Introduction

The last years have been the years of scientific and technological progress. There has been so
much added to the sum total of human knowledge that it has been several hundred times more
than all the knowledge that had been accumulated since the beginning of civilization before this
time. Technological development has been so rapid and still gathering momentum, that it is
likely to have a significant impact in all the fields in a near future.
On the most significant progress in the technological field is the invention of the SCADA
system, which is mainly applicable on Control Engineering. Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition; SCADA refers to a system that collects information from various sensors in a
factory and then sends these collected data to a central computer which finally manages and
controls the process.
The feedback control is first passed through the remote terminal unit (RTU) or the programmable
logic controller (PLC) while the function of the SCADA system monitors, controls and regulate
the process performances.
The versatility of the SACADA system permits its application in many industrial processes such
as the manufacturing industries, production industries, power generation, textile industries and in
the refinery industries (Oil Refinery).
According to the Earth Science from Moorland School, a refinery is defined as a factory which
takes as input raw materials (crude oil) and transforms it into petrol and other useful products.
The Refinery breaks the raw input down into its various components in a highly automated
control room.

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There are 3 important steps during the refinery of crude oil mainly:

Separation or fractional distillation.

Source: Educational Electronics USA, Fuels IV

Conversion: Cracking and Rearranging the Molecules.

These fractions are usually not in demand but refining these
portions can yield other useful chemicals.

Cracking is one of the process in which long chained

molecules are broken into smaller chained molecules.
Then the coker is another process in which these fractions
obtained are further vaporized into lighter products and the
final residues is used as an industrial fuel.
Source: Earth Science, Oil Refineries

Alkylation is the reverse process of cracking in which the petrol components are produce
by the combination of these fractions with gaseous by-products resulting from cracking.
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Treatment.
Blending, purifying, fine tuning and improving the products are some of the ways in
which the hydrocarbon is converted into finer hydrocarbon
which enhance the performance of the engine.
For example, the car fuel can have different type of
blending in order to suit the weather. That is in winter
season, the fuels are more concentrated with volatile

Source: Earth Science, Oil Refineries

hydrocarbon while on the other hand in summer season the

fuel is concentrated with less volatile hydrocarbon.

The link between crude oil supply and refined products are refineries. Crude oil is distributed to
refineries via pipelines as well as finished products from the refinery to the storage tanks, or to
gas stations.
Up till now, pipelines have been the only
alternative to transport the petroleum products.
Consequently, monitoring and controlling this
pipeline network, the use of the SCADA system
is very much appropriate.

Source: Clker.com Factory Clip Art

In order to measure pressure, temperature, and

the rate of flow of the oil inside the pipelines, a
number of RTU are placed along the pipeline
which is then connected to the SCADA System.

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Below is a typical architecture of the RTU interacting with the SCADA System:

Source: Nary Subramanian, Department of Computer Science, University of Texas, Improving Security of oil Pipeline
SCADA System using Service-oriented architectures

Security is the most significant aspect of oil transportation and therefore one of the main goals of
the SCADA system are designed to provide real time security status of the whole piping network
such that the necessary actions can be taken by human monitoring the central information.

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Fundamentals of SCADA system

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition consists of a computerized network that has for prime
objective to control remotely and monitor the condition of an industrial process from a central
location. Some examples of where SCADA system can be used are in; treatment plants, wells,
pump stations, wells and reservoir. The following objectives of a SCADA system in an oil
pipeline distribution network are as follows:
1. To monitor the system.
2. To control the system and ensure proper functioning of system for optimal performance
and that will enable operating objectives to be set and achieved.
3. To increase automation and decrease operational staffing.
4. To keep record of the behaviour of the system with time.
5. To provide information on the systems performance and establish asset management
procedures.
6. To minimise the need of daily routine and reduce power consumption of pumping station.
7. To provide and alarm system that will detect and analyse the faults from a central point
and thus allow repairs to be made, to remove the fault condition and avoid incidents that
can harm the industry or its environment.

Components of SCADA system

SCADA comprises of a central host computer
and a number of remote terminal unit commonly
known as RTU but also with the operator
terminals that transfer data from one station or
terminal to the other. The general form of a
SCADA system employs data multiplexing
(MUXs) between the central host computer and
the RTUs. In other words the Multiplexers serve
as a data route to and from a number of RTUs on
a local network while they use one or few physical links on a Wide Area Network (WAN)
backbone to pass that data back to the central host.
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Parts of a SCADA system

A SCADA system consists of:

Fields data interface called Remote Station, Remote Terminal Units (RTU) or
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), which interface with the sensing devices.

A communication system which transfer data from one field data interface device,
Control Units and Central Host. The communication system can be: radio, telephone,
cable, satellite or any combination of these. Also this system shall support the use of
operator workstations that can be geographically remote from the central host computer.

A Master terminal unit called SCADA center that acts as a central host for the system.

Human Machine interface (HMI) or Man Machine Interface (MMI) that is standard or
custom software to provide the SCADA central host, operator terminal with the
applications that will be required for it to use the communications services available and
ultimately monitor and control remotely field data interface devices.

Field data Interface devices

These devices are the sensor devices that acts as ears and eyes of the SCADA system.
Examples of such devices are reservoir level meters, water flow meter, valve position
transmitters, temperature transmitters etc. In the case of an oil refinery, this information is used
to know how the different processes are performing. Furthermore, control valve actuators, motor
control switchboards etc. can be used as control unit that is the hands of the SCADA system.
Therefore for the oil refinery situation, control the outflow from a fractionating column or to
release excess pressure in some tanks due to gases. However this information has to be converted
into a suitable form for the SCADA system. In order to perform such task this information is
passed to and from the Field Data Interface device.

