Nehru and Minorities

Author(s): S. Gopal
Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 23, No. 45/47, Special Number (Nov., 1988), pp.
2463+2465-2466
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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Minorities

and

Nehru

S Gopal
Pressure of circumstances led Nehru not to throw his full weight on the side of secularism. In 1948 he committed
the support of the government to the banning ofvscommunalpoliticalparties but did not implement the resolution.
He agreed with Gandhi that the compulsory stoppage of cow-slaughter,taken as an isolated decision, would appear
as a concession to Hindu bigotry and was therefore to be avoided; yet he did not oppose the listing of the banning
of cow-slaughter as one of the directive principles of state policy in the constitution and was content to see that
nothing came of it in practice. An even greater deficiency in his policy of merging religious communities in a
general citizenship was the restriction of the insistence on monogamy to Hindu men and the grant of the rights
of divorce and inheritance only to Hindu women. In his keenness to win the confidence of the Muslim community,
he failed to ensure the equality before the law of all Indians and enact a common civil code. Religion can be
separated from politics more easily if it is also separated from law.
WHEN Nehru came to active politics in the
early twenties, he had not yet moved to the
personal position of religious agnosticism
which was to mark him in later years. His'
conventionalHindu theism helped to block
his mind from questioningGandhi'seffort to
strengthenthe national identity by drawing
up a programmewhich took for grantedthe
divergencebetween the Hindu and Muslim
communities but was acceptable to both.
Nehruwas not comfortablewith the Khilafat
movementbut justifiedit at a politicalrather
than a religious level by arguingthat it was
an effortto thwartthe divisionof Tirkeyand
a part of the struggle for the freedom of
India. This enabled him to square the
Khilafat movement with the assertion that
the Congressshould not identify itself with
controversialreligious issues. But his position was not always logical. It is odd, for
example,to find him saying that it was the
duty of Hindus to help the Muslims at this
time for if the Britishsucceededin destroying Islam they would then try to destroythe
Hindu religion. ' Again, as mayor of
Allahabad in 1923 he guided the Board to
reject unanimously the suggestion to prohibit the slaughterof cattle;but his attitude
was based not so much on any principleas
on a feeling that this was not a matter calling for administrativeintervention;for he
had earliersuggestedto the Hindusthat they
should request Muslimsto stop cow-killing
rather than fight them about it.
The spread of rioting across the face of
India in the mid- twentiesinvolvingsections
of the Hinduand Muslimcommunitiescompelled Nehru to take a more clearcutposition on the question of religion in politics.
It now became obvious to him that India,
caught in the whirlpool of mutual antagonism, would be draggeddown into the
abyssunless this so-calledreligionwas scotched and the intelligentsia at least was
secularised.Nehru used this word in 1926,
not in the accepted sense of the separation
of churchand state-thishad no imme.liate
relevancein India if only because the state
was in alien hands-but to mean the toleration of all faiths and beliefs and permissible religious practices,leading to a separation of religion from politics. For such
toleranceto be not emotionalgenerositybut
Economic and Political Weekly

coldly reasoned Nehru looked to both

industrialisationand mass education of the
type that would dissolve dogma and the
dogmatic mentality. Nehru had begun to
discern the mesh of political *reaction,
economic stagnationand religioussuperstition;and he himselfshedthe vestigesof conventional religious belief. He told Indians
on his return from Europe in December
1927, "the less, we talk of and worryabout
the next world, the more good we are likely to do to our fellow countrymen and
country".
To Nehru religion was now the fountainhead of authoritarianismand the method
used at all times to secure the submission
of the oppressed.But getting rid of religion
altogether was a long-term objective; the
immediate problem was dealing with the
growing communal animosity. Nehru was
clear-sightedabout the reasonsfor this. The
social disharmony between Hindus and
Muslims had spread to other spheres with
the regionalimbalancein developmentunder
the East India Company, leading to the
classes who gained most from British rule
beingpredominantlyHindu. By the time the
interior areas of India caught up with the
rest, national awarene5s expressed itself
increasinglyin aeHinduIdioin.The process
of divergence between the religious communities was furtheraggravatedby official
policy symbolised by tht establishmentof
separateelectorates;and as the franchisewas
broadened periodically on this basis, the
communal elements grew correspondingly
stronger.From this analysisNehru drewthe
conclusionthat the communalproblemwas
a wasteful diversion from the main campaign against the British, The communal
parties, both Hindu and Muslim, derived
their support from thq feudal and upper
classes, defensive of vested interests, seeking office and employmentfrom the British
and panderingto myth and passion in their'
attempts to secure a base among the people. So to Nehru these communal parties
weregiantswith feet of clay,who wouldfade
into nothingnessin the light of reasononce
the British were pushed out. He, therefore,
in accordancewith his favouritestrategyof
indirect approach, ignored the communal
problem and concentratedhis energies on

