Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Page
Sec. 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to
suppress evidence, where to fi le .............
689
695
695
IV. EVIDENCE
A.
Preliminary Considerations
1.
2.
3.
4.
698
698
703
704
1. Object as e v id e n ce .....................................
B. Documentary Evidence
S ec. 2. Documentary E viden ce.............................
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. O riginal docum ent m ust be produced;
excep tion s....................................................
Sec. 4. Original of docum ent.................................
2. Secondary Evidence
Sec. 5. When original document is unavailable
Sec. 6 . When original document is in adverse
partys custody or con tro l.........................
Sec. 8 . Party who calls for document not bound
to offer i t ......................................................
3. Parol Evidence Rule
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original docu
ment is a public re co rd ..............................
xlvii
715
718
718
719
723
726
726
728
Page
Sec.
9.
Sec. 10.
Sec. 11.
Sec. 12.
Sec. 13.
Sec. 14.
Sec. 15.
Sec. 16.
Sec. 17.
Sec. 18.
Sec. 19.
Sec. 20.
Sec. 2 1 .
Sec. 22.
Sec. 23.
Sec. 24.
Sec. 25.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
26.
27.
28.
29.
xlviii
729
735
735
735
736
736
736
736
736
737
737
737
738
740
743
746
753
754
756
758
759
TAHI, OK CONTENTB
Page
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
30.
31.
32.
33.
Hqc. 34.
Sec. 35.
Hoc. 36.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
37.
38.
39.
40.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
Sec. 48.
Sec. 49.
Sec. 50.
C.
760
762
762
764
774
775
775
778
782
784
784
786
787
791
792
795
796
796
800
800
800
R u le 131. B u r d e n o f P r o o f a n d P re s u m p tio n s
Sec.
1. Burden o f p r o o f...........................................
xlix
815
Page
S ec. 2 . Conclusive presum ptions.........................
Sec. 3. Disputable presum ptions.........................
S ec. 4. No p resu m p tion o f le g itim a cy or i l
legitim acy.....................................................
820
820
831
1.
2.
3.
4.
Presentation of Evidence
839
839
841
844
845
845
845
845
847
848
848
849
849
852
853
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memoran
dum ................................................................
Sec. 17. When part of transaction, writing or
record given in evidence, the remainder
adm issible....................................................
Bee I K. Right to inspect w riting shown to w it
ness ................................................................
It Authentication and Proof of Documents
Bor. 19. Classes of docu m en ts................................
Hoc. 20. Proof of private d ocu m en t.......................
Sec. 2 1 . When evidence of authenticity o f pri
vate document not necessary..................
Sec. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence.................
Sec. 24. Proof of official record ...............................
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must s ta te .....
Sec. 26. Irremovability o f public record ...............
Sec. 27. Public record of a private docu m en t.....
Sec. 28. Proof of lack of r e c o r d ...............................
Sec. 29. How judicial record im peached...............
Sec. 30. Proof of notarial docum ents....................
Sec. 31. Alterations in document, how to explain
Sec. 32. S e a l................................................................
Sec. 33. Docum entary evidence in an unofficial
language ......................................................
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
li
854
855
855
856
858
858
858
860
860
861
861
862
862
862
863
866
866
867
867
868
869
869
869
870
870
HK.MI'-IWAI. I;AW C O M P E N D I U M
Page
E.
mined ..........................................................
S ec. 2 . Proof beyond reasonable d ou bt.............
Sec. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient
ground for conviction...............................
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient
Sec. 5. Substantial evid en ce...............................
Sec. 6 . Power o f the court to stop further evi
dence ...........................................................
Sec. 7. Evidence on m otion .................................
876
876
896
898
900
901
901
APPENDICES
A - An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State
o f A ny P rop erty Found to H ave Been
Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer
or E m p loyee and P ro v id in g for the
Procedure Therefor (R.A. 1379)..................
905
909
910
912
914
lii
IV. EVIDENCE*
A. PR ELIM IN AR Y C O N SID ER ATIO N S
RULE 128
GEN ER AL PR O VISIO N S
S ection 1 . E vidence defined. E viden ce is the
m eans, sanctioned by these rules, o f ascertaining
in a ju d ic ia l p roceed in g s the tru th resp e ctin g a
m atter o f fact. (1)
Sec. 2. S cope. The ru les o f ev id en ce sh all
be th e sam e in a ll c o u r ts and in all tr ia ls and
hearings, except as otherw ise provided by law or
these rules. (2a)
NO TES
1 . Sec. 1 o f Rule 128 provides the legal definition of
evidence. Evidence is the m ode and m anner o f proving
com petent facts in judicial proceedings (Bustos vs. Lucent,
etc., 81 Phil. 640).
2 . P roof is the result or effect o f evidence. W hen tho
requisite quantum o f evidence of a particular fact has been
duly adm itted and given weight, the result is called Hi"
p roof o f such fact.
mm
RULE 128
GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECS. 1-2
<;)!)
H U lil< iv.H
m i -v h
700
HIMiK ivti
SECS. 1-2
a.
R elevan t, m aterial, and com petent evid en ce.
R elevant evidence is evidence having any value in reason
701
HULK 128
i * ,
702
It 111, M 12H
( IE N K K A I, P R O V IS IO N S
SEC. :i
703
H U LK 128
E l1 4
704
ifiM.iv r'H
U EN KHAT, P R O V IS IO N S
S K O S. 3-4
705
lUll.rc 128
HRCH i 4
706
HUM'', 128
O K N K H A I, IUOVI.MIONS
H 10( \M a I
707
RU1/K IZH
R E M E D I A L I,AW C O M P E N D I U M
S E t'H
3 4
7. C ir c u m s t a n t ia l e v id e n c e is th e e v id e n c e o f
collateral facts or circum stances from w hich an inference
m ay be draw n as to the probability or im probability o f the
facts in dispute (Moran, loc. cit.). Circum stantial evidence
is legal evidence and, if sufficient, can sustain a judgm ent
(see Sec. 4, Rule 133). Circum stantial evidence is evidence
o f relevant collateral facts.
8 . A s a d m issib ility o f evid en ce is d eterm in ed by
its relevance and com petence, adm issibility is, therefore,
an affair o f logic and law. On the other hand, the w eight
to be given to such evidence, once adm itted, depends on
ju d ic ia l ev a lu a tion w ith in the gu id elin es p rov id ed in
Rule 133 and the decisional rules o f the Suprem e Court.
Thus, while evidence may be adm issible, it may be entitled
to little or no w eight at all. Conversely, evidence w hich
may have evidentiary w eight may be inadm issible because
a special rule forbids its reception.
708
MJLE 128
(IKNKItAL PROVISIONS
SECS. :i 4
709
RULE 12H
HIJCS 8-4
710
O K N K U A L IlIO V IH IQ N H
MKCM ;t 1
(g)
E le c t r o n ic d a ta m e s s a g e r e f e r s
in form ation generated, sent, received or stored by
electronic, optical or sim ilar means.
711
to
R U L E 12H
I t K M K M A L i.AW C O M P E N D I U M
(h )
Electronic docum ent refers to inform ation
or the representation o f inform ation, data, figures,
s y m b o ls o r o th e r m od es o f w r itt e n e x p r e s s io n ,
described or how ever represented, by w hich a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which
a fact may be proved and affirm ed, w hich is received,
recorded, transm itted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically. It includes digitally signed
docum ents and printout, or output, readable by sight
o r o t h e r m e a n s, w h ich a c c u r a t e ly r e f le c t s th e
electronic data m essage or electronic docum ent. For
purposes o f these Rules, the term electronic document
may be used interchangeably w ith electron ic data
m essage.
G iven these definitions, we go back to the original
q u estion : Is an o rig in a l p rin t-o u t o f a fa c sim ile
transm ission an electronic data m essage or electronic
docum ent?
The definitions under the Electronic Commerce Act
o f 2000, its IRR and the Rules on Electronic Evidence,
at first glance, convey the im pression that facsim ile
tr a n s m is s io n s a re e le c t r o n ic d a ta m e s s a g e s or
e le c t r o n ic d o c u m e n ts b e c a u s e th e y a re se n t by
electro n ic m eans. T he exp a n d ed d e fin itio n o f an
electronic data m essage under the IRR, consistent
with the U N CITRAL M odel Law, further supports this
th eory con sid erin g that the en u m eration xxx [is]
not lim ited to ele ctro n ic data in terch a n g e (E D I),
electronic mail, telegram or telecopy. And to telecopy
is to send a docum ent from one p la ce to another via a
fa x m achine.
x x x
T h e r e is n o q u e s t io n t h a t w h e n C o n g r e s s
form u la ted the term electron ic data m essa ge, it
712
HUI.lt r.'H
(IIC N K R A I, I'lt O V IH lO N S
MUCH :t 1
713
RULE 128
HBCS. 3 4
d ra fte d th e la w , it e x clu d e d th e e a r ly fo r m s o f
technology, like telegraph, telex, and telecopy (except
c o m p u t e r g e n e r a t e d fa x e s , w h ic h is a n e w e r
developm ent as com pared to the ordinary fax m achine
to fax machine transm ission), when it defined the term
electronic data m essage.
x x x
We, therefore, conclude that the term s electron ic
data m essage and electronic d ocu m en t, as defined
in the E lectronic Com m erce A ct o f 2000, do not include
a fa csim ile transm ission. A ccordingly, a fa csim ile
tra n s m iss io n ca n n o t be co n s id e r e d as e le c tr o n ic
ev id e n ce. It is not the fu n c tio n a l e q u iv a le n t o f
an o rig in a l u n d er the B est E viden ce R ule and is
not adm issible as electronic evidence.
Since a facsim ile transm ission is not an electronic
data m essage or an electronic docum ent, and cannot
be considered as electron ic evidence by the C ourt,
w ith grea ter rea son is a p h otocop y o f such a fax
transm ission not electronic evidence. In the present
case, th erefore, the Pro F orm a In voice N os. ST2PO STS0401-1 and ST2-PO STS0401-2 (E xhibits E
and F), w hich are mere photocopies o f the original
fax transm ittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary
to the position o f both the trial and the appellate
courts.
714
715
HIM,!'; I.'KI
SBC
716
HIM ,K 181)
HKC. I
717
R U L E 130
r e m e d ia l
l a w
C O M P E N D IU M
SECS,
2-B
his fa cia l fea tu res to determ ine his resem b lan ce and
possible relationship to another (Chua Yeng vs. Collector
o f Custom s, 28 Phil. 591), or his racial origin (Leong vs.
Collector o f Customs, 31 Phil. 417), his probable age (U.S.
vs. A g a d a s et al., 3 6 Phil. 246; B raca vs. C ollector o f
Customs, 36 Phil 929; Lim Cheng vs. Collector o f Customs,
42 Phil. 876)\ or, in the case of a wom an, to establish the
fact o f pregnancy (V illaflor vs. Sum m ers, 41 Phil. 62).