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Remote Terminal Unit

They are used to convert electronic signals received from or required by
the Field devices into (or from) the computer language and transmit it
over a communication channel. RTU are placed in the field as a box in a
switchboard with electrical signals wires running to field devices and a
cable link to a communication channel interface such as a radio.
However due to the limited bandwidth of the communications links
between the SCADA central host and the field data , some instruction
for the automation of the field data interface devices e.g. pump control
logic are stored locally with the interface device. The device with store
this information is known as Programmable Logic Controllers.

Programmable Logic Converters

They are connected directly with the Field data interface device
and consists of in built programmed Intelligence in the form of
logical procedures that can be executed in case of certain field
conditions. For example with reference to the topic of this
assignment, an oil refinery industry might try to automatically
liberate excess pressure in some tank storing lighter fraction petrol
which is being contaminated with some gasified fraction. Thus the
PLC will open the valve only if the pressure exceeds the set
pressure.

Note: RTUs are able to have built in programmed intelligence that can perform logic procedures
and PLC are also able to use communication channels and to report state of a control program to
a computer plugged into the PLC or to a remote computer via a telephone line. Thus RTUs and
PLC compete for the same market but for understanding purposes RTU will be used to refer to a
remote field data interface device.
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Field Data Communications System

It provides a mean by which data can be transferred between the central host computer servers
and the field based RTUs.

Bandwidth
It is a property of a communication channel and it is defined as the capacity to carry data. In
other words bandwidth represents capacity of information. In an analogue channel, bandwidth is
denoted in Hertz. For example a telephone line has a bandwidth of around 3.2 Hz. In digital
transmission, the term bandwidth has been extended to include the transmission rate in bits per
second (bps).

SCADA Communications availability and protocols

One important aspects of the SCADA system , is that this system are generally deployed over a
large geographical area or the central host are linked to remote SCADA outstations which is very
complex in terms of network configuration (physical and logical paths in which data will go) .
Therefore the configuration of the communications system and the bandwidth comes generally
with an important financial consideration.
A process plant generally uses high-speed fiber optic LAN infrastructures which offer the
highest percentage availability with low error bits rates. However, due to the geographical area
for the SCADA communications, a combination of data radio, telephone line and satellite
technology can be employed which offer a lower percentage availability and higher error bits
rate. This happens as there are countless data routing ports and conversion of media as compared
to the fiber optic LAN systems. Thus, there are many single points of failure in a diverse
SCADA communication network. A power failure and human interference can affect the
availability of the SCADA network. Improving this communication is costly and crucial to the
operation security sometimes.
SCADA communication protocols are also extremely important aspect in terms of secure
transmission of data and guaranteeing the reliable delivery of data to its destination. Protocols
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employ detection and messages retry techniques by checking the extra information added before
and after a raw data (headers and footers). This added information will eventually need to have a
tradeoff between the speed of data communications and the reliability of the data. Thus for a
more secure transmission, the speed of that transmission will be the slow and vice versa.
Therefore, SCADA communications is generally slower than the communication used in a
process plan, office or industry floor. However simple communications protocols are used for the
SCADA systems but may be easier to decipher. However protocols are transparent to the person
using the system. The system user must know the error of each communications media used.
If we consider that a command is wrongly sent to a destination, the SCADA system is often back
up with a confirmation from an operator to confirm that a control action is required. Thus, it
provides a protection against that type of error. Also the control confirmation check gives the
operator another chance to select the outstation for control. An example of a SCADA
communication protocol includes Distributed Network Protocol 3.0 (DNP). It includes error
detection, correction and allows confirmation for backup plan for control actions.

Communication media
Common media for communications are

Radio links (UHF and VHF)

Public switched telephone networks

Mobile telephony

Microwave

Cable TV networks

Dedicated Satellite links

Dedicated cable (e.g. fiber optics for short distances communications)

Corporate WAN communication system

Note: Selection of the media depends on:

The reliability of the communications media

The availability and the cost of the communication media

Availability of power
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SCADA systems of communications are generally split into two parts:

Wide Area Network

Local Area Network

Wide Area Network Schematics

WAN connects the host computer to the multiplexers.
It can consist of cable, radio or even satellite data
communication links. The following photos represent
the different arrangement that can be available from
this WAN system.

Local Area Network Schematics

They connect the RTUs to the multiplexers or
directly to the SCADA central host computer if
there is no need for a WAN connection. Links
can be private or rented from a telephone
company. Here is an overview of a LAN
network schematic.

The Central Host Computer

It is the master station which can consist of a single network or a network of computer servers
that provide the overview of the SCADA system. Information is processed from and sent to the
RTU sides and presented to a workable form for the operator. Operator terminals are directly
connected to the central host. New SCADA systems are able to offer a graphical display of the
oil refinery system. In addition this display can:

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give an overall overview of the system.

the real time operation of the equipment in use.

list the alarm that has been seen y the operator or the ones unknown to him/her.

enable the user to display the behavior of a variable overtime.

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SCADA WORKING MECHANISM

a) Acquiring data

It is first accomplished by the RTUs scanning the field data interface devices that are
connected to that RTU. The central host scans the RTU within seconds to access the data
in it. Also it may happen that the system allows the RTU to transmit field values and
alarm to the central host if the central host did not accessed the RTU. This mechanism is
also known as Unsolicited Messaging. Therefore it reduces the use of the communication
channels and favors the instantaneous triggering of the alarm in case of malfunction.
Control actions that are performed by the operator terminal via the central host are treated
as data that are sent to the RTU. In order that the command is properly received by the
target, several layers of checking mechanism occur.

b) Data process

Data falls into three main categories:

Analog data ( real numbers )

Digital data ( on / off )

Pulse data ( counting revolutions )

