
with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned
his back and went to sleep.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together
during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so
together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by
the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this
period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her
by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at
the living room.
They slept together in the same room and on the same bed in 10 Months. But during this
period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she
did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio
Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a
virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time.
While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her
husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her
husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not
show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil
and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the
defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here
in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled
by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several
reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he
is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very
young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled
and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be
cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation
on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with
his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him
only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case
against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the
pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will
consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very
young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined and
the doctor said that the petitioner is not impotent. The doctor asked the defendant to
masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the
original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had
only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of
further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual
intercourse with a woman.
Issue: Whether there is a psychological incapacity to declare the marriage
void?
Ruling: Yes. Petitioner admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after
almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any
physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this
Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage
tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Case: Leouel Santos vs. CA and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos

Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari
Facts: It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the
Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel
and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court
Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding.
Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo
City.
On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr.
The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because
of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs.
Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like
when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or
whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own
parents.
On May 18, 1988, Julia left for the USA to work as a nurse despite Leouels objections.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse
despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01
January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She
promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did.
When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training
program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25
August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all
his efforts were of no avail.
So, when he came back to the Philippines, he filed an action for declaration of nullity of
the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Julia through counsel filed an
answer and denied the claim. The case was dismissed by the RTC which was affirmed by
the CA.
Before the SC, he asserted that there is no love and affection from her because of her
failure to communicate with him for three years. Hence, she is suffering from
psychological incapacity.
Issue: Whether the marriage can be declared void due to psychological
incapacity?
Ruling: No. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if
it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most
importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use
of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant
to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to
have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity
of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the
standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably,
Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither
law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual
problem.
Case: Republic vs. CA and Roridel Olaviano Molina

Facts:
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent
Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were
married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in Manila
Son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed
signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered
his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels
between them; that sometime in February 1986
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the
sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense
quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged
In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her
parents in Baguio City
A few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically
incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly
immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king
to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their
marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an
incompatible marriage from the start.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void.
The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto
the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an
erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as
provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application
thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to
establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is
anathema to our culture."

incapacity?
Ruling: No. There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to the SC to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities
and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor
get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem;
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability
Guidelines on Psychological Incapacity
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favour of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
a. Medically or clinically identified
b. Alleged in the complaint
c. Sufficiently proven by experts
d. Clearly explained in the decision
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by: Articles 68-71, 220,221
and 225 of FC
7. Interpretations of National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, must be given great respect by the
courts
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as a counsel of the State
Case: Brenda Marcos vs. Wilson Marcos
Facts: Brenda and Wilson were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was
solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig ; and (2) on May
8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the
Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila. Out of their marriage,
five (5) children were born.
Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on,
he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the
Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's
Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of
them sought a discharge from the military service.
They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang
Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President
Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and
eventually became sweethearts.
After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo
Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development
Corporation when she was still single.
After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then
engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she
always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as
the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful
employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her.
He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict
physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he
chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their
house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens.
While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning
before going to Malacaang. When she was discharged from the military service, she
concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness
Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a
bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in
their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry
that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even
on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their
children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong
Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions.
Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at
the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he
got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with
a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in
Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their
father as cruel and physically abusive to them.The appellee submitted herself to
psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation while the appellant
on the other hand, did not.
RTC the marriage is void
CA reversed the decision of RTC not psychological incapacity because there is a need
for an examination
Issue: Whether the personal medical or psychological examination
respondent is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity?
of
Whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including
the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the
social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated?
Ruling: No. It is not a requirement and the totality of the evidence she presented does
not show such incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require
that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact,
the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition.
For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to. (Also look for Molina Doctrine)
No, it is not enough. Although the Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed
to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job
and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this
period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support,
and even left the family home.
Petition is denied.
Case: David B. Dedel vs. CA and Sharon Corpuz-Dedel aka Jane Ibrahim
Republic of the Philippines, oppositor-respondent
Facts: David and Sharon married on September 28, 1966. They had four
children. Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an
irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several
men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential
Security Command and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confined in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz,
a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop
her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she
married and with whom she had two children.
However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing
along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the
two illegitimate children as his own.
Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon
abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon
would only return to the country on special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997
a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Summons was effected by publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a
newspaper of general circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not reside
and could not be found in the Philippines.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a
psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking,
diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail
and who exerts his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social
Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed
several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two
children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner.
Lower court declared their marriage void.
Republic appealed to set aside the judgment of the lower court
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered
dismissal of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
Issue: Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically incapacitated.
More
specifically, does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by
petitioner fall within the term psychological incapacity?
Ruling: No. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the
obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption
thereof.
It appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of
the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its
celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children. It must be
shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state,
not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.Petition is Denied.
Case: Republic of the Philippines vs. Lolita Quintero-Hamano

