Civil liberties union vs.

executive secretary
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which
allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries
to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions
subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO
averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being
challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13,
Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment
in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The VicePresident may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2),
Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to
prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or
assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the
government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above
clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio
capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office,
the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the
debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials
should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2),
Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting
the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2
positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows
them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express

mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on
Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E.
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.
and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was
endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen
Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee
on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
"sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet
been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June
2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was
filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by abovementioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one
year bar provided in the Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political
crisis.

HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period
following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the
first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003,
the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro,
Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003
violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a
duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however,
that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political
questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of
political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly
political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the
reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On
the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can
review questions which are not truly political in nature.

Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative

petitions.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a
peoples initiative.
Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to the Lambino Groups petition.
Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic
requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC
did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed
at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and
misleading which renders the initiative void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing
Revision through Initiatives

Lambino Vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 174153
Oct. 25 2006
Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an
initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735.
Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling
what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987
constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by
adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential
form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition
due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment

and revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the
constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the
legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the
present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with
the constitution before complying with RA 6735
Petition is dismissed.

SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELEC

G.R. NO. L-34150
APRIL 2, 1981
FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a prohibiting
proceedings against the validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions
(Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for
residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing
with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National
Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the
amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2
with 1 abstention.) The petitioners contends that such resolution is against the
constitutions in proposing amendments:
ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional?
HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the court ruled the following:
1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its amendments and
how it may be exercised was validly obtained. The 1973 Constitution in its
Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to
propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the
majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on
Amendments similar with the interim and regular national assembly. 15 When,
therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and
Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue of
such impotence.
2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character as to
amount to a revision rather than amendments. To dispose this contention, the
court held that whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose
amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and
propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the
democratic system, is of no moment, because the same will be submitted to the
people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no
debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present
Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no argument against
the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total
overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely

amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the

moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people."
3. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as
well as the standard for proper submission. The language of the Constitution
supplies the answer to the above questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa,
sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a
majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the
three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it
has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed.
That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned.
Further, the period required by the constitution was complied as follows: "Any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three
months after the approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The three
resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a
constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg.
22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day
period provided by the Constitution.

IMBONG VS COMELEC
G.R. No. L-32432; G.R. No. L-32443; September 11, 1970
Ponente: Makasiar, J.
FACTS:
Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in
running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, question the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such
candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly,
passed Res. No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention which shall have
two delegates from each representative district. On June 17, 1969, the Congress
passed Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 by providing that the
convention shall be composed of 320 delegates with at least two delegates from
each representative district. On August 24, 1970, the Congress, acting as a
legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132, implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly
repealing R.A 4914 which previously implemented Res. No. 2. Gonzales assails the
validity of Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a), and the entire law, while Imbong
questions the constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. 6132.
ISSUES:

1. Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and set
the parameters of such convention?
2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?
HELD:
1. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the
constituent assembly. The Congress also has the authority to enact implementing
details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since such details are within
the competence of the Congress in exercise of its legislative power.
2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely in application
with Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and does not constitute a denial of due
process or equal protection of the law. Sec. 2 also merely obeyed the intent of the
Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the apportionment of delegates. The
challenged disqualification of an elected delegate from running for any public office
in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is reasonable and not arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1 of
Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners is still valid as the restriction
contained in the section is so narrow that basic constitutional rights remain
substantially intact and inviolate thus the limitation is a valid infringement of the
constitutional guarantees invoked by the petitioners.

Santiago vs. COMELEC

On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The
COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature
gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said
petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars
to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996,
MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin
Petition. Santiago argues among others that the Peoples Initiative is limited
to amendments to the Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The extension or the
lifting of the term limits of those in power (particularly the President) constitutes
revision and is therefore beyond the power of peoples initiative.
ISSUE: Whether the proposed Delfin petition constitutes amendment to the
constitution or does it constitute a revision.
HELD: The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision
of, the Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ., it would
involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one
that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an
isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections
and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public

service and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative

which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited
to amendments. The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits
provided for all other national and local elective officials are based on the
philosophy of governance, to open up the political arena to as many as there are
Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration
of political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective
proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the
common good; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble
vision of the 1987 Constitution.

Gonzales vs COMELEC
21 SCRA 774 Political Law Amendment to the Constitution Political Question vs
Justiciable Question
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to
hold a plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided
in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on the same day that the general
national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was questioned by
Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this was
unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposals to the people
who would be more interested in the issues involved in the general election rather
than in the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when
they came up with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this
regard, the COMELEC and other respondents interposed the defense that said act
of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a political question.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political
question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.
HELD:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend
as well as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in
the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. Such powers are not
constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such powers are inherent to
the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when
Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so
as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as aconstituent assembly. Such act is not a

legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the constituent
assembly is within constitutional limitations.
II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on
a special election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935]
Constitution to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a
general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections
merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then
obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for
ratification in general elections.
Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. Plebiscite should be
scheduled on a special date so as to facilitate Fair submission, intelligent consent
or rejection. They should be able to compare the original proposition with the
amended proposition.

Mabanag vs. Lopez-Vito

78 Phil. 1 Political Law Journal Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were
suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not
allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House
Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in
determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution
(proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has been considered as an
enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the
Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could
have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had
been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would
have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution
amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take
cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether
or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals
from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the
disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply
rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a
law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190

as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of

the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated
copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of
conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in
order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two,
the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy
appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say
or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater
weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies
shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment
thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both
houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed
by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No.
2210, provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the
proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be
provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those
bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by
copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That
in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when
there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of
said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the
due enactment thereof.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill)
by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail
over those of the journals.

