Suicide in Guyana:

A Parsonsian Corrective to Durkheims Theory of Suicide

Working Paper
By
Duane Edwards
University of the West Indies (UWI)
Cave Hill Campus, Barbados
2014
Abstract: By means of a Guyana case study, this paper sets out to make the point that Durkheim's theory
of suicide requires a theoretical extension to be able to account for suicide in Guyana. Data on suicide in
Guyana goes against the Durkheimian hypotheses in every way possible. Suicide occurs predominantly
among the group with the highest levels of social, political and religious solidarity. When Durkheim's
theory is extented, however, by integrating into his macrosociological framework the microsociological
processes of deviance advanced by Parsons, his theory becomes adequate to account for what would
otherwise be percieved as an anomaly.

Keywords: Suicide, Suicide in Guyana, Durkheim, Parsons, Deviance Theory, suicidology, Caribbean
Sociology, plantation theory, plantation residues

Introduction
According to statistics displayed on the website of suicide.org, Guyana ranked 6th among the countries of
the world in terms of its suicide rates. In 2002 for every 100,000 persons 27.2 persons commit suicide.
Additionally, the WHO/PAHO has identified Guyana as the country with the highest suicide rate per
capita in 2012 (WHO, 2014). In the words of the Director-General of the World Health Organisation
(2014), this level of suicide in any country is enough to brand suicide a public health problem and to
occassion studies into its causes and consequences. This paper seeks to make its contribution towards
understanding this problem in Guyana from a theoretical standpoint. In so doing it draws heavily on the
established sociological theory of suicide while modifying the theory to explain the peculiar phenomenon
as it unfolds in Guyana.
Inspite of many attempts to challenge and modify it, Durkheim's theory of suicide has for long been the
dominant theory of suicide in sociology. This, I presume,

speaks volume about the validity and

robustness of his theory. Using this as the point of departure, the following work seeks not to reject
Durkheim's theory, but to supplement and extent it drawing from the work of another respected
sociologist, namely, Talcott Parsons, thus resulting in what Liao (1990) referred to as theoretical
cumulation
This paper utilises an approach to theory development proposed by Liao (1990) whereby theories are
developed in three dimensions. The first dimension entails confirmation/falsification of theory; the second
dimension entails refining and redefining the scope conditions of theory; and the third dimension, the
introduction of paradigm shifts. In line with this approach, in the first dimension, the paper first gives a
brief outline of the development of Durkheim's theory, linking it to his general theory of social fact. It
then uses suicide data from Guyana to falsify Durkheim's theory. In the second dimension, it then goes on
to offer a brief critique of Durkheim's theory and of his conflating of necessary and sufficient causes or
cause and condition (Travis 1990). It then outlines the microsociological processes of Parsons' deviance
theory, citing it as a veritable supplement of Durkheim's macrosociological theory of suicide, thereby
redefining the scope condition of the theory in question. This macro-micro integration is not necessarily
an imposition from outside as much as it is implied (but not fullly developed) within Durkheim's theory
itself (Berk, 2006). And, lastly it proposes a new way to approach the study of suicide.
The paper uses a Guyana case study to make its point. Data on suicide in Guyana goes against the
Durkheimian macro-level hypotheses in every way possible. Suicide occurs predominantly among the
group with the highest levels of social, political and religious solidarity. When Durkheim's theory is

extented, however, and the micro-level extension integrated, it becomes adequate to account for what
would otherwise be percieved as an anomaly.