Nature: Petition for Review on the Decision of CA (Affirming the decision of RTC
declaring the marriage null and void)
Facts: On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national,
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later
lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed
there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the
Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity
became manifest only after the marriage.
One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by
Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent
for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but
he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio
visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no
collusion existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not
fabricated.
On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondents motion to present her
evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter
offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.
Issue: Whether their marriage can be declared void due to psychological
incapacity?
Ruling: No. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never
alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent
testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing
that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was
no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondents
case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This
could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
Case: Leonilo Antonio vs. Marie Ivonne Reyes

Facts: Leonilo and Ivonne got married barely a year after their meeting. They begot
three children. Leonilo filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity claiming that Ivonne lied about herself, the people
around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things,
to wit:
1. She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, and
instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She
only confessed the truth about the boys parentage when petitioner learned about
it from other sources after their marriage.
2. She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and
kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.
3. She misrepresented herself as psychiatrist to her obstetrician, and told some of her
friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when neither was true.
4. She claimed to be a singer voice talent affiliated in Blackgold Recording Company
(Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged
singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon
show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an
invitation to that effect but he discovered per certification by the Director of Sales
of said hotel that no such occasion has taken place.
5. She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those
names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting
her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million.
Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent
the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. He likewise
realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination
when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.
6. She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her
payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set
from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous
furniture dealer. She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing
money from other people on false pretexts.
7. (7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his
officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual
behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a
reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in
November 1991.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede),
a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated,
based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal,
introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed
that respondents persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or
pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust
and respect. They further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also
pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her
to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded
based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform
her essential marital obligations.
In opposing the petition, respondent
obligations by attending to all the needs
no truth to the allegation that she
personalities. She presented her version,
claimed that she performed her marital

of her husband. She asserted that there was
fabricated stories, told lies and invented
thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of
losing her husband.
(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised
such intent from Davids act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching
psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel
9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of
Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a
Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet
she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show
was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers
thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of
the United States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she
merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates
from petitioner, and not to monitor her husbands whereabouts.
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people
from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that
respondents propensity to lying about almost anythingher occupation, state of health,
singing abilities and her income, among othershad been duly established. According to
the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage. The trial court thus declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack
of due discretion on the part of the parties
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still,
the appellate court reversed the RTCs judgment. While conceding that respondent may
not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held
that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondents
psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals governing the application and interpretation of psychological incapacity
had not been satisfied.
incapacity of the petitioners wife?
Ruling: Yes. The SC find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in
Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented
witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, and certifications from
Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondents
claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses
from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was
tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered
petitioners evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that
respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven
by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory
complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal
behavior "of perennially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing
personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of
lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family
background, among others.
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or
clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two
(2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the
department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals.
Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly
existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She
fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married
petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural childs real
parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their
marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to
prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is
immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of
cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance
speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that
respondents psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent
that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
Respondents ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is
impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondents
ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot
be accorded much credence.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital
obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in
particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how
an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the
Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally
inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite
petitioners efforts to bring the matter to its attention. Such deliberate ignorance is in
contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such
psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated,
he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondents
aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and
maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that
respondents condition is incurable.
Action for Legal Separation

