Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
PART I
HELD: In this case the land in question is not private property as the
Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources have always sustained the public character thereof for
having been formed by reclamation.
It is well-settled "that no public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government."
It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state
or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.
In the case at bar, a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and OCT was issued in
favor of respondent David by competent public officials. He had
acquired the grant and title legally. The notices regarding the auction
sale of the land were published, the actual sale and award thereof to
David were not clandestine but open and public official acts of an
officer of the Government. The application was merely a renewal of his
deceased wife's application, and the said deceased occupied the land
since 1938.
(The first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII says that all lands of the
public domain x x x and other natural resources are owned by the
state,)
A grant by the government through duly competent public officials
cannot be disregarded on the premise that land not passing into
private ownership may not be disposed of by the state.
In discussing the concept of jura regalia, the Supreme Court said:
2.
As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outright
rejection, of the well-known distinction in public law between the
government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately
embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its capacity to own or
acquire property, it is not inappropriate to pursue the matter further.
The former comes under the heading of imperium and the latter of
dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands
held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may
provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural
resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the
Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of the confusion that existed
during the medieval era between such two concepts, but did note the
existence of res publicae as a corollary to dominium. As far as the
Philippines was concerned, there was a recognition by Justice Holmes
in Cario v. Insular Government, a case of Philippine origin, that "Spain
in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all
lands were held from the Crown . . ." That was a manifestation of the
concept of jura regalia, which was adopted by the present Constitution,
ownership however being vested in the state as such rather than the
head thereof. What was stated by Holmes served to confirm a much
more extensive discussion of the matter in the leading case of
Valenton v. Murciano, decided in 1904. One of the royal decrees cited
was incorporated in the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias in these
words: "We having acquired in sovereignty over the Indies, and all
lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our
royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the
royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held
without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us according as
they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or
to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for
public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which
are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition,
but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing
to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage,
confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if
necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and
unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish."
It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular Government that
"as to the unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain
the sole power of legislation is vested in Congress, . . ." They continue
to possess that character until severed therefrom by state grant.
Where, as in this case, it was found by the Court of Appeals that the
disputed lot was the result of reclamation, its being correctly
categorized as public land is undeniable. What was held in Heirs of
Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands finds application. Thus: "There
being no evidence whatever that the property in question was ever
acquired by the applicants or their ancestors either by composition title
from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title or by
any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must
be held to be public domain." For it is well-settled "that no public land
can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government." It is indispensable then that there be a
showing of a title from the state or any other mode of acquisition
recognized by law. The most recent restatement of the doctrine, found
in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, follows: "The applicant, having
failed to establish his right or title over the northern portion of Lot No.
463 involved in the present controversy, and there being no showing
that the same has been acquired by any private person from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property is and
remains part of the public domain." To repeat, the second assignment
of error is devoid of merit.
land since time immemorial and that their possession had been open,
public, notorious and in the concept of owners. The court rendered a
decision confirming the imperfect title of petitioners, holding that
petitioners had adduced sufficient evidence to establish their
registrable rights over the Lot. On appeal, the Court of Appeals granted
the petition and declared the decision of the trial court null and void. It
cited the Regalian Doctrine, enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1),
1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), which
states that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. An
applicant, like the private respondents herein, bears the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain.In the case at bar, private respondents
failed to present any evidence whatsoever that the land applied for has
been segregated from the bulk of the public domain and declared by
competent authority to be alienable and disposable. Worse, the
technical description signed by the officer in charge of the survey
division in the Bureau of Lands categorically stated that the survey was
inside Marikina Watershed. The main thrust of petitioners claim over
the Lot is that all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation
setting aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject to private
rights. They claim that the presumption of law then prevailing under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926 was that the
land possessed and claimed by individuals as their own are agricultural
lands and therefore alienable and disposable.
HELD: The Court finds the petition bereft of merit. It was erroneous for
petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public
Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands
creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable. The term public land referred to all lands of the public
domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown
open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands. The 1987
Constitution prohibits the alienation of all natural resources except
agricultural lands of the public domain. Watershed Reservation is a
Natural Resource.
It can therefore be concluded that petitioners did not acquire private
rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO 33
segregating the same as a watershed reservation. An imperfect title
may be derived from old Spanish grants or a continuous, open and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years
preceding the filing of his application as provided by Section 48 (b) CA
141. The petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable
right or title because of the failure to complete the required period of
possession, whether under the original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior
to the issuance of EO 33, or under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD
1073.
At the same time, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then,
the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public land. The period
of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer be
counted because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer
susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation.
forest land, the court a quo found registrable title in favor of petitioners
based on the Republics failure to show that the land is more valuable
as forest land than for agricultural purposes.
There was no evidence showing that the land has been reclassified as
disposable or alienable. Before any land may be declassified from the
forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the
government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not
apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in
an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. Declassification of
forest land is an express and positive act of Government. It cannot be
presumed. Neither should it be ignored nor deemed waived.
Since the land in question is unregistrable, the land registration court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the same. Any proceedings had or
judgment rendered therein is void and is not entitled to the respect
accorded to a valid judgment.
(Petitioners contention that the Republic is now barred from
questioning the validity of the certificate of title issued to them
considering that it took the government almost eighteen (18) years to
assail the same is erroneous. It is a basic precept that prescription
does not run against the State. The lengthy occupation of the disputed
land by petitioners cannot be counted in their favor, as it remained
part of the patrimonial property of the State, which property, as stated
earlier, is inalienable and indisposable.)
Thus, with reference to the Regalian Doctrine, these provisions provide that
while no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied, from the government, only alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain may nonetheless be subject of such grant. Furthermore,
the grantees of such land, even if alienable, must similarly comply with the
citizenship requirements prescribed by the Constitution.
It must also be noted that notwithstanding the application of the Regalian
Doctrine, the colonizers applying the doctrine did not intend to strip the
natives of their ownership of lands already belonging to them. This was the
ruling in the landmark case of Cario v. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 935
(1909), where the Supreme Court said: when, as far back as testimony or
memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private
ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from
before the Spanish conquest and never have been public land.
Consequently, such land, if not owned by the State at the time of the Spanish
conquest, could not have been ceded by Spain to the United States through
the Treaty of Paris, and later, to the Philippine Government by the time of the
Commonwealth.
The doctrine of immemorial possession set forth in Cario was also
recognized in the opinion defending the constitutionality Republic Act No.
8371 or Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA). In the case of Cruz v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 135385, 6 December 2000, Republic Act No.