B. D ocum entary Evidence
Sec. 2. D ocum entary evidence. D ocum ents as
e v id e n c e c o n s is t o f w r it in g s or a n y m a t e r ia l
containing letters, words, num bers, figures, symbols
or other m odes o f w ritten expressions offered as
p ro of of their contents, (n)
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. O r ig in a l d o c u m e n t m u st be p r o d u c e d ;
excep tion s. W h en the su b ject o f in q u iry is the
c o n te n ts o f a d o c u m e n t, no e v id e n c e s h a ll be
adm issible other than the original docum ent itself,
except in the follow in g cases:
(a) W h e n th e o r ig in a l h a s b e e n lo s t or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, w ithout
bad faith on the part o f the offeror;
(b) W hen the original is in the custody or under
the control o f the party against w hom the evidence
is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) W h en the o rig in a l c o n sists o f n u m erou s
a c c o u n ts or o th e r d o cu m e n ts w h ich c a n n o t be
exam ined in court w ithout great loss o f tim e and
the fact sought to be established from them is only
718
Hu i . k i mo
HttC 1
(d)
W hen the original is a public record in the
custody o f a public officer or is recorded in a public
office. (2a)
Sec. 4. O riginal o f docum ent. (a) The origin al
o f a docu m ent is one the contents o f w hich are the
subject o f inquiry.
(b) W h en a docum ent is in two or m ore copies
executed at or about the same tim e, with id entical
contents, all such copies are equally regarded as
origin als.
(c) W h en an entry is repeated in the regular
course, o f business, one being copied from another
at or near the tim e o f the transaction, all the entries
are likew ise equally regarded as originals. (3a)
N O TES
1 . A docum ent is a deed, instrum ent or other duly
authorized paper by which som ething is proved, evidenced
or set forth (U.S. vs. Orera, 11 Phil. 596; cf. P eople vs.
Cam acho, 44 Phil. 484). D ocum entary evidence is that
w hich is furnished by w ritten instrum ents, inscriptions
and docum ents o f all kinds (3 2 C.J.S. 465).
719
i t m , i ' ; i .10
R K M B D I A l . I,AW C O M P E N D I U M
NICC
720
H U I.K
UK)
SliO . 4
721
HU1,10 130
iftC
-i
722
HUI.K l:I0
HIII.KK O K A D M I H S I I I I M ' I Y
HKC r.
723
RULE 130
HISC ft
724
IU II.K M O K A D M I H H I M U T Y
SKC. I)
725
RULE 130
HUC8 . 0 , H
726
miu<; i:to
H U L K S O F ADM1HHIHILJTY
iE C S
(I, H
727
RULE 180
HE Cl 7
728
KUI.I'i 1MO
III11,KM O P A D M t H S IIIlM T Y
HKC f)
729
RULE 130
SEC. 0
730
HUM'; iHo
HKC ti
731
H U L K 130
R E M E D IA L L A W G O M I E N D IU M
HK G
li
732
HI 11,10 130
HULKS OF ADMISSIBILITY
SEC. 0
733
RULE 130
SEC. (I
734
UU 1 .K 1:10
HULKS O F A D M ISSIB IL IT Y
SECS.
I ()-!?,
735
R U L E 180
R E M E D IA L LAW CO M P E N D IU M
SECS.
1 a -17
736
HULK 130
SECS.
IM ID, 2 0
737
RULE 130
SEC. 21
738
1(111.K ISO
RUKKK O K A D M 1 S 8 I1 1 IU T Y
I -i
739
RU L E 130
R E M E D IA L L A W C O M P E N D IU M
8 K<' <n
740
HUI.K UK)
R U I.K S OK A D M L SK IB IM 'I'Y
sa<....
741
RULE 130
HKC T l
742
HUI.K I MO
NICC an
743
RULE 130
SEC. 2.1
744
H U LK i:u>
ItULKH OK AD M 1 SH 1 IIIU T Y
HKi' T.\
745
HULK 130
8 EC, 24
746
Kill,!', 130
SEC
24
747
uuu<: iso
K K M H U 1 A I . IA W C O M I K N D I U M
HKC
'.M
expressly or im pliedly.
2.
For the disqualification by reason o f the m arital
privilege to apply, it is necessary that: (a) There w as a
valid m arital relation; (b) The privilege is invoked with
resp ect to a con fid en tia l com m u n ica tion b etw een the
spouses during said m arriage; and (c) The spouse against
whom such evidence is being offered has not given his or
her consent to such testim ony.
a. A ccordingly, the privilege cannot be claim ed with
respect to com m unications made prior to the m arriage of
the spouses.
b. Since the confidential nature o f the com m unication
is the basis o f the privilege, the same cannot be invoked
w here it w as not intended to be kept in confidence by
the spouse w ho received the sam e, as in the case o f a
dying declaration o f the husband to his w ife as to who
w as his assailant (U.S. vs. A ntipolo, 37 Phil. 726), w hich
com m unication was obviously intended to be reported to
the authorities. The privilege is lost if the com m unication
is overheard or com es into the hands o f a th ird party,
w hether legally or not (People vs. Carlos, 47 Phil. 626),
by reason o f the fact that w hile the spouse is covered by
the prohibition, such third party is not and, consequently,
can testify thereon. It is necessary, how ever, that there
w as no collusion w ith or voluntary disclosure by either
spouse to the third person, otherw ise the latter becom es
an agent o f the spouse and w ould thereby be covered by
the prohibition.
c. The rules on disqualification by reason o f marriage
and the disqualification by reason o f the m arital privilege
m ay be distinguished as follow s: (a) The form er can be
invoked only if one o f the spouses is a party to the action,
w hile the latter can be claim ed w hether or not the spouse
is a party to the action; (b) The form er applies only if the
748
HUM'; I III)
Hific:. 24
749
HUL1 1.30
SEC. U
750
Htil.io
1:10
RULES OK ADMISSIIHI.ITY
SICC, 24
4.
For the disqualification arising from the physicianpatient privilege to apply, it is necessary that (a) The
physician is authorized to practice m edicine, surgery or
obstetrics; (b) The inform ation was acquired or the advice
or treatm ent was given by him in his professional capacity
for the purpose o f treating and curing the patient; (c) The
in fo rm a tio n , a d vice or trea tm en t, i f re v e a le d , w ou ld
blacken the reputation o f the patient; and (d) The privilege
is invoked in a civil case, w hether the patient is a party
thereto or not.
a. It is not n ecessa ry th a t the p h y sicia n -p a tie n t
relationship was created through the voluntary act o f the
patient. Thus, the treatm ent may have been given at the
beh est o f another, the patient being in extrem is.
b . The privilege extends to all forms o f communication,
advice or treatm ent and includes inform ation acquired by
the p h y sicia n from his p rofession a l ob serv a tion s and
exam in ation o f the patient.
c. The privilege does not apply w here (1) the com
m unication w as not given in confidence; ( 2 ) the com m u
n ica tion is irrelevant to the p rofession al em ploym ent;
(3) the com m unication was made for an unlaw ful purpose,
as When it is intended for the com m ission or concealm ent
o f a crim e; (4) the inform ation was intended to be made
public; or (5) there was a w aiver o f the privilege either by
provisions o f contract or law.
d. U nder Rule 28 o f the Rules o f Court, the results of
the physical and m ental exam ination o f a person, w hen
ordered by the court, are intended to be made public, hence
they can be divulged in that proceeding and cannot be
objected to on the ground o f privilege. Also, results of
a u to p sie s or p o stm o rtem ex a m in a tion s are g en era lly
intended to be divulged in court, aside from the fact that
the d octors services w ere not for purposes o f m edical
treatm ent.
751
RUM'S iao
HKC ''1
e.
An exam ple o f a w aiver o f the privilege by pro
vision o f law is found in Sec. 4 o f said Rule 28 under which
if the party exam ined obtains a report on said exam ination
or takes the deposition o f the exam iner, he thereby waives
any p rivilege regarding any other exam in ation o f said
physical or m ental condition conducted or to be conducted
on him by any other physician. W aiver o f the privilege
by contract m ay be found in stipulations in life insurance
policies.
5. The disqualification due to privileged com m unica
tions betw een m inisters or priests and penitents require
that the sam e were made pursuant to a religious duty
enjoined in the course o f discipline o f the sect or den o
m ination to w hich they belong and m ust be confidential
and penitential in character, e.g., under the seal o f the
confessional.
6 . The disqu alification because o f p rivileged com
m unications to public officers requires (a) that it was made
to the public officer in official confidence; and (b) that
pu blic in terest w ou ld su ffer by the disclosu re o f such
com m unication, as in the case o f State secrets. W here
no public interest would be prejudiced, this rule does not
apply (Banco Filipino vs. M onetary Board, G.R. No. 70054,
J uly 8, 1986).
752
RULE 130
HULKS OK ADMISSIBILITY
SKO. 25
753
RULE 130
SEC, 26
754
H U M ', 130
HEC 26
755
RULE 130
SEC. 27
9.
Flight from justice is an adm ission by conduct and
circum stantial evidence o f consciousness o f guilt (U.S. vs.
Sarikala, 37 Phil. 486; P eople vs. Sam onte, Jr., L-31225,
J u n e 11, 1 9 7 5 ; P e o p le vs. R e a lo n , et a l., L -3 0 8 3 2 ,
Aug. 29, 1980; People vs. Berm oy, L-48502-03, June 17,
1981; People vs. Jabeguero, G.R. No. 61978, Oct. 24, 1983;
P eople vs. Bocasas, G.R. No. 61134, July 15, 1985). Also,
eviden ce o f attem pts to suppress evidence, as b y d es
t r u c tio n o f d o cu m e n ta ry e v id e n c e or e lo ig n m e n t o f
w itnesses, are adm issible under the same rationale.
10.
The act o f repairing a m achine, bridge or other
fa cility a fter an in ju ry has been su sta in ed th erein is
not an im plied adm ission o f negligence by conduct. It
is m erely a m easu re o f extrem e ca u tion by a d op tin g
a d d it io n a l s a fe g u a r d s s in c e , d e s p ite d u e ca re and
diligence, an unexpected accident can still occu r (see 5
M oran, loc. cit., p. 223).
Sec. 27. Offer o f com prom ise not adm issible. In
c iv il c a s e s , an o ffe r o f c o m p r o m is e is n o t an
ad m ission o f any liability, and is not adm issible in
evidence against the offeror.
In crim inal cases, except those in volvin g qu asi
offenses (crim inal negligence) or those allow ed by
law to be com prom ised, an offer o f com prom ise by
th e accu sed m ay be receiv ed in e v id en c e as an
im plied adm ission o f guilt.
A p lea o f g u ilty la te r w ith d ra w n , or an u n
accepted offer o f a plea o f guilty to a lesser offense,
is not adm issible in evidence against the accused
w ho m ade the plea or offer.
A n o ffe r to pay or th e p a y m en t o f m e d ic a l,
hospital or other expenses occasioned by an injury
is not ad m issible in evidence as p ro o f o f civil or
crim inal liability for the injury. (24a)
756
ItULIC I MO
SIOC "7
N O TES
1. As a rule, an offer o f com prom ise in a civil case is
not a tacit adm ission o f liability and cannot be proved over
the objection o f the offeror, unless such offer is clearly not
on ly to b u y p e a ce b u t am ou n ts to an a d m ission of
liability, the offered com prom ise being directed only to the
am ount to be paid (see El Varadero de M anila vs. Insular
Lum ber Co., 46 Phil. 176).
2. In crim inal cases, an offer o f com prom ise is an
im plied adm ission o f guilt (People vs. Sope, et al., 75 Phil.
810), although the accused may be perm itted to prove that
such offer w as not made under consciousness o f guilt but
m erely to avoid the risks o f crim inal action against him
(U.S. vs. M aqui, 2 7 Phil. 97).