The primary interface of the operator terminal is a GUI that displays a representation of the
plant/equipment in graphical form. There is a mixture of the live data graphical shapes in the
foreground that blends with the static background. If a data is changed or altered it is updated.
An example of this is shutting the valve in the outlet of an oil tank. The valve could be shown as
open or closed depending on the data collected. The most recent analogue values are displayed
on the screen as numerical generally or can shoe the amount in the tank itself. A red icon
symbolizes an alert which flashes.
Data from the field are processed to detect alarm condition. If there is any alarm, it will be shown
by the application software on the central host computer and are registered as alarms. Operators
can be notified visually or by an audible sound. Then the operator can investigate the alarm and
store a history of the alarms and the operator who acknowledge it.
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c) Level of control

SCADA system can be deployed over a large geographical area, hence the speed of the link will
be lower than a typical for a link between a computer and a PLC via a hard wired LAN. In an oil
refinery, a high speed Ethernet LAN is generally employed as communication system. This
control system is similar to SCADA but is developed for floor applications. They are referred as
Distributed Control System (DCS). A DCS system usually employs an amount of the remote
loop control, where the required value of a field variable is calculated based on the feedback
received from a measured variable in the field.
In the case of DCS systems, this calculation is often performed within the central host computer.
In comparison, loop control required to operate a remote pump station, for example, will
regularly be housed within a local loop control device which calculates the required value of the
field variable locally and therefore separately from the central host computer.

Consider in this case that the position of the valve depends on the level of oil in the reservoir. An
operator may control the process by issuing a Set Point, which is the desired level at which the
tank should stay. Once the level deviates from the level set point, the controller detects the
deviation and sends a signal to the valve position actuator to move the valve to reduce the error.
The level of the tank is continuously monitored to enable the controller to trim the valve
position.

Within plant floor DCS systems, it is common for this controller to reside within the central host
computer. The communication system connecting the local RTU and the central host is fast and
reliable and it is convenient to house the bulk of the computing power within a centralized
location.

By contrast, SCADA systems generally cover large geographic areas and rely on a variety of
communications systems that are normally less reliable than a LAN associated with a DCS. Loop
control based in the central host computer is therefore less desirable. Instead, the controller
application is housed in the RTU. The SCADA operator is able to alter the tank level set point
remotely and perhaps may be allowed to manually drive the valve open and closed when the
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control loop is disabled. However, the automatic control of the valve is most often resident in the
RTU. If communication to the remote site is lost, it is desirable that the local automatic control
system continue to operate; therefore, the RTU is an autonomous unit which could control the
valve without constant direction from the central host computer. Of course, there is always the
temptation to allow a great percentage of the automation functions to be centralized within a
SCADA system. This approach has many advantages, most notably:

Computing power can be centralized in an office environment, reducing the cost of field
devices which must be designed to operate in sometimes harsh conditions.

Engineering staff are much more readily able to continuously improve and update control
programs, ensuring that there is a standardization of control algorithms across the
SCADA network.

Expensive redundancy system failure proofing can be located in a central location.

Handling of data during SCADA failures

Different SCADA systems cope differently with a failure event. Some systems rely primarily on
the inherent redundancy of the SCADA system, and others may use some form of storage
mechanism to archive data that may be recovered once the SCADA system has returned to
normal operating capacity. These options are summarized as follows:
Storage of data in the RTUs
Some SCADA systems rely on the capacity of the RTU to store data collected from the field
under normal operation and then periodically transmit that data as an unsolicited message. In
times of SCADA system failure, the capacity of the RTU is used to archive information until a
backup central host is brought online or the original system has recovered.
System redundancy
Most SCADA systems incorporate some form of redundancy in their design, such as dual
communications channels, dual RTUs, or dual central host computers. Such systems may be
designed for such redundant equipment to be online (hot standby) to ensure a seamless transfer
upon SCADA system failure, or offline (cold standby) where the backup mechanism must be
manually brought online to operational capacity. Most SCADA systems employ a combination
of the preceding mechanisms to ensure data continuity during failure events.
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PID of oil refinery system

After crude oil has been extracted deep down from the earth, it has to be separated into useful
products, oil, because they have different boiling points, the substances in crude oil can be
separated using fractional distillation. The crude oil is evaporated and its vapors allowed to
condense at different temperatures in the fractionating column. Each fraction contains
hydrocarbon molecules with a similar number of carbon atoms.
The fractions are further treated to convert them into mixtures of more useful saleable products
by various methods such as cracking, reforming, alkylation, polymerisation and isomerisation.
These mixtures of new compounds are then separated using methods such as fractionation and
solvent extraction. Impurities are removed by various methods, e.g. dehydration, desalting, sulfur
removal and hydro treating.
Below is the diagram showing the basic process flow

Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vscX_zawdQw
15 | P a g e

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Storage
Pump
Pre-heater
Tower
Condenser
Reservoir
Pump
Re-boiler

Basic Process flow for Oil refinery:

After having been extracted, the crude oil is transported back to an oil refinery, Now the
crude oil is stored in a storage tank(1)

Pump (2) pumps the crude oil from the tank to the pre-heater (3), the pre-heater heats the
crude oil just below its boiling point.

After passing through the pre-heater it goes to the tower (4), the pressure in the tower is
less than in the pre-heater, hence as soon as the feed gets into the tower, it boils. Here the
heavy liquids get collected at the bottom and the lighter liquids rises

Part of the liquid which falls down to the bottom is pumped out as bottom product, the
bottom product is heated again to vaporise any lighter oil, the latter then get back into the
tower and moves upward.

As the lighter oil moves upward it gets into the condenser (5), where the vapor gets
condensed. Now from the condenser it flow back to a reservoir, from the reservoir ,part
of the liquid goes out as overhead product while the other part is pumped back to the
tower. This liquid is called the external reflux.