Theoretical Analysis
Durkheim argued in his famous work, Suicide that the variations in the rate of suicide in any country is
related to the level of social integration and social regulation in the country. To further highlight his
theory, he drafted a typology of suicide which differentiated among four types of suicide, namely
egotistic, altruistic, anomic and fatalistic suicides. Egotistic and altruistic suicides he attributed to the
level of social integration in a society. When social integration is low, egotistic suicide is high, and on the
other hand, when social integration is high altruistic suicide results. Egotistic and altruistic suicides,
therefore, are directly and inversely related to low and high social integration respectively. Fatalistic and
anomic suicides bear the same relationship to social regulation in a society: fatalistic suicide occurs
whenever the social regulations become too strong and anomic suicide occurs whenever they become too
weak.
This typology and full-blown theory of suicide developed by Durkheim shifted the focus from
psychological factors as explanants of suicide and brought sociological explanations into the limelight.
Durkheims theory of suicide was a special case of his general theory of social facts. He postulated that
the object of sociology is the systematic study of social facts. A social fact, according to him, is any way
of acting or thinking which exercises over the individual a coercive influence. As such, social facts can
be either material or immaterial. Those ways of acting or thinking which are static for over a long period
of time such as laws, economic structures, population, etc are material social facts, while those ways of
acting and thinking which are susceptible to change are immaterial social facts. Durkheims material and
immaterial social facts are somewhat similar to Comtes social static and social dynamics (Durkheim,
1982).
One key element of Durkheims theory is that social facts must be explained by other social facts rather
than by the sentiments or psychic states of individuals. This is why for Durkheim, suicide, which he
recognised as being stable across a long period of time, is a social fact that could only be explained by
social integration or regulation which he postulated as other social facts. In his Rules of Sociological
Method, Durkheim systematically outlined some characteristics of social facts followed by some rules
on how to go about observing social facts.

Characteristics of Social Facts

For Durkheim, one primary characteristic of social facts is its externality. As opposed to psychological
facts, social facts are external to the individual. This means that these facts exist apart from the individual
and apart from whether or not individuals become conscious of them. An example of the externality of a
social fact is illustrated by the presence of laws in any country. Those laws exists even if we are not aware
of them, thus giving rise to the now popular (and contrite) expression that 'ignorance of the law is no
excuse'.
Another important characteristic of social facts is the constraint they exercise on our behaviour. To once
more use the laws of a country as an example, even if we want to deviate from the law, the sanctions that
would be imposed on us would be compelling enough to dissuade us from the deviant behaviour. Those
constraints are there even when they are not imposed by any imposing authority such as the police
officers. A good illustration of the constraining effect of social facts would be the coercive powers that
engagement in economic actions exerts on us. This engagement calls for a high degree of economic
rationality. We cannot deviate too much from this rationality without in some way jeopardising our
economic fortunes or standing.
Another key characteristic of a social fact is its ability to lie undetected until it is deliberately aroused. In
our everyday life we are totally oblivious to the coercive power of social facts until we deliberately go
against the demands and requirements of these facts. They become recognisable when we deviate rather
than when we conform. If we choose to act consistent with the norms and values of society, we are
seldom aware of the extent to which our choice is merely a forced choice. If we choose to go against
those norms, however, we are made immediately aware of their presence.
The fourth characteristic is the independence it maintains of its refracted manifestation. This fourth
characteristic, as Durkheim (1982) himself asserted, is merely an extension (and clarification) of the
characteristic of externality.
Rules for the observation of social facts
Apart from systematically outlining some characteristics of social facts, Durkheim presents us with some
rules by which we must observe social facts. The rules are corollaries of the characteristics he outlined
aboved. The most important rule is that social facts must be treated as things, i.e. having an existence
independent of the idea men have of them (Durkheim, 1982). The following are corollaries of the above:
1. systematically discard all preconceptions
2. define subject matter

3. consider social facts from a viewpoint in isolation from their individual manifestation
With Durkheims description of what constitutes a social fact and his methodology on how we study
social facts, one gets a better understanding of how Durkheim approaches the study of suicide. For
Durkheim, suicide, because of its relatively invariant rate across a long period of time, should be
approach as a social fact. And as a social fact its cause must be sought for not in the subjective experience
of the suicide victims but in factors present in the social environment. And it is in this way that his theory
of suicide becomes connected with his theory of the division of labour. As we move away from a
mechanical type of solidarity (present in the gemeinschaft) to an organic type of solidarity (present in the
Gesellschaft), argues Durkheim, the strong social ties that bind individuals together become more lax and
flexible. For him, the type of laws present in a country could be used as an indicator of the type of
solidarity current in social system. Repressive laws are associated with mechanical solidarity, while
restitutive laws are associated with organic solidarity.
In societies with mechanical solidarity, the network structure takes on the following form:

