MASTER OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

ASSIGNMENT:

CORPORATE FINANCE

Instructor

: DR. CAO MINH MAN

Students name : DAO KIM THANH

Student ID

: CGSVN00015828

Class

: MBAOUM0913 K10A

Course

: BMCF5103 Corporate Finance

HCMC, August 2014

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION: .......................................................................................................................... 3

I.
1.

Management and ownership ...................................................................................................... 3

2.

An overview of REE's businesses .................................................................................................. 3

3.

Office leasing business.................................................................................................................. 5

4.

M&E business ............................................................................................................................... 6

5.

Air conditioner manufacturing .................................................................................................... 7

6.

Investing is REE's new core competency...................................................................................... 8

II.

OUTLOOK ................................................................................................................................. 10

III.

SWOT analysis ........................................................................................................................... 19

IV.

FINANCIALS ............................................................................................................................. 21

1.

Good cash flow from office leasing and dividends....................................................................... 21

2.

Profits from investments drive earnings growth ......................................................................... 22

3.

2013 results review ......................................................................................................................... 24

4.

2014 forecasts .................................................................................................................................. 26

5.

Restatement of 1Q13 earnings depresses yoy performance for 1Q14 ....................................... 28

6.

Recent developments among investee companies ........................................................................ 29

7.

Volatile net margins ....................................................................................................................... 29

V.

VALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION .............................................................................. 29

VI.

REFERENCE: ............................................................................................................................ 32

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The company REE has been research for the critically and analyze about the finance of the
firm, risk or evaluate on investment recommendation also of this firm.
I. INTRODUCTION:
REE was founded in 1977 as an M&E (mechanical and engineering) contractor for building
projects. The company was privatized in 1993 and began manufacturing its "Reetech" brand
of air conditioners in 1999. In 2000, REE became one of the first two companies to list on
the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange, and is still usually among the top 10 most liquid
stocks in Vietnam.
In 2001, REE branched into property investment and construction with its grade B "Saigon
E-town", office building project. The cash flows from this project and its core businesses
funded a series of savvy investments in additional grade B offices, bank shares, and more
recently in utility and infrastructure companies.
1. Management and ownership
REEss CEO-cum-chairwoman Ms. Thanh and her family own 10% of the company and
she is known for her uncanny investing skills. Her move into grade B office buildings was
prescient, as this niche segment of the real estate market weathered the collapse of
Vietnams property bubble well, enabling her to realize a 67% gain on her investment in
Sacombank (STB:VN), and she bought Pha Lai Thermal Power (PPC:VN) just before the
stock doubled in 2013. Also, Ms. Thanhs excellent connections in Vietnam have
facilitated REEs purchase of meaningful stakes in small utility and coal-mining stocks
which generally have low free floats. In addition to having a strong domestic network, the
company also enjoys good access to foreign investors and corporations (which are likely to
invest in Vietnamss utilities at some point in the future), because 11% of the company is
owned by Dragon Capital, a sophisticated international fund which is listed on the London
stock market, and 18% of REE is owned by a subsidiary of Jardine Matheson (which has an
option to raise its stake to 20%).
2. An overview of REE's businesses
REEss M&E business still accounts for 59% of the group's revenue but its investments
contributed 64% of its net profit last year.

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M&E business: this segment focuses on installing the interior systems of a building,
including electrical wiring/control panels, air ducts, air conditioners, sprinklers, etc. About
of the cost of constructing a large office or apartment building comprises M&E expenditure.
Note that REE also does this type of contracting work for larger projects, including both the
Ho Chi Minh city (HCMC) and Hanoi airports. REE holds the dominant share of M&E
contracting work done on locally owned projects (when foreign firms such as those from
Korea or Japan construct a building, they often use foreign M&E contractors such as Kumho
E&C).
Reetech air conditioning: this manufacturing business was somewhat of a natural
outgrowth from its M&E business; REE now installs industrial air conditioners in buildings
that are either made by itself, or by its competitors such as Daikon, LG, Samsung and Funiki
(a local brand), etc. In addition to its industrial air conditioners, REE also sells air
conditioners for home use. Reetech air conditioners are priced at about 30% below
comparable products made by foreign manufacturers, and the brand has a market share
ofabout 7% in Vietnam (although it has a 17% market share in the south, with negligible
sales in the north).
The M&E and Reetech businesses can be considered REEss traditional "core businesses",
although we point out below that it also has a new core competency, i.e. investing the
companyss considerable annual cashflow. The M&E and Reetech businesses employ about
860 people.

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3. Office leasing business
REE owns six grade B offices with a total leasable area of 111k sq m. These buildings are
essentially fully occupied (~98% occupancy at present), in part because the average rent of
US$16-17/sq m/month is sufficiently low to ensure high occupancy rates (averaging 95% in
recent years). We estimate that REEss office buildings generate VND200bn-250bn free
cash flow a year for the company.
The buildings REE owns are located in both the CBD and peripheral areas of the CBD. The
E-town complex, which accounts for 76% of the companyss leasable office space, is
located the furthest away from downtown; it is located about 6km from the CBD, in the
vicinity of the HCMC airport. REEss most recent addition to its office building portfolio is
the Ree Tower building, located in up-and-coming District 4, about 5 minutess drives from
the CBD.

Most of the tenants of these buildings are local companies which aspire to have a more
Western office environment that meets global standards This is a stark contrast to typical
Vietnamese grade C and self-owned office buildings (such as Mobile World Group, a tenant
of the E-town building), the back offices of financial services companies (banks/insurance
companies) as well as the plain offices of second-tier foreign firms that cannot afford the
pricey downtown office spaces that are usually occupied by international banks like HSBC
or high-end consumer companies like LVMH.

REE purchased most of the land, on which its office buildings are located, in the 1990s at
low prices. For that reason, non-cash costs (i.e. depreciation) only comprise 23% of the
overheads for this business line, and REEss office rental business generates a net profit
margin of 47%. During 2009-2012, the office rental business generated the smallest fraction
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of REEss revenues, but made the largest contribution towards its profits (a windfall gain in
2013 boosted its profits from investments, which is discussed below).

