SANCHEZ VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS(114 SCRA 454)

FACTS:
The Resolution of the Commission on Elections, dated May 15, 1980, in Pre-Proclamation Case No. 41 entitled Virgilio
Sanchez vs. Mayor Armando P. Biliwang and the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Fernando, Pampanga.
In the local elections held on January 30, 1980, Virgilio Sanchez was the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party (NP)
for Municipal Mayor of San Fernando, Pampanga, while Armando Biliwang was the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan,s (KBL)
official candidate for the same position.
On February 1, 1980, Sanchez filed with the Commission on Elections a Petition to declare null and void the local
elections in San Fernando, Pampanga due to alleged large scale terrorism. On the same day, the COMELEC denied the
Petition for lack of merit. Sanchez moved for reconsideration. On February 8, 1980, the COMELEC recalled its Resolution
and required Biliwang and the Municipal Board of Canvassers to answer. Hearings were conducted thereafter.
On November 19, 1980, Sanchez filed a petition for Certiorari with this court, docketed as G.R. No. 55513, wherein he
seeks a modification of the portion of the COMELEC Resolution of May 15, 1980 refusing to call a special election.
On December 6, 1980, Biliwang instituted, also with this Court, a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus,
docketed as G.R. No. 55642, assailing the same COMELEC Resolution and alleging that same body has no power to
annul an entire municipal election.
These two Petitions were ordered consolidated and were heard by the court en banc on July 28, 1981.

ISSUES:
Does the COMELEC have the power to annul an entire municipal election on the ground of post-election terrorism?
Does the COMELEC have the authority to call for a special election?

HELD:
Biliwang Asserts that COMELEC lacks the power to annul elections of municipal officials particularly so because, under
Section 190 of the 1978 Election Code, the power to try election contests relative to elective municipal officials is vested in
Courts of First Instance.
Be that as it may, it should be recalled that what COMELEC actually rejected were the sham and illegal returns in San
Fernando, and that kind of fraud and terrorism perpetrated thereat was sufficient cause for voiding the election as a whole.
Besides, COMELEC is empowered motu proprio to suspend and annul any proclamation as, in fact, it did annul Biliwangs
proclamation.
It may be true that there is no specific provision vesting the COMELEC with authority to annul an election. However, there
is no doubt either relative to COMELECs extensive powers. Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is tasked with the
function to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. The 1978 Election Code accords it
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of
insuring free, orderly and honest elections.
In other words, in line with the plenitude of its powers and its function to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC
must be deemed possessed of authority to annul elections where the will of the voters has been defeated and the purity of
elections sullied. It would be unreasonable to state that the COMELEC has a legal duty to perform and at the same time
deny it the wherewithal to fulfill that task.
On this issue, the COMELEC opined that it had no power to order the holding of new or special election.
Thus, the COMELEC deemed it imperative to certify to the President/Prime Minister and the Batasang Pambansa the
failure of election in San Fernando, Pampanga, so that remedial legislation may be enacted.
Again, the foregoing Opinions were rendered under the regime of the 1935 Constitution and the former Revised Election
Code, whereby there was no constitutional nor statutory precept that empowered the COMELEC to direct a new election
after one had already been held. Under Section 8 of that former statute, authority was given to the President to postpone
the election upon the recommendation of the COMELEC. And Section 21 (c) of the same law authorized the President to
issue a proclamation calling a special election whenever the election for a local office failed to take place on the date fixed

by law. In other words, the prerogative to postpone an election or call a special election, was formerly lodged with the
President.
As the laws now stand, however, COMELEC has been explicitly vested with the authority to call for the holding or
continuation of the election.
Clearly, under Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, when the election results in a failure to elect, the COMELEC may
call for the holding or continuation of the election as soon as practicable. We construe this to include the calling of a
special election in the event of a failure to elect in order to make the COMELEC truly effective in the discharge of its
functions. In fact, Section 8 of the 1978 Election Code, supra, specifically allows the COMELEC to call a special election
for the purpose of fillinf the vacancy or a newly created position, as the case may be. There should be no reason,
therefore, for not allowing it to call a special election when there is a failure to elect.