Sanidad vs COMELEC
73 SCRA 333 Political Law Constitutional Law Amendment to the Constitution
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16
Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things,
the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise
by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued
another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by
declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and
canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of
Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No.
991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the

questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October

16, 1976. The Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued
opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire
to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment,
providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the
people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the ReferendumPlebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or
legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence
the court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the
Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a
judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency
to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally
exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973
Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory
Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active
session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of
the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution).
The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National
Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President
undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments
thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October
16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in
lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable
issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which
commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid,
thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the
competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new
Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en
banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional

without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the
last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the
Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the
Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the
Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has
been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the
Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient
time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature.

Dumlao vs COMELEC
Equal Protection Eligibility to Office after Being 65
Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office
and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to
the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed
(par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed
the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was
joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues.
The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other
provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length
of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run
for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary
investigation would already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao
invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action.
HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would
never have been merged. Dumlaos cause is different from Igots. They have
separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be
eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the
exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an
appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon
rd
in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3 requisite was met. The SC ruled
however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for
public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary
investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.

The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is

neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another
class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly
classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are
subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that
candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office,
if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification
although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be
to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On
the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good
elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees
from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to
disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official
just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired
from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from
running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the
challenged provision.

JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION, MATEO CARI

O F O U N D A T I O N I N C . , C E N T E R F O R ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS
FOUNDATION INC., REGINA VICTORIA A. BENAFIN REPRESENTED AND JOINEDBY
HER MOTHER MRS. ELISA BENAFIN, IZABEL M. LUYK REPRESENTED AND JOINED
BY HER MOTHERMRS. REBECCA MOLINA LUYK, KATHERINE PE REPRESENTED AND
JOINED BY HER MOTHER ROSEMARIEG. PE, SOLEDAD S. CAMILO, ALICIA C.
PACALSO ALIAS "KEVAB," BETTY I. STRASSER, RUBY C. GIRON,URSULA C. PEREZ
ALIAS "BA-YAY," EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, CARMEN CAROMINA, LILIA G.
YARANON,D I A N E M O N D O C , p e t i t i o n e r s , v s . V I C T O R L I M , P R E S
I D E N T , B A S E S C O N V E R S I O N D E V E L O P M E N T AUTHORITY; JOHN HAY
PORO POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, CITY OF BAGUIO, TUNTEX (B.V.I.)CO.
LTD., ASIAWORLD INTERNATIONALE GROUP, INC., DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURALRESOURCES, respondents.Facts:

The controversy stemmed from the issuance of Proclamation No. 420 by then
President Ramos declaring a portionof Camp John Hay as a Special Economic Zone
(SEZ) and creating a regime of tax exemption within the John HaySpecial Economic
Zone. In the present petition, petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the proclamation. The Court also
held that it is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of the Constitution, that has the full powerto
exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation, its power to
exempt being as broad as itspower to tax. The challenged grant of tax exemption
would circumvent the Constitution's imposition that a lawgranting any tax exemption
must have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress. Moreover, theclaimed
statutory exemption of the John Hay SEZ from taxation should be manifest and
unmistakable from thelanguage of the law on which it is based. Thus, the Court
declared that the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of taxexemption and other
privileges to the John Hay SEZ was void for being violative of the Constitution.
However, theentire assailed proclamation cannot be declared unconstitutional, the
other parts thereof not being repugnant tothe law or the Constitution. The delineation and
declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as aSEZ was well within the
powers of the President to do so by means of a proclamation. Where part of a
statute isvoid as contrary to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable
from the invalid, as inthe case at bar, may stand and be enforced.
Issue:
WON the petitioners have legal standing to bring the petition
Ruling:
YES
Rationale:
R.A. No. 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation
of SEZs outof all the base areas in the country. The grant by the law on local
government units of the right of concurrence onthe bases' conversion is equivalent
to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of the realinterests
that communities nearby or surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the
interest of petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the legality of
Proclamation No. 420, ispersonal and substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the government actbeing challenged. Theirs is a material interest,
an interest in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely aninterest in the
question involved or an incidental interest, for what is at stake in the enforcement
of ProclamationNo. 420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City. ...
Moreover, petitioners Edilberto T.Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly elected
councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the local governanceof Baguio City and
whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents the question of whether toconcur
with the declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then,
petitionersClaravall and Yaranon, as city officials who voted against
the sanggunia n Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994)supporting the

issuance of the now challenged Proclamation No. 420, have legal standing to bring
the presentpetition

Jacinto Jimenez
Pablo Garcia, Winston Garcia

Osmea v. COMELEC (199 SCRA 750)

For petitioners

Posted: August 9, 2011 in Political Law

FACTS:

Petitioners argue that RA 7056, in providing for desynchronized elections violates

the Constitution:

Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus & Injunction

Ponente: Justice Paras
Personalities: Gov. Emiliano Osmea
Gov. Roberto Pagdanganan
Rep. Pablo Garcia
Rep. Raul del Mar
Rep. Antonio Bacaltos
Rep. Wilfredo Cainglet
Rep. Romeo Guanzon
Petitioners
COMELEC
Oscar Orbos
Guillermo Carague
Rosalina Cajucom
Respondents
Solicitor General, for respondents
Manuel Siayngco, Oliviano Regalado

1. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of
synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992;
2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing
that all incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond
June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected
and qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the
Constitution;
3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens
the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of
November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution;
4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for
Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the provision of
Section 9, Article IX under the title Commission on Elections of the Constitution;
5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in
Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local elections set by the
Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less,
valid justification for postponing the local elections to the second Monday of
November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution itself. If, at all,
Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution, to
eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible, resort
can be made to the self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for its
amendment or revision.
On the other hand, the SolGen, counsel for COMELEC, prays for the denial of this
petition arguing that the question is political in nature and that the petitioners lack
legal standing to file the petition and what they are asking for is an advisory
opinion from the court, there being no justiciable controversy to resolve. On the
merits, the SolGen contends that Republic Act 7056 is a valid exercise of legislative

power by Congress and that the regular amending process prescribed by the
Constitution does not apply to its transitory provisions.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE: WON the Court has competence to take cognizance of the
instant petition?
HELD: Yes.
What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom of RA 7056. Hence, contrary to
SolGens contention, the issue in this case is justiciable rather than political. And
even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within the Courts
power considering the expanded jurisdiction conferred by Article VIII, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed
by any branch or instrumentality of the government. Regarding the challenge to
the petitioners standing, the Supreme Court held that even if the petitioners have
no legal standing, the Court has the power to brush aside technicalities considered
the transcendental importance of the issue being raised herein.

R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution
which fixed the term of office of all elective local officials, except barangay officials,
to three (3) years. If the local election will be held on the second Monday of
November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be serving for only two
years and seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not
three years.
The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing
the campaign period. RA 7056 provides for a different campaign period, as follows:
a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days
before the day of election.
b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day of the election, and
c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and local elective
provincial, city and municipal officials forty-five (45) days before the day of the
elections.

MAIN ISSUE: WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional?

Cruz vs DENR

HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional.

Land Titles and Deeds IPRA Law vis a vis Regalian Doctrine
Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically
enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may
include natural resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an allencompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might
even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said
law violate the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and
reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since
there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was
sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain somehow against
the regalian doctrine.

The Supreme Court held that the law contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of
the 1987 Constitution which provides for the synchronization of national and local
elections. The said law, on the other hand, provides for the de-synchronization of
election by mandating that there be two separate elections in 1992. The term of
synchronization in the mentioned constitutional provision was used
synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent
in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common
termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that the local official first elected under the Constitution shall serve until
noon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local officials
shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall
have been duly elected and qualified. The Supreme Court, quoting Corpus Juris
Secundum, states that it is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of
officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and
qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the
term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin,
there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even
though the successors fail to qualify within the time.

Enrile vs SET
Facts: On January 20, 1995, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel filed with the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) an election protest against Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and other
senatorial candidates who won in the May 1995 senatorial elections.
On June 30, 1995, the petitioner, Sen. Enrile, filed his answer in counter-protest.
Issues having joined, the SET required the parties to submit the list of pilot
precincts number not more than 25% of the total precints involved.
On Aug. 21, 1997, SET held a press conference at the Supreme Court Session Hall
announcing the partial and tentative results of the revision of ballots in the pilot
precincts without resolving the protest. In the tabulation presented, the
th
petitioners name dropped to the 15 position in the senatorial race.
On September 24, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Partial Results in
Sen. Pimentels Protest and to Conduct Another Appreciation of Ballots in the
Presence of All Parties. Respondent and Sen. Coseteng filed separate comments
alleging petitioners motion is premature considering the SET has not resolved
respondents election protest.
Nevertheless, the SET denied petitioners motion holding no sufficient basis to
discard the partial tabulation. The SET also denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
A petition for Certiorari assailed for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion the resolution that denied petitioners Motion to Annul/Set Aside Partial
Results in Pimentels Protest and to conduct another Appreciation of Ballots in the
Presence of All Parties.
Issue: Whether or not there is still useful purpose that can serve in passing upon
merits of said petition.
Held: The Court finds the petition becoming moot and academic. The tenure of the
contested senatorial position subject to respondents protest expired on June 30,
1998. The case became moot considering there is no more actual controversy
between the parties and has no useful purpose that can serve in passing upon any
merit.
Where issues have become moot and academic, justiciable controversies are lost,
thereby rendering the resolution of no practical use or value.

et al
. July 31, 1997G.R. No. 108399This is a petition for review on
certiorari
of the Decision dated January 19, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court,Branch 36,
Manila nullifying an order of the DILG, which cancelled the general elections for the
SK datedDecember 4, 1992 in the City of Manila on the ground that the elections
previously held on May 26, 1990served the purpose of the first SK under the LGC of
1991 (R.A. 7160).On September 18, 1992, the DILG issued a resolution through
then Secretary Rafael M. Alunan IIIexempting the City of Manila from holding its
SK election on December 4, 1992. This was issued in relationto the letter of Joshue
R. Santiago, acting president of the KB City Federation of Manila. In its
resolution,the DILG stated:
[A] close examination of . . . RA 7160 would readily reveal the intention of the
legislature to exempt fromthe forthcoming Sangguniang Kabataan elections those
kabataang barangay chapters which may haveconducted their elections within the
period of January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 under BP 337.Manifestly the term of
office of those elected KB officials have been correspondingly extended to
coincidewith the term of office of those who may be elected under RA 7160.
Respondents filed a petition for
certiorari
and
mandamus
in the RTC of Manila, which then issued aninjunction ordering petitioners to desist
from implementing the order of the DILG.Trial of the case ensued and a Decision
was issued holding that the (1) the DILG had no power to "exempt"the City of
Manila from holding SK elections on December 4, 1992 because under Art. IX, C,
2(1) of theConstitution the power to enforce and administer "all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of anelection, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
and recall" is vested solely in the COMELEC; (2) the COMELEChad already in effect
determined that there had been no previous elections for KB by calling for
generalelections for SK officers in every barangay without exception; and (3) the
"exemption" of the City of Manila was violative of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution because, according to the DILG's records, in5,000 barangays KB
elections were held between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 but only in the
Cityof Manila, where there were 897 barangays, was there no elections held
on December 4, 1992.