8371 said was assailed as unconstitutional on the ground that it deprived the
state of ownership over lands of public domain and natural resources
contained therein. The votes were deadlocked at 7-7 which meant that the
validity of the IPRA was upheld. The opinion defending the validity of the IPRA
held that ancestral domain and ancestral lands are private and belong to the
indigenous people.
Cario v. Insular Government
41 Phil. 936
FACTS: An Igorot applied to the Philippine court for registration of a
certain parcel of land. The plaintiff and his ancestors held the land
since time immemorial. The Philippine government opposed such
application saying that there is no prescription against the crown, and
even if there was, the land is not registered therefore it is public land
by virtue of the Decree of June 25, 1880 which required registration for
good title; and because of such the U.S. is the owner of the property by
succeeding Spain by virtue of the Treaty of Paris.
In addition, Philippine jurisprudence has also recognized that aside from lands
held by person through immemorial possession, properties of the State, even
if administered by the Spanish colonizers, are also not considered public land.
It was not the King of Spain who was the owner of ecclesiastical property
during the time of the Spanish occupation; these lands were owned by the
Roman Catholic Church. Therefore ecclesiastical property was never public
land and could not have been transferred to the United States by virtue of the
Treaty of Paris.
Barlin v. Ramirez
7 Phil. 41
FACTS: Barlin appointed Ramirez to administer Church property. When
the former asked the latter to return the said property, the latter
refused. He said that the property belongs to the State, and the same
is granted to him by the State.
ISSUE: WON Barlin should return the said property?
HELD: Yes, he should return the said property. First, he is stopped by
recognizing that the said property was only entrusted to him. Second
the land belongs to the Roman Catholic Church. Since it belonged to
the Roman Catholic Church, it was never public and therefore it was
not included to the property ceded by Spain to the U.S. by virtue of the
Treaty of Paris.
Roman Catholic Church v. Municipal of Tarlac
9 Phil. 450
FACTS: Prior to the Revolution, the Church and cemetery is controlled
and administered by the Roman Catholic Church. The said properties
where destroyed during the revolution. On January 10, 1903, by virtue
of the circular, the Insular Government conveyed the land to the
Independent Filipino Church for the purpose of administration in favor
of the Municipality of Tarlac. The Roman Catholic Church seeks to get
the property back. The respondent said that the RCC only administered
the property but does not own it because it belongs to the State.
ISSUE: WON the property involved belonged to the State.
HELD: No, it belongs to the Church. As it was held in Barlin v. Ramirez,
even though the property is administered by the Spanish government
it belonged to the RCC and therefore private property. It could not have
been part of the lands ceded to the U.S. by Spain. And because it is not
part of the property ceded, it is not a property of the State and cannot
by conveyed by it.
Friar lands were also an exception to the Regalian Doctrine because they are
private lands at the time Spain ceded to the United States the Philippine
Islands and by the time they were purchased by the government they were
patrimonial property.1
II.
10
The term public lands refer to such lands of the public domain as are
subject to alienation and disposal by the State in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 141, of the Public Land Act. It does not include all
lands of government ownership, but only so much of said lands as are thrown
open to private appropriation and settlement. Accordingly, government
land and public land are not synonymous terms; the first is more extensive
and embraces not only the second by also other lands of the government
already reserved to public use or subject to private right. 2
GENERAL CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
As already set forth above, Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
classifies lands of the public domain as (1) agricultural, (2) forest or timber,
(3) mineral and (4) national parks. The classification is descriptive of the legal
nature of the land and not of what it looks like. Furthermore, under Section 2,
Article XII, alienable lands of the public domain under the Constitution are
limited only to agricultural lands.
This is reflected in Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Public Land
Act. While the Public Land Act generally deals only with alienable lands of the
public domain,3 it nonetheless provides the following specific provision:
SECTION 6.
The President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify
the lands of the public domain into
(a)
(b)
(c)
Alienable or disposable,
Timber, and
Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one
class to another, for the purposes of their administration and
disposition.
Notably, the power to classify lands of the public domain is vested in the
President. In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,4 the Supreme Court,
applying the foregoing provision, ruled that the classification of public land is
an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and
not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the lands remain as
unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition. This should be so under time honored Constitutional precepts.
This is also in consonance with the Regalian Doctrine that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in the land and charged with the conservation of
such patrimony.
2
3
4
NARCISO PEA, PHILIPPINE LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES 17 (1997). [hereinafter PEA, NATURAL
RESOURCES].
See Section 2 of the Public Land Act.
129 SCRA 689
11
12
13
Excepted from the Act were timber and mineral lands, which were to be
governed by special laws, as well as friar lands 9 and those which, being
privately owned, have reverted back to the government.
Friar lands, which are different from lands owned by the Church, are those
lands of certain haciendas which were acquired by the government from
religious orders/corporations or organizations in 1902. However, even though
they were bought by the Philippine Government they are not considered
public lands.10
Notably, once public lands acquired under any of the methods provided by
the Public Land Act, these are no longer to be governed by the provisions of
the said Act. Thus, it was held that where part of the public lands has been
legally appropriated or acquired by a private individual, the same shall be
deemed segregated from the mass of the public lands and no law or
proclamation thereafter made or issued relating to public lands shall operate
upon it inasmuch as the subject of such free-hold or private land is not
embraced in nor covered by the title of said Act. 11
Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain are further classified as (a) Agricultural, (b) Residential,
commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) Educational,
charitable, or other similar purposes; and (d) Reservations for town sites and
for public and quasi-public uses.
SECTION 9.
For the purpose of their administration and disposition,
the lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be
classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are
destined, as follows:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Agricultural;
Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes;
Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes;
Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.
10
11
14
Friar lands, which are different from lands owned by the Church, are those lands of
certain haciendas which were acquired by the government from religious
orders/corporations or organizations in 1902. However, even though they were bought by
the Philippine Government they are not considered public lands (Act 1120).
WHEREAS, the said lands are not "public lands" in the sense in which those words are
used in the Public Land Act, Number Nine Hundred and twenty-six, and cannot be acquired
or leased under the provisions thereof, and it is necessary to provide proper agencies for
carrying out the terms of said contracts of purchase and the requirements of said Act of
Congress with preference to the leasing and selling of said lands and the creation of a
sinking fund to secure the payment of the bonds so issued (Act 1120).
Central Capiz v. Ramirez, GR No. 40399, 40 Phil. 883 (1990).