RULING OF COURT:
WHEREFORE. 1) in G.R. No. 55513, the challenged Resolution of May 15, 1980 is hereby modified, and the Commission
on Elections hereby held empowered to call a special election where there has been a failure to elect. That portion which
certifies the failure of election in San Fernando, Pampanga, to the President and the Batasang Pambansa for the
enactment of remedial measures, is hereby set aside.
2) In G.R. No. 55642, the Petition is hereby denied for lack of merit, and the authority of the Commission on Elections to
annul an election hereby upheld.

HASSAN VS. COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioner, Hadji Nor Basher L. Hassan, and private respondent, Mangondaya P.Hassan Buatan were candidates for the Office of the Vice-Mayor while
the other private respondents were candidates for councilors in Madalum, Lanao del Sur in the last regular local elections of May 8, 1995. However, due to
threats of violence and terrorism in the area there was failure of elections in six out of twenty four precincts in Madalum. The ballot boxes were burned and
there were threats by unidentified persons in Precinct No. 7-A. In Precinct Nos. 9, 9-A, 10, 13, and 14, elections did not take place because the members
of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) failed to report to their respective polling places. Thus, the Monitoring Supervising Team(COMELEC Team)
headed by Regional Election Director Virgilio O. Garcillano recommended to the COMELEC the holding of special elections in said precincts. Thespecial
elections were thereby set on May 27, 1995. On said date, however, themembers of the BEI again failed to report for duty in their respective polling places.
Inan Order dated May 28, 1995, the COMELEC Team rescheduled the elections in theseprecincts for May 29, 1995 at Liangan Elementary (Arabic)
School, which is 15kilometers away from the designated polling places, On May 29, 1995, the membersof the Board did not again report for duty. Hence,
the COMELEC Team wasconstrained to appoint police/military personnel to act as substitute members so as topush through with the elections. The
herein private respondent filed a petition for herimmediate proclamation, on the other hand the petitioner filed the present case dueto the same ground of
terrorism.

ISSUE
Whether or not failure of election shall be declared.

RULING
The court held that there was actually failure of election. The re-scheduling of the special elections from May 27 to May 29, was done
in uncommon haste and unreasonably too close for all voters to be notified of the changes, not only as to thedate but as to the designated polling place.
We must agree with the dissentingopinion that even in highly urbanized areas, the dissemination of notices poses to bea problem. In the absence of proof
that actual notice of the special elections hasreached a great number of voters, we are constrained to consider the May 29elections as invalid. If only to
ascertain the will of the people and to prevent that willfrom being muted, it is necessary that a special election be held in view of the failureof elections in
Madalum, Lanao del Sur. the Court has ruled that the preconditions fordeclaring a failure of election are: (1) that no voting has been held in any precinct
orprecincts because of force majeure, violence or terrorism, and (2) that the votes notcast therein suffice to affect the results of the elections. The
concurrence of these two(2) circumstances are required to justify the calling of a special election. However,due to the insufficiency of the information the
court was constrained to ascertain thevotes to be counted thereof.

CASE NO.2. RICARDO "BOY" CANICOSA and SEVERINO LAJARA were candidates for mayor in Calamba, Laguna,
during the 8 May 1995 elections. After obtaining a majority of some 24,000 votes Lajara was proclaimed winner by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers. On 15 May 1995 Canicosa filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition

to Declare Failure of Election and to Declare Null and Void the Canvass and Proclamation because of alleged widespread
frauds and anomalies in casting and counting of votes, preparation of election returns, violence, threats, intimidation, vote
buying, unregistered voters voting, and delay in the delivery of election documents and paraphernalia from the precincts
to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer. Canicosa particularly averred that: (a) the names of the registered voters did not
appear in the list of voters in their precincts; (b) more than one-half of the legitimate registered voters were not able to
vote with strangers voting in their stead; (c) he was credited with less votes than he actually received; (d) control data of
the election returns was not filed up in some precincts; (e) ballot boxes brought to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer
were unsecured, i.e., without padlocks nor self-locking metal seals; and, (f) there was delay in the delivery of election
returns. But the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition on the ground that the allegations therein did not justify a
declaration of failure of election. (Ref. RICARDO "BOY" CANICOSA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL. G.R. No.
120318 December 5, 1997).
QUESTION: 1. Based on the allegations of Canicosa, would you agree that there was a failure of elections? Why?
Discuss the propriety of the grounds alleged by him.
Borja vs COMELEC [295 SCRA 157; GR 133495, September 3, 1998]
Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011
(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification, Succession Exception to the 3 term limit)
Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending
June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar
Borja. For the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11,
1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on
the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would
therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.
The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Capco
disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros but in the motion for reconsideration, majority overturned the
original decision.

Issue: WON Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor?

Held: No. Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that the term of office of elective local officials shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
This provision is restated in par. 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 71) which states that no local elective
official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected.
The term served must therefore be one for which [the official concerned] was elected. The purpose of this provision is to
prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not
serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such
official cannot be considered to have fully served the term not withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its
expiration.
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the
same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective
local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification
can apply

BORJA, JR. V. COMELEC

Action:
Determination of the scope of constitutional provision barring elective officials, with the exception of barangay officials,
from serving more than three consecutive terms.

FACTS:
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30,
1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For
the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11,
1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on
the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would
therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.
The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Capco
disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros but in the motion for reconsideration, majority overturned the
original decision.

ISSUE:
1.
w/n
Capco
has
served
for
2. w/n Capco can run again for Mayor in the next election

three

consecutive

terms

as

Mayor

HELD:
1. No. Capco was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of
law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased
mayor. A textual analysis supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, Sec. 8 contemplates service by local officials for
three consecutive full terms as a result of election. It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms
in an elective local officials, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification
can
apply.
2. Yes. Although he has already first served as mayor by succession, he has not actually served three full terms in all for
the purpose of applying the three-term limit. The three-term limit shall apply when these 2 conditions concur: (1) the local
official concerned has been elected three consecutive times; and (2) he has fully served three consecutive terms.

BENITO V. COMELEC G.R. NO. 134913 (JAN 19, 2001)

FACTS:
Benito and private respondent Pagayawan were 2 of 8 candidates vying for the position ofmunicipal mayor in Calanogas,
Lanao del Sur during the May 11, 1998 elections. 5 precinctsclustered in the Sultan Disimban Elementary School were
met with violence when some 30 armedmen appeared at the school premises and fired shots into the air. This sowed
panic among thevoters and elections officials, causing them to scatter in different directions. It happened beforenoon at
the day of election. A spot report reported the incident.Both parties are contending contrary facts. Petitioner alleged that
the voting never resumed evenafter the lawless elements left. On the other hand, private respondent alleged that voting
resumedwhen the armed men left around 1 pm in the afternoon. Petitioner is only asking, however, adeclaration of failure
of elections on the first three precincts, not with the entire five precincts. Duringthe counting, the ballots from the three
precincts were excluded. Nevertheless, the winner was theprivate respondent. And even if the votes from the three
excluded precincts were added, privaterespondent still emerged as the winner
Petitioner then filed a petition to declare failure of election and to call a special election. COMELEChowever denied the
petition and affirmed the proclamation.