This means that the main link between social actors is mediated by the social order (represented by the
white circle in the middle), the prevailing nomos, according to Castoriadis. But in a society characterised
by organic society the network structure takes more and more the following form:

In the first form if one member is missing from the interaction, this hardly has an impact on the system as
such or on the other individuals who make up the system. This is because of two main reasons: the first
sociological and the second economic. Sociologically speaking, the bonds that tie society together exist as
a generalised other where the individuals are submerged under the all-powerful and ubiquitous social
order. And in the economic case, because in a society held together by mechanical solidarity, there is little
differentiation and specialisation of functions, an individual is usually self-sufficient and hardly depends
on others for his/her livelihood.
These types of solidarity are illustrated by the structural changes a modern family goes through.
Oftentimes, whenever, a couple meet each other they are directly linked by the passion and desire each
expresses for the other. Based on this mutual feeling for each other they enter into a marriage contract.
This type of solidarity is an organic solidarity because the primary basis of the attachment is the mutual
feeling each party has for each other a feeling which according to Durkheim is generated by the
perceiving in each other the qualities one lacks but desires (Durkheim, 1984). After marriage, the couple
usually begets children. Oftentimes, it is their commitment to their childrens welfare and to the idea of a
nuclear family that keeps the couple together whenever the passion that brought them together in the first
instance is disipated. Therefore, while society begins with mechanical solidarity as asserted by Durkheim
and transforms into organic solidarity in order to keep itself together as it grows in number and density,
the family moves in the opposite direction: it starts with organic solidarity which is then transformed into
mechanical solidarity in order to keep the family intact even after the passion which brought the couple
together recedes.

Critical Analysis of Durkheims Theory of Suicide

According to Durkheim, in societies characterised by mechanical solidarity individual personalities are
submerged under the collective personality, while in societies characterise by organic solidarity individual
personalities are given the opportunity to come to the foreground. Though it is implicit in his theory as
argued by Berk (2006), Durkheim failed to acknowledge that it is because of this foregrounding of the
individual personality that meaning plays an important part in intersubjective relationships. This meaning
has far more causal and explanatory power vis--vis suicide than social integration. This is not to say that
social integration doesnt have explanatory power vis--vis suicide; its has power, however, more as a
condition than as cause.
Lets use the scenario of striking a match stick in the presence of oxygen to further highlight the
difference between cause and condition (Broadbent, 2008). Let's say the presence of oxygen throughout
the atmosphere is analogous with Durkheims solidarity which is usually diffused throughout the

sociosphere (of either the larger group or the subgroup), and the act of striking the match analogous to
committing suicide. Durkheims argument would be that the lighting of the match stick (commiting
suicide) is caused by the presence of oxygen (solidarity), rather than that though oxygen is not the cause
of the match stick being lit, it is a necessary condition. If we transport Durkheims theory into the realm
of physics, what he is in fact saying is that it is not the 'intentional' striking of the match stick that caused
the match stick to light but the presence of oxygen in the atmosphere. Undoubtedly, without oxygen, no
amount of scratching could lead to the presence of fire; this, however, doesnt mean that the presence of
oxygen caused the fire. Because, on the other hand, no amount of oxygen present would automatically
lead to the match stick being lit without it being scratched against a surface.
Durkheims claim that because suicide is relatively stable across time and varies across space, the casusal
factor has to be present in the kind of solidarity existing among the communities, is similar to saying that
because the rate at which matches are sold (a proxy for how many match sticks are struck) are relatively
stable across time but varies widely across space that the causal factor has to be in the presence of oxygen
throughout the atmosphere. In his own words, if the same cause is at work in every case, whence arise
effects so specifically different? (Durkheim, 2010). If social solidarity (which is usually widely
distributed throughout a network) is the cause of suicide why only a small group of people commit
suicide but larger amounts find other ways of coping with the absence of social solidarity?

