Final HNTB Safety Assessment Bridge Report December

LAKE CHAMPLAIN
BRIDGE -
SAFETY
ASSESSMENT
REPORT
Crown Point, NY &

Chimney Point, VT
December 3, 2009
PREPARED FOR – New York

State Department of
Transportation
NYSDOT
Region 1
328 State Street
Schenectady, NY 12305
Contact: James Boni, P.E.

Email: R01-LakeChamplainBridge
@dot.state.ny.us
HNTB New York Engineering &

Architecture, P.C.
5 Penn Plaza
6th Floor
New York, NY 10001
LAKE CHAMPLAIN BRIDGE– SAFETY ASSESSMENT REPORT
Executive Summary
The Lake Champlain Bridge is an iconic continuous truss designed by Charles M. Spofford,
an early pioneer in design methods for continuous trusses, which were destined to become
a staple form for medium and long span crossings. The bridge’s form is a particularly
elegant application of Spofford’s ideas that highlights the advantages of continuity in
structural systems. This bridge has an important place in the evolution of continuous
trusses and the practice of bridge engineering in the United States. The bridge’s
importance to the region, both as an icon and as a vital link between northern New York
and Vermont, cannot be overstated.
In the past weeks, a series of in-depth inspections and tests have highlighted the
significant and rapid deterioration of the unreinforced concrete substructures that
support the Lake Champlain Bridge. The pier deterioration is so significant that bridge
closure was recommended on October 16, 2009.
Follow-up inspections, including a comprehensive underwater inspection of the piers, have
confirmed the fragility of the substructure elements well below water. The severity of the
deterioration at water level and the wide cracks reported below the water level in all the
piers, particularly at piers 5 and 7, reinforce our recommendation to close the bridge.
Unfortunately, we are unable to assess the condition of significant portions of the caissons
and pier stems without underwater excavation, which is problematic given access
constraints (shallow water that does not permit access with barge-mounted excavation
equipment) and very soft lake mud. Piers 6 and 8 may have similar deterioration and
vulnerabilities below the mud line which remain undetected.
There are several major factors that account for the conditions encountered. The frozen
bearings have resulted in increased bending and shear forces at the piers. Freeze/thaw
and ice abrasion damage at the water level has reduced, and will continue to degrade, the
piers’ axial and flexural capacity. It appears that static ice pressure exerted by thawing ice
on the piers closest to the shoreline has caused the formation of large cracks roughly 8 to
10 ft below the water surface. The lack of reinforcement results in large cracks which
exceed 3/8” in many cases.
We have evaluated various methods to rehabilitate the pier foundations in order to reopen
the bridge to traffic in the shortest possible time and to permit the potential for future
comprehensive rehabilitation of the important bridge. All rehabilitation alternatives
evaluated require the contractors and engineers to work in close proximity to the existing
bridge and their safety during the rehabilitation operation cannot be guaranteed, given
the overall fragility of the structure, particularly in winter months where further freeze
thaw damage and ice pressure are anticipated. If any major cracks were to develop
diagonally in the pier or deterioration further reduces the flexural or shear capacity of the
piers, abrupt failure could ensue. Wind loads, temperature induced loads, and ice loads, or
a combination of the three could trigger collapse.
While cost is a secondary issue to safety, it should be noted that any temporary repair
scheme would be costly (well in excess of $20 million) and provide only a limited service
life, and would not eliminate the risk of collapse given our inability to assess the condition
and therefore safety of significant portions of the substructures and foundations. Further
investigations to assess the condition of the substructure and foundation elements also
expose engineers and contractors to increased risk.
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Given these inherent risks to rehabilitation, we must recommend against this course of
action and recommend that rehabilitation options should be dismissed from further study.
This is particularly unfortunate given the iconic character of the structure, and its vital
importance as a regional link. The risks to personnel working in close proximity to the
fragile bridge are too great to permit significant rehabilitation activities in any form.
Moving forward, the existing bridge should be razed in a controlled manner to eliminate
the risk of sudden, potentially catastrophic, collapse and a new bridge be constructed
immediately thereafter on the existing alignment. This will expedite reconstruction
activities to ensure that the region is provided a reliable crossing with an extended service
life.
12/3/2009 ii

Executive Summary
General Plan & Elevation (GP&E)
1. Overview and Description of Bridge
1.1. Location Map
1.2. Lake Champlain Bridge
1.3. Unusual Design Aspects of the Existing Bridge
2. Results of Past Inspections & History of Repairs
2.1. Past Inspections
2.2. History of Repairs
3. Assessment of Current Conditions and Basis for Bridge Closure
3.1. Overall Safety Assessment
3.1.1. Caissons
3.1.2. Pier Shafts
3.1.3. Bearings
3.1.4. Truss Superstructure
3.1.5. Design Loads
4. Risk Assessment
4.1. Safety Considerations
4.2. Unreinforced Concrete – Potential for Abrupt Failure
4.3. Fragility of Continuous Truss Systems
4.4. Closure of the Bridge to Vehicular Traffic
4.5. Worker Safety During Rehabilitation Activities
4.6. Navigational Traffic and Recreational Impacts
5. Repair Alternatives & Implementation Risks
5.1. Bridge Rehabilitation Strategy – Short Term
5.2. Bridge Rehabilitation Strategy – Long Term
5.3. Bridge Replacement
5.4. Service Life and Cost Analysis
6. Summary
6.1. Conclusions and Recommendations
12/3/2009 iv
Appendices:
Appendix A: Cost Analyses of Pier and Bearing Repair, Rehabilitation, and

Replacement Alternatives
Appendix B: Concrete Testing Results
Appendix C: Inspection Rating Scales and Reports
Appendix D: 3-Dimensional T187 Model
12/3/2009 v
1. Overview and Description of Bridge

1.1. Location Map
The Lake Champlain Bridge connects Crown Point, New York and Chimney Point,
Vermont. Comprised of 14 steel spans totaling approximately 2187 feet, the two-lane
bridge was opened to traffic in 1929. Of the 14 spans, five of the spans are deck
trusses, one span is a half-through truss, and the remaining are steel girder
structures. The combination of deck and through trusses at the midspan of the bridge
(Spans 6-8) has been noted for its historic significance and aesthetics.
The bridge serves two sparsely populated
regions, with average daily traffic on the
order of 3500 vehicles. However, there
are few alternative crossings for Lake
Champlain, with ferry and fixed crossings
resulting in significant detour lengths and
increased crossing times with reduced
reliability for ferry alternatives. For
these reasons, the regional importance of
the crossing cannot be underestimated.
1.2. Lake Champlain Bridge
The bridge’s iconic form was conceived by Charles M. Spofford, an early pioneer in
design methods for continuous trusses. The bridge’s form is a particularly elegant
application of Spofford’s ideas that demonstrate the advantages in efficiency of
continuous structural systems. This bridge has an important place in the evolution of
continuous trusses and the practice of bridge engineering in the United States. In
February 2009 the Lake Champlain Bridge was granted approval to be entered in the
National Register of Historic Places. While not formally listed yet, the structure has
12/3/2009 1
met the eligibility requirements regarding “age, integrity, and significance” 1.

There has been a significant amount of rehabilitation and retrofit work on the bridge
over its 80 year life, with the most extensive work completed in the early 1990’s. This
rehabilitation included replacement of the existing concrete deck with a concrete
filled steel grid deck, new traffic barriers, drainage improvements, bearing
rehabilitation, post tensioning containment of piers, gusset plate repairs, and other
miscellaneous steel repairs.
However, in spite of this major rehabilitation, deterioration is progressing rapidly both
for the superstructure and the substructure elements. A recent inspection stated
that “The tops of the pier caps are extensively deteriorated and are compromising the
bearing pedestals”. Past non-structural repairs to the bearing seats only serve to
mask the seriousness of the problems at these critical locations. The superstructure
steel also is deteriorating rapidly given localized failure of the painting system,
particularly at the truss connections. Many primary load carrying members and
connections exhibit heavy section loss and localized perforations, particularly
structural steel adjacent to areas with heavy de-icing salt exposure at the roadway
level. Finally, there is significant cracking, and freeze thaw induced damage to the
piers, at the bearing seats, as well as at and below the waterline. As will be discussed
in more detail below, it is the significant pier deterioration that represents a
considerable risk to the overall safety of the structure.
1.3. Unusual Design Aspects of the Existing Bridge
The Lake Champlain Bridge is an early design of a continuous truss and its chief
designer, Charles Spofford, was influential and active in the analysis and design and
construction of such structures, authoring a book entitled Theory of Continuous
Structures and Arches published in 1937. This structural form was a clear early
innovation in the design of continuous trusses, and Spofford’s role in its development
cannot be argued.
One of the challenges with continuous trusses is that forces in the truss system are
dependent upon support geometry and must be prescribed, given the structure’s
static indeterminacy. For construction, after closure of the main span superstructure
and prior to installation of the bearings, the structure must be jacked into its final
geometry. This process is described by Griggs 2 as well as Spofford in his writings on
continuous truss bridges, and is a critical aspect of the design and construction of the
structure. As will be discussed in more detail below, the superstructure’s sensitivity
to pier movements is a key concern.
Another unusual aspect of the Lake Champlain Bridge design was the use of plain
rather than reinforced concrete for the piers, particularly given the pier slenderness.
In addition, there were no obvious considerations in the pier design for the potential
for ice abrasion. Finally, for concrete placed below water in the deep open
cofferdams, the use of a patented 1-yard dump bucket instead of a tremie pipe was
highly unusual.
In the discussion of Spofford’s ASCE paper entitled Lake Champlain Bridge 3, Jacob
Feld questioned whether there were any
1
www.nps.gov/history/nr/national_register_fundamentals.htm
2
Griggs, Francis, E, Evolution of the Continuous Truss Bridge, ASCE Journal of Bridge Engineering,
Jan/Feb 2007
3
Spofford, Charles, M ASCE Transactions Paper No. 1839 Lake Champlain Bridge, 1931
12/3/2009 2
“special precautions in protecting the surface of the piers at the waterline to take
care of ice pressure and wear during the winter seasons… undoubtedly, this item was
considered in the design, and the omission of special protection for the concrete
must have resulted from definite reasons. It would be interesting to have those
arguments on record.”
He also was interested in
“the accumulation of laitance on the top of each pour of underwater concrete… it
would be interesting to know what depth of soft material was actually removed from
the top of the underwater concrete, and whether any tests were made as to the
strength of the concrete below the removed material”
Spofford’s responses to Feld’s inquiries are telling. Regarding ice pressure and
abrasion, Spofford responded:
“the reason for not protecting the pier concrete against abrasion and deterioration,
it may be pointed out that the piers are in a fresh-water lake with little current and
are practically free from danger of abrasion from ice and floating objects”.
Based upon visual observations, concrete cores near the waterline, and past and
current diving inspections as will be outlined below, ice abrasion and ice pressure has
resulted in significant damage to the piers over the 80 year service life of the bridge.
In regards to underwater concrete placement Spofford responded:
“as the pouring progressed the upper surfaces of the piers were inspected by divers
from time to time, who reported little or no laitance. At the conclusion of pouring,
the amount of laitance that had to be removed was a matter of 2 or 3 in. instead of
the 2 ft suggested as a possibility by Mr. Feld”
The reason for such a small depth of laitance is likely due to the unusual method of
concrete placement with dump buckets, where laitance is distributed throughout the
depth of the caisson instead of at the top as is the case for tremie concrete
placement. This construction method results in potential planes of weakness
throughout the caisson which reduce the reliability and therefore enhance the risk of
failure of this element. This is of particular concern given the difficulties in assessing
the condition of the caisson as well as implementing an effective rehabilitation to
these massive underwater elements.
It also should be noted that steel cofferdams were used in open caisson construction.
The cofferdams were constructed in tiers, and were braced with walers and cross
struts 4. The steel frames below elevation +60 (low water level at elevation +92.5)
were left in place during concrete placement and were therefore cast into the caisson
portion of the piers. Above elevation +60 the majority of the cofferdam bracing was
removed, leaving only the cross struts and diagonals, which were cast into the pier
stems. These cross struts and diagonals consisted of 14” deep I-sections and single
L6x4x3/8 angles, respectively. Two tiers of bracing were placed above the seal
concrete at elevation +60 and below the low water level of elevation +92.5.
While this cofferdam bracing remains encased in the caisson and pier stem concrete,
it should be noted that this does not serve as reinforcement for the pier stems and
foundations since it does not add to the flexural or shear strength of these elements.
In fact, corrosion of these left-in-place cofferdam steel bracing members may have
contributed to the pier cracking.
4
Jacoby, Henry S. and Davis, Roland P., Foundations of Bridges and Buildings 3rd Ed., Article 8-5,
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1941.
12/3/2009 3
2. Results of Past Inspections & History of Repairs

2.1. Past Inspections
The most recent biennial inspection of the Lake Champlain Bridge occurred in spring
2009 and was performed by Chas H. Sells, Inc. During this inspection the number of
reported red, yellow, and safety flags increased dramatically.
Year Yellow Flags Red Flags Safety Flags
2005 1 1 0
2007 1 0 0
2009 20 4 1
The yellow flag identified in 2007 for concrete deterioration of pier 3 was repaired
prior to the 2009 inspection. All 2009 flags were conditions not previously flagged
during inspections, illustrating an increased rate of deterioration of the bridge. Two of
the yellow flags were directly related to the conditions of the piers, including the
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deterioration of piers 6 and 7 post-tensioning bands added in a previous repair

contract to cease cracking of the existing piers.
As a whole, the bridge structure was given a general rating of 4 and a computed
condition rating of 3.722 during the 2007 biennial inspection. Upon completion of the
2009 biennial inspection, the general rating of the bridge was decreased to 3, with a
computed condition rating of 3.375. Structures that have condition ratings between 3
and 4 in New York State are characterized by severe deterioration and considered
structurally deficient, or not functioning as originally designed.
In addition to the recent biennial inspections, a diving inspection was performed in
summer 2005 and an in-depth inspection was performed in fall 2007. The diving
inspection investigated the conditions of piers 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 at and below the water
line. Widespread deterioration was noted, including mapcracking, scaling, cracking of
the concrete, and concrete spalling. Deterioration at the water level was noted up to
approximately 4 inches deep. The report recommended repairs to the cracks
identified at piers 6 and 7 and abrasion damage to all piers at the waterline. These
repairs were anticipated as part of the ongoing project to rehabilitate the bridge.
Diving inspections are required every five (5) years; therefore, the next diving
inspection is required in summer 2010.
The in-depth inspection completed in fall 2007 identified piers 3 through 9 as the
“main problem areas” of the bridge, specifying extensive deterioration at the pier
caps and the stem at the water line. It was noted that concrete cores were extracted
from the piers for testing of the concrete. Compressive strengths of these thirteen
cores ranged from approximately 3,500 psi up to almost 10,000 psi, see Appendix B.
The 2009 biennial inspection resulted in numerous red and yellow flags for steel
deterioration. Upon completion of the inspection, load ratings of the superstructure
were submitted to NYSDOT. The bridge was reduced to one lane of traffic in July of
2009 as an interim resolution of the red flags. The single lane also provided an
access area for work on the bridge. Concurrently, the posting was lowered from an R-
posting down to a load-posting of 40 tons 5 to address the uncertainty of the load
rating in light of the level of deterioration of the steel, as well as acknowledging that
work vehicles would be parked in the closed lane to affect repairs.
2.2. History of Repairs
The Lake Champlain Bridge Commission owned and operated the Lake Champlain
Bridge until 1987 when the commission was abolished. At that point, the bridge
changed ownership to the New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT)
and the Vermont Agency of Transportation (VAOT). A number of repair projects have
been implemented throughout the bridge’s lifetime. Below is a summary of several
major repair projects under both the Lake Champlain Bridge Commission (through
1987) and NYSDOT/VAOT (1987 – Present):
5
For definitions, refer to Appendix C of this report.
12/3/2009 5
Date Description
1935-1939, 1964-1973 Signs – Repair and Maintenance
1945 Repairs to Bearings and Piers
1945 Toll-Keeper’s House Addition
1956, 1960 Roadway Surface
1957 Repairs at Abutments and Approach Slabs
1957, 1964, 1973 Bridge Painting
1959 Toll Booth and Plaza Modifications
1962 Modifications to Expansion Joints
1962 Paving and Membrane Waterproofing Details
1965 Toll Booth Electrical Modifications
1966 Electrical Modifications
1967 Relocation of NY Approach, Crown Point Reservation Recreation Plan
1968 Modifications to New York and Vermont Approaches
1968 Rebuilding Toll Plaza and Electrical System
1970 Restoration of Concrete Bridge Deck and Curbs
1971-1972 Replacement of Sewer System
1972 Replacement Bearings
1974-1975 Repairs to Piers 6 and 7
1974-1977 Repair of Concrete Bridge Deck and Curbs
1977-1978 Deck Replacement Study
1978-1979 Repair of Concrete Bridge Deck and Curbs
1982-1984 Repairs to Piers 5 and 8
1985 Repairs to deck to address deterioration resulting in punch-through
1986 Fishing Access: Chimney Point
Bridge Rehabilitation Cleaning and Replacement of Bearings
• Maintenance Painting of Spans 4-9 and Bearings
• Deck Replacement with Lightweight Grid Deck
• Floorbeam and Stringer Replacement and Strengthening (some
spans)
1990-1991 • Joint Replacement with Modular Joints
• Bridge Rail Modifications
• Approach Slab Replacement
• Concrete Repairs to Piers and Abutments
• Addition of Pier 4 Post-Tensioning Bands
• Modifications to Portal
1995 Replacement of Vermont Abutment Bearings
1996 Rubber Deck Fenders at Piers 6 and 7
2005 Post-Tensioning Band Replacement
2008 Pier Concrete Repairs
2009 Steel Repairs and Strengthening
What is important to note from the above summary of repair contracts is that the
piers have been repaired numerous times over the life of the structure. Pier and
12/3/2009 6
bearing repairs in 1945 should be regarded as unusual, given that the bridge was in
service for only 15 years. Since the 1970’s major pier rehabilitation has been required
each decade. A potentially problematic aspect of pier rehabilitation activities is that
the repairs have been by and large non-structural, and the degree of deterioration of
the piers has been masked by these repairs.
At the time of the bridge closure in October 2009, there were on-going steel repairs
to address many of the yellow and red flags issued during the 2009 biennial bridge
inspection (see Appendix C). With closure to the bridge on October 16th, 2009, these
repairs have not been completed and there remains steelwork to be completed to
stabilize the condition of the superstructure.
3. Assessment of Current Conditions & Basis for Bridge Closure

3.1. Overall Safety Assessment
The existing bridge is 80 years old, and most bridges designed during that era have
an average lifespan of 75 years. The Lake Champlain Bridge has exceeded its
intended service life and requires substantial rehabilitation to remain operational.
Typically, with age comes an increased rate of deterioration, and subsequently, an
increased cost to keep the bridge in a safe and functioning condition.
As an example of the rapid increase in deterioration, the sketches in the figures below
are excerpted from the 2005 diving inspection and the draft findings from a recent
diving inspection completed in late October 2009. The sketches are for both Piers 5
and 7. Upon review of the deterioration noted in 2005 and 2009, specifically
horizontal and vertical cracks below the water level, it is evident that deterioration
has accelerated since the 2005 inspection. This deterioration has occurred in a very
short period of time, with significant degradation in the past 5 years, particularly the
depth of abrasion damage at the water line and the degree, seriousness and
distribution of concrete cracking below the water line.
12/3/2009 7
Pier 5 Begin Face, 2005 Diving Inspection:
Pier 5 End Face, 2005 Diving Inspection:
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12/3/2009 9
12/3/2009 10
3.1.1. Caissons
Description
The water piers of the bridge, piers 4 through 8, are founded on plain concrete
caissons bearing on bedrock at varying elevations. As a point of reference, the
approximate mean water elevation of the lake is 96.0 ft. The tops of the
caissons are typically located a few feet below the lake bottom, ranging in
elevation from 72 ft for piers 6 and 7 to 88 ft for piers 4 and 9, such that the
top of the caissons range from 12 to 25 ft below water. The caisson dimensions
vary from 36 ft by 15.3 ft at pier 4 to 53 ft by 21 ft at piers 6 and 7.
12/3/2009 11
The caissons were constructed using open cofferdams, which required bracing
due to their depths. The cofferdam bracing was placed outside the plan
dimensions of the caisson where possible, as indicated in the Contract
Drawings. However, cofferdam bracing extending through the caisson could
not be avoided, and this bracing was left embedded in the concrete as
confirmed by diving inspections.
Concrete for the caissons was placed in the wet using a drop bottom bucket as
described above in Section 1.3; an unusual technique that warranted a detailed
description by the designer, and a patent was filed for the particular drop
bucket employed on this project. Once the caisson concrete had been placed
and cured, the cofferdams were dewatered, and concreting of the pier stems
was done in the dry. The aggregates (both coarse and fine aggregates) used in
the pier and caisson concrete came from nearby iron mine tailings, in Mineville,
NY. Iron ore was separated from the surrounding rock using a magnetic
separator, with less than 10% of the iron remaining in the rock after processing.
While testing of the resulting concrete showed it to be unusually strong, the use
of iron mine tailings for coarse and fine aggregate is also extremely unusual.
One of the potential problems with the caisson concrete placed under water in
this manner is the formation and presence of laitance throughout. Laitance
results from a separation of the cement paste from the concrete as it is
emptied from the bucket and it comes in contact with the surrounding water.
The alternative method (and recognized as the preferred technique) for
underwater concrete placement is by tremie, whereby concrete is placed via a
pipe which must remain below the top of the concrete pour. In this manner,
the upper portion of the concrete serves as a protective layer for the concrete
underneath, and following completion of the pour, the weakened top portion of
the concrete is removed. This portion of weakened concrete often exceeds 12”.
Given the drop bottom bucket technique, a significant portion of the concrete
must be exposed to water during placement. This would result in the localized
formation of a thin layer of laitance during each bucket placement which would
then be buried by subsequent placement of concrete. Reportedly, underwater
inspections performed during construction showed little or no laitance 6. It is
difficult to assess how this placement technique impacted concrete strength
and the potential for the formation of cracks or zones of weakness in the
caisson concrete. However, the continued exposure of the concrete to open
water during placement operations will result in concrete with reduced strength
and durability.
To assess the capacity of the caissons, lateral support due to the soil was
neglected due to its poor quality 7. The capacity of a pier, comprised of a pier
stem and caisson, will be controlled by one or the other. In this section, the
capacity of the caissons alone will be considered, in the next section, the
capacity of the pier stems will be addressed and compared with those of the
caissons. The ability of the caissons to resist design loads is particularly critical
in evaluating the safety of the structure, given that caissons in deep water
below the mudline are extremely difficult and expensive to retrofit.
In their as-built condition, with the bearings functioning as designed, the pier
caissons were found to have sufficient capacity for gravity (dead) loads. It is
6
Spofford, Charles, M ASCE Transactions Paper No. 1839 Lake Champlain Bridge, 1931.
7
Spofford, Charles, M ASCE Transactions Paper No. 1839 Lake Champlain Bridge, 1931.
12/3/2009 12
important to note that, under gravity loading the piers are subjected to axial
compression alone. Their fragility as unreinforced concrete elements becomes
apparent only under lateral loads which produce flexure in the piers.
Due to the relative width of the caissons, capacity under transverse loading was
found to be adequate. Subject to longitudinal loading, only pier 6 of the water
piers supports fixed bearings and must resist all longitudinal loads transferred
from the main span superstructure (with the assumption that the bearings are
functioning as designed). These longitudinal loads result from wind, seismic and
braking forces. With the bearings performing as originally designed, there are
minimal longitudinal forces from temperature resulting from friction on the
adjacent piers. The remaining caissons that support expansion bearings are
most sensitive to loads applied longitudinally directly to the piers, such as
thermal ice and vessel collision.
Static pressure due to thermal movement of ice sheets is relatively unusual and
is associated with the behavior of ice in lakes or reservoirs. The more common
case for bridge pier design is dynamic ice loading which is associated with flow
in rivers. In accordance with current AASHTO LRFD specifications,
3.9.3 Static Ice Loads on Piers – Ice pressures on piers frozen into ice sheets
shall be investigated where ice sheets are subject to significant thermal
movements relative to the pier where the growth of shore ice is on one side
only or situations that may produce substantial unbalanced forces on the
piers.
Under thermal movement of ice sheets, the pressures generated can be large,
on the order of 4-6 ksf based upon experimental and theoretical work done for
dams and reservoirs. (Note that dynamic ice pressures in accordance with
AASHTO are as a minimum 8 ksf and may be upwards of 32 ksf.) The resulting
forces on the pier stems are directly dependent upon the thickness of the ice,
which is maximized when the entire lake is frozen. Under such conditions, the
resulting longitudinal loads applied to the piers are potentially equal and
opposite (and are unlikely to generate significant net forces on the piers).
However, when the lake is partially frozen, such loading would occur on one
face of the pier only as the ice sheet expansion is resisted by the shoreline. In
our evaluation of the piers and caissons, static ice pressure has been
considered and will be discussed in more detail below.
Vessel impact loads were computed based on the 2009 AASHTO Guide
Specifications for Vessel Collision Design of Highway Bridges and the AASHTO
LRFD Bridge Design Specifications.
A comprehensive survey of present and future vessel traffic to determine an
upper bound for vessel collision forces has not been conducted at this time.
However, there has been a significant reduction in barge traffic on Lake
Champlain in recent years, particularly after the closing of Plattsburgh Air
Force Base. Barges with tonnage capacities that exceed 1500 tons were used
often in the history of the lake, transporting wheat, flax, sugar, coal, pig iron,
and more recently cement and fuel.
Given the relative lack of barge traffic in recent years, we have identified a few
of the larger cruise ships that routinely traverse the bridge site. These vessels
are significantly smaller than the barges described above, and should be
considered as a lower bound for anticipated vessel collision forces.
12/3/2009 13
Three of the larger cruise ships that currently are in use on the lake are shown
below:
The vessel characteristics used in the computations and calculated collision

energy and forces, assuming a velocity of 5 knots, are summarized below:
Gross Net Collision Collision

Vessel Type Tonnage Tonnage Energy Force
(100 ft3) (100 ft3) (kip-ft) (kips)
Grand Mariner
97 72 722 586
(Hull 298)
Grand Caribe
94 40 700 862
(Hull 296)
287 Niagara
99 67 737 663
Prince
The controlling loading on the piers is 862 kips. This loading was only
considered on piers 6 and 7, adjacent to the navigational channel. Note that
collision forces associated with a loaded barge would far exceed the forces
given in the table above.
Given the slenderness of the caissons, the type of failure they are most
susceptible to in their original condition is overturning. This type of failure is
12/3/2009 14
addressed in the current AASHTO Specifications (both Standard and LRFD) by

limiting the eccentricity of the axial compression at the bottom of the footing.
Section 10.6.3.3 of the AASHTO LRFD Specifications requirements gives a
maximum eccentricity for spread footings on rock of 3/8xB (the same limit is
prescribed by the Standard Specifications), with B taken as the length of the
footing in the direction under consideration. From this requirement, the
maximum longitudinal loading can be determined based on the axial
compression in the caisson and the distance to the applied load.
Max F = Pe/d
where:
F = longitudinal load applied to pier
P = axial compression in pier
e = maximum eccentricity of 3/8B
d = distance from base of footing to applied load L
This requirement results in the longitudinal force capacities shown below. They
are based on the factored dead load compression at the bottom of the caisson
where:
Ft = Longitudinal load applied at top of pier (bearing reaction)
Fw = Longitudinal load applied at waterline (ice loading)
Fv = Longitudinal vessel collision loading
Caisson Capacity (kips)
Loading Pier 4 Pier 5 Pier 6 Pier 7 Pier 8
Ft 227 389 595 596 417
Fw 343 668 840 846 734
Fv - - 788 793 -
The table below shows loads applied to the substructure when the bearings are
free to function as designed. Loads shown in red are instances when the
caisson capacity has been exceeded. The AASHTO LRFD Strength III loadcase,
dead load + wind load, governs for Ft when the bearings are free; the Strength I
loadcase, dead load + live load + temperature load, governs when the bearings
are frozen. The magnitudes of the Ft values correspond to roughly 10-15% of
the dead load reaction. Two different ice loadings were considered: a lower
level loading corresponding to moderate levels of thermal ice and a higher level
loading corresponding to the maximum loading that could be developed.
Load Demands (kips)
Ft- free 0 0 418 0 0
Ft - frozen 317 433 620 670 213
Fw – moderate 350 350 350 350 350
Fw – maximum 640 640 640 640 640
Fv - - 862 862 -
12/3/2009 15
The caissons in their original condition have inadequate capacity under

factored dead and live load when the bearings are frozen. In addition, pier 4 has
inadequate capacity for both levels of ice loading and piers 6 and 7 are
insufficient for vessel collision.
Even if the original caisson capacity was found to be adequate for the loadings
investigated, the fact that they are unreinforced would make them suspect
given their slender proportions. Bending moment capacity was estimated by
multiplying the axial force by the maximum moment arm of the section, which
is about half its thickness. Applying this at the base of the pier assumes that the
pier can tolerate sufficient movement by rocking on its base to develop this
moment. This mechanism is commonly applied in the seismic assessment of
unreinforced masonry buildings that have no positive connection to their
foundations. However, it assumes that the structure is sufficiently robust to
behave as a rigid body. Any cracking of the pier would severely limit this
capability. The piers have been found to be far more likely to form a rocking
mechanism between the stem and the caisson than at the bottom of the
caisson.
Another concern is the flexibility of the piers, even in their as-built condition. It
is unlikely that the continuous truss superstructure would be able to withstand
the displacements required to mobilize the full capacity of the piers without
failure, given the inherent sensitivity of continuous truss structures as
discussed in Section 4.3 of this report. This flaw would not have been apparent
to the designers using allowable stress design.
Current Condition
Since the top of the caissons are generally below the lake bottom, evaluating
their condition requires extensive excavation. At pier 7, however, the caisson
extends about 6 ft above the mud line. An inspection of this caisson performed
on Oct. 30, 2009 indicated that there are vertical cracks ranging in width from
hairline to 3/16”. Laitance was also observed, conflicting with the diving
inspection performed during construction.
The current capacity, if the conditions at pier 7 are assumed to be
representative of all the caissons, is impossible to predict. Given as-built
conditions for the caissons, a rehabilitation of the pier stems could only
increase the capacity of the pier to match that of the caissons.
Prior to such an undertaking, some assessment would be required of the
caissons to evaluate their condition. This would require excavating to the
extent possible, inspecting and mapping of cracks, and coring the caisson
concrete. Due to the drop bottom bucket method of placement, the quality of
the concrete at the time of construction was likely inferior to that of the pier
stems. Based on the observed condition of the caisson at pier 7, it is believed
that the level of deterioration of the caisson concrete is comparable to that of
the pier stems, with the exception of the localized damage at waterline. Again,
due to the method of placement, there could be regions in far worse condition
than what has been observed thus far and the location of these regions could
prevent their discovery.
3.1.2. Pier Shafts
Pier Design
The use of unreinforced concrete piers for major truss bridges was an unusual
12/3/2009 16
practice by the late 1920’s, with many bridges of similar size and span
incorporating a minimum amount of reinforcement. Two such examples that
were contemporary with the construction of the Lake Champlain Bridge, the
Pulaski Skyway in New Jersey and the Cape Girardeau Bridge in Missouri, both
continuous truss bridges with similar spans over water, have piers constructed
of reinforced concrete.
The American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO, a precursor to
the present day AASHTO) provisions were not adopted until the early 1930’s,
however, development of the specifications began in 1921 and they were widely
distributed by 1931. Therefore, they are representative of design practices at
the time of the design of the Lake Champlain Bridge and are consistent with
other relevant handbooks on concrete construction that pre-date the formal
adoption of AASHO provisions. Below are a number of excerpts from the 1935
AASHO Standard Specifications for Highway Bridges (Second Edition):
• 3.4.12 Concrete Exposed to Sea Water – Concrete exposed to the action of
ice, drift, or other forces producing shock and abrasion shall be protected by
encasing that portion of the surface so exposed with a special sheathing or
protective armor as shown on the plans or as noted in the supplemental
specifications, and provision shall be made in the size of the original cofferdam
for sufficient clearance to permit access to the concrete surface for the
installation and effective anchorage of this sheathing.
• 5.5.5 Piers – Piers shall be designed to withstand dead and live loads,
superimposed thereon; wind pressures acting on the pier and superstructure;
and forces due to stream current, floating ice and drift; and tractive forces at
the fixed end of spans. Where necessary, piers shall be protected against
abrasion by facing them with granite, vitrified brick, timber, or other suitable
material within the limits of damage of floating ice or debris
• 5.7.10 Columns – The ratio of the unsupported length of a column to its least
dimension shall not exceed 4 for unreinforced and 15 for reinforced concrete
sections… The reinforcement of columns shall consist of at least 4 longitudinal
bars tied together with lateral ties or hoops enclosing the longitudinal
reinforcement. The longitudinal reinforcement shall not be less than 1 inch in
diameter and shall have a total cross sectional area of
not less than 0.7% of the total cross-sectional area of
the column.
Pier slenderness for all the pier stems of the Lake

