You are on page 1of 9

Professional English

Flightpath
AVIATION ENGLISH FOR PILOTS AND ATCOs

DVD TRANSCRIPTS
Unit 2. Danger on the Runway
PART 1
FSS = Flight Service Specialist
CONTROLLER Trans Air 275, active runway 14, winds calm,
altimeter 2993.
PILOT Roger, Trans Air 275, we are two miles on final for 14.
NARRATOR Its not only aircraft that can wander onto an
active runway.
DRIVER Truck 20 leaving garage for Air Eastern hangar.
FSS: Truck 20, proceed via Bravo, Charlie, Echo. Hold short
of runway 14, traffic on final.
DRIVER Um, roger. Bravo, Echo, Charlie, hold short of 14;
truck 20.
FSS Truck 20, thats CHARLIE ECHO.
DRIVER Roger.
NARRATOR The driver of this truck doesnt understand the
directions hes been given by the Flight Service Specialist.
He thinks hell annoy him by asking for clarification.
The Flight Service Specialist hears the uncertainty in the
drivers messages, but he assumes the driver is fully aware
hes approaching the active runway, and that there is an
aircraft on final.
Pre-occupied with finding his way, the vehicle operator rolls
through the hold line at runway one-four ...
FSS Truck 20, get off the runway. NOW!
NARRATOR This time, the Flight Service Specialist noticed
the truck approaching the runway, but it could be a different
story at night or in poor visibility.

PART 2
TOWER: Tower controller
GROUND: Ground controller
CITATION: Citation First Officer
DASH: Dash Captain
TC1 Express three-five-two-five, taxi to position runway 6 Left.
DASH To position 6 left, Express 3525.
GROUND Citation Bravo 77, contact Tower on 118.9. Good
day.
CITATION Tower on 118.9 for Citation Bravo 77. Good day.
NARRATOR The Citation crew is behind schedule and in a
hurry to take off. Because of this, theyve misheard their taxi
instructions. Instead of taxiing to the end of Six Left, they
believe theyre to cross Six Left and proceed to Six Right.
Theyre approaching a mid-point intersection and are about
to enter the active runway.
The tower controller has landing traffic, and wants to
expedite Express 3525s take off.
TOWER Tannair 79, continue number one for runway six left,
traffic on the roll.
Express 3525, winds 070 at six, cleared for take off, Runway
Six Left.
DASH Cleared for take off runway Six Left, Express 3525.
CITATION Tower, Citation B77 with you on taxiway Delta for
Six Right.
1

TOWER Citation B77, say again your position!


Is this Citation on Delta or Charlie?
GROUND Hes on Delta at six-left!!
TOWER Citation B77, STOP! HOLD YOUR POSITION!
DASH Hey! Tower! We just missed a small jet on Six Left!
TOWER Tannair 79 pull up and go around, traffic on the
runway. Citation B77, exit runway Six Left immediately.
NARRATOR Fortunately, Express 3525 is able to lift off and
clear the Citation. Had it not, history has taught us that the
outcome could have been deadly.

PART 3
NARRATOR Distractions, uncertainty, poor visibility,
miscommunication, and working under pressure: These are
the conditions that can set the stage for a runway incursion.
Prevention is everyones responsibility. Pilots, air traffic
controllers, flight service specialists, and vehicle operators
should use common sense, and follow some basic safety
procedures.
TEXT 1) Avoid cockpit distractions
NARRATOR Avoid distractions in the cockpit while taxiing,
like running through checklists or engaging in unnecessary
conversation. Remember: a safe flight is from gate to gate.
TEXT 2) Be vigilant in marginal visibility
NARRATOR Be particularly vigilant at night or in poor
visibility. Look out for other traffic, and watch carefully for
airport signage.
TEXT 3) Know the airport
NARRATOR Become familiar with airport layout and taxiway
designations. Make this a part of your pre-flight preparations.
TEXT 4) Report poor signage and markings
NARRATOR Report faded or missing signage and markings
to ground control.
TEXT 5) Listen carefully to and repeat instructions
NARRATOR Listen carefully for instructions over the radio
and read-back all hold-short instructions.
TEXT 6) Use clear communications
NARRATOR Avoid ambiguous communications, and
TEXT 7) Dont make assumptions
NARRATOR ... make sure the person youre speaking to
understands what youve said.
TEXT 8) If in doubt, ask
NARRATOR Dont be afraid to ask for help or a repeat if
youre not sure.
TEXT 9) Be patient, and keep your cool
NARRATOR Delays happen be patient, and keep a cool
head.
TEXT 10) Be helpful
NARRATOR If you think a pilot or vehicle operator is lost or
unsure of their position, offer assistance ...
TEXT 11) Be courteous
NARRATOR ... and always be courteous and professional in
your communications.