Cooling-Off Period (Art. 58)
Case: Araneta vs Conception and Araneta
Luis Ma. Araneta, petitioner
Hon. Hermogenes Concepcion and Emma Benitez Araneta, respondents
Facts:
Action of the petitioner against his wife for legal separation in the ground of
adultery
the defendant filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their children, a
monthly support of P5,000 and the return of her passport, and to pay for the
attorneys fees
plaintiff denied the petition and alleging that the defendant abandoned the
children, that the conjugal properties are only worth P80,000 and not one million
pesos, that her passport was not taken and contested her right for attorneys fees
He also contended that defendant is not entitled to the custody of the children as
she abandonded them and committed adultery
Plaintiff claims that there were no conjugal assets and she is not entitled for
support because of infidelity and that she was able to support herself
Respondent judge resolved the omnibus petition by granting custody of the
children to defendant and monthly allowance of P2,300 for support for her children,
P300 for a house and P2,000 as attorneys fees.
Petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed against the judge to require the
parties to submit evidences before deciding the omnibus petition. Writ of
preliminary injunction granted against the order
Issue: w/n the grant of custody, alimony and support was valid
Held:
Writ prayed for was issued and respondent judge is ordered to proceed on the
question of custody and support pendent lite. Courts order fixing the alimony and
requiring payment is reversed.
Rationale:
Article 103 (article 58 FC) action for legal separation shall in no case be tried
before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition
It is conceded that the period of 6months is evidently intended as a cooling off
period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses.
Period does not have the effect of overriding the other provisions of the Code such
as determination of the custody of the children, the grant of alimony and support
pendent lite.
Case: Somosa-Ramos vs. Vamenta Jr.
Lucy Somosa-Ramos, petitioner
Clementer Ramos, respondent
Facts:
Petitioner filed a case for legal separation, concubinage on the respondents part
and an attempt by him against her life being alleged
Petitioner sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the
return of her claimed paraphernal and exclusive property
August 4, 1971 respondent judge granted a motion to suspend the hearing of the
petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction.
Petition for certiorari was filed
Issue: w/n Article 103 would preclude the court from acting on a motion for
preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a
suit
Held:
Article 103 of the civil code is not an absolute bar to the hearing of a motion for
preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the 6 months period
At any rate from the time of the issuance of the order complained of on August 4,
1971 more than six months has already elapsed
There can be no more impediment for the lower court acting on the motion of
petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
Based upon the Stipulation of Facts or Confession of Judgment (Art. 60)
Case: De Ocampo vs. Florenciano

JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner,
SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent
Facts:
They were married and had children which is said to be living with the plaintiff
Sometime March 1951, plaintiff dicovered that his wife was betraying his trust by
maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas.
plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed
for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was
going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas
when defendant had finished studying, she left plaintiff and since then they had
lived separately.
June 1955 plantiff surprised his wife by having an illicit affair with Nelson Orzame
Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which
defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in
a criminal action
Plaintiff filed a case of legal separation on the ground of adultery
Defendant while interrogated by the fiscal admitted having sexual relationship with
Orzame
During prosecution, the defendant kept silent and did not attend any hearing
Court ordered the fiscal if there was collusion and the result was none
The Court of First Instance of dismissed the case and Court of Appeals confirmed
that there was confession of judgment, condonation or consent to the adultery and
prescription
Issue: w/n there was confession of judgment, condonation or consent to

adultery and prescription
Held:
No confession of judgment, condonation, collusion and prescription.

SC reversed the appealed decision and decree a legal separation between these
spouse, all the consequent effects. Costs of all instances against Serafina
Florenciano.
Rationale:
Plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home does not
constitute condonation or consent to her adulterous relationship.
It was the wife who "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had
discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search
for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return
Notes:
Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and
confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to
the plaintiff's demand.

Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement.
. . . between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit,
or to be represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to
suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to
obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of
the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce.
Effects of Filing Petition for Legal Separation (Art. 61 and 62)

Case: SABALONES vs CA
Samson Sabalones, petitioner
Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, respondent
Facts:
Petitioner Samson Sabalones being a assigned as a diplomat was assigned in

different countries and left to his wife the administration of some of their conjugal
properties for 15years
After his retirement he returned to the Philippines but not to his wife and children
After 4 years he filed an action for juridical authorization to sell their property in
San Juan which belongs to the conjugal partnership and would use the proceeds of
the sale for his hospital and medical treatments
Respondents opposed the authorization and filed an action for legal separation
Respondent alleges that that the house in San Juan was being occupied by her and
their children and the lot in Forbes Park is being leased to Nobimichi Izumi, and
that her husband never returned to them being the legitimate family and lived in a
separate house in Fairview with Thelma Curameng and their children
Judge Umali found that petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage with Thelma
Curameng
Court granted the decree of legal separation and the petitioner is not entitled to
share in the conjugal properties and he is not entitled to support from his
respondent wife
Decision of lower court was appealed and granted the writ of preliminary injunction
filed by the respondent to enjoin the petitioner from interfering in the
administration of their properties
Petitioner argues that the law provides for joint administration of conjugal
properties and no injunctive relief can be issued against the other because no right
will be violated
Issue: w/n article124 is applicable as regards to joint administration of conjugal

properties
Held: Petition DENIED
Grant for preliminary injunction is valid; it is necessary to protect the interest of

the respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets
Injunction has not permanently installed the respondent as the administrator of the
whole conjugal assets
Presence of 2 requirements of valid injunction:
o Existence of rights of the respondents to a share of the conjugal estate
o There is evidence that entrusting the estate to the petitioner may result to
the irresponsible disposition of assets that would cause injury to his wife and
children
Notes:
Primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status

quo of the subject of the action of the relations between the parties and thus
protect the rights of the plaintiffs respecting these matters during the pendency of
the suit
Twin requirements of valid injunction:
o Existence of a right
o Actual or threatened violation
Article 61: after further petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court
shall in the absence of a written agreement between the couple would appoint
either one of the spouses or a 3rd person to act as the administrator
Case: ESPIRITU vs. CA

Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo and Respondent Teresita Masunding met in 1976 in Iligan city
where the P is employed bu the NSC and R employed as a nurse
1979 R wife left for the US to work as a nurse and obtained her immigrant status
1984 P husband was sent by the NSC to the US and there began their relationship
to live as common law husband and wife
they had 2 children & 1990 when their relationship started to deteriorate &
separated
R left P & children, P bought the children to the Philippines w/ his sister & went
back to the States because his assignment was not yet complete
1992 R returned to the Phils. & filed a petition of writ if habeas corpus against the
P to gain custody over the children
TC dismissed the petition & suspended the parental authority of the R to the
children & declared P having parental authority over them
TC granted custody to the P father
CA reversed the decision & gave custody to the mother
SC reversed the CA decision & upheld the decision of TC
Issue: w/n respondent court (CA) erred in reversing the decision in granting
custody to the respondent
Held: CA erred in granting the custody to the respondent mother
Whether child is under or over seven yrs of age the paramount criterion must
always be the childs interests
Discretion to the court to decide who can best assure the welfare of the child, and
award the custody on the basis of that consideration
Consideration involving the choice made by a child must be ascertained that the
time that either parent is given custody ever the child
LERMA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Teodoro Lerma, petitioner
Conception Diaz, respondents
Facts:
Petitioner and respondents are husband and wife married on May 19, 1951
August 22,1969 petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against respondent
Respondent filed in lower court a complaint against the petitioner for legal
separation/ separation of properties, custody of their children and support with
urgent petition lite for her and their youngest son
Complaint for legal separation on 2grounds (1)concubinage, (2) attempt against
her life
The application for petition for pendente lite was granted as to effect orders (1)
respondent entitled to support pendent elite from the date of the filing of the
complaint, (2) monthly support reduced from P2250 to P1820
Petition for certiorari & prohibition with preliminary injunction to was filed to annul
the orders granted by Judge Luciano
CA: granted the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence before the lower
court for his defense against the petition for pendente lite
Respondent moved to reconsider the decision on the ground that the petitioner
had never asked that he be allowed to present evidences in the lower court
CA set aside its 1st decision and dismissed the petition instead
Issue: w/n petitioner should be allowed to present evidence in the lower court
when the defense of action has been moot and academic
Held: resolution of respondent CA and order issued to the respondent is set
aside
petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who him/herself guilty of an act w/c
constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse,
cannot be considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate
support
Duty to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity and render
mutual help and support (Art. 68)
ARROYO vs ARROYO
Facts:
Spouses were united in bonds of wedlock by their marriage in 1910

Not until 1920 when the wife went away from the common home with the intention
of living separately with her husband
After efforts made by the husband for his wife to comeback to them, it initiated
him to compel his wife to return to the matrimonial home and live with him
Defendant wife admitted that she had left her husband without his consent
Wife prayed for affirmative relief consisting of (1) decree of separation, (2)
liquidation of conjugal partnership, (3) allowance for counsel fees and separate
maintenance
Lower court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant
Issue: w/n plaintiff husband can compel his wife to return to the conjugal
home?
Held:
it is not within the province of the court to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with and render conjugal rights to the other, although husband is without a
doubt entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has absented herself w/o
sufficient cause and that is she is admonished that it is her duty to return
act of living together is a mere voluntary act of the spouses
if one of the spouses leaves the conjugal home, the other spouse cannot go to
court and seek for an order to compel such spouse to return
a writ of habeas corpus will not even issue to compel a spouse to live together with
the other
Case: ILUSORIO vs. BILDNER