HELD:
Petition
Dismissed.1. Two preconditions must exist before a failure of election may be declared: (1) no voting hasbeen
held in any precinct due to force majeure, violence or terrorism; and (2) the votes not casttherein are sufficient to affect the
results of the election. The cause of such failure may arise beforeor after the casting of votes or on the day of the
election.2. Whether there was a resumption of voting is essentially a question of fact. Such are not proper subjects
of
inquiry in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.3. Voting in all five precincts resumed after peace and order was reestablished in the DisimbanElementary School. There was no objection raised to the count of votes in the said two
precinctsduring the counting of votes at the counting center. So why a selective objection to the threeprecincts herein?
4. Petitioner equates failure of elections to the low percentage of votes cast vis--vis the number of registered voters in
the subject election precincts. However, there can be a failure of election in apolitical unit only if the will of the majority has
been defiled and cannot be ascertained. But if it canbe determined, it must be accorded respect. After all, there is no

provision in our election laws whichrequires that a majority of registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires
is that a winningcandidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual number of
ballotscast.5. The power to throw out or annul an election should be exercised with the utmost care andonly
under
circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt either that the disregard of the lawhad been so fundamental or so
persistent and continuous that it is impossible to distinguish whatvotes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any
certain result whatsoever, or that thegreat body of voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation and threats from
exercisingtheir franchise.

SAMBARANI V COMELEC, 438 SCRA 319G.R. No. 160427, September 15, 2004

FACTS:
A Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections were held on July 15, 2002 in Lanao del Sur.Sambarani,
Miraato, Abubacar, Mascara and Dayondong ran for re-election as punong barangay in their respectivebarangay, namely:
Occidental Linuk, Pindolonan Moriatao Sarip, Talub, New Lumbacaingudand Tatayawan South. The COMELEC
subsequently issued Resolution No. 5479 which sets the date for specialelections on August 13, 2002, due to failure of
elections in eleven barangays including the five barangaysmentioned. On August 14, 2002, Acting Election Officer Esmael
Maulay issued a certification that there were nospecial elections held on August 13,2002. The petitioners filed a joint
petition for holding of another special election. They also contend that the failure of election was due to the failure of
Maulay to followthe directive of Commissioner Sadain to use the ARMMs 2001 computerized voters list and
voters registration records. Since Maulay failed to file a written explanation, the COMELEC moved for the resolution
of the case. It directed the DILG to appoint Barangay Captains and Barangay Kagawads in the fivebarangays mentioned
in pursuance to RA 7160. The petitioners filed an instant petition to hold another specialelection which the COMELEC
subsequently denied on the ground that the 30-day period already lapsed.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its decision in denying the petition to hold another special election.
2. Whether the DILG can appoint barangay and SK officials as directed by the COMELEC.

HELD:

1. Yes. The COMELECs decision denying the petition for another special election is void. Section 6 of theOmnibus
Election Code which is the basis of the COMELECs denial of the petition is merely direc
tive and not mandatory. Section 45 also provides that in case of postponement or failure of election the COMELEC shall
set theelections within thirty days from the cessation of the causes for postponement. The elections may be held
anytimewithin the thirty day period from the time the cause of the postponement ceased.

2. No. The DILG cannot appoint barangay and SK officials due to Section 5 of the RA 9164 which provides for ahold over
period where an incumbent officer may remain in office until their successors have already been electedand qualified.
Therefore, the petitioners can assume office in a hold-over capacity pending the assumption of asuccessor into office.

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G.RECTO
and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN

FACTS:

Petitioners assailed the manner by which the simultaneous regular and special elections of 2001 were conductedby the
COMELEC. Petitioners contend that, if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election must bedistinguished in the

documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results. Thirteen senators wereproclaimed from the said election with
the 13th placer to serve that of the remaining term of Sen. Guingona, whovacated a seat in the senate. Petitioners sought
for the nullification of the special election and, consequently, thedeclaration of the 13 th elected senator.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Court had jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not the petition was moot.
3. Whether or not petioners had locus standi.
4. Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year TermSenatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001

RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction, Court had jurisdiction because what petitioners were questioning was the validity of the
special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected and not to determine Honasans right in the exercise of
his office as Senator proper under a quo warranto.On the issue of mootness, it was held that courts will decide a question
otherwise moot if it is capable of repetitionyet evading review. On the issue of locus standi, the court had relaxed the
requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage,
considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again. On the Validity of the Election, the Court held that
the May 14, 2001 Election was valid. The Court held that COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of the Time of the Special
Election as required under RA 6645, as amended, did Not Negate the Calling of such Election. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645
itself provides that incase of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously
with the next succeeding regular election.
The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELECs failure to give the additional notice did not negate the
calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.
Further, there was No Proof that COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of the Office to be Filled and the Manner of
Determining the Winner in the Special Election Misled Voters. IT could not be said that the voters were not informed since
there had been other accessible information resources. Finally, the Court held that unless there had been a patent
showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with the affairs and conduct of the Comelec.