Agricultural Lands
12
13
14
15
15
Homestead Settlement
By homestead is meant the home, the house and the adjoining land where
the head of the family dwells; the home farm; the fixed residence of the head
of a family, with the land and buildings surrounding the main house. 16
Technically, and under the modern homestead laws, it is an artificial estate in
land, devised to protect the possession and enjoyment of the owner against
the claims of his creditors, by withdrawing the property from execution and
forced sale, so long as the land is occupied as a home. 17
To qualify for a homestead settlement, the applicant must show that he is a
citizen of the Philippines over the age of eighteen years, or is the head of a
family, and does not own, or has not received by gratuitous allotment from
the government, more than twenty-four hectares of land in the Philippines.
Such homestead settlement must not exceed twenty-four hectares of
agricultural land of the public domain. 18 In order to be entitled to a land
grant, the applicant is required to cultivate and improve at least 1/5 of the
land continuously since the approval of the application and has resided
therein for at least one year in the municipality in which the land is located,
or in a municipality adjacent to the same. 19
Should the applicant comply with the foregoing obligations, he shall acquire a
vested right to the land, and will be entitled to receive a final deed of
conveyance called a homestead patent. The execution and delivery of the
patent, after the right to a particular parcel of land has become complete, are
the mere ministerial acts of the officer charged with that duty. Even without a
patent, a perfected homestead is a property right in the fullest sense,
unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is still in the
government. Such land may be conveyed or inherited. No subsequent law
can deprive him of that vested right.20
The Supreme Court has held that once a homestead applicant has complied
with all the conditions essential to a government grant, he acquires not only a
right to a grant, but a grant of the government. Thus, where all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with
through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly, with a
right to a certificate of title to said land, the possessor is deemed to have
already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of
the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title to be issued
in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts an application
therefore being sufficient under the Public Land Act. 21
16
17
18
19
20
21
16
25
26
27
17
said capital stock belongs wholly to citizens of the Philippines, may lease any
tract of agricultural public land available for lease under Chapter VI (Lease) of
the Act.28 Pursuant to Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, private
corporations may lease alienable lands of the public domain for a period not
exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years, and not to exceed
1,000 hectares. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than 500
hectares, or acquire no more than 12 hectares thereof by purchase,
homestead or grant.29
It shall be an inherent and essential condition of the lease that the lessee
shall have not less than one-third of the land broken and cultivated within five
years after the date of the approval of the lease. However, in case the land
leased is to be devoted to pasture, it shall be sufficient compliance with this
condition if the lessee shall graze on the land as many heads of cattle as will
occupy at least one-half of the entire area at the rate of one head per
hectare.30
Judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title
Under the Public Land Act, persons already in possession of alienable lands of
the public domain may, by the mere passage of time or failure to obtain title
through no fault of their own, be constituted owners of the said parcels of
land, subject to the qualifications and limitations set forth therein.
Thus, when an applicant conforms to all the requisites of confirmation
prescribed under the Public Land Act, he obtains the right to a grant without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The application for
confirmation becomes a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the
legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the
Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. 31
Susi v. Razon
48 Phil. 424 (1925)
Petitioner Susi has been in open, continuous, adverse and public
possession, personally and through his predecessors, of a certain
parcel of land since 1880. Then the Director of Lands sold the said land
to the respondent by virtue of an application for purchase filed on
August 15, 1914. The court ruled that by the time the respondent filed
his application for purchase the petitioner has already possessed the
land for thirty-four years, the petitioner already had a right over the
land. By that time ,the land ceased to be public and therefore
removing it from the disposition of the Director of Lands therefore
making the sale between the Director of Lands and Razon invalid.
28
29
30
31
18
Confirmation of imperfect title over alienable lands of the public domain may
be achieved judicially, or through administrative confirmation via the
issuance of free patents.
i.
The Public Land Act, and subsequent amendments thereto, 32 enumerate the
following requirements necessary for the judicial confirmation of imperfect
title:
(1)
The land sought to be registered must form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.
The current state of law requires that the land sought to be registered must
be alienable and disposable land of the public domain. As provided in
Presidential Decree No. 1073, which amends Section 48(b) and (c) of the Act:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and (c), Chapter VIII, of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions
shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the application himself or thru his
predessessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Thus, lands classified as forest or timber lands, mineral lands and lands
within national parks are excluded. This is due to the rule in Section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution, limiting alienable and disposable public lands only to
agricultural lands. The rule on confirmation of imperfect title does not apply
unless and until the land classified as, say, a forest land is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain. 33 There must be a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators;
and a legislative act or statute. 34 Hence, the applicant must secure a
certification from the government that the land applied for by the applicant is
alienable and disposable.35
It must be noted, however, that Republic Act No. 3872, which amended
Section 48 of the Public Land Act on 18 June 1964, added a new sub-section
thereto which recognized the right of cultural minorities to seek judicial
confirmation even over lands which were not considered alienable or
disposable. This right was limited by Presidential Decree No. 1073 which, as
earlier mentioned, reiterated that only alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain may be the subject of judicial confirmation. Notwithstanding
the enactment of Presidential Decree No. 1073, however, the Supreme Court
32
33
34
35
Republic Act No. 3872, Presidential Decree No. 1073, Republic Act 9176.
Bracewell v. Court of Appeals, 323 SCRA 193 (2000).
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Ceniza, 392 SCRA 190 (2002).
Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 (1991).
19
Aliens are barred from applying for the benefits of Chapter VIII of
Commonwealth Act 141 for they are barred by the Constitution from owning
alienable lands of the public domain. In Oh Cho v. Director of Lands,39 a
Chinese national was denied from applying for judicial confirmation because
he was a foreign national.
Similarly, the constitution limits ownership of lands of the public domain to
individuals and not corporation, even if they be Filipino corporations. Thus,
36
37
38
39
20
Under the original provisions of the Public Land Act, actions for judicial
confirmation were only allowed until 31 December 1938. Subsequent enacts
extended this period until the most recent legislation, which sets the deadline
at 21 December 2020 (Republic Act No. 9176). The filing of the application
within the foregoing time period, however, is not a jurisdictional requirement,
only a time limitation. Thus, an application filed beyond the foregoing period,
but not objected to by the State either in a Motion to Dismiss or Answer, does
not prevent the Court from granting such application. 42
ii.
Under Section 44 of the Public Land Act, any natural born citizen of the
Philippines who does not yet own more than 12 hectares of agricultural land
may apply for a free patent, provided that he, by himself, or by his
predecessors-in-interest, has continuously occupied and cultivated
agricultural land of the public domain for at least thirty (30) years since 4 July
1945. In lieu of continuous cultivation, it may be sufficient for the applicant
to show that he has paid real estate taxes on the property for the same
period and that the same has not been occupied by any other person. 43 The
land grant, conformably with the Constitution, cannot exceed 12 hectares.
