Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts

2010, Vol. 4, No. 3, 136 143

2010 American Psychological Association

1931-3896/10/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0017379

Creativity as Flexible Cognitive Control

Darya L. Zabelina and Michael D. Robinson
North Dakota State University
Creative individuals have been described in terms suggestive of greater automatic processing (e.g.,
defocused attention, looser associations) and greater controlled processing (e.g., greater abilities to focus
while working on a creative task). Both views cannot be correct from a static ability-related perspective.
On the other hand, both views could be correct if creative individuals are better able to modulate the
functioning of their cognitive control system in a context-sensitive manner. The present study (N 50)
assessed individual differences in creativity in terms of original responses on the Torrance Test of
Creative Thinking (Torrance, 1974) and also in terms of creative behavior on the Creative Achievement
Questionnaire (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005). The same participants performed a colorword
Stroop task. Creative individuals were neither more nor less capable of overriding cognitive conflicts on
incongruent (relative to congruent) Stroop trials. On the other hand, creative individuals displayed more
flexible cognitive control, as defined by greater cognitive control modulation from trial to trial.
Implications for theories of creativity and its underlying processing basis are discussed.
Keywords: creativity, cognition, Stroop, automaticity, control

is more creative would utilize the cognitive control circuits of the

brain to transcend mundane overlearned associations (Miller &
Cohen, 2001).
On the basis of such theories and sources of data, should lower
or higher levels of cognitive control facilitate creative thinking and
behavior? We contend that there appears to be no easy answer to
this question. On the one hand, lower levels of cognitive control
may facilitate the sorts of associative processes long viewed as
important to creative thinking. On the other hand, individuals
prone to automatic processing are likely to perseverate in their
thinking, resulting in lower levels of creativity. In the present
study, we sought to inform such discrepant views of creativity by
attempting to link individual differences in Stroop costsa classic
measure of cognitive control ability (MacLeod, 1991)to creative
performance. Of more importance, we assessed individual differences in the flexibility of cognitive control, which we hypothesized
would be of greater predictive value in differentiating creative
versus noncreative individuals.

Although both automatic and controlled processes seem to characterize creative thinking in some uncertain combination, theories
of creativity tend to emphasize one or the other somewhat exclusively. Psychodynamic theories of creativity tout the value of
reliance on more primitive, primary-process thinking as a source of
creative insight and production (e.g., Kris, 1952). Gardner (1982)
has similarly suggested that creative thinking is childlike in nature
and presumably spontaneous and automatic for this reason. A
particular sort of theory of this type emphasizes the importance of
unfocused or defocused attention in facilitating creative performance (Eysenck, 1995; Kasof, 1997). Defocused attention would
necessarily be associated with low levels of cognitive control
according to contemporary theories of executive attention (Posner
& Rothbart, 2007; Rueda, Posner, & Rothbart, 2005).
Such automaticity views of creativity can be contrasted with
other theories emphasizing the importance of controlled processes.
Especially high levels of creativity seem to require some degree of
focused mental efforts (e.g., Groborz & Necka, 2003). Indeed, it
seems quite unlikely that any creative idea would result in creative
behaviors to the extent that there was no persistence in pursuing it
(Feist, 1999). In neurobiological terms, it is quite apparent that the
cognitive control capabilities of the human being, relative to other
animal species, permit far less reliance on rigid stimulusresponse
associations and far greater capacities for creative thinking (Fuster,
1995; Stuss & Knight, 2002). By extension, human cognition that

The Potential Importance of Flexible Control

Block and Blocks (2006) 30-year research program makes a
lucid distinction between individual differences in control versus
its flexible use. Their ego control construct differentiates individuals on the basis of whether they characteristicallythat is, somewhat invariantly express affect and impulse (undercontrol) versus inhibit such tendencies (overcontrol). Neither end of the
continuum would be especially conducive to creativity, but for
different reasons. Undercontrolled individuals would be spontaneous but lack the discipline for sustained creative efforts. On the
other hand, overcontrolled individuals would be persistent but lack
spontaneity (for findings supporting this trade-off, see Zabelina,
Robinson, & Anicha, 2007).
Block and Block (2006) contrasted ego control with ego resiliency. Resilient individuals are conceptualized as moderate in ego