Since the external reflux is cooler than the vapors in the tower, the heavy oil vapors at the
top condensed and falls down leaving the lighter vapor at the top, this technique increases
the purity of the distillation.
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The diagram below is a process flow diagram of a typical oil refinery

Source:http://pascagoula.chevron.com/home/abouttherefinery/whatwedo/processingandr
efining.aspx

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Typical PID diagram of oil refinery

How are oil pipelines monitored?

The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system is active 24 hours a day to
control and monitor the activity along the entire pipeline for the operating company. There is a
collection of data by the SCADA system about valve function, line pressure, and flow rate.
Furthermore, the system is equipped with automatic leak-detection systems and alarms, and if
ever the computerized system fails, another system in a different location will come online.
The SCADA system is the heart of the monitoring pipeline system and gives an overall view of
the pipeline activities and the operator is able to regulate the entire length of the pipeline from a
single control centre which is staffed continuously by skilled operators to maintain full
operations of the pipeline.
The SCADA system on transmission line uses a satellite for transmission purposes. However,
depending on the region, pipelines can also be monitored over microwave, spread spectrum,
radio frequency, dedicated land lines, or intranet networks using a combination of copper, optic
fibres and wireless technology.
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The SCADA system consists of:

Field instruments and devices

Station control using programmable logic controllers (PLCs) or Remote Terminal Units
(RTUs)
Master Terminal Units (MTUs)
The control centre

The RTUs/PLCs collect field information such as valve on/off transition status, power
distribution, temperature and pressure. This information is then relayed to the control centre. The
RTUs are located at each pumping station along the length of the pipeline and enable the control
room operators to compare calculations of actual product flow rate and pressure with the
expected values as a means to identify anomalies and take the necessary actions including the
shutdown of the entire pipeline.
Below is a list of the methods used to monitor pipelines.
Automatic Look Ahead Model:

Uses current state from real-time model and simulates future operation conditions for
pipelines.

Used to alert operators of imminent short term violation of constraints.

Predictive Model: It is an off-line model that uses the same equation as the Real Time Model and
simulates pipeline operations based on changes to the current state or archived of historical state
previously generated.
Leak Detection (Pressure-flow deviation): It detects the occurrence of leaks and gives an
estimate of volume, based on the difference between the data produced from the Real Time
Model and the SCADA measurements.
Leak Detection (Volume Balance):

Detects the occurrence of a leak and gives estimate of volume based upon mass/volume
balance.

If (Mass/Volume at inlet) = (Mass/Volume at outlet) : no leak

If (Mass/Volume at inlet) > (Mass/Volume at outlet) : leak

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Batch tracking: This is done by tracking the movement of a known mass of the product in the
pipeline. The basic input to the system is the time when a batch is introduced into the pipeline
and according to the flow rate and density of the product at different points, the movement of the
product in the pipeline is calculated.
Scraper Tracking: This model calculates the position of scrapers in the pipeline and estimates the
arrival time of each scraper at its receiving station. The purpose of this model is to enable the
operator to monitor the movement of scrapers and to schedule scraper-receiving operations.
A typical SCADA system is shown below:

Source: the UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-ROLLA- RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF SCADA SYSTEMS

Oil and gas leak detection in pipelines:

Pipelines for gas, oil and other medium are essential part of the modern worlds infrastructure.
Despite the fact being known for being highly efficient and safe, they are prone to leaks which
influence the population and the environment as well as the company itself. SCADA system is an
intrinsic Computational Pipeline monitoring method which uses the available real time process
20 | P a g e

data of the control centre SCADA application software by making use of mathematical
algorithms which is the basis for the identification of related leaks anomalies and their location.
They are focused on mass or volume balance, doing pressure point analysis or calculating real
time transient model, as previously mentioned above.
Large hydrocarbon fluid pipeline leaks are usually detected by the SCADA system that controls
and monitors the pipeline, making use of the flow or pressure deviation calculations or rate of
change monitoring on flow and pressure measurements to detect a possible leak.
Leak detection system:
The typical leak detection system consists of the following software modules:
When Line In operation:

Pressure and flow profile module/Pressure Wave module- to detect leak and its location
Volume balance method: To detect leak only

Under Shut In condition:

Pressure wave module: To detect leak and its location

Pressure drop method: To detect leak only

The different leak detection systems may be represented as shown below:

Leak Detection

Continuous Monitoring system

Non-continuous system:

Inspection by helicopter
Intelligent pigging
Internal based systems:Balancing
systems

Pressure/flow monitoring
Statistical Analysis
Real Time Transient
Model based

External based systems:

Acoustic emission detectors

Vapor/liquid sensing cables

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E-RTTM (Extended Real Time Transient Model) Leak Localization Principle:

Providing accuracy:
There is the simultaneous calculation of leak position by the use of 3 different methods
which are which are:

Gradient Intersection Method

Wave propagation Method (Time of flight)
Extended time of Flight

The main advantages are that it combines strengths and avoids weaknesses as well as
providing excellent overall accuracy.
The Gradient Intersection Method: There is no need of additional pressure sensors.

Source: Schneider Electric

Advantages

Disadvantages

Good accuracy during stationary conditions

Independent

of

leak

Accuracy based on whole pipeline length L.

characteristic Poor accuracy during Transient Conditions.

(spontaneous, creepy)

The pressure profile is capable of indicating leaks, but small leaks have minimal effect on
pressure and thus are difficult to be located and to filter out normal pressure variations.

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Time of flight method: RTTM technology reduces influences of transients enormously.

Source: Schneider Electric

Advantages

Disadvantages

Good accuracy during stationary and transient

Accuracy based on whole pipeline length L

conditions for appropriate leak characteristics

Requires fast sampling

Not applicable for small and/or creeping leaks

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Extended Time of Flight Method: It is a RTTM-based technology with additional pressure

sensors.