40
41
42
43
21
46
47
48
49
22
agricultural lands. However, with the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657, or
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the provisions of Presidential
Decree Nos. 27 and 266 have generally been superseded. 50
B.
Sale or Lease of Public Lands for Residential, Commercial or Industrial
Purposes.
Under Chapter IX of the Public Land Act, lands intended for residential,
commercial, industrial and similar productive purposes may be disposed of by
sale or lease thru public bidding, generally following the procedure prescribed
for agricultural lands. The land or the right to lease is acquired also in a public
auction thru bidding. The difference, however, lies in the fact that where in
agricultural sales, the auction sale is thru sealed bidding with the applicant
enjoying the right to equal the highest bid, the auction sale of residential,
commercial and industrial lands is thru oral bidding where the applicant has
to outbid the other bidders in order to be successful bidder. In other words,
the applicant does not have preferential right, unless he is an applicant who
has introduced improvements on the land by virtue of a permit issued to him
by the Bureau of Lands, in which case he has the right to a sealed bidding.
Lands disposable for residential, commercial or industrial purposes are
classified as:
a.
b.
c.
b.
In case of lease, the rental shall be 3% of the value of the land plus 1% of the
value of the improvements. Every ten (10) years, the land and improvements
shall be reappraised but the rental shall not be increased by more than 100%
every ten years.
The duration of the lease is 25 years renewable for another 25 years at the
governments option.
Under R.A. No. 730 direct or negotiated sale of public land may be resorted to
if: (a) the applicant has occupied the same and has in good faith built a
50
23
residential house thereon where he lives, (b) he is not the owner of any
residential lot, and (c) the land is not needed by the government for any
public purpose.
Development of the laws governing foreshore/reclaimed areas
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 is the first statutory law governing the
ownership and disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines. Under this
law, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and all waters within the maritime zone of
the Spanish territory belonged to the public domain for public use. This law
allowed the reclamation of the sea in consequence of works constructed by
the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons. 51 It also provided
that the reclaimed land from the sea belonged to the party undertaking the
reclamation, provided the government issues the necessary permit and did
not reserve ownership over such land.
Act No. 1654 was enacted by the Philippine Commission on May 18, 1907,
which provided for the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the
government to corporations and individuals. This act mandated that the
government should retain title to, and exercise control and disposition of, all
reclaimed lands. Private parties could lease these lands only if they were no
longer needed for public use. Public bidding for the lease of these lands was
also prescribed.
Act No. 2874 also known as the Public Land Act, was approved by the
Philippine Legislature in Nov. 29, 1919. It authorized the lease, but not the
sale, of reclaimed lands of government to corporations and individuals. Under
this law, the Governor-General was authorized to: (1) classify lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable lands (2) declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession and (3) to classify further such lands into
government, reclaimed, foreshore, marshy, and other classes of lands. It also
limited alienable lands to those which have been officially delimited and
classified. The land must first be declared not necessary for public use before
allowing lease to private parties. 52
Commonwealth Act No. 141 also known as the Public Land Act, was passed
by the National Assembly which also authorized the lease, but not the sale, of
reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. C.A. No.
141 continues to be the general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain. Under this law, the President had
the same powers as those of the Governor-General under Act No. 2874
except that the President is not authorized, under this law, to reclassify
reclaimed lands into non agricultural lands. The sale of lands of public
domain was likewise prohibited, only lease was allowed subject to the same
conditions prescribed in Act No. 2874. The government could sell to private
parties only those agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes not
classified as disposable lands of the public domain.
51
52
24
State policy prohibits the sale of these lands, as they are part of public
dominion intended for public use. This state policy has been embodied in the
1935 , 1973 as well as in the 1987 Constitution. Since then and until now, the
only way the government could sell government reclaimed areas to private
properties is through a legislative enactment allowing such sale. The reason
behind this requirement is that government units and entities should not just
turn around and sell these lands to private properties in violation of
constitutional or statutory limitations.
C.
Disposition of Public Lands for Educational, Charitable and Similar
Purposes
Lands under this category may be disposed of by the Government in favor of
a province, city, municipality or other branches of the Government in the
form of donation, sale, lease, exchange, or any form.
Such lands may also be sold or leased to qualified private persons for the
purpose of founding a cemetery, church, college, school, university or other
educational institutions for educational, charitable or philantrophical
purposes or scientific research. The Secretary of the DENR has the discretion
to sell the land without auction and to waive the condition requiring
cultivation.
D.
Townsite Reservations
25
workingmens
village
and
other
b.
Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or
homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by
the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years
from the date of the conveyance.
c.
26
d.
Sec. 121. Except with the consent of the grantee and the approval of
the Secretary of Natural Resources, and solely for commercial,
industrial, educational, religious or charitable purposes or for a right of
way, no corporation, association, or partnership may acquire or have
any right, title, interest, or property right whatsoever to any land
granted under the free patent, homestead, or individual sale provisions
of this Act or to any permanent improvement on such land.
The provisions of Section 124 of this Act to the contrary
notwithstanding, any acquisition of such land, rights thereto or
improvements thereon by a corporation, association, or partnership
prior to the promulgation of this Decree for the purposes herein stated
is deemed valid and binding; Provided, That no final decision of
reversion of such land to the State has been rendered by a court; And
Provided, further, That such acquisition is approved by the Secretary of
Natural Resources within six (6) months from the effectivity of this
Decree.
e.
E.
27
(a)
(b)
Those which belong to the State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth.
These properties are parts of the public domain and are outside the
commerce of men and are therefore, not subject to private appropriation.
These properties, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance
or disposition through public or private sale.
All other properties of the State, which are not of the character mentioned
above, form part of its patrimonial property. Property of public dominion,
when no longer needed for public use or for public service, shall also form
part of the patrimonial property of the State.
According to Article 5 of the Water Code of the Philippines, the following
belong to the State as well: (1) rivers and their natural beds; (2) continuous
or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and
the bed themselves; (3) natural lakes and lagoons; (4) all other categories of
surface waters such as water flowing over lands, water from rainfall whether
natural, or artificial, and water form agriculture run-off, seepage and
drainage; (5) atmospheric water; (6) subterranean or ground waters and; (7)
seawater.
Article 6 of the same Code provides that even the following waters found in
private lands belong to the state: (1) continuous or intermittent waters rising
on such lands; (2) lakes and lagoons naturally occurring on such lands; (3)
rain water falling on such lands; (4) subterranean or ground waters and; (5)
waters in swamps and marshes.