Reproduced with permission of the Minister of Public Works and Government Services, Canada.

Photocopiable

DVD TRANSCRIPTS

Unit 4. Runway incursions

Clip 1 When attention is diverted

Clip 2 Fog & poor procedures

AREA ATCO Ajet 123 cleared visual approach runway 31


Right, keep up speed, contact tower on 118.7.
AJET CAPTAIN Visual approach runway 31 Right, high
speed, tower on 118.7, Ajet 123.
AJET F/O Bluefield Tower Ajet 123 on downwind runway 31
Right.
TOWER I confirm ASTOR 1B departure for Bjet 456.
Ajet 123 continue approach runway 31Right , report on final.
AJET CAPTAIN Runway 31 Right will report final, Ajet 123.
TOWER OK ASTOR 1B for B-Jet 456.
BJET F/O Bluefield Tower, Bjet 456 request intersection
Romeo 3.
TOWER Bjet 456 Romeo 3 approved, hold short of runway
31 Right.
BJET F/O Holding short of runway 31 Right at Romeo 3, Bjet
456.
TOWER Bjet 456 new ATC clearance, are you ready to copy?
BJET F/O Were ready.
TOWER Bjet 456, re-cleared to Farport, ASTOR 1B
departure, flight level 150, transponder 2125.
BJET F/O Farport via ASTOR 1B departure, flight level 150,
transponder 2125 Bjet 456.
...
AJET CAPTAIN A bit fast but we will be fine.
AJET F/O OK, speed 140.
...
BJET F/O Bluefield tower, Bjet 456, please confirm ...
transponder 2125?
TOWER Bjet 456, confirming transponder 2125, line up
runway 31 Right.
BJET F/O Lining up runway 31 right, Bjet 456.
... Hmm, he left the stop-bar on.
BJET CAPTAIN Yeah ... well, call him, tell him to switch it off.
BJET F/O Tower, Bjet456, can you please switch off the stop
bar?
TOWER Sorry for that Bjet 456. It should be off now.
BJET F/O No, it is still on.
TOWER And now?
BJET F/O Thank you, now it is off. Lining up runway 31
Right.
AJET TCAS TWO HUNDRED
AJET CAPTAIN Tower, there is an aircraft on the runway, we
are going around!

FJET F/O Fjet 123 on final runway 31 right


TOWER Fjet 123, wind calm, high intensity lights on, runway
31 Right cleared to land.
...
DRIVER The forecasts say the fog will be goine by the
afternoon, but well see what happens.
ENGINEER I know, its terrible!
DRIVER You got that right. Im going to take a break and
have something to eat. See you later.
Tower, Airport 8 would like to drive taxiway A back to apron 1.
TOWER Airport 8, drive A to to apron 1.
DRIVER Via A to apron 1, Airport 8
FJET TCAS ONE HUNDRED
... THIRTY. TEN ...

Clip 3 40 seconds
ATCO CJet 333, continue approach, Runway 15 Left, Number
1
CJET F/O Continue approach Runway 15 Left, C-Jet 333
ATCO B-Jet 110, taxi to and hold at intersection A 3 for
Runway 15 Left.
BJET F/O Holding at intersection A 3 for Runway 15 Left,
B-Jet 110.
... Check list completed.
BJET CAPTAIN OK, thank you, check list completed.
ATCO A-Jet 234, Runway 15 Left, cleared for take-off.
AJET CAPTAIN Cleared for take-off, Runway 15 Left A-Jet
234.
ATCO B-Jet 110, behind landing 15 Left, line up and wait
behind.
BJET F/O Behind landing (traffic) Runway 15 Left, lining up
and wait behind, B-Jet 110.
OK, thats our landing. Lining up.
ATCO C-Jet 333, wind 170 degrees, 7 knots, runway 15 Left,
cleared to land.
CJET F/O Cleared to land, Runway 15L, C-Jet 333.
... Whats that here? Right! Go right!

