EAN UNIVERSITY

MAYRA ALEJANDRA ROJAS

MARTIN ANTHONY HIGGINS
DIPLOMACY
NOV 26th 2014

A MAD1 STRATEGY
Mankind must put an end to war or war will put an end to mankind.
John F. Kennedy, September 25th , 1961

During the Cold War, the political, economic, military informative and social conflict, born
because of the tensions that occurred in the postwar period after the end of World War II, and
between 1947 and 1989, various strategies were established that, in a certain extent, allowed to
avoid an ending with terrible consequences for the United States and Russia mainly. First, and
for some time, the US was in advantage over its nuclear capability.

Therefore, the Soviets, who faced a possible attack and failed to guarantee the deterrence of the
United States, was always in search of a strategic balance that allowed some advantage over
the imminent inferiority, as was forcing the missile crisis in Cuba, when Russia set mediumrange missiles on the island, not to protect Castro as was seen in the media and others, but with
the main objective of being able to pressure the United States from inland waters, using the
opportunity of the revolution to create a strategic balance.

This war was characterized by defined segmentation nations because of the political and
economic ideologies: capitalism and communism. Tensions between the US and Russia,
formerly allies in the struggle against fascism, were multiplied daily, but vigilance exerted by the
other countries in favor of preserving the illusion of peace settled after the war, did not allow
them to reach the peak of performance. However, conflicts were located in third countries, such
as Germany and Korea, where were developed some of the most serious due to the intervention
of international superpowers such as China and the US.

Mutual Assured Destruction

In the mid 50's tension decreases slightly due to the change in leadership in both powers, added
to the growing equality in nuclear weapons. Consequently, using the threat called "massive
retaliation" to deter the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - USSR - that not resort to
aggression, since the end of the 50s had already managed to build a large nuclear arsenal, that,
hinted at the attack vulnerability that were under US and Western Europe. This strategy led to
reconsider the consequences that were generating by the conflict, as Russia began to increase
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and strengthen its brand in the security and military
strategy; while on the other hand, US alliances with some European countries began its
deterioration and had to raise a new strategic known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

The MAD strategy began in the mid-60's, as a military doctrine based on the principle of nuclear
annihilation for both nations when the strategic stalemate, born of mutual deterrence that both
nations exercised, led to the abstention of attack by countries involved because of the certainty
of mutual destruction. That is, if one of the two countries, USSR and USA, made use of one of
its nuclear weapons to attack the other, all that could hope for would be an attack immediately
after, ensuring the destruction of both.

The use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima shocked the world, the starting point for this arms
race. MAD thus became a struggle aimed to set aside the construction of nuclear weapons
through the use of deterrence. Since moment when the USSR produced its atomic bomb in
1949 and the H bomb in the 60's, the war ceased to be a real threat to become a contrasting
ideological struggle through propaganda. By the end of the 60's, the superpowers were making
investments exceeding 50 million dollars a day on nuclear weapons, which began to make it
impossible for the parties and intolerable.

Emerges then. the concept of "balance of terror", which refers to the vulnerability on which are
all citizens of a country, which are defenseless against possible nuclear attack. The true
potential of nuclear weapons is in its capacity not to use, ie as objects at rest are categorically
threatening and somewhat abstract.

"Unfortunately, the same certainty that none of the two superpowers wanted really
push the atomic button, tempted both sides to expedite the use of atomic weapons
with negotiating purposes or (in the US) for domestic consumption, trust that the

other did not want war. This confidence proved to be justified, but at the price of
unhinge the nerves of several generations" (Own Translation) (HOBSBAWM, 1998,
pg. 233)

This feeling of imminent equilibrium becomes unstable, since it depends on a number of variable
factors such as political or technological advancement; on the one hand postures and political
ideologies of either of the two superpowers on the benefits or detriments of equilibrium strategy
may change, and with respect to technological changes, every day with greater complexity and
broader range of uses, can drive with relative ease recurrent need to leave a path of one-way
strategic as imposed by MAD and address the political questions that it creates.

The logic given by MAD is very difficult to accept, as it leads to a conviction for those who
assume a peace based on fear, which implicitly leads to the acceptance of the impossibility of
defeating the enemy. There have been many criticisms of this strategy, mainly ethical, political
and strategic. This strategy is based on inhuman assumptions about how to lead a war. The
logic used by MAD is that while most horrible may be the consequences of a war, there is less
chance of recourse to carry it out, and the more controllable those consequences are the
possibilities and risks of war occurring will increase.

In the early 70s, the president of the United States, Richard Nixon, and Secretary General of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party Leonid Brezhnev signed the Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaty (SALT) in Moscow, composed of various agreements relating to conflict as
were the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) which limited the use of these weapons for defense
and limitation in manufacturing ICBM and SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile). In this
way, and after several years of conflict, the two superpowers had made it out of the difficult
economic situation caused by the arms production.

In 1974, President Ford and Prime Minister Brezhnev signed the Agreement Vladivostok limiting
the number of Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRV) and the number of delivery
vehicles. However, during that year was detonated a nuclear device in the desert of Rajasthan,
which produced a strong shock in the international community.

Many questions arise about it and, as explained above, from many areas. It is then necessary to
ask how can be ethically justify a strategy based on the threat of massive destruction of millions
of innocent victims? At this disagreement, MAD ethical different political dilemmas presented are
added. This dilemma, arguably, is either psychological; in principle is not completely removed
from reality that is threatened with the possibility of a mutual suicide whenever it is done with
deterrence, specifically in the event that there is a direct threat to the survival of the citizens of a
country. However, no president who can establish that threat, unless be is represented in an
irrational policy, which is logically and actually impossible in the current political systems that
require project a number of conditions that enable citizens to live according to the principles of
moderation and predictability of the movements for the interests of all.

Finally, there is the criticism made at MAD strategy. Mutual Assured Destruction is a theory that
may sound very interesting and consistent during an event or academic seminar, but in reality
are almost entirely ineffective. In other words, MAD does not respond to key questions are
raised such as: what if deterrence breaks and a nuclear conflagration by someone involved? i.e.
what would happen during breaks making war except humiliation or holocaust? In conclusion,
here is the great dilemma that has MAD; It is a great political strategy designed to avoid acting,
performing practical actions, refrain from acting, not for practical action, you cannot
communicate it, if by that we mean, in terms of the relationship between strategy and policy, the
possibility of lead to its realization an abstract theory, to convey the political courses of action to
address the war.

Bibliografa
HOBSBAWM, E. (1998). Historia del siglo XX. Barcelona: Crtica. Consultado a travs de la Web el 20 de
noviembre de 2014:
http://www.fmmeducacion.com.ar/Bibliotecadigital/Hobsbawm_HistoriadelSiglo_XX.pdf
LaDiplomaciaAtomicaEnLaGuerraFriaYEstadosUnidos-3891694.pdf
EstrategiaPoliticaEnLaEraNuclear-4553535.pdf
http://anibalromero.net/Hacia.la.guerra.de.las.galaxias.pdf