This business has been very successful, when judged either by the cash flow it generates for
the company or by the high occupancy rates of its buildings. Thus, REE would like to
increase the number of office buildings that it owns and leases. Since it has exhausted its land
bank, REE would need to acquire new projects or enter into JVs with other companies to
accomplish this (which would reduce net margins, as property prices have risen significantly).
The grade B office building market
Grade B office buildings in Ho Chi Minh City, and REEss office building in particular,
have only been moderately affected by the deflation of Vietnams real estate bubble, which
peaked in 2010. Grade B office rents have remained in a stable range of US$16-19/sq
m/month despite a surge in supply. At the peak of the bubble, grade B rentals were as high as
US$25. In contrast, grade A rents soared as high as US$80 at the peak of the bubble before
crashing to about US$35 at present (typical grade A rents around the bubble period were
probably closer to US$65, but a few transactions took place at prices as high as US$80).
The main impact of the crash in upper-end real estate prices (but not in rents for grade B
offices) for REE has been the reduction of construction activity, which had in turn dampened
the demand for the companys M&E contracting business (which is described in the next
section) - although the slowdown in office and apartment building construction was offset to
some extent by large government projects, such as the Hanoi Airport.
4. M&E business
M&E is still REEss core business, and still makes up about 59% of its revenues, up from
33% in 2009, thanks to some large-scale government projects. REEss reputation in this
field has been built up over 30 years, although it now faces growing competition from foreign
players such as Kumho and Kinden. REE still has a strong share of the market for buildings
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constructed by local general contractors, such as Vinaconex (VCG:VN) and Hoa Binh
Construction (HBC:VN), but foreign M&E sub-contractors are increasingly gaining an edge
for larger building projects undertaken by firms like Bouygues and Kumho. The weak real
estate market impeded revenue growth, given the tepid demand for construction
contractorss services. REE achieved just 62% of its target for new contracts signed in FY13
and net margins have deteriorated from 13% in FY09 to 8% in FY13 due to the weak real
estate market and increased foreign competition. For this reason, net profit grew at a CAGR of
25% over 2009-2013 vs. a CAGR of 37% for revenue

That said, REE has a reasonable pipeline of large, government-related projects, for which it
faces minimal competition, and it has recently entered the Myanmar market by signing an
M&E contract with HAG (HAG:VN) which has a large real estate development project in
downtown Rangoon. REE currently has a VND4,100bn backlog, which is equal to almost 2.5
years of M&E revenue. A typical project takes 1-2 years to complete and in theory, revenues
are booked on a percentage-completion basis - though we understand that REE takes a
conservative approach and tends to book a disproportionate amount of the costs upfront. For
that reason, profits get a modest boost when large M&E projects are completed. Clients
typically pay about of the contract cost upfront when the contract is signed, which can help
mitigate risk. However, some of these large scale projects have an element of currency risk if
the client requires imported M&E equipment, or if REE is paid in a foreign currency for its
services (especially for its more recent Japanese ODA-sponsored airport terminal project,
where REE is paid in JPY)
5. Air conditioner manufacturing
REEss Reetech air conditioners are a mass-market product that competes on price - being
priced about 30% below its competitorss products. The company holds a share of about 7%
of the nations air conditioner market and a share of about 17% in the south (REE does not
have a significant presence in the northern market).
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In recent years, Reetech has faced strong competition from international brands, such as
Panasonic, LG and Samsung. This pushed down the net margins of this business from 6% in
FY09 to 4% in FY13, and reduced this segmentss contribution to overall revenues from
40% in 2009 to 22% in 2013 - given the anemic revenue CAGR of 3% over that period (and
virtually flat profit growth).

REE has recently set up a joint venture with Fujitsu to distribute its Generals brand of air
conditioners, which we believe will enable the former to diversify its product portfolio and
compete with international players in Vietnam. As general brand air conditioners are priced
about 15% higher than REEss products, the distribution of these products, which we
estimate generate net margins of 8% for REE, will allow the firm to address a higher pricepoint niche of the market
6. Investing is REE's new core competency
REEss core business and its portfolio of office buildings generate about VND400bnVND500bn in annual cash flow. We understand that REE plans to invest a portion of that
free cash flow in listed and unlisted shares as part of its new core business (REE pays out
about 76% of its free cash flow in the form of dividends to common stock holders). REEss
~VND4, 000bn (US$190m) investment portfolio represents just over half
of the companys total assets. Investments in electricity generators accounted for 69% of
REEss investment portfolio, followed by water (14%), real estate (9%) and coal (5%).
About 60% of its investment portfolio is in listed companies and 40% in unlisted ones.

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The company currently holds 25 investments, including six power companies, three coalmining companies, five water utilities and 11 other companies. It now holds board seats in
PPC, TMP, TBC, NBP, TDW, BOO Thu Duc, Saigon Clean Water Investment, Vietnam
Infrastructure Investment & Development. REE increased its investments in utilities and
coal-mining companies from 46% of its portfolio in 2010 to 74% in 2013. REE is betting on
the liberalization of the electricity (see section 2.1) and coal (see section 2.2) industries. This
year, the company is continuing to gradually ramp up its holdings of utility and coal-mining
stocks, albeit at a slower pace, as the prices of such stocks have increased (thanks in part to
REE itself). REE also seems to favor high-dividend yielding stocks, with high payout ratios,
thereby giving the company more cash to invest and pay dividends to its own shareholders.
Profits from REEss investments (including dividend income and REEss share of profits
from its associates) have been a key driver of the Company overall net profit. In FY13, the
profit derived from these investments accounted for 64% of the companys net profit, up
from 34% in 2009. The contribution from investments towards REEss overall net profit is
poised to rise as its investment portfolio expands going forward - the size of REEss
Investment portfolio grew 46% in 2013 as shown in Figure 17. However, the performance
of REEss investments also seems to have improved. The companys (realized net profit
from investments /investment portfolio value) rose from 3% in 2010 to 16% in 2013, which is
also shown in Figure 17.

The company has an excellent track record of making savvy investments. REE purchased
Sacombank (STB:VN) shares and sold them for a 67% gain in 2010, right before the central
bank started to clamp down on the activities of banks in Vietnam. It also bought Phai Lai

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Thermal (PPC:VN) in 2012, right before PPCss share price doubled, thanks to the rising
optimism over electricity price liberalization in Vietnam and PPCss large yendenominated debts which benefited from a weakening yen. That increase in PPCss share
price played a huge role in REEss share price increasing by 78% in 2013. This track record
makes us confident that REE (under Ms. Thanh's watch) will time its exit of its current
investments and take decisive action when it is time to sell. About 1/3 of REEss investment
portfolio comprised bank shares in 2011, but this figure fell to nearly zero by 2012 - when the
"writing was on the wall" in the wake of the credit boom of 2005-2010 and hence, fuelling the
argument that it was time to get out of banks.