Forest lands
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution, do
not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooden land or an expanse covered
by dense growth of trees and underbrush. 54 The fact that the disputed land
is not thickly forested and, in any event, it has been in the actual
possession of many persons for many years, it was already private land
which is better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest
purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest
classification. Furthermore, the mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it
or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry
land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and
present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals, which it is more
valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for
agricultural purposes.55
54
28
The power to convert a land which forms part of public forest into private
property is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest
Development and beyond the power of the registration court. 56 Possession
thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property.
Ankron v. Government of the Philippines
40 Phil. 10
Facts: An action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu. Its purpose was
to have registered, under the Torrens system, a certain piece or parcel
of land with the following description:
That all of said land, with the exception of a small part at the north, the
exact description and extension of which does not appear, has been
cultivated and planted for more than forty-four years prior to the date
of this decision.
That said land was formerly occupied, cultivated and planted by Moros,
Mansacas and others, under a claim of ownership, and that they lived
thereon and had their houses thereon, and that portion of the land
which was not planted or cultivated was used as pasture land whereon
they pastured their carabaos, cattle, and horses;
That the applicant now has some one hundred fifty (150) hills of hemp,
some eight thousand (8,000) cocoanut trees, a dwelling house, various
laborers' quarters, store-building, large camarin (storehouse of wood, a
galvanized iron and other buildings and improvements on said land.
The appellant contends that portions of said land cannot be registered
in accordance with the existing Land Registration Law for the reason
that they are manglares. That question is not discussed in the present
brief. The appellant, however., refers the court to his discussion of that
question in the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (39 Phil. Rep.,
560). By reference to the argument in the brief in the case, it is found
that the appellant relied upon the provisions of section 3 of Act No.
1148 in relation with section 1820 of Act No. 2711 (second
Administrative Code). Section 3 of Act No. 1148 provides that "the
public forests shall include all unreserved lands covered with trees of
whatever age." Said section 1820 (Act No. 2711) provides that "for the
purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise
specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and
mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character."
HELD: Paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 only permits the
registration, under the conditions therein mentioned, of "public
agricultural lands." It must follow, therefore, that the moment that it
appears that the land is not agricultural, the petition for registration
must be denied. If the evidence shows that it is public forestry land or
55
Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 14213, Aug. 23, 1919, 40 Phil.
10.
56
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Lastimado, 89 SCRA 648 (1979); Director of Lands v.
Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5 (1975); Bureau of Forestry v. Court of Appeals and Gallo, 153 SCRA
351 (1987).
29
public mineral land, the petition for registration must be denied. Many
definitions have been given for "agricultural," "forestry," and "mineral"
lands. These definitions are valuable so far as they establish general
rules. In this relation we think the executive department of the
Government, through the Bureau of Forestry, may, and should, in view
especially of the provisions of section 4, 8, and 20 of Act No. 1148,
define what shall be considered forestry lands, to the end that the
people of the Philippine Islands shall be guaranteed in "the future a
continued supply of valuable timber and other forest products." (Sec.
8, Act No. 1148.) If the Bureau of Forestry should accurately and
definitely define what lands are forestry, occupants in the future would
be greatly assisted in their proof and the courts would be greatly aided
in determining the question whether the particular land is forestry or
other class of lands.
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the AttorneyGeneral admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question
belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that
a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself
sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral
land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future
value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said,
many definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and
"mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think
it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof
must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which
it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It
is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or
that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or
mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or
mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by
reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable
minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently
classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that
particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or
the other purposes.
The courts, however, has the right to presume in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural
lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a
particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must,
therefore, be a matter of proof.
Watersheds
A watershed is an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by
a boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds. 57
Protection of the watersheds is an inter-generational responsibility.
Watershed reservation is not susceptible of occupancy, disposition,
conveyance or alienation.58
Mangrove swamps
57
58
30
Sta. Rosa Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 367 SCRA 175 (2001).
Collado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107764, Oct. 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 343.
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
Director of Forestry v. Villareal, G.R. No. L-32266, Feb. 27, 1989, 170 SCRA 598.
Sec 4(aj) and (an), DENR Administrative Order No. 95-936, as amended.
Republic v. Court of Appeals and De la Rosa, G.R. No. L-43938, April 15, 1980, 160
SCRA 228.
Cham v. Pizarro, A.C. No. 5499, August 16, 2005.
G.R. No. 156951, Septempber 22, 2006.
OSWALDO D. AGCAOLI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE AND RELATED LAWS (LAND TITLES AND
DEEDS) 225-235, (2006 ed.). [hereinafter AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE]
299 SCRA 199 (1998).
31
Facts: Republic Act No. 1899 ("RA 1899"), which was approved on June
22, 1957, authorized the reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered
cities and municipalities. Section I of said law, reads:
Sec. 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and chartered
cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation
by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering
them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper
and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and
chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of
Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
On May 6, 1958, invoking the a forecited provision of RA 1899, the
Pasay City Council passed Ordinance No. 121, for the reclamation of
Three Hundred (300) hectares of foreshore lands in Pasay City,
empowering the City Mayor to award and enter into reclamation
contracts, and prescribing terms and conditions therefor. The said
Ordinance was amended on April 21, 1959 by Ordinance No. 158,
which authorized the Republic Real Estate Corporation ("RREC") to
reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain terms and
conditions. Certain portions of the said lands are submerged lands
On April 24, 1959, Pasay City and RREC entered into an Agreement for
the reclamation of the foreshore lands in Pasay City.
The Republic of the Philippines filed an Amended Complaint
questioning subject Agreement between Pasay City and RREC (Exhibit
"P") on the grounds that the subject-matter of such Agreement is
outside the commerce of man, that its terms and conditions are
violative of RA 1899 with regard to the phrase foreshore lands
Issue: WON the lands in dispute are considered foreshore lands and
cannot, therefore, be alienated
HELD: The CA ruled erroneously when it opinioned that under RA 1899,
the term "foreshore lands" includes submerged areas. As can be
gleaned from its disquisition and rationalization aforequoted, the
respondent court unduly stretched and broadened the meaning of
"foreshore lands", beyond the intentment of the law, and against the
recognized legal connotation of "foreshore lands". Well entrenched, to
the point of being elementary, is the rule that when the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or
construction, but only for application. So also, resort to extrinsic aids,
like the records of the constitutional convention, is unwarranted, the
language of the law being plain and unambiguous. Then, too, opinions
of the Secretary of Justice are unavailing to supplant or rectify any
mistake or omission in the law. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands"
refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and
that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. (Words
and Phrases, "Foreshore")
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part
of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward
32
margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high
tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. (Webster's Third New
International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so
doing, we cannot broaden its meaning, much less widen the coverage
thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas,
it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide
could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term
"foreshore lands.