Champlain Bridge exceeds the slenderness limit of 4 for
unreinforced concrete. Even the use of standard batters
of 1/2” per ft which was consistent with the practice of
the time for highway bridges was not strictly followed,
with the batter stopping at elevation +92.5, when a 10 ft
width in the longitudinal direction was achieved and
remained constant to the top of caisson (72 ft for piers 6
and 7, and 80 ft and 88 ft for piers 5 and 8 respectively).
Of particular concern is pier 6, where all longitudinal
forces from wind, live load, and seismic are transmitted
via fixed bearings for the main span unit. It has no
additional strength in the longitudinal direction when
12/3/2009 17
compared to the remaining piers which must only transmit bearing frictional
forces.
Reinforcement
It is interesting to
note the beneficial
effects that would
have resulted from
the inclusion of the
current code-
required minimum
reinforcement in the
piers. Due to the
extremely low levels
of axial load in the
piers, this would have
increased its flexural
capacity greatly. This
can be clearly seen
by comparing the
capacity orbits
shown for pier 5
under dead load compression levels. Reinforcement would also have been
beneficial in reducing the amount of damage the pier has experienced at the
water level. Although it is impossible to predict how much the reinforcement
would have prevented the deterioration of the concrete, it is certain that, had
reinforcement been provided, the bridge would have sufficient load carrying
capacity to remain open to traffic.
Pier Damage and Deterioration
There are a number of areas of damage and deterioration to the unreinforced
concrete piers that have resulted in a substantial reduction in the overall safety
of the structure. These areas are as follows:
• Pier cap at the bearing seats
• Pier stem at the water-line
• Pier stem below water
A discussion of the seriousness of deterioration with respect to the overall

safety of the structure is described in detail in Section 4.
Overall, piers 5, 6, 7, and 8 exhibit severe deterioration of the existing concrete
at the water level. A recent drop in the water level exposed surface
deterioration much worse than previously noted. Upon further investigation, it
was discovered that Pier 5 exhibits approximately 30% section loss. The 30%
section loss noted is based upon core results (see Appendix B) and
observations reported by NYSDOT’s Regional Structures Engineer.
Qualitatively, this equates to 18 inches of deteriorated concrete around the
perimeter of the pier. A similar level of severity of section loss occurs at piers
6, 7, and 8 as well. Numerous repair contracts have been issued for the piers
and bearings starting as early as 1945. This in and of itself is critical in
understanding the existing condition of the piers. It is highly unusual for
12/3/2009 18
concrete and bearing repairs to take place on a bridge that is only 15 years old,
as the Lake Champlain Bridge was in 1945. Repairs performed at this stage in
the bridge’s life suggest that the piers may have been under distress for
decades. It is also important to note that these repairs are superficial and
cosmetic, as they do not increase the structural integrity of the piers. In fact,
the previous concrete repairs have masked some of the structural deterioration
to the piers and
the bearings.
The height of the
piers, as
measured from
the top of the
caisson, varies
from about 27 ft
at pier 4 to 58 ft
at piers 6 and 7.
As previously
mentioned, the
piers were placed
in the dry, and
the cross-struts
and diagonals of Deterioration at Pier 5
the cofferdam
bracing embedded in the pier concrete. Underwater inspection has revealed a
number of the cross-struts protruding from the surface of the concrete at piers
6 and 7. Inspection also shows some difference in the geometry of the pier
stem from the original Contract Drawings. Piers 5 through 7 were constructed
with an increased plinth region below waterline, varying in dimension for each
pier.
Deterioration at Pier 8
The pier stems are sensitive to
the same load cases as the
caissons. As with the caissons,
the as-built capacity of the piers
under gravity loading was found
to be sufficient, and the
concerns regarding the plain
concrete construction apply to
the piers as well.
The capacity of the piers was
calculated in the same manner
as the caissons. Although they
are not spread footings, the fact
that there is no positive
connection between the pier and
the caisson makes them susceptible to the same type of failure (overturning).
The application of this approach produces the capacities shown below.
12/3/2009 19
Pier Capacity (kips)

Ft 152 200 274 274 219
Fw 485 575 776 777 1260
Fv - - 600 600 -
Again, the table below shows loads applied to the substructure when the
bearings are free to function as designed. Loads shown in red are instances
when the pier stem capacity has been exceeded. Similar to the caissons, the
AASHTO LRFD Strength III load case, dead load + wind load, governs for Ft
when the bearings are free; the Strength I loadcase, dead load + live load +
temperature load, governs when the bearings are frozen.
Loads Demands (kips)
Ft- free 0 0 418 0 0
Ft - frozen 317 433 620 670 213
Fw – moderate 350 350 350 350 350
Fw – maximum 640 640 640 640 640
Fv - - 862 862 -
The piers are therefore under capacity for dead and wind loading when the
bearings are operating in their original condition, as well as dead and live
loading with the bearings frozen. In addition, piers 4 and 5 are inadequate for
the higher level ice forces, and piers 6 and 7 are inadequate for vessel collision.
The above evaluation of the pier stem capacity assumes as-built conditions and
does not account for the significant waterline deterioration and freeze thaw
damage which has resulted in loss of sound concrete to depths that exceed 18”
around the entire pier perimeter. That is to say that the pier capacities given in
the above table are an upper bound and significant reductions in capacity are
expected given the degree of deterioration.
Cracking and the Impact on Pier Capacity
The typical approach for calculating the

shear capacity of concrete members, by
summing the individual contributions to
shear capacity made by both the concrete
and steel, cannot be applied to
unreinforced members. The concrete
contribution is based on empirical data
obtained from the testing of reinforced
members.
To estimate the shear capacity of

unreinforced members, the principle
tension is calculated and compared with
the modulus of rupture. This approach
does not apply to members once they have
cracked. To estimate the post-cracked
shear strength of the piers, a shear friction
12/3/2009 20
approach based on Section 8.16.6.4 of the AASHTO Standard Specifications

was adopted. This approach is used for reinforced members in determining
shear capacity across an interface.
The shear friction equation is:
Vr =φvVn = Avffyµ (8-56A)
In the case of the piers and caissons, the normal force (Avffy) of the above
equation) is provided solely by axial compression. The code specifies friction
coefficients ranging from 0.6 for construction joints where the concrete
surface has not been intentionally roughened, to 1.4, to be used for post-
cracked, monolithic concrete.
To apply this approach, a crack angle is assumed and the forces normal and
parallel to the crack calculated from the applied loading, as shown. From this,
equation 8-56A can be rewritten as:
Fv =φvFnµ
Where:
Fn = PcosΘ - VsinΘ
Fv = PsinΘ + VcosΘ
Substituting and solving for the ratio of shear capacity to axial compression
gives the following:
V/P = φµcosΘ-sinΘ/φµsinΘ+cosΘ
A graph of V/P for varying crack angles and friction coefficients is shown below
(only values up to 70 degrees shown):
From this, the influence of both the friction coefficient and the crack angle is
clear. Notice that if the crack angle is great enough, V/P becomes negative,
which means the pier no longer has adequate capacity under dead load alone
and collapse is imminent. Please note that this only applies to cracks extending
12/3/2009 21
through the pier cross section, and therefore the cracks that are vertical or
near vertical in the transverse direction are not directly at issue. It also must
be recognized that the vertical cracks were serious enough to require the
addition of banding at the top of the piers. The banding is the means to pre-
compress the vertical cracks such that shear failure is avoided While the
banding is effective in the direction transverse to the bridge (at the top of the
pier), it is not effective in the longitudinal direction at or below the water line.
From the recent underwater inspections, horizontal cracks were found along
both faces of all piers. From the locations of the cracks, it can be implied
(though not definitively) that any through-thickness cracks are relatively flat.
However, pier 7 in particular shows a number of horizontal cracks at varying
elevations, making it difficulat to predict at what angle a through thickness
crack may develop.
Another uncertainty is the friction coefficient, though a lower bound of 0.6 is
recommended given the size, distribution, and severity of the cracking together
with the marine environment. From the above graph, it is clear that for cracks
that exceed an angle of 20 degrees, failure can be anticipated. This is
particulary concerning, as the potential for cracking at this angle currently or in
the near future cannot be ruled out.
Seismic Response
At the time of the design of the bridge, there were no seismic design standards
and seismic loads were certainly not considered. Even in their original
condition, it would be difficult to predict with any degree of certainty what the
capacity of the piers might be. Their response under seismic loading would
include rocking, which could occur at either the base of the piers, or the base
of the caissons or both. Although rocking has been observed and documented
as a means of dissipating seismic energy, without reinforcement, we cannot
ensure that the piers, as well as the top of the caissons, would have sufficient
local strength to withstand the forces induced by rocking response.
The capacity of the pier stems in their current condition, as with the caissons, is
also difficult to estimate reliably. The deterioration of the concrete at water
level and the amount of cracking observed below the water level severely
compromise the force transfer mechanisms that must develop for adequate
seismic response. The rocking mechanism assumed for the as-built condition,
as previously stated, cannot be mobilized with the level of cracking observed in
the piers. The development of a crack through the pier at a relatively modest
angle could result in the sudden failure of the pier under dead load alone.
3.1.3. Bearings
The original construction of the bridge in 1928 utilized a combination of fixed,

roller, and rocker bearings that were designed as follows:
• Pier 3: Fixed
• Pier 4: Rocker • Pier 7: Rocker
• Pier 5: Span 5: Roller • Pier 8: Span 8: Roller
• Pier 5: Span 6: Roller • Pier 8: Span 9: Roller
• Pier 6: Fixed • Pier 9: Fixed
12/3/2009 22
There have been several repair and replacement contracts for the bearings
since the original construction. The first recorded contract occurred in 1945.
Additional bearing work was performed in 1972, 1983, and 1991. Some of the
original bearing types have been replaced with more modern bearing types.
Upon completion of the 2009 biennial inspection, the bearings, bolts, and pads
at piers 3 and 4 were assigned a conditional rating of 4, and piers 5, 6, 7, 8, and
9 were rated at 3. As noted earlier, a rating between 3 and 4 in New York State
indicates severe deterioration, and the member is considered structurally
deficient, as it is not functioning as originally designed. Following the 2009
biennial inspection, the following conditions were noted at the bearings:
• Pier 3, Fixed: Moderate surface rust, some pack rust.
• Pier 4, Rocker: Some pack rust inhibiting, but not preventing rocking;
anchor bolts exhibit up to 30% section loss.
• Pier 5, Slider at Spans 5 and 6: Solid pack rust preventing rotation and
inhibiting lateral movement of slide plates; anchor bolts exhibit 30-60%
section loss.
Pier 5 Bearing at Span 6
Pier 5 Bearing at Span 5
• Pier 6, Fixed: Pack rust inhibiting, but not preventing rotation; anchor bolts
slightly bent.
• Pier 7, Roller Nests: Pack rust preventing rotation; anchor bolts exhibit 30-
60% section loss; lateral translation appears inhibited by corrosion of slide
plate.
12/3/2009 23
Pier 7 Bearing
• Pier 8, Roller at Spans 8 and 9: Solid pack rust preventing rotation; anchor
bolts exhibit 30-60% section loss; longitudinal movement of slide plates
inhibited by distortion of slide plate. The left and right bearings for Span 8
exhibit differential contraction: left is contracted 4”, right is contracted 2
1/2” relative to center of masonry plate. The left and right bearings for Span
9 are both frozen at approximately 3” off center.
Pier 8 Bearing at Span 8 Pier 8 Bearing at Span 9
• Pier 9, Fixed: Moderate surface rust, solid pack rust between gusset plate
and bearing
In a situation where a bearing or bearings are frozen and the bridge

superstructure expands or contracts under temperature changes, flexure
occurs to accommodate the bridge movement. As a result of this flexure,
additional, unintended forces occur. In the case of the Lake Champlain Bridge,
the additional forces created in the structure, in conjunction with a
substructure having relatively low resistance to horizontal deflection and low
elastic ductility, the behavior of the bridge system becomes unpredictable and
was unanticipated in the original design. The frozen bearings may then fail and
12/3/2009 24
cause the pier to shift when the span expands or contracts. It is also possible
that the pier may shift first.
It is recommended that the existing bearings be replaced, following any pier
rehabilitation. It is important that the piers be strengthened prior to bearing
replacement to verify that the piers have adequate strength to resist any
jacking forces during bearing replacement.
3.1.4. Truss Superstructure
In order to assess the existing superstructure of the bridge, a 3-dimensional model

was constructed for analysis under several load cases. The model was created using
T-187, an in-house structural analysis software package written by HNTB Corporation.
The bridge was modeled as a global grillage structural model, and includes both the
steel truss superstructure and the unreinforced concrete piers. In order to accurately
capture the effects of the stiffness of the global system, all truss spans (Span 4 to
Span 9) were modeled. The model was used to analyze the global effects under
various loading conditions on both the as-built structure with functioning bearings,
and the assumed current conditions with frozen bearings.
The following simplifying assumptions are applied to the model:
1. Top chords, bottom chords, and verticals are modeled using beam elements
and lateral bracing, sway bracing, and diagonals are truss elements. The beam
elements represent the rigidly connected members of the top and bottom
chords, and the compression verticals.
2. The material deterioration and section loss are not considered. As-built
section properties are used.
3. The bridge deck is simplified as a grillage system. The composite action

existing between the concrete filled steel grid deck and the steel stringer and
transverse beams is not taken into account during the establishment of
modeling.
4. The bearings at each truss support are modeled by “tying” the truss node at
the bearing location to a node representing the bearing. The nodes are tied in
translation for all three directions and rotations about the bridge longitudinal
axis at fixed bearings, while longitudinal translation is allowed for rocker and
roller bearings. The forces from the bearing nodes are transferred through
rigid members to the centerline of the pier.
5. The base of each pier is fixed in translation and rotation in all directions.
Model results and images can be found in the attached Appendix D.
3.1.5. Design Loads
There are numerous loading conditions considered in the analysis for design a
new or rehabilitation of an existing structure. Per Section 6B.7 of the AASHTO
Manual for Bridge Evaluation (First Edition, 2008), the following loads are to be
12/3/2009 25
included in the analysis of existing bridges in addition to dead load: live loads,
wind loads, temperature, creep, and shrinkage loads, and ice pressure. One
key unknown in the assessment of the safety of the truss is the force in the
bearings at piers 5 and 8 given the bearing rehabilitations that have been
implemented in the past as well as the deck replacement activities. The
potential for large force redistribution in the truss based upon jacking forces
different than optimal at these bearings could compromise the safety of the
superstructure. One key component of any superstructure rehabilitation will be
re-establishing the optimal bearing reactions for the dead load condition.
3.1.5.1. Live Loads
The design truck, fatigue truck, design tandem, truck train and lane loads
described in the AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design Specifications have been used
for rehabilitation and replacement design. Given regional and national changes
to truck weights and configurations and the likelihood of future increases in
truck weights, a site-specific live load study is warranted to establish live
loading for final design.
3.1.5.2. Wind Loads
Wind load are included in the analysis of existing structures classified as “high-
level structures”, consistent with the geometry of the Lake Champlain Bridge.
These loads are calculated based on the AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design
Specifications.
3.1.5.3. Temperature Loads
As the existing bridge piers are composed of unreinforced concrete and

support a long-span structure and the bearings are not performing adequately,
temperature loads have been included in the analysis. The bridge is analyzed
for all expected thermal movements, forces and effects of a cold climate.
3.1.5.4. Ice Pressure
Forces that result from ice pressure are to be analyzed in the evaluation of
substructure elements, as the Lake Champlain Bridge is located in a region
characterized by a cold climate. As previously discussed, it is believed that ice
floes have resulted in some of the damage to the existing piers.
Below are examples of fluctuating temperatures for winter months from 2004
through 2009. The high variability illustrates conditions conducive for ice
formation followed by a rapid thaw period in which ice can break apart and ice
floes form. For the static ice condition, the formation of a large thick ice sheet
between the shore and piers represents the most severe case.
12/3/2009 26
2004-2005
2005-2006
2006-2007
2007-2008
12/3/2009 27
2008-2009
The average ice thicknesses calculated per AASHTO LRFD Section 3.9, are
depicted in the figure below based upon temperatures in Ticonderoga for the
last four (4) years.
Given that ice thickness computed in this manner is approximate, it is

preferable to use local measurements where available. Given that this portion
of Lake Champlain is a popular ice fishing location, we are fortunate to have
independent measurements of ice thickness. Local accounts observe maximum
ice thicknesses on the order of 24”-30” encountered each year during peak
fishing season. It is also noted that the center portion of the lake in the vicinity
of the bridge freezes later and thaws earlier, which supports the theory that
static pressure from thermal ice movements will introduce a longitudinal thrust
on piers 5 and 7.
Another key consideration is the shoreline configuration and the presence of
mud flats. In many cases, static ice pressures are limited by localized failure of
the ice at the shoreline, particularly where the banks slope gradually upward.
In the case of mudflats, it is possible that the frictional force between the ice
sheet and the lake mud does not permit ice failure at the shoreline, and results
in the potential to deliver significant forces to the piers, in excess of what has
been measured at dams and reservoirs.
12/3/2009 28
3.1.5.5. Vessel Impact
Although not required in the AASHTO Manual for Bridge Evaluation, the effect
of vessel impact should be evaluated for the bridge piers. There is a risk to the
overall bridge stability from vessel impact to the existing substructure. Vessel
impact is evaluated without additional live loading applied to the bridge, given
the relatively low average daily traffic (ADT) at this crossing.
4. Risk Assessment
4.1. Safety Considerations
The deterioration of the piers represents a significant decrease in the overall safety
of the structure, particularly given the potential for localized failure to generate a
catastrophic collapse, which could engage not only the main span unit but the
approach spans as well. Given the structure’s height above water, the depth of water
for the main span unit and the lack of emergency equipment and personnel,
catastrophic collapse would most likely result in multiple fatalities, even though the
average daily traffic for the facility is less than 4000 vehicles per day.
One measure of ensuring the safety of bridges to the travelling public is the federal
bridge inspection program, implemented after the Silver Bridge collapse in West
Virginia in 1967. While bridge inspection and the use of federal funding to rehabilitate
aging bridges has enhanced the safety of U.S. bridges, major bridge collapses still do
occur, as evidenced from recent occurrences including the De La Concorde Overpass
Collapse on September 30, 2006 in Quebec, Canada and the I-35 bridge collapse on
August 1, 2007 in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Both bridge collapses are relevant to the
safety assessment of the Lake Champlain Bridge, as both structures received in-depth
inspections and were deemed safe and remained open to live load. Both bridges
collapsed abruptly, and were not exposed to any unusual environmental loads or
heavy traffic loads at the time of collapse.
4.2. Unreinforced Concrete – Potential for Abrupt Failure
The use of reinforcement in concrete dates back to the late 1800’s, and by the time of
the design of the design of the Lake Champlain Bridge, the use of reinforcement in
concrete was typical of pier construction. The designer’s choice of plain concrete,
particularly for such slender piers, is difficult to understand.
One of the key advantages of reinforcement in concrete is the ability to develop
flexural strength and ductility (i.e. to avoid brittle failure). Minimum reinforcement
requirements were specified very early in the code development of reinforced
concrete, where sufficient reinforcement to develop the cracking moment is typical.
Otherwise, under flexure, abrupt failure can occur. Scale effects, whereby larger
concrete members show more brittle response as compared to smaller beams, have
been the focus of recent research and modern codes, recognizing the need for
additional reinforcement in large members to avoid explosive behavior.
The collapse of the De La Concorde Overpass near Montreal was an abrupt shear
failure of a thick slab without shear reinforcement. The cantilever slab was over 4 ft
thick and supported a precast concrete drop in span. Forensic investigations
demonstrated the brittle nature of the shear failure of the slab as well as freeze thaw
12/3/2009 29
deterioration of the concrete in the vicinity of the failure plane. The cantilever slab
met the applicable design requirements at the time of construction.
For the unreinforced concrete piers of the Lake Champlain Bridge, the potential for
similar abrupt failure cannot be ruled out. Freeze thaw deterioration is continuing to
damage the piers at water level. Lake icing and thrust associated with thermal
movements of the ice sheet can produce large horizontal loads in the piers, well
beyond their design capacity. Wind loads result in localized forces introduced into
pier 6, (if the bearings are functioning properly) that are beyond the computed
capacity of the pier 6 shaft and caisson foundation. Additionally, frozen bearings are
introducing longitudinal forces into piers 5 and 8, which have the most serious
deterioration at the water level. The potential for any of these loads, individually or in
combination, to precipitate pier failure and collapse of the structure cannot be ruled
out.
4.3. Fragility of Continuous Truss Systems
At the time, one of the innovative features of the superstructure design was the use
of a continuous system, which has a number of advantages from the perspective of
structural efficiency. A clear down-side to this structural system is its sensitivity to
damage, even localized damage, which could result in destabilizing the entire
superstructure system. The dramatic failure of the I-35 Bridge in Minneapolis on
August 1, 2007 due to the buckling and localized failure of a single gusset plate is
clear evidence of the fragile nature of continuous truss systems. It is interesting to
note that frozen bearings and shifting piers were evaluated as potential contributors
to the I-35 collapse (though found to be relatively unimportant, in comparison to the
gusset plate mechanism). Both frozen bearings and the potential for pier movement
are significant concerns for the Lake Champlain Bridge.
The deterioration of the piers, resulting in relative instability as compared to modern
reinforced construction, represents a major safety issue for the structure. Relative
movement and/or localized settlement as a result of continued pier deterioration, is
sufficient to cause collapse of the structure under its own weight, without the
presence of live load or other lateral loads that might serve as triggering events.
4.4. Closure of Bridge to Vehicular Traffic
Based upon the core samples, freeze thaw damage is responsible for the degree of
deterioration of the saturated concrete, particularly the concrete at water level. Ice
abrasion has deteriorated the surface, but the damage extends well within the core of
the structure with large cracks extending to depths approaching 36” at pier 6. Given
the limited coring that has been undertaken to date, the degree and significance of
cracking and the overall stability of the pier is unknown. In addition, cosmetic repairs
to the piers have been undertaken numerous times over the past 20 years. These
repairs are non-structural, since there is no established load path between existing
concrete and the repairs. Unfortunately, the repairs serve to mask the seriousness
and degree of deterioration that is present, making it more difficult to ascertain the
safety of the piers in their current state.
It is also clear that local freeze thaw damage has severely compromised the
compressive strength of the piers at water level, and the overall safety of
unreinforced piers is highly dependent upon compressive strength. A core taken from
12/3/2009 30
pier 5 above the waterline as a follow-up to overall concrete concerns raised in the
2007 biennial bridge inspection showed a concrete compressive strength of nearly
10,000 psi, indicative of high quality undamaged concrete. Subsequent coring and
compressive tests near the water line showed much less compressive strength (as
little as 3000 psi) and these cores were taken from well inside the pier, given the
freeze thaw damaged concrete at the surface. This suggests that saturation and
freeze thaw damage have penetrated deep inside the pier, further compromising the
overall safety of the structure.
The deterioration and lack of safety at pier 5 under thermal loads with the bearings
assumed frozen was the basis of closure of the bridge to live load on October 16th,
2009. The potential for pier 5 failure and subsequent collapse of a significant portion
of the structure could not be ruled out. Further investigative work was scheduled to
assess the degree of deterioration below the water line, and water line cores were
taken from the remaining water piers to assess degree of deterioration. Given the
potential fragility of the bridge under both wind and temperature loads, work
restrictions were imposed if wind or temperature were found to be outside a
predetermined range.
In addition, HNTB recommended installation of a triaxial accelerometer / bi-directional
tilt meter at pier 5 in order to assess pier movements continuously to help in our
assessment of overall risk of bridge collapse.
Installation of this remote sensor system was
completed on November 4th, 2009.
The monitoring system installed on pier 5 consists of
a network enabled sensor unit capable of measuring
3 axes of acceleration, 2 axes of tilt, and ambient
temperature. This sensor utilizes a microwave link
to communicate with a base station computer
located in the nearby Lake Champlain Visitors Center
on the New York shore. The base station records
and locally caches the data which is continuously
streaming from the sensor. The base station is also
able to broadcast data over the internet providing
near-real time external access to the sensor.
The ability to continuously track temperature and tilt
of the pier allows inferences to be drawn regarding
the relationship between temperature shift and structural behavior. As can be seen in
figures below, the strong correlation between temperature and tilt of the pier in the
longitudinal direction indicates that the pier is ‘rocking’ about the base as the steel
superstructure undergoes thermal expansion and contraction.
12/3/2009 31
Transverse Tilt (X-direction)

20 0.55
18 0.54
16 0.53
Temperature [deg C] 14 0.52
Tilt [deg]
12 0.51
10 0.5
8 0.49
6 0.48
4 0.47
2 0.46
0 0.45
12:25 AM 12:25 PM 12:25 AM 12:25 PM 12:25 AM 12:25 PM 12:25 AM 12:25 PM 12:25 AM 12:25 PM
Time Temperature Tilt X
Longitudinal Tilt (Y-direction)

20 -1.15
18 -1.16
16 -1.17
Temperature [deg C]
14 -1.18
Tilt [deg]
12 -1.19
10 -1.2
8 -1.21
6 -1.22
4 -1.23
2 -1.24
0 -1.25
12:25 AM 12:25 PM 12:25 AM 12:25 PM 12:25 AM 12:25 PM 12:25 AM 12:25 PM 12:25 AM 12:25 PM
Time Temperature Tilt Y
Preliminary readings indicate the pier top translates approximately one inch for every
30 degrees Celsius of temperature swing. This behavior is strongly indicative of poor
performance of the expansion bearings intended to isolate the piers from the thermal
behavior of the superstructure.
A second function of the sensor system is the ability to monitor the dynamic behavior
of the structure through the tri-axial accelerometers. Highly dynamic events such as
abrupt crack propagation release energy into the structure which will be subsequently
recorded by the accelerometers. Significant events generate a unique and
recognizable response spectrum, allowing thresholds to be set which can trigger
emergency notification of all necessary parties. This system can provide early
warning of changing structural conditions to workers on and around the bridge, as
well as engineers monitoring the bridge remotely. It should be noted that in order to
develop appropriate thresholds, a baseline for dynamic behavior of the bridge must
be established over several weeks of varying environmental conditions.
4.5. Worker Safety During Rehabilitation Activities
To develop pier retrofit strategies, we recommended that diving inspections be

undertaken at each pier, to establish the limits and geometry of required
strengthening and to assess the condition of the portion of the pier stems and
caissons below water. Our plan was to completely encapsulate the deteriorated pier
stems with reinforced concrete, and anchor the reinforcement into the top of the
caisson.
Diving inspections revealed significant horizontal and vertical cracking at piers 5 and
12/3/2009 32
7, far in excess of what had been identified in the 2005 diving inspection. Complete
horizontal cracks around the entire pier stem perimeter, roughly 8 to 10 ft below the
water line were noted at both piers. A large number of vertical and inclined cracks
were also identified that cross the horizontal cracking plane. The degree, number,
and size of cracking were much more significant than anticipated and result in
reduced safety of the piers. It is very difficult to know whether the horizontal cracks
are inclined and the degree to which shear can be effectively carried by the
deteriorated piers. It is also clear that cracking is active (based upon differences
between the 2005 and current diving inspections) and that the rate of deterioration is
alarming.
Given the severity, distribution, and extent of the cracking at piers 5 and 7, as well as
the increase in degree and severity of cracking since the last diving inspection, we
have become concerned about the interim safety of the bridge during potential
rehabilitation activities, particularly during winter months where lake icing (which we
surmise is the root cause of the extensive cracking at these piers) has the potential to
deliver large loads to these deteriorated substructures and the combination of cold
temperatures and frozen bearings results in additional risks.
Ultimately, it is our view that the risk of an abrupt collapse cannot be ruled out, and
that the rapid deterioration of the substructures warrants additional caution. This
potential for failure makes further substructure investigations and rehabilitation
strategies extremely hazardous to workers.
4.6. Navigational Traffic and Recreational Impacts
Given the fragility of the structure, outlined above, we feel compelled to restrict
navigational traffic underneath the bridge. Boating activities, including potential ferry
service, should not occur within 200 ft of the centerline of the bridge. We are also
aware that the vicinity of the bridge is a popular site for ice fishing. Ice fishing
activities in close proximity of the bridge should be avoided, particularly given the
additional vulnerability of the structure during winter months.
5. Repair Alternatives & Implementation Risks

5.1. Bridge Rehabilitation Strategy – Short Term
In order to facilitate reopening the bridge as quickly as possible, HNTB developed a

short term repair to rehabilitate the deteriorated piers. This short term repair is
projected to take 9 months to implement and targets a service life of 4-5 years.
Evaluation of the existing conditions has led HNTB to suggest, at a minimum, that
piers 5, 6, 7, and 8 be repaired. The pier repair is initially intended for these piers,
although it can be applied to any pier.
Conceptually, the short term repair strategy aims to depend on the existing piers as
little as possible. While it is believed that the inner cores of the piers are still strong
under compression, evaluation of the existing conditions of the outer portion of the
piers suggests that the strength of the piers is severely compromised. The
methodology of the repair strategy aims to build a support system around the pier,
and then constrain the existing concrete with a reinforced concrete shell. Factors
framing in to the development of the repair scheme included safety of the contractor
performing the repairs, ease of construction, availability of materials and equipment,
12/3/2009 33
and overall schedule of the repair construction.