II. OUTLOOK
1. Electricity price deregulation
About 69% of REEss investment portfolio comprises investments in power generators
which look set to benefit from the deregulation of electricity prices that should lead to an
annual increase of circa 10% in electricity prices for the next 5-6 years. Vietnam's electricity
prices are currently subsidized by EVN and are the lowest in the region. Retail electricity
prices were more than 60% below those in the rest of the region in 2009. Seven electricity
price increases since 2009 have closed the gap somewhat but prices in Vietnam are still about
50% below those in the rest of ASEAN (we calculated the 50%s figure by weighting the
electricity prices in the table below with the GDP of each ASEAN country).

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Vietnamss price subsidies to e nd-consumers have generated VND 20tr(~$US1bn) of

accumulated losses for EVN. The seven electricity price hikes since 2009 described above
increased retail prices by 63% (or 10% CAGR over2008-2013), which stopped the flow of red
ink at EVN, but the company is far from being reasonably profitable. In 2012, EVNss all-in
costs, including generating/ purchasing electricity and the cost of maintaining the grid, came
toVND1,322/kwh while its average selling price to retail customers was VND1,364/kwh. For
2014, EVN targets an ROE of only 1%.To help EVN bolster its profitability, the government
approved a further 21% of price hikes, in three increments, which will raise the retail electricity
price toVND1,835/kwh (8.7 US cents) by 2015. However, part of these price hikes will go
towards addressing another dysfunctional aspect of the power industry in Vietnam the
subsidy system goes beyond retail electricity prices. Currently, the independent power
producers are being paid 5 US cents/kwh vs.8 US cents/kwh in Thailand, where hydro power
companies are paid only about 3 US cents/kwh. The retail electricity price is set to increase at a
maximum growth rate of 22% by 2015.
In Jul 2013, Vietnamss 2004 electricity law was amended to reaffirm a longstanding(but
sluggishly implemented) plan to create a competitive electricity market in Vietnam. Electricity
prices are being liberalized in Vietnam for two reasons:
a. The increase in Vietnamss electricity capacity has not kept pace within creasing
demand, no thanks in part to EVNss lack of focus on its core electricity business in
recent years and the dysfunctions (outlined above) that have discouraged private sector
investment.
b. Vietnams SOE coal and natural gas monopolies are coerced to sell to coal- and gasbased electricity generators at below-market prices but these subsidies will need to be
eliminated within the next few years because Vietnam is set to become an importer of
gas and coal which necessitates the application of market prices. These two
exogenous factors give us confidence in the continued reforms for Vietnamss power
industry the government simply cannot put off reforming the system much longer.
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Also, EVNss stature in Vietnam has declined and we do not believe that it has the
ability to block market reforms any longer.
Demand growing 14-15% per year Vietnams electricity demand is growing at about
14-15% a year. The current system requires about US$5bn of investment a year just to
keep pace with demand, which means about another 5,000MW of capacity a year lest
the problem of brownouts becomes worse, which would reduce Vietnams
competitiveness as a low-cost production base. For example, one reason cited for
Vietnams fall from the 90th position to the 99th position in the World Banks most
recent Doing Businesss survey was the availability of electricity.
Vietnams government does not have US$5bn a year to spend on electricity, especially
at a time when physical infrastructure spending is being ramped up (roads, bridges,
ports, etc.) and Vietnams banking system is being cleaned up (the government has
repeatedly said it does not want to spend public money to bail out the banks but we
think that some public money will be needed to recapitalize some of the banks).
Reforms needed to eliminate cross-subsidy system
We mentioned above that Vietnam will need to start importing natural gas and coal
within the next 2-3 years. We think that it is very unlikely that the government will be
able to compel the SOE gas and coal companies to sell to the gas- and coal-based
generators at below-market prices when the former starts to import these commodities
at global prices. Also, it should be noted that for whatever reasons, these two SOEs
have relatively more political power in Vietnam relative to EVN, making it even less
likely for the current cross-subsidy system to survive. We also believe that the
government will not be able to eliminate the cross-subsidies from the natural gas and
coal SOEs to the power generators without also reducing the cross-subsidization of coal
and gas electricity generators by the hydropower generators. This means that the PPAs
for hydropower companies look set to rise. Timetable of industry reforms the
transformation of Vietnams electricity market into a transparent, competitive market is
set to take place in three phases:
i.

Phase 1: Competitive generation market (2011-2014)

Competition happens in the generation of electricity but there is only a single

wholesaler (i.e. EVN is still the single buyer from the power generators). A fraction of
power generators output (~20%) can be sold to EVN via a particular bidding
mechanism.
ii.

Phase 2: Competitive wholesale market (2015-2021)

Competition happens in electricity generation and in electricity wholesaling. There will

be multiple wholesalers (multiple buyers) that will bid for electricity from the

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generators. The wholesaler will also compete to supply the electricity to
distributors/transporters.

2015-2016: pilot wholesale market

2017-2021: wholesale competitive market

iii.

Phase 3: Competitive retail market (2020 onwards)

Competition happens in electricity generation, wholesaling and retailing, meaning that

end-users will be able to select their electricity provider. The retailers will compete for
the electricity offered by the wholesalers by paying market prices.

2022-2023: pilot retail market

2024 onwards: competitive retail market

2. Coal price deregulation

Vietnams government is eliminating the subsidies in the coal industry which caused
Vinacomin, the (unlisted) SOE coal miner to lose well over US$300m in 2012 because it sold
coal to power producers at below-cost. Some of those losses incurred by Vinacomin were
mitigated by the fact that it also buys some of its coal from the listed coal companies at belowmarket prices.
One by-product of this cross-subsidization is a lack of transparency on the exact prices that are
being paid to the listed coal companies, the prices that are charged to the electricity generators
and the exact amount of losses that this arrangement generates. Vinacomin is in the midst of
restructuring, which is set to run until 2015. The three main thrusts of that restructuring are:
a. an elimination of price subsidies,
b. the disposal of non-core investments, and
c. An increase in industry-wide productivity by increasing mechanization.
The first leg of the programmed is well underway coal prices to Electricity Vietnam (EVN),
the SOE electricity distribution monopoly, and its subsidiaries have been raised steadily, in
tandem with rising electricity prices. The coal price has jumped from below the cost-ofextracting-coal-from-the-ground to the production-breakeven level with the latest price hike,
which is part of the seven hikes since Mar 2010.

