21.

Did it sound as though the statement of work/specifications provided by the

city to the PMT was vague for the design phase?

The statement of work provided by the city to the PMT was vague in the design
phase.

• The DIA was based upon a “house-on-the-Range” design. The city wanted a
wide open entry point for visitors.

• The city wanted a thing of beauty rather than an easy to clean airport which the
airport personnel needed.

• PMT complained that the direction given by airport personnel focused on

operational issues rather than aesthetic values.

• Furthermore, almost all decisions seemed to be made in reaction to

maintenance or technical issues.

• This created a problem for the design team because the project’s requirements
specified that the design reflect a signature image of the airport. The major
reasons for the same can be seen from the failure of PMT in achieving the
following.

• PMT failed to sort out the differences between the city’s aspirations and the
maintenance orientation of the operators.

• PMT failed to detect the cost and constructability issues with the first design
even though the partners had in house expertise.

• PMT did not appear to be aware that the first design may not have met the
project standards.

22.During the Design Phase, contractors were submitting re-estimation of work,

30 days after their original estimates, and the new estimates were up to $50
million larger than the prior estimates. Does this reflect up on the capabilities of
the PMT?

No, it does not reflect up on the capabilities of the PMT. They were correct in
taking action; the timing of the intervention again reveals something about the internal
dynamics of the project. By the time they took the action, the airport was already 6
months behind schedule and four opening dates had already been missed. In addition
the disastrous demonstration of the system had shown to the world how bad the state
of the project really was.
 The four missed opening dates and the disastrous demonstration indicate that
those at the highest level really had little idea what the true status of the project was.
Bringing in an external consultant to review the project was certainly a good decision,
but again it was a decision that was made far too late. A project of this size,
complexity and risk should have had a number of such reviews along the way and
independent expert assessment should have been a continual part of the project.

23. Should the PMT be qualified to perform risk analyses?

Yes, The PMT should definitely be qualified to perform risk analysis as DIA was
facing Recessionary problems. The Risk Analysis includes Risk Assessment, Risk
Management and Risk Communication. The case involves three preliminary risk
areas-

• Cost.

• Human resources.

• Bad Weather.

Also, one of the function or role of the Project Manager is to do risk analysis which is
important part of the project. PMT needs to make various Risk Checklists-

• Customer risk
• Quality risk
• Resource risk
• External environment risk
• End/deliverable risk
• Requirement risk
Therefore, PMT should be qualified to perform risk analyses.

24. Why were the architects co-ordinating the changes at the construction site?

The architects were co-ordinating the changes at the construction site to reduce
paper work and maintain the schedule. Architects heavy involvement during the
construction phase is highly unusual and the reason was that the PMT was abdicating
control to the architects who will be responsible for the coordination.

It was because of the PMT’s failure to sort out the differences between the
city’s aspirations and the maintenance orientation of the operators; their failure to
detect the cost and constructability issues with the first design that led to the burden of
responsibilities on the shoulders of the architects.

25. Should the PMT have been replaced?

Yes, the PMT should have been replaced for the followings reasons-

• There was change in Strategy at the onset of the project itself. The project
management team needed to do a better job of planning prior to the start of the
project.

• Decision to proceed – took more time that the scheduled time.

• Schedule scope and budget commitments. Knowingly they undertook risk.

• Negotiation Mistakes- even though Airlines were key stakeholders in the

system they were excluded from strategic decisions.

• Lack of Planning, Poor management oversight and ineffective communication.

• The PMT failed to sort out the differences between the city’s aspirations and
the maintenance orientation of the operators.

• They failed to detect the cost and constructability issues with the first design
even though both PMT partners had vast-in house expertise.

• The PMT also did not appear to be aware that the first design may not have met
the project’s standards.

• PMT did not know what to do with the Destination Coded Vehicle system. The
risks were unknown. The complexities of the system was unknown especially
Software Requirements.

• PMT was also abdicating control to the architects who would be responsible
for coordination.

• The trust that had developed during the early phases began evaporating.

26. Do scope changes reflect upon the ineffectiveness of a PMT?

Yes, the scope changes reflect upon the ineffectiveness of a PMT.

The various scope changes in the case are:

• Structural modifications of the terminal building( primarily in the Landside

Terminal and Concourse B) to accommodate the automated baggage system
 • Changes in the interior configuration of Concourse B
• Increase in the scope of various airline tenant finished , equipment, and
systems particularly in Concourse B
• Increase in the costs of runway, taxiway, and apron paving and change orders
as a result of changing specifications for the running light system.
• Grading, drainage, utilities, and access costs associated with the relocation of
air cargo facilities to the south side of the airport
• Increase in the scope and the cost of the communications and control systems,
particularly premises wiring.
Because of these scope changes the PMT failed to perform their roles effectively.

27. Why did the United Airlines decide to act as the project manager for the
baggage handling system on concourse B?

Airports are judged by passengers on their ability to handle their baggage

systems. Baggage handling is at the heart of an airport. The automated baggage
handling system at the Denver International Airport (DIA) was a huge undertaking.

The baggage handling systems at DIA connects gates in three concourses

where baggage are loaded on and off the plane with two main terminals where
passengers check and claim their luggage. United Airlines in the early planning stages
insisted on an automated baggage system, like the one it operated in San Francisco.
United Airlines did not want to operate on the conventional baggage system because it
was time consuming and labor intensive. Denver officials decided that an automated
baggage handling system, most closely resembling the one at Frank Joseph Strauss
Airport in Munich, would be designed at the Denver International Airport.

United Airlines changes were more significant. It widened concourse B by 8

feet to accommodate two moving walkways in each directions. It added a second level
of service and had the roof redesigned to provide a clerestory of natural light. Most
important, United wanted a destination-coded vehicle (DCV) baggage handling
system where bags could be transferred between gates in less than 10 minutes, thus
supporting short turnaround times. The DCV was to be on Concourse B (United)
only.

Denver, after some consideration concluded that all the concourses at the
airport would operate on the automated high speed baggage handling system, not
limiting it only to United Airlines.