Data on Suicide in Guyana

As argued by Liao (1990), theory confirmation is a never-ending undertaking. It usually entails the
continous gathering of data and evidence. Theory falsification on the other hand is usually a one-off
event. He uses a simple example to clarify this point. The proposition, 'All swans are white' must be
continously confirmed everytime a white swan is observed. Even if we observe millions of white swans in
hundreds of different situations and geographical spaces, the proposition is never fully confirmed because
there is always the possibility of seeing a black swan in the future that would render the proposition false.
The falsification of the proposition, on the other hand, required only the one instance on an observed
black swan.
The same goes for Durkheim's theory of suicide. Falsification requires only one instance of high
solidarity being associeted with high suicide. It is with this aim in mind that the data on suicide in Guyana
is presented.
The data on suicide presented here was made public by the Stats Unit of the Ministry of Health in
Guyana.

Regions

Reg 1

Reg 2

Reg 3

Reg 4

Reg. 5

Reg. 6

Reg. 7

Reg. 8

Reg. 9

Reg. 10

Population

23,623

48,727

102,791

305,619

52,376

122,432

16,750

10,023

19,477

39,955

92

130

324

65

309

15

13

26

1114

1498

Suicide Rate

Suicide rate

2,953

530

790

943

806

396

1116

per capita

Table 1. Population volume, suicide rate and suicide rate per capita by regions

Figure 1 . Number of suicide deaths by regions for the years 2003-2007

Ethnicity

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

African
Amerindian
East Indian
Portuguese
Other
Unknown
Total

12
11
156
1
16
5
201

18
2
153
0
13
0
186

15
3
140
1
12
0
171

21
5
161
0
14
1
202

12
10
155
0
9
0
186

Table 2. Suicide by Ethnicity 2003 - 2007

1537

Figure 2. Number of suicide deaths by ethnicity

Interpretation of Data
From the data displayed above, it is clear that Regions 2 and 6 have the highest rates of suicide per capita.
It is also clear that suicide occurs predominantly among the Indo-Guyanese population in Guyana and that
this ethnic group makes up the largest cross-section of the population in the two regions in question. For
Durkheims theory to be applicable to this situation, one must find comparatively low levels of social
solidarity in the two regions in question. In pursuing this course of analysis, we will test the level of social
solidarity in three areas, namely religious, political and social. Social is used here in its narrow sense as in
the social sub-system in Parsons' AGIL scheme.

Social Capital and Suicide

When the coping strategies used by resident in the various regions were collected, Regions 6 and 2 scored
highest in two important areas, those are, help from friends and gift from friends and they scored
relatively high in the other two areas, namely Borrow Money from the Bank, Assistance from other
Source, and Credit from shop. The table below, extracted from the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
(Guyana, 2011), gives the comparative performance of the ten regions in the various areas of coping
strategies.

Coping
Stategies

Reg. 1

Reg. 2

Reg. 3

Reg. 4

Reg. 5

Reg. 6

Reg. 7

Reg. 8

Reg. 9

Reg. 10

Borrow money
from the bank

2.55

17.71

8.34

12.87

5.21

15.3

4.44

5.76

17.97

Help from
friends

41.09

54.17

40.66

41.52

34.79

52.16

31.11

30.53

36.13

43.23

Assistance from
other sources

8.36

11.04

6.54

15.84

3.96

14.82

2.22

14.74

6.28

17.97

Gift from friend

22.91

35

23.03

33.85

9.17

41.35

9.44

21.05

21.99

41.15

Credit from
shop

61.09

58.96

36.11

28.28

51.88

42.39

35

68.42

43.46

34.64

Table 3. Extracted from the Guyana Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2011 2015, pg. 12.

All of the coping strategies listed above can be used as proxies of social integration.

Political Integration and Suicide

The table below presents the outcome of another test of social integration, namely, political integration of
what Durkheim refers to as the political society. The level of political integration in each region was
tested using a reverse entropy test (Coleman, 2004) on the party choices of the 2006 national election in
Guyana. Low entropy was reverse coded as high conformity, hence high political integration. From the
table below, Region 6 which has the highest suicide rate (1 for every 396 persons) also has the highest
political integration (lowest entropy :1.09). The table also shows that the regions with the lowest political
integration are also the regions with the lowest suicide rates: these regions are 7,8, and 9. Interestingly,
contrary to Durkheims theory, the region with a relatively low population density. If we single out the
region with the highest suicide rate, we see that it goes directly the opposite of Durkheims theory: it is
both the region with a relatively low population density and a comparatively high score in three important
areas of social integration, namely social, political and religious integration. When we single out the
region with the second highest suicide rate, the same characteristics can be found. It is a region with a
relatively low population density and relatively high social solidarity.
Regions