Also, note that coal export tariffs were lowered from 20% to 10% in 2012. The tariff cut was
somewhat controversial because the government derives a significant portion of its revenues
from export tariffs and the budget deficit is already 6% of GDP YTD. However, Vinacomin
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was able to convince the government to reduce tariffs by citing the lower tariff rates for other
coal-exporting countries, including 0% in Indonesia and Australia, 5% in Russia, 7% in
Mongolia and 10% in China.
Regarding the third component of Vinacomins restructuring plan, the government wants the
industry to increase the amount of coal it extracts every year from 47m tones in 2010 to 55m
tones by 2015, but that increase in productivity will require about US$2bn of investments in
new machinery and equipment.
Listed coal companies set to benefit the listed coal companies that REE has invested in are all
subsidiaries of Vinacomin and they are essentially contract miners which are paid a profit
margin on top of their costs of extracting coal. These listed coal miners differ from proper
contract miners, i.e. each of these listed companies has a specific, designated coal mine which
it extracts coal from (these companies do not bid on mining contracts for other mines), and its
profitability is solely determined by Vinacomin.
Up until now, Vinacomin has only allowed such contract miners to earn scant operating
margins of circa 5% vs. 10%, which a typical contract coal miner would earn in Indonesia for
example. That said, the listed Vietnamese coal miners generally post high ROEs as the backing
of their SOE parent allows them to lever up the average gearing ratio in the sector is 2.0
times.
By investing in these stocks, REE hopes that the increased profitability of Vinacomin will
enable it to pay higher margins to its coal-mining subsidiaries. The increased profitability of
Vinacomin should be facilitated by the fact that 60% of Vinacomins coal is sold to the
electricity industry, and the uptrend in electricity prices which will in turn allow electricity
companies to pay higher prices for coal.
3. Outlook for water business
About 14% of REEss investment portfolio comprises investments in water utilities, including
water supply and treatment facilities located in the greater Ho Chi Minh city (HCMC) area. The
prospects for water utilities in HCMC are favorable due to rising consumption, rising prices,
ample room to increase efficiency, and the fact that less than 90% of HCMCss households
have access to clean water thus, the further expansion of the current system is inevitable.
In order to cope with the rising demand, HCMCss government is investing in projects to
increase the system's daily capacity from 1.5m cubic meters in 2010 to 2.4m cubic meters in
2015 and 3.2m cubic meters in 2025. To facilitate this investment, water prices rose at the
annual rate of 10% over 2010-2013. Sawaco, HCMCs (unlisted) SOE water utility, has
proposed to further increase the water tariff from VND5,300/cubic meter in 2013 to
VND9,400/cubic meter in 2018, representing a 12% CAGR.

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The tariff increases in the figure above will enable Sawaco to undertake the major projects
listed below (REEss investments in this sector are primarily in the listed subsidiaries of
Sawaco, which should benefit from large-scale water-infrastructure projects.)

In addition to capacity expansion, the industry has ample room to increase revenues by
improving efficiency. At present, the water loss rate of the system stands at 34% vs. the
average of 24% which would be more typical in other major Asian cities in Thailand, Indonesia
and the Philippines
The attractiveness of Ho Chi Minhs water industry is evidenced by the investments it has
drawn from the Philippines conglomerate, Ayala. Its Manila Water has invested in BOO Thu
Duc (an associate of REE) and Kenh Dong Water indirectly via an investment in Saigon
Water (SII:VN), a listed company which focuses on water projects. In addition, Ayala has also
invested in Hochiminh City Infrastructure Investment Company (CII: VN), a listed company
which focuses on infrastructure projects.
4. Outlook for office leasing business
The outlook for REEs office leasing business hinges on:
a. The prospects for rents and occupancy for grade B office buildings
b. REEs ability to add more buildings to its property investment portfolio, now that its
own land bank has been exhausted.
This second topic will be discussed in more detail in the next section, but we felt compelled to
highlight in advance that REE aims to increase its leasable office space by 30k-50k sq m every
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two years (it takes about two years to construct a new office building, including the time taken
to complete all the necessary paperwork and approvals). REE increased its leasable office space
from 66k sqm in 2007 to 109k sq m at present, with the addition of three office buildings
during that time. REEs grade B buildings
A brief discussion on the favorable prospects in the grade B office market is inevitable, but
before delving into that it is worth mentioning that within the grade B segment, REE has carved
out a niche for itself for offering affordable, high-quality products to its tenants products that
come with reliable maintenance and decent (although not luxurious) interior building systems.
The latter is obviously facilitated by the fact that REE does the M&E work itself. REEs nofrills properties are located outside the CBD, but they are of a high enough caliber that we
would call them grade B+. In contrast, many grade B office building projects in Saigon were
constructed in haste, during the property bubble of 2005-2010, by inexperienced developers
such as Gemedept, a port company, and VFC, a fertilizer maker. We have gathered favorable
feedback from the tenants of these two buildings, but many grade B buildings that were
constructed during the bubble are managed by inexperienced landlords or show overt signs of
cost-cutting. That makes them unsuitable for the wave of foreign companies which are now
flooding into Vietnam, or for meeting the demands of aspiring Vietnamese companies that want
to project a more professional image. Also, while we mentioned the examples of two local
companies (Gemedept and VFC) that managed to construct reasonable-quality grade B office
buildings on land that they owned for legacy reasons, both of these buildings were the only
major real estate developments of these two companies. REE is the only developer which has
built enough grade B office buildings to give it proper brand recognition in the segment,
enabling it to attract foreign companies such as Nestle, DKSH and Daichi that are now opening
rep offices in Vietnam.
The prospects for grade B offices in HCMC During Vietnams property bubble from 20052010, there was a massive overbuilding of both luxury apartments (US$1,800/sq m) and grade
A office buildings (US$60-70 / sq m / month). The vacancy rates for grade A offices soared as
such

new

buildings

came

on

to

the

market.