Special Number

the national movementagainst foreignrule

and on the need to give that movementan
economic slant. The vast majority of the
Indianpeople, whatevertheir religion,bore
the commonburdensof hungerand poverty,
and when these burdenswere lightenedthe
curse of religion in politics would be lifted.
Religiousminoritiesshouldbe of no political
significance;the minoritythat matteredand
which had to be resistedwas that of the rich
exploiters.
Nehru, therefore,regardedas a waste of
time all attemptsat a political settlementof
the commural problem.Ansari pinned his
faithon mutualadjustmentsthroughformal
and informalconversationswith communal
parties, but to Nehru this was a futile
endeavour.These partiesdid not wish to see
unity conferences succeed; nor did the
British, who could always outbid the Congress. So CongressMuslimswerealwayson
the retreat, continuously offering concessions to which there could be no end; and
Nehru, despite his personal affinity with
Ansariand manyotherMuslimsin the Congress, could not conceal his contempt for
their attitude.
Even Nehru, however,especially in the
yearswhen he was the presidentof the Congress,could not'completelyturn awayfrom
trying to eliminate the communal menace.
Till the time came when class conflicts set
aside religious clashes, he wished the
Hindus,as the majoritycommunity,to show
the generositywhich wouldremovefearand
suspicion. The minorities should be given
the fullestassurance,not of jobs and of seats
in assemblies, but that their culture and
traditionswould be safe. Provisionto foster
languages and education would help to
nourish the rich, varied, larger, common
culture of India. The, existence of such a
culturewas also one of the points he sought
to establishin his historicalwritings.Nehru
had not the training of a professional
historianbut he had the instincts of a good
one. He rejected,even in the early thirties,
the gtandardperiodisationof Indianhistory
into Hindu, Muslim and British; and he
stressed to his readers that Islam did not
believe in religious persecutionand a man
like Mahmudof Ghazni,who was generally
regardedas an iconoclast, was in fact no

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2463

more than a successful soldier who would

have looted for whicheverreligion he had
belonged. The best of Indian culturewas to
Nehru a synthesis;this had badly frayedin
recent times and should be rebuilt on the
more secure foundations of freedom 4nd
social equality and in consonance with a
better world order.
To ensurethat civil disobediencein 1930
was not weakened by communal forces,
Nehru reasserted the commitment of the.
Congressto religious,cultural,linguisticand
educationalfreedom, and promisedthat on
communal issues the Congress would not
favour any side but hold the centre impartially. 2 In the resolution on fundamental
rightsat the KarachiCongressin 1931,looking forwardto a free India, he incorporated
clauses providingthat every citizen should
enjoy freedom of conscience and the right
freely to profess and practise any religion,
subjectto publicorderand morality,that all
citizens wereequal before t S law, irrespective of religion, creed, caste or sex, that no
disability attached to citizens for these
reasonsin regardto publicemploymentand
in the exerciseof any trade or calling, and
that the state should observe neutralityin
regard to all religions. This was the first
breakdown,in concrete terms, of the concept of secularismin the Indiancontextand
formed the basis of the articles in the constitution many years later. Once the Congress,the leadingpoliticalpartyin the country,had committeditself to these provisions,
Nehru expected the ground to be removed
from undercommunalism,for therewas no
logical justification left for communal
demands. On the political plane, the only
solution was the nationalist one, with no
room for special representation.
Life,however,as Nehruhimselfoften said,
is different from and larger than logic. He
might assertthat communalismwas a ghost
but the ghost refused to vanish and continued to drink blood. So, tacitly shedding
the viewthat the Hindu-Muslimproblemdid
not exist because it had nothing to do with
the masses, Nehru decided, during the few
months at the end of 1933when he was out
of prison, to face the issue. He was still of
the opinion that the communalpartieswere
basicallyprops of political reaction,and he
continued to urge the Hindus, as the
majority community, to take the initiative
in generosity.But he shifted from the position that communal feeling was alwaysthe
artificialcreationof political groups.Tothe
extentthat it existedamong the Hindus and
was able to disguise itself as nationalism,it
was the Indianversionof fascismand deserving of the severestcondemnation.
Muslimcommunalgroupsseemedto him
at least middle class and representativein
some degreeof the Muslimviewpoint,while
its leadersbehavedwith greaterdignitythah
those of the Hindu Mahasabha,who spoke
only for capitalists, landlords, and a few
princes and their hangers-on. Nehru also
now conceded that it was understandable
that the Muslims, as an economically and
educationallybackwardcommunity,might
Economic and Political Weekly