10

Suicide rate

2953

530

790

943

806

396

1116

1114

1498

1537

Political
integration

1.57

1.25

1.21

1.57

1.16

1.09

2.02

2.26

2.24

1.57

Table 4. Political integration computed as reverse entropy

Religious Integration and Suicide

As opposed to the other lagest ethnic group which has in many ways appropriated (forcefully and
otherwise) the religion and culture of the white planters, Indians have remained, by and large, Hindus and
a smaller group, Muslims (Jayawardena, 1980). This adherence to the same religion, no doubt created
high levels of religious solidarity among Indians in Guyana. Though Africans are by and large Christians,
the preponderance of the various denominations in Christianity interferes with any heightening of
religious solidarity among this group. For Indians on the other hand, this denominational variety was not
a constraining factor as the Hinduism practiced by Indians in Guyana was reconstructed as an ideological
substitute to make up for the break with India their homeland (Jayawardena, 1980). This provides
Hinduism in Guyana with a kind of ideological unity not present among Africans or Amerindians.
It might be useful here to distinguish between social (or internal integration) and system (or external)
integration. In the former case, social integration refers to the 'orderly or conflictual relationship between
actors' (qtd in Mouzellis 1997). The latter case can be highlighted by the analytic division Parsons made
between the structural requirements of any social system. For Parsons, all social systems (and any system
as a matter of fact) must fulfill four functional/structural requirements, those are: Adaptation, Goal
attainment, Integration, and Latency management. These requirements are usually refer to by their
acronym, AGIL. The function of adaptation is said to be performed by the economy, goal attainment by
the polity, integration by civil society, and latency management by symbolic culture. It goes without
saying that as much as the fulfillment of these functions are required for the life of any system, their
coordination is also equally important. So as much as internal integration is needed in any of the four
subsystems referred to above external integration among the subsystems are also of equal importance.
That said, the data above only shows that Indians have high internal integration; it says nothing about the
external integration, although it is the author's view that the Indian group has a relatively low external
integration. Their cultural subsystem has not yet been fully incorporated into the larger cultural system.
Indians, therefore enjoy high levels of social integration but low levels of system integration. The
Amerindians also enjoy high levels of social integration and low system integration but the suicide level
among the Amerindians is negligible. Therefore, the specific way in which Indians are integrated
internally and relatively disintegrated externally cannot be proffered as an explanation of high suicide
among that race group. For this reason, the author will pay no attention to system integration.
What the Guyana data shows is that Durkheims structural analysis, though necessary is not sufficient to
account for suicide in Guyana. An extension of Durkheims theory becomes necessary to account for
microsociological processes. Parsons theory of deviance offers a very interesting integration of the
microsociological and macrosociological. In this way it can act as a veritable supplement of Durkheims
theory. Durkheims theory, as stated above, posits that the transition from mechanical solidarity to organic

solidarity give rise to suicide because of the fluidity of social relations. My contention is that although
such transition is indeed necessary for there to be a rise in the suicide rate, such macrosociological
transition merely provides the occasion for, but it is not the cause of suicide. The cause of suicide must be
sought for at the microsociological level of dyadic (and triadic) relationships.