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However, unlike the situation in the luxury condominium market, where owners/speculators
have been very reluctant to slash prices in order to move their inventory; as many of the office
building projects were funded by bank loans, landlords slashed rents to attract tenants. Some
players that held out, such as Bitexco (the owner of the iconic Bitexco Financial Tower),
eventually capitulated around 2010 and saw their occupancy rates soar after cutting rents.
We understand that Vincom (VIC:VN) also offered aggressive leasing deals to tenants, though
16% of the office space of its HCMC flagship office building is still vacant. Plunging grade A
rents compelled tenants that previously occupied grade B and grade C buildings to upgrade to
the new premises the examples of this phenomenon that we are most acutely aware of are in
our own industry of securities brokerage. VN Direct (CIMBss local partner in Vietnam),
Maybank Kim Eng, VietCapital Securities, HSC, VP Bank Securities and a few other firms
have all upgraded to more luxurious digs, because of the steep fall in rents. This migration from
mid-range buildings to upper-end buildings also prompted increasing interest in mid-range
office space from companies that previously occupied lower rated premises (note that this
section is about the general demand for grade B office space REEs buildings are sufficiently
attractive that they did not experience a significant migration of its tenants into higher-spec
buildings).
At the same time that lower-end tenants have been upgrading to grade B buildings, a wave of
foreign companies that want to rent mid-range offices is now coming to Vietnam. Two pieces
of statistical data on the latter from commercial real estate broker CBRE have been making the
rounds recently:
a. over half of the demand by CBREs customers for grade B offices comes from foreign
clients, and
b. about 60% of CBREs foreign clients target rents below US$20/sq m. The first statistic
is not so surprising, given that CBRE is an international firm, so it is an obvious first
port of call for foreign companies looking to set up a rep office in Vietnam.

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The second statistic, that CBREss foreign clients are looking for offices with rents below
US$20/sq m, points to a growing number of western firms that want to hawk more mundane
products in Vietnams huge market (such as industrial vacuum cleaners and photocopiers). Past
rentals of grade A office space were dominated by financial services companies (Citibank,
Prudential Insurance, airlines and upscale consumer products such as LVMH, Kirin, etc).
5. Future office building projects
The outlook for REEss office leasing business depends on the general market conditions for its
grade B office buildings, which we believe are favorable (as discussed earlier), and in its ability
to add new buildings to its portfolio now that it has exhausted its land bank. We understand that
the company is pursuing a few different angles to add more buildings to its portfolio.
The next likely addition will be an office building with about 30,000 sq m of leasable office
space in up-and-coming District 4, where its most recent office building, Ree Tower, is located
(this has been a highly successful project). Progress on the new District 4 development, which
would increase REEs leasable office space by about 30%, has been somewhat complicated by
the fact that REE is partnering with another local company that owns the land which the office
building will be constructed on. This made the process of obtaining all the relevant zoning
approvals more complicated.
The market consensus is that the new District 4 building will take about two years to construct
and will go into operations around 2016-2017. However, we have not factored this building
into our modeling until there is more clarity, given the notoriously complicated land clearance
and zoning approval processes in Vietnam. Ideally, we would like to see construction actually
commencing, which could happen in early 2015, before baking the cash flows from this new
building into our forecasts.
Finally, we understand that REE is also searching for other potential locations to build other
new grade B office buildings on including the Binh Tan district that is also on the periphery
of the CBD (circa 10 minutess drive). Here again, the companys strong network should help it
acquire good plots of land and/or establish partnerships with local companies that own land for
legacy reasons but do not have the capability to develop their land into high-quality office
buildings.
6. Outlook for core businesses: M&E and Reetech
REE has a 2-year pipeline of M&E work (the depth of that pipeline is linked to the construction
time of the individual projects that the M&E work is being carried out on). We expect this
segment to grow its revenues 12% annually over the next four years, with profits growing 15%
each year. Profits should keep pace with revenues, despite increasing competition from foreign
M&E competitors as REE has a defendable market position when tendering for projects in
which a Vietnamese construction company is the general contractor.

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This is partly due to the fact that REE is able to deliver such work at about 5-15% cheaper than
foreign firms such as Kumho. Revenue growth should be supported by a moderate rebound in
construction activity. Market observers such as BMI, EMI and the commercial real estate
brokers expect construction activity in Vietnam to grow at a CAGR of anywhere between 6%
and 10% over the next four years, given the rebound in the real estate market and the pick-up in
infrastructure construction. Given REEs expertise and connections, we believe that it can grow
its M&E revenues faster than the pace of overall construction activity growth in Vietnam.

As for the air conditioning business, the outlook for revenue growth in this segment is subdued
for 2014, but buoyant for 2015. That is because consumer air conditioner sales typically lag
sentiment in the real estate market by about one year, with the real estate market bottoming in
2013. The longer-term outlook is modestly supported by REEss agreement to sell Fujitsuss
Generals brand air conditioners in Vietnam, although we estimate that the margin for this
particular business is only around 8%.
III. SWOT analysis

1. REE's earnings and share price linked to associates

In 2013, 64% of REEs profits were derived from its share of profits in associates and from
dividends in long-term investments. One associate, PPC contributed 45% of REEs profits last
year owing to some specific circumstances that are outlined in section 4.3. In short, REE
purchased PPC shares at below book-value and then the book-value of the shares subsequently
soared following the yen sharp depreciation.
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An increasing share of REEs profits is being generated by its investments in listed/unlisted
companies, but the windfall profit the PPC investment generated in 2013 caused the
contribution of investment portfolio income to the groups net earnings to soar from 50% in
2012 to 64% in 2013. These windfall gains were of course welcome, but they also illustrate that
REE's reliance on investment income could lead to a higher level of volatility for its overall
earnings in the future (especially if REE were to suffer losses on any of its investments).
Furthermore, the fact that over half of REEs assets comprises investments in listed and
unlisted shares means that REEs own share price will, of course, be linked to the movements
in the prices of the shares it holds, as can be seen in the case of PPC below (PPC currently
represents about 19% of REEs overall assets).

2. Real estate slowdown

Vietnams real estate bubble peaked in 2010. Prices fell about 60% from the peak and
construction activity ground to a halt in 2011-2012, but activity seems to have bottomed in
2013 (although it is likely to take years for prices to rebound). The inventory overhangs of
unsold real estate projects declined by about 1/3 over the last year, according to the Ministry of
Construction.
That said, as real estate construction activity was still weak in 2013, REEs M&E segment only
achieved 62% of its FY13 target for new contracts signed and the Reetech air conditioner
business only met 70% of its revenue target. The slowdown of the real estate market also
depressed the net margins of these two segments (see sections 1.4 and 1.5).