Darya L. Zabelina and Michael D. Robinson, Department of Psychology, North Dakota State University.
Darya L. Zabelina acknowledges support from a National Science
Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Darya L.
Zabelina, Department of Psychology, North Dakota State University, Department 2765, P.O. Box 6050, Fargo, ND 58108-6050. E-mail: darya
.zabelina@ndsu
136

CREATIVITY AS FLEXIBLE COGNITIVE CONTROL

control rather than characteristically low or high along this dimension. The reason for this is that such individuals are seen to adjust
their control of affect and impulse to best suit the present context.
If the context favors spontaneity (e.g., while on vacation), such
individuals are thought to relax ego control. On the other hand, if
the context favors a greater degree of vigilance for inappropriate
responses (e.g., while on a job interview), such individuals are
thought to up-regulate their levels of ego control. Ego-resilient
individuals, then, are viewed as flexible in the use of ego control
resources.
Ego resiliency has not typically been assessed in cognitive
terms, and measures of creative originality and/or creative performance have rarely been administered in this research program
(Block & Block, 2006). Nonetheless, Letzring, Block, and Funder
(2005) report that ego-resilient individuals are viewed by acquaintances and clinicians as playful, imaginative, and possessing a
wide range of interests. Such correlates of ego resiliency suggest
that higher levels of flexible cognitive control may facilitate higher
levels of creative originality and behavior. In the present study, we
sought to assess flexibility in control in more objective cognitive
terms and hypothesized that higher levels of cognitive control
flexibility would be associated with higher levels of creativity. By
contrast, following Block and Block (2006) and the aforementioned considerations, we hypothesized that context-invariant levels of cognitive control would be inconsequential in predicting
individual differences in creativity.

Assessing Cognitive Control Abilities Versus Their

Flexible Use
Cognitive control is required in contexts in which automatically
activated thoughts are prone to error (Carter, Braver, Barch,
Botvinick, Noll, & Cohen, 1998; van Veen & Carter, 2006). The
most widely validated measure for assessing cognitive control is
the colorword Stroop task (MacLeod, 1991). Individuals are
asked to categorize the font color of presented words regardless of
the word in question. Because word reading is automatic (Neely,
1991), individuals tend to display robust Stroop interference costs
when font color and word meaning are incongruent (e.g., the word
red presented in a green font) relative to when they are congruent (e.g., the word red in a red font).
Greater Stroop interference costs (i.e., incongruent condition
minus congruent condition) have been observed among clinical
populations, such as among children high in attention deficit/
hyperactivity disorder (Barkley, 1997) or those exhibiting clinically significant antisocial behavioral tendencies (Morgan & Lilienfeld, 2000). On the basis of such findings, especially impulsive
individuals appear less capable of overriding cognitive conflicts in
the Stroop task (MacLeod, 1991). On the other hand, cognitive
control abilities as assessed by Stroop interference costs have
rarely predicted functional or dysfunctional outcomes among normal adult populations in zero-order terms (e.g., Lansbergen, van
Hell, & Kenemans, 2007; Robinson, Pearce, Engel, & Wonderlich,
2009). This is likely so because capacities for cognitive control are
present among all normal adult individuals (Rueda et al., 2005). If
so, the flexible recruitment of cognitive control is likely to be more
important than its absolute capacity in understanding individual
differences in outcome realms such as creativity (Robinson,
Schmeichel, & Inzlicht, 2009).