Parsons Theory of Deviance

According to Parsons, at the microsociological level of dyadic relationships, ego and alter have, in their
interaction, developed mutual cathectic attachments to each other, so that they are sensitive to each
others attitudes, i.e., attitudes are fundamental as sanctions, and that the interaction is integrated with a
normative pattern of value-orientation, both ego and alter, that is, have internalized the value-pattern
(Parsons, 1991, p. 171). Because this interaction system is characterized by the complementarity of
expectations, the behavior and attitudes of alter conform to the expectations of ego and vice versa.
According to Parsons, this simple interactive paradigm outlined above provides the setting for the
analysis of the genesis of motivation to deviant behaviour, in this case, suicide.
He goes on to say that In the event that alter fails to respond favourably to egos needs, ego has the three
options available to him: He can first restructure his own need-dispositions, by inhibition and by one or
more of the mechanisms of defence, such as simply repressing the needs which are no longer gratified. He
can, secondly, seek to transfer his cathexis to a new object and relieve the strain that way and, finally, he
can renounce or seek to redefine the value-orientation pattern with which alter is no longer conforming
(Parsons, 1991, p. 171). The three alternatives given by Parsons show clearly that he has failed to fully
explore the options available to ego. He failed to consider that as an alternative ego could retreat and
commit suicide: for ego the only way of repressing the need and destroying the cathexis is by destroying
its vessel, that is, ego himself.
He goes on to say that ego must have some reaction to the frustration which alter has imposed upon him,
some resentment or hostility. In other words the cathectic orientation acquires an ambivalent character,
there is still the need to love or admire alter, but there is also the product of his frustration in the form of
negative and in some sense hostile attitudes toward alter.
The integration of egos expectations with the value-pattern has been disturbed by alters failure to
conform to it, the pattern may be too strongly internalized for ego to be able to abandon it and accept one
in conformity with alters behavior. Here again ego may develop an ambivalent attitude structure, at the
same time adhering to the normative pattern and resenting the cost of this adherence in that it involves
him in conflict with alter and with aspects of his own personality.

Parsons went on to say that though

there are many complications involved in the possibilities of handling the strains inherent in
such an ambivalent motivational structure. For our purpose, however, they may be related to two
fundamental alternatives. The first is repression of one side of the ambivalent structure so that
only the other side receives overt expression. If it is the negative side which is repressed, ego will
continue to be attached to alter and/or to be motivated to conform with the normative pattern in
question. If the positive side is repressed, conversely ego will tend to abandon his attachment to
alter, in the sense of giving it overt expression, and to refuse to conform with the normative
pattern. The second fundamental possibility is for ego to try to find a way to gratify both sides of
his ambivalent motivation .
Suicide definitely results from the repression of the positive side of the ambivalent structure as the suicide
act involves both the abandonment of attachment to alter and a refusal to conform with the normative
pattern.
He goes on to say that gratifying both sides of the ambivalent motivation is impossible in the same
concrete relationship. This is so, however, only if we abstract that particular relationship from the broader
social multidimensional relationships. It is however possible in a more complex social system (172).
He referred to the negative component of the ambivalent motivational structure as alienative needdisposition and the positive component, conformative need-disposition.
Where the conformative component is dominant over the alienative component, we shall refer to it as
compulsive conformity, otherwise, we shall refer to it as compulsive alienation. These terms (compulsive)
suggest that ego is not only experiencing a conflict in his relationship with alter but also in internal
conflict in his own need-disposition. This leads, according to Parsons to a 'vicious circle' or cumulative
motivation to deviance, because ego, after being rejected by alter, starts to demand more acceptance than
was formerly necessary to satisfy his need disposition, but this puts a strain on alter who is willing to
provide lesser and lesser approval.
the vicious circle in the interaction of two actors is the fundamental paradigm of the genesis of the
motivation for deviant behavior. (174)
Parsons, being true to his analytic approach, went on to highlight some further differentiations of the
motivation to deviance. These further differentiations, however, are not necessarily required to make the
point being made here. This simple contribution by Parsons to deviance theory provides a valid

background against which to explain suicide in Guyana. What is important here is that though Parsons
recognised the importance of the normative structure within which actors interact, in the final analysis
deviance stems from alienative need-disposition in the personality.
From an earlier study on suicide in Guyana, the two main recurring reasons given for suicide in Guyana
were domestic family problems and problems with love relationships. From a sample of respondents,
22.4% gave family problems as the main reason for suicide and attempted suicide, while 10% gave
relationship problems as their main reasons for suicide and attempted suicide. Alcoholism came in as a
close third with 9.5% of respondents choosing that as the main reason (Danns, 2001). This paper,
however, deals specifically with the first two reasons and will demonstrate how Parsons theory of
deviance can be used as a theoretical explanation for these two reasons for suicide which occur almost
exclusively among the Indo-Guyanese population.

