Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No.

169838 April 25, 2006 DIGEST

Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,
G.R. No. 169838
(April 25, 2006)
Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their
right as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was
violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They
argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or
absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of
expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message which the expression is
sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The
words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by
the government. Also, the phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against the
government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
This petition and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During the course of
oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their
petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as
applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.
Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5,
6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the
exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.
Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances,
together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of
constitutional protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all
the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall
not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or
society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police
power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and
manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would
use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have
to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither the words
opinion, protesting, and influencing in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use
cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of
the content of the expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety,
public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and
Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of
Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in
every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving
of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the
public parks or plaza in every city or municipality that has not yet complied with section 15 of the law. Furthermore,
Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum
tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY
OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED

BILL OF RIGHTS
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELECG.R. No. (190582April 8, 2010)
FACTS:
Petitioner is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration
with the COMELEC in 2006 as a party-list organization under Republic Act 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial
membership base. In 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC upon which it was
dismissed on moral grounds.

Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First Resolution, stating that the party-list
system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nations.
Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities
is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that. That the
Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral
precepts espoused by said religions have sipped into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national poltical agenda to benefit the
nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT
sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941. Thus Ladlad filed this petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner should be accredited as a party-list organization under RA 7941.

HELD:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the resolutions of the COMELEC. It also directed the
COMELEC to grant petitioners application for party-list accreditation.
The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of
the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements
for accreditation. Nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to
register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent
with this policy of neutrality.
Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the
party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to elections be applied
to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC Leave a comment

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for
accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said
petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that
since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even
punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to
benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT
sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements
in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors
specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under
the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in
religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the
youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system
would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at
worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything
else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised
Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly
needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals
cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public
interest.

Estrada vs Escritor Estrada vs Escritor A.M. No. P-02-1651 (June 22, 2006)
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, Complainant,vs.SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, Respondent.A.M. No. P-021651 (June 22, 2006) (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P)FACTS:
In a sworn-letter complaint dated July 27, 2000, complainant Alejandro Estradarequested Judge Jose F. Caoibes,
Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253, RegionalTrial Court of Las Pias City, for an investigation of respondent Soledad
Escritor,court interpreter in said court, for living with a man not her husband, and havingborne a child within this
live-in arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor iscommitting an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the
court, thus she shouldnot be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the courtcondones her act.
Consequently, respondent was charged with committing"disgraceful and immoral conduct" under Book V, Title I,
Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5)of the Revised Administrative Code.Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered
the judiciary in 1999, she wasalready a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she
startedliving with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twentyyears ago when her
husband was still alive but living with another woman. Shealso admitted that she and Quilapio have a son. But as a
member of the religious
sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract
Society, respondent asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity withtheir religious beliefs and has the
approval of her congregation. In fact, after tenyears of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a
"Declaration of PledgingFaithfulness."
For Jehovahs Witnesses, the Declaration allows members
of the congregationwho have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. TheDeclaration thus
makes the resulting union moral and binding within thecongregation all over the world except in countries where
divorce is allowed. Aslaid
out by the tenets of their faith, the Jehovahs congregation requires that at thetime the declarations are executed,
the couple cannot secure the civil authorities
approval of the marital relationship because of legal impediments.In our decision dated August 4, 2003, after a long
and arduous scrutiny into theorigins and development of the religion clauses in the United States (U.S.) and
thePhilippines, we held that in resolving claims involving religious freedom (1)benevolent neutrality or
accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is thespirit, intent and framework underlying the religion clauses
in our Constitution; and
(2) in deciding respondents plea of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause
(from the law with which she is administratively charged), it is the compelling stateinterest test, the strictest test,
which must be applied.
Past Ruling:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is
REMANDED
to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the casewhere it will be
given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and
centrality of respondents claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to presentevidence on the states "compelling
interest" to override respondents
religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts
in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondents religious
freedom.