The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite concerning only the proposal to lower the voting
age from 21 to 18. This was even before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then under revision) had been approved.
Arturo Tolentino then filed a motion to prohibit such plebiscite.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper.

HELD: Yes. If the advance plebiscite will be allowed, there will be an improper submission to the people. Such is not
allowed. The proposed amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for ratification. Election here is singular which meant that the entire constitution
must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the people were not given a proper frame of
reference in arriving at their decision because they had at the time no idea yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution
would ultimately be and therefore would be unable to assess the proposed amendment in the light of the entire document.
This is the Doctrine of Submission which means that all the proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be
presented to the people for the ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT piecemeal.

TOLENTINO v. COMELECGR 1488334 (01/21/04)Facts:

Pres. GMA, after her succession to the presidency in 2001, nominated Senator Guingona as Vice-President, thus, leaving
a vacancy in the Senate. The Senate passed Res. 84 calling on COMELEC to fillthe said vacancy through a special
election to be held SIMULTANEOUSLY with the regular electionson May the same year. 12 senators each with a 6-yr term
were to be elected. Res. 84 provided that the candidate with the 13th highest number of votes shall serve for the unexpired
term of former Sen.Guingona (3 years).

Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th in the polls. COMELEC issued Res. 01-005 provisionally proclaimingthe 12 senators (with
6-yr terms) and the 13th senator (for the unexpired term).
Petitioners (Tolentino and Mojica) filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC, enjoining themfrom the final
proclamation the 13th senator, and prayed for the nullification of Res. 01-005.

ISSUES:

1. Procedural:
WON petition is actually for quo warranto to be decided by the SenateElectoral tribunal (and not the SC)

2. On the merits: WON the special election was held validly:

a. WON Comelecs failure to give notice as to the time of the special election negate thecalling of said election
b. WON Comelecs failure to give notice of office to be filled and the manner of determining the winner misled voters
c.

WON separate canvassing and documentation for the special election was required

HELD:
1. No. The petitioner does not seek to determine Honasans right in the exercise of his office in the
Senate. What the petitioners allege is COMELECs failure to comply with certain requirements
pertaining to the conduct of the special election. Hence, the court has jurisdiction.

2. Yes. Special election was held validly. Hence, petition has no merit.
a. No. Sec. 2 of RA 6645 (which was passed to implement art 6, sec. 9 of the constitution),EXPRESSLY
PROVIDES that in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be heldsimultaneously with the
next succeeding regular election. In a special election, the rule is that if a statute expressly provides that an
election to fill the vacancy shall be held at the next regularelection, the statute FIXES the date, hence, the
election is NOT INVALIDATED by the fact that thebody charged by law with the duty (in this case, COMELEC)
failed to do so. (as opposed to if thelaw does not fix the time and place but empowers some authority to fix
those, the statutoryprovision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory and failure to do so will make
electionvoid) The law then charges the voters with knowledge of the statutory notice and COMELECs failure
to give additional notice does not negate the election.
b. No. The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice is whether
the lack of notice resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters. The petitioners were not able to prove
that COMELECs failure to give the notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the result
of the vote.
c.