Reproduced with the kind permission of the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation
(EUROCONTROL).

Photocopiable

DVD TRANSCRIPTS

Unit 5. Volcanic Ash Hazard


PART 1

PART 4

NARRATOR United flight 869 is cruising at FL 330 along a


north Pacific oceanic route en route to Tokyo, Japan.
FIRST OFFICER Do you smell something like electrical
smoke?
CAPTAIN I had a whiff of something, but its gone now.
NARRATOR The captain acknowledges that he doesnt smell
anything anymore, but instructs the first officer to don his
oxygen mask as a precaution. Then he instructed the first
officer to recheck, because if it was sulphur dioxide from a
nearby volcanic eruption that they smelled, their sense of
smell could be desensitised.

NARRATOR The captain begins a 180 degree turn to avoid


further ash, declares the emergency and asks for the
Indicated Airspeed Disagree / Airspeed Mach Unreliable
checklist. The captain advises both Air Traffic Control and
United Airlines Dispatch and then asks the first officer for
the Multiple Engine Flame-out checklist.
DISPATCH Youve lost four engines and you have returned
two; we have two engines returned. Youve declared the
emergency. Stand by and Ill get some information for you.
Stand by.
And Matt, if youll let the manager know that we have an
emergency with United 869; hes lost four engines. He
believes he has encountered inadvertently volcanic ash.
He has got two engines relit and Ill need some help to get
some information to the flight crew.

PART 2
NARRATOR The captain then checks with United Dispatch to
see if they have any reports of volcanic activity.
CAPTAIN This is United 869 ...
DISPATCH Copy all that United 869.
CAPTAIN Were getting some kind of dust or something on
the .. up here. I want to ... put on my mask. Lets do the, ah,
Smoke, Fumes, Odour QRC (Quick Reference Checklist).
F/O [inaudible, then] ... engine number four has failed.

PART 3
NARRATOR The first officer has no sooner started the
checklist when he see the number 4 engine failing. The
captain allows that the dust situation is manageable and
calls for the engine 4 failure checklist. Suddenly the number
1 engine begins to show indications near the red line limits
and the captain chooses to shut that engine down and calls
for the Engine Limits Surge / Stall QRC checklist. As the first
officer acknowledges that order, the captain says, There
go number 2 and number 3 engines. We need to shut them
down as well and declare a Mayday.

PART 5
NARRATOR While the emergency scenario has played out
aboard United 869, the Air Traffic Control system has begun
receiving alerts of a volcanic eruption in the geographic
vicinity of United 869. The Alaska Volcano Observatory
has received seismic alerts fromt eh Russia Volcano
Observatory, signifying that Russian Mount Shevelush has
apparently erupted, and they have activated their notification
procedures.
After receiving the emergency declaration from United
869, Dispatch does a sweeping weather check for suitable
emergency airfields in the vicinity and determines that the
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy airport is the best choice. The
arrival weather is suitable and the runway length is 11,155
feet. After checking a suitable route to the airport that will
avoid further contamination from the ash cloud, Dispatch
coordinates all of that information with the crew. They also
take steps to notify airport officials of the diversion of 869
to their airport and the nature of the support that flight 869
needs upon their arrival.
During the recovery to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, the flight
crew are successful in restarting two of the failed engines.
The crew completes the approach to the airport and lands
successfully.