Source: Schneider Electric

Advantages

Disadvantages

Accuracy based on reduced segment length Not applicable for creeping leaks
xi
Significantly improves accuracy against Requires fast sampling
simple Time-of-Flight
Suitable for small leaks

E-RTTM performance Leak Detection and Localization:

For a liquid pipeline:

The smallest detectable leak flow is typically 0.5%

Fast leak detection is typically 3 min (metering consideration)
Accurate leak localization is 1% of segment length

For a gas pipeline:

The smallest detectable leak rate is between 1.0% to 2.0%

Detection time is typically 15 minutes (Length, volume and metering consideration)
24 | P a g e

Accurate leak localization ( Typically the accuracy is 2.0% of segment length)

The factors that can cause leaks are internal & external corrosion, external intervention (e.g. hit
by a truck or a back hoe), soil displacement, material defects and system malfunctions (e.g.
Operating above design pressure). The selection of appropriate methodology is dependent upon
the instrument availability, field devices, communication infrastructure, transported fluids and
gases and performance criteria. In combination with statistical analysis pipelines leak detection
system provides model-based methods (Model Compensated Mass Balance, Transient Model,
Pressure-Temperature Method and Gradient Evaluation) and methods that can utilize the
signature of a leak (Pressure Wave Analysis, Pattern Recognition). These methods are optimized
to detect and locate leaks accurately during steady state, shut-in and transients operations for
onshore and offshore pipelines of all sizes. The different methods can be used in parallel to
ensure the highest possible reliability, and all leaks are clearly indicated and presented
graphically via the graphical user interface. The interface gives significant information to the
operator and leak warnings and alarms are also sent to the SCADA system. Alarms are a key
element in the SCADA system display that has the purpose of indicating changes along the
pipeline. These alarms must be designed accordingly to covey the right information to the
controller, who will in turn take the appropriate measures according to the situation. They are of
greatly benefit the controller by helping him to detect leaks in the pipeline.
The graph and table below shows the number of incidents of oil spillage for the past periods. It
can be clearly seen that a proper leakage detection system is of great importance, and the
SCADA system helps in decreasing the amount of leakage within a piping system.

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Source: Performance of European cross-country oil pipelines statistical summary of reported

spillages in 2010 and since 1971. CONCAWE Oil Pipelines Management Groups

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PID control in oil refinery

From a central reading location a SCADA system can track a number of remote sites equipped
with Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) or Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). The RTUs can
measure an array of conditions and a wider variety of parameters, including temperature, current,
voltage flow, and tank levels. Real-time measurements are obtained from the RTU's via the
different sensors they have inside. The following types of sensors can be included in RTUs:
-Temperature
-Flow
-Level
-Pressure
-Proximity
The data acquired is then sent back via the communication link. Some of the larger systems can
monitor 10-20,000 remote sites, with each site handling as many as 2000 input/output (I/O)
points. These units in turn report back to the Central Processing Unit (CPU) that carries out the
control functions and needed analysis.
OIL & GAS FLOWING
Refineries

will

be

forced

to

control

emissions

of Volatile

Organic

Compounds

(VOCs) associated with applicable process vents, equipment containing or contacting hazardous
wastes, and tanks and other units used for storage of hazardous wastes. VOCs are responsible for
causing ground-level ozone and are also toxic. Approximately 76% of refineries are within three
miles of population centers with more than 25,000 people.
Environmental legislation and regulations affecting the petroleum industry will continue to have
a tremendous impact on this industry. The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) inhibits new
system installations in the largest markets, both in North America and Europe. Compliance with
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations regarding emissions and effluents are
expected to have a positive impact on the U.S. market for SCADA systems and software. As
more oil and gas pipelines are built worldwide, so will the need for SCADA systems increase.

27 | P a g e

Regulations affect end-user industries forcing them to better manage their resources, prevent
leakage and address possible problems immediately. SCADA is an integral part in attaining the
level of control necessary to manage pipelines and distribution. Regulations affecting the U.S. oil
and gas industry include the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) rules, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).
Additionally, legislation is in the works to eliminate Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) in
gasoline. This additive has been used mostly in reformulated gasoline. MTBE is a possible
carcinogen that has been leaking into groundwater in several regions with serious environmental
effects.
From a strictly industry profitability standpoint, the ability to actually measure the rate of the
flow is key to making sure that both inventory levels and storage transfers from one enterprise to
another are accurate. All this converts into more money reaching the bottom line, with fewer
write-offs on financial statements. Utilizing plant resources efficiently is just as critical when the
industry is booming as when it is in a downturn. On one hand, for the oil and gas industry that as
a whole in the past couple of years has been struggling due to low crude oil prices, SCADA
systems have been a necessary tool for their survival in a tough marketplace. And although the
market is on the rebound, experiencing a banner year in 2000, for such companies as Chevron
who reported net income in second quarter 2000 earnings of $1.116 billion, SCADA systems are
also vital in assisting them in managing a global enterprise. These systems are key to helping
them manage offshore exploration, custody transfers, pipeline efficiency (both upstream and
downstream), enabling them to have better control over their assets worldwide.

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What are the vulnerabilities of SCADA systems?