be apprehensiveabout the future. "Honest

communalismis fear;falsecommunalismis
political reaction".3
To distinguish between shades of communalism and to contend that it could
sometimes be honest and, therefore,
presumablylegitimate,was to embarkon a
dangerouscourse.It at once jeopardisedthe
position of the many Muslims in the Congress who had not hesitated to participate
in the civil disobedience movement; and
Nehru made this worse by stating that no
other organisation could successfully
challengethe claim of the communaliststo
speak for the Muslims and that their aggressivelycommunalcharactergavetheman
advantageoverthe Muslimsin the Congress.
Having yielded so much ground in argument to Muslim communalists, Nehru
sought to defeat them in practiceby contending that the way to deal with communal
parties was not to barterwith them but to
appealovertheir heads to the masses.Their
culturalunitywas enduring,the demandfor
political and economic freedom was the
realityand the communalmyth wouldcease
to existwhenput to the test of massopinion.
A constituentassemblyelectedby adultfranchise, even on the basis of separate electorates,would disposeof the communalproblem readily enough. All this seemed very
remote as the Congressdeveloped no clear
objectivesor ideology, the governmentwith
the Communal Award divided the people
into numerousreligiouscompartmentsand
Nehru, sitting in prison, heardof persistent
communal voilence. "What a disgusting
savage people we are. Politics, progress,
socialism, communism, science-whereare
they before this black religious savagery".4
But the election campaign of 1936, with a
wider franchisethan before,gave Nehruhis
chance. He played down the communal
issue, held up independence and better
economic conditions as the first priorities
and centredhis fire on the alien rulers,the
capitalistsand the landlords.In the United
Provinces,a clash with the Muslim League
was avoided.Speakingon the sameplatform
as Jinnah, Nehru referredto communalism
as no more than a nuisance which made
people petty-mindedand hid from view the
maj6rproblems.In his presidentialaddress
at the FaizpurCongressin December 1936
he did not refer to communalism at all.
The results of the elections confirmed
Nehru in his view, gained during his tours,
that the Congresshad never been stronger.
But it had contested few Muslim seats and
of these lost most. Even so, Nehru felt that
*the Congress should have fielded more
Muslimcandidates.The Muslim-masseshad
been too long doped with communalpoison
and were suspicious of the Congress; but
there was a ferment among the younger
Muslims and the masses and the Congress
shouldreachout to them. The Muslimrankand-file had a greaterpotentiality,perhaps
becauseof more freedomin social relations,
than the Hindu counterpart and, if convinced of a new thought, would accept it.
So, smothering Jinnah'shopes of a resur-