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A protracted downturn in the real estate market would dent the groups top-line, although it
would have less impact on the bottom line as these segments only contribute less than 20% of
net profit.
3. Delays in electricity and coal price liberalization
There is a risk that the electricity and coal price reforms will not adhere to the planned
schedule. Such a scenario would lead to the depressed share prices of the listed/unlisted
electricity generator and coal-mining companies that comprise 74% of REEs investment
portfolio (or 41% of its total assets).
The liberalization of the electricity industry was already delayed for seven years because of
EVNss interference in the process (such interference was part of efforts to protect its own selfinterests). Although the first phase of liberalization has kicked off, EVN still has considerable
power and there are still disputes over power purchase agreements between EVN and the
independent power producers, including with the IPPs that REE has invested in. Rising coal
prices are also in conflict with EVNss interests, especially at a time when EVN is strapped for
cash and already owes trillions of VND (hundreds of millions of US dollars) to Petrovietnam,
the natural gas supplier, and Vinacomin, the coal supplier.
If EVN were able to impede or delay the increases in the prices it pays for electricity generated
by independent generators or for the coal mined by the listed subsidiaries of Vinacomin, the
profits (and share prices) of those companies are likely to suffer. Given REEss and Ms.
Thanhss track record for savvy investments in the real estate and banking sectors, we are not
overly concerned about this risk. Such concerns are further mitigated by the growing demand
for electricity in Vietnam from the emerging middle class, and more critically, sufficient
electricity supply to sustain the inflow of FDI into high-tech factories.
IV.

FINANCIALS
1. Good cash flow from office leasing and dividends

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The annual cash flows generated from REEss office leasing business increased when it
launched its new Ree tower building in District 4. Tenants began renting offices in this building
in 2011 and it currently enjoys a 100% occupancy rate. We expect cash flows from the office
leasing business to remain stable. On one hand, as the supply-demand balance for grade B
office buildings is at equilibrium, we only expect modest, single-digit rent increases going
forward (i.e. less than 5%). On the other hand, as REEss products are highly suitable for the
needs of the market, we expect the occupancy rates of these buildings to remain high going
forward (REEss E-town campus has enjoyed occupancy rates of over 95% for 10 years).
Dividends from REEss associate companies have also increased as REE has enlarged its
investment portfolio of listed and unlisted electricity/coal/water companies.

Looking at these associate companies, they are typically companies that have high payout
ratios and pay high dividends. In fact, we believe this is REEss investment strategy: investing
in stocks that are undervalued but which pay high dividends

The resulting cash flows from this strategy have enabled REE to invest further and maintain its
own cash dividend of VND1,600/share, which represents a 6.% dividend yield at its current
share price (note that REEss dividend yield has been as high as 14% in recent years).
2. Profits from investments drive earnings growth
The increasing size of REEss investment portfolio has made profits from its
investments/associates the main earnings driver for the group. Over the period of FY11-13,
profits from core businesses and office rental business delivered a CAGR of 10% vs. 68% for
profits from investments, which allowed the company to post a net profit CAGR of 38%.

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REEss investment portfolio has been growing and the individual investments have generally
performed well, which has boosted the companyss earnings.
However, as REE has recently increased its stake in Thac Ba Hydro Power from 38% to 58%,
it will need to consolidate both revenues and earnings from this investment, treating Thac Ba
Hydro Power as a subsidiary from this year onwards.
This consolidation will support REEss revenue growth as well as its earnings growth, but
since hydro companies generally have high cash flows, we believe that REE will also increase
the dividend payout ratio of this now majority-owned subsidiary (such a move will also help
improve its own cash flow). Thac Ba Hydro Power is REE's first investment which passed the
50% threshold, but we expect it to gradually increase its stakes beyond 50% for the other small
companies in its portfolio as this will support its revenue and dividend growth, as well as
earnings growth.
Accounting for the profits from REE's investments under VAS Of the 25 listed and unlisted
companies that REE invested in as at end-2013, 16 of them were accounted for by the equity
method (stakes of 20-49%), and nine were listed in REEss accounts as "short-term
investments" (stakes below 20%) which were held at book value. Also, as mentioned earlier,
one investment will become a consolidated subsidiary this year.
The dividends from short-term investments are recorded as financial income. In our
understanding, although these investments are held at book value, they are subject to
impairment provision charges in the case of a material diminution in their value - which is
more likely for investments in listed stocks rather than unlisted companies.
Regarding REEss investments that are accounted for under the equity method, these generally
adhere to international accounting methods, except for one key difference. The contribution of
profit/loss for an individual investment accounted for by the equity method in Vietnam is
exactly the same under

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Vietnam Accounting Standards (VAS) as it would be under IFRS. The key difference is that in
VAS, dividend income received from associates is reported under "Financial Income" (along
with interest earned from bank account deposits, for example), and then "Profit from
associates" is calculated by apportioning REEss share of net earnings minus the dividends
received from the investment.
In contrast, under IFRS, a company incorporates its share of its associatess earnings in the
"Profit from associates" item of the income statement, with no deduction of dividends received.
That said, as no additional dividend income is recorded under "Financial Income", the net
impact on the investing companyss earnings is identical under these two different accounting
systems.
3. 2013 results review
In 2013, REEss revenue inched up 1% but net profit jumped 49% yoy due to profits from
associates/long-term investments which comprised 64% of its overall net profit last year.
Revenue only increased nominally in 2013 due to a 26% fall in sales for the Reetech air
conditioning segment, which was offset by the increase in revenue for M&E (+14% yoy) and
office leasing (+7% yoy).
The increase in M&E sales (59% of overall 2013 revenues) was due to the revenue recognition
of some large completed (or partially completed) projects - including Pullman Saigon Centre,
Crowne Plaza Nha Trang, Thao Dien Pearl and Noi Bai International Airport - while operating
margins were nearly unchanged. The fall in Reetech air conditioner sales (22% of revenues)
was due to:
a. the weak real estate market which depressed unit sales by about 15%, and ,
b. One large-ticket sale of industrial air conditioners in the prior year (Reetech sells air
conditioners for homes and industrial use).
The operating margin was nearly unchanged. The increase in revenues in the office leasing
segment came from the first full-year contribution from REEss new Ree Tower building in
District 4, with tenants starting to move in during 2Q11 (the building has 18,000/sq m of
rentable space, which increased REEss overall rentable space by nearly 20%).
As the initial 3-month rental holiday offered to tenants of this building expired, this segmentss
net margin increased from 45% in 2012 to 47% in 2013.
Finally, the main story for the year was the surge in dividends and profits from associate
companies, primarily because of the extraordinary profits from PPC, which are highlighted
below. Its dividend income jumped (+155%), thanks to a growing investment portfolio and the
increase in dividend payouts by REEss associate companies.
Income from associates leaped from VND44bn in 2012 to VND428bn in 2013, VND486bn of
which came from PPC (these two figures may seem to imply that REEss other associates lost
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money last year, but that is not the case - because under Vietnamese accounting, these income
associates figures do not include dividends received by those associate companies, as
discussed in the previous section). This leap in investment income and REEss 22% stake in
PPC (whose share price doubled in 2013) are the main reasons behind REEss share price
rising by 78% in 2013.
PPC windfall gain REE purchased PPC shares in 2012 at an average price which we estimate
was VND8,000 vs. the companyss book value per share of about VND12,700 at that time.
REE purchased those shares throughout 2012 and by the end of 2Q13, the year had
accumulated a 22% stake which entitled it to account for this investment by using equity
method accounting. Since REE had purchased the shares at a price which was below the book
value, the application of equity method accounting for this investment generated a "negative
goodwill". REE was then free to either amortize this "negative goodwill" over 10 years or to
take an accounting profit immediately, which reflected the difference between the price REE
paid for the shares and the book value per share of PPC