Photocopiable

DVD TRANSCRIPTS

Unit 6. Level Best

Part 1

Part 2

We are now going to look at two incidents which illustrate


some of the communication errors that can lead to a level
bust. The following simulated radar replays use fictitious
company call signs, but are based on real events.
Czar 286 and Endol 675 are both inbound to London
Heathrow. Endol 675 is descending to Flight Level 100 and
is in contact with the Heathrow Intermediate Director. Czar
286 is still in contact with the TC Bovingdon sector.
TC BOVINGDON Czar 286, descend Flight Level 110.
CZAR 286 Descend 110, Czar 286.
TC BOVINGDON Czar 286, contact Heathrow Director
119.72. Goodbye.
CZAR 286 119.72, Czar 286. ... Director, good afternoon,
Czar 286, 747-400, were Tango. Were just passing 130 for
one zero zero to Bovingdon.
HEATHROW D Czar, 286, thank you. Take up the hold at
Bovingdon, short delay.
CZAR 286 Hold at Bovingdon, Czar 286 heavy.
Time brought forward 1 minute 40 seconds
HEATHROW D Shamrock 162, heading 270 degrees
downwind, and call Radar 120.4.
SHAMROCK 162 Heading 270, calling 120.4, Shamrock
162. Bye.
HEATHROW D Bye, bye, sir ... And, er, Heathrow Broadcast:
QNH is now 1024 millibars, 1024 Heathrow QNH. And, er,
Czar 286, just confirm maintain Flight Level 110.
CZAR 286 Roger, 110. Weve been ordered to descend to
one zero zero.
HEATHROW D OK, Endol 675, fly heading 180, 180 degrees.
ENDOL 675 180 the heading, 675.
HEATHROW D Endol 675,descend flight level 90
ENDOL 675 Flight level 90, Endol 675.
CZAR 286 Czar 1 286, confirm you wish us to climb back
to 110.
HEATHROW D 286, just stay on that heading for the time
being, please.
NARRATOR The prime cause of this incident was the failure
of Czar 286 to descend to its cleared level of Flight Level of
110. The crew descended to Flight Level 100 in error. This
was compounded by the failure of the Heathrow Director to
notice the erroneous level report. The incorrect phraseology
of Flight Level one zero zero* used by Czar 286 for the
descent to Flight Level one hundred also contributed to the
event.

ATC Shuttle 2966, maintain 4,000 on the Lambourne


departure. We took a slightly early right turn, now
establishing inbound to Detling.
NARRATOR This event occurred in the London TMA near
the Detling VOR. The controller is operating two sectors
combined and, as a result, the frequency is very busy. RT
loading was running close to maximum capacity for ten
minutes prior to this incident. The two aircraft involved in this
event are VSHJV outbound from Biggin Hill and Lomair 814D
inbound to London Gatwick.
CONTROLLER Ryanair 4976, climb Flight Level 170.
RYANAIR 4976 Flight Level 170, Ryanair 4976.
CONTROLLER Lomair 814D, descend Flight Level 90
LOMAIR 814D Descending Flight Level 90, 814D.
CONTROLLER VYV, climb Flight Level 80, heading 095
degrees.
VSHJV Flight Level 80 heading 85, 85, zero ...
CONTROLLER VYV, just confirm heading 095.
VSHJV 095, JV.
Time brought forward 63 seconds. The frequency remains
very busy.
CONTROLLER Air France 217G approaching Biggin Hill.
AF 217G Roger 3325 2,900 feet handover for Golf
CONTROLLER 2325, Squawk ident and no speed
restrictions.
AF217G Right then, 3325
CONTROLLER Midland 7Y2, descend Flight Level one
hundred, speed 220 knots.
MIDLAND Descending Level one hundred*, speed 220
knots, Midland 7Y2
CONTROLLER VYV, descend Flight Level 80, Flight Level 80,
to maintain.
VSHJV Descending 80 to maintain.
PILOT 1 Descending Level 70, inbound
PILOT 2 Good afternoon, OEIDM maintaining 4,000 to
Detling
LOMAIR 814D Lomair one four delta, we had a TCAS
resolution, TCAS, climbed up
CONTROLLER Lomair 814D, roger, speed 220 knots now,
descend to 4,000 feet, QNH 1001 millibars.
NARRATOR No avoiding action or traffic information was
given as the aircraft passed, where separation reduced to
1.1 miles and 600 feet. A subsequent ATC investigation
determined that although the controller had used standard
phraseology when issuing instructions to VJV the crew were
confused and climbed to their assigned heading.
* Flight Level one zero zero is correct ICAO standard
phraseology. However, given the well-documented cases of
confusion which have occurred between FL 110 and FL100,
the UK CAA has decided to adopt hundred (FL 100: Flight
Level one hundred; FL 200: Flight Level two hundred etc.)
rather than zero zero. For this and the other differences
between ICAO and UK phraseology notified to ICAO, see CAA
CAP 413 Radiotelephony Manual, Appendix 1.