3. In p r o s e c u tio n s fo r v io la t io n o f th e in te r n a l
revenue laws, such offers o f com prom ise are not adm issible
in evidence as the law provides that the paym ent o f any
internal revenue tax may be com prom ised, and all crim inal
v iola tion s m ay likew ise be com prom ised, except those
already filed in court and those involving fraud (Sec. 204,
R.A. 8424 [T a x R eform A ct o f 1997]).
4. W hile rape cases can in effect be com prom ised by
actual m arriage o f the parties since crim inal liab ility is
th ereby extinguished (Art. 344, last par., R evised P enal
Code), an offer to compromise for a monetary consideration,
and not to m arry the victim , is an im plied adm ission of
guilt (People vs. A m iscua, L-31238, Feb. 27, 1971). In
P eople vs. M anzano (L-38449, Nov. 25, 1982), the attem pt
o f the parents o f the accused to settle the case w ith the
com plainant w as considered an im plied adm ission o f guilt.
A t any rate, the Suprem e Court has held that an offer of
m arriage by the accused, during the investigation o f the
rape case, is also an adm ission o f guilt (People vs. Valdez,
G.R. No. 51034, M ay 29, 1987).
757
RULE 130
SEC, 28
758
kulk
mo
O',I' '4H
759
RULE 130
BBC. 30
agent o f the client, subject to the lim itation that the same
should not am ount to a com prom ise [Sec. 23, R ule 138]
or confession o f judgm ent (Acenas, et al. vs. Sison, et al.,
L -17011, Aug. 30, 1963).
5.
The phrase join t debtor does not refer to mere
com m unity o f interest but should be understood according
to its m eaning in the com m on law system from w hich the
p r o v is io n w a s ta k e n , th a t is, in so lid u m , a n d n ot
m ancom unada (Jaucian vs. Querol, etc., 88 Phil. 707; cf.
A goncillo, et al. vs. Javier, etc., 38 Phil. 424).
Sec. 30. A d m iss io n by co n s p ira to r . T he act
or d e c la r a tio n o f a c o n s p ir a to r r e la tin g to the
conspiracy and during its existence, m ay be given
in evid en ce again st the c o -c o n sp ira to r after the
conspiracy is show n by evidence other than such
act or d eclaration. (27)
N O TES
1. T his rule applies on ly to extra ju d icia l acts or
statements and not to testim ony given on the witness stand
at the trial w here the party adversely affected thereby
has the opportunity to cross-exam ine the declarant (People
vs. Serrano, et al., 1 0 5 Phil. 531). Hence, the requirem ent
that the co n sp ira cy m ust p relim in a rily be p rov ed by
evidence other than the conspirators adm ission applies
on ly to e x tra ju d icia l, b u t not to ju d ic ia l, a d m ission s
(People vs. N ierra, et al., L-32624, Feb. 12, 1980).
2. A n a d m issio n by a co n s p ir a to r is a d m issib le
against his co-conspirator if (a) such conspiracy is show n
by evidence aliunde, (b) the adm ission was made during
the existence o f the conspiracy, and (c) the adm ission
relates to the conspiracy itself. These are not required
in a d m ission s du rin g the tria l as the co -a ccu sed can
760
Kill, Is 130
Kill,ICS O F A D M IS S IIIIU T Y
Mice :ki
761
RULE 130
SECS. 31. 32
762
HUM1', 1ao
si'ii i.
32
763
RULE 130
SBC. 33
764
m u .K i;m
R U L E S 01*' A D M IS S IB IL IT Y
S E C . aa
a. T h e co n fe s s io n m u st in v o lv e an e x p re ss and
categorical acknow ledgm ent o f guilt (U.S. us. Corrales, 28
Phil. 362)-,
b. T he fa cts a d m itted m ust be co n s titu tiv e o f a
crim inal offense (U.S. vs. Flores, 26 Phil. 262)]
c. The confession m ust have been given voluntarily
(P eople vs. N ishishim a, 57 Phil. 26);
d. The confession must have been intelligently made
(B ilaan us. Cusi, L-18179, June 29, 1962), the accused
realizin g the im portance or legal significance o f his act
(U.S. vs. A gatea, 40 Phil. 596)] and
e. T h ere m ust have been no v iola tion o f Sec. 1 2 ,
Art. I l l o f the 1987 Constitution.
5. Confessions are presum ed to be voluntary and the
onus is on the defense to prove that it w as involuntary for
having been obtained by violence, intim idation, threat or
prom ise o f rew ard or leniency (People us. Garcia, 101 Phil.
615).
6 . The follow ing circum stances have been held to be
indicia o f the voluntariness o f a confession:
a.
The confession contains details w hich the police
cou ld not have supplied or invented (P eople vs. Bersam in,
765
RULE 130
SEC. 33
766
1(111,1'. 1,10
HULKS OK ADMIHHIltll.ITY
HKc :t;i
767
HU 1,1C 130
sice :i;i
768
HWI.K I III)
H U LK S OK A D M IS S I HI LITY
HKC 311
769
RULE 130
SEC. an
770
11111,15 i:to
RULES OK ADMISSIBILITY
HKC
II!l
771
RULE 130
8 ICC. :i;l
772
KUI.I'', 130
SEC. 33
773
R U L E 130
R E M E D IA L LAW C O M P E N D IU M
SEC, 34
774
RU LE i a o
B U LKS O P A D M IS S IB IL IT Y
S E C S . JIB, 30
775
RULE i:$o
SEC HO
776
hum
-; i;m
SR C
M0
Ill
RULE 130
SEC. 37
( 1) D ying D eclaration
Sec. 37. D ying declaration. The d eclaration o f
a dying person, m ade under the consciousness o f
an im pending death, m ay be received in any case
w h e re in h is d ea th is the su b je c t o f in q u ir y , as
e v id e n ce o f the cause and su rro u n d in g c ir c u m
stances o f such death. (31a)
778
HUI.K 130
Htll.KH O P A D M1 S H I H 1 MT Y
HUG. M7
NOTES
1. A dying declaration, also known as an ante mortem
statem ent or a statem ent in articulo mortis, is adm issible
under the follow ing requisites: (1) That death is im m inent
and the declarant is conscious o f the fact; (2) That the
declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circu m
stances o f such death; (3) T hat the declaration relates
to facts w hich the victim is com petent to testify to; and
(4) That the declaration is offered in a case w herein the
declarants death is the subject o f the inquiry.
2. A d e cla ra tio n w ill be d eem ed as h a v in g been
m ade u n der the con sciou sn ess o f im m in en t death, in
consideration o f
(a) The w ords or statem ents o f the declarant on the
sam e occasion;
(b) His conduct at the time the declaration was made
(U.S. vs. Virrey, 37 Phil. 618); or
(c) T h e seriou s n a tu re o f h is w ou n d s as w ou ld
n ecessarily engender a b elief on his part that he would
not survive therefrom (P eople vs. A vila, 92 Phil. 805;
P e o p le vs. S a ra b ia , et a l., L -2 7 4 2 2 , Jan. 30, 1984),
especially w here he died an hour thereafter (P eople vs.
Brioso, et al., L-28482, Jan. 30, 1971; People vs. Garcia,
L-44364, A pril 27, 1979; People vs. A raja, et al., L-24780,
June 21, 1981).
3. The in terv en in g tim e from the m a k in g o f the
d ecla ra tion up to the actual death o f the decla ra n t is
im m aterial, as long as the declaration w as m ade under,
the consciousness o f im pending death (U.S. vs. M allari,
29 Phil. 14) w hich is a question o f fact for the trial court
to determ ine (People vs. Extra, L-29205, July 30, 1976),
and as long as no retraction w as m ade by the declarant
u ntil his dem ise. W here the gravity o f the w ound did not
779
RULE 130
HICC'. 37
780
h i i i .io
ian
SEC. 37
781
RULE 130
SEC. :ih
requisites concur.
8 . A dying declaration may be oral or w ritten or made
by signs w hich could be interpreted and testified to by a
w itness thereto. The wife o f the declarant may testify to
the sam e, either for the prosecution or as a w itness for the
defense, and this does not violate the m arital privilege as
a d y in g d e cla ra tio n is not co n sid e re d a co n fid e n tia l
com m unication betw een the spouses (U.S. vs. A ntipolo,
supra). I f the ante mortem statem ent w as m ade orally,
the w itness who heard it m ay testify thereto, w ithout
necessarily reproducing the exact words as long as he can
give the substance thereof, and if the deceased had an
unsigned dying declaration, the same may be used as a
m em orandum by the w itness who took it dow n (People vs.
Odencio, et al., L -31961, Jan. 9, 1979).
782
HULK nil)
lUIl,KM OK A D M IS S IB IL IT Y
-IICO I1H
in te r e st, th a t a r e a so n a b le m an in h is p o sitio n
w ould not have m ade the d ecla ra tio n u n less he
believed it to be true, m ay be received in evidence
again st h im se lf or his successors in in terest and
against third persons. (32a)
NOTES
1. T here is a vital distinction betw een adm issions
a g a in s t in te r e s t a n d d e c la r a tio n s a g a in s t in te r e s t.
A dm issions against interest are those m ade by a party to
a litigation or by one in privity w ith or identified in legal
interest w ith such party, and are adm issible w hether or
not the declarant is available as a w itness. D eclarations
a g a in st in te re s t are th ose m ade by a p erson w ho is
neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are
secon dary evidence but constitute an exception to the
hearsay rule, and are adm issible only w hen the declarant
is u n a v a ila b le as a w itn ess (N eely us. K a n sa s P u b lic
Seruice Co., 252 S.VK. 2d 88; see also Note 6 under Sec. 26
o f this Rule).
2. In order that a statem ent may be adm issible as a
declaration against interest, it is required that (a) the
declarant is dead or unable to testify; (b) it relates to a
fact against the interest o f the declarant; (c) at the tim e
he m ade said declaration the declarant was aw are that
the sam e w as con trary to h is a foresa id in terest; and
(d) the declarant had no m otive to falsify and believed
such declaration to be true (see Ong us. CA, et al., L-47674,
Oct. 30, 1980).
3. A declaration against interest is the opposite o f a
se lf serving declaration w hich is a statem ent favorable
to or intended to advance the interests o f the declarant.
C onsequently, a self-serving declaration is inadm issible
as b ein g h ea rsa y i f the d ecla ra n t is u n a v a ila b le as a
witness.
783
RULE 130
HEC8, HtJ 40
4.
In People vs. Toledo and H olgado (51 Phil. 825),
it was opined by three justices that a declaration admitting
that he w as the one w ho killed the victim , m ade by a
declarant who died shortly thereafter, is adm issible w here
another person was subsequently charged as the killer of
the sam e victim , under the theory that said declaration
w as one against the penal interest o f the declarant. This
w ould be a ju stifiable theory since under our penal laws a
p e rs o n cr im in a lly lia b le is also civ illy lia b le, a n d is
sustained under the present am ended rule w hich does not
delim it or distinguish as to the interest against w hich the
declaration is made.