The Compelling Interest Test:

As previously stated, the compelling state interest test involves a three-stepprocess. We explained this process in
detail, by showing the questions which mustbe answered in each step, viz:
First
[H]as the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise of religion?"
The courts often look into the sincerity of the religious belief, but without inquiring into the truth of the belief
becausethe Free Exercise Clause prohibits inquiring about its truth as held in
Ballard and Cantwell. The sincerity of the claimants belief is ascertained
to avoid the mere claim of religious beliefs to escape a mandatoryregulation.
Second
, the court asks:
"[I]s there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement of religious liberty?"
In this step,the government has to establish that its purposes are legitimate for thestate and that they are
compelling. Government must do more than assertthe objectives at risk if exemption is given; it must precisely show
how andto what extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions aregranted.
Third
, the court asks:
"[H]as the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least intrusive means possible so that the
free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state?"
The analysis requires the state to showthat the means in which it is achieving its legitimate state objective is
theleast intrusive means, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimatestate end that imposes as little as
possible on religious liberties.
Three kinds of accommodation:
Again, the application of the compelling state interest test could result to threesituations of accommodation: First,
mandatory accommodation
would result if theCourt finds that accommodation is required by the Free Exercise Clause. Second,if the Court finds
that the State may, but is not required to, accommodate religiousinterests,
permissive accommodation results
. Finally, if the Court finds that that
establishment concerns prevail over potential accommodation interests, then itmust rule that the
accommodation is prohibited
.The cases of American Bible Society, Ebralinag, and Victoriano demonstrate thatour application of the
doctrine of benevolent neutrality-accommodation
coversnot only the grant of permissive, or legislative accommodations, but alsomandatory accommodations. Thus,
an exemption from a law of general applicationis possible, even if anchored directly on an invocation of the Free
Exercise Clausealone, rather than a legislative exemption. At this point, we must emphasize that the adoption of the
benevolent neutrality-accommodation approach does not mean that the Court ought to grant exemptionsevery time
a free exercise claim comes before it. Although benevolent neutrality isthe lens with which the Court ought to view

religion clause cases, the interest of thestate should also be afforded utmost protection. This is precisely the
purpose of thetest
to draw the line between mandatory, permissible and forbidden religiousexercise.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrativecharge
of "gross and immoral conduct
HELD:
NO. A look at the evidence that the OSG has presented fails to demonstrate "thegravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests" which could limit or overrider
espondents fundamental right to religious freedom. Neither did the government
exert any effort to show that the means it seeks to achieve its legitimate stateobjective is the least intrusive
means.In its Memorandum-In-Intervention, the OSG contends that the State has a
compelling interest to override respondents claimed religious belief and practice, in
order to protect marriage and the family as basic social institutions. The Solicitor General, quoting the Constitution
and the Family Code, argues that marriage andthe family are so crucial to the stability and peace of the nation that
the conjugalarrangement embraced in the Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness should not berecognized or given
effect, as
"it is utterly destructive of the avowed institutions of marriage and the family for it reduces to a mockery these
legally exalted and socially significant institutions which in their purity demand respect and dignity."
Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution.
It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights
"the most inalienable and sacred of human rights,"
in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend that
the states interest is important, because our Constitution itself holds the right to
religious freedom sacred.
The State must articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the exemption
which must be compelling,
for only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit thefundamental right to religious freedom.
To rule otherwise would be to emasculatethe Free Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself.Thus, it is not the
States broad interest in "protecting the institutions of marriage
and the family," or even "in the sound administration of justice" that must be
weighed against respondents claim, but the States narrow interest in refusing to
make an exception for the cohabitation which respondents faith finds moral.
In other words, the government must do more than assert the objectives at risk if exemption is given; it
must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are
granted.

This, the Solicitor General failed to

do. As previously discussed, our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutralityapproach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required bythe Free Exercise Clause. Thus, in arguing that respondent
should be heldadministratively liable as the arrangement she had was "illegal per se because, byuniversally
recognized standards, it is inherently or by its very nature bad,improper, immoral and contrary to good conscience,"
the Solicitor General failed toappreciate that
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not
offend compelling state interests.
Finally, even assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it hasto further demonstrate that the
state has used the least intrusive means possible sothat the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary
to achieve thelegitimate goal of the state, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate stateend that imposes as
little as possible on religious liberties. Again, the Solicitor General utterly failed to prove this element of the
test.Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances,
respondent Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be pena
lized as she has madeout a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedomof religion.
The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order thatfreedoms - including religious freedom - may
be enjoyed. In the area of religiousexercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an
authorityhigher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be socompelling that its violation
will erode the very fabric of the state that will alsoprotect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state
interest exists,man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant administrative
complaint is
dismissed.