Reproduced with the kind permission of NATS and ITL Video.

Photocopiable

DVD TRANSCRIPTS

Part 3
NARRATOR Controllers should be aware that high RT
occupancy has implications for their own workload and
for pilots monitoring the frequency. Splitting sectors can
significantly reduce RT workload, which reduces the chance
of an error being made and increases the chances of picking
up an incorrect readback.
There are other practical steps that controllers can take to
reduce the chance of communication error occurring:
Monitor all readbacks
If the frequency gets busy, dont speed up your delivery; it
doesnt help
Avoid multiple instructions; ideally, dont include more
than two instructions in one transmission
For some operators, consider issuing only one instruction
per transmission
Whenever practicable, reduce the number of level change
instructions that you issue to each aircraft
Keep frequency changes separate from other instructions
If you detect a level bust which may result in a loss of
separation, do not waste time by asking the aircraft
involved to confirm the cleared level; pass good and
effective avoiding action; use the words avoiding action;
and if its urgent, then make it sound urgent.
If a pilot reports that he or she is responding to a TCAS
Resolution Advisory, acknowledge the message and pass
pertinent traffic information.

Reproduced with the kind permission of NATS and ITL Video.

Photocopiable

DVD TRANSCRIPTS

Unit 7. Loss of communication


CONTROLLER A Finnair niner three four radar contact,
maintain flight
level three seven zero.
... Er yes, Maintain flight level three five zero.
... Sector Alpha? Yes, thats OK.
... Finnair six seven two golf, climb flight level one five
zero, direct to Mike Alpha Romeo.
... Sector Alpha?
CONTROLLER B Sector Bravo, Maintain flight level three one
zero for the AJet two seven four five, Ive got opposite traffic
descending.
CONTROLLER A Will do, coming shortly.
...
CAPTAIN AJet two seven four five request descent.
CONTROLLER A AJet two seven four five maintain flight level
three one zero.
CAPTAIN Maintaining three one zero AJet two seven four
five.
If this weather continues, our golfs off!
F/O Lets hope it clears up!
CAPTAIN Ahh, coffee.
STEWARDESS Sorry for the delay, Captain. One of the
passengers is a bit ill. I think hes OK for now
but well just have to keep an eye on him.
...
CONTROLLER A AJet two seven four five, maintain flight
level
three one zero.
STEWARDESS Can I get either of you anything else?
F/O Yes please, Ill have a sandwich if there are any left.
CONTROLLER A contact one two eight decimal zero five
zero
STEWARDESS Ill check for you, do you have any
preference?
F/O No. Im easy.
CAPTAIN Contact one two eight decimal zero nine zero, AJet
two seven four five, thank you and goodbye.
STEWARDESS Ill just go and check on the passenger and
Ill see what I can find.
F/O Thank you.
CAPTAIN Control, AJet two seven four five maintaining flight
level three one zero.
Control, AJet two seven four five maintaining flight level three
one zero
Control, AJet two seven four five do you read?
What was the new frequency?
F/O Sorry, Im not sure.
CAPTAIN Thats it, one two eight decimal nine nine zero
F/O OK.
CONTROLLER B AJet two seven four five control.
AJet two seven four five, do you read?
AJet two seven four five from control.
... Have you sent AJet two seven four five?

CONTROLLER A AJet two seven four five yes I already


sent him, standby.
AJet two seven four five, do you read?
CONTROLLER A No, hes not with me.
CONTROLLER B OK.
CAPTAIN Control, AJet two seven four five.
CONTROLLER C AJet two seven four five, did you call?
CAPTAIN AJet two seven four five request descent
CONTROLLER C AJet two seven four five. Descend flight
level two six zero
CONTROLLER B ZJet niner seven niner, descend
immediately flight level two hundred, you have traffic at your
ten oclock position, descending towards you.
CONTROLLER B Whos got AJet two seven four five?
CONTROLLER C Hes here.