(3) Act or D eclaration A bout Pedigree
Sec. 39. A ct or declaration about pedigree. The
act or declaration o f a person deceased, or unable
to te s tify in resp e ct to the p ed ig ree o f an oth er
person related to him by birth or m arriage, m ay be
received in evidence w here it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship betw een the two
persons is show n by evidence other than such act
or d e c la r a tio n . T he w ord p e d ig r e e in c lu d e s
r e la tio n sh ip , fa m ily g e n e a lo g y , b irth , m a rria g e ,
death, the dates when and the places where these
facts occu rred , and the nam es o f the relatives. It
em braces also facts o f fam ily h isto ry in tim a tely
connected w ith pedigree. (33a)
(4) Fam ily Reputation or T radition
Regarding Pedigree
Sec. 40. Fam ily reputation or tradition regarding
p ed ig ree. The re p u ta tio n or tr a d itio n e x istin g
in a fam ily previous to the controversy, in respect
784
H U L K UK)
UUI.ICS O F A D M I S S I B I L I T Y
SECS. Mil 40
785
RULE 130
SEC. 41
786
H U L K iao
HULKS OK ADMIMHIIIIL1TY
H1C(
787
RULE 130
SEC. 42
788
ifiii.i'', in o
Hind
ia
im pen din g death, w hile the rule o f res g esta e has its
ju stifica tion in the spontaneity o f the statem ent.
Consequently, while the statem ents o f the victim may
not qualify as a dying declaration because it was not m ade
under the consciousness o f im pending death (P eople vs.
P alam os, et al., 49 Phil. 601), it may still be adm issible as
part o f the res gestae if it w as m ade im m ediately after the
in ciden t (People vs. R eyes, 52 Phil. 538; P eople vs. Abboc,
et al., L-28327, Sept. 14, 1973, and cases therein cited;
P eople vs. Pascual, et al., L -29893, Feb. 23, 1978; People
vs. A raja, et al., L-24780, June 29, 1981) or a few hours
thereafter (People vs. Tum alip, et al., L -28451, Oct. 28,
1 974; P eo p le vs. L an za, su p ra ; cf. P eo p le vs. B a ib a s
L-47686, June 24, 1983). H ow ever, w here the elem ents
o f both are present, the statem ent m ay be adm itted both
as a d y in g d e cla ra tio n and as p a rt o f th e res g es ta e
(P eo p le vs. B aibas, su p ra ; P eop le vs. C ortezan o, G.R.
No. 140732, Jan. 29, 2002).
Form erly, a dying declaration was adm issible only in
a crim inal case w herein the declarants death w as the
subject o f the inquiry, w hereas a statem ent as part o f the
res gestae w as adm issible in both crim inal and civil cases.
T h is d is tin ctio n has been e lim in a te d by th e p resen t
am endm ent o f the Rule (see Note 7 under Sec. 37).
4.
To be adm issible as part o f the res gestae, the
statem ent m ust (a) be spontaneous, (b) be m ade w hile a
startlin g occurrence is taking place or im m ediately prior
or subsequent thereto, and (c) relate to the circum stances
o f th e s ta rtlin g occu rren ce. F u rth erm ore, on ly such
sta tem en ts as appear to have been in v olu n ta rily and
sim u ltan eou sly w rung from the w itn ess by the im pact
o f the occurrence are adm issible (P eople vs. Tulagan,
et al., G.R. No. 68620, July 22, 1986).
789
R U L E 130
R E M E D IA L LAW C O M P E N D IU M
HEO
42
5. T h e in te r v a l o f tim e b e tw e e n th e s t a r t lin g
occurrence and the statem ent depends upon the circum
stances; but such statem ent m ust have been made w hile
the declarant was under the im m ediate influence o f the
startling occurrence, hence it is generally required to have
been made im m ediately prior or subsequent to the event.
How ever, if the declarant w as rendered unconscious after
the startling occurrence, his statem ents relative thereto
upon regaining consciousness are still part of the res gestae
regardless o f the tim e that intervened in between.
If the statem ent w as m ade under the influence of
a sta rtlin g event and the d ecla ra n t did not have the
opportu nity to concoct or contrive a story, even if made
9 hours after the k illing, the statem ent is adm issible
as part o f the res gestae (P eople vs. B eram e, L -27606,
July 30, 1976).
6 . Statem ents or outcries as part o f the res gestae
h ave b e e n a d m itted to e sta b lish the id e n tity o f the
a ssa ila n t (P eop le vs. A lb a n , L -15203, M ar. 29, 1961;
P eople vs. Diva, et al., L-22946, A pril 29, 1968), to prove
the com plicity o f another person in the crim e (U.S. vs.
D avid, 3 P hil. 128), and to establish an adm ission o f
liability on the part o f the accused (People vs. Reyes, et al.,
82 P h il. 5 6 3 ; P eo p le vs. G on d a ya o, et a l., L -2 6 2 4 0 ,
Oct. 31, 1969).
790
KUI.K 1M0
i r
11
791
HULK 130
SEC, 44
792
H U L K mi)
8HC. 41
NOTES
1 . Entries in official records, ju st like entries in the
course o f business, are m erely prim a facie evidence o f the
facts therein stated.
2. To be adm issible, it is necessary that:
(a) The entries were made by a public officer in the
perform ance o f his duties or by a person in the perform ance
o f a duty specially enjoined by law (Africa, et al. vs. Caltex
[P hil.], Inc., et al., L-12986, Mar. 31, 1966);
(b) The entrant had personal know ledge o f the facts
stated by him or such facts were acquired by him from
reports m ade by persons under a legal duty to subm it the
sam e (Salm on, D exter & Co. vs. W ijangco, 46 Phil. 386);
an d
(c) S uch en tries w ere du ly en tered in a re g u la r
m anner in the official records.
3. A n official record may be a register (U.S. vs. Que
P ing, 40 Phil. 17), a cash book (U.S. vs. A sen si, 34 Phil.
750), or an official return or certificate (M analo, et al.
vs. R obles Trans. Co., Inc., 99 Phil. 729).
4. The motor vehicle accident report o f a police officer,
m ade in the perform ance o f his duties and at about the
tim e o f the accident, if based upon inform ation given to
him by the drivers o f the vehicles who figured in and had
p ersonal know ledge o f said accident, is adm issible under
Sec. 35, Rule 123 o f the Rules o f Court [now, Sec. 44, R ule
130, o f the am ended Rules o f Court] (People vs. N uque,
58 O.G. 8442), and is prim a facie evidence o f the facts
therein stated, being entries in official records.
5. The report subm itted by a police officer in the
perform ance o f his duties and on the basis o f his own
personal observation o f the facts reported m ay properly
793
RULE 130
SEC
-4 4
794
HULK 180
H U L E 8 O F A D M IS S IB IL IT Y
SBC
*ft
795
HULK 130
S K I'S
Hi, 47
796
H U LK 1BO
NEC
it
NOTES
1. In order to be adm issible as an exception to the
hearsay evidence rule, this section requires that:
(a) The w itness is dead or unable to testify (G uevara
vs. A lm ario, et al., 56 Phil. 476);
(b) H is te s tim o n y or d e p o s itio n w as g iv e n in a
form er case or p roceedin g, ju d icia l or ad m in istrative,
betw een the sam e parties or those representing the same
interests;
(c) The form er case involved the sam e subject as that
in the present case, although on different causes o f action;
(d) The issue testified to by the w itness in the form er
trial is the sam e issue involved in the present case (31A
C.J.S. 957-958); and
(e) The adverse party had an opportunity to crossexam ine the w itness in the form er case.
2. This section originally required that the testim ony
o f the unavailable w itness w as given at a form er tria l,
h ence such testim ony m ust have been given in a ju dicial
proceeding. It excluded testim ony given in adm inistrative
or q u a s i-ju d ic ia l p ro c e e d in g s , ex ce p t th o se g iv e n in
a prelim in ary investigation b y specific provision o f then
S ec. 1(f), R u le 115, p ro v id e d the a d v erse p a rty had
the opportu nity to cross-exam ine. T his rule w as later
liberalized, insofar as crim inal cases are concerned, by the
1985 Rules on Crim inal Procedure as explained in N ote 4,
infra. U nder the present am endm ent, such testim ony is
also adm issible even if given in a former case or proceeding,
ju dicial or adm inistrative.
3. S u bsequ en t failure or refu sal to appear at the
second trial, or hostility since testifying at the first trial,
797
RULE 130
SEC. 47
798
KUl.K I MO
R U L E S O F A D M IS S IB IL IT Y
SBC. 47
5.
The adm issibility o f a prior judgm ent, and not the
previous testim ony, in a crim inal action is governed by
differen t rules. A ju dgm en t in a crim inal proceeding,
and this rule applies w ith equal, if not greater, force to
adm inistrative proceedings, cannot be read in evidence in
a civ il action against a person not a party th ereto to
esta blish any fact th erein determ ined. T he m atter is
res in ter a lios and can n ot be in vok ed as res ju d ic a ta
(A lm eida Chantangco, et al. vs. A baroa, 40 Phil. 1056).
Such ju dgm en t m ay only be adm itted in evidence in a
civil case by w ay o f inducem ent, or to show a collateral
fact relevant to the issue in the civil action (Ed. A. K eller
& Co. [L td .] vs. E llerm an & B u ckn all S team sh ip Co.,
[L td .], et al., 38 Phil. 514; City o f M an ila vs. M an ila
E lectric Co., 52 Phil. 586).
Said judgm ent cannot, in a civil action arising from
the com m ission o f a crim e, or in w hich the com m ission
o f said crim e is collateral, be adm itted to prove p la in tiffs
cause o f action, or defen d an ts defense, and w h atever
findings o f fact are made by the trial court in the decision
are not binding upon the parties to the civil action. The
ju d gm en t can only prove that a certain defendant has
been con victed o f a crim e and sentenced to the penalty
therein im posed (Aram bulo vs. M anila E lectric Co., 55
Phil. 75). W hatever inform al expressions o f view s w ere
m ade by the court therein have no probative value. They
am ount to n othing m ore th a n an ord er for ju d gm en t,
w hich is not part o f the judgm ent [C ontreras, et al. vs.
Felix, et al., 78 Phil. 570] (R ebullida vs. E strella, 55 O.G.
10553).
799
RULE 130
SECS. 48-50
800
H U M S i;io
H KtM i m ho
or
801
RULE
130
802
HUliK mo
R tJU IS OP A D M IS S IB IL IT Y
SHCS, 48-60
I). 11 has also been held in our ju risd iction that, w ith
respect to a handw riting expert, the value o f his opinion
deponds not upon his m ere statem ent w hether a w riting
is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he m ay afford
in pointing out distinguishing m arks, characteristics and
discrepancies in and betw een genuine and false specim ens
o f w r itin g w h ich w o u ld o r d in a r ily e sca p e n o tic e or
detection by an untrained observer (U.S. vs. Kosel, 24 Phil.
594; People vs. Florendo, 40 O.G. [2nd S upp.] 224).
c. W hether or not courts are bound by the testim ony
o f an expert depends greatly upon the nature of the subject
o f inquiry. I f the same is one that falls w ithin the general
k n o w le d g e o f ju d g e s , c o u r ts a re n ot b o u n d b y th e
conclusions o f even a real expert along such line (Paras
vs. N arciso, 35 Phil. 244; D olar vs. D iansin, et al., 55 Phil.