137

The importance of flexible cognitive control has recently been

emphasized by the cognitive neuroscience literature (e.g., van
Veen & Carter, 2006). For the brain to function in an ideal manner,
cognitive control resources should be recruited specifically in the
context of cognitive conflicts or error-prone processing tendencies
(Carter et al., 1998; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). By contrast, there is
no reason to enact processing in a controlled manner when automatic processing tendencies appear to be working, as doing so is
costly in multiple manners (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Lieberman,
2003), not the least of which may involve overly rigid, rule-bound
thinking and behavior (Block & Block, 2006).
Flexible cognitive control, as opposed to more static cognitive
control abilities, can be assessed in terms of trial-to-trial variations
in performance. In the context of the Stroop task, flexible cognitive
control is indicated to the extent that Stroop interference costs for
target trials are lower after previous trials that did (i.e., incongruent
prime trials) versus did not (i.e., congruent prime trials) require
cognitive control recruitment (Kerns, Cohen, MacDonald, Cho,
Stenger, & Carter, 2004). In other words, flexible cognitive control
is defined in terms of up- or down-regulating cognitive control
depending on whether its use was needed on the previous trial.
Gratton, Coles, and Donchin (1992) first established that individuals recruit cognitive control in such a dynamic trial-to-trial
manner. Subsequent studies have replicated this dynamic pattern
quite well (e.g., Liston, Matalon, Hare, Davidson, & Casey, 2006;
Wuhr, 2005). Moreover, flexible cognitive control performance
has been shown to be reliant on activation of regions of the brain
responsible for cognitive control, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Kerns, 2006; Kerns et al., 2004). Therefore, flexible
cognitive control can be viewed in terms of recruiting the cognitive
control resources of the brain in a context-specific manner deemed
to be most functional in general terms (Miller & Cohen, 2001; van
Veen & Carter, 2006).

Creativity as Flexible Cognitive Control

The purported benefits of automatic processing include its generative capacity (Dixon, 1981), as automatic processes are massively parallel and highly associative (Lieberman, 2003). The
purported benefits of controlled processing include greater freedom from overlearned stimulusresponse routines and the ability
to sustain processing in a goal-directed manner (Miller & Cohen,
2001). Creative individuals, we suggest, are those whose minds are
more capable of switching rapidly between these two processing
modes in a manner suited to the present processing context.
If so, individuals scoring higher in creativity should also score
higher in flexible cognitive control (see Vartanian, 2009, for a
related perspective). We examined this idea in the context of two
different measures of creativity, one involving original responses
on a version of the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking (TTCT;
Torrance, 1974) and the other involving a history of creative
achievements as assessed by the Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ; Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005). The TTTC is a
measure of creative potentiala latent trait underlying creative
behavior. The CAQ, on the other hand, is a measure of actual
creative achievementsocially useful and acceptable products
that is dependent on creative potential but quite a few other factors
as well (Eysenck, 1995; Ivcevic, 2009).

ZABELINA AND ROBINSON

138
Method
Participants and Procedures

Participants were 50 (26 female, 24 male) undergraduate student

volunteers from North Dakota State University seeking extra credit
for their psychology classes. They were primarily Caucasian in
race (90%), and their average age was 19.14 years. The study
was somewhat generically described as one involving drawing
pictures, both in relation to our Sona Systems participant registration system and in terms of the consent forms subsequently
administered. This was deemed best to emphasize the most salient
activity involved while avoiding mention that the study concerned
individual differences in creativity.
The laboratory consisted of a large central room for initial
instructions and six private adjoining rooms for data collection.
Thus, assessment sessions always involved fewer than 7 individuals. In their private cubicle rooms, participants first completed a
version of the TTCT (Torrance, 1974) and then the CAQ (Carson
et al., 2005); both are further described below. Finally, they
completed a colorword Stroop test administered by personal
computer. The activities were described as independent, and the
order of measures was held constant to facilitate the individual
difference comparisons of central interest to the study.