Reproduced with the kind permission of the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation
(EUROCONTROL).

Photocopiable

DVD TRANSCRIPTS

Unit 8. Call sign confusion


INT.
ATCO 1 (V/O) It was my first day back after a long holiday,
the weather was miserable, and I was just about to start my
shift.
ATCO 2 Welcome back, how was it?
ATCO 1 Sunny and warm, more than I can say for
here.
ATCO 2 Well you picked a good day to come back. The
Supervisor just called, he has given us the east sector.
CONTROLLER He must be pleased to have me back then. I
can cover that.
...
WOMAN What kind of a plane is that?
PRIVATE PILOT Its a PA28, stroke one eighty. Theyve
been around since the 1960s. Dont worry, this one is a bit
more modern, youre gonna love it. Youll get a totally new
perspective on the world!
WOMAN Well see.

INT. 737 (B-JET 3158)


BJET F/O Can you show me that again? ... Sorry youre too
quick for me with that computer!
BJET CAPTAIN Its no wonder you guys were taken over by
us, youre working for B-Jet now!
...
ATCO 2 Okay then, er Lufthansa three echo mike cleared
to four thousand feet, the SAS one one four two to six
thousand feet, and B-Jets as you see it.
ATCO 1 Yeah, Ive got it.
ATCO 2 Its all yours.
ATCO 1 (V/O) I had five aircraft on the frequency but few
conflicts, four were inbound, number one and two from one
airline and the last two from B-Jet. One aircraft had just
departed, probably a conflict but I wanted to see how things
developed.

INT. BJet 3158


...
BJET CAPTAIN Were behind schedule, maintain two forty.
BJET F/O You know the published speed is two ten?
BJET CAPTAIN Yes, I know.
...
PRIVATE PILOT Secure?
WOMAN Its a bit smaller than I expected.
PRIVATE PILOT Here, put this on.
WOMAN So where are you taking me?
PRIVATE PILOT Ah thats a secret!
...

ATCO 1 (V/O) The two inbounds were passing well ahead


of the outbound AJet but I had to reclear the first of the two
BJets, BJet three one five eight.
...
WOMAN I didnt think wed be able to get so close. Is that
normal?
...
ATCO 1 Radar.
TOWER Tower here. Do you know whats just south? Its
gonna block my departures.
ATCO 1 Just noticed that, can you see it from the tower?
TOWER Yeah, it looks like a PA28.
CONTROLLER Standby. AJet one five eight two stop climb at
five thousand feet.
AJET Stopping climb at five thousand feet, Ajet one five eight
two.

INT. BJet 3158


BJET F/O I need to reduce speed soon.
BJET CAPTAIN Keep speed at two forty.
...
TOWER Could you keep an eye on it?
ATCO 1 Ill watch it and see where it lands.
BJET CAPTAIN (IN BACKGROUND) Stopping descent six
thousand feet, B-Jet three five one eight.

INT. BJet 3158


BJET F/O was that for us?
BJET CAPTAIN Was what for us?
ATCO 1 (V/O) The BJet three one five eight was travelling a
lot faster than I expected and hadnt levelled out.
ATCO 1 BJet three one five eight, confirm maintaining six
thousand feet.

INT. BJet 3158


TCAS ALERT ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED.
ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED.
BJET CAPTAIN Increase descent!
TCAS ALERT CLIMB.
CLIMB.

Reproduced with the kind permission of the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation
(EUROCONTROL).