The strategy to rehabilitate the foundations includes underpinning the existing
superstructure. Drilled shaft piles would be installed around the existing caisson, and
steel members would be added at the top of the drilled shafts to create a support
point for the existing truss. Neoprene would be added on the steel at the potential
point of contact between the new steel bracing members and the existing truss
superstructure, with about a 1/4“ gap between the new and old steel. The truss
system would not rest directly on the new steel members, but rather, the new drilled
shaft/steel beam system would exist as a bolster in case the existing piers fail and the
bridge begins to fall. At a maximum, the bridge would drop 1/4” to rest on the
temporary support system.
Following construction of the drilled shafts and steel beams, a new reinforcing cage
would be installed around the existing pier, doweling in to the existing caisson and
treating the top of the existing caisson as the bottom of the repair foundation. The
entire pier stem would then be jacketed with concrete, from the top of the caisson to
the bottom of the bearings.
Once the piers repairs are complete, the bridge could be reopened to restricted
traffic. The second step of the repair is replacement of the frozen bearings on the
pier with high load, multi-rotational disk bearings. The bearing replacement would
require some local strengthening of the steel truss. Once the steel work is completed
it is estimated that a weekend closure would be sufficient to install the new bearings.
Beyond the current flag repairs, no short term designs for the steel truss have been
developed.
While the repair strategy described above does allow the bridge to open to traffic in
the shortest time frame, it is no more than a stop-gap. Ultimately, the bridge
foundations are going to continue to deteriorate. Additionally, the condition of the
remaining piers that have not exhibited the heavy losses of piers 5, 6, 7 and 8 will
continue to decline. The possibility also exists that any permanent strategy will
require the removal or demolition of the retrofitted piers.
12/3/2009 34
Bridge Rehabilitation Strategy – Drilled Shafts with Steel Support Beams
5.2. Bridge Rehabilitation Strategy – Long Term
The short term rehab strategy described above does not investigate the conditions of
the caissons. An extended service life, or long term, rehabilitation on the order of 20+
years would require a thorough evaluation of the existing caissons. If the caissons
exhibit losses similar to the piers, there is little chance that the foundations can be
retained for a long term fix.
Rehabilitation of the unreinforced concrete caissons will meet many challenges when
trying to satisfy current design requirements, such as higher load demands, wind
loads, thermal loads, and seismic loads. The soft soils in the area are an additional
12/3/2009 35
challenge when considering strengthening measures to the slender, unreinforced

piers. It is likely that the existing piers would be removed and replaced with new,
reinforced concrete piers.
One strategy to rehabilitate the foundations permanently includes underpinning the
existing superstructure using the same strategy for the temporary repair as described
in Section 5.1. Drilled shaft piles would be installed around the existing caisson, and a
steel frame would be constructed along the top of the drilled shafts. This system
would serve as a temporary support for the existing superstructure during
replacement of the piers. Once in place, the existing piers would be removed. A new
pile cap would then span between the new pile shafts. The new pile cap would likely
be very thick, on the order of 10 feet, coming to just below the water surface. The
short term pier repair described above in Section 5.1 could be encompassed by this
long term repair.
Long term rehabilitation would also require a complete deck replacement as well as
steel repairs for the existing truss. A painting contract is slated in the next few years,
and would be necessary for a rehabilitation alternative.
The long term rehabilitation strategy could restore the bridge to service and
functionality for at least 50 years. However, there are many challenges and
complications that make this option rigorous in both design and construction. The
historical aspects of the bridge restrict the design options; the environment and
weather affect the design in terms of loading and construction time. Of key concern
is also the time it takes to design and construct the bridge.
5.3. Bridge Replacement
The final strategy for the bridge is full replacement. Given the current level of
uncertainty, it is difficult to assume that a short term repair or rehabilitation project
would bring the bridge up to an acceptable level of safety. In order to avoid an
unacceptable level of risk, we suggest that the existing bridge be demolished in a
controlled manner, and replaced with a new bridge on the same alignment. A new
bridge could be designed for a service life of 100 years. In addition, pedestrian and
bicycle access could be provided for safe crossings of the structure. A new structure
would be designed to meet current design codes, ensuring adequate performance
under dead, live, wind, thermal, creep and shrinkage, seismic, and ice loads.
Structure replacement alternatives have to meet similar navigational requirements to
the existing bridge, though a reduction in vertical clearance is likely warranted.
Additionally, given the importance of the structure to the regional economies and the
lack of viable detours, enhanced safety and service life should be a clear project goal.
In addition, the bridge should be both easy to inspect and maintain, and should avoid
fracture critical elements.
On a preliminary basis, we have advanced three potential alternatives, a conventional
steel girder bridge, a network tied arch with steel multi-girder approach spans and a
steel composite superstructure, and a single cell trapezoidal concrete segmental box
alternative.
Network Tied Arch
A network tied arch has a number of distinct advantages over other steel alternatives
from the perspective of cost and constructability, but more importantly, in terms of
safety and redundancy. The use of inclined suspenders achieves behavior similar to a
12/3/2009 36
truss, and minimizes bending moments transmitted to the arch rib and tie-girder.
With the use of a built up section, the tie girder is designed as a fully redundant
element as has been done on the Blennerhassett Island Bridge in Charleston, WV with
an 880 ft main span.
In addition, the crossing cable pattern allows for the cables to be both fully redundant
and fully replaceable with no impact to live load. Furthermore, the use of stay cables
with their enhanced corrosion protection further enhances bridge service life. The
use of an arch at the site will also provide an innovative and picturesque structure
that directly relates to the character of the existing Lake Champlain Bridge.
Concrete Box Girder
Segmentally constructed concrete box girder bridges originated in Europe over 50
years ago and have become increasingly popular in the Unites States over the past 35
years. This type of structure has proven to be economical, durable, and aesthetically
pleasing.
The superstructure is composed of a single or two parallel concrete boxes that are
post-tensioned by high strength steel tendons in the longitudinal direction to minimize
tensile stresses in the concrete. Similarly, the deck slab is post-tensioned in the
transverse direction. This two-way precompression of the concrete largely eliminates
concrete cracking and contributes to the excellent durability of this type of structure.
Post-tensioning tendons have at least three levels of corrosion protection and
multiple tendons provide for excellent redundancy.
The aesthetic qualities of concrete box girder bridges are characterized by the clean,
smooth lines presented by the closed box. The shape of the piers and superstructure
is somewhat flexible, giving the opportunity to create a unique and aesthetically
pleasing structure. Further enhancements can be achieved through inlays,
pigmentation of the concrete, and lighting.
For the new Lake Champlain Bridge constant depth approaches would transition into
a variable depth structure for the leap over the navigation channel. This gives the
structure an arch-like appearance and emphasizes the main span, while at the same
time maintaining continuity and harmony with the approaches. This continuity also
permits the elimination of intermediate expansion joints over the full length of the
structure.
Conventional Steel Bridge
A conventional steel multi-girder bridge is the most basic and utilitarian option. As
one of the most widely used bridge types in the U.S., its greatest advantages are ease
of construction and value. A multi-girder bridge is a redundant system that can be
designed to a variety of cross sections and easily adapted to the needs of the
community. It also has lower initial costs due to conventional materials and erection.
Similar to the existing approach structures, the structure would create a low,
unassuming profile over the lake. The open roadway also offers unobstructed vistas
for pedestrians and motorists of Lake Champlain. Unfortunately, the steel girder
bridge type does not contribute to the Lake Champlain environment aesthetically.
The existing truss bridge is heralded by the local communities as an elegant and
beautiful structure.
The cost of a new bridge is estimated at approximately $77 million for a network tied
arch bridge, $86 million for a segmental concrete alternative, and $67 million for a
12/3/2009 37
conventional steel girder bridge, all including demolition costs. Each alternative is less
expensive than the full rehabilitation option, and the element of risk is drastically
reduced with a new structure. The approximate time frame for demolition, design, and
construction is estimated to be roughly 22-24 months. Full descriptions of the cost
and timeframe associated with each alternative can be found in Section 5.4 and
Appendix A.
5.4. Service Life and Cost Analysis
The service life of the alternatives is broken down into two categories – temporary
and permanent (long term). The temporary solution evaluated has an estimated
service life of 5 years, and provides an independent support for each concrete lake
pier. The two permanent solutions would extend the serviceable life of the bridge 50
years should a complete rehabilitation alternative be selected, or 75 years for a new
bridge on the existing alignment.
The cost and schedule for design/construction is included herein and summarized
below:
Design/Construction Cost (million)
Short Term Rehabilitation 9 Months $22.6
Long Term Rehabilitation 30 Months $84.1
Bridge Replacement (Arch) 24 Months $76.7
Bridge Replacement (Concrete Box) 24 Months $86.0
Bridge Replacement (Conventional) 22 Months $67.2
6. Summary
6.1. Conclusions and Recommendations
As a result of in-depth inspections and tests in recent weeks, significant and rapid
deterioration of the unreinforced concrete substructures that support the Lake
Champlain Bridge has been exposed, and subsequently bridge closure to live load was
recommended on October 16th, 2009. Follow-up inspections including comprehensive
diving inspections have further confirmed the fragility of the substructure elements
well below water and have expanded the areas of concern from piers 5 and 8 to
include the main span bridge piers 6 and 7.
In particular, piers 5 and 7 have full width horizontal cracks at two locations below the
water line, as well as numerous vertical and inclined cracks that intercept the
horizontal cracks. The potential for significant additional cracking in the caissons
below the mud-line appears likely. If any major cracks develop diagonally in the pier
shaft or concrete deterioration reduces the contact bearing area between concrete
segments, the pier could fail without warning. This mass failure of an unreinforced
pier would be sudden and catastrophic.
With that said, we have been evaluated various methods to rehabilitate the piers in an
effort to reopen the bridge to vehicular traffic in the shortest possible time, and to
stabilize the structure to allow for future rehabilitation instead of replacement. We
have made every effort to develop rehabilitation options that minimize risk to the
12/3/2009 38
public, as well as the contractor and inspection personnel involved in assessment,

repairs and rehabilitation. With safety our primary concern, we focused on a
temporary repair option to stabilize what are clearly the most vulnerable portions of
the piers. This interim strategy strengthens only the pier wall stems from the top of
caisson to the top of pier including bearing seats. In order to do so, we would precede
pier strengthening by constructing a redundant superstructure support system. This
redundant system would include installing four large diameter drilled shafts (from
rock level to pier top) outside the footprint of each existing pier, and then underpin
the superstructure from these shafts.
This repair option is a temporary solution, but provides an independent and therefore
redundant means of superstructure support, thereby reducing the risks associated
with construction activities under the existing bridge. However, this strategy
negatively impacts both cost and schedule. We estimate this option to be over $20
million and construction could take approximately 9 months to complete, depending
on equipment limitations for installation of large diameter drilled shafts.
An advantage to the use of large diameter drilled shafts outside of the caisson
footprint for the temporary rehabilitation is that they can be incorporated into the
final pier design in a permanent rehabilitation strategy to reduce the overall
construction cost of that alternative. It is stressed that the risk involved with a repair
project to the existing structure cannot be completely eliminated, even with an
underpinning strategy. Although underpinning the existing superstructure provides a
redundant system for construction, construction operations within close proximity of
the fragile structure are still required, and abrupt collapse would most certainly result
in risk to contractor personnel and equipment.
In lieu of rehabilitating the piers, which is only a temporary measure until a
permanent solution is developed, a second option would be to accelerate either long
term rehabilitation or bridge replacement. With a focus on restoring the crossing to
full operations as quickly as possible, we will limit our comparison to a bridge
constructed on the existing alignment given that a full environmental impact
statement (EIS) would be required if an off-site location was selected. An on-site
replacement would likely require either a design report (i.e. categorical exclusion with
documentation) or an environmental assessment. For these two options, we offer the
following:
Bridge Rehabilitation
• Install new pier foundations (presumably large diameter drilled shafts) outside
the footprint of each pier. The new pier foundations would also serve as
temporary support scaffolding which, in turn, would support the
superstructure. At points of support, the truss will require significant
modification and localized strengthening.
• Demolish existing piers to the top of cofferdams (existing cofferdams to be

abandoned in place).
• Install a precast or cast-in-place reinforced concrete pile cap connecting the

shafts at water level. The top of the pile cap would be preferably fall below
high water.
12/3/2009 39
• Construct pier stems, install new bearings, reseat the superstructure and
remove the temporary supports.
• Blast clean the superstructure steelwork (lead based paint requiring full
containment), repair/replace a large percentage of the severely deteriorated
steel superstructure, and repaint the steelwork.
• Replace all deck joints and evaluate the condition of the concrete filled steel
grid deck and replace if necessary. If the deck is found to be in good condition,
an overlay will be provided to improve traction.
• Rehabilitation construction cost estimate: $84 million. Design and construction

duration: 30 months.
Bridge Replacement
• Remove the existing superstructure, complete or partial, and install new

foundations (presumably large diameter drilled shafts) offset from the existing
foundation locations.
• Demolish existing piers to the top of cofferdams (existing cofferdams to be

abandoned in place) in concert with superstructure fabrication and
construction of new pile caps and pier stems.
• Install superstructure and modify approach roadways as necessary.
• Replacement construction cost estimate (minimum): $67 million. Design and

construction duration: 22 months.
To summarize, three distinct options were evaluated: one temporary rehabilitation

strategy that extends the serviceable life of the bridge 5 years, and two permanent
solutions. The pros and cons of each option are highlighted below:
Temporary Option
• Short Term Rehabilitation: Redundant Pier Support

• Pros
 Reduced risk during construction, but risk not eliminated
 Disruption to traffic only 9 months
• Cons
 High cost - $20+ million
 Additional bridge and lane closures during various repairs and painting
 Limited service life, complete bridge rehabilitation or replacement required
in 5 years
Permanent Options
• Long Term Bridge Rehabilitation

• Pros
12/3/2009 40
 Retains the existing historic structure

• Cons
 Functionally obsolete
 Reduced safety and reliability as compared to new construction that does
not incorporate fracture critical elements.
 Risks during construction activities, particularly during truss strengthening
and bearing replacement.
 Initial cost - $84 million
 Disruption to traffic – 30 months
 High future maintenance costs (i.e. bridge painting)
 Reduced service life, estimated at 50 years, but dependent upon fatigue
induced damage and the extent of rehabilitation.
• Bridge Replacement
• Pros
 Initial cost - $67 million (minimum)
 Pedestrian and bicycle access
 Lower future maintenance costs
 Significantly enhanced Safety and Reliability
 Long service life, >75 years
• Cons
 Eliminates historic bridge
 Disruption to traffic – 22 months (minimum)
The short term temporary option is estimated to cost more than $20 million to
provide proper foundation support. Another $14 million is estimated to repair
structural steel and paint the bridge; $34 million is too high a price to pay for a 5 year
extension of the bridge’s serviceable life and then be faced with either closing the
bridge for another two years to provide a long term on-site solution or construct a
new bridge off-site. Additionally, rehabilitation options, whether temporary or
permanent, expose engineers and contractor’s personnel to significant risks in the
event of an abrupt collapse during construction activities.
Given the risks associated with rehabilitation, together with the reduced level of
safety of the rehabilitated structure as compared to a new bridge after completion,
we recommend that rehabilitation options be dismissed and a permanent on-site
replacement be advanced. Given the long detour lengths, the importance of the
bridge to the regional economy, and the need for a safe reliable crossing at this
location for many years to come, both temporary and permanent rehabilitation
strategies are inadequate for this crossing. Given the importance of the existing Lake
Champlain Bridge as an innovative and iconic example of the continuous truss form,
this is particularly unfortunate.
It is also our recommendation that the existing superstructure be demolished in a
controlled manner as soon as practical to eliminate the risk of sudden, potentially
catastrophic, failure. Piece by piece superstructure demolition with water or
structure-based cranes is inappropriate, given the overall fragility of the structure.
With the severe regional impacts of this bridge closure, replacement of the Lake
Champlain Bridge along the same alignment is recommended to expedite regulatory
approvals and minimize impacts to the vitally important cultural resources in close
proximity to the structure.
12/3/2009 41
LAKE CHAMPLAIN BRIDGE – SAFETY ASSESSMENT REPORT
APPENDIX A:
Cost Analyses of Pier and Bearing Repair,

Bridge Rehabilitation, and Bridge
Replacement Alternatives
12/3/2009
Lake Champlain Bridge - Safety Assessment Report
Lake Champlain Bridge

Connecting Crown Point, New York to Chimney Point, Vermont
Table I - Life Cycle Cost Study - Summary
Table Summary: Table I - Life Cycle Cost Study - Summary, summarizes both the immediate and future costs developed in Tables II and III for all five alternates. The Total
Present Value Costs are for a 75 year life cycle.
Alternate I Alternate II Alternate III-A Alternate III-B Alternate III-C

Description Short Term Rehabilitation with Bridge Long Term Bridge Rehabilitation with
Arch Bridge Replacement Segmental Concrete Bridge Replacement Long Span Girder Bridge Replacement
Replacement in 5 yrs Bridge Replacement in 50 yrs
Immediate Costs (see Table II) $22,595,915 $84,106,240 $76,707,805 $86,014,072 $67,234,045
Future Costs (see Table III) $88,636,534 $49,381,953 $20,295,894 $12,153,146 $20,295,894
Total Present Value Cost $111,232,450 $133,488,193 $97,003,699 $98,167,217 $87,529,939
12/3/2009
GT/CB

Table II - Life Cycle Cost Study - Immediate Cost Summary
Table Summary: Table I - Life Cycle Cost Study - Immediate Cost Summary, calculates the present costs of all immediate repairs,
for all five alternates. Costs were developed based on recommendations made in this report.
Description Alternate I Alternate II Alternate III-A Alternate III-B Alternate III-C

Mobilization $ 1,050,973 $ 3,911,918 $ 3,567,805 $ 4,000,654 $ 3,127,165
Substructure Repairs $ 15,811,214 $ 22,998,228 $ - $ - $ -
Superstructure Repairs $ 1,705,000 $ 22,891,200 $ - $ - $ -
Painting - Superstructure $ - $ 12,000,000 $ - $ - $ -
Bridge Demolition $ - $ 3,809,208 $ 5,194,375 $ 5,194,375 $ 5,194,375
Bridge Replacement $ - $ - $ 49,269,040
49 269 040 $ 56,483,200
56 483 200 $ 41,925,040
41 925 040
Civil Site Improvements $ - $ 3,500,000 $ 5,000,000 $ 5,000,000 $ 5,000,000
Engineering $ 1,401,297 $ 5,215,891 $ 4,757,073 $ 5,334,206 $ 4,169,553
Construction Management $ 1,751,621 $ 6,519,864 $ 5,946,341 $ 6,667,757 $ 5,211,941
Contingency $ 875,811 $ 3,259,932 $ 2,973,171 $ 3,333,879 $ 2,605,971
Total $22,595,915 $84,106,240 $76,707,805 $86,014,072 $67,234,045
12/3/2009
GT/CB

Table III - Life Cycle Cost Study - Future Cost Summary
Table Summary: Table III - Life Cycle Cost Study - Future Cost Summary, calculates the present costs of all anticipated repairs and/or rehabilitations for a
75 year period, for all five alternates. Costs are developed by first selecting the year the repair / rehab. will be performed, setting a present day cost,
escalating to obtain a future cost, and then finally discounting back to a present value. The PV factor that is utilized is developed by using both an
inflation and interest rate, which simultaneously escalates and discounts costs to present values, given the year the repair will be performed.
Interest rate 6.00%

Inflation rate 4.00%
PV factor = 1/ (1 + RR)n Real Rate 1.92%
Real Rate - (RR) = (1+int R )/(1+Inf R) - 1
Year Present Cost PV Factor PV of Future Costs = (PC x PVF)

Description
(n) (PC) (PVF) Alternate I Alternate II Alternate III-A Alternate III-B Alternate III-B
Bridge Replacement 5 $75,000,000 0.9092 $ 68,186,537 - - - -
Paint - Superstructure 10 $200,000 0.8266 - $ 165,312 $ 165,312 - $ 165,312
Paint - Superstructure 15 $200,000 0.7515 - $ 150,294 - - -
Paint - Superstructure 220 0
$200,000 0.6832 $ 136,641 $ 136,641 $ 136,641 - $ 136,641
Paint - Superstructure 25 $200,000 0.6211 $ 124,227 $ 124,227 $ 124,227 - $ 124,227
Paint - Superstructure 25 $10,000,000 0.6211 - $ 6,211,362 $ 6,211,362 - $ 6,211,362
Deck Overlay Replacement 25 $2,500,000 0.6211 - - - $ 1,552,841 -
Approach Repairs 25 $2,500,000 0.6211 - $ 1,552,841 $ 1,552,841 $ 1,552,841 $ 1,552,841
Superstructure Repairs 25 $3,500,000 0.6211 - $ 2,173,977 $ 2,173,977 $ 2,173,977 $ 2,173,977
Substructure Repairs 25 $1,500,000 0.6211 - $ 931,704 $ 931,704 $ 931,704 $ 931,704
Paint - Superstructure 25 $10,000,000 0.6211 $ 6,211,362 - - - -
Deck Overlay Replacement 30 $2,500,000 0.5647 $ 1,411,771 - - - -
Approach Repairs 30 $2,500,000 0.5647 $ 1,411,771 - - - -
Superstructure Repairs 30 $3,500,000 0.5647 $ 1,976,479 - - - -
Substructure Repairs 30 $1,500,000 0.5647 $ 847,063 - - - -
12/3/2009
GT/CB

Interest rate 6.00%


Description
Paint - Superstructure 50 $10,000,000 0.3858 - $ 3,858,102 $ 3,858,102 - $ 3,858,102
Deck Overlay
O Replacement
l 50 $2,500,000
$2 500 000 0.3858
0 3858 - - - $ 964
964,525
525 -
Approach Repairs 50 $2,000,000 0.3858 $ 771,620 $ 771,620 $ 771,620 $ 771,620 $ 771,620
Superstructure Repairs 50 $3,500,000 0.3858 $ 1,350,336 $ 1,350,336 $ 1,350,336 $ 1,350,336 $ 1,350,336
Substructure Repairs 50 $1,500,000 0.3858 $ 578,715 $ 578,715 $ 578,715 $ 578,715 $ 578,715
Bridge Replacement 50 $75,000,000 0.3858 - $ 28,935,765 - - -
Paint - Superstructure 60 $10,000,000 0.3189 $ 3,188,955 - - - -
Deck Overlay Replacement 75 $2,500,000 0.2396 - - - $ 599,102 -
Approach Repairs 75 $2,000,000 0.2396 $ 479,281 $ 479,281 $ 479,281 $ 479,281 $ 479,281
Superstructure Repairs 75 $3,500,000 0.2396 $ 838,742 $ 838,742 $ 838,742 $ 838,742 $ 838,742
Substructure Repairs 75 $1,500,000 0.2396 $ 359,461 $ 359,461 $ 359,461 $ 359,461 $ 359,461
12/3/2009
GT/CB

Interest rate 6.00%


Description
Total $ 88,636,534 $ 49,381,953 $ 20,295,894 $ 12,153,146 $ 20,295,894
12/3/2009
GT/CB

Short Term Bridge Rehabilitation - Pier Strengthening and Underpinning Support of Superstructure
UNIT QUANTITY UNIT COST TOTAL

Pier 4 Rehab
Foundation Excavation CY 231 $ 50.00 $ 11,550
Cofferdam SF 4,860 $ 80.00 $ 388,800
Reinforcement Steel LBS 186,788 $ 1.50 $ 280,182
Post Tensioning Strands LF 706 $ 4.00 $ 2,824
High Performance Concrete CY 131 $ 600.00 $ 78,600
8' Dia. Drilled Shaft in Soil LF 212 $ 2,500.00 $ 530,000
8' Dia. Drilled Shaft in Rock LF 20 $ 5,000.00 $ 100,000
Pier Cap CY 811 $ 600.00 $ 486,600
Structural Steel - Underpinning LBS 120,120 $ 4.20 $ 504,504 $ 2,383,060
Pier 5 Rehab
Cofferdam SF 4,860 $ 80.00 $ 388,800
Post Tensioning Strands LF 1,955 $ 4.00 $ 7,820
Pier Cap CY 811 $ 600.00 $ 486,600
Pier 6 Rehab
Cofferdam SF 6,156 $ 80.00 $ 492,480
8' Dia. Drilled Shaft in Soil LF 508 $ 2,500.00 $ 1,270,000
Pier Cap CY 811 $ 600.00 $ 486,600
Pier 7 Rehab
Foundation Excavation CY - $ 50.00 $ -
Cofferdam SF 6,156 $ 80.00 $ 492,480
Pier Cap CY 811 $ 600.00 $ 486,600
Pier 8 Rehab
Cofferdam SF 4,860 $ 80.00 $ 388,800
Pier Cap CY 811 $ 600.00 $ 486,600
12/3/2009
GT/CB

Short Term Bridge Rehabilitation - Pier Strengthening and Underpinning Support of Superstructure

Bearing Retrofit / Replacement
at Pier 4 EA 2 $ 2,500.00 $ 5,000
at Pier 5 EA 4 $ 4,000.00 $ 16,000
at Pier 6 EA 2 $ 7,000.00 $ 14,000
at Pier 7 EA 2 $ 7,000.00 $ 14,000
at Pier 8 EA 4 $ 4,000.00 $ 16,000 $ 65,000
Truss Stengthening
at Pier 4 and Span 4 LBS 10,000 $ 20.00 $ 200,000
at Pier 8 and Span 8 LBS 16,000 $ 20.00 $ 320,000 $ 1,640,000
Painting - Superstructure $ - no painting
Subtotal $ 17,516,214
Mobilization $ 1,050,973 6.0% of Subtotal

Engineering $ 1,401,297 8.0% of Subtotal
Construction Management $ 1,751,621 10.0% of Subtotal
Contingency $ 875,811 5.0% of Subtotal
Total Short Term Bridge Rehabilitation $ 22,595,915

Approximate Construction Duration - 9 months
Service Life 5 years
12/3/2009
GT/CB

Permanent Bridge Rehabilitation

Pier 4 Replacement
Cofferdam SF 4,860 $ 80.00 $ 388,800
Pier Cap CY 811 $ 600.00 $ 486,600
Pier 5 Replacement
Cofferdam SF 4,860 $ 80.00 $ 388,800
High Performance Concrete CY 1,797 $ 600.00 $ 1,078,200
Pier Cap CY 811 $ 600.00 $ 486,600
Pier 6 Replacement
Cofferdam SF 6,156 $ 80.00 $ 492,480
Pier Cap CY 811 $ 600.00 $ 486,600
Pier 7 Replacement
Foundation Excavation CY - $ 50.00 $ -
Cofferdam SF 6,156 $ 80.00 $ 492,480
Pier Cap CY 811 $ 600.00 $ 486,600
Pier 8 Replacement
Cofferdam SF 4,860 $ 80.00 $ 388,800
High Performance Concrete CY 1,485 $ 600.00 $ 891,000
Pier Cap CY 811 $ 600.00 $ 486,600
Bearing Retrofit / Replacement

at Pier 4 EA 2 $ 2,500 $ 5,000
at Pier 5 EA 4 $ 4,000 $ 16,000
at Pier 6 EA 2 $ 7,000 $ 14,000
at Pier 7 EA 2 $ 7,000 $ 14,000
at Pier 8 EA 4 $ 4,000 $ 16,000 $ 65,000
12/3/2009
GT/CB

Permanent Bridge Rehabilitation

Floorbeam and Stringer Retrofits LBS 240,000 $ 8.00 $ 1,920,000 $ 1,920,000
Truss Stengthening / Misc Steel Repairs

at Pier 4 and Span 4 LBS 80,000 $ 16.00 $ 1,280,000
at Pier 8 and Span 8 LBS 128,000 $ 16.00 $ 2,048,000 $ 10,496,000
Temporary Falsework for Truss Retrofits 20% of truss repairs $ 2,099,200
Bridge Deck Replacement

Width 31.67 FT
Length 2186.88 FT
Area 69258.33 SF
Cost/SF $ 120.00
Total Cost $ 8,311,000
Painting - Superstructure $ 12,000,000
Bridge Demolition - Bridge Deck and Piers

Width 31.67 FT
Length 2186.88 FT
Area 69258.33 SF
Cost/SF $ 55.00
Total Bridge Demolition Cost $ 3,809,208
Civil Site Improvements $ 3,500,000
Subtotal $ 65,198,635
Mobilization $ 3,911,918 6.0% of Bridge Cost

Engineering $ 5,215,891 8.0% of Bridge Cost
Construction Management $ 6,519,864 10.0% of Bridge Cost
Contingency $ 3,259,932 5.0% of Subtotal
Total Long Term Bridge Rehabilitation Cost $ 84,106,240

12/3/2009
GT/CB

Network Tied Arch Bridge Replacement Alternative
Main Span
Width 68.0 FT
Length 450.0 FT
Area 30600.0 SF
Cost/SF $ 640.00
Total Main Span Cost $ 19,584,000
Approach Spans
Width 61.0 FT
Length 1738.0 FT
Area 106018.0 SF
Cost/SF $ 280.00
Total Approach Span Cost $ 29,685,040
Bridge Demolition
Width 31.67 FT
Length 2186.88 FT
Area 69258.33 SF
Cost/SF $ 75.00
Subtotal $ 59,463,415

Total Bridge Replacement - Arch $ 76,707,805

Expedited Design and Contracting Method
12/3/2009
GT/CB

Segmental Concrete Bridge Replacement Alternative
Main Span
Width 68.0 FT
Length 450.0 FT
Area 30600.0 SF
Cost/SF $ 460.00
Approach Spans
Width 61.0 FT
Length 1738.0 FT
Area 106018.0 SF
Cost/SF $ 400.00
Bridge Demolition
Width 31.67 FT
Length 2186.88 FT
Area 69258.33 SF
Cost/SF $ 75.00
Subtotal $ 66,677,575

Total Bridge Replacement - Segmental Concrete $ 86,014,072

12/3/2009
GT/CB

Long Span Girder Bridge Replacement Alternative
Main Span
Width 68.0 FT
Length 450.0 FT
Area 30600.0 SF
Cost/SF $ 400.00
Approach Spans
Width 61.0 FT
Length 1738.0 FT
Area 106018.0 SF
Cost/SF $ 280.00
Bridge Demolition
Width 31.67 FT
Length 2186.88 FT
Area 69258.33 SF
Cost/SF $ 75.00
Subtotal $ 52,119,415

Total Bridge Replacement - Long Span Girder $ 67,234,045

12/3/2009
GT/CB
APPENDIX B:
Concrete Testing Results
12/3/2009
2007 Concrete Core Testing
Note: These cores were taken as a result of a yellow flag at pier 3 during the 2007 biennial
inspection. The 2007 inspection led to overall concerns regarding concrete conditions of
the bridge substructure.
Compressive Strength
Pier No. Core No.
Results (psi)
3 31 5860
3 35 4740
4 23 6770
4 25 7050
5 17 9910
6 15 3550
6 12 6800
7 6 7290
7 10 6910
8 4 3770
8 1 6550
9 27 4790
9 29 5190
12/3/2009
2009 Concrete Core Testing
12/3/2009
MEMORANDUM
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
To: Tom Hoffman, Region 1 Structures Engineer
From: Greg Wichser, Acting Region 1 Materials Engineer
Subject: Crown Point Bridge Pier Core Reports
Date: October 23, 2009
The attached Core Reports contain the additional information requested by the HNTB memo
dated October 21, 2009. The cores are obtained by coring to the maximum depth of the bit,
approximately 16 inches, and then the core is broken off, extracted, and repeated until the desired
depth of 36 inches was achieved.
The core extraction process often yielded short sections near the face of the pier. The
photographs do not fully illustrate the distress in these cores, but the short pieces generally have
several cracks parallel with the face. The cracking and orientation is listed in the attached reports.
The Core Report lists “existing loss” as the depth of deterioration found prior to coring
operations. Further loss from coring activities is noted, and loose material collected and bagged.
Core Photographs are arranged as “in-situ” with the depth illustrating distance from “original
face”. All Depths listed are referenced to the outer face theoretically prior to loss. This distance
was measured in the field using a straight edge and should be considered approximate. For
example, when a core photograph shows the top of core at 7 inches, then 7 inches of loss prior to
coring was noted.
Please call if you have any questions or comments.
cc: John Grady, Acting Region 1 Construction Engineer

James Boni, Assistant to the Regional Director
James Bridges, Region 1 Design Engineer
Attachement Files: CPB, Pier 3 Core Report

CPB, Pier 4 Core Report
STRUCTURAL CORE REPORT
REGION 1 MATERIALS Page 1 of 8
Location: Crown Point Bridge, Pier 3 PIN: n/a

Essex County
Project Manager: T. Hoffman Dates cored: 10-21-09

10-22-09
Core No. Location Total PCC Depth
9 Pier 3, east face, middle 42” from original surface
Approximately 4” existing surface loss. 9A-12”, 9B-14”, 9C-12”
Visible cracking to 8” below original surface (parallel to outside face).