Measures
Abbreviated TTCT. The TTCT (Torrance, 1974) is arguably
the gold standard performance-based test for assessing individual
differences in creative originality (Kim, 2008). We used a shortened version of the TTCT, termed the ATTA, which displays
favorable psychometric properties and predictive validity among
adult populations (Goff & Torrance, 2002). The ATTA consists of
three activities, one involving verbal responses and two involving
figural responses (e.g., using incomplete figures to make pictures).
Individuals were given 3 min for each activity, originality was
scored according to the manual, and originality scores were averaged across activities (Goff & Torrance, 2002).1
The CAQ. Capacity for creative originality and its manifestation in creative performance can often be independent (Ivcevic,
2009). Thus, it was deemed important to assess individual differences in creative performance as well. We did so in terms of the
CAQ (Carson et al., 2005). Individuals were asked to characterize
their previous creative achievements in 10 artistic domains (architectural design, creative writing, culinary arts, dance, humor, inventions, music, scientific inquiry, theater and film, & visual arts).
For each domain, participants could indicate that they had made 0
achievements (I have no training or recognized talent in this
area) or had some training (e.g., scored as 1: I have taken lessons
in this area), with 6 other ascending levels of creative performance (e.g., scored as 7: My choreography has been recognized
by a national publication). To score creative achievement in a
general manner, we averaged scores across the 10 different domains involved. Carson et al. reported extensive evidence for the
reliability and validity of such total Creative Achievement scores.
Stroop task. Cognitive control and its flexibility were assessed in terms of a basic colorword Stroop task (MacLeod,
1991), which was programmed with E-prime software. Individuals
were asked to categorize the color of presented letter strings as

either green or red, using the 1 or 5 key, respectively, of a

response box. To create conditions of colorword congruence and
incongruence, we presented letter strings that involved either the
word green or red, randomly selected by the computer program. There were 140 consecutive trials in the task.
The background was black, ensuring high stimulus contrast. The
response mappings (1 green; 5 red) were continuously
displayed to reduce forgetting the mappings involved (Robinson,
2007a). Correct responses were followed by a 500-ms blank to
prepare for the next trial. Error responses, which were infrequent
(M 3.01%), were penalized by a 1,000-ms visual error message.
This procedure ensures a high degree of accuracy, thus rendering
reaction times as the focus of interest (Sanders, 1998). Reaction
times were positively skewed, and we therefore log-transformed
them before the analyses reported later. In addition, particularly
fast or slow responses can unduly influence response time means
(Ratcliff, 1993). For this reason, we replaced 2.5-SD outlier log
times with these 2.5-SD outlier scores (Robinson, 2007a).
To assess individual differences in both cognitive control and
flexible cognitive control, we coded trials in terms of whether they
involved congruent or incongruent targets (i.e., on Trial n) and
followed congruent or incongruent primes on the previous (i.e.,
n 1) trial. Log and millisecond means were then averaged as a
function of this 2 (prime congruence) 2 (target congruence)
within-participant design. Flexible cognitive control is defined in
terms of a smaller (or perhaps even reversed) target congruency
effect after incongruent primes and a larger target congruency
effect after congruent primes (Gratton et al., 1992; Kerns et al.,
2004).

Results
Descriptive Results
Descriptive results for the ATTA scores on originality in the
present study (M 5.54, SD 3.38) were similar to norms
reported by the test developers (Goff & Torrance, 2002). The same
was true for scores (M 12.65; SD 10.77) from the CAQ
measure of creative performance (Carson et al., 2005). The correlation between ATTA and CAQ scores was not significant, r
.14, p .30. The nonsignificance of this relation is consistent with
Runcos (2008) suggestion that creative potential (as assessed by
measures such as the ATTA) and creative behavior (as assessed by
1
Before scoring ATTA originality for the present study, Darya L.
Zabelina first achieved a very high level of agreement with example
responses from the ATTA manual. Sample protocols from a previous study
(Zabelina & Robinson, 2010) were sent to the test developers, and again a
very high level of agreement with the test developers was obtained (r
.93). Therefore, Zabelina scored creative originality, blind to the other
individual difference measures assessed. Fluency scores (i.e., the number
of pertinent responses generated) were also calculated for the ATTA.
Fluency and originality were uncorrelated, p .15, a result consistent with
their general independence in previous investigations (e.g., Kim, 2008).
Moreover, higher levels of fluency were not associated with cognitive
control, whether defined in terms of Stroop interference costs or in terms
of flexible cognitive control performance, Fs 1. Thus, our results
document a novel predictor of the originality of creative thinking independent of its fluency.