No. No such requirements exist. What is mandatory under RA 6645 is for COMELEC to fix the date if
necessary and state the office/s to be voted for. The method adopted by COMELEC merely implemented RA
No.84 that the senatorial candidate garnering the 13 th highest number of votes shall serve only for the

unexpired term of former Sen. Guingona (an amendment introduced by Sen. Roco) WHEREFORE, we
DIMISS the petition for lack of merit. So ordered.
(Note however, that SC reminded COMELEC to comply strictly with all the requirements under applicable
laws relative to the conduct of elections)

Marquez vs COMELEC GR 112889 (April 18, 1995)

FACTS:
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the Province of Quezon filed a petition for certiorari praying for the reversal
of the COMELEC Resolution which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly
a fugitive from justice. It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge
against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the
Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by
said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged flight from
that country.
Petitioners subsequent recourse (in G.R. No. 105310) from the COMELECs May 8, 1992 resolution was dismissed
without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against private
respondent.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC for cancellation of respondents CoC on
account of the candidates disqualification under Sec. 40 (e) of the LGC.
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo
warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private respondent before the COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a
criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice
contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC and is, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible
from holding on to, an elective local office.
HELD:
Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide that a Fugitive from justice in criminal cases here and abroad are
disqualified from running for any elective local position. It has been held that construction placed upon law by the officials
in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp.
vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166,181). However, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely
be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must
remain congruent to it.
The confinement of the term fugitive from justice in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of
1991 to refer only to a person who has been convicted by final judgment is an inordinate and undue circumscription of
the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not private respondent is in fact a fugitive
from justice as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Courts opinion. The omission is
understandable since the COMELEC outrightly dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of
the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court, not being a trier of facts, is thus
constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.

MARQUEZ versus COMELEC (243 SCRA 538)

Facts:
Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon Province during the 1998 elections, filed a petition praying for the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification under section 40 of the Local
Government Code (Section 40. Disqualification. The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective
position (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.) Rodriguez is allegedly criminally
charged with insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property in the United States and that his arrest is yet to be served

because of his flight from the country. The COMELEC dismissed Marquezs Petition. Rodriguez was proclaimed the
Governor-elect of Quezon.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his COC is said to be facing criminal charges before a
foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice.

Held:
NO. Although it is provided in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991
that for a person to be considered a fugitive from justice, he or she has to be convicted by final judgment, but such
definition is an ordinate and under circumscription of the law. For the term fugitive from justice includes not only those who
after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition
truly finds support from jurisprudence, and it may be conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the
term.

EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC, BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR.G.R. No. 120099 July 24, 1996

FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr. (Rodriguez and Marquez, for brevity)
wereprotagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was
proclaimed duly-elected governor.
Marquez challenged Rodriguez' victory via petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC, alleging that the latter has a
pending casein LA, hence, a fugitive from justice and thus disqualified for the elective position.
Marquez Decision:
"fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise thosewho, after
being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (. . .), and it may be
soconceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term
In previous case, Whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" under the definition thus given was not passed
upon by theCourt. That task was to devolve on the COMELEC upon remand of the case to it, with the directive to proceed
therewith withdispatch conformably with the MARQUEZ Decision.
Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position of governor. This time, Marquez challenged
Rodriguez'candidacy via petition for disqualification before the COMELEC, based principally on the same allegation that
Rodriguez is a "fugitivefrom justice."
The COMELEC, allegedly having kept in mind the MARQUEZ Decision definition of "fugitive from justice", found
Rodriguez to be one.
At any rate, Rodriguez again emerge as the victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995 election for the position of governor.

Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez' proclamation which the COMELEC grantedIssue: Whether
petitioner is disqualified to the elective positionHeld: No
The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular
jurisdiction.And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the
fleeing subject of analready instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.

o There is no dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US, as per certifications issued by the Bureau
of Immigrations, preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court
To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice")
areinvolved in the MARQUEZ Decision and the instant petition. The MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal (the Marquez'
quo warrantopetition before the COMELEC). The instant petition is also an appeal although the COMELEC resolved the
latter jointly (Marquez'petition for the disqualification of Rodriguez). Therefore, what was irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule in theMARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant petition. And we specifically refer to the concept of
"fugitive from justice" as defined inthe main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision which highlights the significance of an
intent to evade but which Marquez and theCOMELEC, with their proposed expanded definition, seem to trivialize.
To re-define "fugitive from justice" would only foment instability in our jurisprudence when hardly has the ink dried in the
MARQUEZDecision.
To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for the disqualification or ineligibility of a person seeking to run
for anyelective local petition under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, should be understood according to the
definition given inthe MARQUEZ Decision

O A "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those
who,after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. (Emphasis ours.)
Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a
conviction or atleast, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight.

oNot being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province
gubernatorialpost

RODRIGUEZ vs COMELEC

FACTS:
Eduardo Rodriguez and Bienvenido Marquez were protagonist for the gubernatorialseat in the Province of Quezon. During the 1992 elections, Rodriguez
won which wasquestioned by Marquez through a quo warranto petition (EPC 92-28)
with the COMELEC. The protest cited Sec 40 (e) of the LCG as the basis of disqualification. Marquez revealed that a charge was filed against Rodriguez in
the US on 12 Nov 1985for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft. The petition was DISMISSED.Upon appeal to the Supreme
Court via certiorari (Marquez vs Rodriguez GR 112889) the court promulgated on 18 Apr 1995 the MARQUEZ decision effectively
defining the term fugitive from justice:
i n c l u d e s
n o t
o n l y
t h o s e
w h o
f l e e
a f t e r
c o n v i c t i o n
t o
a v o i d
p u n i s h m e n t
b u t
l i k e w i s e
t h o s e
w h o
a f t e r
b e i n g
c h a r g e d ,
f l e e
t o
a v o i d
prosecution. It REMAMDED the case to the COMELEC for its factual determinationWON Rodriguez was in fact a fugitive of justice. Motion for
Reconsideration filed byRodriguez and subsequently an Urgent Motion to Admit Additional Argument in supportof such motion was filed to which was

attached a certification from the Commission onImmigration showing that Rodriguez left the US on 25 Jun 1985 (prior the chargeagainst him was ever
filed).Pending the decision of the Supreme Court on the Motion for Reconsideration, duringthe 1995 elections wherein Rodriguez and Marquez renewed
their rivalry for the same position. Marquez this time challenged Rodroguez candidacy via a petition for disqualification (SPA
95-089) on the same grounds as EPC 92-28, this was filed on 11 April 1995.Subsequently the Motion for Reconsideration of Rodriguez regarding
GR 112889 wasDISMISSED. Thereby, the COMELEC promulgated a CONSOLIDATED Resolutiondated 7 May 1995 on EPC 92-28 and SPA95-089,
ruling in favor of Marquez OrderedRodriguez to immediately vacate his position and his certificate of candidacy was
setaside. At any rate Rodriguez emerged victorious in the 8 May 1995 elections and he wasproclaimed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers as Governor despite the suspensionfrom the COMELEC in relation to the consolidated resolution promulgated in 7 May1995.This order of
suspension of proclamation is the issue of this petition for certiorari

(GR120099) as filed by Rodriquez on 16 May 1995. The decision of the court with regard tothis petition DIRECTED COMELEC to receive and
evaluate evidence. After the proper proceeding COMELEC declared Rodriguez NOT a fugitive from justice, the
intent toevade is material to the definition of fugitive from justice in t
he Marquez Decision, such intent is ABSENT in Rodriguezs case evidence has established that Rodriquez
arrived in the Philippines long before the criminal charge was instituted in the US. But itfurther stated that it would be more comfortable if the Supreme Court
decided on thematter given the conflicting interpretations of the parties as to the definition provided inthe Marquez Decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, Roodriguez was a fugitive from justice as defined in the Marquez Decision, rendering him ineligible to run for office as
provided for in Sec 40 (e)of the LGC.

Rulings:
NO, the element of i n t e n t
t o
e v a d e not present in the case of Rodriguez, whichis a compelling factor in the Marquez
Decision definition, he cannot be held as a fugitivefrom justice.