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 9A

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 9B

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 9C

Essex County

10-22-09

10 Pier 3, west face, north end (on radius) 43” from original surface
Approximately 4” of existing surface loss. 10A-13”, 10B-13”, 10C-13”
Visible cracking to 6” from original surface (parallel to outside face).

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 10A

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 10B

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 10C

Essex County

10-22-09
7 Pier 4, east face, north end 40” from original surface

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 7A

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 7B

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 7C

Essex County

10-22-09

8 Pier 4, west face, south end 32” from original surface
Visible cracking to 8” below original surface (parallel to outside face). Large piece of wood at 18” below original
surface.

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 8A

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 8B

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 8C
PAVEMENT CORE REPORT

Essex County

1 East Face, North End 1140 mm
Measured from original
surface
Approximately 150 mm of surface loss measured prior to coring. Recovered 3 sections, measuring: A- 310 mm, B-
350 mm, and C- 330 mm. Cracking was observed to a depth of approximately 80 mm in the outermost core
(approximately 230 mm from original surface).

2 East Face, South End 490 mm
surface
Approximately 150 mm of surface loss measured prior to coring. Lost approximately 70 mm of additional material
during coring. Recovered 1 section measuring 270 mm. No additional cracking was observed in the recovered core.

3 West Face, South End 980 mm
surface
Approximately 80 mm of surface loss measured prior to coring. Lost approximately 210 mm of additional material
during coring. Recovered 2 sections measuring: B- 360 mm and C- 330 mm. Cracking was observed to a depth of
150 mm in the outermost core (approximately 440 mm from original surface).

Essex County
Core 1, Section “
A”
Core 1, Section “
B”

Essex County
Core 1, Section “
C”
Core 1, cracking on outermost end


Essex County
Core 2
Core 3, Section “
B”

Essex County
Core 3, Section “
C”
Core 3, cracking on outermost end. (The side loss is due to coring.)


Essex County

10-22-09
5 Pier 6, east face, north end 34” from original surface
Approximately 3” existing surface loss. Additional 1” rubble during coring process. 5A-4”, 5B-13”, 5C-13”
Visible cracking to 13” from original surface (parallel to outside face). Visible cracking to 34” from original surface
(perpendicular to outside face).

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 5A

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 5B

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 5C

Essex County

10-22-09

6 Pier 6, west face, middle 34” from original surface
Visible cracking to 11” below original surface (parallel to outside face). Visible cracking to 22” below original
surface (perpendicular to outside face).

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 6A

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 6B

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 6C

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 3 location photo was not obtained.


Essex County

10-22-09
Core 3A

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 3B

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 3C

Essex County

10-22-09


Essex County

10-22-09
Core 4A

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 4B

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 4C

Essex County

10-22-09

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 1A

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 1B

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 1C

Essex County

10-22-09

Approximately 8” existing loss. 2A-2”, 2B-9”, 2C-14”, 2D-14”
Visible cracking to 12” from original surface (parallel to outside face)

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 2A and 2B

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 2C

Essex County

10-22-09
Core 2D
2009 NYSDOT Petrographic

Analysis Report
12/3/2009
CROWN POINT BRIDGE:
RESULTS OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF CONCRETE FROM PIER 3
Various options are being considered for addressing the observed deterioration of concrete
piers that support the Crown Point Bridge, which was built in the 1920s and spans Lake
Champlain from New York to Vermont. The Geology Section was asked to address the cause(s)
for the distresses that have contributed to its current state of deterioration.
Samples of 6-inch cores taken from Pier 3, one of 4 that support the Crown Point Bridge,
were delivered to the Geology Lab. After an inspection of the cores, it was determined that 4
thin sections would be cut from a portion of Core 3a that would reasonably represent the
concrete from Pier 3. An inspection of the thin sections was conducted by engineering
geologists in the Geology Lab under both normal and polarized light with a petrographic
microscope, yielded the following observations and determinations:
• The coarse aggregate was determined to be diorite, a crystalline igneous rock composed
mostly of plagioclase feldspar with minor amounts of quartz, hornblende, biotite, and
pyroxene.
• Aggregate particles do not have reaction rims associated with alkali-silica reaction.
• There is significant cracking of the mortar. When these fine cracks encounter an
aggregate particle, they travel along the aggregate-mortar interface.
• The cracks contain a white infilling that is visible to the unaided eye.
Considering the aforementioned observations, it is the opinion of this geologist that the
deterioration of the concrete in the piers is due primarily to freezing and thawing that has
been exacerbated by delayed ettringite formation. Ettringite, by filling the air voids and
cracks in the mortar, has the effect of removing the freeze-thaw protection normally
afforded by the air void system. It is most likely that the substance infilling the cracks and
voids is ettringite, and not silica gel, for the following reasons (see figures 1. And 2.):
• Diorite has not been associated with alkali-aggregate reaction in New York State.
• There are no reaction rims surrounding the aggregate particles. Such rims are a
diagnostic feature of ASR.
• There are many cracks in the mortar, but they were not observed to extend through
the aggregate particles. Cracks generated by ASR swelling and cracking aggregate
particles, particularly coarse aggregate particles, propagate away from the particle
and through the mortar.
• There are very few cracks in the coarse aggregate particles. The few cracked
aggregate particles examined contained no infilling substances. Numerous cracked
particles with infillings are a feature of ASR.
Prognosis:
This coarse aggregate has not been associated with alkali-aggregate reaction. As long as the
concrete that forms the bridge piers are exposed to water, deterioration as described will
continue.
Figure 1. Concrete from Pier 3 (Core 3a) showing No. 2-sized aggregate particle and surrounding
mortar. Cracks and voids are filled with ettringite.
Figure 2. Concrete from Pier 3 (Core 3a) showing No. 1 and 2-sized aggregate particles and
surrounding mortar. Cracks and voids are filled with ettringite.
William H. Skerritt
Geology Section, Materials Bureau
Office of Technical Services
NYSDOT
October 16, 2009
APPENDIX C:
Inspection Rating Scales and Reports
12/3/2009
NYSDOT Inspection Rating Scale
9 – Condition and/or existence unknown.

8 – Not applicable.
7 – New condition. No deterioration.
6 – Used to shade between ratings of 5 and 7.
5 – Minor deterioration, but functioning as originally designed.
3 – Serious deterioration, or not functioning as originally designed.
1 – Totally deteriorated or failed condition.
NYSDOT Definitions
Red Flags: Issued for deficiencies involving critical structural components that require
prompt evaluation and corrective measures to resolve the flag condition.
Yellow Flags: Identify less critical conditions that are likely to affect the long-term
durability of a bridge and may progress to a more serious condition if left unattended for
extended periods.
Safety Flags: Address non-structural safety related issues noticed by inspectors during
the inspections. Examples include loose concrete, guide rail damage, and exposed utility
wires.
R-Posted Bridge: A bridge, which based on design or condition, does not have the reserve
capacity to accommodate most vehicles over legal weights, but can still safely carry legal
weights. These bridges are identified with signage stating "No Trucks with R Permits."
Posted Load Bridge: A bridge or elevated structure which has a specific weight limit in
tons posted on a sign. All vehicles exceeding the specified weights are prohibited,
including those with overweight permits.
12/3/2009
Federal Condition Rating Scale
N – Not applicable
9 – Excellent condition
8 – Very good condition: no problems noted
7 – Good condition: some problems noted
6 – Satisfactory condition: structural elements show some minor deterioration
5 – Fair condition: all primary structural elements are sound but may have minor section
loss, cracking, spalling or scour.
4 – Poor condition: advanced section loss, deterioration, spalling or scour
3 – Serious condition: loss of section, deterioration, spalling or scour have seriously
affected primary structural components. Local failures are possible. Fatigue cracks in
steel or shear cracks in concrete may be present.
2 – Critical condition: advanced deterioration of primary structural elements. Fatigue
cracks in steel or shear cracks in concrete may be present or scour may have removed
substructure support. Unless closely monitored it may be necessary to close the bridge
until corrective action is taken.
1 – “Imminent” failure condition: major deterioration or section loss present in critical
structural components or obvious vertical or horizontal movement affecting structural
stability. Bridge is closed to traffic but corrective action may put structure back in light
service.
0 – Failed condition: out of service, beyond corrective action.
12/3/2009
2009 Biennial Inspection
12/3/2009
Inspection Date: 5/1/2009 RC: 12 BIN: 5521180
Bridge Ratings
Carried: 185 910L12011040 Crossed: LAKE CHAMPLAIN CheckValue: 1,685,247,327
Inspection Agency: 13 - Consultant Type of Inspection: 1 - BIENNIAL

GTMS: 310 -- Steel - Truss - Thru
POSTINGS: See Gen Rec Page 1 for Postings at time of inspection.
Further Investigation Needed: Pier strap ties at Piers 4, 5, 6, 7, & 8.
State Highway Number: 1796 Milepoint: 3.69 AADT/Yr: 3148 / 2008
Orientation: 2 - Northeast Political Unit: 0211 - Town of CROWN POINT Year Built: 1929
Total Spans: 14 Ramp Bridge Attached To Span: NA BIN: NA
General Recommendation: 3 Computed Condition Rating: 3.375
Abutment Ratings: Beg Abut End Abut

Joint with Deck 3 3
Bearings, Bolts, Pads 6 5
Seats and Pedestals 5 4
Backwall 5 5
Stem (Breastwall) 4 4
Erosion or Scour 5 6
Footings 9 9
Piles 8 8
Recommendation 5 4
Wingwall Ratings: Beg Abut End Abut
Walls 4 4
Footings 9 9
Erosion or Scour 5 6
Piles 8 8
Channel Ratings: Channel
Stream Alignment 7
Erosion and Scour 7
Waterway Opening 7
Bank Protection 8
Approach Ratings: Approaches
Drainage 4
Embankment 5
Settlement 3
Erosion 5
Pavement 4
Guide Railing 6
Number of Flags Issued:
RED: 4 Yellow: 20 Safety: 1
Vulnerability Reviews Recommended: 1=Yes, 2=No, 3=NA, X=NotActive

Hydraulic: 2 Overload: X Steel: 1
Collision: 2 Concrete: X Seismic: X
Inspector's Signature: CheckValue: 1,685,247,327 Date: 5/1/2009
Signed copy of this inspection report is available

Carl D. Snyder,PE () (Inspector ID:1120049) in the appropriate NYSDOT Regional Office
Reviewed By: Date: 6/26/2009

Signed copy of this inspection report is available
in the appropriate NYSDOT Regional Office
Robert Seeley,PE () (QC ID:1120046)
Span Ratings
Deck Element Ratings: 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 010
Wearing Surface 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 4
Curbs 4 5 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3
Sidewalks, Fascias 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Railings, Parapets 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Scuppers 2 8 2 1 3 5 5 5 1 8
Gratings 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Median 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Mono Deck Surface 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Superstructure Ratings: 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 010
Structural Deck 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 6
Primary Members 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 3 3 6
Secondary Members 6 6 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 5
Paint 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
Joints 8 8 3 8 1 8 8 2 3 8
Recommendation 6 6 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 5
Pier Ratings: 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 010
Bearings, Bolts, Pads 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 6
Pedestals 6 6 4 5 4 3 3 3 3 6
Top of Cap or Beam 8 8 6 5 3 3 3 4 3 8
Stem Solid Pier 8 8 5 4 4 4 3 3 5 8
Cap Beam 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Pier Columns 5 5 2 8 8 8 8 8 5 5
Footings 5 5 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 5
Erosion or Scour 6 6 6 5 6 5 5 5 6 6
Piles 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Recommendation 5 5 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 6
Utility Ratings: 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 010
Lighting 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 2 3 3
Sign Structure 6 8 8 8 8 8 5 8 5 8
Utilities and Support 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Field Notes:
Field Date Arrival Departure Temp (C) Temp (F) Weather Conditions
3/18/2009 9:15:00 AM 6:00:00 PM 45 Rain showers; light w
3/19/2009 8:00:00 AM 5:00:00 PM 30 M. cloudy; winds 20-3
3/20/2009 8:00:00 AM 3:30:00 PM 35 M. Sunny; winds 10-20
3/23/2009 9:30:00 AM 4:30:00 PM 20 P. Cloudy; winds 20-3
3/24/2009 7:45:00 AM 6:00:00 PM 30 Sunny; winds 20-25mph
3/25/2009 7:35:00 AM 4:00:00 PM 35 Sunny; light winds
3/30/2009 9:20:00 AM 5:10:00 PM 45 Rain showers; light w
4/6/2009 9:15:00 AM 2:15:00 PM 38 Showers, fog; light w
4/7/2009 8:00:00 AM 5:00:00 PM 28 Snow showers; winds 2
4/8/2009 8:00:00 AM 4:30:00 PM 35 Show showers; light w
4/9/2009 8:00:00 AM 4:30:00 PM 45 Sunny; winds 10-20mph
4/27/2009 9:40:00 AM 6:00:00 PM 85 Sunny, winds 20-30mph
4/28/2009 8:00:00 AM 5:30:00 PM 80 M. sunny; high winds
4/30/2009 8:15:00 AM 5:20:00 PM 48 Sunny; light winds
5/1/2009 8:00:00 AM 2:00:00 PM 65 Occas. drizzle; light
Span Ratings
Deck Element Ratings: 011 012 013 014

Wearing Surface 4 3 4 3
Curbs 3 3 3 3
Sidewalks, Fascias 5 5 5 5
Railings, Parapets 7 7 7 7
Scuppers 8 1 8 1
Gratings 8 8 8 8
Median 8 8 8 8
Mono Deck Surface 8 8 8 8
Superstructure Ratings: 011 012 013 014

Structural Deck 6 6 6 6
Primary Members 6 6 6 6
Secondary Members 6 6 6 6
Paint 3 3 3 3
Joints 8 8 8 8
Recommendation 6 6 6 6
Pier Ratings: 011 012 013 014

Bearings, Bolts, Pads 5 5 5 8
Pedestals 6 6 6 8
Top of Cap or Beam 8 8 8 8
Stem Solid Pier 8 8 8 8
Cap Beam 8 8 8 8
Pier Columns 5 5 5 8
Footings 5 5 5 8
Erosion or Scour 6 6 6 8
Piles 8 8 8 8
Recommendation 5 5 5 8
Utility Ratings: 011 012 013 014

Lighting 3 3 3 3
Sign Structure 8 8 8 5
Utilities and Support 8 8 8 8
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 13095521180000A

Beg Abut -- Abutment: Joint with Deck -- Rated 3, Was 6
End Abut -- Abutment: Joint with Deck -- Rated 3, Was 4
Referenced Photos: "1", "2", "3", "4"
2009 BEGIN JOINT WITH DECK

The Begin Joint seal is detached from the armor along 75% of the joint,
with daylight visible through the joint in several locations. Also, the seal
between the approach-side header and the concrete approach slab is failed.
Both conditions allow leakage and contribute to serious deterioration of
abutment concrete. Joint armor and headers are in good condition.
<4165, 4359>
________________________________________
2009 END JOINT WITH DECK
The End Joint seal is detached from the armor along 50% of the joint, with
long gaps and daylight visible through at the curblines. Also, the approach
side header is cracked parallel to the joint, with local spalling up to 2"
deep. The header/slab seal is failed; both conditions contribute to serious
deterioration of abutment concrete. Joint armor has some minor plow
damage.
<4220, 4221, 4403>
Note ID: 13095521180000B

Beg Abut -- Abutment: Seats and Pedestals -- Rated 5, Was 5
End Abut -- Abutment: Seats and Pedestals -- Rated 4, Was 5
Referenced Photos: "5"
2009 BEGIN SEAT & PEDESTALS

Good condition.
________________________________________
2009 END SEAT & PEDESTALS
The End Seat exhibits scattered mapcracking and hollowness throughout.
The Left corner is spalled up to 2" deep from the top edge down through
the coping. Conditions do not compromise Pedestal areas or Bearings.
<4226>
Note ID: 13095521180000C

Beg Abut -- Abutment: Stem (Breastwall) -- Rated 4, Was 5
End Abut -- Abutment: Stem (Breastwall) -- Rated 4, Was 4
Referenced Photos: "6", "5"
2009 BEGIN ABUTMENT STEM

The Begin Stem is mapcracked, damp, and deeply hollow-sounding over
25% of the area. The Left side is spalled 2" deep x 20SF, with crumbly
concrete remaining on the surface.
<4163>
________________________________________
2009 END ABUTMENT STEM
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 13095521180000C - continued

The End Stem is mapcracked and damp throughout, with hollow-sounding
areas and local scaling. The Left corner is spalled up to 5" deep x 20SF,
with exposed rebars and crumbling concrete.
<4226>
Note ID: 13095521180000D

Beg Abut -- Wingwalls: Walls -- Rated 4, Was 5
End Abut -- Wingwalls: Walls -- Rated 4, Was 4
2009 BEGIN ABUTMENT WINGWALLS

The Begin Left Wingwall is 50% mapcracked and damp, with extensive
hollowness, and trace efflorescence. At the corner at the Backwall, the
WW is spalled 2" deep x 4SF.
<4162>
The Begin Right Wingwall would rate 5 for similar but much less extensive
conditions.
________________________________________
2009 END ABUTMENT WINGWALLS
The End Right Wingwall exhibits 1/2" deep scaling and shallow
hollowness over 25% of the surface. The wall is spalled 2" deep x 8SF
adjacent to the bridge seat. Overall, the wall has fine mapcracking and
trace efflorescence over 40% of the area.
<4224, 25>
The End Left Wingwall would rate 5 for similar but much less extensive
conditions.
Note ID: 13095521180000F

Approaches: Drainage -- Rated 4, Was 6
2009 APPROACH DRAINAGE
The Begin Left drain gutter has an erosion hole 1.2' in diameter through the
asphalt surface at about midheight on the embankment. The hole is 2'
deep and extends as gutter undermining for an unknown length. There is
an outwash fan of soil built up at the base of the slope. Balance of item
would rate 5 or 6.
<4160>
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 13095521180000E

Approaches: Settlement -- Rated 3, Was 3
2009 APPROACH SETTLEMENT

The Begin pavement exhibits gradual settlement of 2-3" at approx 30 feet
from the Begin Joint. Condition causes considerable bounce for trucks,
increased impact loads on the bridge.
<4161>
The End pavement is abruptly settled up to 2½" at the edge of the concrete
approach slab, especially at the Right curbline. An asphalt transition
wedge here is ineffective. Condition causes a jarring bump for most
vehicles.
<4222>
Note ID: 130955211800010

Approaches: Pavement -- Rated 4, Was 4
Referenced Photos: "10", "11", "12"
2009 APPROACH PAVEMENT

The Begin Pavement (asphalt) exhibits a band of serious fatigue cracking
along the centerline for 20LF, starting 20' from the bridge joint. There are
also large transverse cracks within 30' of the bridge.
<4161>
The End Pavement (asphalt) exhibits large transverse cracking, longitudinal

fatigue-cracking bands and moderate rutting in wheel tracks. At approx
100' from the bridge, there is an asphalt/asphalt transition which is
extensively deteriorated, with fatigue cracking and raveling/potholes up to
3" deep.
<4222, 4223>
Note ID: 130955211800011

Span 001 -- Deck Elements: Wearing Surface -- Rated 4, Was 4
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 130955211800011 - continued

Referenced Photos: "13", "14", "15", "16"
2009 WEARING SURFACE

ALL SPANS: In all spans the Wearing Surface is comprised of a one-
half-inch thick polymer concrete overlay with embedded traction grit. The
WS exhibits orthogonal cracking throughout, reflecting the steel bars in the
concrete-filled grid structural deck. The cracking is occasionally
accompanied by light rust staining. The traction grit is mostly worn off in
the wheel tracks in each lane.
Photo 13 <4366>
2009 WEARING SURFACE - SPANS 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 14

In SPANS 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 14, the WS exhibits significant delamination,
with more prominent orthogonal cracking, scattered areas of hollowness,
fatigue cracking, and spalling/raveling of the entire overlay, exposing the
top of the steel grid. Areas of delamination by span:
Span 4: 10SF spalled off, in Right lane.
Span 6: 200SF patch in Right lane, plus smaller spalls.

Photo 14 <4378>
Span 8: 3SF spalled off, in Left lane.
Span 9: 10SF fatigue cracked, Left lane.

Photo 15 <4395>
Span 12: 80SF larger ortho-cracking, in Right lane.
Span 14: 100SF spalled off, Right lane.

Photo 16 <4402>
Note ID: 130955211800013

Span 001 -- Deck Elements: Curbs -- Rated 4, Was 5
Referenced Photos: "17", "18", "19", "20", "21", "22", "23"
Inspection Notes

2009 DECK ELEMENTS: CURBS
ALL SPANS: In ALL Spans the granite Curbs exhibit varying degrees of
detachment from the sidewalk/fascia concrete and shifting of the stone
units toward the travel lanes. Curb units shifted more than 1" typically
have dirt and vegetation behind them. Remainder of curbs not covered
below is in good condition. Details, by span:
SPAN 1: Left & Right wingwall curbs have all units loose, shifted up to
3/4". Left Curb in span 20LF and shifted up to 1/2".
Photo 17 <4362>
SPAN 2: Very minor separation cracking, no significant shifting.
SPAN 3: End Left approx 10LF loose and shifted up to 1"; last 1.5LF
broken and missing at End Left (Safety Flag considered; not warranted, as
condition is within 6" of bridge railing; condition is also similar to the as-
built curb omissions at the modular joints). End Right 20LF loose and
shifted up to 2".
Photo 18 <4367>
SPAN 4: Left side approx 10LF loose, shifted up to 1".

Photo 19 <4368>
SPAN 5: Left side IMPROVED: approx 5LF re-mortared. Right side has
50LF loose and shifted typically 1/4", mostly at End of span.
Photo 20 <4374>
SPAN 6: Left side approx 140LF loose and shifted up to 1¼".

Photo 21 <4379>
SPAN 7: Left side approx 105LF loose and shifted up to 1¼".

Photo 22 <4397>
SPAN 8: Left side approx 60LF loose and shifted up to 1½".

Photo 22 <4397>
SPAN 9: Left side approx 160LF loose, shifted up to 2". Right side
approx 30LF loose, shifted up to 1".
Photo 22 <4397>
SPANS 10-14 (each span length is approx 50'): Left and Right Curbs are
loose, shifted up to 1½", and have many cracked stone units. Affects
approx 50% of each span. Span 14 Left and Right wingwall curbs are
similar to Span wingwall curbs.
Photos 17, 23 <4398>
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 130955211800014

Span 001 -- Deck Elements: Scuppers -- Rated 2, Was 3
2009 DECK ELEMENTS: SCUPPERS

________________________________________
SCUPPER GRATINGS
In ALL SPANS with Scuppers, Scupper gratings exhibit varying degrees
of debris blockage. All downspouts are clear. Conditions by span:
SPAN 1: Left grating 90% plugged; Right grating 40% plugged.
SPAN 2: N/A.
SPAN 3: Left grating 80% plugged; Right grating 75% plugged.
SPAN 4: Left grating 60% plugged; Right grating 80% plugged (would rate
3; see below).
SPAN 5: All 6 gratings 20-40% plugged.
SPAN 6: All gratings <10% plugged.
SPAN 9: All 6 gratings 20-40% plugged (would rate 3; see below).
SPAN 10: N/A.
SPAN 11: N/A.
SPAN 12: Left & Right gratings 100% plugged.
SPAN 13: N/A.
SPAN 14: Left & Right gratings 100% plugged.