CREATIVITY AS FLEXIBLE COGNITIVE CONTROL

Normative Results From the Stroop Task

We used a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) to
assess normative trends in Stroop performance. As expected, there
was a main effect for target congruence, F(1, 49) 20.73, p .01,
partial 2 .29. Reaction times were faster for congruent (M
506 ms) relative to incongruent (M 530 ms) targets, a classic
Stroop interference effect. There was also a main effect for prime
congruence, F(1, 49) 11.18, p .01, partial 2 .11. Incongruent primes led to slower target performance (M 524 ms) than
did congruent primes (M 512 ms). Effects of this type are
thought to reflect a greater degree of caution following cognitive
conflicts or errors (Rabbitt, 1966; Robinson, 2007b).
Of most importance, however, was a significant Prime Congruence Target Congruence interaction, F(1, 49) 83.92, p .01,
partial 2 .62, indicating flexible cognitive control (Kerns,
2006). After congruent primes, there was a robust Stroop interference effect, as responses were slower for incongruent targets (M
547 ms) than for congruent targets (M 477 ms), F(1, 49)
87.65, p .01, partial 2 .63. After incongruent primes,
however, individuals were actually faster to respond when targets
were incongruent (M 512 ms) relative to congruent (M 535
ms), F(1, 49) 23.65, p .01, partial 2 .26. Thus, although
the Stroop target effect was robust in terms of the target main
effect, the more remarkable pattern was its elimination (and, in
fact, reversal, as in Kerns, 2006) following incongruent primes.
We hypothesized that this crossover patternindicating flexible
cognitive controlwould be particularly pronounced among creative relative to less creative individuals.

Relations Between ATTA Originality and Flexible

Cognitive Control
We conducted a general linear model (GLM) analysis to examine relations between ATTA originality and cognitive control
performance in the Stroop task. GLM analyses combine features of
ANOVA and regression and are capable of simultaneously modeling the influence of (a) within-participant variable designs of the
present type and (b) between-participants variables (e.g., originality) without dichotomizing them (Robinson, 2007a). Dimensional
variations in ATTA originality were z scored for this analysis
(Aiken & West, 1991), and the within-participant factors of prime
and target congruence were retained. Because normative results
from the GLMmain effects for prime and target congruence as
well as their interactionwere exactly as those reported earlier,
here we report only results involving originality on the ATTA.
In this GLM analysis, there was no main effect for originality on
the ATTA Originality measure, F 1. Thus, more creative individuals were neither faster nor slower in the task, regardless of
prime and target congruence factors. The ATTA Originality
Target Congruence interaction was nonsignificant, F 1. Thus,
more creative individuals were neither higher nor lower in Stroop

interference costs, regardless of priming factors. The ATTA Originality Prime Congruence interaction was also not significant,
F 1. Thus, the tendency to slow down after incongruent primes
was equally manifest among those low versus high in creative
originality.
We hypothesized that creative individuals would exhibit more
flexible cognitive control, a hypothesis initially supported by a
three-way ATTA Originality Prime Congruence Target Congruence interaction, F(2, 98) 4.21, p .05, partial 2 .08. To
understand the nature of the three-way interaction, we estimated
means for the Prime Target interaction as a function of low (1
SD) and high (1 SD) levels of originality on the ATTA, following
Aiken and West (1991). Because there were no main effects or
two-way interactions involving ATTA originality, and to simplify
the presentation of the results in a manner best contacting the
flexible cognitive control hypothesis, we computed difference
scores to reflect the effects of prime congruence (congruent prime
minus incongruent prime) for each target type separately considered. Such difference scores, as they vary by ATTA originality, are
reported in Figure 1.
As shown in Figure 1, both those low (1 SD) and high (1
SD) in ATTA originality displayed flexible cognitive control, but
such effects were clearly more pronounced at high levels of ATTA
originality. Follow-up analyses supported both points. A cognitive
control flexibility score was calculated such that it reflected the
prime target interaction: ((incongruent/congruent log mean
congruent/incongruent log mean) (congruent/congruent log
mean incongruent/incongruent log mean)). Simple slopes analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) were then performed, and they revealed that cognitive control flexibility was exhibited at both low
(1 SD, t[49] 5.06, p .01, 0.30) and high (1 SD, t[49]
7.93, p .01, 0.39) levels of ATTA originality. On the other
hand, ATTA originality was a significant and positive predictor of
such cognitive control flexibility scores, r(48) .29, p .05.
Thus, the results support the hypothesis that higher levels of
flexible cognitive control, but not cognitive control per se, predicts
greater creative originality. We sought to conceptually replicate
this result in terms of creative behaviors as assessed by the CAQ.