The petition is dismissed.

Alunan
et al
. vs Mirasol

Petitioners sought this review on

certiorari
. They insist that the City of Manila, having already conductedelections for the KB
on May 26, 1990, was exempted from holding elections on December 4, 1992.
Insupport of their contention, they cite 532(d) of the Local Government Code

of 1991, which provides that: All seats reserved for the pederasyon ng
mga sangguniang kabataan in the different sangguniangshall be deemed vacant
until such time that the sangguniang kabataan chairmen shall have beenelected
and the respective pederasyon presidents have been selected:
Provided
,
That, elections forthe kabataang barangay conducted under Batas Pambansa Blg
.
337 at any time between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 shall be considered
as the first elections provided for in thisCode
.
The term of office of the kabataang barangay officials elected within the said
period shallbe extended correspondingly to coincide with the term of office of those
elected under this Code
.Issue: Whether the case has been moot and academic.Held: The Supreme Court
held that the issue is not moot and it is necessary in fact to decide the case on
theissues raised by the parties. The case comes with the rule that courts will decide
a question otherwise moot
and academic if it is capable of repetition and yet evade review.
Rejecting the contention of being moot and academic, the Supreme Court in the
Southern Pacific Terminal
case held:
The question involved in the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission are
usually continuing (as aremanifestly those in the case at bar), and these
considerations ought not to be, as they might be, defeated,by short-term orders,
capable of repetition, yet evading review, and at one time the government, and
atanother time the carriers, have their rights determined by the Commission
without a chance of redress.
Moreover in
Roa vs. Wade
, the US Supreme Court explained:

[W]hen, as here, pregnancy is a significantfact the litigation, the normal 266-day

human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come toterm before the
usual appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a case moot,
pregnancylitigation seldom will survive. Our laws should not be that rigid.
Pregnancy provides a classic justification
for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be capable of repetition, yet
evading review.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 is

REVERSED andthe case filed against petitioner by private respondents
is DISMISSED.

Salonga vs Hermoso
97 SCRA 121 Political Law Right to Travel Even During Martial Law
During the time of Martial Law, Jovito Salonga filed a mandamus proceeding to
compel Rolando Hermoso of the Travel Processing Center to issue a certificate of
eligibility to travel to Salonga.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to travel may be prohibited during martial law.
HELD: No. This issue became moot and academic because it appears that Hermoso
did issue and did not deny Salongas request for a certificate of eligibility to travel.
The issuance of the certificate was in pursuant to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights on the Right to Travel. The Philippines, even though it is
under martial law, shall in no instance facilitate the erosion of human rights. The
Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression
that certain citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional right to travel could
be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance this is to avoid such similar cases to
face the Court which needlessly expire the Courts effort and time.

JOVITO R. SALONGA vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO

GR 59524. February 18, 1985.

FACTS:
A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August,
September and October of 1980. On September 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr.,
a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killed
himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a
small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building in Manila. Found in Lovely's
possession by police and military authorities were several pictures taken sometime
in May 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the
latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were
among those whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures together with other
guests, including Lovely. As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was
brought by military and police authorities to the AFP Medical Center (V. Luna
Hospital)where he was place in the custody and detention of Col. Roman P.
Madella, under the over-all direction of General Fabian Ver, head of the National

Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA). Shortly afterwards, Mr. Lovely and his
two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely where charged with subversion, illegal
possession of explosives, and damage to property. Bombs once again exploded in
Metro Manila including one which resulted in the death of an American lady who
was shopping at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others which caused injuries
to a number of persons. The President's anniversary television radio press
conference was broadcast. The younger brother of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was
presented during the conference. The next day, newspapers came out with almost
identical headlines stating in effect that Salonga had been linked to the various
bombings in Metro Manila. Meanwhile, Lovely was taken out of the hospital's
intensive care unit and transferred to the office of Col. Madella where he was held
incommunicado for some time. More bombs were reported to have exploded at 3
big hotels in Metro Manila. The bombs injured 9 people. A meeting of the General
Military Council was called for 6 October 1980. Minutes after the President had
finished delivering his speech before the International Conference of the American
Society of Travel Agents at the Philippine International Convention Center, as mall
bomb exploded. Within the next 24 hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders
(ASSOs) were issued against persons, including Salonga, who were apparently
implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. Elements of
the military went to the hospital room of Salonga at the Manila Medical Center
where he was confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial
asthma and placed him under arrest. The arresting officer showed Salonga the
ASSO form which however did not specify the charge or charges against him.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court may still elaborate on a decision when the lower courts have
dropped the case against petitioner Salonga.

HELD:
The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority
into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as constitutionally
protected spheres where even the awesome powers of Government may not enter
at will is not the totality of the Court's functions. The Court also has the duty to
formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,doctrines, or
rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of
protection given by constitutional guarantees. In dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1),
the petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail bond as excessive
and,therefore, constitutionally void, escaped from the provincial jail while his
petition was pending. The petition became moot because of his escape but we
nonetheless rendered a decision. In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or
not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an

executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree 15, the Center's new charter
pursuant to the President's legislative powers under martial law. Still, the Court
discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of
Filipino culture for national identity. In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v.
Enrile (59 SCRA183), during the pendency of the case, 26 petitioners were released
from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner was
facing charges of murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The fact
that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent the Court in the exercise
of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decision
sever printed in the Reports. Herein, the prosecution evidence miserably fails to
establish a prima facie case against Salonga, either as a co-conspirator of a
destabilization plan to overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of any
subversive organization. The respondents have taken the initiative of dropping the
charges against Salonga. The Court reiterates the rule, however, that the Court will
not validate the filing of an information based on the kind of evidence against
Salonga found in the records.

Macalintal vs PET, GR 191618, June 7, 2011

Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011
(Admin Law, PET, Quasi-judicial power)
Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme Court,
sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate
its rules for the purpose.
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court
and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SCs
decision dismissing the formers petition and declaring the establishment of the
respondent PET as constitutional.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of
the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12,
Art VIII of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing
on the basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of

all election contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of
the Constitution.
Issue:
1. Whether or not PET is constitutional.
2. Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held:
1. Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to
a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring
that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution,
they constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power granted to the
Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of
necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and
vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it
into effect.
2. No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution which provides that the power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The set
up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of
electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the
Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election
contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law.
Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election
contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the
explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the
COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals)
of the Constitution.
OPOSA vs. FACTORAN
G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993.

FACTS:
The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to order the
respondent, then Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License
Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. They alleged that the massive
commercial logging in the country is causing vast abuses on rain-forest.They further
asserted that the rights of their generation and the rights of the generations yet
unborn to a balanced and healthful ecology. Plaintiffs further assert that the

adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so

capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a
matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to
present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence
in the course of the trial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi.

HELD:
The SC decided in the affirmative. Locus standi means the right of the litigant to act
or to be heard.Under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it states that:
The state shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Petitioners,
minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generation yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of
their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded considers
the rhythm and harmony of nature. Nature means the created world in its
entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys
forest, mineral, land, waters fisheries, wildlife, off- shore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say,
every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes,
at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come. This landmark case has been ruled as a class
suit because the subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
interest, not just for several but for ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Agan Jr. Vs. PIATCO Case Digest

Agan Jr. Vs. PIATCO
402 SCRA 612

G.R. No. 155001

The petitioners have local standi. They are prejudiced by the concession agreement
as their livelihood is to be taken away from them.

May 5, 2003
Tatad vs Secretary of Energy
Facts: Some time in 1993, six business leaders, explored the possibility of investing
in the new NAIA airport terminal, so they formed Asians Emerging Dragon Corp.
They submitted proposals to the government for the development of NAIA Intl.
Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). The NEDA approved the NAIA IPT III project.
Bidders were invited, and among the proposal Peoples Air Cargo (Paircargo) was
chosen. AEDC protested alleging that preference was given to Paircargo, but still
the project was awarded to Paircargo. Because of that, it incorporated into, Phil.
Intl. Airport Terminals Co. (PIATCO). The DOTC and PIATCO entered into a
concession agreement in 1997 to franchise and operate the said terminal for
21years. In Nov. 1998 it was amended in the matters of pertaining to the definition
of the obligations given to the concessionaire, development of facilities and
proceeds, fees and charges, and the termination of contract. Since MIAA is charged
with the maintenance and operations of NAIA terminals I and II, it has a contract
with several service providers. The workers filed the petition for prohibition
claiming that they would lose their job, and the service providers joined them, filed
a motion for intervention. Likewise several employees of the MIAA filed a petition
assailing the legality of arrangements. A group of congressmen filed similar
petitions. Pres. Arroyo declared in her speech that she will not honor PIATCO
contracts which the Exec. Branch's legal office concluded null and void.

Issue: Whether or Not the 1997 concession agreement is void, together with its
amendments for being contrary to the constitution.

Held: The 1997 concession agreement is void for being contrary to public policy.
The amendments have the effect of changing it into and entirely different
agreement from the contract bidded upon. The amendments present new terms
and conditions which provide financial benefit to PIATCO which may have the
altered the technical and financial parameters of other bidders had they know that
such terms were available. The 1997 concession agreement, the amendments and
supplements thereto are set aside for being null and void.

Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law

Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the
government has always been findingways to alleviate the oil industry. The
government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One
such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law
allows that any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil
and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and
operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or
use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the
Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims,
among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil
and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause.
Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil
refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil
industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined
petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products
and 7% on refined crude products.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19
of Art 12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens
oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that our
downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign
oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in
the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant
players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities.
The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is
only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the
heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New
players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by
building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will
not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of
increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The
argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce
prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first
need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them

with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron,
Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against
the new players insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis
the established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already
being observed by the latter.

BLAS F. OPLE
v.
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO,ROBERT
BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEADOF
THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDITFacts:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking
of the rightto privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of
rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative
Order No. 308 entitled"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds,
viz
:(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it impermissibly
intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.We grant the petition for the rights
sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against furthererosion.A.O. No. 308 was
published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997.
On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary
Ruben Torresand the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee, arecharged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we
issued a temporary restraining orderenjoining its implementation.
Issue:
WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308
Ruling:
YES
Rationale:
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to
sue of thepetitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that
petitioner has no legalinterest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be
promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished
member of our Senate. Asa Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising
the issue that the issuance of A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.
4
As taxpayer and member of the Government Service InsuranceSystem (GSIS), petitioner can also
impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSISfunds to implement A.O.

No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the
implementing rules of A.O.No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as
invalid
per se
and as infirmed on itsface. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its
fatal defects. Moreover, therespondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308
without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS)
caused the publication of a notice to bid for themanufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.
Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announcedthat representatives from the GSIS and
the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identificationsystem.All signals from the
respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait forthe
formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that
wetighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an
importantconstitutional principle and a fundamental right

Chavez vs PEA
Land Titles and Deeds Lands of the Public Domain
The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to
undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling
functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to bereclaimed foreshore lands
are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of
submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be
transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of
PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged
areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain.
Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitutionwhich prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of
290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for

being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO

vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President
to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity
and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the
Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding,
those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and
the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration
as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued
that:

FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level
public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations
to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate,
arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties.
All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite
people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body,
it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing
of an information in our courts of law.

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to
conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any
event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as
amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to
create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because
there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial
body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it
was validly created for laudable purposes.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC
from performing its functions. They argued that:

ISSUES:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O.
No. 1;

2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the

powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies
and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body
to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right
to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are
allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes
on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E.
O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In
private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides
that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek
judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the
petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight
as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers
under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if
laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to
know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his
duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing
funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of
the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the
amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever
funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very
source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the
PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement
those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing
of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and
the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it
can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1
in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in
Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar

manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person
within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the states duly constituted authorities.

GUANZON VS. DE VILLA [181 SCRA 623; G.R. 80508; 30 JAN 1990]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid

classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class.

Facts: The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target
zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional.
They alleged that there is no specific target house to be search and that there is no
search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their
civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. The residents were
rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their houses.
The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men
were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo
marks. The residents complained that they're homes were ransacked, tossing their
belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their money and valuables had
disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported incidents of maulings,
spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained also suffered mental
and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical informations. The
respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents contends that
the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive
movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning
were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the
communities were the said drives were conducted. They said that they have
intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the actual operation and that
local and foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such event.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label
the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least,
have the authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights
determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the
Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

Issue: Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of

human
rights.

Held: It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the
procedure used or the methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based
on the facts stated by the parties, it appears to have been no impediment to
securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or
individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no showing that the
objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even
as th rights of the squatters and low income families are fully protected. However,
the remedy should not be brought by a tazpaer suit where not one victim
complaints and not one violator is properly charged. In the circumstances of this
taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can order
prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no permanent relief can be given.

In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the
court temporary restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses.
Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila.

(4) Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges against the
petitioner is still basis for the petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as
ruled
in
AO
No.
152

UMALI VS. GUINGONA [305 SCRA 533; G.R. No. 131124; 21 Mar 1999]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Held: Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer, he can only be
removed for cause and under the Administrative Code of 1987, 6 loss of confidence
is not one of the legal causes or grounds for removal. Consequently, his dismissal
from office on the ground of loss confidence violated his right to security of tenure,
petitioner theorized. After a careful study, we are of the irresistible conclusion that
the Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three Issue. To be sure, petitioner
was not denied the right to due process before the PCAGC. Records show that the
petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged violation
of internal revenue laws and regulations, and he attended the hearings before the
investigatory body. It is thus decisively clear that his protestation of nonobservance of due process is devoid of any factual or legal basis. Neither can it be
said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as his security of tenure.
According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal Revenue, he is
CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure. However, petitioner's claim of CESO
eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. It was incumbent upon him to prove
that he is a CESO eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence
on the matter. His failure to do so is fatal. As regards the issue of constitutionality
of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late to raise for the
first time at such late stage of the proceedings. As to last issue, It is worthy to note
that in the case under consideration, the administrative action against the
petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the criminal case. The charges
included in Administrative Order No. 152 were based on the results of investigation
conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal charges before the Ombudsman.
In sum, the petition is dismissable on the ground that the Issue posited by the
petitioner do not constitute a valid legal basis for overturning the finding and
conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals. However, taking into account the
antecedent facts and circumstances aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise of
its equity powers, has decided to consider the dismissal of the charges against
petitioner before the Ombudsman, the succinct and unmistakable manifestation by
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue that his office is no longer
interested in pursuing the case, and the position taken by the Solicitor General,
that there is no more basis for Administrative Order No. 152, as effective and
substantive supervening events that cannot be overlooked.

Facts: Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in Manila,
November 29, 1993 to March 15, 1994 and Makati, March 16, 1994 to August 4,
1994. On August 1, 1994, President Ramos received a confidential memorandum
against the petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and
regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director, more particularly the
following malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance. upon receipt of the said
confidential memorandum, former President authorized the issuance of an Order
for the preventive suspension of the petitioner and immediately referred the
Complaint against the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and
Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation. Petitioner was duly informed of the charges
against him. And was directed him to send in his answer, copies of his Statement of
Assets, and Liabilities for the past three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet. Initial
hearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGC Office. On August
23, the petitioner filed his required answer. After evaluating the evidence on
record, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a prima
facie evidence to support six (6) of the twelve (12) charges against petitioner. On
October 6, 1994, acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, then President
Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from the service,
with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's Right to Security of Tenure.
(2)

Whether

or

Not

Petitioner

was

denied

due

process

of

law

(3) Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted government agency and
whether the petitioner can raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in its
motion
for
reconsideration
of
the
trial
courts
decision.

Zandueta v. Dela Costa

November 28, 1938

G.R. No. L-46267

NATUR
This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco Zandueta
against the Honorable Sixto de la Costa to obtain from this court a judgment
declaring the respondent to be illegally occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Fourth Judicial District, ousting him
from said office, and holding that the petitioner is entitled to continue occupying
the office in question by placing him in possession thereof, with costs to said
respondent
FACTS
Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No.145, the petitioner, the
Honorable Francisco Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance,
Ninth Judicial District, comprising solely the City of Manila, and was presiding over
the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of said city, by virtue of an ad interim
appointment issued by the President of the Philippines in his favor on June 2, 1936,
and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly-On
November 7, 1936, the date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise
known as the Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received from
the President of the Commonwealth a new ad interim appointment as judge of first
instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the
Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan-The National Assembly adjourned
without its Commission on Appointments having acted on said ad interim
appointment-Another ad interim appointment to the same office was issued in
favor of said petitioner, pursuant to which he took a new oath-After his
appointment and qualification as judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial
District, the petitioner, acting as executive judge, performed several executive actsOn May 19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly
disapproved the aforesaid ad interim appointment of said petitioner-On August 1,
1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the herein respondent, Honorable
Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with
authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila
and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and his appointment was approved by
the Commission on Appointments
ISSUE
WON the petitioner may question the validity of Commonwealth Act No. 145 to
entitle him to repossess the office occupied by him prior to the appointment issued
in his favor by virtue of the assailed statute

HELD
When a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance
of a judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid appointment, accepts another
appointment to preside over the same branch of the same Court of First Instance, in
addition to another court of the same category, both of which belong to a new
judicial district formed by the addition of another Court of First Instance to the old
one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new office and receives the
corresponding salary, he abandons his old office and cannot claim to repossess it or
question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his new appointment has
been issued.
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official
voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by
law, which new office is incompatible with the one formerly occupied by him ,
qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath,
and enters into the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said
newly created or reorganized office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will
be considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of his
former appointment (46Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he cannot question the
constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed (11 American
Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121;id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted from said rule only
when his non-acceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or
when he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies. In the case under
consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim appointment
issued by the President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance with said
Commonwealth Act No. 145. If the petitioner believed that Commonwealth Act
No.145 is unconstitutional, he should have refused to accept the appointment
offered him or, at least, he should have accepted it with reservation, had he
believed that his duty of obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and
afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the final determination of the
question whether a law is unconstitutional or not.-The petitioner, being aware of his
constitutional and legal rights and obligations, by implied order of the law(art. 2,
Civil Code), accepted the office and entered into the performance of the duties
inherent therein, after taking the necessary oath, thereby acting with full
knowledge that if he voluntarily accepted the office to which he was appointed, he
would later be stopped from questioning the validity of said appointment by
alleging that the law, by virtue of which his appointment was issued, is
unconstitutional. The petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the same is
dismissed with costs to the petitioner.

Tarrosa vs Singson

Gabriel Singson was appointed as the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
by then president Fidel Ramos. Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a taxpayer, opposed the
said appointment and he argued that Singson cannot perform such position
without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Tarrosa invoked
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7653 which provides that the Governor of the BSP if
appointed is subject to the confirmation of the COA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to COAs confirmation.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Congress exceeded its legislative powers
in requiring the confirmation by the COA of the appointment of the Governor of
the BSP. An appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which
have to be confirmed by the COA cited in Section 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.
Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the Commission
on Appointmentsand require confirmation of appointment of other government
officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article 7 of
the Constitution.

Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886)

Norton v. Shelby County
Argued March 24-25, 1886
Decided May 10, 1886
118 U.S. 425
Syllabus
This Court follows the decisions of the highest court of a state in construing the
constitution and laws of the state unless they conflict with or impair the efficacy of
some principle of the federal Constitution or of a federal statute or a rule of
commercial or general law.
The decisions of state courts on questions relating to the existence of its
subordinate tribunals and the eligibility and election or appointment of their
officers and the passage of its laws are conclusive upon federal courts.
Page 118 U. S. 426

Following the decision of the highest court of the Tennessee in Pope v. Phifer, 3
Heiskell 691, and other cases, this Court holds that the Board of Commissioners of
Shelby County, organized under the Act of March 9, 1867, had no lawful existence;
that it was an unauthorized and illegal body; that its members were usurpers of the
functions and powers of the justices of peace of the county; that their action in
holding a county court was void, and that their acts in subscribing to the stock of
the Mississippi River Railroad Company and issuing bonds in payment therefor
were void.
While acts of a de facto incumbent of an office lawfully created by law and existing
are often held to be binding from reasons of public policy, the acts of a person
assuming to fill and perform the duties of an office which does not exist de jure can
have no validity whatever in law.
An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative
as though it had never been passed.
The action of a minority of the justices of the peace of the County Court of Shelby
County, Tennessee, prior to May 5, 1870, did not operate as a ratification by the
county court of the previously invalid subscription of the county to stock in the
Mississippi River Railroad Company, and on and after that day, on which the new
Constitution of Tennessee took effect, no ratification could be made without
previous assent of three-fourths of the voters of the county.
This suit was brought to enforce payment of twenty-nine bonds for $1,000 each
issued by the Board of Commissioners of Shelby County in payment of a
subscription by the county to stock in the Mississippi River Railroad Company. The
form of the bond appears in the opinion of the Court, post, p. 118 U. S. 434.
On the 25th February, 1867, the county court of any county through which that
railroad might run was authorized to subscribe to its capital stock. Laws of 18661867, page 131, c. 48, 6, [Footnote 1]
Page 118 U. S. 427
which power was enlarged November 5, 1867, Private Acts 1867-8, 5. [Footnote 2]
On the 7th day of the following March, the legislature reorganized the City of
Memphis, and enacted that the powers theretofore vested in the Quarterly Court

should be vested in a Board of Commissioners created by that act. Acts of 18671868, c. 46,
Official Supreme Court case law is only found in the print version of the United
States Reports. Justia case law is provided for general informational purposes only,
and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make
no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the
information contained on this site or information linked to from this site. Please
check official sources.