Suicide caused by relationship problems

In societies characterised by mechanical solidarity everyone is tied to what is referred to by Mead as the
generalised other. This generalised other takes the foreground in such societies. When there is a transition
to organic societies, it is not that this generalised other is totally eliminated, it is just that it takes a
background role. As a result, persons make up for this lost by forging more strong and interdependent
relationships with each other. Whenever there is a strain or disruption in these relationships, persons feel
abandoned to the social void created by the lack of mechanical solidarity. It is important to note that this
feeling of abandonment need not accurately reflect structural reality, it is enough that it exist only in the
individual's mind for it to have a destructive influence on the individual. This is where Parsons action
theory, influenced by Webers, is very insightful. By way of an example, lets go with the Parsonsian
assertion that a social system is made up of a multiplicity of actors fulfilling a multiplicity of roles
(Parsons, 1991). Therefore, at any one time, ego and alter, while interacting with each other in some
cathetic relationship is also interacting with a multiplicity of others, being a part of various social
networks. For example, an individual might have social relationships at any one time with family
members (mother, father, siblings, cousins, aunts, etc.), school friends, church friends, club associates,
and lovers. But a disruption in one of the relationships, lets say the lovers relationship, would be enough
to inspire in the individual a feeling of lost and abandonment and thereby drive the individual to commit
suicide. This is so even if all the other relationships remain intact.
This depends, however, on the emotional investment ego makes in that one relationship and the kinds of
returns he is expecting from it. If the emotional investment is high, his expectations of alter will also be
high, and if his emotional investment is low his expectations will be low. What this shows is that it is not

necessarily the change in the macro situation that causes one to commit suicide, but merely the
interpretation (or the social meaning) one gives to the disruption which occurs in the micro
situation(Berk, 2006). While this example highlights the origin of Durkheims egotistic suicide, the same
can be said for anomic suicide. Whenever, there is a financial crisis, it is not the crisis itself which causes
the millionaire to commit suicide, but the meaning he attaches to living at a lower level of wealth or
living in poverty.
From this standpoint all of Durkheims types of suicide look interestingly similar. Although they are all
occasioned by different external circumstances, they result from very similar internal motivation.
Egotistic suicide is caused by ego attaching a certain meaning to the break that occurs in the relationship
with himself and alter; anomic suicide by the meaning (fear, apprehension, etc) he attaches to living in an
anomic situation; altruistic suicide by the meaning he attaches to his relationship with alter; and fatalistic
suicide by the fear that he has no control over the prevailing situation. In all these cases, Durkheim was
correct when he highlighted the social conditions necessary for these types of suicides to occur. He erred,
however, when he gave to them a causal rather than a conditioning power. It does not take much thinking
to conclude that were these factors causal their very existence across the entire social network would have
given rise to a far higher incidence of suicide within the network.
Having said the above, the question still remains what are the specific elements in the cultural subsystem
of Indo-Guyanese that is so different from other ethnic groups to the extent that the presence of those
elements influences suicidal behaviour among indian actors? Speaking specifically for suicide which has
been influenced by relationship problems, the cultural elements have to do with the level of sexual
freedom among the Indo-Guyanese. As already demonstrated by the data provided, a higher level of
mechanical solidarity exists among the Indo-Guyanese group than among the other ethnic groups. Let's
take the Afro-Guyanese group as an example. This group possesses relatively high sexual freedom partly
because of the high levels of organic solidarity which prevails within the group. As a result, members of
this groups are more opened to having loose sexual relationships and therefore reacts differently when
cheated upon by their partners. For example, there is a saying among the Afro-Guyanese group that a man
should expect two things in life: 'blow and goadie'. Blow refers to sexual and marital infidelity, while
goadie is the folk term for hydrocele. The meaning and normative structure from which this saying
emerges psychologically prepares the Afro-Guyanese actors for any act of infidelity by their partners.
Another cultural pattern within the Afro-Guyanese group which plays a significant role in minimising the
suicidogenic tendencies among them is the fact that they marry at a relatively later age than their Indo-

Guyanese counterpart. This gives them the opportunity of being part of several loose relationships before
they finally settle down in a more committed one at an older age.
These two cultural factors pinpointed above are relatively absent from the Indo-Guyanese group whose
members both marry at a relatively younger age and lack the cultural values which trivialise sexual and
marital infidelity.