In the past, when SCADA systems were independent and vendor-controlled systems with no
connections to other systems and the network protocol was owned by only a few people knew
making its existence not known by the public. However, nowadays SCADA systems are widely
distributed and networked. Since the systems are dependent on open protocols for the internet,
they are vulnerable to external remote cyber threats. SCADA systems are different from general
information systems in terms of security management. In the risk and security management of
general information systems, after analyzing the assets, threats, and vulnerabilities of
information systems and calculating the degrees of a risk, security measures are prioritized for
calculating the remaining risk. In contrast, for SCADA systems, the analysis of the assets is
performed not from the viewpoint of systems but from the viewpoint of target facilities
managed and operated. There are two distinct threats that can affect SCADA systems. The first
one is the threat of unauthorized access to the control software, whether it is human access or
changes made unintentionally by virus infections and other software threats existing on the
control host machine. The second is the threat of bulk access to the network segments hosting
SCADA devices. Security researchers are concerned about security and authentication in the
design, deployment, and operation of some existing SCADA networks. Moreover, they need to
also take into consideration whether the SCADA networks are secured just because they are
physically disconnected from the internet. In addition, security researchers are also concerned
about the existing security and authentication protocols in the design, deployment, and
operation of SCADA networks, with the belief that SCADA systems have the benefit of
security through obscurity through the use of specialized protocols and proprietary interfaces.
The following list suggests ways to help protect the SCADA network can be presented as
follows:
1. Strict limitations and authority control are needed for external connections.
2. Reinforced security for the systems in demilitarized zones (DMZs) as well as for the
internal network is recommended.
3. Enhancing security using virtual private networks (VPNs) in addition to integrity tools

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of servers.
4. Minimization of access paths to the internal network and enhanced concentration of
monitoring.
5. Encryption of emails and locking of files and directories.
6. Regular and thorough inspection of security and vulnerability.
7. Developing control and monitoring methods to cope with any contingencies in the
SCADA equipment.

The trends of use of SCADA system

If you follow the financial trend, things are going to get more and more common, SCADA
systems will control more and more complex operations. This is so as SCADA system that is
put in place can do something much more easily than an operator, who has to go from place to
place, can do that same function. So from these reasons SCADA systems will be involved more
in our critical operations.
Example of a SCADA system and the way to secure the system.
In complex SCADA architectures, there is a variety of both wired and wireless media and
protocols involved in getting data back to the central monitoring site. This allows
implementation of strong IP-based SCADA networks (internet protocol) over mixed cellular,
satellite, and landline systems. SCADA communications can employ various ranges of both
wired (telephone lines, optical fibers, ADSL, cables) and wireless media (radio, spread
spectrum, cellular, WLAN, or satellite).

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To run SCADA information over an IP network, various issues have to be considered such as
operating equipment types, bandwidth used for SCADA center communication, network
redundancy criteria and protection schemes, restoration times in case of failures, and other IP
services within the network. There are several relevant advantages brought by IP technology.
These advantages include the efficient use of bandwidth to avoid the allocation of capacity
where it is not necessary, widely accepted standards based on proven technologies and a high
degree of interoperability.

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Securing the IP based SCADA system

To protect SCADA systems from cyber threats, we have to perform the following tasks :
1. The SCADA IP network should be located physically separate from corporate networks
and other untrustworthy networks. When physical separation is not possible, logical
separation must be applied. Logical separation is more complicated to implement
effectively and runs the risk of ineffective configuration. One should avoid the use of the
virtual LAN technology for keeping SCADA IP communications logically separated
from corporate IP communications, as VLAN technology is not designed as a security
measure but as a bandwidth shaping tool.
2. IP communications that originate from untrustworthy networks from outside the
SCADA system networks should terminate in a buffer network. They should not be
allowed direct connections with components in the SCADA system networks; devices
inside the SCADA system networks should not be able to communicate directly with the
internet. Infrequently, existing corporate IT network infrastructure such as switches,
routers, and WAN links must be used as a transport method for portions of the SCADA
communications. If that is the case, then the SCADA communications should be
encrypted and routed through a VPN tunnel that runs through corporate IT or other
noncritical networks.
3. When building a complete end-to-end IP network, avoid using devices that use layer 3
separations between SCADA and other noncritical networks. For proper network
isolation, operate equipment that can provide a layer 2 separation. Lastly, a solid cyber
defense must offer active blocking devices such as firewalls, IPS, and in-line network
antivirus appliances.
4. Designs and procedures are another crucial component. Develop quality insurance
techniques to ensure that all security requirements are recognized during the design
phase and then executed and tested within the final product

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Securing the SCADA system in oil refinery (example pipeline system).

Crude oil is terrestrially distributed by pipelines: from drilling rigs to crude oil storage tanks,
from storage tanks to refineries, and finally the refined oil from refineries to gasoline storage
tanks. On average these pipelines have a length several thousands of miles. So to efficiently
monitor and control this huge oil pipeline network supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems are employed. The oil pipeline SCADA has several hundred RTUs (remote
terminal units) that are connected to field instruments that measure pressure, temperature, and
rate of flow of the oil flowing through the pipes, plus change the statuses of valves and pumps
along the pipeline. The RTUs communicate with a central master station using communication
links such as satellite, cable, cellular, or fiber optic transmission media. The system architecture
for traditional SCADA system is shown in Figure below. The most important aspect of oil
pipeline is security and therefore SCADA systems are designed to provide real-time security
status of the entire pipeline so that necessary action may be taken by the human agents
monitoring the central information to avoid any accident.

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Advantages
1. Supports leading flow computers, artificial lift devices, pump off controllers, tanks and
other field devices
2. Reports real time and historical production data in a customized manner
3. Allows alarms to be defined on any piece of data collected or defined by innovative
trend-based alarms
4. Captures data from remote devices and reports them real time
5. Gives customers the ability to control devices remote through their browser which is
especially useful for managing plunger and other artificial lift devices, compressors,
dehydration units, valve controls and other EOR projects
6. View the location, critical data and alarms on all devices in your operation.
7. SCADA systems have been like a tool of survival for oil refineries in a tough market
place as the price of crude oil has been low in the past couple of years.