Special Number

rection of the atmosphereof the Lucknow

pact and the reaching of a political agreement at the leadershiplevel, Nehru in 1937
initiateda Muslim mass contact campaign.
This was a chance for implementing his
theory that the masses had no communal
problem and could be led to forget this
side-issueby offering them political action
and placing before them an economic
programme; but the opportunity was
squandered.5In fact, it was Jinnah who,
acceptingwhat he regardedas a challenge,
strengthened the position of the League
among the Muslim masses by appealingto
God and the Koranand alleging that Islam
was being threatened.Takingadvantageof
acceptanceof office by the Congress,he slid
easilyfromattackingthe Congress,representing majority opinion, to denouncing it as
representingHindu opinion and complained
of generalharassmentof Muslims without
specifying his charges.
Nehru had gradually and reluctantlyto
change his opinion that there was no real
strength behind the League. Jinnah's
demand that his party be recognisedas the
organisation
authoritativeand representative
of the Muslimswas unacceptable;but it was
no longer enough merelyto go half-wayto
meet the rminoritiesand allay their fears in
matters of culture, language and religious
observances.Nehru was willing to consider,
in any scheme of provincialredistribution,
the grantto importantgroupsand minorities
of territorieswithin which they would have
full opportunitiesfor self-development;but
the League, not being serious about nonpolitical matters, paid no attention. By the
beginning of 1939 Nehru was forced to
acknowledge that the communal problem
had acquireda new and serious aspect. The
fear of the Muslims that they might be
swamped by the Hindu majority had
widened considerably; there was, particularlyin the UnitedProvinces,moregeneral
ill-will among the Muslim masses towards
the Congressthan at any time before, and
fascist elements werebecoming strongerin
both the communal parties. Even now,
Nehru was hopeful that the economic issue
would witherthe communal problemif the
provincialgovernmentsgavepriorityto such
measuresas the wipingout of old debtsand
the arrears of rent; but the Congress
ministrieswere too conservativeto move in
thesematters.By the time warbrokeout and
these ministries resigned, Nehru had to
accept defeat: "Thereis no doubt that we
have been unable to check the growth of
communalism and anti- Congress feeling
among the Muslim masses!'6Evencivil war
now seemed to him possible.
His buoyant optimism, however, soon
returnedto the surface.He placed hopes in
the League'scommitmentto independence;
and even its attainment of a mass basis
mightbe helpfulin bringingpressureto bear
on its feudalleadership.If the Congressand
the Leaguecould work together in dealing
with the governmentin the war crisis, the
communal grievances would fall into
perspective.So the Congresswas willing to

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2465

acceptthe League,if not as the sole Muslim

organisation, at least as an important and
influential party. But joint action with the
Congresshad no interestfor Jinnahand he
would not go beyond seeking statutoryprovision for coalition ministries. With the
eelebrationof the 'day of deliverance'and
the passing of the Pakistanresolutionthere
was no scope for negotiations with the
League,and Nehru becamemore concerned
with giving assurancesto the Christiansand
Sikhs that the Congress was committed to
secularismand legitimateminorityinterests
couldbe protectedby a constituentassembly,
in whichsuch questionswouldbe settlednot
by a majority vote but by common consent
and differences referredif necessary to arbitration not by the British but preferably
by the League of Nations. But during the
war years such matterswere not in Nehru's
hands. The League,with active Britishsupport, expanded its popular backing and
moved to the climax of partition.
Nehru's policy towards the minorities
before 1947, therefore,had not been a success. He had been convinced that the communal problem was not a matter for solution by the communalists. These were
political reactionaries converting religious
mattersinto a political problemto promote
their own narrow interests; and the best
answer to them was religious toleration,
safeguardingof cultureand languagesand
emphasis on political independence and
economic betterment, both of which cut
across religious differences.But the British
government gave Nehru no chance to
translatethis flawless thesis into practice.A
dissolution of the communal problem was
not possible in a colonial setting.
Nehru had written as far back as 1936,
"the day on which India achieves her
freedom, communal differences and
jealousieswill get solvedof themselves".Far
frombeingthis the case,in August 1947such
differences assumed national and even
international proportions. The refusal to
synchronise acceptance of Pakistan with
recognitionof the two-nationtheoryand the
presenceof largereligiousminoritiesin India
made secularismthe only possible basis of
a uniform and durable national identity.
Rational thinking and a civilised outlook
meant the insistenceon religionas a private
matterfor the individualwith no bearingon
civic rights and duties; and in a multireligious society the state had to stay aloof
from all faiths and permitdiverse forms of
worshipprovidedthey did not conflict with
other religions. But to provide in the constitution for secularbehaviourwas only the
beginningof the struggle.The circumstances
of 1947had intensifiedthe communalmood
and even the most senior of Nehru's colleagueswerenot alwayscarefulin maintaining that the state shouldnot promote any
particular religion. It was suggested that
secularismwas a westernconcept unsuited
to India, wherethe largemajority,practised
Hinduism as a social religion. To counter
this Nehru had, long before independence,
2466

definedsecularismnot accordingto any dic- room in a secular society for differencesin