Inspection Notes

Photos 24, 25 <4361, 4399>
________________________________________
SCUPPER DOWNSPOUTS
In ALL SPANS with scuppers, The downspouts exhibit varying degrees
of corrosion in their brackets, and some union boot detachment. The
PVC tubes are typically in good condition.
SPAN 4
In Span 4 the Left Scupper downspout union boot is detached from the
steel tube, resulting in leakage and serious deterioration of the bottom
chord (see Primary Members, Flag 1309.0046).
Photo 26, 43 <4994, 95>
SPAN 9
SAFETY FLAG 1309.0040 (NEW)
* * * SPAN 9 SCUPPER DOWNSPOUT LOOSE * * *
At the End Right corner of Span 9, the PVC scupper downspout pipe is
detached from the steel downspout tube, and it's upper hoop bracket is
severed by corrosion. The corroded hoop still retains the pipe, but is
weakened. The next attachment point is over 30 feet lower, at the bottom
chord of the Left Truss.
Significance: Location is over a Vermont State Park (Chimney Point), with

mowed lawns and a boat launch. The pipe could eventually fall on park
users.
Report Photos 27-29 <photofiles 09-4885a, 4887a, 4888a>
Note ID: 130955211800017

Span 001 -- Superstructure: Primary Members -- Rated 6, Was 5
Referenced Photos: "30", "32", "33", "34", "35", "36", "37", "38", "39", "40", "41", "42", "43", "44", "45",
"46", "47", "48", "49", "50", "51", "52", "53", "54", "55", "56", "57", "58", "59", "60", "61", "62", "63",
"64", "65", "66", "67", "68", "69", "70", "71", "72", "73", "74", "75", "76", "77", "78", "79", "80", "81",
"82", "83", "84", "85", "86", "87", "88", "89", "90", "91", "92", "93", "94", "95", "96", "97", "98", "99",
"100", "101", "102", "103", "104", "128", "105", "106", "107", "108", "109", "110", "111", "112", "113",
Inspection Notes

"114", "115", "116", "117", "118", "119", "120", "121", "122", "123", "124", "125", "126", "127", "129",
"130", "131", "132", "133", "134", "135", "136", "137", "138", "139", "140", "141", "142", "143", "144",
"145", "146", "147", "148", "149", "150", "151", "31"
2009 PRIMARY MEMBERS
#######################################################
TOPICS:
SPANS 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 GENERAL
SPANS 1-5 and 9-14 APPR SPAN FLOORBEAM TORSION
SPAN 4 TRUSS MEMBERS
SPAN 4 TRUSS GUSSET PLATES
SPAN 5 FLOORBEAMS
SPAN 7 FLOORBEAMS
SPAN 7 STRINGERS
SPAN 8 FLOORBEAMS
SPAN 9 FLOORBEAMS
Legend:
FB = floorbeam; SL = section loss; PP = panel point.
(I), (O), T = inventory, operating, tons; (pertaining to load ratings)
Spans 1, 2, 3 and 10-14 FB numbering starts with FB0 in each span.
Spans 4 & 5 FB & PP Numbering is continuous #00-#10-#20.
Spans 6, 7, 8 FB & PP Numbering is continuous #00-#10-#24-#34.
Span 9 FB & PP Numbering is #00-#10.
<x> is team leader's field note reference for image filename(s).
#######################################################
2009 Primary Members
SPANS 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 GENERAL
(Disagree with 5 ratings - too low)
Primary Members are in excellent or near-new condition.
Photos 30, 31 <ElevationRight std photos>
#######################################################
2009 Primary Members - SPANS 1-5 and 9-14
==================================================
APPROACH SPAN FLOORBEAM TORSION
All 11 "approach spans" (excluding main spans 6, 7, 8) exhibit mild
symptoms indicating rolling or torsional strain on floorbeam-stinger-knee-
brace details, in the downslope direction. Symptoms include:
1.Red o de f our around r vet heads of the ong tud na -or ented
knee braces connected to FB webs. Typical only at the knee braces
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 130955211800017 - continued...

located over at the main girder or trusses in the respective spans
(points of restraint). Also typical only in the outermost rivets in the
details.
2.Gaps under the knee-brace c p ang es part cu ar at the far
corners, adjacent to the outmost rivets. Gaps are typically less than
1/8", but range up to 3/8" in extreme cases. Typically accompanied
by red oxide flour.
3.Pa nt crack net orks or ented trans erse to stra n f e ds n c p
angles and FB webs at the knee brace connections. In Span 5 FB20
and Span 9 FB0, this out-of plane bending is accompanied by web
cracks (see below).
4. n a few ocat ons red o de f our around r vet heads at Str nger-
over-Floorbeam bearing plates for Stringers S2 and S4, which are
located over the trusses or girders (points of restraint).
Symptoms appear consistent with a response to long-term cyclic deck

forces on the approach spans, which have a 5.5% grade as indicated on
the plans.
Photos 32-35 <4351, 52, 54, 56 (girder spans)>

Photos 36-42 <4200, 01; 4206, 07, 08; 4540, 41 (truss spans)>
#######################################################
2009 Primary Members - SPAN 4
==================================================
Span 4 Left and Right Truss Bottom Chords typically exhibit 10-15%
gross section losses. Measured losses follow:
Left Truss L04L05: 25.9% gross section loss (flag, see below).
Left Truss L05L06: 22.9% gross section loss.
Left Truss L07L08: 21.1% gross section loss.
Right Truss L02L03: 10.4% gross section loss.

Right Truss L04L05: 13.4% gross section loss.
Span 4 Truss Diagonals and Verticals typically have <10% gross section
losses adjacent to the bottom chord gusset plates. The worst losses
typically affect the bottom 1 to 2 inches of member length.
Span 4 Truss Top Chords are in good condition, with no significant

losses.
________________________________________
YELLOW FLAG 1309.0046 (NEW)
* * * SPAN 4 LEFT TRUSS MEMBER LOSS * * *
The SPAN 4 LEFT Truss exhibits serious section loss in Bottom Chord
member L04L05, near L05. This location has a leaking scupper
downspout which contributes to active corrosion in the member. There
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 130955211800017 - continued......

are no holes, and no sign of cracking or distress.
Losses determined by a combination bow-caliper measurements and visual

estimates of sub-component losses. The percent losses are based on a
field-confirmed original section comprised of 2 MC18x51.9 channels.
This is consistent with the American Bridge Company 1928 shop
drawings, Order No. F3131, Sheet No. 5 (DIFFERS from design plans).
Section losses (SL) and conditions follow:
Left & Right top flanges: 40% SL & 40% SL.

Left & Right bottom flanges: 60% SL & 50% SL.
Left & Right webs: 25% SL & 5% SL
Weighted Gross SL: 25.9%
Significance:
The affected member is load-path non-redundant and fracture critical. Due
to the locally severe pitting and active corrosion, annual monitoring is
recommended, consistent with Yellow Flag status.
Report Photos 43, 44 <photofiles: 09-4995, 5009>
==================================================
Span 4 Top Chord Truss Gusset Plates are typically in good condition,
with no significant losses.
Span 4 Bottom Chord Gusset Plates at Odd-Numbered panel points

(those with only a truss vertical) typically exhibit 40-60% section losses in
the plates where they meet the bottom chord. As these verticals serve
primarily to brace the chord sections, none of these conditions appear to
warrant a Flag.
Span 4 Bottom Chord Truss Gusset Plates at Even-Numbered panel

points typically exhibit 20% section losses along the upper boundaries of
the connected members. Exceptions follow:
________________________________________
* * * SPAN 4 RIGHT TRUSS GUSSET PLATES * * *
The SPAN 4 Right Truss (T2) exhibits serious corrosion section loss in
the Truss Gusset Plates along the Bottom Chord. A TOTAL OF 5
PLATE SEGMENTS have 25% or greater, but less than 50% section loss:
1.) L02 Right Plate, End part: 43.5% (Begin part 18%±). Size: 5/8"
2.) L06 Right Plate, Begin part: 31.2% (Begin part 19%±). Size: 1/2"
3.) L08 Left Plate, Begin part: 40.5% (End part <=20%). Size: 9/16"
4.) L08 Right Plate, Begin part: 28.2%. Size: 9/16";
5.) L08 Right Plate, End part 42.6%. Size: 9/16"
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 130955211800017 - continued.........

Report Photos 45, 46 <photofiles 09-4265, 66 (L02)>
Report Photos 49-52 <photofiles 09-4269-72 (L08)>
________________________________________
* * * SPAN 4 LEFT TRUSS GUSSET PLATES * * *
The SPAN 4 Left Truss (T1) exhibits serious corrosion section loss in the
Truss Gusset Plates along the Bottom Chord. A TOTAL OF 6 PLATE
SEGMENTS have 25% or greater, but less than 50% section loss:
1.) L06 Left Plate, Begin half: 30.8%. Size: 1/2".

2.) L06 Right Plate, Begin half: 29.9%. Size: 1/2".
3.) L06 Right Plate, End half: 37.8%. Size: 1/2"
5.) L08 Left Plate, End half: 30%±. Size: 9/16".
Report Photos 53-55 <photofiles 09-5004, 06, 07 (L06)>

________________________________________
Nature of Losses:
Except as noted, losses are in horizontal bands just above the bottom
chord members, where dirt, salt, and moisture collect. Corrosion is active,
with heavy rust scale. NO cracking, distortion, or through-holes were
found in these locations. Other locations on the plates typically have 20%
or less SL.
Measurements:
Losses to the nearest 0.1% are based on d-meter readings taken at
locations selected to best represent the average profile of the remaining
metal. Losses with "±" are based on visual comparisons of pitting and
corrosion.
Significance:
This is a load-path non-redundant steel deck-truss structure; all gusset
plates are LPNR and fracture-critical. Reference is made to recently
developed Flag guidelines for gusset plate section losses (i.e., 25% for
Yellow Flag; 50% for Red Flag).
________________________________________
RED FLAG 1309.0037 (NEW)
* * * SPAN 4 LEFT TRUSS GUSSET PLATE * * *
The SPAN 4 Left Truss (T1) exhibits (1.) serious corrosion section loss
AND (2.) as-built plate delamination at Panel Point L02.
1.) Corrosion section losses of approximately 50% occur in the gusset

plates along the top of the bottom chord, tops of the diagonals, and sides
of the vertical member framing into this panel point. This 50% figure is
based on bow-caliper measurements at the edges of the plate, combined
with pitting depth measurements. Corrosion is active, with heavy rust
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 130955211800017 - continued............

scale. NO cracking, distortion, or other distress was found in these
locations. NO through-holes were found at this time. Note: The d-meter
could not be reliably used anywhere on these Left and Right gusset plates
(see below).
2.) Both Left and Right plates exhibit a central zone of delamination
originating at the rolling mill. This has the effect of splitting each plate into
2 layers (at least) throughout. Attempts to take full-thickness d-meter
measurements at locations with and without losses resulted in erratic
readings reflecting back from this delamination zone. The presence of the
delamination was confirmed at multiple locations along the plate edges (see
photos).
Significance:
Report Photos 59-66 <photofiles 09-5010, 11a, 16a, 17, 18, 20a, 22, 23>
#######################################################
==================================================
Left Truss L19L20: 20% estimated gross section loss <4993>.

Right Truss L14L15: 10.5% gross section loss <4211>

losses.
==================================================

Inspection Notes
Note ID: 130955211800017 - continued...............

warrant a Flag.

points L02 through L12 typically exhibit 20% section losses along the
upper boundaries of the connected members. (Other B.C. panel points
have doubled gusset plates, with typically less than 10% gross section
loss.) Exceptions follow:
________________________________________
the Truss Gusset Plates along the Bottom Chord. A TOTAL OF 1 (ONE)
1.) L12* Right Plate, Begin part: 27.9% (End part 20%+/-). Size: 3/4"
*Span 4 & 5 trusses are 2-span continuous with 10 panels per span.
Nature of Losses:
Losses are in horizontal bands just above the bottom chord members,
where dirt, salt, and moisture collect. Corrosion is active, with heavy rust
scale. NO cracking, distortion, or other distress was found in these
locations. NO through-holes were found at this time.
Measurements:
Losses are based on d-meter readings taken at locations selected to best
represent the average profile of the remaining metal. Visual comparisons
were made at less corroded areas.
Significance:
==================================================
SPAN 5 FLOORBEAMS
Span 5 FBs are typically in excellent condition. Exceptions follow:
________________________________________
RED FLAG 1309.0002 (New)
* * * SPAN 5 FB20 WEB CRACKS * * *
Span 5 End Floorbeam FB20 (over Pier 5) has distortion-induced web
cracks below the knee braces at Stringers S2 and S4. The cracks are 10"
and 7" long, respectively, and run horizontally in the web just above the
bottom fillet. This location corresponds to the bottom of the knee brace
clip angles on the Begin side of the FB. The ends of the cracks trend
slightly upward, in the "smile" shape typical of out-of-plane bending
distortion cracks. There are small branching cracks at the tips.
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 130955211800017 - continued..................
No red oxide flour was evident, and crack edges appear rounded from
corrosion. Web section losses of 25 to 30% are typical throughout this
member, which is adjacent to a failed, leaking modular deck joint. This
loss is a contributing factor. The cracks are accompanied by localized
web crippling and distortion, which widens the cracks up to 3/32" at mid-
length. This crippling does not result in any significant reduction in
member height.
Similar cracking was NOT apparent at the other stringers. S2 and S4 are
closest to the FB bearing points on the trusses, subjecting the location to
greater restraint at the bottom flange.
Joint deterioration may also be a contributing factor: the Joint at Pier 5 is

falling apart, resulting in constant hammering on the Span 5-side header.
This increases the longitudinal deck forces which are resisted by the knee
brace detail.
Significance:
The affected member is a load-path- and internally non-redundant rolled
end floorbeam. The cracks appear to have developed slowly over a long
time, and have probably relieved the strain locally. Thus, propagation to a
critical state is likely to occur slowly, as web section loss continues. PIA
status does not appear necessary for this condition.
Note: Additional Flags are being issued for this member.
Report Photos 69 <photofiles 09-4236 (Overview);

Report Photos 70-73 <09-4239, 40, 43, 45 (@ S2);
Report Photos 74-78 <09-4246, 47, 48, 49, 50 (@ S4)>
________________________________________
YELLOW FLAG 1309.0003 (New)
* * * SPAN 5 FB20 SECTION LOSSES * * *
Span 5 End Floorbeam FB20 (over Pier 5) has serious section losses from
corrosion, localized in critical areas. Some of these losses contribute to
web cracks at the knee-brace clip angles, which are addressed in Flag
1309.0002. No OTHER distress is evident. This FB is adjacent to a
failed, leaking modular deck joint.
WEB
The web exhibits losses of 25% to 30% throughout, with locally higher
losses around the perimeters of the post-tensioning anchor brackets. At
the Left PT bracket, losses range up to 47% on the inboard side of the
bracket. At the Right PT bracket, losses range up to 37% on the inboard
side of the bracket. This affects the FB at a point of locally high stresses
from the PT tendons. No local crippling or buckling is evident around the
PT anchors.
TOP FLANGE
The Top Flanges exhibit losses of 25% to 27% in the vicinity of Stringers
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 130955211800017 - continued.....................

S2 and S4, and the centerlines of the Left and Right Trusses. This affects
the FB at the points of maximum negative bending moment. No distress is
evident from this condition.
Significance:
end floorbeam. Section losses are serious and corrosion is active. The
condition should be monitored at least annually, consistent with Yellow
Flag status.
Report Photos 79-81 <photofiles 09-4229, 30, 33 (@T2);

Report Photos 69 <09-4236 (Overview);
Report Photos 82, 72 <09-4235, 43 (@ T1)>
#######################################################
==================================================
(See Flag 13090084 for updated load rating info.)
Left Truss L00L02: <10% est. gross SL (flag for holes, see below).
Left Truss L02L04 (typical): <10% est. gross SL (flag for holes, see
below).
Left Truss L03L04 at L04: 21.7% gross SL <4967…>
Left Truss L04L06: 34.2% gross SL (flag, see below).
Left Truss L06L07: 14.3% gross SL <4957>.
Right Truss L00L01 at L01: 17.7% gross SL <4262>
typically affect the bottom 1 to 2 inches of member length. One exception:
Right Truss U01L02 at L02: 13.2% gross SL <4278>
Span 6 Truss Top Chords typically have high section losses in top plates
(up to 50%) and outer side plates (up to 35%), but no significant losses in
angles or inner side plates. Resulting gross section losses are typically up
to 16%
Photo 128 <4281>.
_______________________________________
* * * SPAN 6 LEFT TRUSS MEMBER LOSSES * * *
The SPAN 6 LEFT Truss exhibits serious section losses with holes in the
Bottom Chord between Panel Points L00 and L06. There is no sign of
cracking or distress. The greatest loss occurs in the section from L04 to
L06, but similar corrosion is active from L00 to L04. Losses determined
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 130955211800017 - continued........................

by a combination bow-caliper measurements and visual estimates of sub-
component losses.
The percent losses are based on a field-confirmed original sections (see
below), are consistent with the shop drawings and the design plans.
Section losses (SL) and conditions follow:
Member L04L06 (at several locations):

Section: 4 L6 x 4 x 7/16 and 2 Plates 20 x 7/16"
Upper Angles, Horizontal Legs: SL 50%.
Upper Angles, Vertical Legs: SL 10%.
Lower Angles, Horizontal Legs: SL 25%.
Lower Angles, Vertical Legs: SL 15%.
Left Plate: 50%, with pitting both sides, and through-holes.
Right Plate: 40%, with pitting both sides, and through-holes.
Member L00L02:
Section: 4 L5 x 3½ x 3/8 and 2 Plates 20 x 7/16"
All Angles: <5% section losses.
Side Plates: <25% losses with numerous through-holes.
Weighted Gross SL <10%
Member L02L04:
Section: 4 L6 x 4 x ½ and 2 Plates 20 x 11/16"
Side Plates: <25% losses and no holes found, but many locations with
heavy pitting nearly through the plates.
Significance:
The affected members are load-path non-redundant and fracture critical.
Due to the holes and locally severe pitting, and following Regional
consultation, this flag is being issued with Red flag status.
Report Photos 83-86 <photofiles: 09-4971, 74, 75, 76 (L04L06)>

Report Photos 87-89 <photofiles: 09-4982, 83, 85 (L00L02)>
Report Photos 90, 91 <photofiles: 09-4990, 91 (L02L04)>
==================================================
Span 6 Top Chord Truss Gusset Plates typically have 15-20% section
losses in the outer plates throughout the span, and 15-20% losses in inner
plates from Panel Points U06 to U10.
Photo 92 <4280>

warrant a Flag.
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 130955211800017 - continued...........................

_______________________________________
SEGMENTS have 25% or greater, but less than 50% section loss. Some
plate segments have losses along multiple lines (1.a., 1.b., 1.c., etc.):
1.a.) L02 Left Pl., Begin ½ along top of L01L02 : 30% ±. Size: 5/8".
1.b.) L02 Left Pl., Begin ½ along top of U01L02: 30% ±.
1.c.) L02 Left Pl., Begin ½ along U02L02: 30% ±.
2.a.) L02 Left Pl., End ½ along top of L02L03: 34.7%. Size: 5/8".
2.b.) L02 Left Pl., End ½ along top of L02U03: 29.4%.
2.c.) L02 Left Pl., End ½ along U02L02: 30% ±.
3.a.) L02 Right Pl., Begin ½ along top of U01L02: 30% ±. Size: 5/8".
3.b.) L02 Right Pl., Begin ½ along U02L02: 30% ±.
4.a.) L02 Right Pl., End ½ along top of L02U03: 30% ±. Size: 5/8".
4.b.) L02 Right Pl., End ½ along U02L02: 25% ±.
5.) L04 Left Pl., End ½ along top of L04L05: 29.9%. Size: 3/4".
6.) L04 Right Pl., Begin ½ along top of L03L04: 37.1%. Size: 3/4".
8.) L06 Right Pl., End ½ along top of L03L04: 37.1%. Size: 3/4".

Nature of Losses:
found in these locations. Other locations on the plates typically have 20%
or less SL.
Measurements:
locations selected to best represent the average profile of the remaining
metal. Losses with "±" are based on visual comparisons of pitting and
corrosion.
Significance:
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 130955211800017 - continued..............................
#######################################################
==================================================
gross section losses.
losses concentrated in 2 areas: adjacent to the bottom chord gusset plates;
AND adjacent to the sidewalks (splash zone). <4328>

losses.
==================================================
Span 7 Top Chord Truss Gusset Plates are typically in good condition
with no significant section losses.

warrant a Flag.

_______________________________________
YELLOW FLAGS 1309.0006 & 0042 (NEW)
SEGMENTS have 25% or greater, but less than 50% section loss (Flag
0006: items 1-6; Flag 0042: items 7-10):
1.) L13* Right Plate, Begin & End parts: 25-30% estimated. Size: 3/4"
2.) L14 Right Plate, Begin part: 42.9% (End part 20%+/-).
Size: 5/8" main plate; 1/2" secondary plate.
3.) L16 Right Plate, Begin part: 30.4% (End part 20%).
4.) L18 Right Plate, Begin & End parts: 25-30% estimated.
5.) L20 Right Plate, Begin part 33.7% (End part 20%+/-).
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 130955211800017 - continued.................................

6.) L21 Right Plate, Begin & End parts: 25-30% estimated. Size: 3/4"
7.) L11 Left Plate, Begin part: 27.3% (End part 16.6%); Size: 3/4"
8.) L11 Right Plate, Begin part: 30.9%; Size: 3/4"
9.) L11 Right Plate, End part: 30.1%; Size: 3/4"
10.) L12 Right Plate, Begin part: 42.3% (End part along truss vertical
U12L12: 24.4%); Size: 3/4"
Report Photos 117-120 <photofiles 09-4939, 40, 41, 42 (L12)>

Report Photos 105, 106 <photofiles 09-4296, 97 (L14) /
Report Photos 107, 108 <4326, 27 (L16) /
Report Photos 109-112 <4306-09 (L20)>
_______________________________________
* * * SPAN 7 RIGHT TRUSS GUSSET PLATES ***
1.) L13 Left Plate, Begin part: 26.5% (End part 23.3%). Size: 3/4"
2.) L14 Left Plate, End part: 27.6% (Begin part 20%+/-).
3.) L16 Left Plate, Begin part: 25-30% estimated (End part 20%+/-).
4.) L18 Left Plate, Begin part: 31.3% (End part 21.6%).
Report Photos 113, 114 <photofiles 09-4289, 92 (L13) /

Report Photos 115, 116 <4320, 21 (L18)>
_______________________________________
Nature of Losses (Flags 0006, 0042, 0007):
found in these locations. Other locations on the plates have 20% or less
SL.
Measurements (Flags 0006, 0042, 0007):

were made at less corroded areas. SPAN 7: Losses account for
contribution of both main and secondary plates.
Significance (Flags 0006, 0042, 0007):

Inspection Notes
Note ID: 130955211800017 - continued....................................

==================================================
SPAN 7 FLOORBEAMS
Span 7 FBs typically have web plate section losses between the fascia
stringers and the adjacent truss. Some losses extend around the bottom of
the stringer connections. Small through-holes are present in some
locations. Estimated gross section losses for the web plates alone are less
than 20%. Due to alternate load paths in the built-up assemblies, none of
these conditions appear to warrant a Flag. Worst locations:
FB13 at Right: 4" x 2½" perf.
Photo 124 <4290>
FB16 at Left: 3" x 2" perf.

Photo 125 <4325>
==================================================
SPAN 7 STRINGERS
Span 7 Fascia Stringers exhibit isolated deep pitting in bottom flanges. In
the worst combination of locations and losses, there is up to 25% bottom
flange section loss at mid-panel.
Photo 126 <4305>
Photo 127 <4453>
#######################################################
==================================================
Right Truss L31L32 near L31: 12.0% gross SL <4491>
Span 8 Truss Top Chords typically have high section losses in top plates
(up to 50%) and outer side plates (up to 35%), but no significant losses in
angles or inner side plates. Resulting gross section losses are typically up
to 16%.
Photo 128 <4281>.
==================================================
Span 8 Top Chord Truss Gusset Plates typically have 15-20% section
losses in the outer plates throughout the span, and 15-20% losses in inner
plates from Panel Points U24 to U28.
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 130955211800017 - continued.......................................

Photo 92 <4280>

primarily to brace the chord sections, none of these conditions appears to
warrant a Flag, with one exception:
_______________________________________
* * * SECTION LOSS: TRUSS GUSSET PLATES * * *
The Span 8 Right Truss at Panel Point 25 has serious section losses in the
truss gusset plates. These plates connect the truss vertical member
U25L25 to the bottom chord. The worst losses occur along and just
above the bottom chord. The original plate thickness is 3/8", and the plate
is 24 inches long where it meets the bottom chord. No distortion,
cracking, or other distress is evident in the plates. Losses follow:
Left (inboard) Plate: 75% loss, including an 8-1/2" long perforation zone.
Right (outboard) Plate: 50% loss, no holes.
Significance:
The affected connection is part of a load-path non-redundant deck truss
system. The bottom chord runs straight through this panel point, with no
splice or angle change. The vertical is a 'zero force' truss member; it
reduces the unbraced length of the bottom chord in its weak axis (i.e.,
vertical plane). Condition should be monitored annually, consistent with
Yellow Flag status.
Report Photos 129-131 <photofiles: 09-4471, 4472, 4473>
==================================================

________________________________________
The SPAN 8 LEFT TRUSS (T1) exhibits serious corrosion section loss in
PLATE SEGMENTS have 25% or greater, but less than 50% section loss
(SL):
1.) L26 Right Plate, Begin End part: 33.5% SL; Size: 7/8".
2.) L28 Left Plate, Begin part: 43.2% SL; Size: 3/4"
3.) L28 Right Plate, Begin part: 25.1% SL; Size: 3/4"
Nature of Losses:
Losses are in horizontal bands just above the bottom chord members,
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 130955211800017 - continued..........................................

where dirt, salt, and moisture collect. Corrosion is active, with heavy rust
scale. NO cracking, distortion, or through holes were found in these
locations. Other locations on the plates have 20% or less SL.
Measurements:
were made at less corroded areas.
Significance:

==================================================
SPAN 8 FLOORBEAMS
Span 8 FBs typically have web plate section losses between the fascia
stringers and the adjacent truss. Some losses extend around the bottom of
the stringer connections. Small through-holes are present in some
locations. Estimated gross section losses for the web plates alone are less
than 20%. Due to alternate load paths in the built-up assemblies, none of
these conditions appear to warrant a Flag . Worst locations:
FB26 at Right: 5" x 2½" perf.
FB27 at Left: 4" x 2" perf.
Photo 137 <4484>
Photo 138 <4489>
#######################################################
==================================================

losses.
typically affect the bottom 1 to 2 inches of member length. Exceptions:
Left Truss L00U01 at 1/3 panel length: 18.9% gross SL <4893>
Right Truss ("end post") U00L00 most of length: 26.0% gross SL
Photos 139, 140 <4521, 22>
Left Truss L00L01 at 10' from L00: 21.4% gross SL <4889…>

Inspection Notes
Note ID: 130955211800017 - continued.............................................

Left Truss L09L10: 29.4% gross SL (flag, see below).
Right Truss L00L01: 35.1% gross SL (flag, see below).
Right Truss L09L10 at L10: 15.4% gross SL <4542>
Right Truss L14L15: 10.5% gross SL <4211>
________________________________________
* * * SPAN 9 RIGHT TRUSS BOTTOM CHORD * * *
Span 9 Right Truss Bottom Chord L00L01 exhibits serious section loss at
Panel Point L00 (at Pier 8). There is no sign of cracking or distress. The
greatest loss occurs between the truss panel point L00 gusset plates and
the first tie plate (batten plate) on the member. Losses determined by a
combination of d-meter and bow-caliper measurements. The percent
losses are based on a field-confirmed original section comprised of two
channels MC18x58 (tf 0.625", tw 0.700"). This is consistent with the
American Bridge Company 1928 shop drawings, Order No. F3133, Sheet
No. 1 (differs from design plans).
Component Measurements & Section Losses (SL):

Left Channel Top Flange: 0.315"; SL 49.6%
Left Channel Web: 0.538"; SL 23.1%
Left Channel Bottom Flange: 0.407" SL 34.9%
Right Channel Top Flange: 0.459" SL 26.6%

Right Channel Web: 0.380" SL 45.7%
Right Channel Bottom Flange: 0.394" SL 37.0%
Significance:
The affected member is load-path non-redundant and fracture critical.
Annual monitoring is recommended, consistent with Yellow Flag status.
Report Photos 141-143 <photofiles: 09-4525, 4526, 4527>

________________________________________
* * * SPAN 9 LEFT TRUSS BOTTOM CHORD * * *
Span 9 Left Truss Bottom Chord L09L10 exhibits serious section loss
along most of the member. The worst location appears to be 17 feet from
Panel Point L09 (panel length 27'-1-1/4"). There is no sign of cracking or
distress. The percent losses are based on a field-confirmed original
section comprised of 2 channels MC18x42.7 (tf 0.625", tw 0.450"), plus 2
plates 17-1/2"x3/8"; Original Area 38.33 in^2. This is consistent with the
American Bridge Company 1928 shop drawings, Order No. F3133, Sheet
No. 5 (DIFFERS from design plans).

Left Channel Top Flange: 0.531" average.
Left Channel Web: Est. SL 10%
Left Channel Bottom Flange: 0.381" average.
Left Plate: Est. 90% SL, with perforation.
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 130955211800017 - continued................................................
Right Channel Top Flange: 0.584" average.