Facts:
Potenciano Ilusorio a lawyer and a rich business man is married to Erlinda Kalaw
and had 6 children
Upon his arrival from the US the stayed in Antipolo with Erlinda for 5 months
Their children alleged that their mother overdosed him as a result of his
deteriorating health
Erlinda filed a petition for guardianship over the properties due to his health
problems and advanced age
After attending a meeting in Baguio city he did not return to their house in Antipolo
but instead lived in Makati
Erlinda filed a petition for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband and
visitation rights
CA granted the petition for humanitarian reasons
SC reversed the CAs decision
Issue: w/n the CA erred in granting the petition for habeas corpus
Held:
Writ of habeas corpus should not be issued

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his
wife
Evidence show that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
Ilusorio that would justify the issuance of the writ
Even though he is in medication- does not render him mentally incapacitated
Ilusorio was in sound and alert mind and can still make his own choices
Case: AYALA INVESTMENT vs. CA

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO MAGSAJO,
petitioners,
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING,
respondents.
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM) obtained a

P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as AIDC).
To security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching,
Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements making himself
jointly and severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness to AIDC
PBM failed to pay the loan
AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo
Ching
Court found PBM and Ching jointly and severally liable
upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of execution pending appeal.
Upon AIDC's putting up of an P8M bond
private respondents filed a case of injunction against petitioners alleging that
petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal partnership levied
because the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal
partnership
auction sale took place. AIDC being the only bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale
by petitioner Magsajo
trial court promulgated its decision declaring the sale on execution null and void
Issue: w/n respondent court erred in ruling that the conjugal partnership of
private respondents is not liable for the
obligation by the
respondent-husband
Held : NOT liable
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of Philippine
Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
Philippine Blooming Mills has a personality distinct and separate even though
members of the said family happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such.
In the case at bar, respondent-appellant AIDC failed to prove that the debt was
contracted by appellee-husband, for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
gains.
The debt is clearly a corporate debt and petitioners right of recourse against Ching
as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings. It does not extend to
the conjugal partnership of gains of the family of
Case: CARLOS vs. ABERLARDO

HONORIO L. CARLOS, petitioner,
MANUEL T. ABELARDO, respondent.
Facts:
October 1989, respondent and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached
him and requested him to advance the amount of US$25,000.00 for the purchase
of a house and lot
petitioner, in October 31, 1989, issued a check in the name of a certain Pura
Vallejo, seller of the property, who acknowledged receipt and the amount was in
full payment of the property
when petitioner inquired about the status of the loan due, respondent spouses
pleaded that in they are not yet in the position to settle the obligation
respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioners inquiries on the amount to
the extent of making various death threats against petitioner
petitioner made a formal demand for the payment of the amount of US$25,000.00
but the spouses failed to comply with their obligation
petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages against
respondent and his wife before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela
Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial courts decision and dismissed the
complaint for insufficiency of evidence to show that the subject amount was indeed
loaned by petitioner to respondent and his wife
SC reversed decision of CA
Issue: w/n CA erred in dismissing the case due to lack of evidence to prove that
respondent spouses are liable
Held: petition GRANTED, respondent spouse are jointly and severally liable in
the payment plus damages
a. General rule is that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife
before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
The defendants never denied that the check of US$25k was used to
purchase the property and used as family home
o Spouses didnt deny that the same served as their conjugal home, thus
benefiting the family.
o acknowledgment of the loan made by respondent wife binds the conjugal
partnership since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family
b. R husband cannot allege as a defense that the amount of US $25,000.00 was received
as his share in the income or profits of the corporation and not as a loan for he is not a
stockholder nor an employee of the company
o
c. the amount of money loaned came from the personal account of the plaintiff
Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated
administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by
both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the
other to the extent that the family may have been benefited;
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties.
Case: WALTER VILLANUEVA AND AURORA VILLANUEVA, VS. FLORENTINO
CHIONG AND ELISERA CHIONG
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision affirmed RTC annulled the sale
Facts:
Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married sometime in January 1960 but have
been separated in fact since 1975.
During their marriage, they acquired a Lot situated at Poblacion, Dipolog City issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte.
Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold the one-half western portion of the lot to petitioners
for P8,000, payable in installments. (verbally)
Thereafter, Florentino allowed petitioners to occupy the lot and build a store, a shop,
and a house thereon.
Shortly after their last installment payment on December 13, 1986,petitioners
demanded from respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their favor.
Elisera, however, refused to sign a deed of sale.
On May 13, 1992, Florentino executed the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of petitioners.
On July 19, 2000, the RTC, in its Joint Decision, annulled the deed of absolute sale
dated May 13, 1992, and ordered petitioners to vacate the lot and remove all
improvements therein.
ISSUES:
(1)
Is the subject lot an exclusive property of Florentino or a conjugal
property of respondents? (2) Was its sale by Florentino without Elisera's
consent valid?
Ruling:
It is Conjugal Property As proof of the lot's conjugal nature, Elisera presented a
transfer certificate of title, a real property tax declaration,
and
a
Memorandum of Agreement dated November 19, 1979 which she and her husband
had
executed
for
the
administration
of
their
conjugal
properties.
Respondents' separation in fact neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot
nor prejudiced Elisera's interest over it.
Under Article 178 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact between husband and wife
without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its
conjugal
nature.
Moreover, the conjugal nature of the lot was admitted by Florentino in the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated May 13, 1992, where he declared his capacity to sell as a
co-owner
of
the
subject
lot.
Anent the second issue, the sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent is not,
however, void ab initio.
held that without the wife's consent, the husband's alienation or encumbrance of
conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 is not void,
but merely voidable. Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code provide:
ART. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is
under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium,the husband cannot alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's
consent...
Applying Article 166, the consent of both Elisera and Florentino is necessary for the
sale of a conjugal property to be valid.
Accordingly, the contract entered by Florentino is annullable at Elisera's instance,
during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned,
conformably with Article 173. Fortunately, Elisera timely questioned the sale when she
filed Civil Case No. 4383 on July 5, 1991, perfectly within ten years from the date of sale and
execution
of
the
deed.
Case: JADER vs. CAMAISA

