Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v.

People (2004)
Facts: Petitioners driver was involved in an accident. He was found guilty and convicted of reckless
imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was also
sentenced to suffer imprisonment. He was also ordered to pay damages, and in the event of his insolvency,
the PRBL will be liable for the accuseds civil liabilities. The driver jumped bail and remained at large. Sec. 8,
Rule 124 of RoC authorizes the dismissal of the appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused filed a
notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. CA also affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in
behalf of the accused.
PRBL also filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court and then filed its brief. The OSG moved
to be excused from filing the Peoples brief (because OSGs authority to represent People is confined to
criminal cases on appeal) but his was denied. The respondent then filed this instant motion to dismiss. This
motion was granted by RTC, and the appeal was dismissed. CA affirmed the RTC decision. CA ruled that once
the civil liability of the employee is determined in the criminal case, the employers subsidiary civil liability
becomes conclusive and enforceable. Also, to allow an employer to dispute independently the civil liability
fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat the final
judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA, then the
judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final and executory. Included in the civil
liability of the accused was the employers subsidiary liability. Hence this petition for review under Rule 45.
The issue related to the topic is whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its
accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
Held: No. Petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case instituted against their employee. They have an
interest therein but this should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. They may assist their
employees but the employer cannot act independently on its own behalf.
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify
or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. To allow them to appeal the final criminal
conviction of their employee without the latters consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying
or defeating the judgment. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive
upon the employer not only with regard to the formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The
liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the
employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then
the formers subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable.
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a procedural remedy of
statutory origin, a remedy that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law
authorizing such exercise. The legal requirements must be strictly complied with.

Menchavez v. Bermudez (2012)

Facts: Menchavez and Bermudez entered into a loan agreement covering the amount of P500, 000 with
interest at 5% per month. Bermudez executed a promissory note. She then issued a check which she later
replaced with five postdated checks. Four of the checks were cleared and fully encashed while the fifth,
although dishonoured, was partially paid with a replacement check.
Menchavez allegedly entered into a verbal compromise agreement with Bermudez regarding the delay in
payment and the accumulated interest. Under the agreement, B will deliver 11 postdated Prudential Bank
checks as payment. When presented for payment, 8 of those checks were dishonoured.
Nine criminal informations were filed against B, each charging her with violation of BP22. In the MeTC, B
raised the defense of payment, and proved paying M P925, 000, or P425, 000 over the P500k loan. The MeTC
of Makati City acquitted her. Menchavez appealed to the RTC the civil aspect of the case. RTC partially granted
the appeal, and modified the decision of the MeTC: Bermudez should pay Menchavez P165, 000 as civil
liability with legal interest of 12%. RTC said that the P425k excess payment had not fully settled Bs
obligation. No evidence was presented as to the payment on the 8 checks covering the P190k in the
compromise agreement. P165k remained unpaid. The 5% monthly interest stipulated in the loan agreement
cannot be applied since there was no written agreement. 12% should be used.
Bermudez then appealed to the CA. CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. It said that the
compromise agreement could not be detached from and taken independently of the principal loan.
Menchavez brought the matter to SC.
Held: CA decision is affirmed. Petitioner attempts to exact payment on both the compromise agreement and
the original loan transaction. These are NOT separate and distinct. The purpose of the compromise agreement
was to extinguish the obligation under the loan.
The 5% monthly interest rate is excessive and iniquitous. Also, the statement of account already showed that
the original obligation of P500k has already been paid, and the P425k excess would be treated as interest
paid, even at the iniquitous rate of 60% per annum. M has been sufficiently compensated for the loan and the
interest earned, and cannot be allowed to further recover on an interest rate which is unconscionable. Since
the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as if there was no express contract on said interest rate. Courts
may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity demand.
(Note: In the case, nothing was mentioned about the topic Who may appeal.)

People v. Paradeza (2003)

Facts: On June 7, 2000, Romeo Paradeza was found guilty of raping Lailani Gayas (26 years old with a
mentality of a 7-year old child) by the RTC Zambales and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Paradeza filed his notice of appeal. On June 1, 2001 the Appellants Brief was filed, while the
Appellees Brief was filed on November 20. On December 10, 2001, the Court required appellant to file his
Reply Brief. However, the Public Attorneys Office (counsel of Paradeza) on April 3, 2002, filed a motion to
withdraw his appeal. In a resolution dated July 17, 2002, the Court required the OSG to comment on the
motion to withdraw. The OSG, seeking stiffer penalties, said that since both appellee and appellant already
filed their Briefs, under the ROC, the approval of appellants motion to withdraw his appeal is now a matter of
discretion on the part of the Court. The issue now is WON to grant appellants motion to withdraw appeal.
Held: YES. The withdrawal of an appeal is a matter of right before the filing of the appellees brief. After that,
withdrawal may be allowed in the discretion of the court. In the present case, appellants motion to withdraw
his appeal was made only after the OSG had filed the Appellees Brief. However, the Court had required
appellant to file his Reply Brief per its Resolution dated December 10, 2001. Thus accused-appellant had not
yet completed the process of filing briefs when he moved to withdraw his appeal, a situation which calls for a
more liberal rule.
The Court also took into account the fact that appellant is hardly literate functionally and of very low socioeconomic standing as a mere bangus fry catcher. In making his appeal, he is actually wagering his life as
against his sentence below, a point not often stressed to or understood by the convict.