Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Jonathan BARNES
ABSTRACT
Before Frege, the term Begriffsschriftwas used to indicate (i) a language the expressions of
which adequately represent the structure of the judgements or concepts which they signify, and
(ii) a language the written signs of which designate ideas rather than sounds. In 1879 Frege follows (i). Later he adopts (ii) and with it the Aristotelian theory of language in which it is
embedded.
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of Begriffsschrift), and Latino sine flexione (in which Peano sometimes wrote
and sometimes lectured), and how can I resist it? La langue bleue or
Bolak.2
To be sure, Freges new language did not have the aspirations of Bolak.
Most artificial languages were supposed to possess the power and flexibility
of a natural language: you can write verse in Volopk, you can make love in
Latino sine flexione. Their pretensions are social and political: like the flags by
which ships communicate, they are supranational; a Frenchman and a German
will chat with one another in Bolak and had Bismarck and Napoleon so chatted, the Franco-Prussian War might have been prevented. Nor was Leibniz less
optimistic: once his universal language is adopted, science will march forward
and men will quarrel no more all will be resolved in a calculemus.3
Freges language had a more modest aim and a more restricted scope: it
was to be a language of science (and in the first instance of arithmetic); it was
to be capable of expressing all that a scientist might want (in his scientific
moments) to express and nothing more. Just as a microscope is superior to
an eye for certain scientific purposes and useless for most of the ends of everyday life, so Freges new language is superior to German in the study or in the
laboratory and perfectly out of place in the salon or the boudoir. (The inept
comparison with a microscope was perhaps a nod to Ernst Abbe.4)
I have heard it denied that Frege was out to create a new language: he
speaks in that vein but surely it is a rhetorical exaggeration, a faon de par ler? Well, you might decide that something in which you cannot write a billet
doux or tell a joke does not deserve the name of language. But if Frege did not
invent a language, what did he invent? Two possible answers to the question
must be scouted.
First, Frege did not invent a code or a notation he and Sam Morse were
not in the same line of business. A Morse formula a certain sequence of dots
and dashes is a funny way of writing or sounding an English (or German or
French) expression. You understand the formula only when you know which
English (or German or French) expression it encodes. A Fregean formula is
not like that: in order to understand a Fregean formula you do not have to find
some corresponding English formula no more than, in order to understand
a German formula, you have to discover a corresponding English formula.
2
For a history of these things see Couturat and Lau, 1907; for Leibniz contributions
see Trendelenburg, 1867; Knecht, 1981.
3
See esp. Leibniz, 1673 (quoted in Trendelenburg, 1867, pp. 32-37). The calculemus
occurs in a note printed in Leibniz, 1890, p. 200.
4
Or was it taken from Leibniz? See Leibniz, 1673, p. 241 (cited by Trendelenburg,
1867, pp. 36-37).
What is a Begriffsschrift?
67
Secondly, Frege did not invent an adjunct or supplement to natural language. All the sciences have their jargon and the arts ape them. Jargon is not
a substitute for English: it is a superaddition to English. A scientist will write
English afforced. Freges invention is not like that. Consider the following
sequence of signs, three of them Fregean and three English:
Frege is French
The two sequences are not sentences, they are not well-formed, they belong
to no language: they are macaroni. (To be sure, they are intelligible enough;
but then plenty of nonsense is perfectly intelligible.)
Freges invention, as the title of Begriffsschrift proclaims, is modelled on
the formular language of arithmetic. To what language does the following
sequence of signs belong?
2 + 4 = 6.
If so, then had this paper been written in German, the sequence would have
abbreviated a German sentence; and in general, one and the same sequence of
symbols will belong to an indefinitely large number of languages and, by a
felicitous coincidence, will express the very same thought in each of the languages to which it belongs. According to Frege, the sequence
2+4=6
That is to say, should the new language be a written language or a spoken language?
Frege offers three reasons in favour of preferring for scientific purposes
what he calls signs for the eye. First, visible signs are more sharply defined
than audible signs: they are less prone to be confused with one another ink
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Jonathan Barnes
is less labile than noise. Secondly, visible signs endure longer than audible
signs: you may look back to the top of the page or turn back to the start of the
chapter ink fades less fast than noise. Thirdly, visible signs are made on a
two-dimensional surface, so that their vertical as well as their horizontal order
may be made to carry significance: audible signs occupy one dimension, the
before and after of time.
The three reasons are repeated, in almost the same words, in the paper on
Peanos Begriffsschrift which Frege published in 1896.5 He presumably
thought that they were good reasons; and so they are: that is to say, they advert
to certain contingent facts which give to writing in certain contexts and for
certain ends an advantage over speech. But if Freges reasons are unexceptionable, the question to which they are addressed is queer.
Should the new language be spoken or written? shall we choose signs for
the eyes or signs for the ears? Well, why think that we must choose the one or
the other? why not have both? 6 When an improbable student assures me that
he has mastered a new language over the vacation, I do not ask him whether
it was a written or a spoken language; for I suppose that languages most ordinary languages are both written and spoken. Frege asks us to pick either A
or B, and he urges the advantages of A; but we might plausibly complain that
he has suppressed the most enticing option the conjunctive option of both A
and B. And a reason for preferring A to B is no reason for preferring A to both
A and B.
Frege did not overlook the conjunctive option. He did not suppose that
most languages are both written and spoken. He supposed that most languages
are spoken. The supposition was a commonplace, and ancient.
At the beginning of his de Interpretatione Aristotle observes that
items in the voice are symbols of passions in the soul, and written items of items in the
voice. (16a3-4)
That is to say, the written expressions of a language represent or stand for certain spoken expressions, just as the spoken expressions of a language represent or stand for certain psychological states or events. This thesis is one element in the semantic theory which commentators read into the opening
paragraph of the de Interpretatione. The theory invokes written items, or
inscriptions; items in the voice, or utterances; passions in the soul, which
later Aristotelians generally identified as thoughts or concepts; and things.
5
The second of the three reasons is found in Trendelenburg, 1867, p. 2 (who adds that
written signs are readily transportable).
6
The signs <of the universal language> must be not only visible but also audible
(Trendelenburg, 1867, p. 22).
What is a Begriffsschrift?
69
A word-language is a language-like German or English whose signs consist of words rather than of formulae; and a word-script is the written version of, or the inscriptional notation for a word-language. The word-script
merely imitates the language: the inscriptions are not the linguistic realities
themselves, and the signs which Freges printer has inscribed on the page are
signs of signs, they are signs of utterances.
7
1880, pp. 13-14. The phrase signs of signs occurs, in a similar context, in
Humboldt, 1826, p. 111. No doubt it was a common formula.
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Jonathan Barnes
Here, then, we have the Aristotelian thesis presented in all its simplicity
and presented as a commonplace. The thesis returns, near the end of Freges
life, in a qualified version:
A sentence which a writer inscribes is in the first place a recipe for the construction of a
spoken sentence in a language in which the sequence of sounds serves as a sign for the
expression of a sense. Hence at first there is only a mediated connexion between written
signs and an expressed sense. Once this connexion is established we can regard the written
or printed sentence as an immediate expression of a thought, hence as a sentence in the
proper sense of the word. (1923+, p. 280)
The Aristotelian thesis is here said to hold only in the first place: at first, I
must look for the sound associated with the inscription and then hunt the sense
associated with the sound; but as I get used to the game, I may learn to look
directly for the sense on seeing the inscription. The Aristotelian thesis is modified, but not abandoned.
A language is a system of significant expressions. I shall say that a language is Aristotelian if it is a system of significant sounds. A theory of meaning for an Aristotelian language will make reference to utterances, it will produce theorems of the form
Utterance U means such and such.
But the addition of a notation is an optional extra; and it will have no effect
on the semantic theory of the language.
According to the Aristotelian thesis, natural languages are Aristotelian languages.8
Whether or not the Aristotelian thesis is true, it is easy to conceive of the
contrary of an Aristotelian language, of an anti-Aristotelian language. An
anti-Aristotelian language is a system of significant inscriptions. A theory of
meaning for an anti-Aristotelian language will produce theorems of the form
Inscription I means such and such.
What is a Begriffsschrift?
71
Judgement is prior to concept, Urteil to Begriff and so the name Begriffsschrift may seem infelicitous. Freges reason for disliking the name is not
Schrders reason; but the implication is the same a better term for the new
language might have been Urteilsschrift.
Then why did Frege call his new language a Begriffsschrift rather than an
Urteilsschrift?
The term Begriffsschrift was not a Fregean neologism. Scholars refer to
Adolf Trendelenburg. In the introductory pages of a long piece entitled ber
Leibnizens Entwurf einer allgemeinen Charakteristik he says:
The human mind, which owes so much to signs, has here recognized the possibility of elaborating signs still further inasmuch as, instead of the words already present in the language,
it brings sign and thing, the form of the sign and the content of the concept, into direct contact, and devises signs which represent as separated or conjoined the characteristics which
are separated or conjoined in the concepts. Science has, in certain areas and for its own reasons, already produced the first beginnings of such a Begriffsschrift
9
The terms Aristotelian and anti-Aristotelian are contraries, not contradictories:
there may, in principle, be languages which are neutral, neither Aristotelian nor antiAristotelian. The semantic theory for such a language will produce theorems of the form
Expression E means such and such.
Where an expression is neither an inscription nor an utterance (or else it is one or the other,
indifferently). I suppose that natural languages are, in this sense, neutral; but I have no room
to explore the matter.
10
Letter to Frege, 14.10.96, in Frege, 1976, pp. 188-189.
11
In his review of Begriffsschrift known to me from Bynum, 1972, p. 224 n..
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Jonathan Barnes
Such a manner of designation will be, in contrast to word-signs which are more or less
indifferent to the content of the ideas, a characteristic language of concepts, and, in contrast to the particular languages of different peoples, a universal language of things.12
Frege is alluding to a paragraph which occurs a couple of pages after the passage I have just quoted. Presumably he read the essay from the beginning; and
it seems likely that he read it to the end.13
Trendelenburgs paper was first published in the Abhandlungen of the
Berlin Academy for 1855. The word Begriffsschrift had made its Academy
dbut some thirty years earlier. The Abhandlungen for 1826 print an address
which Wilhelm von Humboldt gave in 1824 under the title: ber die Buchstabenschrift und ihren Zusammenhang mit dem Sprachbau. Having distinguished different forms and functions of linguistic signs, Humboldt declares
that
The individuality of words, in every one of which there is always something more than
merely its logical definition, is so attached to sound that this immediately awakens in the
soul their peculiar effects. A sign which strives after the concept and neglects the sound can
express this only imperfectly.A system of such signs merely reproduces the bare concepts
of the outer and inner world; but language is meant to contain this world itself, changed, to
be sure, into thought-signs but nonetheless in the whole plenitude of its rich, colourful and
living multiplicity.
But there never has been, and there never can be, a Begriffsschrift which is modelled purely
on concepts and which has not been profoundly influenced by the words, contained in determinate sounds, of the language for which it was invented. The undeniable advantage of
a Begriffsschrift the fact that it can be understood by people of different languages does
not outweigh the disadvantages which it brings in from other sides.14
What is a Begriffsschrift?
73
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Jonathan Barnes
The genial metaphor dates from the 1650s: the idea behind it is older. Sir
Thomas Browne:
Certainly of all men that suffered from the confusion of Babel, the gyptians found the
best evasion; for, though words were confounded, they invented a language of things, and
spake unto each other by common notions in Nature, whereby they discoursed in silence,
and were intuitively understood from the theory of their Expresses. (1646, p. 419)
(the theory of their Expresses: the observation of their written signs.) And
my Lord Bacon, having duly cited the de Interpretatione for the Aristotelian
thesis, adds:
And we understand further that it is the use of China and the kingdoms of the high Levant
to write in Characters Real, which express neither letters nor words in gross, but Things or
Notions (1605, p. 121)
The Egyptian sages were masters of a sacred language; their script depicted
things, not sounds; theirs was a Bilderschrift or picture-script and a Bilderschrift is a kind of Begriffsschrift, a sort of ideography.
Not everyone shared the enthusiasm of Browne, or of Plotinus, for the theory of expresses;18 but the hieroglyphs were recognized, from antiquity, as an
exception to the natural rule that languages are Aristotelian. Champollion
characterized such anti-Aristotelian languages by way of the word idographique. Humboldt used ideographischin the same sense; and for a noun
he employed Ideenschrift and also Begriffsschrift(which perhaps was his
own invention).
As for Frege, in the essay on Boole he implies that the signs of a Begriffsschrift are signs of things [Sache](1880, p. 14). A sentence in Berechtigung
is more explicit:
The formula-language of arithmetic is a Begriffsschrift since it expresses things [die Sache]
immediately, without the mediation of the sound. (1882, p. 54)
What is a Begriffsschrift?
75
system of rules in accordance with which you may express thoughts immediately without the mediation of sound, by written or printed signs (p. 666).
That is to say, Frege uses the word Begriffsschrift in pretty much its standard German sense. 19
I say pretty much for two reasons. First, an ideography expresses ideas
or concepts, a Fregean Begriffsschrift does not. Rather, the expressions of a
Fregean Begriffsschrift express things (in 1880 and 1882) or thoughts (in
1904); and no doubt we should say though I do not think that Frege himself
ever said so that the signs of a Fregean Begriffsschrift express senses. Now
senses are not concepts but objects. This is no trifling fact about Freges
semantic ideas, and it might be taken to induce a significant difference
between Freges Begriffsschrift and a Champollionic ideography.
Secondly, an ideography is a script: a Fregean Begriffsschrift is a language.
Hieroglyphics is not a language: it is a way of writing Egyptian. The Fregean
Begriffsschrift is not a way of writing German: it is a language. Nor should it
be thought that a Begriffsschrift is simply a language whose script is ideographic. If a language is a Begriffsschrift, then its script is ideographic that
much is an evidence. But if the script of a language is ideographic, it does not
follow that the language is a Begriffsschrift; for from the fact that the script
of a language is ideographic, nothing follows about the semantic status of any
spoken utterances.
Freges use of the term Begriffsschrift does not, for these two reasons,
coincide with the Champollionic use of idographie or with Humboldts
use of Begriffsschrift. Nonetheless, you might reasonably believe that the
differences are less important than the similarities. Freges use of the term to
designate a language rather than a script is readily intelligible. Frege implicitly corrects Champollions false, Aristotelian, notion that linguistic signs
signify ideas or thoughts. But at bottom Champollion and Frege agree; for the
essential feature alike of an ideography and of a Fregean Begriffsschrift is the
fact that inscriptions are immediate bearers of sense.
Then why did Frege call his new language a Begriffsschrift? He called it
so because it was an anti-Aristotelian language because it was a Begriffsschrift.
This answer is comfortingly banal; and it carries a moral: the correct English translation of Freges word Begriffsschrift is ideography. The first
reported occurrence of any member of the ideographic family dates from 1823
in an anonymous review of Champollions Letter to M. Dacier:
19
Frege lectured on his Begriffsschrift almost every year of his academic life. It is natural to guess that each time he will have explained what the word Begriffsschriftmeant but
Carnaps notes (Frege, 1996) record no such explanation.
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Jonathan Barnes
In the course of his ten years lucubrations, he has produced two Memoirs to prove, that
neither the hieratic or sacerdotal, nor the demotic or vulgar, writing is alphabetical, (as, he
says, was generally thought,) but ideographic, like the pure hieroglyphics; that is to say,
that they are, like the latter, the signs or pictures of ideas, and not the representation of
sounds. But neither is this a discovery due to M. Champollion, nor are his results quite correct.20
The only sort of content or meaning possessed by the expressions of the new
language will be the sort of content or meaning which is pertinent to inference.