THELMA A. JADER-MANALO, petitioner,
NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA and EDILBERTO CAMAISA, respondents.
Facts:
Through an advertisement, petitioner was interested in 2 properties in Makati and

Taytay respectively, so she negotiated to purchase it from a real estate broker
authorized by the respondent spouses
After inspection of the properties and some documents, petitioner met with the
vendors who turned out to be respondent spouses
Petitioner made a definite offer to buy the properties to respondent Edilberto
Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of his wife, respondent Norma
Camaisa in the presence of the real estate broker
The agreement made was handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto and
petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of the properties, Edilberto assured her
of his wife's conformity and consent to the sale
A contract to sell has been executed
petitioner met again with respondent spouses and the real estate broker at
Edilberto's office for the formal affixing of Norma's signature, she was surprised
when respondent spouses informed her that they were backing out of the
agreement because they needed "spot cash" for the full amount of the
consideration
Norma refused to sign the contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint for
specific performance and damages against respondent spouses
Norma filed a Motion for summary judgment
TC rendered a summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that
under Art. 124 of the Family Code, the court cannot intervene to authorize the
transaction in the absence of the consent of the wife since said wife who refused
to give consent
CA affirmed judgment of TC
Issue: whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property
without the wife's written consent.
Held: No
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as
administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife,
otherwise, the disposition is void
The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the
contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must
concur.
Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the
sale.
even granting that respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the
sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is
required by law for its validity.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
Art. 124. The
administration
and enjoyment
of spouse
the conjugal
partnership
administration
of the
conjugal properties,
the other
may assume
sole property
powers ofshall
belong to both
spouses
case of
disagreement,
the husband's
decision shall
administration.
These
powersjointly.
do not In
include
the
powers of disposition
or encumbrance
subject
recourse
the
court
wife for
a proper
remedy,
which must
whichprevail,
must have
the to
authority
of to
the
court
or by
thethe
written
consent
of the
other spouse.
In
be availed
of within
five years
from the
of the contract
implementing
such
the absence
of such
authority
or consent
the date
disposition
or encumbrance
shall be
void.
decision.
However,
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.

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Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

June 23, 2009

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Article 1- Definition of Marriage

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Article 3- Formal Requisites of Marriage/ Authority of Solemnizing Officer

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Case: Aranes vs. Judge Salavador M. Occiano

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Nature: Administrative Complaint

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Case: Ireneo Geronimo vs. CA and Antonio Esman

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Case: Jaime Sevilla vs. Carmelita Cardenas

There was a Civil Marriage contracted in the City Hall of Manila

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Marriage in Articulo Mortis (Article 27, 31, 32)

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Cohabitation for Five Years (Article 34)

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Case: Rodolfo Navarro vs. Judge Hernando Domagtoy

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Marriage Certificate: Contents Thereof (Article 6, 22)

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is the legal wife of the deceased?

Marriage by Proxies/ Common- Law Marriages

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

When referring to a "spouse" it contemplates a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine

Remulla, Jammy Kate S.

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine