RILLORAZA,

AFRICA,
DE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS.,
COMPANY, respondents.

OCAMPO
INC. and

and
AFRICA, petitioners,
vs. EASTERN
PHILIPPINE TELEPHONE LONG DISTANCE

FACTS: Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) represented by the law firm SAGA, filed
with the RTC Makati, a complaint for recovery of revenue shares against PLDT. Atty. Francisco D.
Rilloraza, a partner of the firm appeared for ETPI. After ETPI rested its case, it paid SAGA the billed
amount of P100,000.00. The trial court issued a resolution granting ETPIs application for preliminary
restrictive and mandatory injunctions. During this period, SAGA was dissolved and four of the junior
partners formed the law firm RADA, which took over as counsel in the case for ETPI. The latter signed a
retainer agreement with counsel. Petitioner received a letter from ETPI signed by E. M. Villanueva,
President and Chief Executive Officer. In substance, the letter stated that ETPI was terminating the
retainer contract.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a notice of attorneys lien, furnishing copies to the plaintiff ETPI, to the
signatory of the termination letter and PLDT. On the same date, petitioner additionally sent a letter to
ETPI attaching its partial billing statement. In its notice, RADA informed the court that there were
negotiations toward a compromise between ETPI and PLDT. Petitioner confirmed that indeed the parties
arrived at an amicable settlement and that the same was entered as a judgment.
Petitioner filed a motion for the enforcement of attorneys lien with the Regional Trial Court of Makati and
then appraised the Supreme Court thereof by manifestation.
RTC: denied the motion for enforcement of attorneys lien.
ISSUE: whether or not petitioner is entitled to recover attorneys fees amounting to P26,350,779.91 for
handling the case for its client Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. filed with the RTC Makati,
though its services were terminated in midstream and the client directly compromised the case with the
adverse party.
HELD: We understand that Atty. Francisco Rilloraza handled the case from its inception until ETPI
terminated the law firms services in 1988. Petitioners claim for attorneys fees hinges on two
grounds: first, the fact that Atty. Rilloraza personally handled the case when he was working for SAGA;
and second, the retainer agreement dated October 1, 1987.
We agree that petitioners are entitled to attorneys fees. We, however, are not convinced with the
petitioners arguments that the services RADA rendered merit the amount they are claiming.
First, petitioner contends that Atty. Rilloraza initiated the filing of the complaint. When a client employs
the services of a law firm, he does not employ the services of the lawyer who is assigned to personally
handle the case. Rather, he employs the entire law firm. In the event that the counsel appearing for the
client resigns, the firm is bound to provide a replacement. Thus, RADA could not claim to have initiated
the filing of the complaint considering that ETPI hired SAGA. What is more, on September 17, 1987,
ETPI paid SAGA the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,00.00) representing services
performed prior to September 17, 1987. SAGA assigned one of its associates, Atty. Francisco Rilloraza,
to handle the case for the firm. Although Atty. Rilloraza handled the case personally, he did so for and in
behalf of SAGA.
Second, petitioner claims that under the retainer agreement, which provides:
6.2
B. Court Cases:
Should recourse to judicial action be necessary to effect collection or judicial action be taken by adverse
party, our attorneys fees shall be fifteen percent (15%) of the amounts collected or the value of the
property acquired or liability saved.
However, the retainer agreement has been terminated. True, Attorney Rilloraza played a vital role during
the inception of the case and in the course of the trial. We cannot also ignore the fact that an attorney-

client relationship between petitioner and respondent no longer existed during its culmination by amicable
agreement. To award the attorneys fees amounting to 15% of the sum of One Hundred Twenty Five
Million Six Hundred Seventy One Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Six Pesos and Four Centavos
(P125,671,886.04) plus Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) paid by PLDT to ETPI would be too
unconscionable.
In any case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts shall fix a reasonable compensation which
lawyers may receive for their professional services. A lawyer has the right to be paid for the legal
services he has extended to his client, which compensation must be reasonable. A lawyer would be
entitled to receive what he merits for his services. Otherwise stated, the amount must be determined on
a quantum meruit basis.
Quantum meruit, meaning as much as he deserved is used as a basis for determining the lawyers
professional fees in the absence of a contract but recoverable by him from his client. Recovery of
attorneys fees on the basis of quantum meruit is authorized when (1) there is no express contract for
payment of attorneys fees agreed upon between the lawyer and the client; (2) when although there is a
formal contract for attorneys fees, the fees stipulated are found unconscionable or unreasonable by the
court; and (3) when the contract for attorneys fees is void due to purely formal defects of execution;
(4)when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its conclusion; (5)
when lawyer and client disregard the contract for attorneys fees.
In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum
meruit, the elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance of the subject matter in
controversy, (2) the extent of services rendered, and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer. A
determination of these factors would indispensably require nothing less than a full-blown trial where
private respondents can adduce evidence to establish the right to lawful attorneys fees and for petitioner
to oppose or refute the same. The trial court has the principal task of fixing the amount of attorneys
]
fees . Hence, the necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.
Charging Lien
Petitioner contends that pursuant to Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is entitled to a charging
lien. The rule provides:
Section 37. Attorneys liens. An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of
his client, which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have
a lien to the same extent upon all judgements for the payment of money, and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time
when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the
court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to
be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such
judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his
just fees and disbursements. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not agree. A charging lien to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorneys fees
requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment
secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A charging lien presupposes that the
attorney has secured a favorable money judgment for his client. From the facts of the case it would seem
that petitioner had no hand in the settlement that occurred, nor did it ever obtain a favorable judgment for
ETPI.
ETPI entered into a compromise agreement when it ended the services of petitioner and through the
effort of ETPIs new lawyers, the law firm Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De los
Angeles. Whether there was bad faith in the substitution of the lawyers to avoid compliance with the
retainer agreement could only be determined after a trial of the case on the merits.

This decision, however, should not be interpreted as to impose upon petitioner any additional burden in
collecting its attorneys fees. The petitioner must avail itself of the proper remedy in order to forestall the
possibility of any injustice on or unjust enrichment of any of the parties.

NIEVES RILLAS VDA. DE BARRERA, complainant,

vs.
CASIANO U. LAPUT, respondent.
FACTS: Complainant Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera seeks the disbarment of respondent Casiano U.
Laput, upon the ground that, being her counsel, as administratrix of the estate of her late husband,
Macario Barrera, in Special Proceedings No. 2-J of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, he (Laput)
had misappropriated several sums of money held by him in trust for said estate and tried to
appropriate two (2) parcels of land belonging to the same, as well as threatened her, in a fit of anger,
with a gun, into signing several papers, despite the fact that she is 72 years of age.
In his answer, respondent admitted his former relationship with Mrs. Barrera as attorney and client
and, apart from denying the main allegations of her complaint, averred that the filing thereof was
"part of a scheme to beat off" his claim for attorney's fees in said Special Proceedings No. 2-J.
The Solicitor General, who after appropriate proceedings, recommended the dismissal of all the
charges preferred against the respondent, for insufficiency of the evidence except as regards the
alleged act of coercion on his part, for which said Officer filed the corresponding complaint
alleging, inter alia:
3. That while being such counsel for the administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera, and of the
estate, the respondent Casiano U. Laput on January 10, 1955 presented to the complainant Nieves
Rillas Vda. de Barrera at her residence at 854-D D. Jakosalem St., Cebu City, certain pleadings for
the latter's signature in the aforementioned administration proceedings;
4. That the complainant administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera declined to sign said pleadings
but requested respondent to leave the papers in order that she may first ask somebody to translate
the same for her;
5. That the respondent Casiano U. Laput instead of acceding to her (his) client's request became
angry and told complainant to sign the papers, at the same time drawing his revolver from its holster
and placing it on his lap with the evident purpose of intimidating the complainant, an old woman of
72 years old, into signing the papers or pleadings presented for signature;
6. That complainant administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera intimidated by the threat
aforementioned was compelled to sign as in fact she did sign, said pleadings against her will;
and praying that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
In his answer, respondent denied having committed the acts imputed to him in this complaint of the
Solicitor General and alleged, in substance that the papers he caused Mrs. Barrera to sign, on the
occasion referred to in said pleading, was a "Notice for Rendition of Final Accounting and Partition of
Estate"; that this "notice" was legally unnecessary and useless; that he, however, caused it to be
prepared in order to impress upon Mrs. Barrera the necessity of filing her final accounts in the
aforementioned proceedings and, closing the same, because she was reluctant to do so; that Mrs.
Barrera had, also, filed against him a criminal complaint for coercion with the office of the City Fiscal

of Cebu, based upon the same allegations made in her administrative complaint herein; and that,
after due investigation, said criminal complaint was dismissed by the City Fiscal.
From the evidence on record, we gather that, prior to January 10, 1955, Mrs. Barrera was not
inclined to cause the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Macario Barrera to be closed;
that, upon the other hand, respondent wanted to put an end to said proceedings since there was
nothing else to be done therein so that he could collect his fees for services rendered to Mrs.
Barrera as administratrix of said estate; that he, therefore, prepared a petition for the declaration of
Mrs. Barrera as the universal heir of her deceased husband, for the delivery to her of the residue of
his estate and the termination of the proceedings; that he, moreover, caused to be prepared a notice
"for the rendition of the final, accounting and partition" of said estate; that his purpose in preparing
said petition was to induce her to virtually agree and promise to submit her final accounts by signing
this notice; that respondent presented said petition and notice to Mrs. Barrera, on January 10, 1955,
for her signature; that she, however, refused to do so and suggested that the papers be left with her
so that she could have them read by somebody else; that, annoyed or angered by this open
manifestation of distrust, respondent sought to offset her adamance by putting his revolver on his
lap; and that, although he did not point the firearm at her, its display attained the intended effect of
intimidating Mrs. Barrera, who, accordingly affixed her signature on the petition and the notice
aforementioned.
Improper and censurable as these acts inherently are, they become more so when we consider that
they were performed by a man dealing with a woman 72 years of age. The offense in this case is
compounded by the circumstance that, being a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, the
offender should have set the example as man of peace and a champion of the Rule of Law. Worse
still is the fact that the offended party is the very person whom the offender was pledged to defend
and protect his own client.
There are, of course, two (2) extenuating circumstance in favor of respondent herein, namely: (1) he
evidently considered himself insulted by Mrs. Barrera and was obfuscated because she clearly
indicated her lack of confidence in him, by stating bluntly that she wanted somebody else to read the
papers to her; and (2) he required her to do something really harmless. Still, it cannot be denied that
his intent in placing the gun on his lap was to intimidate his client.
WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Solicitor General, respondent herein is hereby found guilty
of gross misconduct in office and accordingly suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year, beginning from the date of entry of judgment in this case. It is so ordered.

Regala vs. Sandiganbayan

PCGG want to build up their case against Eduardo Coujuanco for the anomalies in the COCO LEVY
FUNDS. PCGG wants petitioners divulge that Cojuangco indeed was a client of their firm, as well as other
information regarding Cojuangco.
Issue: Can the PCGG compel petitioners to divulge its clients name?
Held: NO.
As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery. The general is that a
lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.
1) the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is
flesh and blood.

2) the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The
attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
3) the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
adversary. A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is. He cannot be obliged to grope
in the dark against unknown forces.
Except:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would
implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys client unless, by revealing the
clients name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary
to convict an individual of a crime, the clients name is privileged.
That client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of
the client's identity would implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyers legal
advice was obtained.