Priming Effects in Milliseconds

measures such as the CAQ) are dissociable. A history of creative

behaviors, for example, would likely be influenced to a greater
extent by developmental exposure to the arts and a history of
formal training. Conceptual replication across the two different
measures of creativity would thus be somewhat impressive, given
their diverse nature and likely different developmental roots.

139

60
40
20
0

Congruent
Targets

-20

Incongruent
Targets

-40
-60
-80
-100
Low Originality

High Originality

Figure 1. Prime (congruent [solid bars] minus incongruent [open bars])

effects for congruent and incongruent target stimuli as a function of
individual differences in originality on a shortened version of Torrance
Test of Creative Thinking.

ZABELINA AND ROBINSON

140
Relations Between CAQ Scores and Flexible
Cognitive Control

We conducted a second GLM analysis in which we used individual differences in CAQ scores to predict cognitive control
performance. CAQ scores did not predict faster speed in the Stroop
task, F 1, nor were the CAQ Target Congruence or CAQ
Prime Valence interactions significant, Fs 1. Of particular
importance, such results suggest that creative individuals are neither more no less capable of overriding Stroop conflicts than are
less creative individuals irrespective of the priming context.
On the other hand, and consistent with the results reported
earlier for ATTA originality, there was a significant three-way
CAQ Score Prime Congruence Target Congruence interaction, F(2, 98) 11.81, p .01, partial 2 .20. Estimated means
for the three-way interaction were calculated as described earlier,
and prime difference scores (congruent prime condition minus
incongruent prime condition) for each target type are reported in
Figure 2. Figure 2 again suggests that higher levels of cognitive
control flexibility were observed among more creative individuals.
Individual differences in cognitive control flexibility were then
quantified in terms of the Prime Congruence Target Congruence
interaction, and analyses parallel to those reported above were
performed. Significant cognitive control flexibility was exhibited
at both low (1 SD), t[49] 4.51, p .01, 0.25) and high
(1 SD, t[49] 9.39, p .01, 0.44) levels of creative
performance as assessed by the CAQ. On the other hand, CAQ
scores were a robust predictor of higher levels of cognitive control
flexibility, r(48) .44, p .01. The CAQ-based analyses thus
replicated results involving ATTA originality scores in all respects.

Discussion

Priming Effects in Milliseconds

The present study was the first that we know of to directly

examine whether creative individuals exhibit higher levels of
cognitive control, lower levels of cognitive control, or neither. We
examined this relationship in terms of individual differences in
Stroop interference costs (MacLeod, 1991). Individual differences
in creativity were not correlated with Stroop interference costs
independent of the previous priming context. This was true both
when creativity was defined in terms of a performance-based task

60
40
20
0

Congruent
Targets
Incongruent
Targets

-20
-40
-60
-80
-100
Low Creative
Achievement

High Creative
Achievement

Figure 2. Prime (congruent [solid bars] minus incongruent [open bars])

effects for congruent and incongruent target stimuli as a function of
individual differences in creative achievement on the Creative Achievement Questionnaire.

(i.e., the ATTA) and in terms of sustained and notable creative

achievements in the past (i.e., the CAQ).
Instead, and as hypothesized, creative individuals were better
characterized in terms of their higher levels of flexible cognitive
control. They, relative to less creative individuals, displayed
greater modulation of the cognitive control system across trials. To
be sure, similar tendencies were found in pattern (although not
magnitude) at low levels of creativity as well, a result that is
consistent with the idea that all human beings without brain
damage may share an ability to modulate functioning of the
cognitive control system (Miller & Cohen, 2001). Nonetheless,
individuals low in creativity evidenced this normative pattern to a
lesser extent. Thus, what the findings indicate is that highly creative individuals can be characterized in terms of unusually high
levels of cognitive control flexibility.