Frege will dub this sort of meaning conceptual content, begriffliche Inhalt.
Hence Begriffsschrift is an appropriate appellation for the new language. A
language is a Begriffsschrift if and only if the only content which its expressions possess is conceptual content.
20
anon, 1823, p. 189. With the last sentence cf. Humboldt, 1880, p. 116: Mr.Young,
who is nice about questions of literary property, admires the work of Champollion but claims
that it does no more than extend his own ideas. For the story of the decipherment, and the jealousies and intrigues which surrounded it, see Hartleben, 1906, I, pp. 345-500.
21
On the first page of his article Jourdain speaks of the Begriffsschrift; in a footnote
to the same page he uses this ideography; and thereafter he always uses ideography, except
that the title of Freges monograph remains in German. For the comments which Frege sent to
Jourdain before the publication of the article and which Jourdain largely incorporated into
the published version see Frege, 1983, pp. 116-124.
What is a Begriffsschrift?
77
This is a clear explanation clear, I mean, to the extent that the notion of
conceptual content is clear.Yet it is not only different from the Champollionic
explanation which Frege was to offer a year or so later it is not even equivalent to that explanation. For it is plain that an ideography, in Champollions
sense, need not be restricted to the expression of conceptual content (Egyptian hieroglyphics was a colourful script); nor, conversely, is there any reason
why the restriction to conceptual content should be the exclusive property of
ideographies.
It is evident why the explanation which Frege offered in 1879 was later
replaced: the phrase conceptual content, on which it is based, was soon repudiated by its inventor. But how did Frege hit upon the Champollionic explanation as a replacement? And why did he offer the 1879 explanation in the
first place? I have nothing to say on the former question: perhaps Frege looked
up the term Begriffsschriftin a dictionary, perhaps he came across the word
in a book he was reading, perhaps it was a topic of conversation at one of Ernst
Abbes intellectual soires.22 In any event, he must have been peculiarly
pleased to find that he could redefine the term in a manner which both did justice to German usage and fitted his new language to a T.
Whence came the 1879 explanation? Trendelenburg offers no explicit definition of the word Begriffsschrift. But his text gives a hint. It does not hint
at the Champollionic explanation on the contrary, the signs of a Begriffsschrift must be not only visible but also audible.23 Rather, the text suggests
something like this: a Begriffsschrift is a language in which the form and structure of the signs, uttered or written, correspond to the structure and form of
the ideas which they present. This is certainly not identical with Freges 1879
explanation; and it is certainly less than pellucid. But it is easy enough to imagine how Frege might have arrived at his explanation on the basis of what he
found in Trendelenburg. It does not follow, but it is an economical supposition, that Frege did indeed take the term Begriffsschriftfrom Trendelenburg.
Then whence came Trendelenburgs un-Champollionic notion? (It is clear
that he did not invent it.) I have not hit upon any earlier and pertinent use of
Begriffsschrift; but the word was surely calqued on idographie (or perhaps on Ideographie) and about the family to which that term belongs there
is a little more to be said.24
In his philosophical Handwrterbuch, the first edition of which was done
in 1827, Wilhelm Traugott Krug explains that
22
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Jonathan Barnes
ideographics is the art of expressing ideas the word here signifies, quite generally,
all common representations or concepts by means of a script intelligible to all men.
What is a Begriffsschrift?
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Jonathan Barnes
. 1977. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufstze, ed. I.Angelelli. Darmstadt. (3rd edition.)
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HARTLEBEN, H. 1906. Champollion: sein Leben und sein Werk. Berlin.
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KNECHT, H.H. 1981. La logique chez Leibniz: essai sur le rationalisme baroque. Lausanne.
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und 1893. In I. Max and W. Stelzner (edd), Logik und Mathematik: Frege-Kolloquium Jena
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