Case Digest: Professor Randolf S. David, et. al. vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, et. al.

G.R. No. 171396

03 May 2006
Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
OVERVIEW:
This is a case of seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition alleging that in issuing Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion.
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a State of National Emergency invoking Section 18,
Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry out
appropriate actions to suppress and prevent the lawless violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the same. She did so
citing the following bases:
The elements of the elements of the Extreme Left (NDF-CPP-NPA) and Extreme Right are now in alliance threatening to
bring down the President;
Being magnified by the media, said acts are adversely affecting the economy thus representing clear and present danger
to the safety and integrity of the State
A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021. It must be noted that before the said proclamations, the following
course of events ensued:
February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a document entitled Oplan Hackle I detailing the plans for bombing more
particularly that which was to occur in the PMA Homecoming in Baguio City which the President was to attend.
February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a communist safehouse where 2 flash disks containing information that
Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I.
February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP-SAF were planning to defect.
Also, it was discovered that B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Col. Ariel Querubin were plotting to break the AFP chain of command
for a movement against the Arroyo administration. The two were later taken into custody by Gen. Senga. However,
statements were being released from the CPP-NPA and NDF on the increasing number of anti-Arroyo groups within the
police and military.
The bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan.
The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 are as follows:
Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the cancellation of programs and activities for the 20th celebration of Edsa I as
well as revocation of rally permits resulting in the violent disposal of the said groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner
Randolf David and Ronald Llamas.
Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and confiscation of news stories and various documents
Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis Party) by the police showing a 1985 warrant from the Marcos regime
and attempts on the arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al.
The petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987 Constitution have been violated, thus the case at
hand.
ISSUES:
Whether PP 1021 in lifting PP 1017 renders the petitions moot and academic;
Whether the Court may review the factual bases of PP1017 on the petitioners contention that the said proclamation
has none of it;

Whether PP 1017 and GO no. 5 are unconstitutional for their insofar as it allegedly violates the right of the people
against unreasonable search and seizures, the right against warrantless arrest, the freedom of speech, of expression, of
the press, and to peaceably assemble.
HELD:
The court held that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic.
During the eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers committed illegal acts implementing it. There is no
question that the issues being raised affect the publics interest involving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom
of expression, of assembly and of the press. An otherwise moot case may still be decided provided that the party
raising it continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance (Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary) which
is applicable in the present case.
Yes, the Court may do so. As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise of power, it must be proven
that the President did not act arbitrarily. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is
totally bereft of factual basis as the Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. This,
however, was something that the petitioners failed to prove.
Since there is no law defining acts of terrorism, it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5 who has the discretion to
determine what acts constitute terrorism, without restrictions. Certainly, the effects which may be implicated by such
violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, the acts of terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.
The plain import of the language of the Constitution provides that searches, seizures and arrests are normally
unreasonable without a search warrant or warrant of arrest. A warrantless arrest shall only be done if the offense is
committed in ones presence or it has just been committed based on personal knowledge both of which are not
present in Davids warrantless arrest. This being done during the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU, et. al. is
also violative of the right of the people to peaceably assemble. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a
blatant disregard of the principle that freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing
of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. Revocation of such permits
may only be done after due notice and hearing. In the Daily Tribune case, the search and seizure of materials for
publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of
government officials to media are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who
tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant
to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens rights under the Constitution, the
Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.

26 SCRA 150 Political Law The Legislative Department Journals vs Enrolled Bill
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not possess a
bachelors degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of
lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the
resignation of the former Chief, Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a
provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service,
approved the designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected his appointment for failure to meet the minimum
educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position. Instead, Subido certified other persons as
qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person may be appointed chief of a city police
agency unless he holds a bachelors degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record,
or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years;
or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of
captain and/or higher.

Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who has served the police department of a city can be
qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved
version was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree and has served either in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has
held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the
police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain
and/or higher.

Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged
from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase or has served as
chief of police with exemplary record. Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic
copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found
attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look
searchingly into the matter.
HELD: No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that
Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go
behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government
demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts
of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying
to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of
the legislative process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be
sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house.
To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal,
is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does
not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the
enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.