Submerged lands
Until reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the
Constitution, waters. . . owned by the State forming part of the public
domain and consequently inalienable. These areas, after reclamation, can be
classified as public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the
only natural resources that the State can alienate. Thereafter, the
government may declare these lands no longer needed for public service and
therefore, alienable and disposable lands open disposition. 66
Republic Act 4850 was passed on June 22, 1957 which authorized the
reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities and municipalities. On
January 11, 1973, Presidential Decree No. 3-A was issued, repealing all laws
on reclamation of areas under water and vesting solely in the government the
power to reclaim lands.
On February 4, 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1084 was issued, creating the
Public Estates Authority (PEA) which was renamed as Philippine Reclamation
Authority in 2004. It authorized PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged
areas of the public domain. It also empowers PEA to hold lands of public
domain even in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by
statute. Thus, PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as title to lands of
public domain.
Executive Order 525 was issued on 1979 which designated PEA as the
national governments implementing arm to undertake all reclamation
projects of the government which shall be undertaken by the PEA or
through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity. Under
such contract, reclamation services rendered to PEA by private parties shall
be compensated. PEA becomes primarily responsible for integrating,
directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects and on behalf of the
National Government.
However, reclaimed areas do not automatically become alienable or
disposable upon acquisition by the PEA. Two official acts are needed before
reclaimed lands become alienable lands of public domain. First, there must be
a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to
disposition; and second, there must be a declaration that these lands are not
66
33
needed for public service. Absent these two official acts, lands reclaimed by
PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain.
Nevertheless the requirement of a legislative enactment allowing the sale of
reclaimed disposable lands still applies to reclaimed areas of the PEA. The
PEAs power is further subject to the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of public domain.
However, in a May 6, 2003 Resolution, the court clarified that reclaimed
lands of the public domain if sold or transferred to a public or municipal
corporation for a monetary consideration become patrimonial property[and]
may be soldto private properties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified
corporations.67
Lakes
Republic Act No. 4850 prescribes that lands located at and below the
maximum lake level of elevation of the Laguna de Bay are public lands which
form part of the bed of the said lake.68 Areas forming part of the Laguna de
Bay are neither agricultural nor disposable lands of the public domain.
Navigable rivers
If the land forms part of the bed of a navigable stream, creek or river, the
decree and title in the name of the applicants would not give them any right
or title to it. Like the rest of the non-disposable properties, a land registration
court has no jurisdiction over navigable rivers and cannot validly adjudge the
registration of title thereof in favor of a private applicant. Ownership of a
navigable stream may not be acquired under a free patent and the issuance
of the corresponding certificate of title does not change its public character. 69
It is part of public property and cannot be acquired by adverse possession. 70
Creeks
A creek has been defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. Under the Civil Code, a creek,
including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. 71 It is only
after the government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse
possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title. 72
67
68
69
70
71
72
34
Private Lands
A.
75
35
land and property laws of Spain, ipso jure, took effect therein. This is the
Regalian Doctrine.76
The Crown Lands were distributed to the inhabitants in accordance with the
laws of Spain, principally the laws of the Indias (Recopilacion de las Leyes de
Indias),77 and became lands of private ownership or private lands.
This transformation transpired once more during the American Occupation of
the Philippine Islands in 1898, by way of (1) State Grant the Homestead
Patent; (2) Sale the Sales Patent; and (3) Administrative and Judicial
Confirmation of Imperfect title the Free Patent. All Free Patent were available
as they are now, under the Public Land Act. 78
Agricultural lands of the public domain are deemed alienable and disposable
and by the foregoing methods of land acquisition, public lands ceased as
such and became private lands of the purchaser, or occupants and
possessors.79
Therefore, private land, may be as it has been, defined as any land of
private ownership. This includes both lands owned by private individuals and
lands which are patrimonial property of the state or of municipal
corporations.80 Property of private ownership includes (1) the patrimonial
property of the State, and (2) property belonging to private persons, either
individually or collectively.81 Most of these private lands emanated from
private agricultural lands that had been, or may still be, sold or granted by
the State to individual citizens, associations and corporation qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain and subject to the limitations
provided by law.82
Private property and patrimonial property
Private property connotes ownership of an immovable or real property,
and/or a movable or personal property. As abovementioned, it specifically is
comprised of all property that belongs to private persons, natural or juridical,
either judicially or collectively. And real property is described in the Civil Code
as (1) the immovable or property which consists principally of land; (2)
those movables as the buildings, trees plants, statues or other objects
placed on land that reveals the intention to have them permanently
attached to the land; and (3) the real rights over the immovable property. 83
Property ownership, or land of private ownership and private property are
synonymous. It also means, and includes the patrimonial property of the
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
36
86
87
88
89
Id.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES & JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
VOL. II 32 (1963).
Id. at 34.
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 170.
G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000.
212 U.S. 449.
37
Constitutional Restrictions
As a general rule, only the following may acquire private lands pursuant to
Section 7:
(1)
(2)
(3)
38
in favor of one who is not qualified. 94 In the case of Moss v. Director of lands,
the Ordinance appended to the 1935 Constitution provided that until final
withdrawal of the United States, Americans and American Corporations
enjoyed the same civil rights as Filipino citizens and could therefore acquire
private lands until July 4, 1946.95
As mentioned previously, private land means any land of private ownership.
This includes both lands owned by private individuals and lands which are
patrimonial property of the State or of municipal corporations. 96 In the case of
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, the term private agricultural lands meant
any private land that was neither timber nor mineral land. 97 Again, the
capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain. This is because aliens were
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain (since the 1935
Constitution), aliens, whether individuals or corporations, were also
disqualified from acquiring private lands. The prohibition applies even to a
regime of conjugal partnership in marriage. Thus, an alien spouse in a
conjugal partnership does not have the right to give or not to give consent in
the disposition of the land.98
Exception for former Filipino Citizens:
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of sec. 7 of this article, a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to the
limitations provided by law.
A 1981 amendment to the 1973 Constitution created another exception in
favor of a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship.
He or she may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his
residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide. This now embodied in
Sec. 8. The 1987 provision, however, not longer contains the phrase for use
by him as residence.99
A Filipino corporation can acquire land
Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution makes the capacity to acquire private land
dependent on capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private
corporations can hold lands of the public domain only by lease. They are
thus not in the same position as aliens who cannot even lease land of the
public domain.100 By analogy, Filipino Corporations, as a creation of the
legislature (The Corporation Code, Batas Pambansa 68) also has Filipino
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
39
(2)
(3)
(4)
40
upon the making of the award or in not more than ten equal annual
installments from the date of the award. It is required that the purchaser shall
have not less than one-fifth of the land cultivated within five years from the
date of the award, and before any patent is issued, he must show actual
occupancy, cultivation and improvement of at least one-fifth of the land until
the date of final payment.105
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila
79 Phil. 461
FACTS: Krivenko bought a residential lot from Magdalena Estate, Inc., in
December of 1941, the registration of w/c was interrupted by the war.