MANILA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MANUEL T.

FLORES, Defendant-Appellant.

decision came down after he had submitted his brief. And in answer to his main
contention, the following portion is quoted from a resolution of this Court. 4
2. Rutter vs. Esteban (93 Phil., 68) may be construed to mean that at the time of
the decision the Moratorium law could no longer be validly applied because of the
prevailing circumstances. At any rate, although the general rule is that an
unconstitutional statute
confers no right, creates no office, affords no protection and justifies no acts
performed under it. (11 Am. Jur., pp. 828, 829.)
there are several instances wherein courts, out of equity, have relaxed its operation
(cf. notes in Cooleys Constitutional Limitations 8th ed., p. 383 and Notes 53 A. L. R.,
273) or qualified its effects since the actual existence of a statute prior to such
declaration is an operative fact, and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored (Chicot County vs. Baster, 308 U. S., 371) and a realistic approach is
eroding the general doctrine (Warring vs. Colpoys, 136 Am. Law Rep., 1025, 1030).
Judgment affirmed, without costs.

DECISION
BENGZON, J.:
In May 1954, Manila Motor Company filed in the Municipal Court of Manila a
complaint to recover from Manuel T. Flores the amount of P1,047.98 as chattel
mortgage installments which fell due in September 1941. Defendant pleaded
prescription:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 1941 to 1954. The complaint was
dismissed. On appeal, the Court of First Instance saw differently,
sustaining Plaintiffs contention that the moratorium laws had interrupted the
running of the prescriptive period, and that deducting the time during which said
laws were in operation three years and eight months 1 the ten-year term had
not yet elapsed when complainant sued for collection in May 1954. Wherefore said
court ordered the return of the case to the municipal judge for trial on the merits.
Defendant appealed, arguing principally that the moratorium laws did not have the
effect of suspending the period of limitations, because they were unconstitutional,
as declared by this court in Rutter vs. Esteban, 49 Off. Gaz. (5) 1807. He cites
jurisprudence holding that when a statute is adjudged unconstitutional it is as
inoperative as if it had never been passed, and no rights can be built upon it. 2
Some members expressed doubts as to whether the order of the lower court was
appealable in nature; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut we agreed not to discuss the
point, inasmuch as the question submitted byAppellant could speedily be disposed
of. In Montilla vs. Pacific Commercial 3 we held that the moratorium laws
suspended the period of prescription. That was rendered after the Rutter-Esteban
decision. It should be stated however, in fairness to Appellant, that the Montilla

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,

J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in
1952. The title of the law was, An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar
Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%

1955..74%

power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the

practice of law.

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in
any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the
grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average in
subsequent bar examinations.

Macalintal vs COMELEC

ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being
embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar
flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing,
thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary.

1.

2.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that
for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken
down was based under the following reasons:
1.
1.

2.
3.

4.

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from
1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to
the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the
petitions of the said candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative to determine who
may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to
repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress
under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the
judgment of the court on who can practice law; and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough
votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in
1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying
admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the

2.

Political Law Election Laws Absentee Voters Act Proclamation of Winners in a

National Elections
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the
said act on the following grounds, among others:
That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be
allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating
his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the
requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year
and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately
preceding the election;
That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim
winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of
winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it
violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically
reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters.
Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably
used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is
concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to.
Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the
Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being
qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute
the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.
The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress
to allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vicepresidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that
Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation
of the presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and
was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.

Lidasan vs Comelec
21 SCRA 496 Political Law Effect if Title Does Not Completely Express the Subject
Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790,
entitled An Act Creating theMunicipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del
Sur, was passed. Lidasan however discovered that certain barrios located in
Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA
4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA
4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter
registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to have RA
4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not clearly
indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in its territory
several barrios from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in
another province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the
constitutional mandate that No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill?
HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here
presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of
Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns
of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of
their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the
adjacent Province of Lanaodel Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns
and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from
Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own
province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality
of RA 4790.

Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

Puno, J
Facts:
RA 7653 otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act took effect July 3 1993,
effectively replacing the earlier Central Bank of the Philippines (established 1949)
by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. On June 8 2001, petitioner Central Bank (now
BSP) Employees Association Inc. filed a petition against the Executive Secretary of
the Office of the President to restrain BSP from implementing the last proviso in

Section 15 (i), Article II of RA 7653 which pertains to establishment of a Human

resource management system and a compensation structure as part of the
authority of the Monetary Board. Employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and
below shall be in accordance with the rates in the salary standardization act.
Petitioner contends that the classifications is not reasonable, arbitrary and violates
the equal protection clause. The said proviso has been prejudicial to some 2994
rank- and file BSP employees. Respondent on the other hand contends that the
provision does not violate the equal protection clause, provided that it is construed
together with other provisions of the same law such as the fiscal and
administrative autonomy of the Bangko Sentral and the mandate of its monetary
board. The Solicitor General, as counsel of the Executive Secretary defends the
provision, that the classification of employees is based on real and actual
differentiation and it adheres to the policy of RA 7653 to establish professionalism
and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the
government.
Issue: Whether or not the contended proviso if RA 7653 violates the equal
protection of laws, hence unconstitutional.
Held: Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate on the salary grade or the
officer employee status, it distinguishes between economic class and status with
the higher salary grade recipients are of greater benefit above the law than those
of mandated by the Salary Standardization Act. Officers of the BSP receive higher
wages that those of rank-and-file employees because the former are not covered
by the salary standardization act as provided by the provision.