tionary.or historical tradition but in a way rl. vnal law which claim religioussanction.
adapted to conditions in this country. The To denyrights to Muslimwomen which are
future Indian state would not be hostile to availableto womenof other faithsis a violareligion but would not representany one tion of the provisionin the constitutionthat
religionand would providefreedomof con- the state shall not discriminateagainst any
science to all.
citizen on grounds of religion.
As before 1947, Nehru as prime minister
As Nehruhad realisedfrom the verystart,
was more concerned with Hindu than-with the realanswerto the mixingof religionwith
Muslim communalism. The Hindu faith, politics is mass education. An educated
preachinghospitality to all forms of belief, society, forward-lookingand striving for
was idealon paper;but the practicewasrigid development,will, evenwithout knowingit,
and narrow. The Muslim outlook might liquidate communalism, both of reaction
often be worse,but it could not makemuch and of fear. Nehru was always awarethat
difference to the future of India. So the the problemof minoritieswas best handled
destruction of Hindu communalism was not in itself but as a part of wider issues.
indispensablefor India'ssurvival. But just But he could not achievewhat he hoped for
as Hindu revivalismwas the greatestdanger, during the freedom movement and he did
so also it was the primeresponsibilityof the not do what he knew should be done in an
Hindus to provide the religious minorities independent India. He himself suggested
with a sense of security.The test of success that the problemsof the minoritieswerenot
was not what the Hindus thoughtbut how suitedto his temperamentand cast of mind.
the Muslimsand otherminoritiesfelt. It was "I must confess to you" he wrote to Jinnah
only if the Hindusweresecularthat the non- aftersome talks with him soon afterthe outHindus could become secular.They should breakof war,"thatin this matterI havelost
not gain the impressionthat they werebeing confidence in myself, though I am not
treated as second-class citizens. So Nehru usually given that way. But the last two or
assured the Christians of full freedom for threeyearshavehad a powerfuleffecton me.
evangelicalwork so long as it did not imp- My own mind moves on a different plane
inge on politics and, giving the Muslims and most of my interestslie in other direcspecial attention, encouragedtheir recruit- tions. And so, though I have given much
ment to the armed and civil services, par- thoughtto the problemand understandmost
ticularly the police, and their employment of its implications, I feel as if I was an outin the privatesector.Recognisingthat Urdu, sider and alien in spirit."But if he did not
while spokenby both Hindus and Muslims, come up with appropriateand effective achad become a symbol of Islamic culture,he tions in differentcontexts,he at least left us
providedthat its use and teachingweregiven with the right answers and the correct
priority, especially in Delhi and Uttar approaches.
Pradesh.
Notes
Yet,just as to distinguishbetweenHindu
and Muslim communalismwas to falter in
(Thisis the sixth M A Ansari Memorial Lecture
logic, so too to seem to favourthe majority
delivered at the Department of History, Jamia
or to providespecialtreatmentto minorities
Millia Islamia.]
is to weaken secularism as the foundation
of equality and democracy.Pressureof cir1 Presidentialaddress at the Bundelkhandconcumstancessometimesled Nehru to hesitate
ference,June 13, 1921.Selected Works,Vol 1,
and not to throw his full weight on the side
p 177 ff.
of secularism.In 1948he committedthe sup2 'The Problem of Minorities' March 14, 1930.
Selected Works, Vol 4, pp 259-261.
port of the governmentto the banning of
3 Interview, November 29, The Bombay
communal political partiesbut did not imChronicle, December 2, 1933.
plement the resolution. He agreed with
4 Diary entry, April 17, 1935.
Gandhi that the compulsory stoppage of
5 MushirulHasan, 'The Muslim Mass Contact
cow- slaughter,takenas an isolateddecision,
Campaign',EconomicandPoliticalWeekly,
would appear as a concession to Hindu
December 27, 1986.
bigotry and thereforeto be avoided;yet he
6 Nehru to RajendraPrasad, October 18, 1939.
did not oppose the listing of the banningof
7 October 18, 1939.
cow-slaughteras one of the directiveprinciples of state policy in the constitutionand
was content to see that nothing came of it
Economic and Political Weekly
in practice.An evengreaterdeficiencyin his
Availablefrom
policy of mergingreligiouscommunities in
a general citizenship was the restrictionof
M/s Dey and Bose MagazineAgent,
the insistenceon monogamy to Hindu men
C/o SridumMazumdar,
and the grant of the rights of divorce and
107, SadarBaxi Lane,
inheritance only to Hindu women. In his
Howrah - 711 101.
keenness to win the confidence of the
WestBengal
Muslim community,he failed to ensurethe
equality before the law of all Indians and
CentralNews Agency (P) Ltd.
enact a common civil code. Religioncan be
23/90, ConnaughtCircus,
separatedfrom politics more easily if it is
New Delhi - 110001.
also separated from the law. There is no
Economic and Political Weekly

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November 1988