In May 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but it was
denied on the ground that Krivenko is an alien. Krivenko then brought
the case to the CFI of Manila by means of a consulta. The court
rendered judgment sustaining the refusal.
HELD: The 1935 Constitution classified lands namely as agricultural,
timber and mineral since this was the basic classification existing in
laws and jurisprudence at that time. The phrase public agricultural
lands includes residential lot & their alienation is limited to Filipino
citizens. To construe this phrase as not including residential lots or
lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that aliens may freely
acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for
themselves but also other forms of public agricultural lands.
Director of Lands v. Lood
124 SCRA 460
FACTS: Quezon City Development & Financing Corp filed an application
with the CFI of Rizal, seeking the registration of title under Act. 496,
claiming to be the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land in Taytay,
Rizal. The Director of Lands, filed an opposition, on the ground that the
applicant has no sufficient title to the land, not having acquired the
same by composition title from the Spanish Govt or by possessory
information title pursuant to Royal Decree of February 13, 1894. The
CFI ruled that the applicant has a registrable title over the parcel of
land.
HELD: The applicant, being a juridical person, is disqualified to apply
subject property for registration. Limiting the mode of acquisition of
corporations, by purchase, but not by homestead, free patent or
judicial confirmation, does not offend the Constitution. Corporations
were never intended to acquire lands by such modes. Further,
corporations, as product of statutory action, the legislative can define
the powers of a corporation.
C.
Modes of Acquisition
41
well illustrated by what actually took place in the Philippines after its
discovery by Magellan in 1521. It was held by the discovery and conquest of
the entire Philippine territory became the exclusive patrimony and dominion
of the Spanish Crown. With this as basis, the Spanish government began to
handle the direct distribution of public lands to settlers, vassals and other
people by the issuance of royal grants and concessions in varied forms.
It seems but only logical that tile to land must emanate from some source for
it cannot just issue forth from nowhere. And consistent with the general
tendency observed in different countries, the government or head of state is
vested with such power to make public land grants according to existing
statutes.
Republic v. Lee
197 SCRA 13
FACTS: On June 29, 1976, Lee filed before the CFI of Pangasinan, an
application for registration in her favor of a parcel of land at Magaldan,
Pangasinan. The Director of Lands, filed an opposition, alleging that
neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have acquired
the land under any of the Spanish titles or any other recognized mode
for the acquisition of title. The CFI rendered judgment confirming the
title of the applicants over the said parcel of land pursuant to the Land
Registration Law.
ISSUE: WON public land can be acquired by a private person without
any grant.
HELD: No public land can be acquired by private persons without any
grant, express or implied, for government. A grant is conclusively
presumed by law when the claimant, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, has occupied the land openly, continuously,
exclusively, and under a claim of title since July 26, 1894 or prior
thereto.
(1)
The Spanish Government, during their colonial rule, issued Royal Grants as
title to the lands, to discoverers, settlers, vassals, and other people in varied
forms.
During the Commonwealth Government, the Public Land Act was passed and
by virtue thereof public agricultural lands were distributed to citizens under
certain conditions specified therein. These lands so distributed became
ultimately the property of the distributees.
In, Aureus v. Secretary of Agriculture & Commerce,107 it was held that the
mere filing by an individual of an application for a permit to occupy a piece of
public land does not create an obligation on the part of the administrative
officer concerned to grant his application. If it does, the Director of Lands or
106
107
42
Prescription
Land ownership and other real rights or obligations may be acquired through
the lapse of time, in the manner and action laid down by law. 111 All things
which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless
otherwise provided. Thus, the peaceful and adverse possession of land that is
continuous and uninterrupted for a certain period of time may be converted
into ownership of the land. 112 However, property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.113
The claim of ownership114 must be in the concept of owners, adverse, public
and peaceful.115 Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. 116
The law fixes ten (10) years by ordinary prescription, that is, without need of
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
24 Phil. 193.
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND, supra note 199, at 16.
Id. at 17.
CIVIL CODE, art. 1106.
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 53.
CIVIL CODE, art. 1113.
Supra note 246.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 3, at 17.
DESIDERIO P. JURADO, COMMENTS AND JURISPRUDENCE ON OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS 653 (7 th
rev. ed, 1980). [hereinafter JURADO, OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS].
43
title and good faith,117 and thirty (30) years by extraordinary prescription,
without need of title and good faith.118
For ordinary prescription, the following requisites must concur: (1) Capacity to
acquire by prescription; (2) the object must be susceptible of prescription; (3)
The possession must be in concept of owner, public, peaceful, continuous and
uninterrupted; (4) The possession must be in good faith; (5) The possession
must be by virtue of a just title; and (6) The period of possession must be 4
years if the object is movable or ten years if it is immovable.