Disadvantages
There are many SCADA alarm notification systems in place for a geographically distributed
workforce. Typically, these systems use e-mail, SMS, pagers, or some combination of these
options, to deliver alarm notifications to remote field forces. Some alarm delivery solutions
augment these with automated voice messaging.
Inherent in each of these alarm notification methods are shortcomings at odds with the mission
critical nature of the systems monitored and managed. There are four very significant problems
with these notification methodologies.
1) SMS text messages, e-mails, and pager notifications can experience significant delays in
delivery. And because these systems depend, in part, on third party services and
infrastructure, performance improvements are outside the control of the organization
operating the SCADA system. As critical events escalate and alarm notifications are sent,

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field responders may not be aware there is an issue to be addressed because alarm
notification delivery fails. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon to hear stories of SMS and
e-mail alarm notifications arriving hours and even days after a critical alarm was raised.
2) Most of these notification implementations lack accountability. Was the alarm sent,
received, or acted upon? For many systems, there is no record of whether an SMS or email response message was received, or if received, when. Add unexpected delivery
delays to the acknowledgement message, and you have an alarm delivery system that
works well some of the time but lacks the event records that document the successes and
failures.
3) No one would consider any of these traditional alarm delivery methods to be secure.
Authorization, authentication, and encryption the basic tenets of software system
security are missing or inadequate.
4) None of these harness the computing capabilities of today's mobile devices to provide
location-based awareness, peer collaboration, available resource visibility, and intelligent
alarm escalation.
These problems are further exacerbated by wireless network unreliability in remote locations. In
an industry like oil and gas, where rapid response time may save millions of dollars, avoid an
environmental disaster, or prevent injury and loss of life, the usual systems for alarm
notifications are not only inadequate, they are unacceptable.
Due to the wide Area Network of a SCADA system there is possibility of cyber-attack. The
complexity of modern SCADA systems leaves many vulnerabilities as well as vectors for attack.
Attacks can come from many places, including indirectly through the corporate network, virtual
private networks (VPN), wireless networks, and dial-up modems.

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SECURITY AND SAFETY:

Protection of Petroleum Industry from Hackers by Monitoring and Controlling SCADA System:

A control system refers to a computer based facility system and equipment which is used to
remotely monitor and control sensitive processes and physical functions. Measured values and
operational data are collected and processed in the field of facilities and control commands are
conveyed to local or remote equipment. These control systems play the role of a central nervous
system for energy-based facilities.

IMPACT: If a control system were to undergo cyber attack from the outside, there could be
negative consequences for public health and safety. These control systems have been regarded as
safe from external threats of cyber attack up to now, but remote systems in the wrong hands
could be utilized to cripple or shut down infrastructure systems through insertion of a virus or
other malicious software which seriously damage other systems in the network, or associated
networks in the industry (SQL injection attacks, DNS poisoning, Dos attacks). Data theft and
hacking process control terminals that are left un-monitored are the major problems in oil and
gas industry.

SOLUTION: Continuous monitoring regular scanning and updates of the software are necessary
to leave us in safe zone and maximize operational efficiencies
For instance, A mobile phone
Traditional alarm notification solutions relying on SMS and e-mail introduce significant security
risks.
Mobile devices access to sensitive SCADA system information mandates special security
considerations, since these devices move outside of physically secured, controlled environments
and communicates over channels outside the control of the SCADA owner. An alarm notification
solution should include user authentication and authorization capabilities, verifying access and
access limitations, as well as data encryption on both the device and in data transmissions.

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Traditional alarm notification solutions relying on SMS and e-mail introduce significant security
risks.

Cybercrime in SCADA system of oil and gas

Anyone working with SCADA or industrial control systems (ICS) in the oil and gas industry is
aware of the pressure to increase productivity and reduce costs through network integration. For
example, sharing real-time data from field operations with management is standard practice for
most companies. Similarly, the demand for remote support has made many pipeline control
systems accessible via Internet-based technologies.
At the same time, SCADA systems themselves have changed radically. Proprietary networks
have been replaced with equipment using Ethernet technology. Single-purpose operator stations
have been replaced with computers running Window, and IT software such as PDF readers and
web browsers are installed in every station or control center.
These new technologies are enabling companies to implement agile, cost-effective business
practices. Unfortunately, they also come at a cost - many of the same security vulnerabilities that
have plagued business systems now appear in SCADA systems. Pipeline control systems are
now exposed to cyber-security threats they were never designed for.

Health and safety

Health and safety, being serious risks, are important responsibilities that every industry must
strictly consider since these risks directly or indirectly affect the business operations.
Consequently for a company to grow and prosper, risks should be effectively and wisely be
managed since by managing business risks, an organizations health, assets and opportunities can
be secured.
Basically and logically, the oil and gas industry is the one of the riskiest industries when it comes
to the health and safety of the employees. Interruption in oil production caused by fires and
accidents lead to significant economic losses and potential hazards to humans and the

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environment. Employees are also endangered to infectious disease, food borne and waterborne
illness and wildlife and vector induced diseases.
The oil and gas industry faces many criticisms when it comes to health and safety of its
employees. This is due to the numerous activities within the industry that include chemical use
for various processes including drilling, cementing completion, stimulation and production.
Working in oil refineries exposes the employees to benzene and Naturally Occurring Radioactive
Material or NORM substances that are extremely dangerous to health.
The Occupational health and safety measures should thus be strictly taken into consideration.
Recommended practice for Occupational safety for production of Oil and Gas
Shall: Denotes that the recommended practice has universal application to that specic activity.
Should: Denotes a recommended practice:
(1) where a safe comparable alternative practice is available
(2) that may be impractical under certain circumstances or
(3) that may be unnecessary for personnel safety under certain circumstances
Safety practices:
1. The employers and employees shall be properly trained in relation to their job duties.
Additionally, pre-job safety meetings that include all affected personnel, including contractors,
should be held to review responsibilities for the operation(s) to be performed.
2. Personnel should receive instruction in correct work methods to reduce chance of injury to
themselves or fellow personnel
3. A safety program should be established and maintained. The following elements should be
considered when developing a comprehensive safety program:

conned space entry

contractor safety

electrical safety
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re prevention and protection

emergency response

rst aid

general safety rules

hazard communication

hazardous environment

hot working/welding

housekeeping

hydrogen sulde and sulfur dioxide

lifting

lockout/tag out

other equipment safety (hoists, cranes, etc)

periodic reviews

personal protective equipment

personnel training

production equipment safety

roles and responsibilities

safe use of hand tools

safety meetings

transportation

trenching and excavation

4. Unsafe and potentially dangerous conditions should be eliminated immediately, if possible, or

reported to the supervisor in charge for corrective action.
5. The off going supervisor shall inform the incoming supervisor of any known special hazards
or work in progress that may affect the safety of the crew. Incoming personnel shall be alerted to
work in progress that could affect their safety.