479). It is only w here the subject o f inquiry is o f such a
te ch n ica l nature th a t a laym an can p ossib ly have no
know ledge th ereof that courts must depend and rely upon
expert evidence (Raym undo vs. Legaspi, 47 O.G. 807, cited
in N A R IC vs. F irst N ational Security & A ssu rance Co.,
Inc., et al., [CA], 64 O.G. 10607).
d. C o n flictin g ex p ert ev id en ce have n e u tra lizin g
effect on contradictory conclusions. They generate doubt
(People vs. Sy Yen, et al., [CA], 67 O.G. 9645). W here
the su pposed ex p erts testim on y w ould con stitu te the
sole ground for con viction and there is equally expert
testim ony to the contrary, the constitutional presum ption
o f in n ocen ce m ust preva il (C esa r vs. S an d igan bayan ,
et al., G.R. Nos. 54719-50, Jan. 17, 1985; Siasat, et al.
vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 67889, Oct. 10, 1985).
e. Expert evidence on handw riting is, at best, weak
an d u n s a tis fa c to r y . L ess w e ig h t sh ou ld be g iv e n to
inferences from com parison, than to direct and credible
testim onies o f w itnesses as to the m atters w ithin their
803
RULE 130
SECS. 48-50
804
K U L E 8 OK A D M IS S IB IL IT Y
S E C S . 4 8 -5 0
805
RULE 130
SECS. 48-60
806
lUH.K I HO
IUII.MS ()K A D M IS S IB IL IT Y
SEC S. <1H 50
807
RULE 130
SECS. 48-GO
808
HUI.K 1MO
SECS. 48-50
o.
It should be noted that the Suprem e Court has
categorically declared the adm issibility o f D N A evidence,
thus w riting finis to previous disputes on this point.
(1 )
In P eople us. Vallejo (G.R. No. 144656, M ay 9,
2002), it briefly explain ed that D N A (deoxyribon u cleic
acid) is an organic substance found in a persons cells which
contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical twins,
each person s D N A profile is distinct and unique.
W hen a crime is com m itted, m aterial is collected from
the scene o f the crim e or from the victim s body for the
suspects DNA. T hat m aterial con stitutes the evidence
sam ple w hich is then m atched w ith the reference sam ple
taken from the suspect and the victim , and th ese are
subjected to various chem ical processes to determ ine their
profiles. If the sam ples are different, this conclusion is
absolute and requires no further analysis. I f the results
are in con clu sive, variou s parts o f the analysis m ay be
repeated w ith the sam e or different sam ples to obtain
a m ore co n clu siv e resu lt. I f the sam ples are sim ila r,
the analyst determ ines the statistical significance o f the
similarity.
In assessing the probative value o f D N A evidence, it
is necessary to consider, inter alia, how the sam ples were
c o lle c te d , how th ey w ere h a n d led , th e p o s s ib ility o f
con tam ination o f the sam ples, the procedure follow ed in
a nalyzing the sam ples, the determ ination o f w hether or
not the proper standards and procedures w ere follow ed in
conducting the tests, and the qualifications o f the analyst
who conducted those tests.
For a discussion and admission o f this highly technical
and unique type o f evidence in a prosecution for the special
crim e o f rape w ith hom icide, see P eople us. Yatar (G.R.
No. 150224, M ay 19, 2004).
809
RULE 130
SliCS. 48-BO
(2)
In H errera vs. Alba, etc., et al. (G.R. No. 148220,
June 15, 2005), D N A testing was utilized as a forensic
tool in a paternity case, seeking com pulsory recognition,
support and dam ages, the Suprem e Court observed that
the past and present tests involved a credibility contest
betw een claim s of the m other and denials o f the putative
father, the date o f birth o f a child to spouses subject to
presum ptions o f law, the physical resem blance betw een
the child and the alleged father, the rules o f evidence on
pedigrees, the incrim inating verbal and w ritten acts o f
the putative father, and blood-grouping tests.
D N A evidence is the latest and appears to be less
susceptible o f error since it is the fundam ental building
block o f a persons entire genetic m ake-up, is found and is
the same in all cells o f the sam e person and is unique for
every person, except identical twins. Parenthetically, it
is accepted that it does not violate the right against self
incrim ination.
Previous A m erican and P hilippine decisions on the
adm issibility o f D N A test results w ere not decisive at
first and, in fact, w avered in some, but that w as to be
expected due to the novelty and rarity o f their involvem ent
in ju d icial proceedings. The present rule recognizes the
validity o f and gives official recognition to D N A test results
arising from properly conducted standards and procedures
in the collection, handling, and analysis o f the sam ples by
a qualified analyst.
W h ile w e h a v e c o m p a r a t iv e ly lib e r a l r u le s on
adm issibility, the persuasion is that the probative value
or w eight o f the DNA analysis should be subjected to the
exa ctin g requisites o f evaluation. Thus, adopting the
h ighest standard follow ed in an A m erican jurisdiction ,
trial courts should require at least 99.9% as the m ini
mum num erical estim ate for the likelihood or probability
o f paternity. DNA analysis that excludes the putative
810
H U I.H iao
RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY
SECS. -I8 60
811
RULE 130
SEC. 51
812
HU LK 180
IU ILK 8 UK A D M IS S IB IL IT Y
SEC . 61
813
R U L E 130
skc
r.i
814
815
R U L E 131
SEC I
C h a r g e s o f m is c o n d u c t a g a in s t ju d g e s r e q u ir e
clear and convincing evidence (Pesole vs. R odriguez, A.M .
No. 755-MJ, Jan. 31, 1978), w hile the ground for their
rem oval should be established beyond reasonable doubt
(R a qu iza vs. C astaneda, Jr., etc., A .M . No. 1312-CF1,
Jan. 31, 1978). In agrarian cases, all that is required is
substantial evidence (Sec. 18, P.D. 946). S ubstantial
evidence does not necessarily im port preponderance o f
evidence, as in civil cases, but only such relevant evidence
as a re a s o n a b le m in d m ig h t a cce p t as s u ffic ie n t to
support a conclusion (Tolentino, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R.
No. 56265, M ay 20, 1987). This definition and quantum
o f evidence has now been adopted for cases filed before
adm inistrative or quasi-judicial bodies (Sec. 5, R ule 133).
2. In civil cases, the burden of p roof is on the party
who w ould be defeated if no evidence were given on either
side; in crim inal cases, the burden o f p roof is alw ays on
the prosecution. Thus, in civil cases, the burden o f p roof
is generally on the plaintiff, w ith respect to his com plaint;
on the defendant, w ith respect to his counterclaim ; and
on the cross-claim ant, w ith respect to his cross-claim .
3. The burden o f p roof and the burden o f evidence
im posed upon the parties m ay be distinguished as follow s:
a. The burden o f p roof does not shift as it rem ains
th rou g h ou t the tria l w ith the p a rty upon w hom it is
im posed; the burden o f evidence shifts from party to party
depending upon the exigencies o f the case in the course
o f the trial (see B autista, et al. vs. Sarm iento, etc., et al.,
L-45137, Sept. 29, 1985).
b. The burden o f p ro o f is generally determ ined by
the pleadings filed by the party; the burden o f evidence is
generally determ ined by the developm ents at the trial, or
by the provisions of the substantive law or procedural rules
w hich m ay relieve the party from presenting evidence on
816
H U I.K I .'I I
B U R D E N OK P R O O F
SEC. I
A N D P R E S U M P T IO N S
817
RULE 131
SEC, 1
818
HUM'. I.II
BURDEN O F PROOF
SEC. I
A N D P R E S U M P T IO N S
819
RULE 131
REMEDIAL LAW C O M P E N D I U M
8K0B. 2, II
820
R U tl
181
B U R D IN OP PROOF
SBC.
A N D P R E S U M P T IO N S
evidence:
(u) That a person is innocent o f crim e or w rong;
(b) T h a t an u n la w fu l act w as done w ith an
unlaw ful intent;
(c) T h a t a p e r s o n in t e n d s th e
consequen ces o f his voluntary act;
o r d in a r y
821
R U L E 131
SEC. 3
(c)
That the said evidence is available only to said
party (People vs. Tulale, 97 Phil. 953).
3. The presum ption does not apply if the evidence in
question is equally available to both parties (Staples-H owe
P rintin g Co. vs. M anila B uilding and Loan Ass., et al.,
36 Phil. 417), or the evidence is m erely corrob ora tive
(M odesto, et al. vs. Leyva, et al., 6 Phil. 186), or m erely
cu m u la tiv e (P eo p le vs. V ela yo, 96 P h il. 9 7 3 ), or is
unnecessary (N icolas vs. N icolas, 52 Phil. 265).
Hence, this presumption does not arise from the failure
o f the p rosecu tion to present the NBI agents and the
results o f the fingerprint and paraffin tests in view o f
the overw helm ing evidence on the positive identification
o f the accused. F urtherm ore, the defense cou ld have
availed o f said evidence which was equally available to
it (P eop le vs. R ealon, et al., L -3 08 3 2, A ug. 29, 1980;
People vs. Araja, et al., L-24780, June 29, 1981).
4. T h u s, by w ay o f resum e, it w as h eld that the
adverse presum ption of suppression o f evidence does not
arise w hen (1) the su p p ression is not w illfu l, (2) the
evidence w ithheld is m erely corroborative or cum ulative,
(3) the evidence is at the disposal o f both parties, and
(4) the suppression is an exercise o f a privilege (People
vs. N avaja, G.R. No. 104044, Mar. 30, 1993).
(f) That m oney paid by one to another was due
to the latter;
(g) That a th in g d elivered by one to another
belonged to the latter;
(h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor
has been paid;
(i) That prior rents or installm ents had been
paid when a receipt for the later ones is produced;
822
H U L K 101
BURDEN OP PROOF
SBC. 8
A N D P R E S U M P T IO N S
NOTE
1.
See, in connection with par. (i), the provisions o f
A rt. 1176, C ivil Code, w h ich also lays dow n the p r e
sum ption that interest has been paid if the prin cipal is
received by the creditor w ithout reservation.
0)
That a person found in possession o f a th in g
taken in the doing of a recent w rongful act is the
tak er and the doer o f the w hole act; otherw ise, that
thin gs w hich a person p ossesses, or exercises acts
o f ow nership over, are owned by him ;
(k) That a person in possession o f an order on
h im se lf for the paym ent o f m oney, or the d elivery
o f an ything, has paid the m oney or delivered the
th in g accordingly;
(1)
That a person acting in a public office was
regularly appointed or elected to it;
(m )T h a t o f f i c i a l d u ty h a s b e e n r e g u la r ly
performed;
(n) T h a t a c o u r t, or ju d g e a c t in g as s u c h ,
w hether in the Philippines or elsew here, was acting
in the law ful exercise of ju risd iction ;
(o)
That all the m atters w ithin an issue raised
in a case were laid before the court and passed upon
by it; and in like m anner that all m atters w ithin an
issue raised in a dispute subm itted for arbitration
were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon
by them ;
(p) T h at p rivate tra n sa ctio n s have been fair
and regular;
(q) That the ordin ary course o f b u sin ess has
been follow ed;
823
RULE 131.
8 1 0 ,8
824
RUL1C
181
BURDEN
OP PROOF
SEC.