In extraordinary acquisitive prescription, the following must concur: (1)
Capacity to acquire by prescription; (2) The object must be susceptible of
prescription; (3) The possession must be in the concept of owner, public,
peaceful, continuous, and uninterrupted; and (4) The period of possession
must be 8 years if the object is movable or 30 years if it is immovable. 119
The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the
person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could
transmit his ownership.120 In its negative aspect, it consists in the ignorance
of the possessor of any flaw which would invalidate his title or mode of
acquisition.121
For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant
came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized
by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor
was not the owner or could not transmit any right. 122 Its requisites are: (1) It
must be just; (2) it must be true; (3) it must be valid; (4) it must be proved. 123
Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion
over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own
property. The general rule is that the possession and cultivation of a portion
of a tract under claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if
the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another. 124 However, the
period of possession in acquisitive prescription may be interrupted naturally,
civilly, or by express or tacit recognition by the possessor of the ownership. 125
In extinctive prescription, interruption may occur (1) when they are filed
before the court, (2) when there is a written extra-judicial demand by the
creditors, and (3) when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by
the debtor.126 With such conversion, property may now fall within the
contemplation of private lands under Section 14(2), and may be registered
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
44
130
131
132
45
Accretion
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited. 139 It is the act by which
the land bordering a stream or other body of water increases its area by the
gradual deposit of soil or seaweeds by the current of the river or other natural
process.140
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that to the owners of lands adjoining
the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the waters. As a mode of acquiring property
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
46
under Article 457 of the Civil Code, there are three requisites which must
concur before an accretion is said to have taken place:
(a)
(b)
(c)
These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to
owners of lands adjoining he banks of rivers or streams any accretion
gradually received from the effects of the current waters. 142 Alluvion is the
soil deposited on the estate fronting the river bank. 143
In order to acquire land by accretion, there should be a natural and actual
continuity of the accretion to the land of the riparian owner. 144 The
requirement that the deposit should be due to the effects of the current of
the river is indispensable. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. 145 A
riparian owner then does not acquire the additions to his land caused by
special works expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion. 146
There must be evidence to prove that the addition to the property was made
gradually through the effects of the current of the river. 147
In the absence of evidence that the change in the course of the river was
sudden or that it occurred though avulsion, the presumption is that the
change was gradual and caused by accretion and erosion. 148 Acts of
possession exercised over bordering land are always understood legally to
cover that portion added to the property by accretion. 149 One must prove his
claim by a preponderance of evidence.150
The fact that the accretion to ones land used to pertain to anothers estate,
which is covered by a Torrens certificate of title, cannot preclude the former
from being the owner thereof. Registration does not protect the riparian
owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes
in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers
may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of
the owners of the banks. Such accretions are natural incidents to land
bordering on running streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that
respect are not affected by the Property Registration Decree. 151
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
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Reclamation157
This method suggests the filling of submerged land by deliberate act and
reclaiming title thereto. In the Philippines, there is no law, express or implied
which grants to owners of adjacent upland the right to fill the adjacent land
under water. Reclaimed lands may however, be declared by the government
as property of the adjoining owners and as such increment thereto only when
it is no longer necessary for public use. Reclamation projects may be
undertaken for the establishment of residential, commercial or industrial
sites, construction or extension of roads, wharves or piers, airfields, parks,
playgrounds, plazas, market places, etc.
Republic Act No. 2264, entitled AN ACT AMENDING THE LAWS GOVERNING
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BY CREATING THEIR AUTONOMY AND REORGANIZING
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS, does not expressly authorize local
governments to undertake or carry out reclamation projects. However, such
authority is believed to be included in the general authority granted local
152
153
154
155
156
157
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governments to undertake and carry out any public works projects. This
view is grounded on Section 12 of said Act. 158
The reclamation projects in Manila Bay and the coastal municipalities
extending from Pasay City to Cavite City are being undertaken pursuant to
the authority granted by R.A. 2264 to local governments.
Under R.A. 1899, the National Government granted to all municipalities and
chartered cities, the authority to carry out at their own expense, the
reclamation by dredging, filling, and other means of any foreshore lands
bordering on them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair
proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities or
chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Minister of Finance,
the Minister of Public Works and Highways. Any and all such lands reclaimed
will become property of the respective municipalities and chartered cities; but
the new foreshore along the reclaimed areas shall continue to become
property of the National Government.
(5)
Voluntary Transfer
A private grant is the usual means by which title to land is transferred by the
owner himself or his duly authorized representative. Here the consent or
cooperation of the grantor is an essential element. This transfer is given
effect by the voluntary execution of deed of conveyance in certain prescribed
form, completed by the recording or registration thereof in a public office. The
purpose of such registration is to serve public notice at least constructively
and thereby legally bind third persons. Under the Torrens system, it is the
registration that is the operative act to convey the land and affect title
thereto. In other words, the legal title to the land does not pass until the
conveyance shall have been duly registered or made of public record. 159
Filamore called this transfer Tradition. Tradition is the act of delivering the
thing sold to the buyer or vendee by (a) turning over material possession of
the thing sold, or (b) symbolic transfer of ownership thereof. 160 The former
transfers actual and physical control over the buyer, while the other is done
by executing a public instrument. Filmore said that, according to Melquiades
J. Gamboa, the requisites of tradition are: (1) the transferor is the owner of
the property transferred and has the capacity and intention to grant; (2) the
transferee has the capacity to acquire the property; (3) there is justa causa or
valid means of transfer such as the contract of sale, barter or legacy; and (4)
158
159
160
R.A. No. 2264, Sec. 12 provides that the implied power of a province, a city or
municipality shall be liberally construed in its favor, and that any fair and reasonable doubt
as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the local government and
it shall be presumed to exist. It also provided that the general welfare clause shall be
liberally interpreted in case of doubt so as to give more power to local governments in
promoting the economic condition, social welfare and material progress of the people in
the community.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 3, at 20.
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 53.
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Involuntary Alienation
This method of transfer does not require the consent or cooperation of the
owner of the land, and, in fact, is usually carried out against his will. For the
more common forms of involuntary alienation, we have them in connection
with judgments of the courts in expropriation or condemnation proceedings.
Land is forcibly acquired by the state through the exercise of eminent
domain, or by way of escheat or forfeiture. It may also be confiscated, seized
or attached, and subsequently sold at public auction to the highest bidder.
We have the execution sale by the sheriff to satisfy a money judgment, the
tax sale to satisfy unpaid taxes and penalties, the auction sale by a public
officer in foreclosure of mortgage. Some authorities even consider the sale of
property under special order of the court for and in behalf of a minor or a
person under legal disability as falling within the category of involuntary
alienation in the same way as a sale by judicial administrator or executor of
an estate of a decedent. Under this mode of acquiring land, the purchasers
are generally subject to the rule of caveat emptor. 162
(7)
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adulterous children succeed in this order. Finally, the State inherits when the
ascendants and descendants of the testator do not exist. 166
Professor Gamboa summarizes the order of intestate succession, thus: (1)
legitimate children and their descendants; (2) legitimate parents and
descendants; (3) illegitimate children and their descendants; (4) surviving
spouse without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters; (5) collateral
relatives within the fifth (5th) degree; and (6) the State. 167
In Austria v. Reyes 168 the Supreme Court enunciated that testacy is favored
and doubts are resolved on the side, especially where the will evinces an
intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate.
Furthermore, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided
and the wishes of the testator allowed prevailing, that we could even vary the
language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect.
Succession by Devise
One succeeds by devise when he acquires land from one who may not be a
relative, if he is named by the latter in his last will and testament to succeed
as such.
Even a stranger may acquire title by devise if appropriate
disposition has been made in his favor by the testator in the latters will.
Where the heirs entitled would so prefer, title to land under this method may
formally be transferred without proceeding in court. Under the provisions of
Rule 74, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, they may agree upon an
extrajudicial settlement or partition of the estate of the decedent, provided
there are no debts left by him which remain unsettled.
166
167
168
51