Flexible Cognitive Control and Creativity

Brainstorming, which facilitates creativity, involves letting go
of self-censure in the service of novel decision-making solutions
(Brown & Paulus, 2002). Intrinsic motivation, also linked to higher
levels of creativity, can be similarly characterized (Collins &
Amabile, 1999). The creativity theory of flow similarly contends
that creative performance may be facilitated when self-censure
drops out of awareness (Csikszentmihalyi, Abuhamdeh, & Nakamura, 2005). Finally, we (Zabelina & Robinson, 2010) have shown
that a playful, childlike mindset among adults facilitates creative
originality, presumably so because it encourages them to engage
with the creativity task in a spontaneous, automatic manner (Gardner, 2004).
Such theories and sources of data, we believe, capture something cognitively important to the creative process. When automatic processes are working, they should not be interrupted by the
self-critical controlled mind (e.g., Dijksterhuis, Bargh, &
Miedema, 2000). From this perspective, the creative individual is
one who is likely to recognize the value of automatic processing
tendencies that appear to be working. In turn, such individuals
are likely to benefit from automatic processes linked to higher
levels of creativity such as greater access to remote semantic
associates (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Baumann & Kuhl,
2002). It is for such reasons, we suggest, that creative individuals
in the present study demonstrated larger Stroop costs after congruent Stroop trials. They, more so than low creative individuals,
appeared to relax cognitive control when such resources are apparently not needed.
On the other hand, it is quite apparent that higher levels of
cognitive control, too, may be important to creative performance.
The prefrontal cortex, responsible for cognitive control operations,
facilitates flexible stimulusresponse behaviors (Miller & Cohen,
2001). Indeed, damage to the prefrontal cortex results in stereotyped stimulusresponse behaviors that are definitely not creative
(Duncan, Burgess, & Emslie, 1995; Luria, 1966; Shallice, 2002).
In personality-processing terms, cognitive control has been shown
to facilitate novel solutions that bypass entrenched stimulus
response habits (e.g., Ackerman, Schneider, & Wickens, 1984).
Finally, it appears that cognitive control, in the form of persistence
and resistance from distraction, may be necessary for sustained
creative performance (Feist, 1999).

CREATIVITY AS FLEXIBLE COGNITIVE CONTROL

The latter theories, we suggest, also capture something cognitively important to the creative process. When automatic processes
are not working, they should be interrupted (Baddeley, 1996;
Lieberman & Eisenberger, 2005) and overridden (Shallice, 2002)
in service of novel information-processing solutions. The flexible
use of cognitive control has been conceptualized in terms of
greater awareness of problematic processing tendencies and the
greater recruitment of cognitive control under such circumstances
(Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Miller &
Cohen, 2001). It is for such reasons, we suggest, that creative
individuals in the present study demonstrated smaller Stroop costs
after incongruent Stroop trials. In other words, they displayed
higher levels of cognitive control particularly when the context
suggested that the recruitment of cognitive control would be beneficial.
Our link of higher levels of creativity to flexible cognitive
control is novel. However, some precedents can be cited. Shirley
Brice Heath, a recipient of a MacArthur genius award, provided
a narrative account of her strategies for creative achievement in
response to a focused interview (Shekerjian, 1990). In facilitating
her creative potential, this eminent individual recommended minimal interventions when creative endeavors were progressing well
and willful attempts to disrupt processing strategies that did not
appear to be working. This narrative account appears quite consistent with our link of higher levels of creativity to the flexible
and context-specific use of controlled processing strategies.
Similarly, Kris (1952) viewed creativity in terms of regression
in the service of the ego. From this perspective, regression (presumably linked to automatic processing tendencies) can be functional if guided and directed by an ego sensitive to conditions
under which such regressive processes would be most functional.
More recently, Vartanian (2009) reviewed an impressive body of
evidence for the idea that creative individuals exhibit either greater
or lesser attentional focus, depending on whether the task favors
either greater or lesser attentional focus, respectively. The present
results can be viewed as consistent with this cognitive flexibility
theory, but in the context of a single task in which we were able to
assess both general and context-specific tendencies toward cognitive control.