Right Channel Web: Est. SL 5%
Right Channel Bottom Flange: 0.492" average.
Left Plate: Est. 20% SL.
Original Area: 38.33 in^2; Existing Area: 27.08 in^2

Similar losses are present throughout the member.
Significance:
The affected member is load-path non-redundant and fracture critical.
Annual monitoring is recommended, consistent with Yellow Flag status.
Report Photos 144-147 <photofiles: 09-4876, 77, 79, 81>
==================================================

warrant a Flag.

points typically exhibit <10% gross section losses along the upper
boundaries of the connected members. (All these panel points have
doubled or partly-doubled gusset plates.)
==================================================
SPAN 9 FLOORBEAMS
________________________________________
* * * SPAN 9 FB0 (Zero) WEB CRACKS * * *
Span 9 Floorbeam FB0 (over Pier 9) has a distortion-induced web crack
below the knee brace at Stringer S4. The crack is 7" long, and runs
horizontally in the web just above the bottom fillet. This location
corresponds to the bottom of the knee brace clip angles on the End side of
the FB. The ends of the crack trend slightly upward, and there are small
branching cracks at the tips.
No red oxide flour was evident, and crack edges appear rounded from
corrosion. Web section losses of 20 to 30% are typical throughout this
member, which is adjacent to a leaking modular deck joint. The cracks are
accompanied by localized minor web distortion not affecting overall
member height or alignment. Similar cracking was NOT evident at Stringer
S2, or other stringers.
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 130955211800017 - continued...................................................
Significance:
end floorbeam. The crack appears old and there is presently no evidence
of active propagation, so PIA status does not appear necessary for this
condition.
Report Photos 148 <photofiles 09-4508 (Overview);

Report Photos 149-151 <09-4511, 15, 17 (at S4)>
Note ID: 130955211800022

Referenced Photos: "30", "32", "33", "34", "35", "36", "37", "38", "39", "40", "41", "42", "43", "44", "45",
"46", "47", "48", "49", "50", "51", "52", "53", "54", "55", "56", "57", "58", "59", "60", "61", "62", "63",
"64", "65", "66", "67", "68", "69", "70", "71", "72", "73", "74", "75", "76", "77", "78", "79", "80", "81",
"82", "83", "84", "85", "86", "87", "88", "89", "90", "91", "92", "93", "94", "95", "96", "97", "98", "99",
"100", "101", "102", "103", "104", "128", "105", "106", "107", "108", "109", "110", "111", "112", "113",
"114", "115", "116", "117", "118", "119", "120", "121", "122", "123", "124", "125", "126", "127", "129",
"130", "131", "132", "133", "134", "135", "136", "137", "138", "139", "140", "141", "142", "143", "144",
"145", "146", "147", "148", "149", "150", "151", "31"
2009 PRIMARY MEMBERS
#######################################################
TOPICS:
POST-Q/C LOAD RATING FLAGS - VARIOUS SPANS:
==================================================
YELLOW FLAG 13090082 (NEW)
* * * SPAN 4 LOAD POSTING REDUCTIONS * * *
Following the updated 2009 BLRS (truss members) and Virtis (floor
system members) load rating, various elements will require load posting
below the current R-Permit restriction (using SLC= 0.60 x HOR per EI05-
034).
Inspection Notes

Separate flags had been issued previously at the time of the inspection for
the deterioration of many of these members (see flags 13090003,
13090015, 13090016, 13090039, 13090045 & 13090046).
Members whose current level of deterioration will now require load
postings in accordance with NYSDOT EI 05-034 are as follows (legend:
SL= section loss; OR=operating rating; LP=load posting):
Span 4 Left Truss:

a. L4L5. 26% SL: H20 OR= 31T. Max LP = 28T.
b. L5L6. 23% SL: H20 OR= 32T. Max LP = 30T.
==================================================
034).
13090015, 13090016, 13090039, 13090045 & 13090046).
Span 5 End Floorbeam:

FB20 at Cantilever over Truss: 25% top flange SL; 30% web SL: H20
OR= 29T. Max. LP = 18T.
Span 5 Left Truss:

c. L14L15. 15% SL: H20 OR= 29T. Max LP = 20T.
Span 5 Right Truss:

a. L10L11. 15% SL: H20 OR= 29T. Max LP = 25T
d. L15L16. 15% SL: H20 OR= 22T. Max LP = 20T.
==================================================
034).
Inspection Notes

13090015, 13090016, 13090039, 13090045 & 13090046).
Span 6 Left Truss:

==================================================
034).
13090015, 13090016, 13090039, 13090045 & 13090046).
Span 9 Left Truss, L0U1. 19% SL: H20 OR= 33T. Max LP = 30T.
Span 9 end Floorbeam FB0 at Cantilever over truss: 25% top flange SL,
30% web loss. H20 OR= 27T. Max. LP = 18T.
Note ID: 130955211800018

Span 001 -- Superstructure: Secondary Members -- Rated 6, Was 5
Inspection Notes

Referenced Photos: "30", "43", "152", "154", "155", "153", "158", "156", "157", "161", "162", "163",
"164", "165", "166", "167", "168", "159", "160", "31"
2009 SECONDARY MEMBERS

#######################################################
2009 Secondary Members - SPANS 1, 2, 11, 12, 13, 14
GENERAL CONDITIONS
Secondary Members are in excellent or near-new condition.
#######################################################
2009 Secondary Members - SPANS 3 & 10
GENERAL CONDITIONS
Secondary Members are in excellent or near-new condition. Transverse
and longitudinal pier column bracing is rated under Pier Columns item.
#######################################################
2009 Secondary Members - SPANS 1-5 and 9-14
APPROACH SPAN FLOORBEAM TORSION
All 11 "approach spans" (excluding main spans 6, 7, 8) exhibit mild
symptoms indicating rolling or torsional strain on floorbeam-stinger-knee-
brace details, in the downslope direction. Knee Braces are Secondary
Members involved. See Primary Members item for full description.
#######################################################
2009 Secondary Members - SPANS 4-9
TRANSVERSE SWAY BRACING
All Truss Spans exhibit corrosion of transverse, vertical-plane sway
bracing, with section losses and pack rust between built-up
subcomponents. Conditions are the worst under leaking joints at piers.
Section losses include small holes, and typically range from 25% to 50%
gross SL.
Pack rust distorts or scallops members, particularly adjacent angle legs,

commonly up to 1", and occasionally thicker.
Photo 152 <4182 (Sp3-4>

Photo 153 <4259 (Sp5-6)>
#######################################################
HORIZONTAL LATERAL BRACING (HLB)
All Truss Spans exhibit corrosion of the Lower HLB (in the same plane as
the truss bottom chords). Conditions are the worst near leaking joints at
piers. Section losses include small holes, and typically range up to 25%
gross SL. Pack rust distorts or scallops members, particularly adjacent
angle legs, commonly up to 1", and occasionally thicker.
Inspection Notes
Also: HLB gusset plates at truss panel points typically have section losses
at their perimeters, with knife-edges and occasional through holes
(previously cited under Primary Members). Losses appear generally
consistent with the losses of the attached HLB members.
Upper HLB systems are typically in very good condition.
Photo 154 <4262 (Sp6 T2 L01)>

Photo 155 <4264 (Sp6 Panel 2)>
Photo 156 <4299 (Sp7 T1 L14)>
Photo 157 <4303 (Sp7 T2 L15)>
#######################################################
BATTEN PLATES & LACING BARS
Batten Plates (or Tie Plates) and Lacing Bars exhibit conditions similar to
the truss members they are part of. In general, there are very few
completely severed plates or bars, and the incidence of severed or nearly-
severed elements is very isolated.
Badly corroded elements tend to form in small groups at areas susceptible
to corrosion: under leaking joints at Piers, under the deck edges, near
leaking scupper downspouts. Span 9 has the worst conditions for this
sub-element, with numerous severed or nearly severed batten plates.
Photo 43 <4995>
Photo 158 <4968>
Photo 159, 160 <4538, 4892>
#######################################################
2009 Secondary Members - SPAN 7
PORTAL FRAMES
Span 7 Portal Frames exhibit signs of repeated impact damage in all the
bottom horizontal struts from Panel Point 14 through Panel Point 20.
Conditions itemized by Panel Point:
Span 7 PP14 Portal: Bottom strut in good condition. Lower "X" bracing
panel has the lower left diagonal bowed 2" out of plane. <4329>
Span 7 PP15 Portal: Bottom strut has a 5" long crack in the top flange
angle, Begin side, near the bridge centerline. The crack is starting to
propagate in to the top cover plate weld.
Photo 161, 162 <4331, 32>
Span 7 PP16 Portal: Entire bottom strut is twisted about 10° on its own
long axis. The strut bottom cover plate has a 3/8" long crack in the cover
plate weld at the Begin Right corner. The bottom strut connection to the
Right Truss has a 2½" crack in the gusset plate and a 2" crack in the
bottom of the Begin-side clip angle transverse leg.
Photo 163, 164, 165, 166 <4334, 35, 36, 38>
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 130955211800018 - continued......
Span 7 PP17 Portal: The bottom strut connection to the Right Truss has a
2" crack in the bottom of the Begin-side clip angle transverse leg (location
has hole drilled for lighting conduit). <4339, 40>
long axis, and has a 2-3" sweep toward the Begin. The bottom strut
connection to the Left Truss has a crack up to 3" long in the gusset plate,
mostly behind the clip angles.
Photo 167 <4341>
Span 7 PP19 Portal: The bottom strut bottom cover plate has a 1/4" long
crack in the cover plate weld at the Begin Right corner. The bottom strut
connection to the Right Truss has a crack up to 3" long in the gusset plate,
mostly behind the clip angles. The lower "X" bracing panel has the lower
left diagonal kinked and bowed 2-3" out of plane. <4343-46>
long axis, and is bent and bowed up and (mostly) toward the Begin. The
bottom strut bottom cover plate has a 1/4" long crack in the cover plate
weld at the Begin Left corner. The bottom strut connection to the Right
Truss has a crack up to 3" long in the gusset plate, mostly behind the clip
angles
Photo 168 <4384>
Note ID: 130955211800019

Span 001 -- Superstructure: Paint -- Rated 3, Was 4
Inspection Notes

Referenced Photos: "30", "152", "155", "169", "67", "69", "83", "128", "109", "123", "134", "140", "160",
"31"
2009 SUPERSTRUCTURE PAINT

#######################################################
2009 Paint - SPANS 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 (Rated 3)
Approach Spans 1, 2, and 10-14 exhibit extensive adhesion failure in the
paint system, with numerous large areas of bare steel exposed. Little rust
is present except where minor leakage or drainage occurs - mostly trace
amounts along the fascias. There is no significant section loss and very
limited and inconsequential pack rust.
Photos 30, 31
#######################################################
2009 Paint - SPAN 3 (Rated 2)
Approach Span 3 transitions between the 3-rated approach spans and the
1-rated truss spans. Conditions throughout the majority of the floor
framing system match those in Spans 1 & 2. Conditions at Pier 3 include
heavy corrosion and serious section losses in the steel pier column system,
with a flag for holes in the column bases.
Photos 30, 152
#######################################################
2009 Paint - SPANS 4 through 9 (Rated 1)
Truss Spans 4-9 all have adhesion failure noted above, plus serious paint
system failure along truss bottom chords, with heavy corrosion, and
section losses, and occasional through holes in primary and secondary
member components. Numerous strucrtural flags are issued for section
losses to truss members, gusset plates, and floorbeams at deck joints.
Photos 67, 69, 83, 128, 134, 140, 155, 160, 169
Note ID: 13095521180001A

Span 001 -- Superstructure: Joints -- Rated 8, Was 8
Referenced Photos: "170", "171", "172", "173", "174", "175", "176", "177"
2009 SUPERSTRUCTURE JOINTS - SPANS 1 & 2: N/A
________________________________________
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 13095521180001A - continued

2009 SUPERSTRUCTURE JOINTS - SPAN 3
The Joint at Pier 3 has a shredded seal and leaks. Leakage past and
present contributes to locally severe deterioration of the steel pier column,
with a flag issued for section losses and holes in members. Joint hardware
is rusted but functional below deck. Armor plates and headers appear on
in good condition at the wearing surface.
Photo 170 <4183>
Photo 171 <4369>
________________________________________
The modular Joint system at Pier 5 is failed in several respects. The first
of the 4 seals is completely missing, and the second is mostly detached
and sitting on brackets below the armor. Thr first bar is completely loose,
and whips back and forth while hammering loudly under traffic.
Temporary welded tabs between bars have broken welds and missing tab
plates. Temporary bar brackets (channel sections) have mostly broken off
and fallen to the pier below. Leakage past and present results is locally
severe deterioration in the steel superstructure, with flags for related
section losses and cracks.
Photo 172 <4228>
Photo 173 <4214>
Photo 174 <4238>
________________________________________
The modular Joint system at Pier 8 has its 4th seal detached from the
armor and adjacent joint bar. Other seals are still attached, but the
hardware hammers loudly under traffic. Leakage past and present results
is locally severe deterioration in the steel superstructure, with flags for
related section losses and cracks.
Photo 175 <4392>

Photo 176 <4894>
________________________________________
The Joint at Pier 9 has a partly detached seal, and exhibits seepage.
Conditions contribute to locally moderate deterioration of paint and steel
under the joint.
Photo 177 <4543>
________________________________________
2009 SUPERSTRUCTURE JOINTS - SPANS 10-14: N/A
Note ID: 13095521180001B

Span 001 -- Pier: Bearings, Bolts, Pads -- Rated 5, Was 5
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 13095521180001B - continued

"190", "191"
2009 PIER BEARINGS - SPAN 1 Rated 5.
No notes or photos.
________________________________________
2009 PIER BEARINGS - SPAN 2
Pier 2 Right Bearing has solid pack rust up to 3/4" thick between sole and
bearing/cap plates, bending the outer edges of the bearing plate. The Pier
2 Left Bearing has a similar less severe condition.
Photo 178 <4169>
________________________________________
2009 PIER BEARINGS - SPAN 3 @ 45°F
Pier 3 Bearings for Span 3 Girders (at top of column bent, per BIM), rate
4: Sole and Bearing cap plates have moderate rust scale on the surface,
and pack rust up to 1/2" thick causing minor plate distortions.
Photo 179 <4174>
Pier 3 Bearings for Span 4 Trusses rate 4: All components have moderate
surface rust. Pack rust between gusset plates and pin inhibits rotation.
Photo 180 <4181>
Pier 3 Bearings are IMPROVED: undermining condition eliminated by

repairs to pedestal and top of pier cap. Flag 1107.0032 was removed by
NYSDOT.
Photo 181 <4173>
________________________________________
Pier 4 Bearings have pack rust at the pin gussets inhibiting but not
preventing rotation. Anchor bolts have up to 30% section loss. Roller
nests appear functional.
Photo 182 <4205>
________________________________________
At Pier 5 all 4 Bearings have solid pack rust at the pin gussets preventing
rotation. Anchor bolts have 30 to 60% section losses. Slide plates under
the bearing shoes are distorted by pack rust, allowing very limited
longitudinal movement. Gravity loads appear adequately supported.
Photo 183 <4252>
Photo 184 <4256>
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 13095521180001B - continued...

Photo 185 <4257>
________________________________________
At Pier 6 Bearings have solid pack rust up to 3/4" thick at the pin gussets
inhibiting but not preventing rotation. Anchor bolts appear slightly bent.
Gravity loads appear adequately supported.
Photo 186 <4286>
________________________________________
At Pier 7 Bearings have solid pack rust at the pin gussets preventing
rotation. Anchor bolts have 30 to 60% section losses. Corrosion in the
roller nests likely inhibits translation. Bearing drain holes under the pin are
plugged resulting in ponding in the cradle. Also: the Right Bearing is
slightly compromised by spalling of the pedestal concrete at the End Right
corner. Effective loss of bearing area less than 2%.
Photo 187 <4464>
________________________________________
At Pier 8 all 4 Bearings have solid pack rust at the pin gussets preventing
rotation and spreading the gussets slightly. Anchor bolts have 30 to 60%
section losses and are bent toward the Begin. Stainless steel slide plates
under the bearing shoes are distorted by pack rust, greatly inhibiting
longitudinal movement.
Left and Right Bearings for Span 8 Trusses exhibit differential contraction
(relative to center of masonry plate): Left is contracted 4", Right is
contracted 2½".
Left and Right Bearings for Span 9 Trusses have roughly equal positions,
but are frozen at approx 3" in expansion mode.
Gravity loads appear adequately supported.

Photo 188 <4503>
Photo 189 <4504>
Photo 190 <4505>
________________________________________
Pier 9 Bearings for Span 9 Trusses rate 3: All components have moderate
surface rust. Solid pack rust between gusset plates and pin greatly inhibits
rotation and has spread the gussets slightly.
Photo 191 <4546>
Pier 9 Bearings for Span 10 Girders (at top of column bent, per BIM),
would rate 5.
________________________________________
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 13095521180001B - continued......

2009 PIER BEARINGS - SPAN 14 Rated 8 (N/A)
No notes or photos.
Note ID: 13095521180001C

Span 001 -- Pier: Pedestals -- Rated 6, Was 5
Referenced Photos: "178", "179", "181", "192", "193", "187", "194", "195", "196", "197", "198"
2009 PIER PEDESTALS - SPANS 1 & 2
(Disagree with 5 & 4 ratings: See BIM Fig. 4D.3.1, p. 4D.20)
Pier 1 & 2 Pedestals are comprised of the built-up riveted steel brackets
under the tapered bearing plates at the tops of steel columns. They are in
near-new condition.
Photo 178
________________________________________
2009 PIER PEDESTALS - SPAN 3
Pier 3 steel Pedestals for Span Girders are comprised of the built-up
riveted steel brackets under the tapered bearing plates at the tops of steel
columns. They exhibit minor distortions of the outstanding angle legs due
to pack rust.
Photo 179
Pier 3 concrete Pedestals are IMPROVED by concrete repairs to the pier.

Flag 1107.0032 was removed by NYSDOT.
Photo 181
________________________________________
2009 PIER PEDESTALS - SPAN 4 (rated 5)
(No notes or photos.)
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 13095521180001C - continued

________________________________________
Pier 5 Pedestals are cracked and hollow-sounding around the perimeters of
the bearings. Hollowness and cracking appears to extend under the edges
of the masonry plates, but there is no undermining evident.
Photo 192
________________________________________
Pier 6 Pedestals are cracked and hollow-sounding around the perimeters of
the bearings, and in some locations the concrete is spalled to a vertical face
at and below the edges of the masonry plates. Hollowness and cracking
appears to extend under the edges of the masonry plates, but there is no
undermining evident.
Photo 192
________________________________________
Pier 7 Right Pedestals is spalled 3 to 4" deep, up to and under the edge of
the masonry plate by 1 to 2". Effective loss of bearing area is less than
4%. Balance of the Pedestals are cracked and hollow-sounding around the
perimeters of the bearings. Hollowness and cracking appears to extend
under the edges of the masonry plates, but there is no other undermining
evident.
Photo 187
________________________________________
Pier 8 Pedestals are disintegrated and crumbled 3" to 4" deep around the
outboard half of each of the Span 8 Truss Bearings. Loss of concrete
leaves a vertical concrete profile below the plate edges, with no
undermining evident.
Photo 194
Other Pier 8 Pedestals are IMPROVED by concrete repairs to the pier cap
between the span 8 truss bearings. Would rate 7.
Photo 195
________________________________________
Pier 9 Right Pedestal is disintergrating and crumbling up to 3" deep to the
Right of the Right bearing areas. The End face of the Right Pedestal is
spalled to a vertical face up to the edge of the base plate for the steel
column bent. No undermining evident.
Pier 9 Left Pedestal areas would rate 5.

Photos 196, 197
________________________________________
(Disagree with 5 rating: See BIM Fig. 4D.3.1, p. 4D.20)
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 13095521180001C - continued...

Pier 10 Pedestals are comprised of the built-up riveted steel brackets under
the tapered bearing plates at the tops of steel columns. They are in near-
new condition.
Photo 198
________________________________________
2009 PIER PEDESTALS - SPANS 11, 12, 13
Pier 11, 12, and 13 Pedestals are comprised of the built-up riveted steel
brackets under the tapered bearing plates at the tops of steel columns.
They are in near-new condition.
Photo 198
Note ID: 13095521180001D

Span 001 -- Pier: Top of Cap or Beam -- Rated 8, Was 8
2009 PIER TOP OF CAP - SPANS 1 & 2 - N/A
No Notes or Photos.
________________________________________
2009 PIER TOP OF CAP - SPAN 3
Pier 3 Top of Cap IMPROVED by concrete repairs to the pier. Flag
1107.0032 was removed by NYSDOT.
Photo 181
________________________________________
2009 PIER TOP OF CAP - SPAN 4 (rated 5)
No Notes or Photos.
________________________________________
Pier 5 Top of Cap is 95% cracked and hollow sounding between the
bearings, with large, loose slabs of concrete heaved and buckled on the
surface.
Photo 192
________________________________________
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 13095521180001D - continued

bearings, with spalling up to 6" deep at the edges, and loose concrete on
the surface.
Photo 193
________________________________________
bearings, with spalling up to 6" deep at the edges, and loose concrete on
the surface.
Photo 199
________________________________________
Pier 8 Top of Cap is cracked and hollow-sounding outboard of the
centerlines of the Span 8 trusses, with concrete disintegrated up to 4"
deep. This comprises approximately 15% of the top surface area. The
other 85% is IMPROVED by concrete repairs. Condition rating weighs
the percent areas repaired and still deteriorated, and considers that the
"worst-of" Pedestal rating covers areas around the bearings.
Photos 194, 195
________________________________________
Pier 9 Top of Cap is cracked and hollow-sounding outboard of the Span 9
Right Truss, with concrete disintegrated up to 3" deep. The balance has
minor mapcracking and hollowness.
Photo 196
Note ID: 13095521180001E

Span 001 -- Pier: Stem Solid Pier -- Rated 8, Was 8
"212", "213", "214", "215", "216", "217", "218", "219", "220", "221", "222", "223", "224", "225", "226",
"227"
2009 PIER STEM - SPANS 1 & 2 - N/A
No Notes or Photos.
==================================================
2009 PIER STEM - SPAN 3
Pier 3 Stem is IMPROVED by concrete repairs to the pier. Resurfacing
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 13095521180001E - continued

coveres both Left and Right bullnoses and most of the coping (as well as
top of cap & pedestal areas). Minor mapcracking, hollowness and efflo
remain.
Photo 181
==================================================
2009 PIER STEM - SPAN 4 (rated 5)
Pier 4 Stem is mapcracked with trace dampness and efflorescence.
Recent concrete patchwork is cracked and mostly hollow-sounding.
There is a band of scaling typically 1'' deep, 2" max, at the waterline
(visible mostly below water this inspection).
The post-tensioned strap tie system appears to be in good condition.

Previously reported cracked grout appears to be limited to an extra layer of
grout applied to pitch the top of the bearing grout pads for drainage.
The latest Diving Inspection in the BIN folders is 2003. Info from the
2005 inspection, cited in the 2007 Biennial, is repeated here:
"The 2005 diving inspection reported that the underwater surfaces of the pier are covered
with zebra mussels up to 75mm thick. The underwater portions of the stem were reported to
contain extensive mapcracking and efflorescence and scattered vertical and horizontal cracks
up to 10mm wide."
Photos 201, 202.
==================================================
Pier 5 Stem surface above water is 100% mapcracked, with extensive
hollowness, dampness and efflorescence in stem faces and the coping.
Overall, approx 80% of the concrete above water is hollow-sounding.
There is a band of scaling typically 1'' deep, 3" max, at the waterline
The post-tensioned strap-tie system exhibits some cracking of duct casing

in the uppermost tie, on the Begin side. No significant corrosion or
section loss to the tie rod is evident. Patchwork and injection ports over
old crack systems appear in good condition, with no re-opening of cracks
evident.
up to 10mm wide."
Photos 203, 204

Inspection Notes
Note ID: 13095521180001E - continued...
==================================================
Pier 6 Stem surface above water is 75% mapcracked and hollow-sounding,
with dampness and efflorescence in stem faces and the coping. The
coping is spalled up to 6" deep, affecting Pedestal and Top of Cap
elements. There is a band of scaling typically 1'' deep at the waterline
up to 10mm wide."
Photo 205
The post-tensioned strap-tie system exhibits some serious deficiencies:

________________________________________
* * * PIER 6 STRAP TIES * * *
At Pier 6, the uppermost of the 4 steel strap ties exhibits serious
deficiencies, including disintegration of the protective duct and grout,
section losses, and loss of tension. The worst conditions occur adjacent
to the connection between the tie rods and the bullnose straps. The
uppermost rod at this pier is a smooth, solid, round rod, with an assumed
original size of 1½"Ø (no record information was available on this item).
The other 3 strap ties at Pier 6 appear newer and in good condition.
Strap Tie 1:
At Begin Right: 25% section loss (1.30"Ø).
At End Right: No apparent section loss, but evidence of tension loss: a

gap of 3/8" between the strap plate and the grout pad on the pier coping.
At Begin Left: 25% section loss (1.28"Ø).
At Begin Left: 42% section loss (1.14"Ø) - Controls.
Significance:
The strap ties appear to be intended to add to pier stem integrity. There is
no outward sign of loss of pier stem integrity resulting from the conditions
described above. No information on these ties was found in the BIN
folder or via inquiry to Region 1. Annual monitoring is recommended,
consistent with Yellow Flag status.
Report Photos 205-209 <photofiles 09-4946, 50, 51, 53, 54>

Inspection Notes
Note ID: 13095521180001E - continued......

==================================================
Pier 7 Stem surface above water is 60% mapcracked and hollow-sounding,
with dampness and efflorescence in stem faces and the coping. The
coping is spalled up to 6" deep, affecting Pedestal and Top of Cap
elements. There is a band of scaling typically 1'' deep at the waterline
up to 10mm wide."
Photo 210
The post-tensioned strap-tie system exhibits serious deficiencies:

________________________________________
At Pier 7, the steel strap ties exhibit serious deficiencies, including
disintegration of protective ducts and grout, section losses and loss of
tension in tie rods, and cracking and crumbling of grout pads. The worst
conditions occur adjacent to the connection between the tie rods and the
bullnose straps. The uppermost rod at this pier is a smooth, solid, round
rod, with an assumed original size of 1½"Ø (no record information was
available on this item). Section losses (SL) follow (ties numbered top to
bottom):
Strap Tie #1:

Begin Left 25% SL (1.30"Ø); Begin Right: 20% SL (1.34"Ø).
End Left 32% SL (1.24"Ø); End Right: 16% SL (1.38"Ø).
Gaps up to 1/2" under strap plates at the tangent portions.
Strap Tie #2:

Anchor head grout cracked & broken, exposing end of tie rod.
Strap Tie #3:

End Left grout pad disintegrated up to 4" deep under strap plate, balance
of grout badly cracked.
Strap Tie #4:

Inspection Notes
Note ID: 13095521180001E - continued.........

Gaps up to 1" under strap plates at the tangent portions.
End Right anchor box/seat plate weld is cracked 5½" long on the bottom,
with potential to propagate through the strap plate or the anchorage
assembly.
Significance:
The strap ties appear to be intended to add to pier stem integrity. There is
no outward sign of loss of pier stem integrity resulting from the conditions
described above. No information on these ties was found in the BIN
folder or via inquiry to Region 1. Annual monitoring is recommended,
Report Photos 211-214 <photofiles 09-4907a, 08a, 09a, 10 (End Left)>

Report Photos 215, 216 <photofiles 09-4911a, 12a (Begin Left)>
Report Photos 217-220 <photofiles 09-4913a, 14a, 17a, 20a (Begin
Right)>
Report Photos 221-223 <photofiles 09-4922a, 23a, 27a (End Right)>
==================================================
Pier 8 Stem surface above water is 100% mapcracked and very hollow-
sounding, with large areas of shotcrete surfacing delaminating and falling
off. Underlying concrete can be hand-excavated in some areas to at least
4" deep. Stem has extensive dampness and efflorescence in stem faces
and the coping at the Left and Right bullnoses. The coping is
IMPROVED by concrete repairs between the span 8 truss bearings.
There is a band of scaling typically 1'' to 3" deep at the waterline.

Previously reported waterline spalling "300mm deep" not found and may
be present below water, which is high during this inspection.
up to 10mm wide."
Photos 224, 225
The post-tensioned strap-tie system exhibits some cracking of duct

casings on the ties. On the Begin side, the bottom tie casing is cracked
open, exposing a "dwydag" style threaded rod, with light rust but no
significant section loss. At the Begin Right, the top strap-tie has cracked
and crumbling up to 4" deep in the grout pad for the strap. Sloped
drainage grout is also badly cracked.
Photos 226, 227
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 13095521180001E - continued............
Note ID: 130955211800000

Span 001 -- Pier: Pier Columns -- Rated 5, Was 6
Referenced Photos: "181", "228", "229", "230", "231"
2009 PIER COLUMNS - SPANS 1, 2, and 9-13 (rated 5)
No Notes or Photos.
==================================================
2009 PIER COLUMNS - SPAN 3

* * * PIER 3 COLUMN BENT LOSSES * * *
Span 3 Steel Pier Columns exhibit serious section losses, including holes,
at their bases. Losses occur over in the bottom 1 to 2 inches of column
height, just above the base gusset plates. This condition is accompanied
by out-of-plane bending of the flanges which appears to be caused by
pack rust in the base assembly. No crippling or buckling is evident.
Losses are based on assumed component thicknesses of 1/2 inch for the
webs, and 3/4 inch for the flanges. The assumed section is W14x95 (plans
for this component not available at present).
________________________________________
LEFT COLUMN
Begin Left flange: 23% loss.
Begin Right flange: 19% loss.
End Left flange: 70% loss.
End Right flange: 69% loss.
Web: 85% loss, including 5" perforation.
________________________________________
RIGHT COLUMN
Inspection Notes

Significance: The affected members are part of a load-path non-redundant

column bent supporting LPNR deck girders at the end of the span. The
losses combined with the distortion from pack rust make the columns
susceptible to crippling with the eventual possibility of 1 to 2 inches of
settlement of the end of the span at the joint over this pier. The column
bent is also compromised with respect to lateral loads on the span, such as
wind load. Overall column section loss is moderate, and does not appear
warrant flag status for loss of buckling capacity This condition should be
monitored at least annually, consistent with Yellow Flag status.
Report Photos 181, 228-231 <photofiles 09-4173, 4176, 4178, 4179,

4180>
Note ID: 13095521180001F

Span 001 -- Pier: Footings -- Rated 5, Was 9
Span 002 -- Pier: Footings -- Rated 5, Was 9
2009 PIER FOOTINGS - SPANS 1 & 2
(Disagree with "9" ratings: exposed concrete "pedestals" under the steel
column bents are the tops of footings founded directly on rock, based on
the 1928 design drawings. This is also consistent with Pier Footing ratings
for spans 10-13).
Pier 1 & 2 Footings are in good condition.

Photo 232 <4166>
Note ID: 130955211800020

Span 001 -- Utilities: Lighting -- Rated 3, Was 4
Referenced Photos: "233", "234", "235", "236", "239", "240", "237", "238"
2009 UTILITIES - LIGHTING
________________________________________
Inspection Notes

GENERAL BRIDGE LIGHTING - FUNCTIONALITY
ALL SPANS
General Lighting fixtures throughout the bridge and matching fixtures on
the approaches are ALL unlit with 2 exceptions: Span 1 Left, and Span 5
Left. Many fixtures also have broken glass panes, and many fixtures are
twisted or crooked on their bracket arms.
Photo 233, 234 <4158, 4380>
________________________________________
GENERAL BRIDGE LIGHTING - POSTS
ALL SPANS
All on-bridge light posts (excluding Span 7 which has fixtures but no
posts), are in poor condition. Inboard face plates typically have 30-60%
section losses with holes in many locations. The face plates appear to be
sacrificial or protective, as they are on one side and partial-length. The
remaining post steel is rusty, but has only moderate section losses - up to
30% flange loss in the paired channels making up the posts. Tie plates at
or below deck typically have 30-60% losses.
Photo 235, 236 <4167, 4377>
SPAN 1
The Lighting on the Begin Right approach has a ground-mounted post
leaning 10° away from the road.
Photo 233.
SPAN 8
The Lighting on Span 8 Right at Panel Point 2 has a detached upper post
unit. The angle brackets attaching the two sections are broken on the
Begin side, and missing fasteners on the End side. The upper section
extends down into the lower one about 3 feet, and is attached with two
bolts, so there is no hazard condition.
Photo 237, 238 <4389, 90>
________________________________________
GENERAL BRIDGE LIGHTING - CONDUIT
SPAN 1
A Lighting conduit JB cover is open on the Right Fascia, with wires
exposed. Location not a pedestrian use area.
Photo 239 <4365>
SPAN 5
A Lighting conduit expansion sleeve is dislocated at the modular joint at
Pier 5, on the Left side, exposing wires.
Photo 240 <4218>
________________________________________
NAVIGATION LIGHTING - SPAN 7
The Span 7 Navigation Lighting system is operational; fixtures were on
during the inspection.
Inspection Notes
Note ID: 130955211800021

Span 009 -- Utilities: Sign Structure -- Rated 5, Was 8
2009 SIGN STRUCTURE - SPAN 9
(Disagree with 8 rating, element exists)
The Sign at Span 9 Begin Right is in good condition.
Photo 241
Note ID: 130955211800016

Referenced Photos: "31", "32", "33", "34", "35"
Inspection Photos in Photo Number Order
Location: Begin
Abutment at Backwall:
Joint with Deck.
Photo Number: 1 Photo Filename: 09-4165.JPG

Location: Begin
transition: Joint with Deck.