Suicide caused by Family Problems

One of the main differences between the Indian ethnic group and other ethnic groups in Guyana is that the
Indian group subscribes to values and norms that are inconsistent in some ways with the norms and values
of the larger social system (Smith 2001; Smith 1984). This creates ambivalence among Indian actors who
are always called upon to either acquiesce to the demands of the ethnic subsystem or to those of the larger
social system.
The Indian ethnic group has always been a more closed group than other groups in society. The reasons
for this are two-fold. In the first instance, the lack of openness results from their relationship with the
plantation system which has been theorised as a closed system by R.T. Smith (2001). Unlike the Africans
whose relationship with this system was outwardly hostile, antagonistic, and repressive and who moved
away from the system in order to be incorporated in the colonial society, the Indians who replaced the
Africans had a more settled relationship with the plantation system and developed their communities
within and around the already established total structures.
The other reason is that Indians were introduced into the Guyanese creole society at a relatively later date
than most other ethnic groups; this resulted in a comparatively later exposure to modern universalistic
values which were incorporated into the creole system. These two factors helped to reinforce family
norms based on values which were at odds with the values of the larger society. One expression of this
norm of collectivity (over that of self) is the need by the family to dictate to the individual issues relating
to sexual relationship. In an effort to maintain or augment the family status, families dictate that their
members must marry persons within their own race (or higher) and class (or higher). This normative
element takes away from the individual the freedom to make decisions relating to the most personal
aspects of their lives. Landis (1973) captured this sentiment in an empirical research he conducted in his
analysis of racial attitudes among Africans and Indians in Guyana. According to him, four-fifth of the
Indian respondents said they would object to their son or daughter marrying an African. Only 16 per cent
of the Africans said they would object to their son or daughter marrying and Indian. This quest for
control by parents in an era of individual freedom creates tension in the parent-child relationship. As a

reaction to this control, children often choose, along with any of the three options outlined by Parsons
(dealt with above), a fourth option, namely, suicide.
Although racial issues are not the only issues for which parent and children come into sharp conflict, they
are enough to demonstrate the disruption in the parent-child relationship and the pressure created when
traditional values defended by the parent comes into conflict with modern values adopted by the child.
The first point to emphasize is that the ways in which pressure is exerted on the motivational system
of the actor will vary as a function of the kind of pattern with which he is expected to conform. (Parsons,
1991, p. 181). My view is that the normative pattern in the Indian community places tremendous pressure
on Indians actors, especially the younger generation, to conform. The normative pattern of the larger
social system which runs contrary to the ethnic subsystem, also places pressure on the actor, thereby
forcing actors to choose either of the three options outlined by Parsons above, or the fourth option
advanced by this writer.
Conclusion
From the discussion above, it becomes evident that both macrosociological as well as microsociological
factors interplay to influence suicide. As argued, the macrosociological factors provide the background
against which suicide or any deviant act could occur. The microsociological factors, on the other hand,
existing at the level closer to the act itself hence has more explanatory power vis-a-vis the act. Any
explanation of suicide, therefore,

must take into consideration both macrosociological and

microsociological factors. It is only then that a complete theory of suicide can be postulated. Durkheim's
theory of suicide which focused only on the macro level of social solidarity, while necessary, is not
sufficient to account for suicide. This is because Durkheim confused necessary and sufficient causes in
his classic analysis of Suicide (Travis, 1999). He thought that the mere correlation of high levels of
suicide with organic solidarity is enough to give to the latter variable causal power. The high occurences
of suicide in Guyana, among a group which seems to possess the highest levels of social solidarity bring
into sharp focus the inadequacies of Durkheim's theory. Applying a Parsonian corrective to Durkheim,
however, completes the theory and gives it more explanatory power. This being done, suicide in Guyana,
an anomaly from the Durkheimian perspective, becomes understandable and explanable.

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