Photocopiable

DVD TRANSCRIPTS

Unit 9. NZ60 A free lesson (part 1)

Part 1

Part 2

NARRATOR 1 Well let the crew help tell you the story after
the aircraft was established on the localizer for RWY 08.
NARRATOR 2 The Glideslope capture happened almost
immediately after the Approach mode was selected. The
captain had the aircraft in Vertical Speed mode to slow down
and was concerned that the aircraft seemed to accelerate as
it pitched down with the Glideslope capture.
FO2 (V/O) As we came round the arc, everything was fine,
but suddenly at glide slope intercept, everything became
rushed. The aircraft pitched down, but now the aircraft was a
lot faster than it should be, as you come into the descent for
the ILS.
NARRATOR 2 But the ILS indications were all correct, so the
captain concentrated on managing the energy problem.
CAPTAIN (V/O) I reconciled it by saying, tail wind, heavy
weight.
FO1 (V/O) There were no flags, no warnings of any sort
to indicate that there was anything other than an autopilot
capture of a valid localizer and a valid glide slope. But we
were just reacting to the circumstances and doing what we
had to do to intercept what we thought was the glide slope.
NARRATOR The first officer did not remember talking to Apia
tower about this time because he was focused on assisting
the captain with the management of the aircraft energy
problem.
FO1 (V/O) We were getting pretty preoccupied with
managing the airplane and slowing down the configuring.
CAPTAIN Flaps 15 ... Gear down, please.
FO1 (V/O) We were travelling quite fast; we had to use the
speedbug to slow down. We had to use the gear to slow
down. We had to select Flap 15 and then after Flap 15,
we had to select Flap 25 to get the airplane to slow down
enough.
CAPTAIN (V/O) The high-energy situation demanded the
use of intermediate flap settings, plus the speedbrake.

NARRATOR The crew had completed the landing checklist.


Each started to think again about the unease they had felt
when the aircraft had captured the glide slope so quickly.
FO2 (V/O) Why were we rushing? Why was the airplane
going down so quickly? Why were we needing to use
speedbrakes? Why were we needing to use the gear?
CAPTAIN (V/O) I was heads down managing the aircraft all
the way through till the landing checklist was complete.
NARRATOR 2 The pilots were still concerned about the
unease they had felt when the Glideslope was captured. With
the aircraft now set up for landing, they started to revisit
their doubts. They were looking for something to confirm that
the On Slope Glideslope indications were, in fact, correct.
FO2 (V/O) I looked up to clarify in my own mind where we
were.
FO1 (V/O) Something in my mind said, things were not
right.
NARRATOR 2 All three pilots looked up through the forward
windscreens, expecting to now see the runway lights in front
of them. The captain reported seeing a mishmash of lights
and thought that scattered cloud, previously reported by Apia
Tower, might be partially obscuring them. The other pilots
could not see the runway lights either.
FO1 (V/O) Well, when I looked out of the windscreen, and I
couldnt see the airfield and I expected to
FO2 (V/O) I remember looking out the windscreen and all I
could remember seeing was two dim red lights and thought,
well, thats interesting. Wheres the airport? It didnt make
any sense to me, so I came back inside.
FO1 (V/O) I then saw that the Glideslope and the Localizer
are still both centred. There are no warning flags and the
three autopilots are still engaged.
NARRATOR 2 The first officer looked out of his side window
and was surprised to see that the lights from the village on
the adjacent island were so close.
FO1 (V/O) But what I could see out of the right hand side
was the little island we go past.
NARRATOR 2 He voiced this surprise saying,
FO1 Shit! Those lights are close.
NARRATOR 2 At the same time the captain was doing a
DME crosscheck, but was unable to make the answer tie
up with the aircraft altitude. He decided that there was
something seriously wrong with the ILS instrumentation.
He disconnected the autopilot, applied power and pitched
the aircraft up into a go-around.
PILOTS Go around. Go around.
NARRATOR 2 The third pilot also checked the DME against
the altitude.
FO2 (V/O) I did the first DME check; it didnt make sense.
What had I done wrong? And then suddenly it all clicked,
that my DME checks were saying we werent where we
were supposed to be and all three of us said almost
instantaneously, Go around, go around.
NARRATOR 2 The autopilots were disconnected and a
missed approach was conducted to a safe altitude using
only the standby instruments. The captain chose to fly to a
safe position to assess what should be done next.

Reproduced with the kind permission of Air New Zealand.