Location: End Abutment

from Right: Joint with
Deck.

Location: End transition:
Joint with Deck.

Location: End Abutment

from Left: Seat &
Pedestals; Stem

Location: Begin
Abutment from Left: Stem.

Location: Begin Abut

Left: Wingwalls.

Location: End Abut
Right: Wingwalls.

Location: Begin Left

approach embankment:
Drainage.
Photo Number: 9 Photo Filename: 09-4160a.JPG

Location: Bridge from
Begin Approach:
Settlement; Pavement.


End Approach:
Settlement; Pavement.

Location: End Approach
100'± from bridge:
Pavement.

Location: Span 3 Right:

Wearing Surface (all
spans similar).

Location: Span 6:
Wearing Surface.

Location: Span 9 from

End: Wearing Surface.

Location: Span 14 at
End Right: Wearing
Surface.

Location: Along Begin

Right WW: Span 1 Curbs
(span 14 similar).

Location: End Left
corner of Span 3: Curbs.


Curbs.

Location: Span 5 Left:
Curbs


Curbs.

Curbs (spans 7-9 similar)


Curbs (spans 10-14
similar)

Scuppers (other locations
similar)


Scuppers (span 14 similar)

Scuppers

Location: Span 9 at End

Left: Scuppers

Location: Span 9 at End
Left: Scuppers

Location: Span 9 Left

side: Scuppers

Location: Spans 1-3
Framing: Primary
Members; Secondary
Members;
Paint
Photo Number: 30 Photo Filename: FramingSpan01-03

Location: Spans 10-14

Elevation: Primary
Members; Secondary
Members;
Paint
Photo Number: 31 Photo Filename: ElevationRightSp1

Location: Span 11 FB0
at G2: Primary Members
(all girder spans similar)






Location: Span 4 FB7 at
T2: Primary Members
(spans 4, 5, 9 similar)


T2: Primary Members

Location: Span 5 S4
over FB13: Primary
Members (spans 4, 5, 9
similar)

Location: Span 5 S4
over FB13: Primary
similar)

Location: Span 5 S4
over FB13: Primary
similar)


T2: Primary Members

T2: Primary Members

Location: Span 4 T1
Panel 5: Primary
Members; Secondary
Members
(lacing bars); Scuppers

Location: Span 4 T1
Panel 5: Primary Members

Location: Sp4 T2 at L02:

Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members; Paint

Primary Members

Location: Sp5 FB20:


Location: Sp5 FB20:
Primary Members

Location: Sp5 FB20:

Primary Members

Location: Sp5 FB20:
Primary Members

Location: Sp5 FB20:

Primary Members

Location: Sp5 FB20:
Primary Members

Location: Sp5 FB20:

Primary Members

Location: Sp5 FB20:
Primary Members

Location: Sp5 FB20:

Primary Members

Location: Sp5 FB20:
Primary Members

Location: Sp5 FB20:

Primary Members

Location: Sp5 FB20:
Primary Members

Location: Sp5 FB20:

Primary Members

Location: Sp5 FB20:
Primary Members

Location: Sp6
T1-L04L06: Primary
Members; Paint

Location: Sp6
T1-L04L06: Primary
Members

Location: Sp6
T1-L04L06: Primary
Members
Pho o Number 85 Photo Filename: 09-4975.JPG

Location: Sp6
T1-L04L06: Primary
Members

Location: Sp6
T1-L00L02: Primary
Members

Location: Sp6
T1-L00L02: Primary
Members

Location: Sp6
T1-L00L02: Primary
Members

Location: Sp6
T1-L02L04: Primary
Members

Location: Sp6
T1-L02L04: Primary
Members

Location: Sp6 T2 at U05:
Primary Members (span 8
similar)


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members



Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members



Location: Sp7 FB13 at
T2: Primary Members


T1: Primary Members

Location: Sp7 Panel 20
Stringer S1: Primary
Members

Location: Sp7 Panel 23

Stringer S5: Primary
Members

Location: Sp6
T2-U05U06: Primary
Members; Paint (span 8
similar)


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members

Primary Members


Primary Members



Primary Members

Primary Members


T2: Primary Members

T1: Primary Members

Location: Sp9
T2-U00L00: Primary
Members

Location: Sp9
T2-U00L00: Primary
Members; Paint

Location: Sp9
T2-L00L01 at L00:
Primary Members

Location: Sp9
T2-L00L01 at L00:
Primary Members

Location: Sp9
T2-L00L01 at L00:

Location: Sp9
T1-L09L10 near L10 (pier
9): Primary Members

Location: Sp9
9): Primary Members

Location: Sp9
9): Primary Members

Location: Sp9
9): Primary Members

from Right: Primary
Members


from Right: Primary
Members

from center: Primary
Members


T2, Begin side: Primary
Members

Location: Pier 3: Span 4
Secondary Members;
Span 3 Paint.

Location: Pier 5: Span 5

& 6 Secondary Members
(spans 8 & 9 similar).

Location: Span 6 Right
at L01: Secondary
Members - Lower HLB
(spans
4, 5, 6, 8, 9 similar)

Location: Span 6 Panel

2: Secondary Members -
Upper HLB (spans 4, 5,
6, 8, 9 similar); Paint
(upper, interior portions of
spans 4-9 similar)

Location: Span 7 Left at
L14: Secondary Members
- Lower HLB

Location: Span 7 Right

at L15: Secondary
Members - Lower HLB

Location: Span 6
T1-L03L04 at L4:
Secondary Members -
Lacing Bars

Location: Span 9
T2-L08L09 at L08:
Secondary Members -
Batten Plates

Location: Span 9
T1-L00U01 near L00:
Secondary Members -
Batten
Plates; Paint

Location: Span 7 at
PP15: Secondary
Members

Location: Span 7 at
PP15: Secondary
Members

Location: Span 7 at
PP16: Secondary
Members

Location: Span 7 at
PP16: Secondary
Members

Location: Span 7 at
PP16: Secondary
Members

Location: Span 7 at
PP16: Secondary
Members

Location: Span 7 at
PP18: Secondary
Members

Location: Span 7 at
PP20: Secondary
Members

Location: Span 4
T2-L02L03: Paint

Location: Over Pier 3:
Joint


Joint

Joint


Joint

Joint


Joint

Joint


Joint

Location: Pier 2 Right:
Bearings (span 2 only);
Pedestals (spans 1 & 2
similar)

Location: Pier 3 at Sp3

Left Girder: Pier 3
Bearings; Pedestals

Left truss: Bearings

Location: Pier 3 Begin

Left: Bearings; Pedestals;
Top of Cap; Columns

Location: Pier 4 Left:
Bearings



Right truss: Bearings



Location Pier 6 Left:
Bearings


Bearings; Pedestals






Bearings

Location: Pier 5:
Pedestals; Top of Cap

Location: Pier 6:


Location: Pier 8 interior:


Location: Pier 9 End
Right: Pedestals; Top of
Cap


Right: Pedestals

Location: Spans 10-14:
Pier Pedestals
Photo Number: 198 Photo Filename: FramingSpans10-

Location: Pier 7: Top of

Cap

side: Stem


side: Stem

Stem


side: Stem

Right: Stem


Left: Stem

Location: Pier 6 at Begin
Right: Stem

Location: Pier 6 at End

Right: Stem

Left: Stem


Left: Stem

side: Stem


Left: Stem

Left: Stem


Left: Stem

Left: Stem


Left: Stem

Left: Stem


Right: Stem

Right: Stem


Right: Stem

Right: Stem


Right: Stem

Right: Stem


Right: Stem

side: Stem


Right: Stem

Right: Stem


Right: Stem

Columns


Columns

Columns


Columns

Location: Pier 1:
Footings (span 2 similar)


Begin Appr: Lighting

Location: Span 6 Right,
near 3/4 span: Lighting


Lighting

Lighting


Lighting

Lighting


Lighting

Lighting


Signs

Inspection Sketches in Sketch SysID Order
Sketch ID: 130955211800000 Sketch Filename: 09-SDVA-5521180.wpd

General Sketch for Bridge
Referenced Photos:
Sketch ID: 130955211800000 Sketch Filename: 09-SDVA-5521180.wpd

Referenced Photos:
Sketch ID: 130955211800001 Sketch Filename: 09-Bd187-Span01-05.tif

Referenced Photos:

Referenced Photos:

Referenced Photos:

Referenced Photos:
Gen. Rec., Postings, Federal Ratings, etc.
Overall Condition:
GENERAL RECOMMENDATION: 3
Computed Condition Rating: 3.375
Problems Requiring Action:

FURTHER INVESTIGATION IS NEEDED
Pier strap ties at Piers 4, 5, 6, 7, & 8.
RED, YELLOW, and SAFETY Flags Issued
POSTINGS:
Inspector Confirmed existing Posting data as correct.
Posted Vertical Clearance ON the bridge is: No Posting
Posted Vertical Clearance UNDER the bridge is: No Posting
Bridge is: "R" Posted
Overloads Observed:
NO Overload Vehicles were observed on this bridge
FEDERAL RATINGS:
NBI Deck Condition: 6
NBI Superstruct Condition: 4
NBI Substruct Condition: 4
NBI Channel Condition: 9
NBI Culvert Condition: N
Diving Inspection Needs:

Diving Inspection Required? No Date of Last Diving Inspection: No Date
Inventory Problems:
Inventory Problems Exist? No
Miscellaneous:
Time Required to Inspect Bridge: 180 Hours
Lane Closure Needs: By Contract for 120 Hours
No Railroad Flagging Required
No Pedestrian Fence
No Snow Fence
The BIN Plate is in OK condition

Gen. Rec., Postings, Federal Ratings, etc.
Special Emphasis Inspection Required:

Non-Redundant/Fracture Critical Members - Yes
Pin and Hangers - No
Fatigue-Prone Welds - No
Non-Categorized Fatigue-Prone Details - Yes
Other (Specified in Text) - No
Special Emphasis Details:

Spans 1-3 & 10-14: LPNR Deck Girders (note: FB's are at 8'-0" & 10'-1"
o.c.)
Spans 4-6 & 8-9: LPNR Deck Trusses & Floorbeams (FB's at 22'-6", 27'-
0", & 29'-0" o.c.)
Span 7: LPNR Arching Deck Truss/Thru Truss system (FB's at 31'-0"
o.c.)
Spans 4, 5, & 9: Floorbeam Post-Tensioning Retrofit System
Piers 1-4, 10-13: Steel Pier Bents
2009: All Special Emphasis items inspected as required - C. Snyder, PE

062203 Team Leader
General Notes To the Next Inspector:

2008 Access: UB50 by McClain; 60' Lift; LC w/2 Flaggers & SV.
General: Continuous Panel Point & FB Numbering: Spans 4-5 (#0-#10-#20); and
Spans 6-7-8 (#0-#10-#24-#34).
Improvements Observed:
2008: Pier 3 concrete repaired - Flag 11070032 Removed by NYSDOT; Pier 8 top
concrete repaired; minor Curb patching done.
2007: (no entry)
2005: (no entry)
2003: Begin and End joint seals were replaced sometimes before the 2003 inspection.
Review Progress and Personnel Present at Inspection
Inspection Submission Status:
Submitted to QC Engineer on: 6/26/2009

QC Submission Number: 30190205
QC Review Completed: 6/26/2009

QC Engineer: Robert Seeley
Submitted to Liaison Engineer on: 6/26/2009

Liaison Submission Number: 0190201
Liaison Review Completed: 6/30/2009

Liaison Engineer: ID: 51000037
Submitted for BIIS Processing on: 6/30/2009

BIIS Submission Number: .kp1
Current Status: Keypunched, Sent to BIIS

Check Value: 1,685,247,327
Personnel Present During Inspection:
Carl D. Snyder - Team Leader

Cesar Ulloa - Assistant Team Leader
Discovery Date: 3/18/2009 RC: 12 BIN: 5521180
Yellow Flag 13090001
Carried: 185 910L12011040 Crossed: LAKE CHAMPLAIN
Prompt Interim Action Recommended: No
Inspector: Snyder, Carl D. Date Discovered: 3/18/2009

Flag Number: 13090001 Supersedes Flag Number: __________
Bridge Description:
BIN: 5521180 Carried: 910L 910L12011040 Crossed: LAKE CHAMPLAIN
Region: 1 - Albany County: 2 - Essex

Political Unit: 0211 - Town of CROWN POINT
Primary Owner: 10 - State Department of Transportation
Secondary Owner: 72 - Other
Primary Maintenance: 10 - State - Highway Maintenance
Secondary Maintenance: 72 - Other
Year Built: 1929 Not Posted For Load
Number of Spans by Type: Num Type Description

008 - 114 - Steel - Plate Girder-Floorbeam System, Deck
005 - 117 - Steel - Truss, Deck
001 - 118 - Steel - Truss, Thru (Overhead Bracing)
Bridge is wholly or partially owned or maintained by NYSDOT.
Description of Flagged Condition:
* * * PIER 3 COLUMN BENT LOSSES * * *
Span 3 Steel Pier Columns exhibit serious section losses, including

holes, at their bases. Losses occur over in the bottom 1 to 2 inches
of column height, just above the base gusset plates. This condition
is accompanied by out-of-plane bending of the flanges which
appears to be caused by pack rust in the base assembly. Losses
are based on assumed component thicknesses of 1/2 inch for the
webs, and 3/4 inch for the flanges. The assumed section is
W14x95 (plans for this component not available at present).
________________________________________
LEFT COLUMN
________________________________________
RIGHT COLUMN
Significance: The affected members are part of a load-path non-

redundant column bent supporting LPNR deck girders at the end of
the span. The losses combined with the distortion from pack rust
make the columns susceptible to crippling with the eventual
possibility of 1 to 2 inches of settlement of the end of the span at
the joint over this pier. The column bent is also compromised with
respect to lateral loads on the span, such as wind load. Overall
column section loss is moderate, and does not appear warrant flag
status for loss of buckling capacity This condition should be
monitored at least annually, consistent with Yellow Flag status.
<photofiles 09-4173, 4176, 4178, 4179, 4180>
5 Photos/Sketches Attached
Verbal Notifications: (For RED Flags and Safety Flags with PIA only)
To: ____________________ of Regional Office on ________ at ________
Signature: (a signed copy of this report will be placed in the BIN folder)
Flagged Bridge Report Completed By: Snyder, Carl D. on 3/19/2009
Flagged Bridge Report Signed By: ______________________________ on ________
Snyder, Carl D.
(This PDF Report Created: 6/30/2009 11:20:47 AM)

Yellow Flag 13090001 Attachment
09-4173.JPG - Attached to Yellow Flag 13090001

Pier 3 from Begin Left

Pier 3 Left Column on Left side

Pier 3 Left Column at Begin Right corner

Pier 3 Right Column, Left side.

Pier 3 Right Column, Right side.
RED Flag 13090002

Bridge Description:


* * * SPAN 5 FB20 WEB CRACKS * * *
Span 5 End Floorbeam FB20 (over Pier 5) has distortion-induced

web cracks below the knee braces at Stringers S2 and S4. The
cracks are 10" and 7" long, respectively, and run horizontally in the
web just above the bottom fillet. This location corresponds to the
bottom of the knee brace clip angles on the Begin side of the FB.
The ends of the cracks trend slightly upward, in the "smile" shape
typical of out-of-plane bending distortion cracks. There are small
branching cracks at the tips.
No red oxide flour was evident, and crack edges appear rounded
from corrosion. Web section losses of 25 to 30% are typical
throughout this member, which is adjacent to a failed, leaking
modular deck joint. This loss is a contributing factor. The cracks
are accompanied by localized web crippling and distortion, which
widens the cracks up to 3/32" at mid-length. This crippling does
not result in any significant reduction in member height.
Similar cracking was NOT apparent at the other stringers. S2 and

S4 are closest to the FB bearing points on the trusses, subjecting
the location to greater restraint at the bottom flange.
Joint deterioration may also be a contributing factor: the Joint at

Pier 5 is falling apart, resulting in constant hammering on the Span
5-side header. This increases the longitudinal deck forces which
are resisted by the knee brace detail.
RED Flag 13090002
Significance:
The affected member is a load-path- and internally non-redundant
rolled end floorbeam. The cracks appear to have developed slowly
over a long time, and have probably relieved the strain locally.
Thus, propagation to a critical state is likely to occur slowly, as
web section loss continues. PIA status does not appear necessary
for this condition.
Note: Additional Flags are being issued for this member.
<photofiles 09-4236 (Overview);

09-4239, 40, 43, 45 (@ S2);
09-4246, 47, 48, 49, 50 (@ S4)>
To: Lou Rehder of Regional Office on 3/20/2009 at 3:05:00 PM
Snyder, Carl D.

RED Flag 13090002 Attachment
09-4236.JPG - Attached to RED Flag 13090002

Span 5 FB20, overview.

Span 5 FB20 at S2, Begin side.



Span 5 FB20 at S2, End side.


Span 5 FB20 at S4, Begin side, from Left.

Span 5 FB20 at S4, Begin side, from Right.



Bridge Description:


* * * SPAN 5 FB20 SECTION LOSSES * * *
Span 5 End Floorbeam FB20 (over Pier 5) has serious section

losses from corrosion, localized in critical areas. Some of these
losses contribute to web cracks at the knee-brace clip angles, which
are addressed in Flag 1309.0002. No OTHER distress is evident.
This FB is adjacent to a failed, leaking modular deck joint.
WEB
The web exhibits losses of 25% to 30% throughout, with locally
higher losses around the perimeters of the post-tensioning anchor
brackets. At the Left PT bracket, losses range up to 47% on the
inboard side of the bracket. At the Right PT bracket, losses range
up to 37% on the inboard side of the bracket. This affects the FB
at a point of locally high stresses from the PT tendons. No local
crippling or buckling is evident around the PT anchors.
TOP FLANGE
The Top Flanges exhibit losses of 25% to 27% in the vicinity of
Stringers S2 and S4, and the centerlines of the Left and Right
Trusses. This affects the FB at the points of maximum negative
bending moment. No distress is evident from this condition.
Significance:
rolled end floorbeam. Section losses are serious and corrosion is
active. The condition should be monitored at least annually,
<photofiles 09-4229, 30, 33 (@T2);

09-4236 (Overview);
09-4235, 43 (@ T1)>
Snyder, Carl D.


Span 5 FB20 from Begin Right

Span 5 FB20 from End Right

Span 5 FB20 at Right PT bracket.

Span 5 FB20 at Left PT bracket.

Span 5 FB20 Overview from Begin Left.

Span 5 FB20 at Left PT bracket, End side.

Bridge Description:


The SPAN 4 Right Truss (T2) exhibits serious corrosion section

loss in the Truss Gusset Plates along the Bottom Chord. A
TOTAL OF 5 PLATE SEGMENTS have 25% or greater, but less
than 50% section loss:
1.) L02 Right Plate, End part: 43.5% (Begin part 18%+/-). Size:
5/8"
2.) L06 Right Plate, Begin part: 31.2% (Begin part 19%+/-). Size:
1/2"
3.) L08 Left Plate, Begin part: 40.5% (End part <=20%). Size: 9/16"
4.) L08 Right Plate, Begin part: 28.2%. Size: 9/16";
5.) L08 Right Plate, End part 42.6%. Size: 9/16"
Nature of Losses:
Losses are in horizontal bands just above the bottom chord
members, where dirt, salt, and moisture collect. Corrosion is
active, with heavy rust scale. NO cracking, distortion, or other
distress was found in these locations. NO through-holes were
found at this time.
Measurements:
Losses are based on d-meter readings taken at locations selected to
best represent the average profile of the remaining metal. Visual
comparisons were made at less corroded areas.
Significance:
This is a load-path non-redundant steel deck-truss structure; all
gusset plates are LPNR and fracture-critical. Reference is made to
recently developed Flag guidelines for gusset plate section losses
(i.e., 25% for Yellow Flag; 50% for Red Flag).
<4T2 YSF photofiles 09-4265, 66 (L02) / 67, 68 (L06) / 69-72

(L08)>
Snyder, Carl D.


Span 4 Right Truss at L02, from Begin Right.

Span 4 Right Truss at L02, from End Right.





Span 4 Right Truss at L08, from Begin Left.

Span 4 Right Truss at L08, from End Right.

Bridge Description:



TOTAL OF 1 (ONE) PLATE SEGMENTS have 25% or greater,
but less than 50% section loss:
1.) L12* Right Plate, Begin part: 27.9% (End part 20%+/-). Size:
3/4"
*Span 4 & 5 trusses are 2-span continuous with 10 panels per

span. See attached truss elevation drawing.
<5T2 YSF photofiles 09-4273, 74 (L02)>
Nature of Losses:
found at this time.
Measurements:
Significance:
Snyder, Carl D.




Bridge Description:


The SPAN 7 Left Truss (T1) exhibits serious corrosion section

1.) L13* Right Plate, Begin & End parts: 25-30% estimated. Size:
3/4"
2.) L14 Right Plate, Begin part: 42.9% (End part 20%+/-).
3.) L16 Right Plate, Begin part: 30.4% (End part 20%).
4.) L18 Right Plate, Begin & End parts: 25-30% estimated.
5.) L20 Right Plate, Begin part 33.7% (End part 20%+/-).
6.) L21 Right Plate, Begin & End parts: 25-30% estimated. Size:
3/4"
<7T1 YSF photofiles 09-4296, 97 (L14) / 4326, 27 (L16) / 4306-09

(L20)>
Nature of Losses:
found at this time.
Measurements:
comparisons were made at less corroded areas. SPAN 7: Losses
account for contribution of both main and secondary plates.
Significance:
*Spans 6, 7, & 8 are continuous, with 10, 14, and 10 panels per
span, respectively. See attached truss elevation drawing.
Snyder, Carl D.


Span 7 Left Truss at L14, from Begin Left.

Span 7 Left Truss at L14, from Begin Right.



Span 7 Left Truss at L20, Begin side.

Span 7 Left Truss at L20, from End Left.


Span 7 Left Truss at L16, End side, from Right.

Bridge Description:



1.) L13* Left Plate, Begin part: 26.5% (End part 23.3%). Size: 3/4"
2.) L14 Left Plate, End part: 27.6% (Begin part 20%+/-).
3.) L16 Left Plate, Begin part: 25-30% estimated (End part 20%+/-).
4.) L18 Left Plate, Begin part: 31.3% (End part 21.6%).
<7T2 YSF photofiles 09-4289, 92 (L13) / 4320, 21 (L18)>
Nature of Losses:
found at this time.
Measurements:
comparisons were made at less corroded areas. SPAN 7: Losses
account for contribution of both main and secondary plates.
Significance:
*Spans 6, 7, & 8 are continuous, with 10, 14, and 10 panels per
span, respectively. See attached truss elevation drawing.
Snyder, Carl D.


Span 7 Right Truss at L13, from End Left.


Span 7 Right Truss at L18, from Begin Left.

Span 7 Right Truss at L18, Begin side.

Bridge Description:


* * * SPAN 8 TRUSS GUSSET PLATES * * *
The Span 8 Right Truss at Panel Point 25 has serious section

losses in the truss gusset plates. These plates connect the truss
vertical member U25L25 to the bottom chord. The worst losses
occur along and just above the bottom chord. The original plate
thickness is 3/8", and the plate is 24 inches long where it meets the
bottom chord. No distortion, cracking, or other distress is evident
in the plates. Losses follow:
Left (inboard) Plate: 75% loss, including an 8-1/2" long perforation

zone.
Right (outboard) Plate: 50% loss, no holes.
Significance:
The affected connection is part of a load-path non-redundant deck
truss system. The bottom chord runs straight through this panel
point, with no splice or angle change. The vertical is a 'zero force'
truss member; it reduces the unbraced length of the bottom chord
in its weak axis (i.e., vertical plane). Condition should be
monitored annually, consistent with Yellow Flag status.
<photofiles: 09-4471, 4472, 4473>
Snyder, Carl D.



Span 8 Right Truss at L25, Left gusset plate.

Span 8 Right Truss at L25, Right gusset plate.
RED Flag 13090015

Bridge Description:


* * * SPAN 9 FB0 (Zero) WEB CRACKS * * *
Span 9 Floorbeam FB0 (over Pier 9) has a distortion-induced web

crack below the knee brace at Stringer S4. The crack is 7" long,
and runs horizontally in the web just above the bottom fillet. This
location corresponds to the bottom of the knee brace clip angles on
the End side of the FB. The ends of the crack trend slightly
upward, and there are small branching cracks at the tips.
No red oxide flour was evident, and crack edges appear rounded
from corrosion. Web section losses of 20 to 30% are typical
throughout this member, which is adjacent to a leaking modular
deck joint. The cracks are accompanied by localized minor web
distortion not affecting overall member height or alignment. Similar
cracking was NOT evident at Stringer S2, or other stringers.
Significance:
rolled end floorbeam. The crack appears old and there is presently
no evidence of active propagation, so PIA status does not appear
necessary for this condition.
<photofiles 09-4508 (Overview);

09-4511, 15, 17 (at S4)>
RED Flag 13090015
Snyder, Carl D.


Span 9 FB0 (zero) from End Right.

Span 9 FB0 (zero) from End Right.

Span 9 FB0 (zero), Begin side from bridge centerline, looking
Right.

Span 9 FB0 (zero), Begin side.

Bridge Description:


* * * SPAN 9 RIGHT TRUSS BOTTOM CHORD * * *
Span 9 Right Truss Bottom Chord L00L01 exhibits serious section

loss at Panel Point L00 (at Pier 8). There is no sign of cracking or
distress. The greatest loss occurs between the truss panel point
L00 gusset plates and the first tie plate (batten plate) on the
member. Losses determined by a combination of d-meter and
bow-caliper measurements. The percent losses are based on a
field-confirmed original section comprised of two channels
MC18x58 (tf 0.625", tw 0.700"). This is consistent with the
American Bridge Company 1928 shop drawings, Order No. F3133,
Sheet No. 1 (differs from design plans).

Left Channel Top Flange: 0.315"; SL 49.6%
Left Channel Web: 0.538"; SL 23.1%
Left Channel Bottom Flange: 0.407" SL 34.9%
Right Channel Top Flange: 0.459" SL 26.6%

Right Channel Web: 0.380" SL 45.7%
Right Channel Bottom Flange: 0.394" SL 37.0%
Significance:
The affected member is load-path non-redundant and fracture
critical. Annual monitoring is recommended, consistent with
Yellow Flag status.
<photofiles: 09-4525, 4526, 4527>
Snyder, Carl D.


Span 9 Right Truss at L00 (End side of Pier 8)

Span 9 Right Truss at L00, from Right.

Span 9 Right Truss at L00, from underneath.
RED Flag 13090037

Bridge Description:
BIN: 5521180 Carried: 185 910L12011040 Crossed: LAKE CHAMPLAIN


The SPAN 4 Left Truss (T1) exhibits (1.) serious corrosion section
loss AND (2.) as-built plate delamination at Panel Point L02.
1.) Corrosion section losses of approximately 50% occur in the

gusset plates along the top of the bottom chord, tops of the
diagonals, and sides of the vertical member framing into this panel
point. This 50% figure is based on bow-caliper measurements at
the edges of the plate, combined with pitting depth measurements.
Corrosion is active, with heavy rust scale. NO cracking, distortion,
or other distress was found in these locations. NO through-holes
were found at this time. Note: The d-meter could not be reliably
used anywhere on these Left and Right gusset plates (see below).
2.) Both Left and Right plates exhibit a central zone of delamination
originating at the rolling mill. This has the effect of splitting each
plate into 2 layers (at least) throughout. Attempts to take full-
thickness d-meter measurements at locations with and without
losses resulted in erratic readings reflecting back from this
delamination zone. The presence of the delamination was
confirmed at multiple locations along the plate edges (see photos).
Significance:
RED Flag 13090037
<photofiles 09-5010, 11a, 16a, 17, 18, 20a, 22, 23>
Snyder, Carl D.


09-5011a.JPG - Attached to RED Flag 13090037

Span 4 Left Truss at L02, Begin edge of Left plate.

Span 4 Left Truss at L02, Begin edge of Right plate.

Span 4 Left Truss at L02, Left plate from Begin Left.

Span 4 Left Truss at L02, Right plate from Begin Right.

Span 4 Left Truss at L02, End edges of plates, from End Left.

Span 4 Left Truss at L02, from Left.

Span 4 Left Truss at L02, from Right.

Bridge Description:


* * * SPAN 9 LEFT TRUSS BOTTOM CHORD * * *
Span 9 Left Truss Bottom Chord L09L10 exhibits serious section

loss along most of the member. The worst location appears to be
17 feet from Panel Point L09 (panel length 27'-1-1/4"). There is no
sign of cracking or distress. The percent losses are based on a
field-confirmed original section comprised of 2 channels
MC18x42.7 (tf 0.625", tw 0.450"), plus 2 plates 17-1/2"x3/8";
Original Area 38.33 in^2. This is consistent with the American
Bridge Company 1928 shop drawings, Order No. F3133, Sheet No.
5 (DIFFERS from design plans).

Left Channel Top Flange: 0.531" average.
Left Channel Web: Est. SL 10%
Left Channel Bottom Flange: 0.381" average.
Left Plate: Est. 90% SL, with perforation.
Right Channel Top Flange: 0.584" average.

Right Channel Web: Est. SL 5%
Right Channel Bottom Flange: 0.492" average.
Left Plate: Est. 20% SL.
Original Area: 38.33 in^2; Existing Area: 27.08 in^2

Similar losses are present throughout the member.
Per BLRS (with SL): No Load Posting required.
Significance:
critical. Annual monitoring is recommended, consistent with
Yellow Flag status.
<photofiles: 09-4876, 77, 79, 81>
Snyder, Carl D.



Span 9 Left Truss at L10, Begin side.

Span 9 Left Truss near mid-panel, from Begin Right.

Span 9 Left Truss near mid-panel, from Begin Right.
Safety Flag 13090040

Bridge Description:


SAFETY FLAG 1309.0040 (NEW)
* * * SPAN 9 SCUPPER DOWNSPOUT LOOSE * * *
At the End Right corner of Span 9, the PVC scupper downspout

pipe is detached from the steel downspout tube, and it's upper
hoop bracket is severed by corrosion. The corroded hoop still
retains the pipe, but is weakened. The next attachment point is over
30 feet lower, at the bottom chord of the Left Truss.
Significance: Location is over a Vermont State Park (Chimney

Point), with mowed lawns and a boat launch. The pipe could
eventually fall on park users.
<photofiles 09-4885a, 4887a, 4888a>
Snyder, Carl D.