A N D P R E S U M P T IO N S
825
R U L E 1:t 1
SE C . :i
826
H U L K 111
UU RD EN OK PROOF
SEC. 3
A N D P R E S U M P T IO N S
NOTE
1. Except for subpar. (4), this paragraph is taken from
Arts. 390 and 391 o f the Civil Code. A view is held that
with respect to the ordinary but continued absence o f 7,
10, or 5 years contem plated in the first two subparagraphs,
the absentee is presum ed to have died at the end o f said
period, but that in the case o f qualified absence w here
the absen tee w as in danger o f death under the th ree
instances contem plated therein, the absentee is presum ed
to have died at the tim e he w as exposed to such danger
or peril, that is, at the start o f the 4-year period stated
therein. This distinction assumes significance in questions
o f successional rights to the estate o f the absentee arising
from his presum ptive death.
(x) T h at acqu iescen ce resu lted from a b e lie f
that the th in g acquiesced in was conform able to
the law or fact;
(y) T h at th in gs have h ap p en ed a c co rd in g to
the o rd in a ry course o f nature and the ord in a ry
habits o f life;
(z) T h a t p erson s a c tin g as c o -p a rtn e rs have
entered into a contract o f co-partnership;
(aa) That a m an and w om an dep ortin g th em
selv es as h u sban d and w ife have en tered into a
law ful contract o f m arriage;
(bb) T hat p rop erty acqu ired by a m an and a
w om an w ho are capacitated to m arry each other
a n d w h o liv e e x c lu s iv e ly w ith e a c h o th e r as
husband and wife w ithout the benefit o f m arriage
or under a void m arriage, has been obtain ed by
th eir jo in t efforts, work or industry;
827
HULK 131
SEC, 3
828
U U L a la i
B U R D E N 01*' P R O O E
SEC. 3
A N D P R E S U M P T IO N S
(ff)
829
RULE 131
S IC , 3
5.
I f one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the
other betw een those ages, the latter is deem ed to
have survived.
NO TE
1. In order that the presum ption o f survivorship in
par. (jj) m ay arise, it is necessary that (a) the deaths
occurred in a calam ity, and (b) there are no particular
circum stances from which it can be inferred that one died
ahead o f the other. Thus, regarding the third rule, if one
is a one-day old child and the other is 61 years old, it
cannot be presum ed that the one-day old child survived,
in view o f the second requirem ent.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as betw een tw o or
m ore persons who are called to succeed each other,
as to w hich o f them died first, w hoever alleges the
death o f one prior to the other, shall prove the same;
in the absence o f proof, they shall be considered to
have died at the same tim e. (5a)
NOTES
1. T h is p re su m p tio n is the sam e as th e ru le in
A rt. 43 o f the Civil Code except that it om its the last
cla u s e th e r e in w h ich sta te s and th e re s h a ll b e no
transm ission o f rights from one to the oth er, since said
clause is a rule o f substantive law as to the effect on
the rights o f the parties.
2. Par. (kk) m ay be distinguished from the rule in
par. (jj) as, in the form er, it is not required that the parties
perished in a calam ity and, furtherm ore, it only applies
in questions o f successional rights. The rule in par. (jj)
applies only w here the deaths occurred during a calam ity
and applies to cases not involving successional rights, e.g.,
830
R tJLK 1 8 1
BURDEN OF PROOF
SEC.
A N D P R E S U M P T IO N S
831
RULE 129
W H A T NEED NOT BE PROVED
b. Facts o f Judicial N otice
Section 1. J u d ic ia l n otice, w hen m a n d a tory.
A c o u r t sh a ll ta k e ju d ic ia l n o tic e , w ith o u t the
in tr o d u c tio n o f e v id e n c e , o f th e e x is te n c e and
territoria l extent o f states, their p olitical history,
form s o f governm ent and sym bols o f n atio n ality,
th e law o f n a tio n s, the a d m ira lty and m a ritim e
c o u r ts o f th e w o r ld and t h e ir s e a ls , th e p o l i
tical con stitu tion and history o f the P h ilip pin es,
the official acts o f the legislative, execu tive, and
ju d icia l d epartm ents o f the P hilippines, the law s o f
nature, the m easure o f tim e, and the geographical
divisions, (la )
Sec. 2. J u d icia l notice, when d iscretion a ry. A
cou rt m ay take ju d ic ia l notice o f m atters w hich
a re o f p u b lic k n o w le d g e , o r are c a p a b le o f
u n q u e s tio n a b le d e m o n s tr a tio n , or o u g h t to be
know n to ju d ges because o f their ju d icial functions,
da)
Sec. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.
D urin g the trial, the court, on its ow n initiative, or
on request o f a party, m ay announce its intention
to take ju d icial notice o f any m atter and allow the
parties to be heard thereon.
A ft e r th e t r ia l, an d b e fo r e ju d g m e n t or on
ap peal, the proper court, on its ow n initiative or
on request o f a party, m ay take ju d icial notice o f
any m atter and allow the parties to be heard thereon
832
SEC. 3
833
R U L E 129
R E M E D IA L LA W C O M P E N D IU M
SEC
:i
834
ittu.it; i 2ii
SEC. 3
otherw ise (Phil. Com m ercial & Industrial Bank, etc. vs.
Escolin, etc., et al., L-67896, Mar. 29, 1974).
To prove a w ritten foreign law, the requirem ents of
Secs. 24 and 25, Rule 132 m ust be com plied with, that is,
by an o ffic ia l p u b lica tio n or by a du ly a tte ste d and
authenticated copy thereof. The provisions o f the foreign
law may also be the subject o f ju d icia l adm ission under
Sec. 4 o f this Rule. Absent any o f the foregoing evidence
or adm ission, the foreign law is presum ed to be the same
as that in the Philippines, under the so-called doctrine o f
p rocessu al presu m ption (In R e Testate E state o f Suntay,
50 O.G. 5321; Collector o f Internal R evenue vs. Fisher,
et al., L-11622, Jan. 28, 1961). To prove an unw ritten
foreign law, the provisions o f Sec. 46, Rule 130 supply the
evidential sources or rem edies (see W ildvalley S hipping
Co., Ltd. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 119602, Oct. 6, 2000).
8.
In M a n u fa ctu rers H a n ov er T rust Co., etc. vs.
G uerrero (G.R. No. 136804, Feb. 19, 2003), the Suprem e
C o u r t n o t e d th a t w h ile c e r t a in e x c e p t io n s to th e
requirem ents laid down in Secs. 24 and 25 of this Rule for
p ro o f o f foreign law have been recognized, the evidence
presented for that purpose in this case is unacceptable.
H ere, the petitioner subm itted an affidavit o f a New Y ork
attorney w hich does not even state the specific N ew Y ork
law on the issue o f damages involved, but m erely contained
the affiants interpretation and opinion o f the facts o f the
case vis-a -vis the alleged law and ju risp ru d en ce cited
therein. Further, said affidavit was taken ex parte abroad
and the affiant never testified in court.
In the cases w herein testim ony on the foreign law
w as accepted by the Suprem e Court, such as C ollector o f
Internal R evenue vs. Fisher, et al., supra, the w itness, who
w as an active m em ber o f the C alifornia Bar, testified that
he was fam iliar with the C alifornia revenue and tax laws
in question, and, as part o f his testim ony, a fu ll quotation
835
R U L E 129
R E M E D IA L L A W C O M P E N D IU M
SEC. <1
836
K II I .K 129
W H A T N E E D N O T HE P R O V E D
SEC.
837
RULE 129
SEC. 4
838
839
RULE
132
SEC. 2
840
RULE 132
PRESENTATION OP EVIDENCE
SEC. 3
3.
T he testim on y o f a w itn ess in court ca n n ot be
considered self-serving since he can be subjected to crossexam ination. Self-serving evidence is one m ade out o f
cou rt and is excluded on the sam e ground as hearsay
evidence, i.e., deprivation o f the right o f cross-exam ination
(Co vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 52200, A ug. 21, 1980).
Sec. 3. R igh ts and ob lig a tion s o f a w itness. A
w it n e s s m u s t a n s w e r q u e s t io n s a lt h o u g h h is
answ er m ay tend to establish a claim against him .
H ow ever, it is the right o f a w itness:
(1) To be protected from irrelevant, im proper,
or in su lting questions, and from harsh or in su ltin g
dem eanor;
(2) Not to be detained longer than the interests
o f ju stice require;
(3) Not to be exam ined except only as to m atters
p ertin en t to the issue;
(4) N ot to give an answ er w hich w ill tend to
s u b je c t h im to a p e n a lty fo r an o ffe n se u n le ss
otherw ise provided by law ;
(5) N ot to give an answ er w hich w ill tend to
degrade his repu tation, unless it be to the very fact
at issue or to a fact from w hich the fact in issue
w ould be presum ed. But a w itness m ust answ er to
th e fa c t o f his p re v io u s fin a l c o n v ic tio n fo r an
offense. (3a, 19a)
N O TES
1.
A w itn e ss ca n n ot refu se to a n sw er q u estion s
m aterial to the inquiry even if it m ay tend to establish a
claim against him , but he m ay validly refuse to answ er
841
RULE 132
SEC.
842
i n u , i c i : ta
SEC. 3
843
RULE 132
REMEDIAL LAW C O M P E N D IU M
SEC
In G a lm a n , et a l. vs. P a m a r a n , et a l. (G .R .
N os. 7 1 2 0 8 -0 9 , A u g . 30, 1985), th e S u p re m e C ou rt
noted the classes and application o f im m unity statutes.
It explain ed that im m unity statu tes m ay be generally
classified into those which grant use immunity and others
w hich grant transactional im m unity. Use im m unity
prohibits the use o f the w itness com pelled testim ony and
its fruits in any m anner in connection with the crim inal
p r o s e c u t io n o f th e w it n e s s . O n th e o t h e r h a n d ,
transactional im m unity grants im m unity to the w itness
from prosecution for an offense to w hich his com pelled
testim ony relates. Thus, w here the statute grants only
use im m u n ity , m e re ly te s tify in g a n d /o r p ro d u cin g
e v id e n ce d oes n ot re n d e r th e w itn ess im m u n e from
prosecution despite his invocation o f the right against
se lf-in crim in a tion . He is m erely saved from the use
again st him o f such statem ents or evidence w h ich he
h a d b e e n co m p e lle d to p rod u ce n o tw ith s ta n d in g his
h a v in g s e a s o n a b ly in v o k e d sa id rig h t a g a in s t s e l f
incrim ination.
5. The right against self-in crim in ation is granted
only in favor o f individuals, hence, a corporation cannot
invoke that privilege as the questioned testim on y can
com e only from a corporate officer or em ployee who has
a personality distinct from that o f the corporation (Hale
vs. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43).
6. The right against self-in crim in ation extends to
adm inistrative proceedings with a crim inal or penal aspect,
e.g., proceedings before the Board o f M edical Exam iners
(P a scu al, Jr. vs. B oard o f M ed ica l E xa m in ers, et al.,
L -25018, M ay 26, 1969).