Photocopiable

DVD TRANSCRIPTS

Unit 10. NZ60 A free lesson (part 2)


Part 1

Part 3

DAVE STOBIE During the investigation, we needed to


understand why the crew acted the way they did, so that we
could look for opportunities to strengthen our defences in
the future. Early on in the investigation, it was obvious that
this crew were cautious, diligent and well-prepared for the
approach. They were aware that they needed to crosscheck
their various pieces of information, but they had a normal
mindset for pilots conducting an ILS. Pilots tend to trust
the most precise information. For example, they trust a
VOR more than an NDB. They also trust an ILS more than
any other approach aid because it allows high-precision
approaches. So when things didnt feel quite right during
the approach, they naturally accepted the most precise
information they had - which was the ILS, especially in the
absence of any warning flags.
BOB HENDERSON That mindset was difficult to break.
The combination of a high work load, managing the aircraft
energy and the trust that they all had learnt to have in the
ILS system made it difficult for them to see the glidepath
error. When the Captain looked up and didnt see the runway
lights, he made the picture fit by assuming that there was
weather in front of him. When they saw a descent rate of
just over 1,000 feet per minute, again made the picture fit
with a tailwind and heavy weight. They were presented with
normal centreline and glideslope indications on all their
instruments. The autopilot had accepted the localizer and
glidepath guidance signals. There were no immediate clues
available to warn them that the information being portrayed
on the instruments was in fact wrong.
The autopilots interrogated all data and found absolutely
no anomalies with the status of the ILS information and
therefore went to LAND 3: Autoland mode. However, youll
remember the feeling of unease that the crew felt when the
glideslope captured. Having managed the energy problem, it
was this unease that brought the crew back to questioning
the information they had in front of them. The FALEOLO VORDME was the only DME not subject to a NOTAM. With the
crew using this DME, instead of the Apia ILS DME to check
altitudes, the conflict of DME distance against the aircraft
altitude took some seconds to resolve.

CHRIS KRIECHBAUM Trust is interesting. There was


significant trust between the three crew. This played a big
part in the unanimous decision to go around. For the open
environment that had been created and the team-building
that had gone on earlier in the night, the crew felt sufficiently
at ease to express their doubts and call the go-around.
We trust our instruments, especially if there are no flags
coupled with a valid ident. One way to review the elements
of this event is to use the Reason Model, a model that you
are all familiar with. The first defence was breached by the
NOTAM terminology because there was a misunderstanding
regarding the potential risk of using unmonitored or not-ATS
monitored approach and landing aids. The second defence,
monitoring the ILS ident, was breached because the ident
was present throughout the approach. The third defence,
the aircraft warning system design, was breached because
the degraded ILS system still provided sufficient electronic
information to withdraw all the onboard warning flags. The
fourth defence was breached when the glideslope intercept
check was not completed. The fifth defence, the warning
available from a Ground Proximity Warning System, because
the aircraft was correctly configured to land which met
all requirements of the GPWS system. The sixth defence
held. The crews situation awareness involving the unease
generated at the glideslope capture; the increased workload
to configure the aircraft; the proximity of the lights on the
island; and reinforced by the conflict between the aircraft
altitude and DME distance caused them to execute a goaround and protect the safety of the aircraft.

Part 2
BOB HENDERSON Although they didnt understand precisely
what was wrong, the conflict generated for each of them
from: the distance/altitude anomaly and the apparent
closeness of the lights on the adjacent island caused them
each to break their mindset of the ILS being correct and
make a safe decision to go around, establish the aircraft
clear of terrain and above safety height and then examine
their options. The investigation revealed that it took them
only an incredibly few fifteen seconds to unlock this mindset
generated by years of aviation experience.
CHRIS KRIECHBAUM When pilots crosscheck information
they do so because they are aware of possible errors.
Over the years we have learnt about many of the technical
errors which occur and we are continually improving our
understanding of human error. It is easy to accept the most
compelling information, in this case the ILS; this is normal
human nature. What this event has taught us, yet again,
is that we must remain vigilant and always be careful to
validate all the information we are presented with. When the
crew of NZ60 went around, they did so because their trust in
the systems and the aircraft had been violated.
9

Reproduced with the kind permission of Air New Zealand.

Photocopiable