Safety Flag 13090040 Attachment
09-4885a.JPG - Attached to Safety Flag 13090040

Span 9 Scupper downspout, End Left corner.

Span 9 End Left corner from End Left.

Span 9 End Left corner from Begin Left.

Bridge Description:


The SPAN 8 LEFT TRUSS (T1) exhibits serious corrosion section

than 50% section loss (SL):
1.) L26 Right Plate, Begin End part: 33.5% SL; Size: 7/8".
3.) L28 Right Plate, Begin part: 25.1% SL; Size: 3/4"
Nature of Losses:
active, with heavy rust scale. NO cracking, distortion, or through
holes were found in these locations. Other locations on the plates
have 20% or less SL.
Measurements:
Significance:

<photofiles 09-4900, 4901, 4902 (L28)>

<photofiles 09-4904, 4906 (L26)>
Snyder, Carl D.


Span 8 T1 at L28, from Begin Left.

Span 8 T1 at L28, from Begin Right.




Bridge Description:



(See Flag 1309.0006 for other Span 7 Left Truss Gusset Plates)

than 50% section loss (SL):
1.) L11 Left Plate, Begin part: 27.3% (End part 16.6%); Size: 3/4"
2.) L11 Right Plate, Begin part: 30.9%; Size: 3/4"
3.) L11 Right Plate, End part: 30.1%; Size: 3/4"
4.) L12 Right Plate, Begin part: 42.3% (End part along truss vertical
U12L12: 24.4%); Size: 3/4"
Nature of Losses:
Except as noted, losses are in horizontal bands just above the
bottom chord members, where dirt, salt, and moisture collect.
or through-holes were found in these locations. Other locations on
the plates have 20% or less SL.
Measurements:
Significance:
<photofiles 09-4939, 40, 41, 42 (L12)>

<photofiles 09-4943, 44, 45 (L11)>
Snyder, Carl D.






Span 7 Left Truss at L11, from Left.



Bridge Description:



than 50% section loss. Some plate segments have losses along
multiple lines (1.a., 1.b., 1.c., etc.):
1.a.) L02 Left Pl., Begin ½ along top of L01L02: 30%±. Size: 5/8".
1.b.) L02 Left Pl., Begin ½ along top of U01L02: 30%±.
1.c.) L02 Left Pl., Begin ½ along U02L02: 30%±.
2.a.) L02 Left Pl., End ½ along top of L02L03: 34.7%. Size: 5/8".
2.b.) L02 Left Pl., End ½ along top of L02U03: 29.4%.
2.c.) L02 Left Pl., End ½ along U02L02: 30%±.
3.a.) L02 Rt. Pl., Begin ½ along top of U01L02: 30%±. Size: 5/8".
3.b.) L02 Right Pl., Begin ½ along U02L02: 30%±.
4.a.) L02 Right Pl., End ½ along top of L02U03: 30%±. Size: 5/8".
4.b.) L02 Right Pl., End ½ along U02L02: 25%±.
6.) L04 Right Pl., Begin ½ along top of L03L04: 37.1%. Size: 3/4".
8.) L06 Right Pl., End ½ along top of L03L04: 37.1%. Size: 3/4".
<photofiles 09-4986-89 (L02)>

<photofiles 09-4962-66 (L04)>
<photofiles 09-4958-60 (L06)>
_______________________________________
Nature of Losses:
the plates typically have 20% or less SL.
Measurements:
locations selected to best represent the average profile of the
remaining metal. Losses with "±" are based on visual comparisons
of pitting and corrosion.
Significance:
Snyder, Carl D.


Span 6 T1 at L06, from End Left.

Span 6 T1 at L06, from End.

Span 6 T1 at L06, from End Right.


Span 6 T1 at L04, from Begin.

Span 6 T1 at L04 Begin side of vertical, from Left.

Span 6 T1 at L04 End side of vertical, from Left.


Span 6 T1 at L02, from End Left.


Span 6 T1 at L02, Begin side of vertical, from Left.

Span 6 T1 at L02, from Begin.

Bridge Description:



3.) L06 Right Plate, End half: 37.8%. Size: 1/2"
5.) L08 Left Plate, End half: 30%±. Size: 9/16".
Nature of Losses:
the plates typically have 20% or less SL.
Measurements:

locations selected to best represent the average profile of the
remaining metal. Losses with "±" are based on visual comparisons
of pitting and corrosion.
Significance:
<photofiles 09-5004, 06, 07 (L06)>

<photofiles 09-4999, 5000, 5001 (L08)>
Snyder, Carl D.



Span 4 T1 at L08, close-up from Begin Left.




Span 4 T1 at L06, from End Right.
RED Flag 13090045

Bridge Description:


* * * SPAN 6 LEFT TRUSS MEMBER LOSSES * * *
The SPAN 6 LEFT Truss exhibits serious section losses with holes
in the Bottom Chord between Panel Points L00 and L06. There is
no sign of cracking or distress. The greatest loss occurs in the
section from L04 to L06, but similar corrosion is active from L00
to L04. Losses determined by a combination bow-caliper
measurements and visual estimates of sub-component losses.
The percent losses are based on a field-confirmed original sections

(see below), are consistent with the shop drawings and the design
plans. Section losses (SL) and conditions follow:
Member L04L06 (at several locations):

Section: 4 L6 x 4 x 7/16 and 2 Plates 20 x 7/16"
Upper Angles, Horizontal Legs: SL 50%.
Upper Angles, Vertical Legs: SL 10%.
Lower Angles, Horizontal Legs: SL 25%.
Lower Angles, Vertical Legs: SL 15%.
Left Plate: 50%, with pitting both sides, and through-holes.
Right Plate: 40%, with pitting both sides, and through-holes.
Member L00L02:
Section: 4 L5 x 3½ x 3/8 and 2 Plates 20 x 7/16"
Side Plates: <25% losses with numerous through-holes.
RED Flag 13090045
Member L02L04:
Section: 4 L6 x 4 x ½ and 2 Plates 20 x 11/16"
Side Plates: <25% losses and no holes found, but many locations
with heavy pitting nearly through the plates.
Significance:
The affected members are load-path non-redundant and fracture
critical. Due to the holes and locally severe pitting, and following
Regional consultation, this flag is being issued with Red flag status.
Resulting H20 ratings per BLRS are 14T (I) & 24T (O) for member
L04L06. Per EI05-034, the maximum allowable load posting would
be 20 Tons. (Members L00L02, L02L04 would NOT require load
posting).
Report Photos 83-86 <photofiles: 09-4971, 74, 75, 76 (L04L06)>

Report Photos 87-89 <photofiles: 09-4982, 83, 85 (L00L02)>
Report Photos 90, 91 <photofiles: 09-4990, 91 (L02L04)>
Note: Flag issuance delayed pending completion of 2009 Load

Rating.
To: Doug Daniels of Regional Office on 5/6/2009 at 1:30:00 PM
Snyder, Carl D.


Span 6 T1 L04L06 from Begin: orange paint marks holes.

Span 6 T1 L05L06 from Begin.

Span 6 T1 L05L06, inside member, from Begin.

Span 6 T1 L05L06, from Begin Right.

Span 6 T1 L00L02, from Begin: orange paint marks holes.


Span 6 T1 L01L02, from Begin Left.

Span 6 T1 L02L04, from Begin (no holes found).


Bridge Description:


* * * SPAN 4 LEFT TRUSS MEMBER LOSS * * *
The SPAN 4 LEFT Truss exhibits serious section loss in Bottom

Chord member L04L05, near L05. This location has a leaking
scupper downspout which contributes to active corrosion in the
member. There are no holes, and no sign of cracking or distress.
Losses determined by a combination bow-caliper measurements

and visual estimates of sub-component losses. The percent losses
are based on a field-confirmed original section comprised of 2
MC18x51.9 channels. This is consistent with the American Bridge
Company 1928 shop drawings, Order No. F3131, Sheet No. 5
(DIFFERS from design plans). Section losses (SL) and conditions
follow:
Left & Right top flanges: 40% SL & 40% SL.

Left & Right bottom flanges: 60% SL & 50% SL.
Left & Right webs: 25% SL & 5% SL

Resulting H20 ratings per BLRS are 18T (I) & 30T (O) for member
L04L05. Per EI05-034, the maximum allowable load posting would
be 28 Tons.
Significance:
critical. Due to the locally severe pitting and active corrosion,
annual monitoring is recommended, consistent with Yellow Flag

status.
Report Photos 43, 44 <photofiles: 09-4995, 5009>
Note: Flag issuance delayed pending completion of 2009 load

rating.
Snyder, Carl D.


Span 4 Left Truss L04L05, from Begin Left.

Span 4 Left Truss L04L05 near L05, from End Left.

Bridge Description:


At Pier 6, the uppermost of the 4 steel strap ties exhibits serious

deficiencies, including disintegration of the protective duct and
grout, section losses, and loss of tension. The worst conditions
occur adjacent to the connection between the tie rods and the
bullnose straps. The uppermost rod at this pier is a smooth, solid,
round rod, with an assumed original size of 1½"Ø (no record
information was available on this item). The other 3 strap ties at
Pier 6 appear newer and in good condition.
Strap Tie 1:
At Begin Right: 25% section loss (1.30"Ø).
At End Right: No apparent section loss, but evidence of tension

loss: a gap of 3/8" between the strap plate and the grout pad on the
pier coping.
At Begin Left: 25% section loss (1.28"Ø).
At Begin Left: 42% section loss (1.14"Ø) - Controls.
Significance:
The strap ties appear to be intended to add to pier stem integrity.
There is no outward sign of loss of pier stem integrity resulting
from the conditions described above. No information on these ties
was found in the BIN folder or via inquiry to Region 1. Annual
monitoring is recommended, consistent with Yellow Flag status.
<photofiles 09-4946, 50, 51, 53, 54>
Snyder, Carl D.


Pier 6 at Begin Right.

Pier 6 at End Right.

Pier 6 at Begin Left.

Pier 6 at End Left.

Pier 6 from Begin Left.

Bridge Description:


At Pier 7, the steel strap ties exhibit serious deficiencies, including

disintegration of protective ducts and grout, section losses and loss
of tension in tie rods, and cracking and crumbling of grout pads.
The worst conditions occur adjacent to the connection between the
tie rods and the bullnose straps. The uppermost rod at this pier is a
smooth, solid, round rod, with an assumed original size of 1½"Ø
(no record information was available on this item). Section losses
(SL) follow (ties numbered top to bottom):
Strap Tie #1:

Strap Tie #2:

Anchor head grout cracked & broken, exposing end of tie rod.
Strap Tie #3:

End Left grout pad disintegrated up to 4" deep under strap plate,
balance of grout badly cracked.
Strap Tie #4:

Gaps up to 1" under strap plates at the tangent portions.
End Right anchor box/seat plate weld is cracked 5½" long on the
bottom, with potential to propagate through the strap plate or the
anchorage assembly.
Significance:
The strap ties appear to be intended to add to pier stem integrity.
There is no outward sign of loss of pier stem integrity resulting
from the conditions described above. No information on these ties
was found in the BIN folder or via inquiry to Region 1. Annual
monitoring is recommended, consistent with Yellow Flag status.
<photofiles 09-4907a, 08a, 09a, 10 (End Left)>

<photofiles 09-4911a, 12a (Begin Left)>
<photofiles 09-4913a, 14a, 17a, 20a (Begin Right)>
<photofiles 09-4922a, 23a, 27a (End Right)>
Snyder, Carl D.

09-4907a.JPG - Attached to Yellow Flag 13090048

Pier 7 at End Left.

Pier 7 at End Left.

Pier 7 at End Left.

Pier 7 at End Left.






Pier 7 Begin side, from Right.



Pier07.jpg - Attached to Yellow Flag 13090048

Standard Photo.

Bridge Description:


Following the updated 2009 BLRS (truss members) and Virtis

(floor system members) load rating, various elements will require
load posting below the current R-Permit restriction (using SLC=
0.60 x HOR per EI05-034).
Separate flags had been issued previously at the time of the

inspection for the deterioration of many of these members (see
flags 13090003, 13090015, 13090016, 13090039, 13090045 &
13090046).

postings in accordance with NYSDOT EI 05-034 are as follows
(legend: SL= section loss; OR=operating rating; LP=load posting):
Span 4 Left Truss:


Snyder, Carl D.


Bridge Description:



0.60 x HOR per EI05-034).

flags 13090003, 13090015, 13090016, 13090039, 13090045 &
13090046).

Span 5 End Floorbeam:

FB20 at Cantilever over Truss: 25% top flange SL; 30% web SL:
H20 OR= 29T. Max. LP = 18T.
Span 5 Left Truss:

Span 5 Right Truss:

a. L10L11. 15% SL: H20 OR= 29T. Max LP = 25T

d. L15L16. 15% SL: H20 OR= 22T. Max LP = 20T.
Snyder, Carl D.


Bridge Description:



0.60 x HOR per EI05-034).

flags 13090003, 13090015, 13090016, 13090039, 13090045 &
13090046).

Span 6 Left Truss:


Snyder, Carl D.


Bridge Description:



0.60 x HOR per EI05-034).

flags 13090003, 13090015, 13090016, 13090039, 13090045 &
13090046).

Span 9 Left Truss, L0U1. 19% SL: H20 OR= 33T. Max LP = 30T.
Span 9 end Floorbeam FB0 at Cantilever over truss: 25% top flange
SL, 30% web loss. H20 OR= 27T. Max. LP = 18T.

Snyder, Carl D.

Inspection Access Requirements
Equipment Required for Inspection

Access Requirement Changes WERE Noted During This Inspection.
This Listing is from the Inspection.
ACCESS CATEGORIES FOR ENTIRE BRIDGE

Required: Walking, 40 Ft UBIU (12 m), 60 Ft UBIU (18 m)
Required: Medium Lift, Rowboat, Diving, Lane Closure
Required: Shadow Vehicle
ACCESS CATEGORIES FOR SPAN 1

Required: Walking, 40 Ft UBIU (12 m), Lane Closure



Required: Walking, 40 Ft UBIU (12 m), Rowboat, Diving
Required: Lane Closure, Shadow Vehicle



Required: Walking, 40 Ft UBIU (12 m), 60 Ft UBIU (18 m)
Required: Medium Lift, Rowboat, Diving, Lane Closure




Inspection Access Requirements
Equipment Required for Inspection - continued



Culvert Measurements
Culvert Measurements
CULVERT DIMENSIONS FOR SPAN 1
LOCATION: L1
Line AF: 0.00 m
Line FE: 0.00 m
Line CF: 0.00 m
Line AD: 0.00 m
Line BE: 0.00 m
COMMENTS:
No Comments Provided.
CULVERT DIMENSIONS FOR SPAN 8

LOCATION: L1
Line AF: 0.00 m
Line FE: 0.00 m
Line CF: 0.00 m
Line AD: 0.00 m
Line BE: 0.00 m
COMMENTS:
No Comments Provided.
Standard Photos RC: 12 BIN: 5521180
5521180_LOCATION_MAP.JPG
5521180_QUAD_MAP.JPG
AbutmentBegin.jpg
AbutmentEnd.jpg
ApproachBegin.jpg
ApproachBeginNY.jpg
ApproachEnd.jpg
ApproachEndVT.jpg
ElevationRightSp01-03.jpg
ElevationRightSp07.jpg
FeatureCrossedLeftBegin.jpg
FeatureCrossedLeftCenter.jpg
FeatureCrossedLeftEnd.jpg
FeatureCrossedRightBegin.jpg
FeatureCrossedRightCenter.jpg
FeatureCrossedRightEnd.jpg
FramingSpan01-03.jpg
FramingSpan04.jpg
FramingSpan05.jpg
FramingSpan06.jpg
FramingSpan07.jpg
FramingSpan07Upper.jpg
FramingSpan08.jpg
FramingSpan09.jpg
FramingSpans10-14.jpg
NY_0892.jpg
Pier01.jpg
Pier02.jpg
Pier03.jpg
Pier04.jpg
Pier05.jpg
Pier06.jpg
Pier07.jpg
Pier08.jpg
Pier09.jpg
Pier10.jpg
Pier11.jpg
Pier12.jpg
Pier13.jpg
Postings.jpg
SignsSpan07.JPG
SignsSpan09.JPG
VT_0891.jpg
2009 Diving Inspection
12/3/2009 1
APPENDIX D:
3-Dimensional T187 Model
12/3/2009
3D Model Configuration &
Global Model Geometry
12/3/2009
T187 Model Configuration
12/3/2009
Geometry
12/3/2009
Geometry (cont’d)
12/3/2009
Load Input Summary
12/3/2009
Load Input Summary
Dead Load (DL) – Member self-weight and superimposed dead loads
Live Load (LL) – AASHTO LRFD HL-93 Loading over two lanes
(Dynamic allowance included)
Temperature Loads (TU) - +30 deg. F / -30 deg. F
Pier Settlement (SETTLE) – One inch settlement at each pier
Ice Load (ICE) – Thrust due to lake freeze, 350 kips
Wind Loads (WS) – Wind pressure distribution according to AASHTO 3.8.1
12/3/2009
12/3/2009
12/3/2009
12/3/2009
Section Properties &
Support Boundary Conditions
12/3/2009
Section Properties Input Data
Section properties were calculated using the as-built drawings and the 1989
rehabilitation plans.
Support Boundary Conditions
As-Built Model – The bearings at each truss support are modeled by “tying” the
truss node at the bearing location to a node representing the bearing. The
nodes are tied in translation for all three directions at fixed bearings, while
longitudinal translation is allowed for rocker and roller bearings. No rotation
about the transverse axis is transferred to the bearings. The force from the
bearing nodes is transferred through rigid members to the centerline of the
pier. The base of each pier is fixed in translation and rotation in all directions.
Fixed Bearing Model (frozen bearing conditions) – The bearings at each truss
support are again modeled by “tying” the truss node at the bearing location to
a node representing the bearing. All bearing nodes are tied in translation in all
three directions, with no ties for rotational degrees of freedom. The force from
the bearing nodes is transferred through rigid members to the centerline of the
pier.
Each pier foundation fixity point was assumed at the bottom of caisson.
12/3/2009
Bearing Reactions
12/3/2009
As-Built bearings according to the original contract drawing are shown below:
Only reactions at the east truss bearings are shown below for simplification.
All reactions are in global coordinate system:

The X-axis is the bridge longitudinal axis (from Pier 3 to Pier 9), Y-axis is the vertical
(Gravity) axis, and Z-axis is the transverse axis.
DEAD LOAD BEARING REACTIONS - AS-BUILT
LOCATION JOINT F-X (kips) F-Y (kips) F-Z (kips) M-X (kip-ft) M-Y (kip-ft) M-Z (kip-ft) RESTRAINTS
PIER 4 10 0 822 -49 14 -1 0 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 5 SN 5 20 0 271 15 0 0 0 DY DZ
PIER 5 SN 6 118 0 228 4 0 0 0 DY DZ
PIER 6 110 0 1269 -76 -11 0 0 DX DY DZ RX RY
PIER 7 210 0 1275 -77 -12 -2 0 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 8 SN 9 320 0 350 16 0 0 0 DY DZ
PIER 8 SN 8 218 0 222 7 0 0 0 DY DZ
12/3/2009
LIVE LOAD BEARING REACTION MAXIMA - AS-BUILT*
PIER 4 10 0 322 -1 4 2 0 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 5 SN 5 20 0 166 0 0 0 0 DY DZ
PIER 5 SN 6 118 0 167 0 0 0 0 DY DZ
PIER 6 110 67 623 3 0 20 0 DX DY DZ RX RY
PIER 7 210 0 674 3 1 23 0 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 8 SN 9 320 0 188 6 0 0 0 DY DZ
PIER 8 SN 8 218 0 334 3 0 0 0 DY DZ
LIVE LOAD LOAD BEARING REACTION MINIMA - AS-BUILT*
PIER 4 10 0 -12 -19 -18 -2 0 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 5 SN 5 20 0 -29 0 0 0 0 DY DZ
PIER 5 SN 6 118 0 -77 0 0 0 0 DY DZ
PIER 6 110 -67 -30 -35 -13 -21 0 DX DY DZ RX RY
PIER 7 210 0 -30 -37 -15 -23 0 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 8 SN 9 320 0 -13 -4 0 0 0 DY DZ
PIER 8 SN 8 218 0 -69 -7 0 0 0 DY DZ
LIVE LOAD BEARING REACTION MAXIMA - FROZEN BEARINGS*
PIER 4 10 88 314 -2 4 15 230 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 5 SN 5 20 13 171 1 2 8 41 DY DZ
PIER 5 SN 6 118 164 174 1 1 2 69 DY DZ
PIER 6 110 175 578 3 0 4 964 DX DY DZ RX RY
PIER 7 210 83 636 2 1 9 514 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 8 SN 9 320 144 185 -2 2 7 61 DY DZ
PIER 8 SN 8 218 9 349 3 13 1 78 DY DZ
LIVE LOAD LOAD BEARING REACTION MINIMA - FROZEN BEARINGS*
PIER 4 10 -65 -25 -20 -18 -14 -195 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 5 SN 5 20 -140 -27 -7 -4 -7 -52 DY DZ
PIER 5 SN 6 118 -10 -39 -11 -1 -2 -54 DY DZ
PIER 6 110 -81 -27 -39 -14 -9 -513 DX DY DZ RX RY
PIER 7 210 -191 -28 -43 -14 -4 -1064 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 8 SN 9 218 -9 -16 -10 -17 -10 -32 DY DZ
PIER 8 SN 8 320 -150 -39 -12 -1 -6 -86 DY DZ
* NOTE: REACTIONS ARE FROM ENVELOPES OF MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM FORCES
12/3/2009
TRANSVERSE WIND LOAD BEARING REACTIONS - AS-BUILT
PIER 4 10 0 511 -234 -78 56 0 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 5 SN 5 20 0 229 -92 0 0 0 DY DZ
PIER 5 SN 6 118 0 128 -83 0 0 0 DY DZ
PIER 6 110 253 1200 -369 -332 -246 0 DX DY DZ RX RY
PIER 7 210 0 1188 -370 -256 -192 0 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 8 SN 9 320 0 246 -102 0 0 0 DY DZ
PIER 8 SN 8 218 0 99 -109 0 0 0 DY DZ
TRANSVERSE WIND LOAD BEARING REACTIONS - FROZEN BEARINGS

PIER 4 10 20 471 -217 -68 -65 -6 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 5 SN 5 20 -337 246 -106 -30 -182 -2 DY DZ
PIER 5 SN 6 118 210 167 -97 -47 81 -3 DY DZ
PIER 6 110 263 1136 -351 -315 -227 -47 DX DY DZ RX RY
PIER 7 210 -263 1162 -352 -232 158 5 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 8 SN 9 320 363 268 -117 -32 238 0 DY DZ
PIER 8 SN 8 218 -216 157 -125 -58 -85 -4 DY DZ
LONGITUDINAL WIND LOAD BEARING REACTIONS - AS-BUILT
PIER 4 10 0 7 0 0 0 0 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 5 SN 5 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 DY DZ
PIER 5 SN 6 118 0 -16 -1 0 0 0 DY DZ
PIER 6 110 -172 5 5 0 -2 0 DX DY DZ RX RY
PIER 7 210 0 19 0 0 0 0 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 8 SN 9 320 0 -3 0 0 0 0 DY DZ
PIER 8 SN 8 218 0 -8 0 0 0 0 DY DZ
LONGITUDINAL WIND LOAD BEARING REACTIONS - FROZEN BEARINGS

PIER 4 10 -26 9 1 0 -1 -51 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 5 SN 5 20 30 -1 3 0 1 -20 DY DZ
PIER 5 SN 6 118 -64 -12 3 0 -1 -9 DY DZ
PIER 6 110 -23 9 1 0 0 -113 DX DY DZ RX RY
PIER 7 210 -23 -9 -1 0 0 -109 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 8 SN 9 320 9 -3 -1 0 0 -21 DY DZ
PIER 8 SN 8 218 -63 12 -3 0 -1 -12 DY DZ
12/3/2009
TEMPERATURE LOAD +30 DEG. F BEARING REACTIONS - AS-BUILT
PIER 4 10 0 0 -122 -4 -10 0 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 5 SN 5 20 0 0 -75 0 0 0 DY DZ
PIER 5 SN 6 118 0 -1 -79 0 0 0 DY DZ
PIER 6 110 0 1 -267 -26 -14 0 DX DY DZ RX RY
PIER 7 210 0 -1 -268 -25 13 0 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 8 SN 9 320 0 0 -74 0 0 0 DY DZ
PIER 8 SN 8 218 0 0 -74 0 0 0 DY DZ
TEMPERATURE LOAD +30 DEG. F BEARING REACTIONS - FROZEN BEARINGS
PIER 4 10 25 -61 -124 -5 -9 29 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 5 SN 5 20 -306 18 -104 -2 -22 42 DY DZ
PIER 5 SN 6 118 318 66 -95 -4 11 -42 DY DZ
PIER 6 110 -10 -67 -269 -24 -14 -110 DX DY DZ RX RY
PIER 7 210 -18 -62 -272 -24 14 21 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 8 SN 9 320 165 -7 -88 -1 16 -71 DY DZ
PIER 8 SN 8 218 -289 64 -89 -3 -10 -8 DY DZ
TEMPERATURE LOAD -30 DEG. F BEARING REACTIONS - AS-BUILT

PIER 4 10 0 0 122 4 10 0 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 5 SN 5 20 0 0 75 0 0 0 DY DZ
PIER 5 SN 6 118 0 1 79 0 0 0 DY DZ
PIER 6 110 0 -1 267 26 14 0 DX DY DZ RX RY
PIER 7 210 0 1 268 25 -13 0 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 8 SN 9 320 0 0 74 0 0 0 DY DZ
PIER 8 SN 8 218 0 0 74 0 0 0 DY DZ
TEMPERATURE LOAD -30 DEG. F BEARING REACTIONS - FROZEN BEARINGS

PIER 4 10 -25 61 124 5 9 -29 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 5 SN 5 20 306 -18 104 2 22 -42 DY DZ
PIER 5 SN 6 118 -318 -66 95 4 -11 42 DY DZ
PIER 6 110 10 67 269 24 14 110 DX DY DZ RX RY
PIER 7 210 18 62 272 24 -14 -21 DY DZ RX RY
PIER 8 SN 9 320 -165 7 88 1 -16 71 DY DZ
PIER 8 SN 8 218 289 -64 89 3 10 8 DY DZ
12/3/2009
Truss Member Force Plots
12/3/2009
T187 Member Axial Force Diagram (DL)
Note: Axial compression in red and tension in blue.
12/3/2009
DL Member Axial Force Plots (East Truss)
As-Built Bearing Condition
12/3/2009
Member Force Comparison (East Truss Member Axial Forces)

(LL+I) Envelope
As-Built Bearing Condition Frozen Bearing Assumption
12/3/2009
Longitudinal Wind Loads (W to E)
12/3/2009
Transverse Wind Loads (wo/ Uplifting Forces)
12/3/2009
1” Settlement @ Pier 3
12/3/2009
12/3/2009
12/3/2009
12/3/2009
12/3/2009
12/3/2009
∆T = +30oF
12/3/2009
∆T = -30oF
12/3/2009

Final HNTB Safety Assessment Bridge Report December

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Final HNTB Safety Assessment Bridge Report December

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LAKE CHAMPLAIN

Crown Point, NY &

PREPARED FOR – New York

Contact: James Boni, P.E.

HNTB New York Engineering &

LAKE CHAMPLAIN BRIDGE– SAFETY ASSESSMENT REPORT

Appendix A: Cost Analyses of Pier and Bearing Repair, Rehabilitation, and

Appendix B: Concrete Testing Results

Appendix C: Inspection Rating Scales and Reports

Appendix D: 3-Dimensional T187 Model

1. Overview and Description of Bridge

1.2. Lake Champlain Bridge

met the eligibility requirements regarding “age, integrity, and significance” 1.

1.3. Unusual Design Aspects of the Existing Bridge

2. Results of Past Inspections & History of Repairs

deterioration of piers 6 and 7 post-tensioning bands added in a previous repair

3. Assessment of Current Conditions & Basis for Bridge Closure

Pier 5 Begin Face, 2005 Diving Inspection:

Pier 5 End Face, 2005 Diving Inspection:

Pier 5 Begin Face, 2009 Diving Inspection:

Pier 5 End Face, 2009 Diving Inspection:

Pier 7 Begin Face, 2005 Diving Inspection:

Pier 7 End Face, 2005 Diving Inspection:

Pier 7 Begin Face, 2009 Diving Inspection:

Pier 7 End Face, 2009 Diving Inspection:

The vessel characteristics used in the computations and calculated collision

Gross Net Collision Collision

addressed in the current AASHTO Specifications (both Standard and LRFD) by

The caissons in their original condition have inadequate capacity under

Pier slenderness for all the pier stems of the Lake

• Pier stem at the water-line

• Pier stem below water

A discussion of the seriousness of deterioration with respect to the overall

Pier Capacity (kips)

Cracking and the Impact on Pier Capacity

The typical approach for calculating the

To estimate the shear capacity of

approach based on Section 8.16.6.4 of the AASHTO Standard Specifications

The original construction of the bridge in 1928 utilized a combination of fixed,

• Pier 3, Fixed: Moderate surface rust, some pack rust.

Pier 5 Bearing at Span 6

Pier 5 Bearing at Span 5

Pier 8 Bearing at Span 8 Pier 8 Bearing at Span 9

In a situation where a bearing or bearings are frozen and the bridge

3.1.4. Truss Superstructure

In order to assess the existing superstructure of the bridge, a 3-dimensional model

The following simplifying assumptions are applied to the model:

3. The bridge deck is simplified as a grillage system. The composite action

Model results and images can be found in the attached Appendix D.

3.1.5. Design Loads

3.1.5.1. Live Loads

3.1.5.2. Wind Loads

3.1.5.3. Temperature Loads

As the existing bridge piers are composed of unreinforced concrete and

3.1.5.4. Ice Pressure

Given that ice thickness computed in this manner is approximate, it is

3.1.5.5. Vessel Impact

4.3. Fragility of Continuous Truss Systems

4.4. Closure of Bridge to Vehicular Traffic

Transverse Tilt (X-direction)

Time Temperature Tilt X

Longitudinal Tilt (Y-direction)