Sec. 4. O rder in the exam ination o f an individual
witness. The order in w hich an individual w itness
m ay be exam ined is as follow s:
844
MULE l;r,'
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
S E C S . 5-8
845
RULE 132
SECS. r. n
NOTES
1. U nder Sec. 87, Rule 123 o f the 1940 Rules o f Court
(now, Sec. 6, R ule 132 o f the present Rules o f Court), it
w as held that a w itness may be cross-exam ined by the
adverse party not only as to m atters stated in the direct
e x a m in a t io n b u t a lso as to a n y m a tte r c o n n e c t e d
th e re w ith , and th is he should be a llow ed to do w ith
s u ffic ie n t fu lln e s s and freed om to te st th e w itn e s s
accuracy, truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias,
and also to elicit from him any im portant fact bearing upon
the issue. It is true that according to the A m erican Rule,
c r o s s -e x a m in a tio n m u st be co n fin e d to th e m a tters
inquired about in the direct exam ination (Cragg us. Los
A n geles Trust Co., 154 Col. 663, 98 Pac. 1963), but it is
likew ise true that according to the English Rule, a witness
m ay be cross-exam ined not only upon m atters testified to
b y him on his direct exam ination, but also on all m atters
relevan t to the issue (M oisaac us. N orth Thom pson Elec.
etc., 172 M ass. 89, 51 N.E. 524; Cupps us. State, 120 VFis.
504, 97 N.W. 210). The rule obtaining in this ju risd iction
on the subject is m ore in accord w ith the English Rule
ju st stated (Gonzales, et al. vs. Bautista, [CA], 52 O.G.
4692).
However, w here the w itness is an unw illing or hostile
w itness so declared by the court or is an adverse party,
the cross-exam ination shall only be on the subject m atter
o f his exam in ation-in-chief (Sec. 12). This is the same
as the lim itation o f the cross-exam ination o f an accused
who testifies as a w itness in his ow n b eh a lf (Sec. l[d],
R ule 115).
2. W hen the question w hich assum es facts not on
record is asked on cross-exam ination, it is objectionable
fo r b e in g m islea d in g ; if on d irect ex a m in a tion , it is
objectionable for lack o f basis.
846
HUM? I IB
I llESKNTATION OK EVIDENCE
8KO. H
847
RULE 132
SECS. 10 11
NO TE
1.
W h e re a ll s id e s in th e ca s e h a v e c o n c lu d e d
th eir exam ination o f the w itness, his recall for further
exam ination is discretionary w ith the court as the interest
o f ju stice requires. H ow ever, w here such exam in ation
has not been concluded, or if the recall o f the w itness was
expressly reserved by a party w ith the approval o f the
court, then his recall is a m atter o f right.
Sec. 10. L ead in g and m isleading questions. A
question w hich suggests to the w itness the answ er
w h ich the ex a m in in g p arty d e sire s is a le a d in g
question. It is not allow ed, except:
(a) On cross-exam in ation ;
(b) On p relim inary m atters;
(c) W hen there is difficulty in getting direct and
intelligible answ ers from a w itness who is ignorant,
or a child o f tender years, or is o f feeble m ind, or a
deaf-m ute;
(d) O f an u nw illing or hostile w itness: or
(e) O f a w itness who is an adverse party or an
officer, d irector, or m anaging agent o f a public or
p r i v a t e c o r p o r a t io n or o f a p a r t n e r s h i p or
association w hich is an adverse party.
A m islead in g question is one w hich assum es as
true a fact not yet testified to by the w itn ess, or
contrary to that w hich he has previously stated. It
is not allow ed. (5a, 6a, and 8a)
Sec. 11. Im peachm ent o f adverse p a r ty s w itn ess.
A w itness m ay be im peached by the party against
w hom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by
848
U U I.K
lay
I RICHENTATION OF KVIDKNCIC
SECS. 1 2 -lit
849
RULE 132
sac, I!)
850
B U I .10 1:12
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
SBC. 13
851
R U L E 132
SEC, I'I
852
H U L E i ; i,
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
SEC. 15
853
RULE 132
SEC. 16
also been held that it is w ithin the pow er o f the trial judge
to refuse to order the exclusion of the principal w itness of
the governm ent during the hearing o f a crim inal case and
it may not, on that count alone, be considered as an abuse
o f his discretion (People vs. Lua Chu, et al., 56 Phil. 44).
Sec. 16. When witness may refer to m em orandum .
A w itness m ay be allow ed to refresh his m em ory
respectin g a fact, by anything w ritten or recorded
by h im self or under his direction at the tim e when
the fact occurred, or im m ediately th ereafter, or at
an y o th er tim e , w h en the fact w as fre sh in his
m em ory and he knew that the same was correctly
w ritten or recorded; but in such case the w riting
or record m ust be produced and m ay be inspected
by the a d v e rse p a r ty , w ho m a y , i f he c h o o s e s ,
cross-exam ine the w itness upon it, and m ay read
it in e v id e n c e . So, a lso , a w itn e ss m ay te s tify
from such a w ritin g or record , though he retain
no r e c o lle c tio n o f the p a r tic u la r fa c ts , i f he is
able to sw ear that the w riting or record correctly
s t a t e d th e t r a n s a c t i o n w h e n m a d e ; b u t su c h
evidence m ust be received with caution. (10a)
N O TES
1. In A m erica n ju risp ru d en ce, the first sen ten ce
o f Sec. 16 is know n as the rule on revival o f present
m em ory, and the second sentence is known as revival of
past recollection . The first rule applies if the w itness
rem em bers the facts regarding his entries and is entitled
to grea ter w eigh t; the second rule applies w h ere the
w itness does not recall the facts involved, and is entitled
to lesser weight.
2. T h e p ro v is io n a p p lies on ly w h en it is sh ow n
beforehand that there is a need to refresh the m em ory o f
854
i u i i .k
la y
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
SECS. 17, 1H
855
R U L E 132
SEC . Ill
856
H ULK I M2
IHICSKNTATION OK KVIIJKNC10
SKC. I!)
857
RULE
132
S E C S . 20 2Z
858
HULK 182
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
SECS. 20-22
859
RULE 132
SECS. 23-24
860
HULK 1112
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
SECS. 25-20
861
RULE 132
SECS. 27-26
862
RULE 132
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
SEC. 30
863
RULE 132
S E C . IK)
864
R U L I 132
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
SEC. 30
865
RULE 132
SECS. 81-32
866
H U til 132
P R E S E N T A T IO N O F E V ID E N C E
SECS. 33, 34
867
R U L E 132
SEC. ;u.
868
I ' l i l C H i i N T A T I O N O K K . V I D K .N C H
SI'ICS. ae-38
869
RULE 132
HE (IS. :i!) 40
870
HULK 1M2
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
SECS. 30-40
871
RULE 132
SECS. 80-40
872
RU L E 132
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
SECS. 39-40
873
RULE 132
SECS. 39-40
874
IUH,1C I:ia
P R E SE N T A T IO N O F EVIDENCE
SECS. 39-40
Co., I Ltd. I us. Ellerm an & Bucknall Steam ship Co., [Ltd.],
et a I., 38 Phil. 514).
11. An erroneous adm ission or rejection o f evidence
by the trial court is not a ground for a new trial or reversal
o f the decision if there are other independent evidence to
sustain the decision, or if the rejected evidence, if it had
b een a d m itted , w ould not h a ve ch a n ged the d ecision
(People vs. Bande, et al., 50 Phil. 37); otherw ise, a new
trial is warranted by reason o f such erroneous ruling which
goes into the m erits of the case and w ould have affected
th e d e cis io n (U .S . vs. V illa n u ev a , 18 P h il. 593). If
the trial court erroneously ruled out the evidence and
discovered such error before the judgm ent had becom e
final or before an appeal therefrom had been perfected,
it may re-open the case (Tinsay vs. Yusay, et al., 47 Phil.
639).
12. T he ru lin g s o f the tria l cou rt on p ro ce d u ra l
qu estion s and on adm issibility o f evidence du rin g the
course o f a trial are interlocutory in nature and m ay not
be the subject o f separate appeals or review on certiorari.
T hese are to be assigned as errors and review ed in the
appeal taken from the trial court on the m erits o f the case
(G atd u la vs. P eople, G.R. No. 140688, Jan. 26, 2001,
citin g cases).
875
RULE I.'IH
SECS. 1-2
NOTES
1. S ecs. 1 and 2 give th e ru les on th e re q u isite
quantum o f evidence in civil and crim inal cases. The last
two sentences of Sec. 1 suggest the factors w hich the court
may take into consideration in determ ining the w eight to
be given to testim onial evidence, and these factors apply
to both civil and crim inal cases (U.S. vs. Claro, 32 Phil.
413). See Note 1 under Sec. 1, Rule 131.
2. Evidence, to be w orthy o f credit, m ust not only
proceed from a credible source but must, in addition, be
credible in itself. And by this is m eant that it shall be
natural, reasonable and probable as to m ake it easy to
believe (P eople vs. B aquiran, L -20153, June 29, 1967;
Vda. de B onifacio, et al. vs. B.L.T. Bus Co., Inc., et al.,
L -2 68 1 0, A ug. 31, 1970; P eop le vs. M acaso, L -30489,
J u n e 30, 1 97 5 ; P eo p le vs. P eru e lo , G .R. N o. 5 0631,
June 29, 1981).
3. Evidence to be believed should be in accord with
the com m on know ledge and experience o f m ankind (see
P eople vs. A cusar, et al., 82 Phil. 490; P eople vs. Cada, 82
P h il. 6 7 1 ; P e o p le vs. T a lled o , et a l., 85 P h il. 5 3 3 ;
C astanares vs. CA, et al., L-41269-70, Aug. 6, 1 9 7 9 ;People
vs. M arong, et al., G.R. No. 56858, Dec. 27, 1982).
4. The general rule is that the findings o f the judge
w ho tried the case and heard the w itnesses are not to be
disturbed on appeal, unless there are substantial facts and
circum stances w hich have been overlooked and w hich, if
properly considered, m ight affect the result o f the case
(P eople vs. Brioso, et al., L-28482, Jan. 30, 1971; People
vs. D ila o , et a l., L -4 3 2 5 9 , O ct. 23, 1 9 8 0 ; P e o p le vs.
S ibayan, L -41700, A ug. 30, 1982; P eop le vs. Cabrera,
L-31178, Oct. 28, 1990). Such findings, except for good
cause, are generally not disturbed on appeal (People vs.
Villaroya, et al., 101 Phil. 1061; People vs. Yap, et al.,
877
RULE 133
SECS. I
878
BULK 133
SECS. 1-2
879
R U L E 133
R E M E D IA L LA W C O M P E N D IU M
SECS,
1-n
880
RULE
133
W E IG H T A N D SU F F IC IE N C Y
S E C S . 1-2
OF E V I D E N C E
881
RULE 133
SECS. 1-2
882
HULK ia:i
W E IG H T A N D S U F F IC IE N C Y
S E C S . 1-2
OF EVIDENCE
883
RULE 133
SECS. 1-2
884
HULK IMS
SECS. 1-2
OF E V ID E N C E
other may not have observed or may not rem em ber. The
apparent conflict may be due to differences in observation
or m em ory w hich does not necessarily im ply falsehood on
their part (People vs. Tuason, 47 O.G. 6177).
28. D elay o f a w itness in revealing to the authorities
what he knows about a crime does not render his testim ony
fa lse, for the delay m ay be exp la in ed b y the n atural
re ticen ce o f m ost people and th eir a b h orren ce to get
in volved in a crim inal case (P eople vs. U ntalasco, Jr.,
et al., G.R. No. 61105, Oct. 25, 1983; People vs. Pacabes,
et al., G.R. No. 55417, June 24, 1985; People vs. Punzalan,
et al., G.R. No. 54562, Aug. 6, 1987). But m ore than this,
there is always the inherent fear o f reprisal, w hich is quite
understandable especially if the accused is a m an o f power
and influence in the com m unity (People vs. Catao, et al.,
1 0 7 Phil. 8 6 1 ;People vs. Estocada, L-31024, Feb. 28, 1977).