The company chose to take VND382bn of financial income via an accelerated recognition of
this negative goodwill in 2Q13, which was recorded in the income statement under the income
from associates item. We believe the company did this for three reasons:
a. The depreciation of the JPY caused PPCss book value to increase from about
VND12,700 at the time REE purchased its stake to about VND15,600 by the end of
1H13, mainly due to the fact that PPC has a heavy JPY-denominated debt burden (and
the depreciation of the JPY caused significant windfall profits for PPC). The resulting
increase in PPCss "negative goodwill" from this investment increased the accounting
profits that could be generated by the accelerated amortization of that negative
goodwill.
b. PPCss share price appreciated sharply in early 2013 because of REEss purchases of
PPC shares and its windfall gain described in the previous point. The increase in PPCss
share price had resulted in the stock trading at a price which was near its book value Page 25

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we do think that REE would have realized this negative goodwill if PPCss share price
was still languishing at levels well below its book value, especially given the influence
of Dragon Capital and Jardine Matheson on the company.
c. In our understanding, the company targets an ROE of 12% each year and management
probably felt that the PPC-related accounting profit was its best chance at meeting this
target in 2013, given the weak performance of its core businesses that can be attributed
to a weak real estate market.
Note that in addition to the windfall income from the negative goodwill which was realised in
2Q13, REE also received a portion of the extraordinary FX gains that PPC earned in 1Q13.
This has became the source of confusion for some (the issue is further obfuscated by the fact
the REEss 2013 accounts were restated in 2014, when REE changed its accounting method
from recognizing earnings from associates semi-annually to recognizing those earnings from
associates on a quarterly basis - which is described in section 5. Jardine converts its CB
In Dec 2013, Platinum Victory, a holding company owned by Jardine Matheson, converted
VND419bn out of the VND558bn REE CBs it owned into 19m REE shares. Victory Platinum
had bought the 6% coupon CBs in 2012, and needed to wait one year before the CBs could be
converted into shares. The conversion of these CBs effectively increased Jardine Mathesonss
stake in REE from 11.3% to 17.7%, and its ownership would reach 19.6% if it were to convert
its remaining holdings of REE's CBs.
The conversion price for the CBs is VND22,000 vs. VND26,300 today (and VND29,700 when
Jardine converted its CBs into shares), but we note that foreign ownership would need to be
available for Jardine to exercise its conversion option on its remaining CBs. When an investor
buys a CB on a Vietnamese stock, the company can petition the SSC to set aside those shares
for the purpose of meeting the 49% foreign ownership limit in Vietnam. However, our
understanding is that at the time the CBs were issued to Victory Platinum, there was
insufficient foreign ownership headroom available to set aside the full amount of shares that
these bonds would convert into - this explains why only VND419bn, out of VND558bn of the
CBs, was converted at the end of last year.
4. 2014 forecasts
We expect REEss FY14 revenue to increase by 17%, backed by improvements across the
segments. However, we anticipate its overall net profit to fall 15% yoy as FY14 will no longer
see the extraordinary profit related to the negative goodwill (arising from the PPC investment
that was mentioned earlier).
We expect PPCss net profit to fall 50% in 2014 due to the absence of the abovementioned FXrelated windfall. Also, we anticipate the overall profit from REEss associates to fall by 50%.
Also, stripping out the effect of the PPC windfall gain in 2013, our net profit forecast for FY14
would represent a yoy increase of 54%.
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M&E: operating margin is likely to increase from 9% in 2013 to 11% in 2014 as the company
is able to source some key equipment such as electric panels, air ducts, etc., at attractive prices
(the prices of these key inputs are surprisingly volatile, and linked to regional construction
activity, which is "lumpy"). In the companyss 1Q results (2Q2 numbers are not available yet),
the segment's operating margin increased from 10% in 1Q13 to 14% in 1Q14. For the full year,
we expect revenues to grow 12%, thanks to the completion of some large-scale projects
including the large Vietcombank tower and Noi Bai Airport Terminal 2 projects. In 1Q, most
of this segmentss revenue was derived from the large Noi Bai Airport project in anoi. The
company targets a net profit of VND140bn, in line with our forecast of VND144bn. Reetech:
we expect sales and profits to increase by about 40%, driven by the sale of Hitachiss
Generals brand air conditioners. The companyss 2014 business plan calls for a 42% increase
in revenue, but a 108% increase in net profit - implying a fairly significant increase in net
margins. We do not expect such an increase in net margin, and our view is supported by the
fact that this segment's operating margins actually fell modestly from 7% in 1Q13 to 6% in
1Q14.
Office leasing: we expect this segmentss results to be fairly flat this year, given that the
buildings are now more-or-less fully occupied and REE will not realistically be able to raise
rents much, given the current equilibrium of supply and demand in the market.
Investments/associates: we expect profits from associates to fall 50% this year as the PPC
windfall mentioned earlier will not be repeated. In REEss 1Q results, profits from associates
fell 74% as a portion of the PPC gains was booked in 1Q13. This will be discussed in further
detail in the next section, 4.5. This fall in profits from associates in 1Q caused the overall 1Q14
net profit of the company to fall 40% yoy.
Finally, we expect net financial expenses to drop about 56% due to the partial conversion of the
CBs held by Jardine Matheson into common shares. We also expect the company to pay a cash
dividend of VND1,600/share (at the AGM, shareholders approved a minimum VND1,200 per
share dividend).
Below consensus FY14 forecast REE targets 10% growth in sales and 9% decline in net profit,
with the sell-side consensus anticipating that earnings will fall 8% to VND890bn. Our forecast