Limitations, Additional Considerations, and Future

Research Directions
A potential limitation of the present study is its racial and
cultural homogeneity. At the same time, two points should be
made in favor of the likely generality of our results. First, there is
extensive evidence for the construct validity of one of our measuresATTA Originalityacross samples composed of different
races, socioeconomic backgrounds, cultural backgrounds, and indeed primary spoken languages (Cramond, 1993; Torrance, 1977).
Second, we assessed cognitive control tendencies that are tied to
basic brain mechanisms that are unlikely to vary by race or cultural
background (MacLeod, 1991; Miller & Cohen, 2001).
Our sample was also relatively homogeneous with respect to age
in that all tested individuals were of traditional college age. We
suggest that there is value to such a sample in that it effectively
controls for age-related influences in cognitive control (e.g.,
MacLeod, 1991). Even so, it is important to point out that our
results emphasized flexible cognitive control rather than absolute

141

levels of cognitive control, and we are not aware of any systematic

research on age differences in cognitive control flexibility. In any
case, we were interested in the predictive value of cognitive
control flexibility within an age group rather than differences
across age groups. Although we view it likely that the present
individual difference predictions would be found with younger and
older individuals too, this possibility remains to be examined.
We used the colorword Stroop task to assess cognitive control
and cognitive control flexibility. This is arguably one of the best
cognitive control measures, as it has a long history in cognitive
psychology and has been validated in numerous ways (MacLeod,
1991). Of perhaps more importance, response conflict tasks such
as the Stroop task must be used to examine the trial-to-trial
variations in cognitive control that we sought to assess (Kerns,
2006). This said, there are certainly other measures of cognitive
control that may be used in future studies of creative cognition.
This includes task-switching measures (Rogers & Monsell, 1995),
memory-updating measures (Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki,
& Howerter, 2000), and noncomputerized tasks such as the Delis
Kaplan Executive Function System (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer,
2001). Indeed, we are struck by the relative dearth of studies on
relations between cognitive control processes and creative cognition.
We did not assess individual differences in intelligence in our
investigation. It may have been useful to do so to demonstrate
discriminant validity. However, it should be mentioned that our
focus was on creative originality and creative behavior, which
merit more process-related analyses of the present type. In addition, relations between intelligence and creativity are potentially
complex and have been debated over time (Batey & Furnham,
2006). Finally, we suggest that intelligence itself is a heterogeneous construct from a cognitive control perspective (Friedman,
Miyake, Corley, DeFries, Hewitt, & Young, 2006). Thus, the value
of the present investigation was its demonstration of a specific
cognitive control functionnamely, flexible cognitive control
that appears to underlie individual differences in both creative
potential and behavior.
Replication of the present findings seems warranted, particularly
with respect to other measures of flexible cognitive control (Kerns,
2006). From a neurological perspective, electroencephalograph
and functional magnetic resonance imaging studies of creativity
have primarily examined the brain correlates of more versus less
creative responses in normative terms (e.g., Nagornova, 2007).
The present findings encourage the use of such technologies in
relation to individual differences in creativity, much as individual
differences in intelligence have been profitably modeled in brainprocessing terms (Duncan et al., 2000; Jensen, 2006).
Individual differences in flexible cognitive control are likely to
predict other functional outcomes aside from higher levels of
creativity. Indeed, we suggested that flexible cognitive control
may underlie individual differences in ego resiliency (Block &
Block, 2006), although we know of no studies directly supporting
this point. Studies of the present type are also needed in supporting
the purported benefits of flexible cognitive control (van Veen &
Carter, 2006). From a broader perspective, then, the present results
are important precisely because they link individual differences in
flexible cognitive control to their wider and more substantive
individual difference correlates and consequences.

ZABELINA AND ROBINSON

142
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Received June 14, 2009

Revision received August 11, 2009
Accepted August 11, 2009

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