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Hazard Communication
A Hazard Communication Program that evaluates the presence and potential hazards of
chemicals found in the workplace shall be established for onshore oil and gas production
operations. Workers shall be provided with information concerning the hazard of chemicals and
appropriate measures to protect themselves while working with hazardous chemicals.

The program shall be written and include information about hazard evaluation, labeling, material
safety data sheets, employee training and methods to review and update changes in the program
based on chemical usage.

Elements of a program include:

Hazard Evaluation
An inventory of all the hazardous chemicals in the work area shall be completed. An
evaluation of the potential hazard of a chemical should be conducted before the
hazardous chemical is handled. Generally applicable measures including engineering
controls, safe work practices and PPE should be considered for safe handling and use of
a hazardous chemical. This information shall be communicated to the worker.

Labeling
A labeling system shall be developed that warns of the potential hazards of working with
a hazardous chemical. Hazardous chemicals shall identify (at minimum) the material or
substance and the physical and health hazards.

Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS)

Chemical manufacturers are normally responsible for developing MSDSs. A MSDS shall
be available and readily accessible for each hazardous chemical used in the workplace. A
system to collect, maintain, and inform workers about the chemical hazard information
found on a MSDS shall be part of the program.

Training
Personnel should be provided hazard communication training upon:
1. Initial assignment to a work area.
2. When a new chemical has been introduced.
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3. A new physical or health hazard has been identied or a process change has occurred
that involves a hazardous chemical.

At minimum the training should include:

1. Information regarding the method and observations that can be used to detect the
presence of a release of a hazardous chemical in the work area.
2. Physical and health hazard information.
3. Measures to protect the worker from harmful exposure, including, engineering, safe
work practices, emergency procedures, PPE use, etc.
4. Specic details on how to recognize and understand labels in the work area, MSDS
interpretation, and safe procedures when working with hazardous chemicals.

Non-Routine Task
Special considerations should be developed to handle non-routine work (e.g., upset or
emergency conditions, cleaning out vessels).

Contractors
Hazard communication information shall be shared with contractors and their
employees.

Safe Work Practices

Load lifting

The manufacturers rated load capacity shall not be exceeded on cranes or other load lifting
devices. This equipment should be operated and maintained in accordance with manufacturers
recommendations. Tag lines should be used to guide and steady all loads being lifted.

Confined space, excavations, and hazardous environments

Where hydrogen sulde, sulfur dioxide, carbon dioxide or other hazardous atmosphere is known
or suspected to exist, the operator shall ensure that personnel, contractor, and service company
supervisors are advised of the potential hazards. Safety guidelines and recommendations for use
in production operations where hydrogen sulde or sulfur dioxide gas may be encountered are
contained.
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A conned space is an area which:

a. Has adequate size and conguration for people to enter.
b. Has limited means of entry or exit.
c. Is not designed for continuous employee occupancy
Examples of conned spaces that can be found at onshore producing facilities are:
a. Well cellars
b. Electrical vaults
c. Fin fan coolers
d. Tanks
e. Vessels
f. Some diked areas
g. Valve pits

These recommendations are made recognizing that owners, operators, contractors, and their
personnel have separate responsibilities that may be contractual in nature. To ensure the safe
performance of work covered by these recommendations, each employer should provide training
and instruction for its personnel. It is not the intent of these recommendations to alter the
contractual relationship(s) between the parties.
The well owner or operator should provide and the contractor should seek pertinent information
that is known or assumed and that the contractor may need to assure a safe operation. At all
times, the specic work activity being performed should be under the immediate supervision of
an authorized person who has the authority to commence, modify, or cease the work methods or
operations, as necessary, to ensure the safety of affected personnel and the general public. The
authorized person should observe changing conditions and improve, whenever required, the
work methods to promote increased protection for the personnel.

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Conclusion
The technological process throughout history has led to the invention of SCADA Systems.
Being credited for its performance in control engineering, SCADA Systems has found their use
in many industries including the oil refineries. Refineries are the piece of puzzle that connects
crude oil supply and refined products. Till today, the only mean to transport crude oil to
refineries is through pipelines. As such, security is an important aspect in this context and this is
where SCADA systems come into play. SCADA systems help provide security to the whole
piping network. Parameters such as pressure, temperature and rate of flow of oil inside the
pipeline are measured by the use of a number of Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) placed along
the pipeline. The pipeline is then connected to the SCADA systems where necessary actions can
be taken by human monitoring the central information. If in the past couple of years, SCADA
systems have been like a necessary tool for the survival of oil industry in a tough market place
due to low crude oil prices, the vulnerabilities and disadvantages of SCADA systems should not
be overlooked. Due to SCADA systems being widely networked and distributed, they are prone
to external remote cyber threats. These threats include firstly, the unauthorized access to the
control software, whether by human access or unintentional changes made due to virus infections
and other software threats existing on the control host machine. Secondly, the bulk access to the
network segments hosting SCADA devices. Hence, SCADA systems need to be securised and
there are security researches working on it. Moreover, there is a risk of shortcomings in SCADA
alarm notifications systems. It is imperative to provide proper training of personnel in oil
refineries in terms of the use and protection of SCADA systems together with safety precautions
to take in case of late alarm notifications by SCADA systems.

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