The delay o f a w itness in divulging w hat she knows
about the crim e, if satisfactorily explained at the trial as
where it w as due to her intense grief, does not underm ine
her credibility (People vs. Castillo, L - l l 793, M ay 19, 1961;
People vs. Provo, et al., L-28347, Jan. 20, 1971; P eople
vs. G u eva rra , L -3 2 1 4 7 -4 9 , M ar. 17, 1978; P eo p le vs.
Cuadra L-27973, Oct. 23, 1978; People vs. Tamayao, G.R.
No. 56699, Jan. 28, 1983). A lso, w here the failure o f a
w itn ess to revea l all that she k now s about the crim e
com plained o f was satisfactorily explained by her during
the trial, and was attributed to her fear o f reprisal and
actual threats made upon her, such failure can not w eaken
the credibility o f her testim ony (People vs. Bulan, 108 Phil.
932). The refusal o f a person to subm it to in vestigation to
explain the innocent role he professes is inconsistent with
the norm al reaction o f an innocent man (People vs. Bunsol,
et a l , L-33344, Mar. 25, 1975).
29. The mere relationship o f the witness to the victim
does not im pair his positive and clear testim ony nor render
885
RULE 133
SECS. 1-2
886
HtH.K la.'l
SECS. 1-2
887
R U L E 133
R E M E D IA L LA W C O M P E N D IU M
SECS, I 2
888
HULK 133
SECS. 1-2
889
R U L E 133
R E M E D IA L L A W C O M P E N D IU M
SECS.
12
890
HULK 133
W E IG H T AN D S U F F IC IE N C Y
SE C S. 1-2
OF EVIDENCE
891
HULK 133
SECS. I 2
892
HULK HIM
W E IG H T A N D S U F F IC IE N C Y
S E C S . 1-2
OF EVIDENCE
41.
As a rule, the m otive o f the accused in a crim inal
case is im m aterial and, not being an elem ent o f a crim e, it
does not have to be proved (People vs. Tiengo, et al., G.R.
No. 55832, Nov. 20, 1984). H ow ever, evidence o f m otive
is relevant or essential in the follow ing instances:
(a) W here the identity o f the assailant is in question
(U .S. vs. M cM ann, 4 Phil. 561; P eop le vs. C aggaw an,
et al., 92 P hil. 118; People vs. M urray, 105 P hil. 591;
People vs. Peruelo, G.R. No. 50631, June 29, 1981);
(b) To determ ine the voluntariness o f the crim inal
act (People vs. Taneo, 58 Phil. 255) or the sanity o f the
accused (People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204);
(c) To d e te rm in e from w h ich sid e th e u n la w fu l
aggression com m enced, as w here the accu sed invoked
self-defense w herein unlaw ful aggression on the part of
his opponent is an essential elem ent (U.S. vs. Laurel, 22
Phil. 252; People vs. Berio, 59 Phil. 533; People vs. Dofilez,
supra; B orguilla vs. CA, et al., L-47286, Jan. 7, 1987);
(d) To determ ine the specific nature o f the crim e
com m itted, e.g., w hether a m urder was com m itted in the
furtherance o f rebellion, in w hich case the latter absorbs
the form er; or w hether the accused had his ow n personal
m otives for com m itting the m urder independent o f his
m em bership in the rebellious m ovem ent, in w hich case
rebellion and m urder would constitute separate offenses
(P eop le vs. G eronim o, 100 P h il. 90); and, a lso, w h ere
injuries were inflicted on a person in authority who is not
in the actual perform ance of his duties in w hich case the
motive o f the offender has to be considered since the attack,
if by reason o f the past perform ance o f his official duties
b y th e p e rson in a u th ority, w ou ld be d irect a ssa u lt;
otherw ise, the crime would be physical injuries (see People
vs. Cadag, et al., L -13830, M ay 31, 1961);
893
RULE 133
SECS. 1-2
894
HUI.K 133
SECS. l-'2
m o tiv e o f th e co n d u ct o f th e a ccu s e d e x p la in s a n d
su p p lies the elem en t o f m alice and, corresp on d in g ly ,
proves his crim inal intent.
43. D raw ing from N eil us. Biggers (409 U.S. 188),
the Suprem e Court has held that on the adm issibility
and reliability o f out-of-court identification o f suspects,
courts have adopted the totality o f circum stances test
w hich utilizes the follow ing factors, uiz.: (1) the w itn ess
opportunity to view the crim inal at the tim e o f the crim e;
(2) the w itn ess degree o f attention at that tim e; (3) the
accuracy o f any prior description given by the w itness;
(4) the level o f certainty dem onstrated by the w itness at
the id e n tifica tion ; (5) the len gth o f tim e b etw een the
crim e and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness
of the identification procedure (People us. Teehankee, Jr.,
G.R. Nos. 111206-08, Oct. 6, 1995; P eople us. Verzosa,
et al., G.R. No. 118944, Aug. 20, 1998).
44. The foregoing ruling w as reiterated in P eople vs.
P ineda, et al. (G.R. No. 141644, M ay 27, 2004) w hich
furth er provided a list, adm ittedly not exhaustive, o f 12
danger signals that the identification may be erroneous
even though the m ethod used is proper, to wit: (1) the
witness originally stated that he could not identify anyone;
(2) the w itness knew the accused before the crim e but
m ade no a ccu sa tion against him w hen q u estion ed by
the police; (3) a serious discrepancy exists betw een the
w itn ess original description and his actual description
o f the a ccu sed ; (4) b efore id e n tify in g the a ccu sed at
the trial, the w itness erroneously identified som e other
person; (5) other w itnesses o f the crim e fail to identify the
accused; (6) before trial, the w itness sees the accused but
fails to identify him; (7) before the com m ission o f the crime,
the w itness had lim ited opportunity to see the accused;
(8) the w itness and the person identified are o f different
racial groups; (9) during his original observation o f the
895
r
RULE 133
SEC, :t
896
HULK 138
SEC. 3
NOTES
1. See notes under Sec. 33, Rule 130.
2. The term corpus delicti m eans the actual com
m ission by som eone o f the particular crim e charged. It is
a com m on fact made up o f tw o things: the existence of
a certain act or result form ing the basis o f the crim inal
charge and the existence o f a crim inal agency as the cause
o f the act or result. The identity o f the accused is not a
necessary elem ent o f the corpus delicti (16 C.J.S. 771).
Corpus delicti literally m eans the body or substance of
the crim e, but, applied to a particular offense, it m eans
the actual com m ission by som eone o f the particular crim e
charged (People vs. M ones, et al., 58 Phil. 46; People vs.
M am aril, et al., 46 O.G. 3431). Consequently, the corpus
delicti is proved w hen the evidence on record shows that
the crim e p rosecu ted had been com m itted (P eop le vs.
Santos, et al., CA-G.R. No. 3767, M ay 8, 1950).
3. In theft, the corpus d elicti is com p osed o f tw o
elem ents: that the property w as lost by the ow ner and
that it w as lost by a felonious taking (People vs. Tradia,
CA-G.R. No. 2524-R, Aug. 27, 1959). Hence, the failure
to recover the property does not detract from the fact
that a crim e may be established w ithout recovery o f the
stolen object (People vs. Mano, [CA], 60 O.G. 5167).
The elem ents constituting corpus delicti in the crim e
o f illegal possession o f a firearm are (a) the existence
o f the firea rm , and (b) that it has been a ctu ally held
w ith a n im u s p o ss id en d i by the a ccu sed w ith o u t the
correspon ding license therefor (People vs. Camoyar, CAG.R. No. 6142-R, A pril 19, 1951).
As corpus delicti means the fact o f specific injury or
loss sustained, in m urder, the fact o f death is the corpus
delicti (P eople vs. Garcia, et al., 99 Phil. 381). W here
th ere is doubt as to the id en tity o f a ca da ver, in the
897
RULE 133
SEC. 4
898
RU TJ 183
NKC 4
(c)
The com bination o f all the circu m stan ces
is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. (5)
NO TES
1. In order to convict a person accused o f a crime
on th e stre n g th o f cir cu m sta n tia l ev id en ce a lon e, it
is in cu m b e n t u p on the p ro s e c u tio n to p re s e n t such
circum stantial evidence w hich will and m ust necessarily
lead to the conclusion that the accused is guilty o f the
crim e charged beyond reasonable doubt, exclu d in g all
and each and every rea son a ble h yp oth esis con sisten t
w ith h is in n o ce n c e (P eo p le vs. T a n -C h oco, 76 P h il.
463; People vs. Jara, et al., G.R. Nos. 61356-57, Sept. 30,
1986).
2. C ircu m sta n tia l ev id en ce is su ffic ie n t for co n
v iction even in ca pita l offen ses, except w hen the law
s p e cifie s the sp ecies and quantum o f ev id en ce as, in
treason (Art. 114, R evised Penal Code) and, form erly, for
certain subversive activities punishable by prision m ayor
to death (Sec. 7, R.A. 1700). It is also subm itted that
circu m stan tial evidence w ould not suffice to sustain a
co n v ictio n for fa lsifica tion , b igam y and lib el th rou gh
w ritten publications, and the docum ents involved m ust
be presen ted. In bigam y, direct evidence o f the first
m arriage is necessary (People vs. Villalobos, [CA], 57 O.G.
8 8 8 2 ). E v id e n c e o f r e p u t a t io n o r c o h a b it a t io n is
in s u f f i c ie n t b u t is m e r e ly c o r r o b o r a t iv e (U .S . vs.
E vangelista, 29 Phil. 215). The same doctrine has been
applied in actions for adultery, parricide, and other cases
w here the issue o f m arriage is prim arily involved (People
vs. Lanas, et al., 93 Phil. 147).
3. N ot on ly the p rior and coeta n eou s a ctu a tion s
o f the accused in relation to the crim e but also his acts
o r con d u ct s u b seq u en t th e re to can be co n sid e re d as
899
RULE 133
SEC, r>
900
RULE 133
SECS. 6, 7
2.
In civil actions, the proponent m ust establish his
case by a preponderance o f evidence in order to recover
thereon. W here an equiponderance of evidence results
such that the scales stand upon an equipoise, and nothing
in evidence inclines it to either side, the court w ill find
for the defendant (Yuchengco, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan,
et al., G.R. No. 149802, Jan. 20, 2006). This equipoise
rule also applies to crim inal cases and holds that w hen
the evidence on a question o f fact is in issue or there is
dou bt on w h ich side the evid en ce p rep on d era tes, the
p rosecu tion , as the party having the b u rd en o f proof,
consequently loses (Abarquez vs. People, G.R. No. 150762,
Jan. 20, 2006).
901
RULE 133
SECS. fi. 7
NO TE
1.
W hile the court may hear and rule upon m otions
solely on the basis o f affidavits or counter-affidavits, if
the affidavits contradict each other on m atters o f fact, the
court can have no basis to make its findings of fact and
the prud en t course is to subject the affiants to crossexam ination so that the court can decide whom to believe
(Sapida, et al. vs. De Villanueva, et al., L-27673, Nov. 24,
1972).