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is more pessimistic as we expect FY14 earnings to drop 15% to VND830bn (though we have
revised up our FY14 forecast from VND709bn at the beginning of this year).
The main difference between our forecast and the rest is in our expectation for profit from
associates and from PPC, in particular. We expect PPCss profit to fall 50% in FY14 in view
of: 1) the non-recurrence of VND1,136bn of force gains caused by the yen's depreciation
(discussed extensively earlier), and 2) the fact that coal prices were increased twice in 2013 and
once (thus far) in 2014, which pushed up PPCss input costs.
The market expects PPC to sign a new Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) in which EVN will
pay PPC a significantly higher price for the electricity it generates. We agree that this is
inevitable, but we do not believe that this is imminent. In our view, EVN is not yet ready to
drop its current approach of paying the independent power generators a PPA price that targets a
fixed (and anemic) ROE for PPC and the other independent power generators.
Also, REE may be entitled to a US$3.8m bonus payment which is related to the sale of its stake
in the Vung Ang thermal power plant project in Sep 2011. This bonus will be paid to REE if
and when it is able to negotiate an attractive power purchase agreement (PPA) contract on
behalf of the new owners of the plant (who are Japanese). So far, REE has not been able to
make this happen, but there is some speculation that a new PPA is imminent - such that REE
should receive the US$3.8m payment this year. However, we would rather wait for more
concrete signs that this will happen before penciling this into our FY14 forecast (this would lift
2014 net profit by about 8%).
5. Restatement of 1Q13 earnings depresses yoy performance for 1Q14
REE previously recognized profits from its associates on a half yearly basis (at the end of 2Q
and 4Q). However, REE has prudently decided to switch to recognizing profits (or losses) from
associates on a quarterly basis because of the rising earnings contribution from associates. This
caused a steep upward revision of 1Q13ss earnings because this is when REEss associate PPC
realized a large gain from the depreciation of the JPY (i.e. REEss portion of such earnings was
restated to have been earned in 1Q13, instead of 2Q13).
The restatement of REEss 2013 accounts this year resulted in an unflattering comparison
between 1Q13 and 1Q14; 1Q net profit fell 40% this year, which partly explains the recent
weak sentiment on the stock.
Also, the 40% drop in 1Q earnings yoy would have been even more pronounced if not for an
extraordinary income item in 1Q14. This extraordinary income was related to a VND52.3bn
bonus payment to the its management, based on REEss performance in FY13. REE expensed
that anticipated bonus payment in its FY13 accounts, but then reversed the amount in 1Q14
because it decided to pay the bonus in the form of ESOP shares at the price of
VND29,600/share.

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6. Recent developments among investee companies
Here are some recent developments in the companies that REE has invested in:

TMP has recently kicked off a 36-month project to increase its hydropower generating
capacity from 150MW to 225MW. The cost of the project, VND1,588bn, is 85%
financed with an ODA loan on concessionary terms, including a below-market interest
rate.

BOO Thu Duc is in the planning phases to double its capacity from 300k cubic
metre/day to 600k cubic metre/day.

Quang Ninhss thermal power generating facility ran at well-below full capacity in
2013 because of maintenance issues. However, these issues seem to have been solved
this year and the plant is generating electricity at full capacity.

Saigon Clean Waterss new Thu Duc 3 facility with a capacity of 300k cubic metre/day
will start operations in Nov 2014.

7. Volatile net margins

REE has experienced a good amount of volatility in its net margins over the last few years.
The two reasons for REEss volatile net margins are the intrinsically volatile nature of its
investment revenues and the lumpy nature of the profits from REEss M&E business. We have
mentioned previously that the company typically experiences a small jump in earnings when a
major project is completed because REE tends to book its costs and revenues for these projects
conservatively (i.e. a disproportionate share of costs is booked upfront while a disproportionate
share of revenues is booked when the project is completed). For this reason, the undertaking of
large M&E projects can lead to some degree of earnings and net margin volatility for REE.
V. VALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION
We use the sum-of-parts to value REE. We apply the sector comparables to value its M&E and
the air conditioning segments, and the DCF method to value its real estate investments, with

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the valuation of REEss portfolio investment based on market prices and available information.
M&E:
We select the peer group from the Asian emerging market, excluding China. REEss M&E is
one of the most profitable M&E companies in the region, with a net profit margin of 9.3%. But
applying a discount for Vietnam's specific market risk, we arrive at a target P/E of 10x, the
average for the region, for REEss M&E valuation. Given its FY14 net profit of VND144bn,
we derive a valuation of VND1,440bn for REE's M&E segment

Air conditioning:
We select the peer group from the Asian emerging market, excluding China. REEss air
conditioning segment is not as profitable as the peer group, coming in below the industry
average. As such, we apply a 40% discount to the industry average in deriving a target P/E of
6x. Given its FY14 net profit of VND43bn, we derive a fair value of VND258bn for REEss air
conditioning segment.

Real estate investment:

We apply a WACC rate of 16% to REE's real estate investment and arrive at a fair value of
VND2,336bn.

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Investment portfolio valuation

We value REEss investment portfolio based on market prices and available information and
arrive at an investment value per share of VND18,010. Looking at REEss investment
portfolio, the BOO Thu Duc is currently the only investment which can give REE a significant
return if it is sold. The investment gain in PPC was mostly reflected in the group's results in
FY13 when it booked the negative goodwill. Based on the latest market prices and book values,
we calculate that the unrealized investment gains amount to VND240bn.

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Valuation summary
We derive a target price of VND32,257 for REE using the sum of its core business, real estate
value, portfolio investment value and net current assets. Given its current share price of
VND27,100 (which offers a potential upside of 19%) and bright growth prospects, we maintain
our Add call on the stock

VI. REFERENCE:
https://vninvestment.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/ree7jul14.pdf

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